REDUCTIONISM

Reductionism refers to several related but different philosophical positions regarding the
connections between phenomena, or theories, "reducing" one to another, usually considered
"simpler" or more "basic".[1] The Oxford Companion to Philosophysuggests that it is "one of the
most used and abused terms in the philosophical lexicon" and suggests a three part division:[2]

1. Ontological reductionism: a belief that the whole of reality consists of a minimal number
of parts

2. Methodological reductionism: the scientific attempt to provide explanation in terms of

ever smaller entities

3. Theory reductionism: the suggestion that a newer theory does not replace or absorb the
old, but reduces it to more basic terms. Theory reduction itself is divisible into three:
translation, derivation and explanation.[3]
Reductionism can be applied to objects, phenomena, explanations, theories, and meanings.[3][4][5]

Reductionists are those who take one theory or phenomenon to be reducible to some other theory
or phenomenon. For example, a reductionist regarding mathematics might take any given
mathematical theory to be reducible to logic or set theory. Or, a reductionist about biological
entities like cells might take such entities to be reducible to collections of physico-chemical
entities like atoms and molecules. The type of reductionism that is currently of most interest in
metaphysics and philosophy of mind involves the claim that all sciences are reducible to physics.
This is usually taken to entail that all phenomena (including mental phenomena like
consciousness) are identical to physical phenomena. The bulk of this article will discuss this
latter understanding of reductionism.

In the twentieth century, most philosophers considered the question of the reduction of theories
to be prior to the question of the reduction of entities or phenomena. Reduction was primarily
understood to be a way to unify the sciences.