CASE1

G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991

RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,
vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION ON APPOINTMENT, and HON.
GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents.
Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.
Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.

PARAS, J.:p
We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While ostensibly only legal issues are
involved, the Court's decision in this case would indubitably have a profound effect on the political aspect of
our national existence.
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:
There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and six Commissioners
who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at
least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and must not have been candidates
for any elective position in the immediately preceding -elections. However, a majority thereof,
including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the
practice of law for at least ten years. (Emphasis supplied)
The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of the 1973 Constitution which similarly
provides:
There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a Chairman and eight Commissioners
who shall be natural-born citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five
years of age and holders of a college degree. However, a majority thereof, including the Chairman, shall be
members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.' (Emphasis
supplied)
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what constitutes practice of law as a legal
qualification to an appointive office.
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the application of legal principles and
technique to serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court,
or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the preparation of pleadings,
and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of
legal instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all advice
to clients and all actions taken for them in matters connected with the law. An attorney engages
in the practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held out to be-an attorney, using a
letterhead describing himself as an attorney, counseling clients in legal matters, negotiating with
opposing counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for services rendered
by his associate. (Black's Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land Title Abstract and Trust Co. v.
Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650) A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he:
... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising person, firms, associations or
corporations as to their rights under the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an
advocate in proceedings pending or prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee,
board, body, committee, or commission constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies
and there, in such representative capacity performs any act or acts for the purpose of obtaining
or defending the rights of their clients under the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a
representative capacity, engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights under the
law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts either in court or outside of court for that
purpose, is engaged in the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley and Co., 102
S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105 Phil. 173,176-177) stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts,
and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services
contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting
proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work
done involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and
conditions. (5 Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)
Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of
any court and having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing,
1
 the giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of
legal instruments covering an extensive field of business and trust relations and other
affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court proceedings, they
are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree
of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to
difficult and complex situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law
bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far
as concerns the question set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work of
the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which involves advice and drafting
of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold
customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of
sound moral character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which
rests upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 [1953 ed.] , p. 665-
666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v.
Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,144). (Emphasis ours)
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation briefing for new lawyers (1974-1975)
listed the dimensions of the practice of law in even broader terms as advocacy, counselling and public service.
One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of employment in the profession. If what
he does exacts knowledge of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in the active
practice of their profession, and he follows some one or more lines of employment such as this
he is a practicing attorney at law within the meaning of the statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW
312)
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure,
knowledge, training and experience. "To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which
device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23)
The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it has adopted a liberal interpretation of
the term "practice of law."
MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a manifestation which I
forgot to do during our review of the provisions on the Commission on Audit. May
I be allowed to make a very brief statement?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
The Commissioner will please proceed.
MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of the
Commission on Audit. Among others, the qualifications provided for by Section I
is that "They must be Members of the Philippine Bar" I am quoting from the
provision "who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years".
To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members of the Bar who are
now employed in the COA or Commission on Audit, we would like to make the clarification that
this provision on qualifications regarding members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or
involve actual practice of law outside the COA We have to interpret this to mean that as long as
the lawyers who are employed in the COA are using their legal knowledge or legal talent in their
respective work within COA, then they are qualified to be considered for appointment as
members or commissioners, even chairman, of the Commission on Audit.
This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional Commissions and Agencies and
we deem it important to take it up on the floor so that this interpretation may be made available
whenever this provision on the qualifications as regards members of the Philippine Bar
engaging in the practice of law for at least ten years is taken up.
MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a lawyer is
equivalent to the requirement of a law practice that is set forth in the Article on
the Commission on Audit?
MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA, although it is
auditing, will necessarily involve legal work; it will involve legal work. And,
therefore, lawyers who are employed in COA now would have the necessary
qualifications in accordance with the Provision on qualifications under our
provisions on the Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the answer is yes.
MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this is equivalent to
the practice of law.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Thank you.
... ( Emphasis supplied)
Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among others, that the Chairman and two
Commissioners of the Commission on Audit (COA) should either be certified public accountants with not less
2
than ten years of auditing practice, or members of the Philippine Bar who have been engaged in the practice of
law for at least ten years. (emphasis supplied)
Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many ways synonymous with the word
"lawyer." Today, although many lawyers do not engage in private practice, it is still a fact that the majority of
lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law Careers [VGM Career Horizons:
Illinois], [1986], p. 15).
At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as commonly understood, means "an
individual or organization engaged in the business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice
alone are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called "firms." The firm is usually a
partnership and members of the firm are the partners. Some firms may be organized as professional
corporations and the members called shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm are the
experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more inexperienced salaried attorneyscalled
"associates." (Ibid.).
The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law practice is essentially tautologous,
unhelpful defining the practice of law as that which lawyers do. (Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal
Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of law is defined as the performance of
any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly understood to be the practice of law. (State Bar Ass'n v. Connecticut
Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870 [1958] [quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn.
325, 22 A.2d 623, 626 [1941]). Because lawyers perform almost every function known in the commercial and
governmental realm, such a definition would obviously be too global to be workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).
The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the most publicly familiar role for lawyers
as well as an uncommon role for the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in courtrooms, and a large
percentage spend their entire practice without litigating a case. (Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do
continue to litigate and the litigating lawyer's role colors much of both the public image and the self perception
of the legal profession. (Ibid.).
In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects history, not reality. (Ibid.). Why is this
so? Recall that the late Alexander SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the importance of a lawyer as
a business counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are still uninformed laymen whose concept of an attorney
is one who principally tries cases before the courts. The members of the bench and bar and the informed
laymen such as businessmen, know that in most developed societies today, substantially more legal work is
transacted in law offices than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation and non-
litigation work also know that in most cases they find themselves spending more time doing what [is] loosely
desccribe[d] as business counseling than in trying cases. The business lawyer has been described as the
planner, the diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t] need not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in
medicine, surgery should be avoided where internal medicine can be effective." (Business Star, "Corporate
Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig engage in a number of legal tasks, each
involving different legal doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other interested
parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized practice wig usually perform at least some legal
services outside their specialty. And even within a narrow specialty such as tax practice, a lawyer will shift from
one legal task or role such as advice-giving to an importantly different one such as representing a client before
an administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).
By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is one of the relatively rare types a
litigator who specializes in this work to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to
have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client counselling, advice-giving, document drafting,
and negotiation. And increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of evaluation and mediation are both effective
for many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).
Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work that is constrained in very important
ways, at least theoretically, so as to remove from it some of the salient features of adversarial litigation. Of
these special roles, the most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some lawyers' work the constraints are
imposed both by the nature of the client and by the way in which the lawyer is organized into a social unit to
perform that work. The most common of these roles are those of corporate practice and government legal
service. (Ibid.).
In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below quoted are emerging trends in corporate
law practice, a departure from the traditional concept of practice of law.
We are experiencing today what truly may be called a revolutionary transformation in corporate
law practice. Lawyers and other professional groups, in particular those members participating
in various legal-policy decisional contexts, are finding that understanding the major emerging
trends in corporation law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making.
Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today requires an accurate
understanding of the nature and implications of the corporate law research function
accompanied by an accelerating rate of information accumulation. The recognition of the need
for such improved corporate legal policy formulation, particularly "model-making" and
"contingency planning," has impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional procedures in
many decisional contexts.

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In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be processed, the sorting and weighing of
significant conditional factors, the appraisal of major trends, the necessity of estimating the
consequences of given courses of action, and the need for fast decision and response in
situations of acute danger have prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of information flow
theory, operational analysis, automatic data processing, and electronic computing equipment.
Understandably, an improved decisional structure must stress the predictive component of the
policy-making process, wherein a "model", of the decisional context or a segment thereof is
developed to test projected alternative courses of action in terms of futuristic effects flowing
therefrom.
Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged in predicting and projecting the
trends of the law, the subject of corporate finance law has received relatively little organized and
formalized attention in the philosophy of advancing corporate legal education. Nonetheless, a
cross-disciplinary approach to legal research has become a vital necessity.
Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by those trained primarily in the
law can be improved through an early introduction to multi-variable decisional context and the
various approaches for handling such problems. Lawyers, particularly with either a master's or
doctorate degree in business administration or management, functioning at the legal policy level
of decision-making now have some appreciation for the concepts and analytical techniques of
other professions which are currently engaged in similar types of complex decision-making.
Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems would require the services of
an astute attorney because of the complex legal implications that arise from each and every
necessary step in securing and maintaining the business issue raised. (Business Star,
"Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously referred to as the "abogado de
campanilla." He is the "big-time" lawyer, earning big money and with a clientele composed of
the tycoons and magnates of business and industry.
Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people could not explain what it is that
a corporate lawyer does. For one, the number of attorneys employed by a single corporation will
vary with the size and type of the corporation. Many smaller and some large corporations farm
out all their legal problems to private law firms. Many others have in-house counsel only for
certain matters. Other corporation have a staff large enough to handle most legal problems in-
house.
A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who handles the legal affairs of a
corporation. His areas of concern or jurisdiction may include, inter alia: corporate legal research,
tax laws research, acting out as corporate secretary (in board meetings), appearances in both
courts and other adjudicatory agencies (including the Securities and Exchange Commission),
and in other capacities which require an ability to deal with the law.
At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other than the legal affairs of the
business of the corporation he is representing. These include such matters as determining
policy and becoming involved in management. ( Emphasis supplied.)
In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being isolated from the action, or not
understanding how one's work actually fits into the work of the orgarnization. This can be
frustrating to someone who needs to see the results of his work first hand. In short, a corporate
lawyer is sometimes offered this fortune to be more closely involved in the running of the
business.
Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be engaged by a multinational
corporation (MNC). Some large MNCs provide one of the few opportunities available to
corporate lawyers to enter the international law field. After all, international law is practiced in a
relatively small number of companies and law firms. Because working in a foreign country is
perceived by many as glamorous, tills is an area coveted by corporate lawyers. In most cases,
however, the overseas jobs go to experienced attorneys while the younger attorneys do their
"international practice" in law libraries. (Business Star, "Corporate Law Practice," May 25,1990,
p. 4).
This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the realm of finance. To borrow the
lines of Harvard-educated lawyer Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to
spot problems, a good lawyer is one who perceives the difficulties, and the excellent lawyer is
one who surmounts them." (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in the arm," so to speak. No
longer are we talking of the traditional law teaching method of confining the subject study to the
Corporation Code and the Securities Code but an incursion as well into the intertwining modern
management issues.
Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with three (3) types of learning: (1)
acquisition of insights into current advances which are of particular significance to the corporate
counsel; (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary skins applicable to a corporate counsel's
management responsibilities; and (3) a devotion to the organization and management of the
legal function itself.
4
These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting circles, with a shared area linking
them. Otherwise known as "intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme for
the corporate counsel's total learning.
Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the counsel's role. For that
matter, the corporate lawyer reviews the globalization process, including the resulting strategic
repositioning that the firms he provides counsel for are required to make, and the need to think
about a corporation's; strategy at multiple levels. The salience of the nation-state is being
reduced as firms deal both with global multinational entities and simultaneously with sub-
national governmental units. Firms increasingly collaborate not only with public entities but with
each other often with those who are competitors in other arenas.
Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making within the corporation is rapidly
changing. The modem corporate lawyer has gained a new role as a stakeholder in some
cases participating in the organization and operations of governance through participation on
boards and other decision-making roles. Often these new patterns develop alongside existing
legal institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are complicated as
corporations organize for global operations. ( Emphasis supplied)
The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with governmental policies toward the
promotion and management of technology. New collaborative arrangements for promoting
specific technologies or competitiveness more generally require approaches from industry that
differ from older, more adversarial relationships and traditional forms of seeking to influence
governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned from other countries. In
Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are examples of collaborative efforts between governmental
and business Japan's MITI is world famous. (Emphasis supplied)
Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the Corporate Counsel comprises a
distinct group within the managerial structure of all kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of both
long-term and temporary groups within organizations has been found to be related to
indentifiable factors in the group-context interaction such as the groups actively revising their
knowledge of the environment coordinating work with outsiders, promoting team achievements
within the organization. In general, such external activities are better predictors of team
performance than internal group processes.
In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the
managerial mettle of corporations are challenged. Current research is seeking ways both to
anticipate effective managerial procedures and to understand relationships of financial liability
and insurance considerations. (Emphasis supplied)
Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three factors are apropos:
First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been found an effective tool for new
managerial thinking regarding both planning and pressing immediate problems. An
understanding of the role of feedback loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow, enable users to
simulate all sorts of systematic problems physical, economic, managerial, social, and
psychological. New programming techniques now make the system dynamics principles more
accessible to managers including corporate counsels. (Emphasis supplied)
Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better decisions involving complexity
and uncertainty. In the context of a law department, it can be used to appraise the settlement
value of litigation, aid in negotiation settlement, and minimize the cost and risk involved in
managing a portfolio of cases. (Emphasis supplied)
Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based models can be used directly by
parties and mediators in all lands of negotiations. All integrated set of such tools provide
coherent and effective negotiation support, including hands-on on instruction in these
techniques. A simulation case of an international joint venture may be used to illustrate the
point.
[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal function, concern three
pointed areas of consideration, thus:
Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills that comprise a major part of
the general counsel's responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial law. Preventive
lawyering is concerned with minimizing the risks of legal trouble and maximizing legal rights for
such legal entities at that time when transactional or similar facts are being considered and
made.
Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are undertaken those activities of
the firm to which legal consequences attach. It needs to be directly supportive of this nation's
evolving economic and organizational fabric as firms change to stay competitive in a global,
interdependent environment. The practice and theory of "law" is not adequate today to facilitate
the relationships needed in trying to make a global economy work.
Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office. The general counsel has
emerged in the last decade as one of the most vibrant subsets of the legal profession. The
corporate counsel hear responsibility for key aspects of the firm's strategic issues, including
structuring its global operations, managing improved relationships with an increasingly
5
 diversified body of employees, managing expanded liability exposure, creating new and varied
interactions with public decision-makers, coping internally with more complex make or by
decisions.
This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing corporate law is not enough to make
one a good general corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the legal system
shapes corporate activities. And even if the corporate lawyer's aim is not the understand all of
the law's effects on corporate activities, he must, at the very least, also gain a working
knowledge of the management issues if only to be able to grasp not only the basic legal
"constitution' or makeup of the modem corporation. "Business Star", "The Corporate Counsel,"
April 10, 1991, p. 4).
The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to have more than a passing
knowledge of financial law affecting each aspect of their work. Yet, many would admit to
ignorance of vast tracts of the financial law territory. What transpires next is a dilemma of
professional security: Will the lawyer admit ignorance and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign
understanding and risk exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jan. 11, 1989, p.
4).
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the position of Chairman of
the COMELEC in a letter received by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991.
Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not possess the required qualification of
having been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the
COMELEC. On June 18, 1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as Chairman of
the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's nomination,
petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying that said
confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections be
declared null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations of 1960 with a
grade of 86-55%. He has been a dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its
inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license fees as lawyer for more than ten years.
(p. 124, Rollo)
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law
office of his father. During his stint in the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an operations
officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved getting acquainted with the laws of
member-countries negotiating loans and coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon
returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group, served as chief executive officer of an
investment bank and subsequently of a business conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to
various companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive officer. As former Secretary-General
(1986) and National Chairman (1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in election
law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy,
Monsod, in his personal capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's Conference for
Human Development, has worked with the under privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor
groups, in initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian reform law and lately the
urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use of his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission,
a quast judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a member of the Constitutional
Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of its Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he
was cited by the President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muoz-Palma for "innumerable amendments to
reconcile government functions with individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list system for
the House of Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)
Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod used to be a member.
In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a team, and which is adequately
constituted to meet the various contingencies that arise during a negotiation. Besides top
officials of the Borrower concerned, there are the legal officer (such as the legal counsel), the
finance manager, and an operations officer (such as an official involved in negotiating the
contracts) who comprise the members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven, "Loan Negotiating
Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers," Staff Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the
Philippines, Manila, 1982, p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)
After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's Constitution; it lays down the law as far as
the loan transaction is concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan Agreement can be
compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental parts: (1) business terms; (2) borrower's
representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4) covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13).
In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt restructuring program. For aside
from performing the tasks of legislative drafting and legal advising, they score national
development policies as key factors in maintaining their countries' sovereignty. (Condensed
from the work paper, entitled "Wanted: Development Lawyers for Developing Nations,"
submitted by L. Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the United States Agency for
6
 International Development, during the Session on Law for the Development of Nations at the
Abidjan World Conference in Ivory Coast, sponsored by the World Peace Through Law Center
on August 26-31, 1973). ( Emphasis supplied)
Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than purely renegotiation policies,
demand expertise in the law of contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting and in
renegotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may work with an international business
specialist or an economist in the formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt restructuring
contract agreements contain such a mixture of technical language that they should be carefully
drafted and signed only with the advise of competent counsel in conjunction with the guidance
of adequate technical support personnel. (See International Law Aspects of the Philippine
External Debts, an unpublished dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321). (
Emphasis supplied)
A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract construction is the set of terms and
conditions which determines the contractual remedies for a failure to perform one or more
elements of the contract. A good agreement must not only define the responsibilities of both
parties, but must also state the recourse open to either party when the other fails to discharge
an obligation. For a compleat debt restructuring represents a devotion to that principle which in
the ultimate analysis is sine qua non for foreign loan agreements-an adherence to the rule of
law in domestic and international affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: "They carry no banners, they beat no drums; but where they
are, men learn that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet genius and serene mastery." (See
Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar of the
Philippine Journal, Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of law". particularly the modern concept of
law practice, and taking into consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the Constitution,
Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of
industry, a lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and the poor verily more
than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143 SCRA 327, the Court said:
Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which
it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should
possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted
on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a
political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can
decide. (emphasis supplied)
No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil Service Commission, 171 SCRA 744)
where it stated:
It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this case, and all the other legal
requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no alternative but to attest to the appointment in
accordance with the Civil Service Law. The Commission has no authority to revoke an
appointment on the ground that another person is more qualified for a particular position. It also
has no authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To do so would be an
encroachment on the discretion vested upon the appointing authority. An appointment is
essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only
condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. ( Emphasis
supplied)
The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar, consists of four (4) stages: (1)
nomination; (2) confirmation by the Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the
Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of its certificate of confirmation, the
President issues the permanent appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. . . .
(Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on Public Officers, p. 200)
The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the nomination of Monsod as Chairman
of the Commission on Elections is mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the Constitution which
provides:
The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the President with the consent of
the Commission on Appointments for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those
first appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years, two Members for five years,
and the last Members for three years, without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall
be only for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any Member be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity.
Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say that his definition of the
practice of law is the traditional or stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished from the
modern concept of the practice of law, which modern connotation is exactly what was intended
by the eminent framers of the 1987 Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's definition would
require generally a habitual law practice, perhaps practised two or three times a week
7
 and would outlaw say, law practice once or twice a year for ten consecutive years. Clearly, this
is far from the constitutional intent.
Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states that in my written opinion, I made use
of a definition of law practice which really means nothing because the definition says that law practice " . . . is
what people ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True I cited the definition but only by way of sarcasm as
evident from my statement that the definition of law practice by "traditional areas of law practice is
essentially tautologous" or defining a phrase by means of the phrase itself that is being defined.
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers almost all situations, most individuals, in
making use of the law, or in advising others on what the law means, are actually practicing law. In that sense,
perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr. Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar,
who has been practising law for over ten years. This is different from the acts of persons practising law, without
first becoming lawyers.
Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an elected President of the Philippines, say,
on the ground that he lacks one or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt. For one thing, how can an
action or petition be brought against the President? And even assuming that he is indeed disqualified, how can
the action be entertained since he is the incumbent President?
We now proceed:
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public hearings on Monsod's confirmation,
implicitly determined that he possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment
rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged power is beyond judicial interference
except only upon a clear showing of a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
(Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of discretion is clearly shown shall the Court
interfere with the Commission's judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the
Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of discretion, that would amount to lack or
excess of jurisdiction and would warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.
Additionally, consider the following:
(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the President, may the Supreme
Court reverse the Commission, and thus in effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the answer
is in the negative.
(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the Commission has confirmed?
The answer is likewise clear.
(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in the U.S. Congress) decides
to confirm a Presidential nominee, it would be incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would
still reverse the U.S. Senate.
Finally, one significant legal maxim is:
We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life.
Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator of Judea asked Delilah (who was
Samson's beloved) for help in capturing Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that
No blade shall touch his skin;
No blood shall flow from his veins.
When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator placed an iron rod burning white-hot
two or three inches away from in front of Samson's eyes. This blinded the man. Upon hearing of what had
happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with anger, and fuming with righteous fury, accused the
procurator of reneging on his word. The procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade touch his skin? Did any blood
flow from his veins?" The procurator was clearly relying on the letter, not the spirit of the agreement.
In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

8
CASE 2
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 89591-96. January 24, 2000]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA, Presiding Judge of
Branch 12, Regional Trial Court of Antique, and AVELINO T. JAVELLANA, respondents.ULANDU
RESOLUTION
PARDO, J.:
On September 8, 1999, we denied the Peoples motion seeking reconsideration of our August 13, 1990
decision in these cases. In said resolution, we held that respondent Judge Bonifacio Sanz Maceda committed
no grave abuse of discretion in issuing the order of August 8, 1989 giving custody over private respondent
Avelino T. Javellana to the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, San Jose, Antique, Atty.
Deogracias del Rosario, during the pendency of Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355. At that time, sufficient reason
was shown why private respondent Javellana should not be detained at the Antique Provincial Jail. The trial
courts order specifically provided for private respondents detention at the residence of Atty. del Rosario.
However, private respondent was not to be allowed liberty to roam around but was to be held as detention
prisoner in said residence.
This order of the trial court was not strictly complied with because private respondent was not detained in the
residence of Atty. Del Rosario. He went about his normal activities as if he were a free man, including
engaging in the practice of law. Despite our resolution of July 30, 1990 prohibiting private respondent to appear
as counsel in Criminal Case No. 4262,[1] the latter accepted cases and continued practicing law.
On April 7, 1997, Senior State Prosecutor Henrick F. Guingoyon filed with the Supreme Court a motion seeking
clarification on the following questions: "(1) Does the resolution of this Honorable Court dated July 30, 1990,
prohibiting Atty. Javellana from appearing as counsel refer only to Criminal Case No. 4262? (2) Is Atty. now
9
(Judge) Deogracias del Rosario still the custodian of Atty. Javellana? and (3) Since it appears that Atty. (now
Judge) del Rosario never really held and detained Atty. Javellana as prisoner in his residence, is not Atty.
Javellana considered an escapee or a fugitive of justice for which warrant for his arrest should forthwith be
issued?"[2]Misspped
In a resolution dated June 18, 1997, we "noted" the above motion.
After we denied the motion for reconsideration on September 8, 1999, the trial court resumed hearing Criminal
Cases Nos. 3350-3355. Earlier, on August 2, 1999, Rolando Mijares filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch
12, San Jose, Antique, a motion seeking the revocation of the trial courts custody order and the imprisonment
of private respondent Javellana in the provincial jail.
On November 15, 1999, private respondent Javellana filed with the Supreme Court an urgent motion seeking
to clarify whether the June 18, 1997 resolution finally terminated or resolved the motion for clarification filed by
the State Prosecutor on April 7, 1997.
Private respondent Javellana has been arrested based on the filing of criminal cases against him. By such
arrest, he is deemed to be under the custody of the law. The trial court gave Atty. Deogracias del Rosario the
custody of private respondent Javellana with the obligation "to hold and detain" him in Atty. del Rosarios
residence in his official capacity as the clerk of court of the regional trial court. Hence, when Atty. del Rosario
was appointed judge, he ceased to be the personal custodian of accused Javellana and the succeeding clerk
of court must be deemed the custodian under the same undertaking.
In our mind, the perceived threats to private respondent Javelanas life no longer exist. Thus, the trial courts
order dated August 8, 1989 giving custody over him to the clerk of court must be recalled, and he shall be
detained at the Provincial Jail of Antique at San Jose, Antique.
Regarding his continued practice of law, as a detention prisoner private respondent Javellana is not allowed to
practice his profession as a necessary consequence of his status as a detention prisoner. The trial courts order
was clear that private respondent "is not to be allowed liberty to roam around but is to be held as a detention
prisoner." The prohibition to practice law referred not only to Criminal Case No. 4262, but to all other cases as
well, except in cases where private respondent would appear in court to defend himself.Spped
As a matter of law, when a person indicted for an offense is arrested, he is deemed placed under the custody
of the law. He is placed in actual restraint of liberty in jail so that he may be bound to answer for the
commission of the offense.[3] He must be detained in jail during the pendency of the case against him, unless
he is authorized by the court to be released on bail or on recognizance.[4] Let it be stressed that all prisoners
whether under preventive detention or serving final sentence can not practice their profession nor engage in
any business or occupation, or hold office, elective or appointive, while in detention. This is a necessary
consequence of arrest and detention. Consequently, all the accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355 must
be confined in the Provincial Jail of Antique.
Considering that the pendency of Criminal Cases Nos. 3350-3355 has dragged on for more than ten (10)
years, the presiding judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, San Jose, Antique, is ordered to continue
with the trial of said criminal cases with all deliberate dispatch and to avoid further delay.
WHEREFORE, the August 8, 1989 order of the trial court is hereby SET ASIDE. All accused in Criminal Cases
Nos. 3350-3355, including Avelino T. Javellana and Arturo F. Pacificador are ordered detained at the
Provincial Jail of Antique, San Jose, Antique, effective immediately, and shall not be allowed to go out of the
jail for any reason or guise, except upon prior written permission of the trial court for a lawful purpose.
Let copies of this resolution be given to the Provincial Director, PNP Antique Provincial Police Office, San
Jose, Antique and to the Provincial Jail Warden, Provincial Jail of Antique, San Jose, Antique.
SO ORDERED.

10
CASE 3
FIRST DIVISION
[A.M. No. P-99-1287. January 26, 2001]
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, complainant, vs. ATTY. MISAEL M. LADAGA, Branch Clerk
of Court, Regional Trial Court, Branch 133, Makati City, respondent.
RESOLUTION
KAPUNAN, J.:
In a Letter, dated August 31, 1998, respondent Atty. Misael M. Ladaga, Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati, Branch 133, requested the Court Administrator, Justice Alfredo L. Benipayo, for authority
to appear as pro bono counsel of his cousin, Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga, in Criminal Case No. 84885,
entitled People vs. Narcisa Naldoza Ladaga for Falsification of Public Document pending before the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 40.[1] While respondents letter-request was pending action, Lisa Payoyo
Andres, the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 84885, sent a letter to the Court Administrator, dated
September 2, 1998, requesting for a certification with regard to respondents authority to appear as counsel for
the accused in the said criminal case.[2] On September 7, 1998, the Office of the Court Administrator referred
the matter to respondent for comment.[3]
In his Comment,[4] dated September 14, 1998, respondent admitted that he had appeared in Criminal Case
No. 84885 without prior authorization. He reasoned out that the factual circumstances surrounding the criminal
case compelled him to handle the defense of his cousin who did not have enough resources to hire the services
of a counsel de parte; while, on the other hand, private complainant was a member of a powerful family who was
out to get even with his cousin. Furthermore, he rationalized that his appearance in the criminal case did not
prejudice his office nor the interest of the public since he did not take advantage of his position. In any case, his
appearances in court were covered by leave application approved by the presiding judge.
On December 8, 1998, the Court issued a resolution denying respondents request for authorization to
appear as counsel and directing the Office of the Court Administrator to file formal charges against him for
appearing in court without the required authorization from the Court.[5] On January 25, 1999, the Court
Administrator filed the instant administrative complaint against respondent for violating Sec. 7(b)(2) of Republic
Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees, which provides:
Sec. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. In addition to acts and omissions of public officials and employees
now prescribed in the Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited acts and
transactions of any public official and employee and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx
(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto.- Public officials and employees during their
incumbency shall not:
xxx
(2) Engage in the private practice of their profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law,
Provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official functions;
In our Resolution, dated February 9, 1999, we required respondent to comment on the administrative
complaint.
In his Comment, respondent explained that he and Ms. Ladaga are close blood cousins who belong to a
powerless family from the impoverished town of Bacauag, Surigao del Norte. From childhood until he finished
his law degree, Ms. Ladaga had always supported and guided him while he looked up to her as a mentor and
an adviser. Because of their close relationship, Ms. Ladaga sought respondents help and advice when she was
charged in Criminal Case No. 84885 for falsification by the private complainant, Lisa Payoyo Andres, whose only
purpose in filing the said criminal case was to seek vengeance on her cousin. He explained that his cousins
discord with Ms. Andres started when the latters husband, SPO4 Pedro Andres, left the conjugal home to cohabit
with Ms. Ladaga. During the course of their illicit affair, SPO4 Andres and Ms. Ladaga begot three (3)
children. The birth certificate of their eldest child is the subject of the falsification charge against Ms.
Ladaga. Respondent stated that since he is the only lawyer in their family, he felt it to be his duty to accept Ms.
Ladagas plea to be her counsel since she did not have enough funds to pay for the services of a
lawyer. Respondent also pointed out that in his seven (7) years of untainted government service, initially with
the Commission on Human Rights and now with the judiciary, he had performed his duties with honesty and
integrity and that it was only in this particular case that he had been administratively charged for extending a
helping hand to a close relative by giving a free legal assistance for humanitarian purpose. He never took
advantage of his position as branch clerk of court since the questioned appearances were made in the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City and not in Makati where he is holding office. He stressed that during the
hearings of the criminal case, he was on leave as shown by his approved leave applications attached to his
comment.
In our Resolution, dated June 22, 1999, we noted respondents comment and referred the administrative
matter to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Judge Josefina Guevarra-Salonga, for
investigation, report and recommendation.
In her Report, dated September 29, 1999, Judge Salonga made the following findings and recommendation:
There is no question that Atty. Misael Ladaga appeared as counsel for and in behalf of his cousin, Narcisa
Naldoza Ladaga, an accused in Criminal Case No. 84-885 for Falsification of Public Documents before the

11
METC of Quezon City. It is also denied that the appearance of said respondent in said case was without the
previous permission of the Court.
An examination of the records shows that during the occasions that the respondent appeared as such counsel
before the METC of Quezon City, he was on official leave of absence. Moreover, his Presiding Judge, Judge
Napoleon Inoturan was aware of the case he was handling. That the respondent appeared as pro
bono counsel likewise cannot be denied. His cousin-client Narcisa Ladaga herself positively declared that the
respondent did not receive a single centavo from her. Helpless as she was and respondent being the only
lawyer in the family, he agreed to represent her out of his compassion and high regard for her.
It may not be amiss to point out, this is the first time that respondent ever handled a case for a member of his
family who is like a big sister to him. He appeared for free and for the purpose of settling the case
amicably. Furthermore, his Presiding Judge was aware of his appearance as counsel for his cousin. On top of
this, during all the years that he has been in government service, he has maintained his integrity and
independence.
RECOMMENDATION
In the light of the foregoing, it appearing that the respondent appeared as counsel for his cousin without first
securing permission from the court, and considering that this is his first time to do it coupled with the fact that
said appearance was not for a fee and was with the knowledge of his Presiding Judge, it is hereby respectfully
recommended that he be REPRIMANDED with a stern warning that any repetition of such act would be dealt
with more severely.[6]
We agree with the recommendation of the investigating judge.
Respondent is charged under Sec. 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees which prohibits civil servants from engaging in the private practice of their profession. A similar
prohibition is found under Sec. 35, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court which disallows certain attorneys
from engaging in the private practice of their profession. The said section reads:
SEC. 35. Certain attorneys not to practice.- No judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of
the Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a member of the bar or give professional
advise to clients.
However, it should be clarified that private practice of a profession, specifically the law profession in this
case, which is prohibited, does not pertain to an isolated court appearance; rather, it contemplates a succession
of acts of the same nature habitually or customarily holding ones self to the public as a lawyer.
In the case of People vs. Villanueva,[7] we explained the meaning of the term private practice prohibited by
the said section, to wit:
We believe that the isolated appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice, within the
meaning and contemplation of the Rules.Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in
frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual
exercise (State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, N.S. 768) Practice of law to fall within the
prohibition of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding ones self out to the public, as a
lawyer and demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644, 647). The
appearance as counsel on one occasion, is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private
practice of law. The following observation of the Solicitor General is noteworthy:
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must have presented himself to be in the
active and continued practice of the legal profession and that his professional services are available to the
public for a compensation, as a source of his livelihood or in consideration of his said services.
For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been given permission by his immediate
superior, the Secretary of Justice, to represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative.[8]
Based on the foregoing, it is evident that the isolated instances when respondent appeared as pro
bono counsel of his cousin in Criminal Case No. 84885 does not constitute the private practice of the law
profession contemplated by law.
Nonetheless, while respondents isolated court appearances did not amount to a private practice of law, he
failed to obtain a written permission therefor from the head of the Department, which is this Court as required by
Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules, thus:
Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business, vocation, or profession or
be connected with any commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial undertaking without a written permission
from the head of the Department: Provided, That this prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers
and employees whose duties and responsibilities require that their entire time be at the disposal of the
Government; Provided, further, That if an employee is granted permission to engage in outside activities, time
so devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the agency to the end that it will not impair in any way the
efficiency of the officer or employee: And provided, finally, That no permission is necessary in the case of
investments, made by an officer or employee, which do not involve real or apparent conflict between his private
interests and public duties, or in any way influence him in the discharge of his duties, and he shall not take part
in the management of the enterprise or become an officer of the board of directors.[9]
Respondent entered his appearance and attended court proceedings on numerous occasions, i.e., May 4-
15, 1998, June 18, 1998, July 13, 1998 and August 5, 1998, as borne out by his own admission. It is true that
he filed leave applications corresponding to the dates he appeared in court. However, he failed to obtain a prior
permission from the head of the Department. The presiding judge of the court to which respondent is assigned
is not the head of the Department contemplated by law.
12
 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Atty. Misael M. Ladaga is hereby REPRIMANDED with
a stern warning that any repetition of such act would be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.

CASE 4
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
[B.M. No. 914. October 1, 1999]
RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR
VICENTE D. CHING, applicant.
RESOLUTION
KAPUNAN, J.:
Can a legitimate child born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien father validly elect
Philippine citizenship fourteen (14) years after he has reached the age of majority? This is the question sought
to be resolved in the present case involving the application for admission to the Philippine Bar of Vicente D.
Ching.
The facts of this case are as follows:
Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen, and Prescila A. Dulay, a
Filipino, was born in Francia West, Tubao, La Union on 11 April 1964. Since his birth, Ching has resided in the
Philippines.
13
 On 17 July 1998, Ching, after having completed a Bachelor of Laws course at the St. Louis University in
Baguio City, filed an application to take the 1998 Bar Examinations. In a Resolution of this Court, dated
September 1998, he was allowed to take the Bar Examinations, subject to the condition that he must submit to
the Court proof of his Philippine citizenship.
In compliance with the above resolution, Ching submitted on 18 November 1998, the following documents:
1. Certification, dated 9 June 1986, issued by the Board of Accountancy of the Professional Regulations
Commission showing that Ching is a certified public accountant;
2. Voter Certification, dated 14 June 1997, issued by Elizabeth B. Cerezo, Election Officer of the Commission
on Elections (COMELEC) in Tubao, La Union showing that Ching is a registered voter of the said place; and
3. Certification, dated 12 October 1998, also issued by Elizabeth E. Cerezo, showing that Ching was elected
as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La Union during the 12 May 1992 synchronized elections.
On 5 April 1999, the results of the 1998 Bar Examinations were released and Ching was one of the
successful Bar examinees. The oath-taking of the successful Bar examinees was scheduled on 5 May
1999. However, because of the questionable status of Ching's citizenship, he was not allowed to take his
oath. Pursuant to the resolution of this Court, dated 20 April 1999, he was required to submit further proof of his
citizenship. In the same resolution, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was required to file a comment on
Ching's petition for admission to the bar and on the documents evidencing his Philippine citizenship.
The OSG filed its comment on 8 July 1999, stating that Ching, being the "legitimate child of a Chinese father
and a Filipino mother born under the 1935 Constitution was a Chinese citizen and continued to be so, unless
upon reaching the age of majority he elected Philippine citizenship[1] in strict compliance with the provisions of
Commonwealth Act No. 625 entitled "An Act Providing for the Manner in which the Option to Elect Philippine
Citizenship shall be Declared by a Person Whose Mother is a Filipino Citizen." The OSG adds that (w)hat he
acquired at best was only an inchoate Philippine citizenship which he could perfect by election upon reaching
the age of majority."[2] In this regard, the OSG clarifies that "two (2) conditions must concur in order that the
election of Philippine citizenship may be effective, namely: (a) the mother of the person making the election must
be a citizen of the Philippines; and (b) said election must be made 'upon reaching the age of majority.[3] The OSG
then explains the meaning of the phrase "upon reaching the age of majority:"
The clause "upon reaching the age of majority" has been construed to mean a reasonable time after reaching
the age of majority which had been interpreted by the Secretary of Justice to be three (3) years (VELAYO,
supra at p. 51 citing Op., Sec. of Justice No. 70, s. 1940, Feb. 27, 1940). Said period may be extended under
certain circumstances, as when a (sic) person concerned has always considered himself a Filipino (ibid., citing
Op. Nos. 355 and 422, s. 1955; 3, 12, 46, 86 and 97, s. 1953). But in Cuenco, it was held that an election done
after over seven (7) years was not made within a reasonable time.
In conclusion, the OSG points out that Ching has not formally elected Philippine citizenship and, if ever he
does, it would already be beyond the "reasonable time" allowed by present jurisprudence. However, due to the
peculiar circumstances surrounding Ching's case, the OSG recommends the relaxation of the standing rule on
the construction of the phrase reasonable period" and the allowance of Ching to elect Philippine citizenship in
accordance with C.A. No. 625 prior to taking his oath as a member of the Philippine Bar.
On 27 July 1999, Ching filed a Manifestation, attaching therewith his Affidavit of Election of Philippine
Citizenship and his Oath of Allegiance, both dated 15 July 1999. In his Manifestation, Ching states:
1. I have always considered myself as a Filipino;
2. I was registered as a Filipino and consistently declared myself as one in my school records and other official
document;
3. I am practicing a profession (Certified Public Accountant) reserved for Filipino citizens;
4. I participated in electoral process[es] since the time I was eligible to vote;
5. I had served the people of Tubao, La Union as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan from 1992 to 1995;
6. I elected Philippine citizenship on July 15, 1999 in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 625;
7. My election was expressed in a statement signed and sworn to by me before a notary public;
8. I accompanied my election of Philippine citizenship with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the
Government of the Philippines;
9. I filed my election of Philippine citizenship and my oath of allegiance to (sic) the Civil Registrar of Tubao La
Union, and
10.I paid the amount of TEN PESOS (Ps 10.00) as filing fees.
Since Ching has already elected Philippine citizenship on 15 July 1999, the question raised is whether he
has elected Philippine citizenship within a "reasonable time." In the affirmative, whether his citizenship by election
retroacted to the time he took the bar examination.
When Ching was born in 1964, the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution. Under Article IV, Section
1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an alien father
followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected Philippine
citizenship.[4] This right to elect Philippine citizenship was recognized in the 1973 Constitution when it provided
that "(t)hose who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred
and thirty-five" are citizens of the Philippines.[5] Likewise, this recognition by the 1973 Constitution was carried
over to the 1987 Constitution which states that "(t)hose born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who
elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority" are Philippine citizens.[6] It should be noted,
however, that the 1973 and 1987 Constitutional provisions on the election of Philippine citizenship should not be
understood as having a curative effect on any irregularity in the acquisition of citizenship for those covered by
14
the 1935 Constitution.[7] If the citizenship of a person was subject to challenge under the old charter, it remains
subject to challenge under the new charter even if the judicial challenge had not been commenced before the
effectivity of the new Constitution.[8]
C.A. No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(3), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution, prescribes the
procedure that should be followed in order to made a valid election of Philippine citizenship. Under Section 1
thereof, legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by expressing such intention
"in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer authorized to administer
oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall accompany the aforesaid statement
with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of the Philippines."
However, the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within which the election
of Philippine citizenship should be made.The 1935 Charter only provides that the election should be made "upon
reaching the age of majority." The age of majority then commenced upon reaching twenty-one (21) years.[9] In
the opinions of the Secretary of Justice on cases involving the validity of election of Philippine citizenship, this
dilemma was resolved by basing the time period on the decisions of this Court prior to the effectivity of the 1935
Constitution. In these decisions, the proper period for electing Philippine citizenship was, in turn, based on the
pronouncements of the Department of State of the United States Government to the effect that the election
should be made within a "reasonable time" after attaining the age of majority.[10] The phrase reasonable time"
has been interpreted to mean that the election should be made within three (3) years from reaching the age of
majority.[11] However, we held in Cuenco vs. Secretary of Justice,[12] that the three (3) year period is not an
inflexible rule. We said:
It is true that this clause has been construed to mean a reasonable period after reaching the age of majority,
and that the Secretary of Justice has ruled that three (3) years is the reasonable time to elect Philippine
citizenship under the constitutional provision adverted to above, which period may be extended under certain
circumstances, as when the person concerned has always considered himself a Filipino.[13]
However, we cautioned in Cuenco that the extension of the option to elect Philippine citizenship is not
indefinite:
Regardless of the foregoing, petitioner was born on February 16, 1923. He became of age on February
16,1944. His election of citizenship was made on May 15, 1951, when he was over twenty-eight (28) years of
age, or over seven (7) years after he had reached the age of majority. It is clear that said election has not been
made "upon reaching the age of majority.[14]
In the present case, Ching, having been born on 11 April 1964, was already thirty-five (35) years old when
he complied with the requirements of C.A. No. 625 on 15 June 1999, or over fourteen (14) years after he had
reached the age of majority. Based on the interpretation of the phrase upon reaching the age of majority," Ching's
election was clearly beyond, by any reasonable yardstick, the allowable period within which to exercise the
privilege. It should be stated, in this connection, that the special circumstances invoked by Ching, i.e., his
continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines and his being a certified public accountant, a registered
voter and a former elected public official, cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship as the law specifically lays
down the requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by election.
Definitely, the so-called special circumstances cannot constitute what Ching erroneously labels as informal
election of citizenship. Ching cannot find a refuge in the case of In re: Florencio Mallare,[15] the pertinent portion
of which reads:
And even assuming arguendo that Ana Mallare were (sic) legally married to an alien, Esteban's exercise of the
right of suffrage when he cane of age, constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine citizenship. It has been
established that Esteban Mallare was a registered voter as of April 14, 1928, and that as early as 1925 (when
he was about 22 years old), Esteban was already participating in the elections and campaigning for certain
candidate[s]. These acts are sufficient to show his preference for Philippine citizenship.[16]
Ching's reliance on Mallare is misplaced. The facts and circumstances obtaining therein are very different
from those in the present case, thus, negating its applicability. First, Esteban Mallare was born before the
effectivity of the 1935 Constitution and the enactment of C.A. No. 625. Hence, the requirements and procedures
prescribed under the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 for electing Philippine citizenship would not be
applicable to him.Second, the ruling in Mallare was an obiter since, as correctly pointed out by the OSG, it was
not necessary for Esteban Mallare to elect Philippine citizenship because he was already a Filipino, he being a
natural child of a Filipino mother. In this regard, the Court stated:
Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is therefore himself a Filipino, and no other act would
be necessary to confer on him all the rights and privileges attached to Philippine citizenship (U.S. vs. Ong
Tianse, 29 Phil. 332; Santos Co vs. Government of the Philippine Islands, 42 Phil. 543, Serra vs. Republic, L-
4223, May 12, 1952, Sy Quimsuan vs. Republic, L-4693, Feb. 16, 1953; Pitallano vs. Republic, L-5111, June
28, 1954).Neither could any act be taken on the erroneous belief that he is a non-Filipino divest him of the
citizenship privileges to which he is rightfully entitled.[17]
The ruling in Mallare was reiterated and further elaborated in Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House of
Representatives,[18] where we held:
We have jurisprudence that defines 'election' as both a formal and an informal process.
In the case of In re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]) the Court held that the exercise of the right of
suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine
citizenship. In the exact pronouncement of the Court we held:

15
Esteban s exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age constitutes a positive act of Philippine
citizenship (p. 52: emphasis supplied)
The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his life here in
the Philippines.
For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be expected to have elected Philippine
citizenship as they were already citizens, we apply the In Re Mallare rule.
xxx
The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those who still have to elect
citizenship. For those already Filipinos when the time to elect came up, there are acts of deliberate choice
which cannot be less binding. Entering a profession open only to Filipinos, serving in public office where
citizenship is a qualification, voting during election time, running for public office, and other categorical acts of
similar nature are themselves formal manifestations for these persons.
An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electing is an alien. Or his status is doubtful
because he is a national of two countries.There is no doubt in this case about Mr. Ong's being a Filipino when
he turned twenty-one (21).
We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the private respondent would not only have
bean superfluous but would also have resulted in an absurdity. How can a Filipino citizen elect Philippine
citizenship?[19]
The Court, like the OSG, is sympathetic with the plight of Ching. However, even if we consider the special
circumstances in the life of Ching like his having lived in the Philippines, all his life and his consistent belief that
he is a Filipino, controlling statutes and jurisprudence constrain us to disagree with the recommendation of the
OSG. Consequently, we hold that Ching failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship. The span Of fourteen (14)
years that lapsed from the time he reached the age of majority until he finally expressed his intention to elect
Philippine citizenship is clearly way beyond the contemplation of the requirement of electing "upon reaching the
age of majority." Moreover, Ching has offered no reason why he delayed his election of Philippine
citizenship. The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking
process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and
thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Ching's unreasonable and unexplained delay in making
his election cannot be simply glossed over.
Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when needed and
suppressed when convenient.[20] One who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an inchoate right
to such citizenship. As such, he should avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude. Sadly, in this
case, Ching slept on his opportunity to elect Philippine citizenship and, as a result, this golden privilege slipped
away from his grasp.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court Resolves to DENY Vicente D. Ching's application for admission
to the Philippine Bar.
SO ORDERED.

SYNOPSIS
Vicente D. Ching is the legitimate son of spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen and Prescila A. Dulay, a
Filipino, Ching was born in Francia West, Tubao, La Union on 11 April 1964. Since birth, he resided in the
Philippines. He is also a Certified Public Accountant and a registered voter of Tubao, La Union. In fact, he was
elected as member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La Union during the 12 May 1992 synchronized
elections. On 17 July 1998, having completed a Bachelor of Laws course at the St. Louis University, Baguio City,
he filed an application to take the 1998 Bar Examinations. He was conditionally admitted to take the Bar
Examinations, subject to the condition that he must submit to the Court proof of his Philippine citizenship. On 5
April 1999, the 1998 Bar Examinations were released and Ching was one of the successful examinees. However,
because of the questionable status of his citizenship, he was not allowed to take his oath and instead, he was
required to submit further proof of his citizenship. In compliance therewith, on 27 July 1999, Ching filed a
Manifestation with attached Affidavit of Election of Philippine Citizenship and Oath of Allegiance dated 15 July
1999.
The Court held that Ching failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship. The span of fourteen (14) years that
lapsed from the time he reached the age of majority until he finally expressed his intention to elect Philippine
citizenship was clearly way beyond the contemplation of the requirement of electing upon reaching the age of
majority. Moreover, Ching had offered no reason why he delayed his election of Philippine citizenship. The
prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that
is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the
same with the nearest civil registry. Chings unreasonable and unexplained delay in making his election cannot
be simply glossed over.
SYLLABUS
1. POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CITIZENSHIP; CHILDREN WITH ALIEN FATHER AND
FILIPINO MOTHER BORN BEFORE JANUARY 17, 1973 MUST ELECT THEIR CITIZENSHIP
PURSUANT TO 1935 CONSTITUTION.- When Ching was born in 1964, the governing charter was the
1935 Constitution. Under Article IV, Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child
born of a Filipino mother and an alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the
age of majority, the child elected Philippine citizenship. This right to elect Philippine citizenship was
16
 recognized in the 1973 Constitution when it provided that (t)hose who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant
to the provisions of the Constitution of nineteen hundred and thirty-five are citizens of the Philippines.
Likewise, this recognition by the 1973 Constitution was carried over to the 1987 Constitution which states
that (t)hose born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority are Philippine citizens.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; 1973 AND 1987 CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS ON ELECTION OF PHILIPPINE
CITIZENSHIP HAVE NO CURATIVE EFFECT.- It should be noted, however, that the 1973 and 1987
Constitutional provisions on the election of Philippine citizenship should not be understood as having a
curative effect on any irregularity in the acquisition of citizenship for those covered by the 1935 Constitution.
If the citizenship of a person was subject to challenge under the old charter, it remains subject to challenge
under the new charter even if the judicial challenge had not been commenced before the effectivity of the
new Constitution.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 625; PRESCRIBES PROCEDURE FOR ELECTION OF
CITIZENSHIP.- C.A. No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(3), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution,
prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order to make a valid election of Philippine citizenship.
Under Section 1 thereof, legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by
expressing such intention in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any officer
authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall
accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of
the Philippines.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ELECTION SHOULD BE MADE WITHIN REASONABLE TIME AFTER ATTAINING
AGE OF MAJORITY. - However, the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time period
within which the election of Philippine citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter only provides that the
election should be made upon reaching the age of majority. The age of majority then commenced upon
reaching twenty-one (21) years. In the opinions of the Secretary of Justice on cases involving the validity of
election of Philippine citizenship, this dilemma was resolved by basing the time period on the decisions of
this Court prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In these decisions, the proper period for electing
Philippine citizenship was, in turn, based on the pronouncements of the Department of State of the United
States Government to the effect that the election should be made within a reasonable time after attaining
the age of majority.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REASONABLE TIME; CONSTRUED.- The phrase reasonable time has been
interpreted to mean that the election should be made within three (3) years from reaching the age of majority.
However, we held in Cuenco vs. Secretary of Justice, that the three (3) year period is not an inflexible rule.
We said: It is true that this clause has been construed to mean a reasonable period after reaching the age
of majority, and that the Secretary of Justice has ruled that three (3) years is the reasonable time to elect
Philippine citizenship under the constitutional provision adverted to above, which period may be extended
under certain circumstances, as when the person concerned has always considered himself a Filipino.
However, we cautioned in Cuenco that the extension of the option to elect Philippine citizenship is not
indefinite: Regardless of the foregoing, petitioner was born on February 16, 1923. He became of age on
February 16, 1944. His election of citizenship was made on May 15, 1951, when he was over twenty-eight
(28) years of age, or over seven (7) years after he had reached the age of majority. It is clear that said
election has not been made upon reaching the age of majority.
6. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT COMPLIED IN CASE AT BAR. - In the present case, Ching, having been born
11 April 1964, was already thirty-five (35) years old when he complied with the requirements of C.A. No.
625 on 15 June 1999, or over fourteen (14) years after he had reached the age of majority. Based on the
interpretation of the phrase upon reaching the age of majority, Chings election was clearly beyond, by any
reasonable yardstick, the allowable period within which to exercise the privilege. It should be stated, in this
connection, that the special circumstances invoked by Ching, i.e., his continuous and uninterrupted stay in
the Philippines and his being a certified public accountant, a registered voter and a former elected public
official, cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship as the law specifically lays down the requirements for
acquisition of Philippine citizenship by election.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; APPLICANT FAILED TO VALIDLY ELECT PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP; CASE AT
BAR.- Consequently, we hold that Ching failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship. The span of fourteen
(14) years that lapsed from the time he reached the age of majority until he finally expressed his intention
to elect Philippine citizenship is clearly way beyond the contemplation of the requirement of electing upon
reaching the age of majority. Moreover, Ching has offered no reason why he delayed his election of
Philippine citizenship. The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is certainly not a tedious
and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit of election of Philippine
citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Chings unreasonable and
unexplained delay in making his election cannot be simply glossed over.
8. ID.; ID.; ID.; PERSON PRIVILEGED TO ELECT PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP HAS ONLY AN INCHOATE
RIGHT TO SUCH CITIZENSHIP.- Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be
claimed when needed and suppressed when convenient. One who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship
has only an inchoate right to such citizenship. As such, he should avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm
and promptitude.

17
CASE 5
EN BANC
[B.M. No. 1154. June 8, 2004]
IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE HARON S. MELING IN THE 2002 BAR
EXAMINATIONS AND FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE SHARIA
BAR,
ATTY. FROILAN R. MELENDREZ, petitioner,
RESOLUTION
TINGA, J.:
The Court is here confronted with a Petition that seeks twin reliefs, one of which is ripe while the other has
been rendered moot by a supervening event.
The antecedents follow.
On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez) filed with the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC)
a Petition[1] to disqualify Haron S. Meling (Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar Examinations and to impose on him
the appropriate disciplinary penalty as a member of the Philippine Sharia Bar.
In the Petition, Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take the 2002 Bar
Examinations that he has three (3) pending criminal cases before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), Cotabato City, namely: Criminal Cases Noa. 15685 and 15686, both for Grave Oral Defamation, and
Criminal Case No. 15687 for Less Serious Physical Injuries.
The above-mentioned cases arose from an incident which occurred on May 21, 2001, when Meling allegedly
uttered defamatory words against Melendrez and his wife in front of media practitioners and other people. Meling
also purportedly attacked and hit the face of Melendrez wife causing the injuries to the latter.
Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the title Attorney in his communications, as
Secretary to the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a member of the Bar. Attached to
the Petition is an indorsement letter which shows that Meling used the appellation and appears on its face to
have been received by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cotabato City on November 27, 2001.
Pursuant to this Courts Resolution[2] dated December 3, 2002, Meling filed his Answer with the OBC.
In his Answer,[3] Meling explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases filed against him by Melendrez
because retired Judge Corocoy Moson, their former professor, advised him to settle his misunderstanding with
Melendrez. Believing in good faith that the case would be settled because the said Judge has moral ascendancy
over them, he being their former professor in the College of Law, Meling considered the three cases that actually
arose from a single incident and involving the same parties as closed and terminated. Moreover, Meling denies
the charges and adds that the acts complained of do not involve moral turpitude.
As regards the use of the title Attorney, Meling admits that some of his communications really contained the
word Attorney as they were, according to him, typed by the office clerk.
In its Report and Recommendation[4] dated December 8, 2003, the OBC disposed of the charge of non-
disclosure against Meling in this wise:
The reasons of Meling in not disclosing the criminal cases filed against him in his petition to take the Bar
Examinations are ludicrous. He should have known that only the court of competent jurisdiction can dismiss
cases, not a retired judge nor a law professor. In fact, the cases filed against Meling are still
pending. Furthermore, granting arguendo that these cases were already dismissed, he is still required to
disclose the same for the Court to ascertain his good moral character. Petitions to take the Bar Examinations
are made under oath, and should not be taken lightly by an applicant.
The merit of the cases against Meling is not material in this case. What matters is his act of concealing them
which constitutes dishonesty.
In Bar Matter 1209, the Court stated, thus:
It has been held that good moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished from good reputation or
from the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in the place where
he is known. Moral character is not a subjective term but one which corresponds to objective reality. The
standard of personal and professional integrity is not satisfied by such conduct as it merely enables a person to
escape the penalty of criminal law. Good moral character includes at least common honesty.
The non-disclosure of Meling of the criminal cases filed against him makes him also answerable under Rule
7.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that a lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly

18
making a false statement or suppressing a material fact in connection with his application for admission to the
bar.[5]
As regards Melings use of the title Attorney, the OBC had this to say:
Anent the issue of the use of the appellation Attorney in his letters, the explanation of Meling is not
acceptable. Aware that he is not a member of the Bar, there was no valid reason why he signed as attorney
whoever may have typed the letters.
Although there is no showing that Meling is engaged in the practice of law, the fact is, he is signing his
communications as Atty. Haron S. Meling knowing fully well that he is not entitled thereto. As held by the Court
in Bar Matter 1209, the unauthorized use of the appellation attorney may render a person liable for indirect
contempt of court.[6]
Consequently, the OBC recommended that Meling not be allowed to take the Lawyers Oath and sign the
Roll of Attorneys in the event that he passes the Bar Examinations. Further, it recommended that Melings
membership in the Sharia Bar be suspended until further orders from the Court.[7]
We fully concur with the findings and recommendation of the OBC. Meling, however, did not pass the 2003
Bar Examinations. This renders the Petition, insofar as it seeks to prevent Meling from taking the Lawyers Oath
and signing the Roll of Attorneys, moot and academic.
On the other hand, the prayer in the same Petition for the Court to impose the appropriate sanctions upon
him as a member of the Sharia Bar is ripe for resolution and has to be acted upon.
Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Sharia Court, is not a matter of right but merely a privilege
bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are also known to possess good moral
character.[8] The requirement of good moral character is not only a condition precedent to admission to the
practice of law, its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of law.[9]
The standard form issued in connection with the application to take the 2002 Bar Examinations requires the
applicant to aver that he or she has not been charged with any act or omission punishable by law, rule or
regulation before a fiscal, judge, officer or administrative body, or indicted for, or accused or convicted by any
court or tribunal of, any offense or crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there any pending case or charge
against him/her. Despite the declaration required by the form, Meling did not reveal that he has three pending
criminal cases. His deliberate silence constitutes concealment, done under oath at that.
The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court to determine whether there is satisfactory evidence of
good moral character of the applicant.[10] The nature of whatever cases are pending against the applicant would
aid the Court in determining whether he is endowed with the moral fitness demanded of a lawyer. By concealing
the existence of such cases, the applicant then flunks the test of fitness even if the cases are ultimately proven
to be unwarranted or insufficient to impugn or affect the good moral character of the applicant.
Melings concealment of the fact that there are three (3) pending criminal cases against him speaks of his
lack of the requisite good moral character and results in the forfeiture of the privilege bestowed upon him as a
member of the Sharia Bar.
Moreover, his use of the appellation Attorney, knowing fully well that he is not entitled to its use, cannot go
unchecked. In Alawi v. Alauya,[11] the Court had the occasion to discuss the impropriety of the use of the title
Attorney by members of the Sharia Bar who are not likewise members of the Philippine Bar. The respondent
therein, an executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Sharia District in Marawi City, used the title Attorney in
several correspondence in connection with the rescission of a contract entered into by him in his private
capacity.The Court declared that:
persons who pass the Sharia Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence, may only practice
law before Sharia courts. While one who has been admitted to the Sharia Bar, and one who has been admitted
to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered counselors, in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a
professional capacity, only the latter is an attorney. The title attorney is reserved to those who, having obtained
the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are
authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.[12]
The judiciary has no place for dishonest officers of the court, such as Meling in this case. The solemn task
of administering justice demands that those who are privileged to be part of service therein, from the highest
official to the lowliest employee, must not only be competent and dedicated, but likewise live and practice the
virtues of honesty and integrity. Anything short of this standard would diminish the public's faith in the Judiciary
and constitutes infidelity to the constitutional tenet that a public office is a public trust.
In Leda v. Tabang, supra, the respondent concealed the fact of his marriage in his application to take the
Bar examinations and made conflicting submissions before the Court. As a result, we found the respondent
grossly unfit and unworthy to continue in the practice of law and suspended him therefrom until further orders
from the Court.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED insofar as it seeks the imposition of appropriate sanctions upon
Haron S. Meling as a member of the Philippine Sharia Bar. Accordingly, the membership of Haron S. Meling in
the Philippine Sharia Bar is hereby SUSPENDED until further orders from the Court, the suspension to take
effect immediately. Insofar as the Petition seeks to prevent Haron S. Meling from taking the Lawyers Oath and
signing the Roll of Attorneys as a member of the Philippine Bar, the same is DISMISSED for having become
moot and academic.
Copies of this Decision shall be circulated to all the Sharia Courts in the country for their information and
guidance.
19
 SO ORDERED.

CASE 6
THIRD DIVISION
[A.M. SDC-97-2-P. February 24, 1997]
SOPHIA ALAWI, complainant, vs. ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk of Court VI, Shari'a District Court, Marawi
City, respondent.
DECISION
NARVASA, C.J.:
Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales representative (or coordinator) of E. B. Villarosa &
Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent
20
executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City. They were classmates, and used to be
friends.
It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on installments by Alauya
of one of the housing units belonging to the above mentioned firm (hereafter, simply Villarosa & Co.); and in
connection therewith, a housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance
Corporation (NHMFC).
Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December 15, 1995, Alauya addressed a letter to the President
of Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of his contract with the company. He wrote:
" ** I am formally and officially withdrawing from and notifying you of my intent to terminate the
Contract/Agreement entered into between me and your company, as represented by your Sales
Agent/Coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, of your company's branch office here in Cagayan de Oro City, on the
grounds that my consent was vitiated by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of
confidence by the aforesaid sales agent which made said contract void ab initio. Said sales agent acting in bad
faith perpetrated such illegal and unauthorized acts which made said contract an Onerous Contract prejudicial
to my rights and interests."
He then proceeded to expound in considerable detail and quite acerbic language on the "grounds which could
evidence the bad faith, deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the
unscrupulous sales agent ** ;" and closed with the plea that Villarosa & Co. "agree for the mutual rescission of
our contract, even as I inform you that I categorically state on record that I am terminating the contract **. I hope
I do not have to resort to any legal action before said onerous and manipulated contract against my interest be
annulled. I was actually fooled by your sales agent, hence the need to annul the controversial contract."
Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-President of Villarosa & Co. at San Pedro, Gusa, Cagayan de
Oro City. The envelope containing it, and which actually went through the post, bore no stamps. Instead at the
right hand corner above the description of the addressee, the words, "Free Postage PD 26," had been typed.
On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya also wrote to Mr. Fermin T. Arzaga, Vice-President, Credit
& Collection Group of the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) at Salcedo Village, Makati
City, repudiating as fraudulent and void his contract with Villarosa & Co.; and asking for cancellation of his
housing loan in connection therewith, which was payable from salary deductions at the rate of P4,338.00 a
month. Among other things, he said:
" ** (T)hrough this written notice, I am terminating, as I hereby annul, cancel, rescind and voided, the
'manipulated contract' entered into between me and the E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd., as represented by
its sales agent/coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, who maliciously and fraudulently manipulated said contract and
unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan without my authority and against my will. Thus, the contract
itself is deemed to be void ab initio in view of the attending circumstances, that my consent was vitiated by
misrepresentation, fraud, deceit, dishonesty, and abuse of confidence; and that there was no meeting of the
minds between me and the swindling sales agent who concealed the real facts from me."
And, as in his letter to Villarosa & Co., he narrated in some detail what he took to be the anomalous actuations
of Sophia Alawi.
Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga of the NHMFC, dated February 21, 1996, April 15, 1996, and
May 3, 1996, in all of which, for the same reasons already cited, he insisted on the cancellation of his housing
loan and discontinuance of deductions from his salary on account thereof.a He also wrote on January 18, 1996
to Ms. Corazon M. Ordoez, Head of the Fiscal Management & Budget Office, and to the Chief, Finance Division,
both of this Court, to stop deductions from his salary in relation to the loan in question, again asserting the
anomalous manner by which he was allegedly duped into entering into the contracts by "the scheming sales
agent."b
The upshot was that in May, 1996, the NHMFC wrote to the Supreme Court requesting it to stop deductions
on Alauya's UHLP loan "effective May 1996," and began negotiating with Villarosa & Co. "for the buy-back of **
(Alauya's) mortgage, and ** the refund of ** (his) payments."c
On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co. of December 15, 1995, Sophia Alawi filed with this Court a
verified complaint dated January 25, 1996 -- to which she appended a copy of the letter, and of the above
mentioned envelope bearing the typewritten words, "Free Postage PD 26."[1] In that complaint, she accused
Alauya of:
1. "Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid grounds through manifest ignorance and evident
bad faith;"
2. "Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and established reputation;"
3. "Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage **;" and
4. Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular members of the Philippine Bar may properly use.
She deplored Alauya's references to her as "unscrupulous, swindler, forger, manipulator, etc." without "even
a bit of evidence to cloth (sic) his allegations with the essence of truth," denouncing his imputations as
irresponsible, "all concoctions, lies, baseless and coupled with manifest ignorance and evident bad faith," and
asserting that all her dealings with Alauya had been regular and completely transparent. She closed with the
plea that Alauya "be dismissed from the service, or be appropriately disciplined (sic) ** "
The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment on the complaint. Conformably with established usage that
notices of resolutions emanate from the corresponding Office of the Clerk of Court, the notice of resolution in
this case was signed by Atty. Alfredo P. Marasigan, Assistant Division Clerk of Court.[2]

21
 Alauya first submitted a "Preliminary Comment"[3] in which he questioned the authority of Atty. Marasigan to
require an explanation of him, this power pertaining, according to him, not to "a mere Asst. Div. Clerk of Court
investigating an Executive Clerk of Court." but only to the District Judge, the Court Administrator or the Chief
Justice, and voiced the suspicion that the Resolution was the result of a "strong link" between Ms. Alawi and
Atty. Marasigan's office. He also averred that the complaint had no factual basis; Alawi was envious of him for
being not only "the Executive Clerk of court and ex-officio Provincial Sheriff and District Registrar," but also "a
scion of a Royal Family **."[4]
In a subsequent letter to Atty. Marasigan, but this time in much less aggressive, even obsequious
tones,[5] Alauya requested the former to give him a copy of the complaint in order that he might comment
thereon.[6] He stated that his acts as clerk of court were done in good faith and within the confines of the law;
and that Sophia Alawi as sales agent of Villarosa & Co. had, by falsifying his signature, fraudulently bound him
to a housing loan contract entailing monthly deductions of P4,333.10 from his salary.
And in his comment thereafter submitted under date of June 5, 1996, Alauya contended that it was he who
had suffered "undue injury, mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold financial suffering,"
considering that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary.[7] He declared that there
was no basis for the complaint; in communicating with Villarosa & Co. he had merely acted in defense of his
rights. He denied any abuse of the franking privilege, saying that he gave P20.00 plus transportation fare to a
subordinate whom he entrusted with the mailing of certain letters; that the words: "Free Postage PD 26," were
typewritten on the envelope by some other person, an averment corroborated by the affidavit of Absamen C.
Domocao, Clerk IV (subscribed and sworn to before respondent himself, and attached to the comment as Annex
J);[8] and as far as he knew, his subordinate mailed the letters with the use of the money he had given for postage,
and if those letters were indeed mixed with the official mail of the court, this had occurred inadvertently and
because of an honest mistake.[9]
Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is "lexically synonymous" with
"Counsellors-at-law," a title to which Shari'a lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the title of
"attorney" because "counsellor" is often mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal or the Maranao term "consial,"
connoting a local legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.
He pleads for the Court's compassion, alleging that what he did "is expected of any man unduly prejudiced
and injured."[10] He claims he was manipulated into reposing his trust in Alawi, a classmate and friend.[11] He was
induced to sign a blank contract on Alawi's assurance that she would show the completed document to him later
for correction, but she had since avoided him; despite "numerous letters and follow-ups" he still does not know
where the property -- subject of his supposed agreement with Alawi's principal, Villarosa & Co. -- is situated;[12] He
says Alawi somehow got his GSIS policy from his wife, and although she promised to return it the next day, she
did not do so until after several months. He also claims that in connection with his contract with Villarosa & Co.,
Alawi forged his signature on such pertinent documents as those regarding the down payment, clearance, lay-
out, receipt of the key of the house, salary deduction, none of which he ever saw.[13]
Averring in fine that his acts in question were done without malice, Alauya prays for the dismissal of the
complaint for lack of merit, it consisting of "fallacious, malicious and baseless allegations," and complainant Alawi
having come to the Court with unclean hands, her complicity in the fraudulent housing loan being apparent and
demonstrable.
It may be mentioned that in contrast to his two (2) letters to Assistant Clerk of Court Marasigan (dated April
19, 1996 and April 22, 1996), and his two (2) earlier letters both dated December 15, 1996 -- all of which he
signed as "Atty. Ashary M. Alauya" -- in his Comment of June 5, 1996, he does not use the title but refers to
himself as "DATU ASHARY M. ALAUYA."
The Court referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and
recommendation.[14]
The first accusation against Alauya is that in his aforesaid letters, he made "malicious and libelous charges
(against Alawi) with no solid grounds through manifest ignorance and evident bad faith," resulting in "undue injury
to (her) and blemishing her honor and established reputation." In those letters, Alauya had written inter alia that:
1) Alawi obtained his consent to the contracts in question "by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud,
dishonesty and abuse of confidence;"
2) Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated ** illegal and unauthorized acts ** ** prejudicial to ** (his) rights and
interests;"
3) Alawi was an "unscrupulous (and "swindling") sales agent" who had fooled him by "deceit, fraud,
misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;" and
4) Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently manipulated the contract with Villarosa & Co., and unlawfully secured
and pursued the housing loan without ** (his) authority and against ** (his) will," and "concealed the real facts
**."
Alauya's defense essentially is that in making these statements, he was merely acting in defense of his
rights, and doing only what "is expected of any man unduly prejudiced and injured," who had suffered "mental
anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold financial suffering," considering that in six months, a
total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary.[15]
The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA
6713) inter alia enunciates the State policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in
the public service.[16] Section 4 of the Code commands that "(p)ublic officials and employees ** at all times
respect the rights of others, and ** refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public
22
policy, public order, public safety and public interest."[17] More than once has this Court emphasized that "the
conduct and behavior of every official and employee of an agency involved in the administration of justice, from
the presiding judge to the most junior clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility.
Their conduct must at all times be characterized by, among others, strict propriety and decorum so as to earn
and keep the respect of the public for the judiciary."[18]
Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with good morals, good customs or public policy, or respect
for the rights of others, to couch denunciations of acts believed -- however sincerely -- to be deceitful, fraudulent
or malicious, in excessively intemperate. insulting or virulent language. Alauya is evidently convinced that he has
a right of action against Sophia Alawi. The law requires that he exercise that right with propriety, without malice
or vindictiveness, or undue harm to anyone; in a manner consistent with good morals, good customs, public
policy, public order, supra; or otherwise stated, that he "act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe
honesty and good faith."[19] Righteous indignation, or vindication of right cannot justify resort to vituperative
language, or downright name-calling. As a member of the Shari'a Bar and an officer of a Court, Alawi is subject
to a standard of conduct more stringent than for most other government workers. As a man of the law, he may
not use language which is abusive, offensive, scandalous, menacing, or otherwise improper.[20] As a judicial
employee, it is expected that he accord respect for the person and the rights of others at all times, and that his
every act and word should be characterized by prudence, restraint, courtesy, dignity. His radical deviation from
these salutary norms might perhaps be mitigated, but cannot be excused, by his strongly held conviction that he
had been grievously wronged.
As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had occasion to declare that persons
who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before
Shari'a courts.[21] While one who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the
Philippine Bar, may both be considered "counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a
professional capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title of "attorney" is reserved to those who, having
obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been
admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they
only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.
Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or "counsellor-at-law," because in his region,
there are pejorative connotations to the term, or it is confusingly similar to that given to local legislators. The
ratiocination, valid or not, is of no moment. His disinclination to use the title of "counsellor" does not warrant his
use of the title of attorney.
Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged unauthorized use of the franking privilege, the record contains no
evidence adequately establishing the accusation.
WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for the use of excessively
intemperate, insulting or virulent language, i.e., language unbecoming a judicial officer, and for usurping the title
of attorney; and he is warned that any similar or other impropriety or misconduct in the future will be dealt with
more severely.
SO ORDERED.

CASE 7
EN BANC
[A.C. No. 4838. July 29, 2003]
EMILIO GRANDE, complainant, vs. ATTY. EVANGELINE DE SILVA, respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Complainant Emilio Grande was the private offended party in Criminal Cases Nos. 96-1346 to 96-1353, filed
with the Regional Trial Court of Marikina City, Branch 273, for Estafa and Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22,
entitled People of the Philippines, Plaintiff versus Sergio Natividad, Accused. During the proceedings,
respondent Atty. Evangeline de Silva, counsel for the accused, tendered to complainant Check No. 0023638 in
the amount of P144,768.00, drawn against her account with the Philippine National Bank, as settlement of the
civil aspect of the case against her client. Complainant refused to accept the check, but respondent assured him
23
that the same will be paid upon its presentment to her drawee bank. She manifested that as a lawyer, she would
not issue a check which is not sufficiently funded. Thus, respondent was prevailed upon by complainant to accept
the check. Consequently, he desisted from participating as a complaining witness in the criminal case, which led
to the dismissal of the same and the release of the accused, Sergio Natividad.
When complainant deposited the check, the same was returned unpaid by the drawee bank for the reason:
Account Closed. On June 19, 1997, complainant wrote a letter to respondent demanding that she pay the face
value of the check.[1] However, his demand was ignored by respondent; hence, he instituted a criminal complaint
against her for Estafa and Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 with the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Marikina, which was docketed as I.S. No. 97-1036. On September 22, 1997, the Marikina City Prosecutor filed
the necessary information for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 against respondent Atty. Evangeline de
Silva.[2]
On November 10, 1997, complainant filed the instant administrative complaint for disbarment of respondent
for deceit and violation of the Lawyers Oath.[3]
In a Resolution dated February 2, 1998 sent to respondents given address at Carmelo Compound, Newton
Avenue, Mayamot, Antipolo City, she was required to comment on the complaint within ten (10) days from
notice.[4] However, it was returned unserved with the notation Moved.[5] The Assistant National Secretary of the
IBP submitted the latest address of respondent as 274 M.H. Del Pilar Street, Pasig City.[6]
On June 20, 2001, another resolution requiring respondent to comment on the administrative complaint filed
against her was served at the aforesaid address. This was again returned unserved with the notation:
Refused. Thus, the case was referred to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) for investigation,
report and recommendation.[7]
In a Report dated December 6, 2001, Investigating Commissioner Florimond C. Rous found respondent
guilty of deceit, gross misconduct and violation of the Lawyers Oath. Thus, he recommended that respondent
be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years.
On October 19, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No. XV-2002-554 which adopted the
recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for
two (2) years.
We fully agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.
The record shows that respondent prevailed upon complainant to accept her personal check by way of
settlement for the civil liability of her client, Sergio Natividad, with the assurance that the check will have sufficient
funds when presented for payment. In doing so, she deceived complainant into withdrawing his complaint against
her client in exchange for a check which she drew against a closed account.
It is clear that the breach of trust committed by respondent in issuing a bouncing check amounted to deceit
and constituted a violation of her oath, for which she should be accordingly penalized.[8] Such an act constitutes
gross misconduct and the penalties for such malfeasance is prescribed by Rule 138, Section 27of the Rules of
Court, to wit:
SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefore. A member of the bar
may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or
other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to
practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so.
The nature of the office of an attorney requires that a lawyer shall be a person of good moral character. Since
this qualification is a condition precedent to a license to enter upon the practice of law, the maintenance thereof
is equally essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. Gross misconduct
which puts the lawyers moral character in serious doubt may render her unfit to continue in the practice of law.[9]
The loss of moral character of a lawyer for any reason whatsoever shall warrant her suspension or
disbarment,[10] because it is important that members of the legal brotherhood must conform to the highest
standards of morality.[11] Any wrongdoing which indicates moral unfitness for the profession, whether it be
professional or non-professional, justifies disciplinary action. Thus, a lawyer may be disciplined for evading
payment of a debt validly incurred. Such conduct is unbecoming and does not speak well of a member of the
bar, for a lawyers professional and personal conduct must at all times be kept beyond reproach and above
suspicion.[12]
Moreover, the attitude of respondent in deliberately refusing to accept the notices served on her betrays a
deplorably willful character or disposition which stains the nobility of the legal profession.[13] Her conduct not only
underscores her utter lack of respect for authority; it also brings to the fore a darker and more sinister character
flaw in her psyche which renders highly questionable her moral fitness to continue in the practice of law: a
defiance for law and order which is at the very core of her profession.
Such defiance is anathema to those who seek a career in the administration of justice because obedience to
the dictates of the law and justice is demanded of every lawyer. How else would respondent even endeavor to
serve justice and uphold the law when she disdains to follow even simple directives? Indeed, the first and
foremost command of the Code of Professional Responsibility could not be any clearer:
CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND
AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LEGAL PROCESSES.
Needless to state, respondents persistent refusal to comply with lawful orders directed at her with not even
an explanation for doing so is contumacious conduct which merits no compassion. The duty of a lawyer is to
uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession at all times. She can only do this by faithfully performing
24
her duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to her clients.[14] We can not tolerate any misconduct that tends
to besmirch the fair name of an honorable profession.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent ATTY. EVANGELINE DE SILVA is SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for a period of Two (2) Years, effective upon receipt hereof. Let copies of this Decision be
entered in her record as attorney and be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and all courts in the
country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

CASE 8
EN BANC
[BAR MATTER No. 712. March 19, 1997]
RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYER'S OATH
RESOLUTION
PADILLA, J.:
Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar examinations held in 1993. The Court however deferred his
oath-taking due to his previous conviction for Reckless Imprudence Resulting In Homicide.
The criminal case which resulted in petitioner' s conviction, arose from the death of a neophyte during
fraternity initiation rites sometime in September 1991. Petitioner and seven (7) other accused initially entered
pleas of not guilty to homicide charges. The eight (8) accused later withdrew their initial pleas and upon re-
arraignment all pleaded guilty to reckless imprudence resulting in homicide.
On the basis of such pleas, the trial court rendered judgment dated 11 February 1993 imposing on each of
the accused a sentence of imprisonment of from two (2) years four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years.
On 18 June 1993, the trial court granted herein petitioner's application for probation.
On 11 April 1994, the trial court issued an order approving a report dated 6 April 1994 submitted by the
Probation Officer recommending petitioner's discharge from probation
On 14 April 1994, petitioner filed before this Court a petition to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath based
on the order of his discharge from probation.
On 13 July 1995, the Court through then Senior Associate Justice Florentino P. Feliciano issued a resolution
requiring petitioner Al C. Argosino to submit to the Court evidence that he may now be regarded as complying
with the requirement of good moral character imposed upon those seeking admission to the bar.
In compliance with the above resolution, petitioner submitted no less than fifteen (15) certifications/letters
executed by among others two (2) senators, five (5) trial court judges, and six (6) members of religious orders.
Petitioner likewise submitted evidence that a scholarship foundation had been established in honor of Raul
Camaligan, the hazing victim, through joint efforts of the latter's family and the eight (8) accused in the criminal
case.
On 26 September 1995, the Court required Atty Gilbert Camaligan, father of Raul, to comment on petitioner's
prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer's oath.
In his comment dated 4 December 1995, Atty. Camaligan states that:
a. He still believes that the infliction of severe physical injuries which led to the death of his son was
deliberate rather than accidental. The offense therefore was not only homicide but murder since the accused
took advantage of the neophyte's helplessness implying abuse of confidence, taking advantage of superior
strength and treachery.
b. He consented to the accused's plea of guilt to the lesser offense of reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide only out of pity for the mothers of the accused and a pregnant wife of one of the accused who went
to their house on Christmas day 1991 and Maundy Thursday 1992, literally on their knees, crying and
begging for forgiveness and compassion. They also told him that the father of one of the accused had died
of a heart attack upon learning of his son's involvement in the incident.
c. As a Christian, he has forgiven petitioner and his co-accused for the death of his son. However, as a
loving father who had lost a son whom he had hoped would succeed him in his law practice, he still feels
the pain of an untimely demise and the stigma of the gruesome manner of his death.
d. He is not in a position to say whether petitioner is now morally fit for admission to the bar. He therefore
submits the matter to the sound discretion of the Court.
The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the strict intellectual and moral
qualifications required of lawyers who are instruments in the effective and efficient administration o f justice. It is
the sworn duty of this Court not only to "weed out" lawyers who have become a disgrace to the noble profession
of the law but, also of equal importance, to prevent "misfits" from taking the lawyer' s oath, thereby further
tarnishing the public image of lawyers which in recent years has undoubtedly become less than irreproachable.
The resolution of the issue before us required a weighing and re-weighing of the reasons for allowing or
disallowing petitioner's admission to the practice of law. The senseless beatings inf1icted upon Raul Camaligan
constituted evident absence of that moral fitness required for admission to the bar since they were totally
irresponsible, irrelevant and uncalled for.
25
 In the 13 July 1995 resolution in this case we stated:
"x x x participation in the prolonged and mindless physical behavior, [which] makes impossible a finding that
the participant [herein petitioner] was then possessed of good moral character."[1]
In the same resolution, however, we stated that the Court is prepared to consider de novo the question of
whether petitioner has purged himself of the obvious deficiency in moral character referred to above.
Before anything else, the Court understands and shares the sentiment of Atty. Gilbert Camaligan. The death
of one's child is, for a parent, a most traumatic experience. The suffering becomes even more pronounced and
profound in cases where the death is due to causes other than natural or accidental but due to the reckless
imprudence of third parties. The feeling then becomes a struggle between grief and anger directed at the cause
of death.
Atty. Camaligan's statement before the Court manifesting his having forgiven the accused is no less than
praiseworthy and commendable. It is exceptional for a parent, given the circumstances in this cases, to find room
for forgiveness.
However, Atty. Camaligan admits that he is still not in a position to state if petitioner is now morally fit to be
a lawyer.
After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow petitioner Al Caparros Argosino to take the
lawyer's oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal profession with the following admonition:
In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not inherently
of bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications show that he is a devout Catholic with a genuine
concern for civic duties and public service.
The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for the death of Raul Camaligan.
We are prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general tendency of youth to
be rash, temerarious and uncalculating.
We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is NOT a mere ceremony or formality for practicing law.
Every lawyer should at ALL TIMES weigh his actions according to the sworn promises he makes when taking
the lawyer's oath. If all lawyers conducted themselves strictly according to the lawyer's oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility, the administration of justice will undoubtedly be faster, fairer and easier for everyone
concerned.
The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino will continue with the assistance he has been giving to his
community. As a lawyer he will now be in a better position to render legal and other services to the more
unfortunate members of society.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, petitioner Al Caparros Argosino is hereby ALLOWED to take the lawyer's oath
on a date to be set by the Court, to sign the Roll of Attorneys and, thereafter, to practice the legal profession.
SO ORDERED.

CASE 9
EN BANC
[A.C. No. 4148. July 30, 1998]
REMEDIOS RAMIREZ TAPUCAR, complainant, vs. ATTY. LAURO L. TAPUCAR, respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
In a letter-complaint dated November 22, 1993, complainant Remedios Ramirez Tapucar sought the
disbarment of her husband, Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar, on the ground of continuing grossly immoral conduct for
cohabiting with a certain Elena (Helen) Pea under scandalous circumstances.[1]
Prior to this complaint, respondent was already administratively charged four times for conduct unbecoming
an officer of the court. in Administrative Matter No. 1740, resolved on April 11, 1980, respondent, at that time the
Judge of Butuan City, was meted the penalty of six months suspension without pay,[2] while in Administrative
Matter Nos. 1720, 1911 and 2300-CFI, which were consolidated,[3] this Court on January 31, 1981 ordered the
separation from service of respondent.[4]
Now he faces disbarment.
The records reveal the following facts:
From the Report and Recommendation of the Commission on Bar Discipline, it appears that complainant
and respondent were married on October 29, 1953 at the Sacred Heart Roman Catholic Church in Quezon
City. They established their residence in Antipolo, Rizal, were eight of their eleven children were born. In 1962
respondent relocated his family to Dadiangas, Cotabato (Now General Santos City), where his last three children
were born and where he practiced his profession until his appointment as a CFI Judge in Butuan City on January
30, 1976.
In August, 1976, shortly after being appointed as CFI Judge, respondent began cohabiting with a certain
Elena (Helen) Pea, in Nasipit, Agusan Del Norte. On December 28, 1977 Elena gave birth to their first child,
named Ofelia Sembrano Pea.

26
 In view of this cohabitation, a certain Atty. Tranquilino Calo filed an administrative complaint against
respondent for immorality. After investigation, the penalty of suspension from office for a period of six months
without pay was meted by this Court upon respondent.[5]
Despite this penalty, respondent still continued to cohabit with Elena, giving rise to another charge of
immorality and other administrative cases, such as conduct unbecoming an officer of the court, and grossly
immoral conduct. These cases were consolidated and after investigation, this Court ordered his dismissal and
separation from the service.[6]
But his dismissal as a judge did not impel respondent to mend his ways. He continued living with Elena,
which resulted in the birth on September 20, 1989, of their second child named Laella Pea Tapucar. Moreover,
he completely abandoned complainant and his children by her.
Respondent later moved from Nasipit, Agusan del Norte back to Antipolo, Rizal, bringing along Elena and
their two children. And onMarch 5, 1992, respondent contracted marriage with Elena in a ceremony solemnized
by Metropolitan Trial Court Judge Isagani A. Geronimo of Antipolo, Rizal. This was done while the respondents
marriage to complainant subsists, as nothing on record shows the dissolution thereof.
Complainant, in the meanwhile, had migrated to United States of America upon her retirement from the
government service in 1990.However, her children, who remained in Antipolo, kept her posted of the misery they
allegedly suffered because of their fathers acts, including deception and intrigues against them. Thus, despite
having previously withdrawn a similar case which she filed in 1976, complainant was forced to file the present
petition for disbarment under the compulsion of the material impulse to shield and protect her children from the
despotic and cruel acts of their own father. Complainant secured the assistance of her eldest daughter, Atty. Ma.
Susana Tapucar-Baua, to represent her in this case.
Consistent with Section 20, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, the matter was referred to the Commission
on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation. After
conducting a thorough investigation, the Commission through Commissioner Victor C. Fernandez recommended
that respondent be disbarred, and his name be stricken off the roll of attorneys.Mainly, this was premised on the
ground that, notwithstanding sanctions previously imposed upon him by the Honorable Supreme Court,
respondent continued the illicit liaison with Elena.[7]
In his report Commissioner Fernandez noted that, instead of contradicting the charges against him,
respondent displayed arrogance, and even made a mockery of the law and the Court, as when he said:
I have been ordered suspended by Supreme Court for two months without pay in 1980 for having a mistress,
the same girl Ms. Elena (Helen) Pea, now my wife. Being ordered separated in later administrative case
constitute double jeopardy. If now disbarred for marrying Ms. Elena Pea will constitute triple jeopardy. If thats
the law so be it.[8]
Based on said report, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, passed on May 17,
1997, a Resolution adopting the Commissioners recommendation, as follows:
RESOLUTION NO. XII-97-97
Adm. Case No. 4148
Remedios Ramirez Tapucar vs. Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-titled case, herein made part of the
Resolution/Decision as Annex A; and, finding the recommendation therein to be fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, Respondent Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar is hereby
DISBARRED and that his name be stricken off the roll of attorneys.
We find the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Fernandez, as approved and adopted by the
Board of Governors of IBP, more than sufficient to justify and support the foregoing Resolution, herein considered
as the recommendation to this Court by said Board pursuant to Rule 139-B, Sec. 12(b), of the Rules of Court.* We
are in agreement that respondents actuations merit the penalty of disbarment.
Well settled is the rule that good moral character is not only a condition precedent for admission to the legal
profession, but it must also remain intact in order to maintain ones good standing in that exclusive and honored
fraternity.[9] There is perhaps no profession after that of the sacred ministry in which a high-toned morality is
more imperative than that of law.[10] The Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that:
Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
Rule 7.03 A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.*
As this Court often reminds members of the Bar, they must live up to the standards and norms expected of
the legal profession, by upholding the ideals and tenets embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility
always. Lawyers must maintain a high standards of legal proficiency, as well as morality including honesty,
integrity and fair dealing. For they are at all times subject to the scrutinizing eye of public opinion and community
approbation. Needless to state, those whose conduct both public and private fails this scrutiny would have to be
disciplined and, after appropriate proceedings, penalized accordingly.
Moreover, it should be recalled that respondent here was once a member of the judiciary, a fact that
aggravates this professional infractions. For having occupied that place of honor in the Bench, he knew a judges
actuations ought to be free from any appearance of impropriety.[11] For a judge is the visible representation of
the law, more importantly, of justice. Ordinary citizens consider him as a source of strength that fortifies their will
to obey the law.[12] Indeed, a judge should avoid the slightest infraction of the law in all of his actuations, lest it
27
be a demoralizing example to others.[13] Surely, respondent could not have forgotten the Code of Judicial
Conduct entirely as to lose its moral imperatives.[14]
Like a judge who is held to a high standard of integrity and ethical conduct,[15] an attorney-at-law is also
invested with public trust.Judges and lawyers serve in the administration of justice. Admittedly, as officers of the
court, lawyers must ensure the faith and confidence of the public that justice is administered with dignity and
civility. A high degree or moral integrity is expected of a lawyer in the community where he resides. He must
maintain due regard for public decency in an orderly society.
A lawyer is expected at all times to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession by faithfully
performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients.[16] Exacted from him, as a member of
the profession charged with the responsibility to stand as a shield in the defense of what is right, are such positive
qualities of decency, truthfulness and responsibility that have been compendiously described as moral character.
To achieve such end, every lawyer needs to strive at all times to honor and maintain the dignity of his profession,
and thus improve not only the public regard for the Bar but also the administration of justice.
On these considerations, the Court may disbar or suspend a lawyer for misconduct, whether in his
professional or private capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity, and good
demeanor, thus proving unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.[17]
The power to disbar, however, is one to be exercised with great caution, and only in a clear case of
misconduct which seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court of and
member of the bar.[18] For disbarment proceedings are intended to afford the parties thereto full opportunity to
vindicate their cause before disciplinary action is taken, to assure the general public that those who are tasked
with the duty of administering justice are competent, honorable, trustworthy men and women in whom the Courts
and the clients may repose full confidence.
In the case of Obusan vs. Obusan, Jr.,[19] a complaint for disbarment was filed against a member of the bar
by his wife. She was able to prove that he had abandoned his wife and their son; and that he had adulterous
relations with a married but separated woman. Respondent was not able to overcome the evidence presented
by his wife that he was guilty of grossly immoral conduct. In another case,[20] a lawyer was disbarred when he
abandoned his lawful wife and cohabited with another woman who had borne him a child. The Court held that
respondent failed to maintain the highest degree of morality expected and required of a member of a bar.
In the present case, the record shows that despite previous sanctions imposed upon by this Court,
respondent continued his illicit liaison with a woman other than lawfully-wedded wife. The report of the
Commissioner assigned to investigate thoroughly the complaint found respondent far from contrite; on the
contrary, he exhibited a cavalier attitude, even arrogance; in the face of charges against him. The IBP Board of
Governors, tasked to determine whether he still merited the privileges extended to a member of the legal
profession, resolved the matter against him. For indeed, evidence of grossly immoral conduct abounds against
him and could not be explained away. Keeping a mistress, entering into another marriage while a prior one still
subsists, as well as abandoning and/or mistreating complainant and their children, show his disregard of family
obligations, morality and decency, the law and the lawyers oath. Such gross misbehavior over a long period of
time clearly shows a serious flaw in respondents character, his moral indifference to scandal in the community,
and his outright defiance of established norms. All these could not but put the legal profession in disrepute and
place the integrity of the administration of justice in peril, hence the need for strict but appropriate disciplinary
action.
IN VIEW THEREOF, respondent Atty. Lauro L. Tapucar is hereby DISBARRED. The Clerk of Court is
directed to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.

28
CASE 10
Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila

EN BANC

MAELOTISEA S. GARRIDO, A.C. No. 6593

Complainant,
Present:
PUNO, C.J.,
CARPIO,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA,
- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
BRION,
PERALTA,
BERSAMIN,
DEL CASTILLO,
*
ABAD,
VILLARAMA, JR.,
PEREZ, and
**
ATTYS. ANGEL E. GARRIDO and MENDOZA, JJ.
ROMANA P. VALENCIA, Promulgated:
Respondents. ______________

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

PER CURIAM:

Maelotisea Sipin Garrido filed a complaint-affidavit[1] and a supplemental affidavit[2] for disbarment against
the respondents Atty. Angel E. Garrido (Atty. Garrido) and Atty. Romana P.Valencia (Atty. Valencia) before the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Discipline charging them with gross immorality. The
complaint-affidavit states:

1. That I am the legal wife of Atty. Angel E. Garrido by virtue of our marriage on June 23, 1962
at San Marcelino Church, Ermita, Manila which was solemnized by Msgr. Daniel Cortes x x x

29
 2. That our marriage blossomed into having us blessed with six (6) children, namely, Mat
Elizabeth, Arnel Angelito, Madeleine Eloiza, Arnel Angelo, Arnel Victorino and Madonna
Angeline, all surnamed Garrido;

3. xxxx

4. That on May, 1991, during my light moments with our children, one of my daughters,
Madeleine confided to me that sometime on the later part of 1987, an unknown caller talked
with her claiming that the former is a child of my husband. I ignored it and dismissed it as a
mere joke. But when May Elizabeth, also one of my daughters told me that sometime on
August 1990, she saw my husband strolling at the Robinsons Department Store at Ermita,
Manila together with a woman and a child who was later identified as Atty. Ramona Paguida
Valencia and Angeli Ramona Valencia Garrido, respectively x x x

5. xxxx

6. That I did not stop from unearthing the truth until I was able to secure the Certificate of Live
Birth of the child, stating among others that the said child is their daughter and that Atty. Angel
Escobar Garrido and Atty. Romana Paguida Valencia were married at Hongkong sometime
on 1978.

7. That on June 1993, my husband left our conjugal home and joined Atty. Ramona Paguida
Valencia at their residence x x x

8. That since he left our conjugal home he failed and still failing to give us our needed financial
support to the prejudice of our children who stopped schooling because of financial
constraints.

xxxx

That I am also filing a disbarment proceedings against his mistress as alleged in the same
affidavit, Atty. Romana P. Valencia considering that out of their immoral acts I suffered not only
mental anguish but also besmirch reputation, wounded feelings and sleepless nights; x x x

In his Counter-Affidavit,[3] Atty. Garrido denied Maelotiseas charges and imputations. By way of defense,
he alleged that Maelotisea was not his legal wife, as he was already married to Constancia David (Constancia)
when he married Maelotisea. He claimed he married Maelotisea after he and Constancia parted ways. He further
alleged that Maelotisea knew all his escapades and understood his bad boy image before she married him in
1962. As he and Maelotisea grew apart over the years due to financial problems, Atty. Garrido met Atty. Valencia.
He became close to Atty. Valencia to whom he confided his difficulties. Together, they resolved his personal
problems and his financial difficulties with his second family. Atty. Garrido denied that he failed to give financial
support to his children with Maelotisea, emphasizing that all his six (6) children were educated in private schools;
all graduated from college except for Arnel Victorino, who finished a special secondary course.[4] Atty. Garrido
alleged that Maelotisea had not been employed and had not practiced her profession for the past ten (10) years.

Atty. Garrido emphasized that all his marriages were contracted before he became a member of the bar
on May 11, 1979, with the third marriage contracted after the death of Constancia on December 26, 1977.
Likewise, his children with Maelotisea were born before he became a lawyer.

In her Counter-Affidavit,[5] Atty. Valencia denied that she was the mistress of Atty. Garrido. She explained
that Maelotisea was not the legal wife of Atty. Garrido since the marriage between them was void from the
beginning due to the then existing marriage of Atty. Garrido with Constancia. Atty. Valencia claimed that
Maelotisea knew of the romantic relationship between her and Atty. Garrido, as they (Maelotisea and
Atty. Valencia) met in 1978. Maelotisea kept silent about her relationship with Atty. Garrido and had maintained
this silence when she (Atty. Valencia) financially helped Atty. Garrido build a house for his second family. Atty.
Valencia alleged that Maelotisea was not a proper party to this suit because of her silence; she kept silent when
things were favorable and beneficial to her. Atty. Valencia also alleged that Maelotisea had no cause of action
against her.

In the course of the hearings, the parties filed the following motions before the IBP Commission on Bar
Discipline:

First, the respondents filed a Motion for Suspension of Proceedings[6] in view of the criminal complaint
for concubinage Maelotisea filed against them, and the Petition for Declaration of Nullity[7] (of marriage) Atty.

30
Garrido filed to nullify his marriage to Maelotisea. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline denied this motion for
lack of merit.

Second, the respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss[8] the complaints after the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City declared the marriage between Atty. Garrido and Maelotisea an absolute nullity. Since Maelotisea
was never the legal wife of Atty. Garrido, the respondents argued that she had no personality to file her
complaints against them. The respondents also alleged that they had not committed any immoral act since they
married when Atty. Garrido was already a widower, and the acts complained of were committed before his
admission to the bar. The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline also denied this motion.[9]

Third, Maelotisea filed a motion for the dismissal of the complaints she filed against the respondents,
arguing that she wanted to maintain friendly relations with Atty. Garrido, who is the father of her six (6)
children.[10] The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline likewise denied this motion.[11]

On April 13, 2004, Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan (Investigating Commissioner San
Juan) submitted her Report and Recommendation for the respondents disbarment.[12] The Commission on Bar
Discipline of the IBP Board of Governors (IBP Board of Governors) approved and adopted this recommendation
with modification under Resolution No. XVI-2004-375 dated July 30, 2004. This resolution in part states:

x x x finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable
laws and rules, and considering that Atty. Garrido exhibited conduct which lacks the degree of
morality required as members of the bar, Atty. Angel E. Garrido is hereby DISBARRED for gross
immorality. However, the case against Atty. Romana P. Valencia is hereby DISMISSED for lack
of merit of the complaint.

Atty. Garrido moved to reconsider this resolution, but the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline denied his motion
under Resolution No. XVII-2007-038 dated January 18, 2007.

Atty. Garrido now seeks relief with this Court through the present petition for review. He submits that under the
circumstances, he did not commit any gross immorality that would warrant his disbarment. He also argues that
the offenses charged have prescribed under the IBP rules.

Additionally, Atty. Garrido pleads that he be allowed on humanitarian considerations to retain his
profession; he is already in the twilight of his life, and has kept his promise to lead an upright and irreproachable
life notwithstanding his situation.

In compliance with our Resolution dated August 25, 2009, Atty. Alicia A. Risos-Vidal (Atty. Risos-Vidal),
Director of the Commission on Bar Discipline, filed her Comment on the petition. She recommends a modification
of the penalty from disbarment to reprimand, advancing the view that disbarment is very harsh considering that
the 77-year old Atty. Garrido took responsibility for his acts and tried to mend his ways by filing a petition for
declaration of nullity of his bigamous marriage. Atty. Risos-Vidal also notes that no other administrative case has
ever been filed against Atty. Garrido.

THE COURTS RULING

After due consideration, we resolve to adopt the findings of the IBP Board of Governors against
Atty. Garrido, and to reject its recommendation with respect to Atty. Valencia.

General Considerations

Laws dealing with double jeopardy or with procedure such as the verification of pleadings and prejudicial
questions, or in this case, prescription of offenses or the filing of affidavits of desistance by the complainant do
not apply in the determination of a lawyers qualifications and fitness for membership in the Bar.[13] We have so
ruled in the past and we see no reason to depart from this ruling.[14] First, admission to the practice of law is a
component of the administration of justice and is a matter of public interest because it involves service to the
public.[15] The admission qualifications are also qualifications for the continued enjoyment of the privilege to
practice law. Second, lack of qualifications or the violation of the standards for the practice of law, like criminal
cases, is a matter of public concern that the State may inquire into through this Court. In this sense, the
complainant in a disbarment case is not a direct party whose interest in the outcome of the charge is wholly his
or her own;[16] effectively, his or her participation is that of a witness who brought the matter to the attention of
the Court.

31
 As applied to the present case, the time that elapsed between the immoral acts charged and the filing of
the complaint is not material in considering the qualification of Atty. Garrido when he applied for admission to
the practice of law, and his continuing qualification to be a member of the legal profession. From this perspective,
it is not important that the acts complained of were committed before Atty. Garrido was admitted to the practice
of law. As we explained in Zaguirre v. Castillo,[17] the possession of good moral character is both a condition
precedent and a continuing requirement to warrant admission to the bar and to retain membership in the legal
profession. Admission to the bar does not preclude a subsequent judicial inquiry, upon proper complaint, into
any question concerning the mental or moral fitness of the respondent before he became a lawyer.[18] Admission
to the practice only creates the rebuttable presumption that the applicant has all the qualifications to become a
lawyer; this may be refuted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary even after admission to the Bar.[19]

Parenthetically, Article VIII Section 5(5) of the Constitution recognizes the disciplinary authority of the
Court over the members of the Bar to be merely incidental to the Court's exclusive power to admit applicants to
the practice of law. Reinforcing the implementation of this constitutional authority is Section 27, Rule 138 of the
Rules of Court which expressly states that a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office
as attorney by the Supreme Court for, among others, any deceit, grossly immoral conduct, or violation of the
oath that he is required to take before admission to the practice of law.
In light of the public service character of the practice of law and the nature of disbarment proceedings as
a public interest concern, Maelotiseas affidavit of desistance cannot have the effect of discontinuing or abating
the disbarment proceedings. As we have stated, Maelotisea is more of a witness than a complainant in these
proceedings. We note further that she filed her affidavits of withdrawal only after she had presented her evidence;
her evidence are now available for the Courts examination and consideration, and their merits are not affected
by her desistance. We cannot fail to note, too, that Mealotisea filed her affidavit of desistance, not to disown or
refute the evidence she had submitted, but solely becuase of compassion (and, impliedly, out of concern for her
personal financial interest in continuing friendly relations with Atty. Garrido).

Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral indifference
to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the community.[20] Immoral conduct is gross when it is
so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when
committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the communitys sense of
decency.[21] We make these distinctions as the supreme penalty of disbarment arising from conduct requires
grossly immoral, not simply immoral, conduct.[22]

In several cases, we applied the above standard in considering lawyers who contracted an unlawful
second marriage or multiple marriages.

In Macarrubo v. Macarrubo,[23] the respondent lawyer entered into multiple marriages and subsequently
used legal remedies to sever them. We ruled that the respondents pattern of misconduct undermined the
institutions of marriage and family institutions that this society looks up to for the rearing of our children, for the
development of values essential to the survival and well-being of our communities, and for the strengthening of
our nation as a whole. In this light, no fate other than disbarment awaited the wayward respondent.

In Villasanta v. Peralta,[24] the respondent lawyer married the complainant while his marriage with his first
wife was subsisting. We held that the respondents act of contracting the second marriage was contrary to
honesty, justice, decency and morality. The lack of good moral character required by the Rules of Court
disqualified the respondent from admission to the Bar.

Similar to Villasanta was the case of Conjuangco, Jr. v. Palma,[25] where the respondent secretly
contracted a second marriage with the daughter of his client in Hongkong. We found that the respondent
exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of members of the Bar. In particular, he made a
mockery of marriage a sacred institution that demands respect and dignity. We also declared his act of
contracting a second marriage contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality.

In this case, the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the admissions of Atty. Garrido
established a pattern of gross immoral conduct that warrants his disbarment. His conduct was not only corrupt
or unprincipled; it was reprehensible to the highest degree.

First, Atty. Garrido admitted that he left Constancia to pursue his law studies; thereafter and during the
marriage, he had romantic relationships with other women. He had the gall to represent to this Court that the
study of law was his reason for leaving his wife; marriage and the study of law are not mutually exclusive.

Second, he misrepresented himself to Maelotisea as a bachelor, when in truth he was already married
to Constancia.[26] This was a misrepresentation given as an excuse to lure a woman into a prohibited relationship.

Third, Atty. Garrido contracted his second marriage with Maelotisea notwithstanding the subsistence of
his first marriage.This was an open admission, not only of an illegal liaison, but of the commission of a crime.
32
 Fourth, Atty. Garrido engaged in an extra-marital affair with Atty. Valencia while his two marriages were
in place and without taking into consideration the moral and emotional implications of his actions on the two
women he took as wives and on his six (6) children by his second marriage.

Fifth, instead of making legal amends to validate his marriage with Maelotisea upon the death of
Constancia, Atty. Garrido married Atty. Valencia who bore him a daughter.

Sixth, Atty. Garrido misused his legal knowledge and convinced Atty. Valencia (who was not then a
lawyer) that he was free to marry, considering that his marriage with Maelotisea was not valid.

Seventh, as the evidence on record implies, Atty. Garrido married Atty. Valencia in Hongkong in an
apparent attempt to accord legitimacy to a union entered into while another marriage was in place.

Eighth, after admission to the practice of law, Atty. Garrido simultaneously cohabited and had sexual
relations with two (2) women who at one point were both his wedded wives. He also led a double life with two
(2) families for a period of more than ten (10) years.

Lastly, Atty. Garrido petitioned for the nullity of his marriage to Maelotisea. Contrary to the position
advanced by Atty. Alicia A. Risos-Vidal, this was not an act of facing up to his responsibility or an act of mending
his ways. This was an attempt, using his legal knowledge, to escape liability for his past actions by having his
second marriage declared void after the present complaint was filed against him.

By his actions, Garrido committed multiple violations relating to the legal profession, specifically, violations of the
bar admission rules, of his lawyers oath, and of the ethical rules of the profession.

He did not possess the good moral character required of a lawyer at the time of his admission to the
Bar.[27] As a lawyer, he violated his lawyers oath,[28] Section 20(a) of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court,[29] and Canon
1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,[30] all of which commonly require him to obey the laws of the land. In
marrying Maelotisea, he committed the crime of bigamy, as he entered this second marriage while his first
marriage with Constancia was subsisting. He openly admitted his bigamy when he filed his petition to nullify his
marriage to Maelotisea.

He violated ethical rules of the profession, specifically, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which commands that he shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct; Canon 7 of the same Code, which demands that [a] lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity
and dignity of the legal profession; Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides
that, [a] lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor
should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal
profession.

As a lawyer, his community looked up to Atty. Garrido with the expectation and that he would set a good example
in promoting obedience to the Constitution and the laws. When he violated the law and distorted it to cater to his
own personal needs and selfish motives, he discredited the legal profession and created the public impression
that laws are mere tools of convenience that can be used, bended and abused to satisfy personal whims and
desires. In this case, he also used the law to free him from unwanted relationships.

The Court has often reminded the members of the bar to live up to the standards and norms expected of
the legal profession by upholding the ideals and principles embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility.[31] Lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality,
including honesty, integrity and fair dealing.[32] Lawyers are at all times subject to the watchful public eye and
community approbation.[33] Needless to state, those whose conduct both public and private fail this scrutiny have
to be disciplined and, after appropriate proceedings, accordingly penalized.[34]

Atty. Valencia

We agree with the findings of Investigating Commissioner San Juan that Atty. Valencia should be administratively
liable under the circumstances for gross immorality:

x x x The contention of respondent that they were not yet lawyers in March 27, 1978 when they
got married shall not afford them exemption from sanctions, for good moral character is required
as a condition precedent to admission to the Bar. Likewise there is no distinction whether the
misconduct was committed in the lawyers professional capacity or in his private life. Again, the
claim that his marriage to complainant was void ab initio shall not relieve respondents from
responsibility x x x Although the second marriage of the respondent was subsequently declared

33
 null and void the fact remains that respondents exhibited conduct which lacks that degree of
morality required of them as members of the Bar.[35]

Moral character is not a subjective term but one that corresponds to objective reality.[36] To have good
moral character, a person must have the personal characteristics of being good. It is not enough that he or she
has a good reputation, i.e., the opinion generally entertained about a person or the estimate in which he or she
is held by the public in the place where she is known.[37] The requirement of good moral character has four
general purposes, namely: (1) to protect the public; (2) to protect the public image of lawyers; (3) to protect
prospective clients; and (4) to protect errant lawyers from themselves.[38] Each purpose is as important as the
other.

Under the circumstances, we cannot overlook that prior to becoming a lawyer, Atty. Valencia already
knew that Atty. Garrido was a married man (either to Constancia or to Maelotisea), and that he already had a
family. As Atty. Garridos admitted confidante, she was under the moral duty to give him proper advice; instead,
she entered into a romantic relationship with him for about six (6) years during the subsistence of his two
marriages. In 1978, she married Atty. Garrido with the knowledge that he had an outstanding second marriage.
These circumstances, to our mind, support the conclusion that she lacked good moral character; even without
being a lawyer, a person possessed of high moral values, whose confidential advice was sought by another with
respect to the latters family problems, would not aggravate the situation by entering into a romantic liaison with
the person seeking advice, thereby effectively alienating the other persons feelings and affection from his wife
and family.

While Atty. Valencia contends that Atty. Garridos marriage with Maelotisea was null and void, the fact remains
that he took a man away from a woman who bore him six (6) children. Ordinary decency would have required
her to ward off Atty. Garridos advances, as he was a married man, in fact a twice-married man with both
marriages subsisting at that time; she should have said no to Atty. Garrido from the very start. Instead, she
continued her liaison with Atty. Garrido, driving him, upon the death of Constancia, away from legitimizing his
relationship with Maelotisea and their children. Worse than this, because of Atty. Valencias presence and
willingness, Atty. Garrido even left his second family and six children for a third marriage with her. This scenario
smacks of immorality even if viewed outside of the prism of law.

We are not unmindful of Atty. Valencias expressed belief that Atty. Garridos second marriage to
Maelotisea was invalid; hence, she felt free to marry Atty. Garrido. While this may be correct in the strict legal
sense and was later on confirmed by the declaration of the nullity of Atty. Garridos marriage to Maelotisea, we
do not believe at all in the honesty of this expressed belief.

The records show that Atty. Valencia consented to be married in Hongkong, not within the country. Given
that this marriage transpired before the declaration of the nullity of Atty. Garridos second marriage, we can only
call this Hongkong marriage a clandestine marriage, contrary to the Filipino tradition of celebrating a marriage
together with family. Despite Atty. Valencias claim that she agreed to marry Atty. Garrido only after he showed
her proof of his capacity to enter into a subsequent valid marriage, the celebration of their marriage in
Hongkong[39] leads us to the opposite conclusion; they wanted to marry in Hongkong for the added security of
avoiding any charge of bigamy by entering into the subsequent marriage outside Philippine jurisdiction. In this
regard, we cannot help but note that Atty. Valencia afterwards opted to retain and use her surname instead of
using the surname of her husband. Atty. Valencia, too, did not appear to mind that her husband did not live and
cohabit with her under one roof, but with his second wife and the family of this marriage. Apparently, Atty.
Valencia did not mind at all sharing her husband with another woman.This, to us, is a clear demonstration of
Atty. Valencias perverse sense of moral values.

Measured against the definition of gross immorality, we find Atty. Valencias actions grossly immoral. Her
actions were so corrupt as to approximate a criminal act, for she married a man who, in all appearances, was
married to another and with whom he has a family. Her actions were also unprincipled and reprehensible to a
high degree; as the confidante of Atty. Garrido, she preyed on his vulnerability and engaged in a romantic
relationship with him during the subsistence of his two previous marriages. As already mentioned, Atty. Valencias
conduct could not but be scandalous and revolting to the point of shocking the communitys sense of decency;
while she professed to be the lawfully wedded wife, she helped the second family build a house prior to her
marriage to Atty. Garrido, and did not object to sharing her husband with the woman of his second marriage.

We find that Atty. Valencia violated Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
as her behavior demeaned the dignity of and discredited the legal profession. She simply failed in her duty as a
lawyer to adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of morality.[40] In Barrientos v. Daarol,[41] we held that
lawyers, as officers of the court, must not only be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of good
moral character and must lead lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. Atty.
Valencia failed to live up to these standards before she was admitted to the bar and after she became a member
of the legal profession.
Conclusion
34
 Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. As a privilege bestowed by law through
the Supreme Court, membership in the Bar can be withdrawn where circumstances concretely show the lawyers
lack of the essential qualifications required of lawyers. We resolve to withdraw this privilege from Atty. Angel E.
Garrido and Atty. Rowena P. Valencia for this reason.

In imposing the penalty of disbarment upon the respondents, we are aware that the power to disbar is
one to be exercised with great caution and only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affects the standing
and character of the lawyer as a legal professional and as an officer of the Court.[42]

We are convinced from the totality of the evidence on hand that the present case is one of them. The
records show the parties pattern of grave and immoral misconduct that demonstrates their lack of mental and
emotional fitness and moral character to qualify them for the responsibilities and duties imposed on lawyers as
professionals and as officers of the court.

While we are keenly aware of Atty. Garridos plea for compassion and his act of supporting his children
with Maelotisea after their separation, we cannot grant his plea. The extent of his demonstrated violations of his
oath, the Rules of Court and of the Code of Professional Responsibility overrides what under other circumstances
are commendable traits of character.

In like manner, Atty. Valencias behavior over a long period of time unequivocally demonstrates a basic
and serious flaw in her character, which we cannot simply brush aside without undermining the dignity of the
legal profession and without placing the integrity of the administration of justice into question. She was not an
on-looker victimized by the circumstances, but a willing and knowing full participant in a love triangle whose
incidents crossed into the illicit.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to:

(1) DISBAR Atty. Angel E. Garrido from the practice of law for gross immorality, violation of the Lawyers
Oath; and violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility;
and

(2) DISBAR Atty. Romana P. Valencia from the practice of law for gross immorality, violation of Canon 7
and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Let a copy of this Decision be attached to the personal records of Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Romana
P. Valencia in the Office of the Bar Confidant, and another copy furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

The Clerk of Court is directed to strike out the names of Angel E. Garrido and Rowena P. Valencia from
the Roll of Attorneys.
SO ORDERED.

35