1
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-48006 July 8, 1942
FAUSTO BARREDO, petitioner,
vs.
SEVERINO GARCIA and TIMOTEA ALMARIO, respondents.
BOCOBO, J.:
This case comes up from the Court of Appeals which held the petitioner herein, Fausto Barredo, liable in
damages for the death of Faustino Garcia caused by the negligence of Pedro Fontanilla, a taxi driver employed
by said Fausto Barredo.
At about half past one in the morning of May 3, 1936, on the road between Malabon and Navotas, Province of
Rizal, there was a head-on collision between a taxi of the Malate Taxicab driven by Pedro Fontanilla and a
carretela guided by Pedro Dimapalis. The carretela was overturned, and one of its passengers, 16-year-old boy
Faustino Garcia, suffered injuries from which he died two days later. A criminal action was filed against
Fontanilla in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and he was convicted and sentenced to an indeterminate
sentence of one year and one day to two years of prision correccional. The court in the criminal case granted
the petition that the right to bring a separate civil action be reserved. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
sentence of the lower court in the criminal case. Severino Garcia and Timotea Almario, parents of the deceased
on March 7, 1939, brought an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila against Fausto Barredo as the sole
proprietor of the Malate Taxicab and employer of Pedro Fontanilla. On July 8, 1939, the Court of First Instance
of Manila awarded damages in favor of the plaintiffs for P2,000 plus legal interest from the date of the
complaint. This decision was modified by the Court of Appeals by reducing the damages to P1,000 with legal
interest from the time the action was instituted. It is undisputed that Fontanilla 's negligence was the cause of
the mishap, as he was driving on the wrong side of the road, and at high speed. As to Barredo's responsibility,
the Court of Appeals found:
... It is admitted that defendant is Fontanilla's employer. There is proof that he exercised the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage. (See p. 22, appellant's brief.) In
fact it is shown he was careless in employing Fontanilla who had been caught several times
for violation of the Automobile Law and speeding (Exhibit A) violation which appeared
in the records of the Bureau of Public Works available to be public and to himself.
Therefore, he must indemnify plaintiffs under the provisions of article 1903 of the Civil
Code.
The main theory of the defense is that the liability of Fausto Barredo is governed by the Revised Penal Code;
hence, his liability is only subsidiary, and as there has been no civil action against Pedro Fontanilla, the person
criminally liable, Barredo cannot be held responsible in the case. The petitioner's brief states on page 10:
... The Court of Appeals holds that the petitioner is being sued for his failure to exercise all
the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of Pedro
Fontanilla to prevent damages suffered by the respondents. In other words, The Court of
Appeals insists on applying in the case article 1903 of the Civil Code. Article 1903 of the
Civil Code is found in Chapter II, Title 16, Book IV of the Civil Code. This fact makes said
article to a civil liability arising from a crime as in the case at bar simply because Chapter II
of Title 16 of Book IV of the Civil Code, in the precise words of article 1903 of the Civil
Code itself, is applicable only to "those (obligations) arising from wrongful or negligent acts
or commission not punishable by law.
The gist of the decision of the Court of Appeals is expressed thus:
... We cannot agree to the defendant's contention. The liability sought to be imposed upon
him in this action is not a civil obligation arising from a felony or a misdemeanor (the crime
of Pedro Fontanilla,), but an obligation imposed in article 1903 of the Civil Code by reason
of his negligence in the selection or supervision of his servant or employee.
The pivotal question in this case is whether the plaintiffs may bring this separate civil action against Fausto
Barredo, thus making him primarily and directly, responsible under article 1903 of the Civil Code as an
employer of Pedro Fontanilla. The defendant maintains that Fontanilla's negligence being punishable by the
Penal Code, his (defendant's) liability as an employer is only subsidiary, according to said Penal code, but
Fontanilla has not been sued in a civil action and his property has not been exhausted. To decide the main
issue, we must cut through the tangle that has, in the minds of many confused and jumbled
together delitos and cuasi delitos, or crimes under the Penal Code and fault or negligence under articles 1902-
1910 of the Civil Code. This should be done, because justice may be lost in a labyrinth, unless principles and
remedies are distinctly envisaged. Fortunately, we are aided in our inquiry by the luminous presentation of the
perplexing subject by renown jurists and we are likewise guided by the decisions of this Court in previous
cases as well as by the solemn clarity of the consideration in several sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of
Spain.
Authorities support the proposition that a quasi-delict or "culpa aquiliana " is a separate legal institution under
the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from
delict or crime. Upon this principle and on the wording and spirit article 1903 of the Civil Code, the primary
and direct responsibility of employers may be safely anchored.
The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and Revised Penal Code are as follows:
CIVIL CODE
ART. 1089 Obligations arise from law, from contracts and quasi-contracts, and from acts
and omissions which are unlawful or in which any kind of fault or negligence intervenes.

xxx xxx xxx
ART. 1092. Civil obligations arising from felonies or misdemeanors shall be governed by
the provisions of the Penal Code.
ART. 1093. Those which are derived from acts or omissions in which fault or negligence,
not punishable by law, intervenes shall be subject to the provisions of Chapter II, Title XVI
of this book.
xxx xxx xxx
ART 1902. Any person who by an act or omission causes damage to another by his fault or
negligence shall be liable for the damage so done.
ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the next preceding article is enforcible, not only for
personal acts and omissions, but also for those of persons for whom another is responsible.
The father and in, case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are liable for any damages
caused by the minor children who live with them.
Guardians are liable for damages done by minors or incapacitated persons subject to their
authority and living with them.
Owners or directors of an establishment or business are equally liable for any damages
caused by their employees while engaged in the branch of the service in which employed, or
on occasion of the performance of their duties.
The State is subject to the same liability when it acts through a special agent, but not if the
damage shall have been caused by the official upon whom properly devolved the duty of
doing the act performed, in which case the provisions of the next preceding article shall be
applicable.
Finally, teachers or directors of arts trades are liable for any damages caused by their pupils
or apprentices while they are under their custody.
The liability imposed by this article shall cease in case the persons mentioned therein prove
that they are exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent the damage.
ART. 1904. Any person who pays for damage caused by his employees may recover from
the latter what he may have paid.
REVISED PENAL CODE
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ART. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of felony. Every person criminally liable for a
felony is also civilly liable.
ART. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. The exemption from criminal
liability established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3, 5, and 6 of article 12 and in subdivision 4 of
article 11 of this Code does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be
enforced to the following rules:
First. In cases of subdivision, 1, 2 and 3 of article 12 the civil liability for acts committed by
any imbecile or insane person, and by a person under nine years of age, or by one over nine
but under fifteen years of age, who has acted without discernment shall devolve upon those
having such person under their legal authority or control, unless it appears that there was no
fault or negligence on their part.
Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor under his authority, legal
guardianship, or control, or if such person be insolvent, said insane, imbecile, or minor shall
respond with their own property, excepting property exempt from execution, in accordance
with the civil law.
Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of article 11, the person for whose benefit the
harm has been prevented shall be civilly liable in proportion to the benefit which they may
have received.
The courts shall determine, in their sound discretion, the proportionate amount for which each one shall be
liable.
When the respective shares can not be equitably determined, even approximately, or when the liability also
attaches to the Government, or to the majority of the inhabitants of the town, and, in all events, whenever the
damage has been caused with the consent of the authorities or their agents, indemnification shall be made in
the manner prescribed by special laws or regulations.
Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of article 12, the persons using violence or causing the fear
shall be primarily liable and secondarily, or, if there be no such persons, those doing the act shall be liable,
saving always to the latter that part of their property exempt from execution.
ART. 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavern keepers and proprietors of
establishment. In default of persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavern keepers, and
any other persons or corporation shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in their
establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or some general or
special police regulation shall have been committed by them or their employees.

Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft
within their houses lodging therein, or the person, or for the payment of the value thereof,
provided that such guests shall have notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the person
representing him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn; and shall furthermore have
followed the directions which such innkeeper or his representative may have given them
with respect to the care of and vigilance over such goods. No liability shall attach in case of
robbery with violence against or intimidation against or intimidation of persons unless
committed by the innkeeper's employees.
ART. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. The subsidiary liability established
in the next preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers, persons, and
corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants,
pupils, workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.
xxx xxx xxx
ART. 365. Imprudence and negligence. Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall
commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer
the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum
period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its
minimum and medium periods shall be imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would
otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium
and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty
of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed."
It will thus be seen that while the terms of articles 1902 of the Civil Code seem to be broad enough to cover the
driver's negligence in the instant case, nevertheless article 1093 limits cuasi-delitos to acts or omissions "not
punishable by law." But inasmuch as article 365 of the Revised Penal Code punishes not only reckless but even
simple imprudence or negligence, the fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code has apparently
been crowded out. It is this overlapping that makes the "confusion worse confounded." However, a closer
study shows that such a concurrence of scope in regard to negligent acts does not destroy the distinction
between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for cuasi-delitos or culpa extra-
contractual. The same negligent act causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under
article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, or create an action for cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual under
articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code.
The individuality of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual looms clear and unmistakable. This legal
institution is of ancient lineage, one of its early ancestors being the Lex Aquilia in the Roman Law. In fact, in
Spanish legal terminology, this responsibility is often referred to as culpa aquiliana. The Partidas also
contributed to the genealogy of the present fault or negligence under the Civil Code; for instance, Law 6, Title
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15, of Partida 7, says: "Tenudo es de fazer emienda, porque, como quier que el non fizo a sabiendas en dao al
otro, pero acaescio por su culpa."
The distinctive nature of cuasi-delitos survives in the Civil Code. According to article 1089, one of the five
sources of obligations is this legal institution of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual: "los actos . . . en que
intervenga cualquier genero de culpa o negligencia." Then article 1093 provides that this kind of obligation
shall be governed by Chapter II of Title XVI of Book IV, meaning articles 1902-0910. This portion of the Civil
Code is exclusively devoted to the legal institution of culpa aquiliana.
Some of the differences between crimes under the Penal Code and the culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito under the
Civil Code are:
1. That crimes affect the public interest, while cuasi-delitos are only of private concern.
2. That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act, while the Civil Code, by means of
indemnification, merely repairs the damage.
3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the former are punished only if there is a penal law
clearly covering them, while the latter, cuasi-delitos, include all acts in which "any king of fault or negligence
intervenes." However, it should be noted that not all violations of the penal law produce civil responsibility,
such as begging in contravention of ordinances, violation of the game laws, infraction of the rules of traffic
when nobody is hurt. (See Colin and Capitant, "Curso Elemental de Derecho Civil," Vol. 3, p. 728.)
Let us now ascertain what some jurists say on the separate existence of quasi-delicts and the employer's
primary and direct liability under article 1903 of the Civil Code.
Dorado Montero in his essay on "Responsibilidad" in the "Enciclopedia Juridica Espaola" (Vol. XXVII, p.
414) says:
El concepto juridico de la responsabilidad civil abarca diversos aspectos y comprende a
diferentes personas. Asi, existe una responsabilidad civil propiamente dicha, que en ningun
casl lleva aparejada responsabilidad criminal alguna, y otra que es consecuencia
indeclinable de la penal que nace de todo delito o falta."
The juridical concept of civil responsibility has various aspects and comprises different
persons. Thus, there is a civil responsibility, properly speaking, which in no case carries
with it any criminal responsibility, and another which is a necessary consequence of the
penal liability as a result of every felony or misdemeanor."
Maura, an outstanding authority, was consulted on the following case: There had been a collision between two
trains belonging respectively to the Ferrocarril Cantabrico and the Ferrocarril del Norte. An employee of the
latter had been prosecuted in a criminal case, in which the company had been made a party as subsidiarily

responsible in civil damages. The employee had been acquitted in the criminal case, and the employer, the
Ferrocarril del Norte, had also been exonerated. The question asked was whether the Ferrocarril Cantabrico
could still bring a civil action for damages against the Ferrocarril del Norte. Maura's opinion was in the
affirmative, stating in part (Maura, Dictamenes, Vol. 6, pp. 511-513):
Quedando las cosas asi, a proposito de la realidad pura y neta de los hechos, todavia menos
parece sostenible que exista cosa juzgada acerca de la obligacion civil de indemnizar los
quebrantos y menoscabos inferidos por el choque de los trenes. El titulo en que se funda la
accion para demandar el resarcimiento, no puede confundirse con las responsabilidades
civiles nacidas de delito, siquiera exista en este, sea el cual sea, una culpa rodeada de notas
agravatorias que motivan sanciones penales, mas o menos severas. La lesion causada por
delito o falta en los derechos civiles, requiere restituciones, reparaciones o indemnizaciones,
que cual la pena misma ataen al orden publico; por tal motivo vienen encomendadas, de
ordinario, al Ministerio Fiscal; y claro es que si por esta via se enmiendan los quebrantos y
menoscabos, el agraviado excusa procurar el ya conseguido desagravio; pero esta eventual
coincidencia de los efectos, no borra la diversidad originaria de las acciones civiles para
pedir indemnizacion.
Estas, para el caso actual (prescindiendo de culpas contractuales, que no vendrian a cuento
y que tiene otro regimen), dimanan, segun el articulo 1902 del Codigo Civil, de toda accion
u omision, causante de daos o perjuicios, en que intervenga culpa o negligencia. Es trivial
que acciones semejantes son ejercitadas ante los Tribunales de lo civil cotidianamente, sin
que la Justicia punitiva tenga que mezclarse en los asuntos. Los articulos 18 al 21 y 121 al
128 del Codigo Penal, atentos al espiritu y a los fines sociales y politicos del mismo,
desenvuelven y ordenan la materia de responsabilidades civiles nacidas de delito, en
terminos separados del regimen por ley comun de la culpa que se denomina aquiliana, por
alusion a precedentes legislativos del Corpus Juris. Seria intempestivo un paralelo entre
aquellas ordenaciones, y la de la obligacion de indemnizar a titulo de culpa civil; pero viene
al caso y es necesaria una de las diferenciaciones que en el tal paralelo se notarian.
Los articulos 20 y 21 del Codigo Penal, despues de distribuir a su modo las
responsabilidades civiles, entre los que sean por diversos conceptos culpables del delito o
falta, las hacen extensivas a las empresas y los establecimientos al servicio de los cuales
estan los delincuentes; pero con caracter subsidiario, o sea, segun el texto literal, en defecto
de los que sean responsables criminalmente. No coincide en ello el Codigo Civil, cuyo
articulo 1903, dice; La obligacion que impone el articulo anterior es exigible, no solo por los
actos y omisiones propios, sino por los de aquellas personas de quienes se debe responder;
personas en la enumeracion de las cuales figuran los dependientes y empleados de los
establecimientos o empresas, sea por actos del servicio, sea con ocasion de sus funciones.
Por esto acontece, y se observa en la jurisprudencia, que las empresas, despues de intervenir
en las causas criminales con el caracter subsidiario de su responsabilidad civil por razon del
delito, son demandadas y condenadas directa y aisladamente, cuando se trata de la
obligacion, ante los tribunales civiles.
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Siendo como se ve, diverso el titulo de esta obligacion, y formando verdadero postulado de
nuestro regimen judicial la separacion entre justicia punitiva y tribunales de lo civil, de
suerte que tienen unos y otros normas de fondo en distintos cuerpos legales, y diferentes
modos de proceder, habiendose, por aadidura, abstenido de asistir al juicio criminal la
Compaia del Ferrocarril Cantabrico, que se reservo ejercitar sus acciones, parece innegable
que la de indemnizacion por los daos y perjuicios que le irrogo el choque, no estuvo sub
judice ante el Tribunal del Jurado, ni fue sentenciada, sino que permanecio intacta, al
pronunciarse el fallo de 21 de marzo. Aun cuando el veredicto no hubiese sido de
inculpabilidad, mostrose mas arriba, que tal accion quedaba legitimamente reservada para
despues del proceso; pero al declararse que no existio delito, ni responsabilidad dimanada
de delito, materia unica sobre que tenian jurisdiccion aquellos juzgadores, se redobla el
motivo para la obligacion civil ex lege, y se patentiza mas y mas que la accion para pedir su
cumplimiento permanece incolume, extraa a la cosa juzgada.
As things are, apropos of the reality pure and simple of the facts, it seems less tenable that
there should be res judicata with regard to the civil obligation for damages on account of
the losses caused by the collision of the trains. The title upon which the action for reparation
is based cannot be confused with the civil responsibilities born of a crime, because there
exists in the latter, whatever each nature, a culpasurrounded with aggravating aspects which
give rise to penal measures that are more or less severe. The injury caused by a felony or
misdemeanor upon civil rights requires restitutions, reparations, or indemnifications which,
like the penalty itself, affect public order; for this reason, they are ordinarily entrusted to the
office of the prosecuting attorney; and it is clear that if by this means the losses and
damages are repaired, the injured party no longer desires to seek another relief; but this
coincidence of effects does not eliminate the peculiar nature of civil actions to ask for
indemnity.
Such civil actions in the present case (without referring to contractual faults which are not
pertinent and belong to another scope) are derived, according to article 1902 of the Civil
Code, from every act or omission causing losses and damages in which culpa or negligence
intervenes. It is unimportant that such actions are every day filed before the civil courts
without the criminal courts interfering therewith. Articles 18 to 21 and 121 to 128 of the
Penal Code, bearing in mind the spirit and the social and political purposes of that Code,
develop and regulate the matter of civil responsibilities arising from a crime, separately
from the regime under common law, of culpa which is known as aquiliana, in accordance
with legislative precedent of the Corpus Juris. It would be unwarranted to make a detailed
comparison between the former provisions and that regarding the obligation to indemnify
on account of civil culpa; but it is pertinent and necessary to point out to one of such
differences.
Articles 20 and 21 of the Penal Code, after distriburing in their own way the civil
responsibilities among those who, for different reasons, are guilty of felony or
misdemeanor, make such civil responsibilities applicable to enterprises and establishments

for which the guilty parties render service, but with subsidiary character, that is to say,
according to the wording of the Penal Code, in default of those who are criminally
responsible. In this regard, the Civil Code does not coincide because article 1903 says: "The
obligation imposed by the next preceding article is demandable, not only for personal acts
and omissions, but also for those of persons for whom another is responsible." Among the
persons enumerated are the subordinates and employees of establishments or enterprises,
either for acts during their service or on the occasion of their functions. It is for this reason
that it happens, and it is so observed in judicial decisions, that the companies or enterprises,
after taking part in the criminal cases because of their subsidiary civil responsibility by
reason of the crime, are sued and sentenced directly and separately with regard to
the obligation, before the civil courts.
Seeing that the title of this obligation is different, and the separation between punitive
justice and the civil courts being a true postulate of our judicial system, so that they have
different fundamental norms in different codes, as well as different modes of procedure, and
inasmuch as the Compaa del Ferrocarril Cantabrico has abstained from taking part in the
criminal case and has reserved the right to exercise its actions, it seems undeniable that the
action for indemnification for the losses and damages caused to it by the collision was
not sub judice before the Tribunal del Jurado, nor was it the subject of a sentence, but it
remained intact when the decision of March 21 was rendered. Even if the verdict had not
been that of acquittal, it has already been shown that such action had been legitimately
reserved till after the criminal prosecution; but because of the declaration of the non-
existence of the felony and the non-existence of the responsibility arising from the crime,
which was the sole subject matter upon which the Tribunal del Juradohad jurisdiction, there
is greater reason for the civil obligation ex lege, and it becomes clearer that the action for its
enforcement remain intact and is not res judicata.
Laurent, a jurist who has written a monumental work on the French Civil Code, on which the Spanish Civil
Code is largely based and whose provisions on cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual are similar to those of
the Spanish Civil Code, says, referring to article 1384 of the French Civil Code which corresponds to article
1903, Spanish Civil Code:
The action can be brought directly against the person responsible (for another), without
including the author of the act. The action against the principal is accessory in the sense that
it implies the existence of a prejudicial act committed by the employee, but it is not
subsidiary in the sense that it can not be instituted till after the judgment against the author
of the act or at least, that it is subsidiary to the principal action; the action for responsibility
(of the employer) is in itself a principal action. (Laurent, Principles of French Civil Law,
Spanish translation, Vol. 20, pp. 734-735.)
Amandi, in his "Cuestionario del Codigo Civil Reformado" (Vol. 4, pp. 429, 430), declares that the
responsibility of the employer is principal and not subsidiary. He writes:
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Cuestion 1. La responsabilidad declarada en el articulo 1903 por las acciones u omisiones
de aquellas personas por las que se debe responder, es subsidiaria? es principal? Para
contestar a esta pregunta es necesario saber, en primer lugar, en que se funda el precepto
legal. Es que realmente se impone una responsabilidad por una falta ajena? Asi parece a
primera vista; pero semejante afirmacion seria contraria a la justicia y a la maxima
universal, segun la que las faltas son personales, y cada uno responde de aquellas que le son
imputables. La responsabilidad de que tratamos se impone con ocasion de un delito o culpa,
pero no por causa de ellos, sino por causa del causi delito, esto es, de la imprudencia o de la
negligencia del padre, del tutor, del dueo o director del establecimiento, del maestro, etc.
Cuando cualquiera de las personas que enumera el articulo citado (menores de edad,
incapacitados, dependientes, aprendices) causan un dao, la ley presume que el padre, el
tutor, el maestro, etc., han cometido una falta de negligencia para prevenir o evitar el dao.
Esta falta es la que la ley castiga. No hay, pues, responsabilidad por un hecho ajeno, sino en
la apariencia; en realidad la responsabilidad se exige por un hecho propio. La idea de que
esa responsabilidad sea subsidiaria es, por lo tanto, completamente inadmisible.
Question No. 1. Is the responsibility declared in article 1903 for the acts or omissions of
those persons for who one is responsible, subsidiary or principal? In order to answer this
question it is necessary to know, in the first place, on what the legal provision is based. Is it
true that there is a responsibility for the fault of another person? It seems so at first sight;
but such assertion would be contrary to justice and to the universal maxim that all faults are
personal, and that everyone is liable for those faults that can be imputed to him. The
responsibility in question is imposed on the occasion of a crime or fault, but not because of
the same, but because of the cuasi-delito, that is to say, the imprudence or negligence of the
father, guardian, proprietor or manager of the establishment, of the teacher, etc. Whenever
anyone of the persons enumerated in the article referred to (minors, incapacitated persons,
employees, apprentices) causes any damage, the law presumes that the father, guardian,
teacher, etc. have committed an act of negligence in not preventing or avoiding the damage.
It is this fault that is condemned by the law. It is, therefore, only apparent that there is a
responsibility for the act of another; in reality the responsibility exacted is for one's own act.
The idea that such responsibility is subsidiary is, therefore, completely inadmissible.
Oyuelos, in his "Digesto: Principios, Doctrina y Jurisprudencia, Referentes al Codigo Civil Espaol," says in
Vol. VII, p. 743:
Es decir, no responde de hechos ajenos, porque se responde solo de su propia culpa,
doctrina del articulo 1902; mas por excepcion, se responde de la ajena respecto de aquellas
personas con las que media algun nexo o vinculo, que motiva o razona la responsabilidad.
Esta responsabilidad, es directa o es subsidiaria? En el orden penal, el Codigo de esta clase
distingue entre menores e incapacitados y los demas, declarando directa la primera (articulo
19) y subsidiaria la segunda (articulos 20 y 21); pero en el orden civil, en el caso del articulo
1903, ha de entenderse directa, por el tenor del articulo que impone la responsabilidad
precisamente "por los actos de aquellas personas de quienes se deba responder."

That is to say, one is not responsible for the acts of others, because one is liable only for his
own faults, this being the doctrine of article 1902; but, by exception, one is liable for the
acts of those persons with whom there is a bond or tie which gives rise to the responsibility.
Is this responsibility direct or subsidiary? In the order of the penal law, the Penal Code
distinguishes between minors and incapacitated persons on the one hand, and other persons
on the other, declaring that the responsibility for the former is direct (article 19), and for the
latter, subsidiary (articles 20 and 21); but in the scheme of the civil law, in the case of article
1903, the responsibility should be understood as direct, according to the tenor of that
articles, for precisely it imposes responsibility "for the acts of those persons for whom one
should be responsible."
Coming now to the sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain, that court has upheld the principles above set
forth: that a quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual is a separate and distinct legal institution, independent from
the civil responsibility arising from criminal liability, and that an employer is, under article 1903 of the Civil
Code, primarily and directly responsible for the negligent acts of his employee.
One of the most important of those Spanish decisions is that of October 21, 1910. In that case, Ramon Lafuente
died as the result of having been run over by a street car owned by the "compaia Electric Madrilea de
Traccion." The conductor was prosecuted in a criminal case but he was acquitted. Thereupon, the widow filed a
civil action against the street car company, paying for damages in the amount of 15,000 pesetas. The lower
court awarded damages; so the company appealed to the Supreme Tribunal, alleging violation of articles 1902
and 1903 of the Civil Code because by final judgment the non-existence of fault or negligence had been
declared. The Supreme Court of Spain dismissed the appeal, saying:
Considerando que el primer motivo del recurso se funda en el equivocado supuesto de que
el Tribunal a quo, al condonar a la compaia Electrica Madrilea al pago del dao causado
con la muerte de Ramon La fuente Izquierdo, desconoce el valor y efectos juridicos de la
sentencia absolutoria deictada en la causa criminal que se siguio por el mismo hecho,
cuando es lo cierto que de este han conocido las dos jurisdicciones bajo diferentes as pectos,
y como la de lo criminal declrao dentro de los limites de su competencia que el hecho de
que se trata no era constitutivo de delito por no haber mediado descuido o negligencia
graves, lo que no excluye, siendo este el unico fundamento del fallo absolutorio, el concurso
de la culpa o negligencia no califacadas, fuente de obligaciones civiles segun el articulo
1902 del Codigo, y que alcanzan, segun el 1903, netre otras perosnas, a los Directores de
establecimientos o empresas por los daos causados por sus dependientes en determinadas
condiciones, es manifesto que la de lo civil, al conocer del mismo hehco baho este ultimo
aspecto y al condenar a la compaia recurrente a la indemnizacion del dao causado por uno
de sus empleados, lejos de infringer los mencionados textos, en relacion con el articulo 116
de la Ley de Enjuciamiento Criminal, se ha atenido estrictamente a ellos, sin invadir
atribuciones ajenas a su jurisdiccion propia, ni contrariar en lo mas minimo el fallo recaido
en la causa.
6
Considering that the first ground of the appeal is based on the mistaken supposition that the
trial court, in sentencing the Compaia Madrilea to the payment of the damage caused by
the death of Ramon Lafuente Izquierdo, disregards the value and juridical effects of the
sentence of acquittal rendered in the criminal case instituted on account of the same act,
when it is a fact that the two jurisdictions had taken cognizance of the same act in its
different aspects, and as the criminal jurisdiction declared within the limits of its authority
that the act in question did not constitute a felony because there was no grave carelessness
or negligence, and this being the only basis of acquittal, it does no exclude the co-existence
of fault or negligence which is not qualified, and is a source of civil obligations according
to article 1902 of the Civil Code, affecting, in accordance with article 1903, among other
persons, the managers of establishments or enterprises by reason of the damages caused by
employees under certain conditions, it is manifest that the civil jurisdiccion in taking
cognizance of the same act in this latter aspect and in ordering the company, appellant
herein, to pay an indemnity for the damage caused by one of its employees, far from
violating said legal provisions, in relation with article 116 of the Law of Criminal
Procedure, strictly followed the same, without invading attributes which are beyond its own
jurisdiction, and without in any way contradicting the decision in that cause. (Emphasis
supplied.)
It will be noted, as to the case just cited:
First. That the conductor was not sued in a civil case, either separately or with the street car company. This is
precisely what happens in the present case: the driver, Fontanilla, has not been sued in a civil action, either
alone or with his employer.
Second. That the conductor had been acquitted of grave criminal negligence, but the Supreme Tribunal of
Spain said that this did not exclude the co-existence of fault or negligence, which is not qualified, on the part of
the conductor, under article 1902 of the Civil Code. In the present case, the taxi driver was found guilty of
criminal negligence, so that if he had even sued for his civil responsibility arising from the crime, he would
have been held primarily liable for civil damages, and Barredo would have been held subsidiarily liable for the
same. But the plaintiffs are directly suing Barredo, on his primary responsibility because of his own presumed
negligence which he did not overcome under article 1903. Thus, there were two liabilities of Barredo:
first, the subsidiary one because of the civil liability of the taxi driver arising from the latter's criminal
negligence; and, second, Barredo's primary liability as an employer under article 1903. The plaintiffs were free
to choose which course to take, and they preferred the second remedy. In so doing, they were acting within
their rights. It might be observed in passing, that the plaintiff choose the more expeditious and effective
method of relief, because Fontanilla was either in prison, or had just been released, and besides, he was
probably without property which might be seized in enforcing any judgment against him for damages.
Third. That inasmuch as in the above sentence of October 21, 1910, the employer was held liable civilly,
notwithstanding the acquittal of the employee (the conductor) in a previous criminal case, with greater reason
should Barredo, the employer in the case at bar, be held liable for damages in a civil suit filed against him
because his taxi driver had been convicted. The degree of negligence of the conductor in the Spanish case cited

was less than that of the taxi driver, Fontanilla, because the former was acquitted in the previous criminal case
while the latter was found guilty of criminal negligence and was sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one
year and one day to two years of prision correccional.
(See also Sentence of February 19, 1902, which is similar to the one above quoted.)
In the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain, dated February 14, 1919, an action was brought against a
railroad company for damages because the station agent, employed by the company, had unjustly
and fraudulently, refused to deliver certain articles consigned to the plaintiff. The Supreme Court of Spain held
that this action was properly under article 1902 of the Civil Code, the court saying:
Considerando que la sentencia discutida reconoce, en virtud de los hechos que consigna con
relacion a las pruebas del pleito: 1., que las expediciones facturadas por la compaia
ferroviaria a la consignacion del actor de las vasijas vacias que en su demanda relacionan
tenian como fin el que este las devolviera a sus remitentes con vinos y alcoholes; 2., que
llegadas a su destino tales mercanias no se quisieron entregar a dicho consignatario por el
jefe de la estacion sin motivo justificado y con intencion dolosa, y 3., que la falta de
entrega de estas expediciones al tiempo de reclamarlas el demandante le originaron daos y
perjuicios en cantidad de bastante importancia como expendedor al por mayor que era de
vinos y alcoholes por las ganancias que dejo de obtener al verse privado de servir los
pedidos que se le habian hecho por los remitentes en los envases:
Considerando que sobre esta base hay necesidad de estimar los cuatro motivos que integran
este recurso, porque la demanda inicial del pleito a que se contrae no contiene accion que
nazca del incumplimiento del contrato de transporte, toda vez que no se funda en el retraso
de la llegada de las mercancias ni de ningun otro vinculo contractual entre las partes
contendientes, careciendo, por tanto, de aplicacion el articulo 371 del Codigo de Comercio,
en que principalmente descansa el fallo recurrido, sino que se limita a pedir la reparaction
de los daos y perjuicios producidos en el patrimonio del actor por la injustificada y dolosa
negativa del porteador a la entrega de las mercancias a su nombre consignadas, segun lo
reconoce la sentencia, y cuya responsabilidad esta claramente sancionada en el articulo
1902 del Codigo Civil, que obliga por el siguiente a la Compaia demandada como ligada
con el causante de aquellos por relaciones de caracter economico y de jurarquia
administrativa.
Considering that the sentence, in question recognizes, in virtue of the facts which it
declares, in relation to the evidence in the case: (1) that the invoice issued by the railroad
company in favor of the plaintiff contemplated that the empty receptacles referred to in the
complaint should be returned to the consignors with wines and liquors; (2) that when the
said merchandise reached their destination, their delivery to the consignee was refused by
the station agent without justification and with fraudulent intent, and (3) that the lack of
delivery of these goods when they were demanded by the plaintiff caused him losses and
7
damages of considerable importance, as he was a wholesale vendor of wines and liquors and
he failed to realize the profits when he was unable to fill the orders sent to him by the
consignors of the receptacles:
Considering that upon this basis there is need of upholding the four assignments of error, as
the original complaint did not contain any cause of action arising from non-fulfillment of a
contract of transportation, because the action was not based on the delay of the goods nor on
any contractual relation between the parties litigant and, therefore, article 371 of the Code
of Commerce, on which the decision appealed from is based, is not applicable; but it limits
to asking for reparation for losses and damages produced on the patrimony of the plaintiff
on account of the unjustified and fraudulent refusal of the carrier to deliver the goods
consigned to the plaintiff as stated by the sentence, and the carrier's responsibility is clearly
laid down in article 1902 of the Civil Code which binds, in virtue of the next article, the
defendant company, because the latter is connected with the person who caused the damage
by relations of economic character and by administrative hierarchy. (Emphasis supplied.)
The above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act may come under both the Penal Code and the
Civil Code. In that case, the action of the agent was unjustified and fraudulent and therefore could have been
the subject of a criminal action. And yet, it was held to be also a proper subject of a civil action under article
1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be noted that it was the employer and not the employee who was being
sued.
Let us now examine the cases previously decided by this Court.
In the leading case of Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil., 359, 362-365 [year 1907]), the trial
court awarded damages to the plaintiff, a laborer of the defendant, because the latter had negligently failed to
repair a tramway in consequence of which the rails slid off while iron was being transported, and caught the
plaintiff whose leg was broken. This Court held:
It is contended by the defendant, as its first defense to the action that the necessary
conclusion from these collated laws is that the remedy for injuries through negligence lies
only in a criminal action in which the official criminally responsible must be made primarily
liable and his employer held only subsidiarily to him. According to this theory the plaintiff
should have procured the arrest of the representative of the company accountable for not
repairing the track, and on his prosecution a suitable fine should have been imposed,
payable primarily by him and secondarily by his employer.
This reasoning misconceived the plan of the Spanish codes upon this subject. Article 1093
of the Civil Code makes obligations arising from faults or negligence not punished by the
law, subject to the provisions of Chapter II of Title XVI. Section 1902 of that chapter reads:

"A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault
or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done.
"SEC. 1903. The obligation imposed by the preceeding article is demandable, not
only for personal acts and omissions, but also for those of the persons for whom
they should be responsible.
"The father, and on his death or incapacity, the mother, is liable for the damages
caused by the minors who live with them.
xxx xxx xxx
"Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for the
damages caused by their employees in the service of the branches in which the
latter may be employed or in the performance of their duties.
xxx xxx xxx
"The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned
therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
avoid the damage."
As an answer to the argument urged in this particular action it may be sufficient to point out
that nowhere in our general statutes is the employer penalized for failure to provide or
maintain safe appliances for his workmen. His obligation therefore is one 'not punished by
the laws' and falls under civil rather than criminal jurisprudence. But the answer may be a
broader one. We should be reluctant, under any conditions, to adopt a forced construction of
these scientific codes, such as is proposed by the defendant, that would rob some of these
articles of effect, would shut out litigants against their will from the civil courts, would
make the assertion of their rights dependent upon the selection for prosecution of the proper
criminal offender, and render recovery doubtful by reason of the strict rules of proof
prevailing in criminal actions. Even if these articles had always stood alone, such a
construction would be unnecessary, but clear light is thrown upon their meaning by the
provisions of the Law of Criminal Procedure of Spain (Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal),
which, though never in actual force in these Islands, was formerly given a suppletory or
explanatory effect. Under article 111 of this law, both classes of action, civil and criminal,
might be prosecuted jointly or separately, but while the penal action was pending the civil
was suspended. According to article 112, the penal action once started, the civil remedy
should be sought therewith, unless it had been waived by the party injured or been expressly
reserved by him for civil proceedings for the future. If the civil action alone was prosecuted,
arising out of a crime that could be enforced only on private complaint, the penal action
8
thereunder should be extinguished. These provisions are in harmony with those of articles
23 and 133 of our Penal Code on the same subject.
An examination of this topic might be carried much further, but the citation of these articles
suffices to show that the civil liability was not intended to be merged in the criminal nor
even to be suspended thereby, except as expressly provided in the law. Where an individual
is civilly liable for a negligent act or omission, it is not required that the injured party should
seek out a third person criminally liable whose prosecution must be a condition precedent to
the enforcement of the civil right.
Under article 20 of the Penal Code the responsibility of an employer may be regarded as
subsidiary in respect of criminal actions against his employees only while they are in
process of prosecution, or in so far as they determine the existence of the criminal act from
which liability arises, and his obligation under the civil law and its enforcement in the civil
courts is not barred thereby unless by the election of the injured person. Inasmuch as no
criminal proceeding had been instituted, growing our of the accident in question, the
provisions of the Penal Code can not affect this action. This construction renders it
unnecessary to finally determine here whether this subsidiary civil liability in penal actions
has survived the laws that fully regulated it or has been abrogated by the American civil and
criminal procedure now in force in the Philippines.
The difficulty in construing the articles of the code above cited in this case appears from the
briefs before us to have arisen from the interpretation of the words of article 1093, "fault or
negligence not punished by law," as applied to the comprehensive definition of offenses in
articles 568 and 590 of the Penal Code. It has been shown that the liability of an employer
arising out of his relation to his employee who is the offender is not to be regarded as
derived from negligence punished by the law, within the meaning of articles 1902 and 1093.
More than this, however, it cannot be said to fall within the class of acts unpunished by the
law, the consequence of which are regulated by articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code.
The acts to which these articles are applicable are understood to be those not growing out of
pre-existing duties of the parties to one another. But where relations already formed give
rise to duties, whether springing from contract or quasi contract, then breaches of those
duties are subject to articles 1101, 1103, and 1104 of the same code. A typical application of
this distinction may be found in the consequences of a railway accident due to defective
machinery supplied by the employer. His liability to his employee would arise out of the
contract of employment, that to the passengers out of the contract for passage, while that to
the injured bystander would originate in the negligent act itself.
In Manzanares vs. Moreta, 38 Phil., 821 (year 1918), the mother of the 8 of 9-year-old child Salvador Bona
brought a civil action against Moreta to recover damages resulting from the death of the child, who had been
run over by an automobile driven and managed by the defendant. The trial court rendered judgment requiring
the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P1,000 as indemnity: This Court in affirming the judgment, said in
part:

If it were true that the defendant, in coming from the southern part of Solana Street, had to
stop his auto before crossing Real Street, because he had met vehicles which were going
along the latter street or were coming from the opposite direction along Solana Street, it is
to be believed that, when he again started to run his auto across said Real Street and to
continue its way along Solana Street northward, he should have adjusted the speed of the
auto which he was operating until he had fully crossed Real Street and had completely
reached a clear way on Solana Street. But, as the child was run over by the auto precisely at
the entrance of Solana Street, this accident could not have occurred if the auto had been
running at a slow speed, aside from the fact that the defendant, at the moment of crossing
Real Street and entering Solana Street, in a northward direction, could have seen the child in
the act of crossing the latter street from the sidewalk on the right to that on the left, and if
the accident had occurred in such a way that after the automobile had run over the body of
the child, and the child's body had already been stretched out on the ground, the automobile
still moved along a distance of about 2 meters, this circumstance shows the fact that the
automobile entered Solana Street from Real Street, at a high speed without the defendant
having blown the horn. If these precautions had been taken by the defendant, the deplorable
accident which caused the death of the child would not have occurred.
It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been prosecuted in a criminal case because
his negligence causing the death of the child was punishable by the Penal Code. Here is therefore a clear
instance of the same act of negligence being a proper subject-matter either of a criminal action with its
consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of an entirely separate and independent civil action for fault or
negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate individually of a cuasi-
delito or culpa aquilianaunder the Civil Code has been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a
negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for
which, after such a conviction, he could have been sued for this civil liability arising from his crime.
Years later (in 1930) this Court had another occasion to apply the same doctrine. In Bernal and Enverso vs.
House and Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., 54 Phil., 327, the parents of the five-year-old child,
Purificacion Bernal, brought a civil action to recover damages for the child's death as a result of burns caused
by the fault and negligence of the defendants. On the evening of April 10, 1925, the Good Friday procession
was held in Tacloban, Leyte. Fortunata Enverso with her daughter Purificacion Bernal had come from another
municipality to attend the same. After the procession the mother and the daughter with two others were passing
along Gran Capitan Street in front of the offices of the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., owned by
defendants J. V. House, when an automobile appeared from the opposite direction. The little girl, who was
slightly ahead of the rest, was so frightened by the automobile that she turned to run, but unfortunately she fell
into the street gutter where hot water from the electric plant was flowing. The child died that same night from
the burns. The trial courts dismissed the action because of the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs. But this
Court held, on appeal, that there was no contributory negligence, and allowed the parents P1,000 in damages
from J. V. House who at the time of the tragic occurrence was the holder of the franchise for the electric plant.
This Court said in part:
9
Although the trial judge made the findings of fact hereinbefore outlined, he nevertheless
was led to order the dismissal of the action because of the contributory negligence of the
plaintiffs. It is from this point that a majority of the court depart from the stand taken by the
trial judge. The mother and her child had a perfect right to be on the principal street of
Tacloban, Leyte, on the evening when the religious procession was held. There was nothing
abnormal in allowing the child to run along a few paces in advance of the mother. No one
could foresee the coincidence of an automobile appearing and of a frightened child running
and falling into a ditch filled with hot water. The doctrine announced in the much debated
case of Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. ([1907]), 7 Phil., 359), still rule. Article
1902 of the Civil Code must again be enforced. The contributory negligence of the child and
her mother, if any, does not operate as a bar to recovery, but in its strictest sense could only
result in reduction of the damages.
It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically applied article 1902 of the Civil Code. It
is thus that although J. V. House could have been criminally prosecuted for reckless or simple negligence and
not only punished but also made civilly liable because of his criminal negligence, nevertheless this Court
awarded damages in an independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code.
In Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes (30 Phil., 624 [year 1915), the action was for damages for the death of the
plaintiff's daughter alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the servant in driving an automobile over
the child. It appeared that the cause of the mishap was a defect in the steering gear. The defendant Leynes had
rented the automobile from the International Garage of Manila, to be used by him in carrying passengers
during the fiesta of Tuy, Batangas. Leynes was ordered by the lower court to pay P1,000 as damages to the
plaintiff. On appeal this Court reversed the judgment as to Leynes on the ground that he had shown that the
exercised the care of a good father of a family, thus overcoming the presumption of negligence under article
1903. This Court said:
As to selection, the defendant has clearly shown that he exercised the care and diligence of a
good father of a family. He obtained the machine from a reputable garage and it was, so far
as appeared, in good condition. The workmen were likewise selected from a standard
garage, were duly licensed by the Government in their particular calling, and apparently
thoroughly competent. The machine had been used but a few hours when the accident
occurred and it is clear from the evidence that the defendant had no notice, either actual or
constructive, of the defective condition of the steering gear.
The legal aspect of the case was discussed by this Court thus:
Article 1903 of the Civil Code not only establishes liability in cases of negligence, but also
provides when the liability shall cease. It says:

"The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned
therein prove that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
avoid the damage."
From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by the
negligence of a servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there
was negligence on the part of the matter or employer either in the selection of the servant or
employee, or in supervision over him after the selection, or both; and (2) that presumption
is juris tantum and not juris et de jure, and consequently, may be rebutted. It follows
necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection and
supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the
presumption is overcome and he is relieve from liability.
This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately on his own negligence and not
on that of his servant.
The doctrine of the case just cited was followed by this Court in Cerf vs. Medel (33 Phil., 37 [year 1915]). In
the latter case, the complaint alleged that the defendant's servant had so negligently driven an automobile,
which was operated by defendant as a public vehicle, that said automobile struck and damaged the plaintiff's
motorcycle. This Court, applying article 1903 and following the rule in Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes, said in
part (p. 41) that:
The master is liable for the negligent acts of his servant where he is the owner or director of
a business or enterprise and the negligent acts are committed while the servant is engaged in
his master's employment as such owner.
Another case which followed the decision in Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes was Cuison vs. Norton & Harrison
Co., 55 Phil., 18 (year 1930). The latter case was an action for damages brought by Cuison for the death of his
seven-year-old son Moises. The little boy was on his way to school with his sister Marciana. Some large pieces
of lumber fell from a truck and pinned the boy underneath, instantly killing him. Two youths, Telesforo Binoya
and Francisco Bautista, who were working for Ora, an employee of defendant Norton & Harrison Co., pleaded
guilty to the crime of homicide through reckless negligence and were sentenced accordingly. This Court,
applying articles 1902 and 1903, held:
The basis of civil law liability is not respondent superior but the relationship of pater
familias. This theory bases the liability of the master ultimately on his own negligence and
not on that of his servant. (Bahia vs.Litonjua and Leynes [1915], 30 Phil., 624; Cangco vs.
Manila Railroad Co. [1918], 38 Phil., 768.)
In Walter A. Smith & Co. vs. Cadwallader Gibson Lumber Co., 55 Phil., 517 (year 1930) the plaintiff brought
an action for damages for the demolition of its wharf, which had been struck by the steamer Helen C belonging
to the defendant. This Court held (p. 526):
10
The evidence shows that Captain Lasa at the time the plaintiff's wharf collapsed was a duly
licensed captain, authorized to navigate and direct a vessel of any tonnage, and that the
appellee contracted his services because of his reputation as a captain, according to F. C.
Cadwallader. This being so, we are of the opinion that the presumption of liability against
the defendant has been overcome by the exercise of the care and diligence of a good father
of a family in selecting Captain Lasa, in accordance with the doctrines laid down by this
court in the cases cited above, and the defendant is therefore absolved from all liability.
It is, therefore, seen that the defendant's theory about his secondary liability is negatived by the six cases above
set forth. He is, on the authority of these cases, primarily and directly responsible in damages under article
1903, in relation to article 1902, of the Civil Code.
Let us now take up the Philippine decisions relied upon by the defendant. We study first, City of Manila vs.
Manila Electric Co., 52 Phil., 586 (year 1928). A collision between a truck of the City of Manila and a street
car of the Manila Electric Co. took place on June 8, 1925. The truck was damaged in the amount of P1,788.27.
Sixto Eustaquio, the motorman, was prosecuted for the crime of damage to property and slight injuries through
reckless imprudence. He was found guilty and sentenced to pay a fine of P900, to indemnify the City of Manila
for P1,788.27, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. Unable to collect the indemnity from
Eustaquio, the City of Manila filed an action against the Manila Electric Company to obtain payment, claiming
that the defendant was subsidiarily liable. The main defense was that the defendant had exercised the diligence
of a good father of a family to prevent the damage. The lower court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
This Court held, in part, that this case was governed by the Penal Code, saying:
With this preliminary point out of the way, there is no escaping the conclusion that the
provisions of the Penal Code govern. The Penal Code in easily understandable language
authorizes the determination of subsidiary liability. The Civil Code negatives its application
by providing that civil obligations arising from crimes or misdemeanors shall be governed
by the provisions of the Penal Code. The conviction of the motorman was a misdemeanor
falling under article 604 of the Penal Code. The act of the motorman was not a wrongful or
negligent act or omission not punishable by law. Accordingly, the civil obligation connected
up with the Penal Code and not with article 1903 of the Civil Code. In other words, the
Penal Code affirms its jurisdiction while the Civil Code negatives its jurisdiction. This is a
case of criminal negligence out of which civil liability arises and not a case of civil
negligence.
xxx xxx xxx
Our deduction, therefore, is that the case relates to the Penal Code and not to the Civil Code.
Indeed, as pointed out by the trial judge, any different ruling would permit the master to
escape scot-free by simply alleging and proving that the master had exercised all diligence
in the selection and training of its servants to prevent the damage. That would be a good
defense to a strictly civil action, but might or might not be to a civil action either as a part of

or predicated on conviction for a crime or misdemeanor. (By way of parenthesis, it may be
said further that the statements here made are offered to meet the argument advanced during
our deliberations to the effect that article 0902 of the Civil Code should be disregarded and
codal articles 1093 and 1903 applied.)
It is not clear how the above case could support the defendant's proposition, because the Court of Appeals
based its decision in the present case on the defendant's primary responsibility under article 1903 of the Civil
Code and not on his subsidiary liability arising from Fontanilla's criminal negligence. In other words, the case
of City of Manila vs. Manila Electric Co., supra, is predicated on an entirely different theory, which is the
subsidiary liability of an employer arising from a criminal act of his employee, whereas the foundation of the
decision of the Court of Appeals in the present case is the employer's primary liability under article 1903 of the
Civil Code. We have already seen that this is a proper and independent remedy.
Arambulo vs. Manila Electric Co. (55 Phil., 75), is another case invoked by the defendant. A motorman in the
employ of the Manila Electric Company had been convicted o homicide by simple negligence and sentenced,
among other things, to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of P1,000. An action was then brought to enforce
the subsidiary liability of the defendant as employer under the Penal Code. The defendant attempted to show
that it had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in selecting the motorman, and therefore claimed
exemption from civil liability. But this Court held:
In view of the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion and so hold, (1) that the
exemption from civil liability established in article 1903 of the Civil Code for all who have
acted with the diligence of a good father of a family, is not applicable to the subsidiary civil
liability provided in article 20 of the Penal Code.
The above case is also extraneous to the theory of the defendant in the instant case, because the action there
had for its purpose the enforcement of the defendant's subsidiary liability under the Penal Code, while in the
case at bar, the plaintiff's cause of action is based on the defendant's primary and direct responsibility under
article 1903 of the Civil Code. In fact, the above case destroys the defendant's contention because that decision
illustrates the principle that the employer's primary responsibility under article 1903 of the Civil Code is
different in character from his subsidiary liability under the Penal Code.
In trying to apply the two cases just referred to, counsel for the defendant has failed to recognize the distinction
between civil liability arising from a crime, which is governed by the Penal Code, and the responsibility
for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code, and has likewise failed to give the importance to the
latter type of civil action.
The defendant-petitioner also cites Francisco vs. Onrubia (46 Phil., 327). That case need not be set forth.
Suffice it to say that the question involved was also civil liability arising from a crime. Hence, it is as
inapplicable as the two cases above discussed.
11
The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate individuality of cuasi-delitos or culpa
aquiliana under the Civil Code. Specifically they show that there is a distinction between civil liability arising
from criminal negligence (governed by the Penal Code) and responsibility for fault or negligence under articles
1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, and that the same negligent act may produce either a civil liability arising from
a crime under the Penal Code, or a separate responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of
the Civil Code. Still more concretely, the authorities above cited render it inescapable to conclude that the
employer in this case the defendant-petitioner is primarily and directly liable under article 1903 of the
Civil Code.
The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should ordinarily be sufficient to dispose of this case.
But inasmuch as we are announcing doctrines that have been little understood in the past, it might not be
inappropriate to indicate their foundations.
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in article 365 punishes not only reckless but also simple negligence. If we were
to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not punished by law,
according to the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa aquiliana would
have very little scope and application in actual life. Death or injury to persons and damage to property through
any degree of negligence even the slightest would have to be indemnified only through the principle of
civil liability arising from a crime. In such a state of affairs, what sphere would remain for cuasi-
delito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to impute to the lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation so
absurd and anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold the letter that killeth
rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and render
almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown development as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-
delito, which is conserved and made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.
Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required,
while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. There are
numerous cases of criminal negligence which can not be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be proved by
a preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and should be made responsible in a civil action
under articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, there would be many instances of unvindicated civil
wrongs. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
Thirdly, to hold that there is only one way to make defendant's liability effective, and that is, to sue the driver
and exhaust his (the latter's) property first, would be tantamount to compelling the plaintiff to follow a devious
and cumbersome method of obtaining relief. True, there is such a remedy under our laws, but there is also a
more expeditious way, which is based on the primary and direct responsibility of the defendant under article
1903 of the Civil Code. Our view of the law is more likely to facilitate remedy for civil wrongs, because the
procedure indicated by the defendant is wasteful and productive of delay, it being a matter of common
knowledge that professional drivers of taxis and similar public conveyance usually do not have sufficient
means with which to pay damages. Why, then, should the plaintiff be required in all cases to go through this
roundabout, unnecessary, and probably useless procedure? In construing the laws, courts have endeavored to
shorten and facilitate the pathways of right and justice.

At this juncture, it should be said that the primary and direct responsibility of employers and their presumed
negligence are principles calculated to protect society. Workmen and employees should be carefully chosen
and supervised in order to avoid injury to the public. It is the masters or employers who principally reap the
profits resulting from the services of these servants and employees. It is but right that they should guarantee the
latter's careful conduct for the personnel and patrimonial safety of others. As Theilhard has said, "they should
reproach themselves, at least, some for their weakness, others for their poor selection and all for their
negligence." And according to Manresa, "It is much more equitable and just that such responsibility should fall
upon the principal or director who could have chosen a careful and prudent employee, and not upon the injured
person who could not exercise such selection and who used such employee because of his confidence in the
principal or director." (Vol. 12, p. 622, 2nd Ed.) Many jurists also base this primary responsibility of the
employer on the principle of representation of the principal by the agent. Thus, Oyuelos says in the work
already cited (Vol. 7, p. 747) that before third persons the employer and employee "vienen a ser como una sola
personalidad, por refundicion de la del dependiente en la de quien le emplea y utiliza." ("become as one
personality by the merging of the person of the employee in that of him who employs and utilizes him.") All
these observations acquire a peculiar force and significance when it comes to motor accidents, and there is
need of stressing and accentuating the responsibility of owners of motor vehicles.
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and the Civil Code on this
subject, which has given rise to the overlapping or concurrence of spheres already discussed, and for lack of
understanding of the character and efficacy of the action for culpa aquiliana, there has grown up a common
practice to seek damages only by virtue of the civil responsibility arising from a crime, forgetting that there is
another remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Although this habitual method is
allowed by our laws, it has nevertheless rendered practically useless and nugatory the more expeditious and
effective remedy based on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the present case, we are asked to help
perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is high time we pointed out to the harm done by such practice
and to restore the principle of responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code
to its full rigor. It is high time we caused the stream of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own
natural channel, so that its waters may no longer be diverted into that of a crime under the Penal Code. This
will, it is believed, make for the better safeguarding of private rights because it re-establishes an ancient and
additional remedy, and for the further reason that an independent civil action, not depending on the issues,
limitations and results of a criminal prosecution, and entirely directed by the party wronged or his counsel, is
more likely to secure adequate and efficacious redress.
In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be and is hereby affirmed, with costs
against the defendant-petitioner.
12
G.R. No. L-33171 May 31, 1979
PORFIRIO P. CINCO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
HON. MATEO CANONOY, Presiding Judge of the Third Branch of the Court of First Instance of Cebu,
HON. LORENZO B. BARRIA City Judge of Mandaue City, Second Branch ROMEO HILOT,
VALERIANA PEPITO and CARLOS PEPITO, respondents-appellees.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu rendered on
November 5, 1970.
The background facts to the controversy may be set forth as follows:
Petitioner herein filed, on February 25, 1970, a Complaint in the City Court of Mandaue City, Cebu, Branch II,
for the recovery of damages on account of a vehicular accident involving his automobile and a jeepney driven
by Romeo Hilot and operated by Valeriana Pepito and Carlos Pepito, the last three being the private
respondents in this suit. Subsequent thereto, a criminal case was filed against the driver, Romeo Hilot, arising
from the same accident. At the pre-trial in the civil case, counsel for private respondents moved to suspend the
civil action pending the final determination of the criminal suit, invoking Rule 111, Section 3 (b) of the Rules
of Court, which provides:
(b) After a criminal action has been commenced. no civil action arising from the
same offense can be prosecuted, and the same shall be suspended, in whatever
stage it may be found, until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been
rendered;
The City Court of Mandaue City in an Order dated August 11, 1970, ordered the suspension of the civil case.
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration thereof, having been denied on August 25, 1970, 1 petitioner elevated
the matter on certiorari to the Court of First Instance of Cebu, respondent Judge presiding, on September 11,
1970, alleging that the City Judge had acted with grave abuse of discretion in suspending the civil action for
being contrary to law and jurisprudence. 2
On November 5, 1970, respondent Judge dismissed the Petition for certiorari on the ground that there was no
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the City Court in suspending the civil action inasmuch as damage to
property is not one of the instances when an independent civil action is proper; that petitioner has another
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy under the law, which is to submit his claim for damages in the criminal
case; that the resolution of the City Court is interlocutory and, therefore, certiorari is improper; and that the
Petition is defective inasmuch as what petitioner actually desires is a Writ of mandamus (Annex "R").
Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied by respondent Judge in an Order dated November 14,1970
(Annex "S" and Annex "U").

3
Hence, this Petition for Review before this Tribunal, to which we gave due course on February 25, 1971.
Petitioner makes these:
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
1. THE TRIAL COURT, RESPONDENT JUDGE MATEO CANONOY, ERRED
IN HOLDING THAT THE TRIAL OF THE CIVIL CASE NO. 189 FILED IN
THE CITY COURT OF MANDAUE SHOULD BE SUSPENDED UNTIL
AFTER A FINAL JUDGMENT IS RENDERED IN THE CRIMINAL CASE.
2. THAT THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT IN ORDER TO AVOID
DELAY THE OFFENDED PARTY MAY SUBMIT HIS CLAIM FOR
DAMAGES IN THE CRIMINAL CASE.
3. THAT THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITION FOR
certiorari IS NOT PROPER, BECAUSE THE RESOLUTION IN QUESTION IS
INTERLOCUTORY.
4. THAT THE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE PETITION IS
DEFECTIVE. 4
all of which can be synthesized into one decisive issue: whether or not there can be an independent civil action
for damage to property during the pendency of the criminal action.
From the Complaint filed by petitioner before the City Court of Mandaue City, Cebu, it is evident that the
nature and character of his action was quasi-delictual predicated principally on Articles 2176 and 2180 of the
Civil Code, which provide:
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault
or negligence is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is caned a quasi-
delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. (1902a)
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for
one's own acts or omissions but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible.
xxx xxx xxx
13
Employers shall be liable for the damages cause by their employees and household
helpers acting within the scope of their assigned tasks, even though the former are
not engaged in any business or industry.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the persons herein
mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage. (1903a)
Thus, plaintiff made the essential averments that it was the fault or negligence of the driver, Romeo Hilot, in
the operation of the jeepney owned by the Pepitos which caused the collision between his automobile and said
jeepney; that damages were sustained by petitioner because of the collision; that there was a direct causal
connection between the damages he suffered and the fault and negligence of private respondents.
Similarly, in the Answer, private respondents contended, among others, that defendant, Valeriana Pepito,
observed due diligence in the selection and supervision of her employees, particularly of her co-defendant
Romeo Hilot, a defense peculiar to actions based on quasi-delict. 5
Liability being predicated on quasi-delict the civil case may proceed as a separate and independent civil action,
as specifically provided for in Article 2177 of the Civil Code.
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is
entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under
the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or
omission of the defendant. (n)
The crucial distinction between criminal negligence and quasi-delict, which is
readily discernible from the foregoing codal provision, has been expounded
in Barredo vs. Garcia, et al., 73 Phil. 607, 620-621, 6 thus:
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in article 365 punishes not only reckless but also
simple imprudence. if we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code
refer only to fault or negligence not punished by law, according to the literal
import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa
aquiliana would have very little scope and application in actual life. Death or
injury to persons and damage to property through any degree of negligence
even the slightest would have to be indemnified only through the principle of civil
hability arising from crime. In such a state of affairs, what sphere would remain
for quasidelito or culpa aquiliana We are loath to impute to the lawmaker any
intention to bring about a situation so absurd and anomalous. Nor are we, in the
interpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold the letter that killeth rather than the

spirit that giveth life. We will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and
render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown
development as culpa aquiliana or quasi-delito, which is conserved and made
enduring in articles 1902 to 11910 of the Spanish Civil Code.
Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence is
sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. There are numerous cases of
criminal negligence which cannot be shown beyond reasonable doubt, but can be
proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and
should be made responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to 1910 of the
Civil Code, otherwise, there would be many instances of unvindicated civil
wrongs. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
Thirdly, to hold that there is only one way to make defendants liability effective,
and that is, to sue the driver and exhaust his (the latter's) property first, would be
tantamount to compelling the plaintiff to follow a devious and cumbersome
method of obtaining a reliel True, there is such a remedy under our laws, but there
is also a more expeditious way, which is based on the primary and direct
responsibility of the defendant under article 1903 of the Civil Code. Our view of
the law is more likely to facilitate remedy for civil wrongs because the procedure
indicated by the defendant is wasteful and productive of delay, it being a matter of
common knowledge that professional drivers of taxis and similar public
conveyances usually do not have sufficient means with which to pay damages.
Why, then, should the plaintiff be required in all cases to go through this round-
about, unnecessary, and probably useless procedure? In construing the laws, courts
have endeavored to shorten and facilitate the pathways of right and justice.
At this juncture, it should be said that the primary and direct responsibility of
employers and their presumed negligence are principles calculated to protect
society. Workmen and employees should be carefully chosen and supervised in
order to avoid injury to the public. It is the masters or employers who principally
reap the profits resulting from the services of these servants and employees. It is
but right that they should guarantee the latter's careful conduct for the personnel
and patrimonial safety of others. As Theilhard has said, "they should reproach
themselves, at least, some for their weakness, others for their poor selection and all
for their negligence." And according to Manresa, "It is much more equitable and
just that such responsibility should fail upon the principal or director who could
have chosen a careful and prudent employee, and not upon the such employee
because of his confidence in the principal or director." (Vol. 12, p. 622, 2nd Ed.)
Many jurists also base this primary responsibility of the employer on the principle
of representation of the principal by the agent. Thus, Oyuelos says in the work
already cited (Vol. 7, p. 747) that before third persons the employer and employee
14
vienen a ser como una sola personalidad, por refundicion de la del dependiente en
la de quien la emplea y utihza (become as one personality by the merging of the
person of the employee in that of him who employs and utilizes him.) All these
observations acquire a peculiar force and significance when it comes to motor
accidents, and there is need of stressing and accentuating the responsibility of
owners of motor vehicles.
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code and
the Civil Code on this subject, which has given rise to overlapping or concurrence
of spheres already discussed, and for lack of understanding of the character and
efficacy of the action for culpaaquiliana there has grown up a common practice to
seek damages only by virtue of the Civil responsibility arising from crime,
forgetting that there is another remedy, which is by invoking articles 1902-1910 of
the Civil Code. Although this habitual method is allowed by our laws, it has
nevertheless rendered practically useless and nugatory the more expeditious and
effective remedy based on culpa aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the
present case, we are asked to help perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is
high time we pointed out to the harm done by such practice and to restore the
principle of responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 et seq. of the
Civil Code to its full rigor. It is high time we cause the stream of quasi-delict or
culpa aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel, so that its waters may no longer
be diverted into that of a crime under the Penal Code. This will, it is believed,
make for the bet ter safeguarding of private rights because it re-establishes an
ancient and additional remedy, and for the further reason that an independent civil
action, not depending on the issues, stations and results of a criminal prosecution,
and entirely directed by the party wronged or his counsel is more likely to secure
adequate and efficacious redress. (Garcia vs. Florida 52 SCRA 420, 424-425, Aug.
31, 1973). (Emphasis supplied)
The separate and independent civil action for a quasi-delict is also clearly recognized in section 2, Rule 111 of
the Rules of Court, reading:
Sec. 2. Independent civil action. In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33,
34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, Are independent civil action
entirely separate and distinct from the c action, may be brought by the injured
party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved as
required in the preceding section. Such civil action shag proceed independently of
the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.
Significant to note is the fact that the foregoing section categorically lists cases provided for in Article 2177 of
the Civil Code, supra, as allowing of an "independent civil action."
 15

Tested by the hereinabove-quoted legal tenets, it has to be held that the City Court, in surrounding the civil
action, erred in placing reliance on section 3 (b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, supra which refers to "other
civil actions arising from cases not included in the section just cited" (i.e., Section 2, Rule 111 above quoted),
in which case 6 once the criminal action has being commenced, no civil action arising from the same offense
can be prosecuted and the same shall be suspended in whatever stage it may be found, until final judgment in
the criminal proceeding has been rendered." Stated otherwise, the civil action referred to in Secs. 3(a) and 3(b)
of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, which should be suspended after the criminal action has been instituted is
that arising from the criminal offense not the civil action based on quasi-delict
In the light of the foregoing disquisition, we are constrained to hold that respondent Judge gravely abused his
discretion in upholding the Decision of the City Court of Mandaue City, Cebu, suspending the civil action
based on a quasi-delict until after the criminal case is finally terminated. Having arrived at this conclusion, a
discussion of the other errors assigned becomes unnecessary.
WHEREFORE, granting the Writ of certiorari prayed for, the Decision of the Court of First Instance of Cebu
sought to be reviewed is hereby set aside, and the City Court of Mandaue City, Cebu, Branch 11, is hereby
ordered to proceed with the hearing of Civil Case No. 189 of that Court.

Article 31 of the Civil Code then clearly assumes relevance when it provides: Without pronouncement as to costs.

Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or SO ORDERED.
omission complained of as a felony, such civil action may proceed independently
of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter. Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero and De Castro, JJ., concur.

For obviously, the jural concept of a quasi-delict is that of an independent source of obligation "not arising
from the act or omission complained of as a felony." Article 1157 of the Civil Code bolsters this conclusion
when it specifically recognizes that:

Art. 1157. Obligations arise from:

(1) Law;

(2) Contracts;

(3) Quasi-contracts;

(4) Acts or omissions punished by law; and

(5) Quasi-delicts. (1089a)

(Emphasis supplied)

It bears emphasizing that petitioner's cause of action is based on quasi-delict. The concept of quasidelica as
enunciated in Article 2176 of the Civil Code (supra), is so broad that it includes not only injuries to persons but
also damage to property. 7 It makes no distinction between "damage to persons" on the one hand and "damage
to property" on the other. Indeed, the word "damage" is used in two concepts: the "harm" done and
"reparation" for the harm done. And with respect to harm it is plain that it includes both injuries to person and
property since "harm" is not limited to personal but also to property injuries. In fact, examples of quasi-
delict in the law itself include damage to property. An instance is Article 2191(2) of the Civil Code which holds
proprietors responsible for damages caused by excessive smoke which may be harmful to persons or property."

G.R. No. L-35095 August 31, 1973
GERMAN C. GARCIA, LUMINOSA L. GARCIA, and ESTER FRANCISCO, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE MARIANO M. FLORIDO OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF
MISAMIS OCCIDENTAL, MARCELINO INESIN, RICARDO VAYSON, MACTAN TRANSIT CO.,
INC., and PEDRO TUMALA Y DIGAL, respondents.
ANTONIO, J.:
Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Misamis Occidental, Branch III, in
Civil Case No. 2850 (German C. Garcia, et al. vs. Marcelino Inesin et al.) dated October 21, 1971, dismissing
petitioners' action for damages against respondents, Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and Pedro Tumala "without
prejudice to refiling the said civil action after conviction of the defendants in the criminal case filed by the
Chief of Police of Sindangan Zamboanga del Norte", and from the order of said Court dated January 21, 1972,
denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
On August 4, 1971, petitioners, German C. Garcia, Chief of the Misamis Occidental Hospital, together with his
wife, Luminosa L. Garcia, and Ester Francisco, bookkeeper of said hospital, hired and boarded a PU car with
plate No. 241-8 G Ozamis 71 owned and operated by respondent, Marcelino Inesin, and driven by respondent,
Ricardo Vayson, for a round-trip from Oroquieta City to Zamboanga City, for the purpose of attending a
conference of chiefs of government hospitals, hospital administrative officers, and bookkeepers of Regional
Health Office No. 7 at Zamboanga City. At about 9:30 a.m., while the PU car was negotiating a slight curve on
the national highway at kilometer 21 in Barrio Guisukan, Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, said car collided
with an oncoming passenger bus (No. 25) with plate No. 77-4 W Z.N. 71 owned and operated by the Mactan
Transit Co., Inc. and driven by defendant, Pedro Tumala. As a result of the aforesaid collision, petitioners
sustained various physical injuries which necessitated their medical treatment and hospitalization.
Alleging that both drivers of the PU car and the passenger bus were at the time of the accident driving their
respective vehicles at a fast clip, in a reckless, grossly negligent and imprudent manner in gross violation of
traffic rules and without due regard to the safety of the passengers aboard the PU car, petitioners, German C.
Garcia, Luminosa L. Garcia, and Ester Francisco, filed on September 1, 1971 with respondent Court of First
Instance of Misamis Occidental an action for damages (Civil Case No. 2850) against the private respondents,
owners and drivers, respectively, of the PU car and the passenger bus that figured in the collision, with prayer
for preliminary attachment.
On September 16, 1971, Marcelino Inesin and Ricardo Vayson filed their answer in the aforementioned Civil
Case No. 2850 admitting the contract of carriage with petitioners but alleged, by way of defense, that the
accident was due to the negligence and reckless imprudence of the bus driver, as when Ricardo Vayson, driver
of the PU car, saw the oncoming passenger bus No. 25 coming from the opposite direction ascending the
incline at an excessive speed, chasing another passenger bus, he had to stop the PU car in order to give way to
the passenger bus, but, in spite of such precaution, the passenger bus bumped the PU car, thus causing the
16
accident in question, and, therefore, said private respondents could not be held liable for the damages caused
on petitioners.
On September 29, 1971, respondents, Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and Pedro Tumala, filed a motion to dismiss on
three (3) grounds, namely: 1) that the plaintiffs (petitioners) had no cause of action; 2) that the complaint
carries with it a prayer for attachment but without the requisite verification, hence defective under the
provision of Sec. 3, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court; and 3) that the defendants (respondents), Mactan Transit
Co., Inc. and its driver, accused Pedro Tumala, had operated said passenger bus with maximum care and
prudence.
The principal argument advanced in said motion to dismiss was that the petitioners had no cause of action for
on August 11, 1971, or 20 days before the filing of the present action for damages, respondent Pedro Tumala
was charged in Criminal Case No. 4960 of the Municipal Court of Sindangan, Zamboanga del Norte, in a
complaint filed by the Chief of Police for "double serious and less serious physical injuries through reckless
imprudence", and that, with the filing of the aforesaid criminal case, no civil action could be filed subsequent
thereto unless the criminal case has been finally adjudicated, pursuant to Sec. 3 of Rule 111 of the Rules of
Court, and, therefore, the filing of the instant civil action is premature, because the liability of the employer is
merely subsidiary and does not arise until after final judgment has been rendered finding the driver, Pedro
Tumala guilty of negligence; that Art. 33 of the New Civil Code, is not applicable because Art. 33 applied only
to the crimes of physical injuries or homicide, not to the negligent act or imprudence of the driver.
On October 14, 1971, petitioners filed an opposition to said motion to dismiss alleging that the aforesaid action
for damages was instituted not to enforce the civil liability of the respondents under Art. 100 of the Revised
Penal Code but for their civil liability on quasi-delicts pursuant to Articles 2176-2194, as the same negligent
act causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Revised Penal Code or create
an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code, and the party seeking recovery is free
to choose which remedy to enforce.
In dismissing the complaint for damages in Civil Case No. 2850, the lower court sustained the arguments of
respondents, Mactan Transit Co., Inc. and Pedro Tumala, and declared that whether or not "the action for
damages is based on criminal negligence or civil negligence known as culpa aquiliana in the Civil Code or tort
under American law" there "should be a showing that the offended party expressly waived the civil action or
reserved his right to institute it separately" and that "the allegations of the complaint in culpa aquiliana must
not be tainted by any assertion of violation of law or traffic rules or regulations" and because of the prayer in
the complaint asking the Court to declare the defendants jointly and severally liable for moral, compensatory
and exemplary damages, the Court is of the opinion that the action was not based on "culpa aquiliana or quasi-
delict."
Petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied by the trial court on January 21, 1972, hence this appeal
on certiorari.

There is no question that from a careful consideration of the allegations contained in the complaint in Civil
Case No. 2850, the essential averments for a quasi-delictual action under Articles 2176-2194 of the New Civil
Code are present, namely: a) act or omission of the private respondents; b) presence of fault or negligence or
the lack of due care in the operation of the passenger bus No. 25 by respondent Pedro Tumala resulting in the
collision of the bus with the passenger car; c) physical injuries and other damages sustained by petitioners as a
result of the collision; d) existence of direct causal connection between the damage or prejudice and the fault or
negligence of private respondents; and e) the absence of pre-existing contractual relations between the parties.
The circumstance that the complaint alleged that respondents violated traffic rules in that the driver drove the
vehicle "at a fast clip in a reckless, grossly negligent and imprudent manner in violation of traffic rules and
without due regard to the safety of the passengers aboard the PU car" does not detract from the nature and
character of the action, as one based on culpa aquiliana. The violation of traffic rules is merely descriptive of
the failure of said driver to observe for the protection of the interests of others, that degree of care, precaution
and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, which failure resulted in the injury on petitioners.
Certainly excessive speed in violation of traffic rules is a clear indication of negligence. Since the same
negligent act resulted in the filing of the criminal action by the Chief of Police with the Municipal Court
(Criminal Case No. 4960) and the civil action by petitioners, it is inevitable that the averments on the drivers'
negligence in both complaints would substantially be the same. It should be emphasized that the same
negligent act causing damages may produce a civil liability arising from a crime under Art. 100 of the Revised
Penal Code or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual under Arts. 2176-2194 of the New
Civil Code. This distinction has been amply explained in Barredo vs. Garcia, et al. (73 Phil. 607, 620-621). 1
It is true that under Sec. 2 in relation to Sec. 1 of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court which became
effective on January 1, 1964, in the cases provided for by Articles 31, 33, 39 and 2177 of the Civil Code, an
independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the civil action, may be instituted by the injured
party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided said party has reserved his right to institute it
separately, but it should be noted, however, that neither Section 1 nor Section 2 of Rule 111 fixes a time limit
when such reservation shall be made. In Tactaquin v. Palileo, 2 where the reservation was made after the tort-
feasor had already pleaded guilty and after the private prosecutor had entered his appearance jointly with the
prosecuting attorney in the course of the criminal proceedings, and the tort-feasor was convicted and sentenced
to pay damages to the offended party by final judgment in said criminal case, We ruled that such reservation is
legally ineffective because the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of
the defendant. We explained in Meneses vs. Luat 3 that when the criminal action for physical injuries against
the defendant did not proceed to trial as he pleaded guilty upon arraignment and the Court made no
pronouncement on the matter or damages suffered by the injured party, the mere appearance of private counsel
in representation of the offended party in said criminal case does not constitute such active intervention as
could impart an intention to press a claim for damages in the same action, and, therefore, cannot bar a separate
civil action for damages subsequently instituted on the same ground under Article 33 of the New Civil Code.
In the case at bar, there is no question that petitioners never intervened in the criminal action instituted by the
Chief of Police against respondent Pedro Tumala, much less has the said criminal action been terminated either
by conviction or acquittal of said accused.
17
It is, therefore, evident that by the institution of the present civil action for damages, petitioners have in effect
abandoned their right to press recovery for damages in the criminal case, and have opted instead to recover
them in the present civil case.
As a result of this action of petitioners the civil liability of private respondents to the former has ceased to be
involved in the criminal action. Undoubtedly an offended party loses his right to intervene in the prosecution of
a criminal case, not only when he has waived the civil action or expressly reserved his right to institute, but
also when he has actually instituted the civil action. For by either of such actions his interest in the criminal
case has disappeared.
As we have stated at the outset, the same negligent act causing damages may produce a civil liability arising
from crime or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual. The former is a violation of the
criminal law, while the latter is a distinct and independent negligence, having always had its own foundation
and individuality. Some legal writers are of the view that in accordance with Article 31, the civil action based
upon quasi-delict may proceed independently of the criminal proceeding for criminal negligence and
regardless of the result of the latter. Hence, "the proviso in Section 2 of Rule 111 with reference to ... Articles
32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code is contrary to the letter and spirit of the said articles, for these articles were
drafted ... and are intended to constitute as exceptions to the general rule stated in what is now Section 1 of
Rule 111. The proviso which is procedural, may also be regarded as an unauthorized amendment of substantive
law, Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code, which do not provide for the reservation required in
the proviso." 4 But in whatever way We view the institution of the civil action for recovery of damages under
quasi-delict by petitioners, whether as one that should be governed by the provisions of Section 2 of Rule 111
of the Rules which require reservation by the injured party considering that by the institution of the civil action
even before the commencement of the trial of the criminal case, petitioners have thereby foreclosed their right
to intervene therein, or one where reservation to file the civil action need not be made, for the reason that the
law itself (Article 33 of the Civil Code) already makes the reservation and the failure of the offended party to
do so does not bar him from bringing the action, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, We find no legal
justification for respondent court's order of dismissal.
WHEREFORE, the decision and order appealed from are hereby reversed and set aside, and the court a quo is
directed to proceed with the trial of the case. Costs against private respondents.
Zaldivar, Castro Fernando, Teehankee, Makasiar and Esguerra, JJ., concur.
Makalintal, Actg., C.J., concurs in the result.

G.R. No. L-4977 March 22, 1910
DAVID TAYLOR, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
THE MANILA ELECTRIC RAILROAD AND LIGHT COMPANY, defendant-appellant.
W. H. Lawrence, for appellant.
W. L. Wright, for appellee.
CARSON, J.:
An action to recover damages for the loss of an eye and other injuries, instituted by David Taylor, a minor, by
his father, his nearest relative.
The defendant is a foreign corporation engaged in the operation of a street railway and an electric light system
in the city of Manila. Its power plant is situated at the eastern end of a small island in the Pasig River within
the city of Manila, known as the Isla del Provisor. The power plant may be reached by boat or by crossing a
footbridge, impassable for vehicles, at the westerly end of the island.
The plaintiff, David Taylor, was at the time when he received the injuries complained of, 15 years of age, the
son of a mechanical engineer, more mature than the average boy of his age, and having considerable aptitude
and training in mechanics.
On the 30th of September, 1905, plaintiff, with a boy named Manuel Claparols, about 12 years of age, crossed
the footbridge to the Isla del Provisor, for the purpose of visiting one Murphy, an employee of the defendant,
who and promised to make them a cylinder for a miniature engine. Finding on inquiry that Mr. Murphy was
not in his quarters, the boys, impelled apparently by youthful curiosity and perhaps by the unusual interest
which both seem to have taken in machinery, spent some time in wandering about the company's premises. The
visit was made on a Sunday afternoon, and it does not appear that they saw or spoke to anyone after leaving the
power house where they had asked for Mr. Murphy.
After watching the operation of the travelling crane used in handling the defendant's coal, they walked across
the open space in the neighborhood of the place where the company dumped in the cinders and ashes from its
furnaces. Here they found some twenty or thirty brass fulminating caps scattered on the ground. These caps are
approximately of the size and appearance of small pistol cartridges and each has attached to it two long thin
wires by means of which it may be discharged by the use of electricity. They are intended for use in the
explosion of blasting charges of dynamite, and have in themselves a considerable explosive power. After some
discussion as to the ownership of the caps, and their right to take them, the boys picked up all they could find,
hung them on stick, of which each took end, and carried them home. After crossing the footbridge, they met a
little girl named Jessie Adrian, less than 9 years old, and all three went to the home of the boy Manuel. The
boys then made a series of experiments with the caps. They trust the ends of the wires into an electric light
socket and obtained no result. They next tried to break the cap with a stone and failed. Manuel looked for a
18
hammer, but could not find one. Then they opened one of the caps with a knife, and finding that it was filled
with a yellowish substance they got matches, and David held the cap while Manuel applied a lighted match to
the contents. An explosion followed, causing more or less serious injuries to all three. Jessie, who when the
boys proposed putting a match to the contents of the cap, became frightened and started to run away, received a
slight cut in the neck. Manuel had his hand burned and wounded, and David was struck in the face by several
particles of the metal capsule, one of which injured his right eye to such an extent as to the necessitate its
removal by the surgeons who were called in to care for his wounds.
The evidence does definitely and conclusively disclose how the caps came to be on the defendant's premises,
nor how long they had been there when the boys found them. It appears, however, that some months before the
accident, during the construction of the defendant's plant, detonating caps of the same size and kind as those
found by the boys were used in sinking a well at the power plant near the place where the caps were found; and
it also appears that at or about the time when these caps were found, similarly caps were in use in the
construction of an extension of defendant's street car line to Fort William McKinley. The caps when found
appeared to the boys who picked them up to have been lying for a considerable time, and from the place where
they were found would seem to have been discarded as detective or worthless and fit only to be thrown upon
the rubbish heap.
No measures seems to have been adopted by the defendant company to prohibit or prevent visitors from
entering and walking about its premises unattended, when they felt disposed so to do. As admitted in defendant
counsel's brief, "it is undoubtedly true that children in their play sometimes crossed the foot bridge to the
islands;" and, we may add, roamed about at will on the uninclosed premises of the defendant, in the
neighborhood of the place where the caps were found. There is evidence that any effort ever was made to
forbid these children from visiting the defendant company's premises, although it must be assumed that the
company or its employees were aware of the fact that they not infrequently did so.
Two years before the accident, plaintiff spent four months at sea, as a cabin boy on one of the interisland
transports. Later he took up work in his father's office, learning mechanical drawing and mechanical
engineering. About a month after his accident he obtained employment as a mechanical draftsman and
continued in that employment for six months at a salary of P2.50 a day; and it appears that he was a boy of
more than average intelligence, taller and more mature both mentally and physically than most boys of fifteen.
The facts set out in the foregoing statement are to our mind fully and conclusively established by the evidence
of record, and are substantially admitted by counsel. The only questions of fact which are seriously disputed
are plaintiff's allegations that the caps which were found by plaintiff on defendant company's premises were
the property of the defendant, or that they had come from its possession and control, and that the company or
some of its employees left them exposed on its premises at the point where they were found.
The evidence in support of these allegations is meager, and the defendant company, apparently relying on the
rule of law which places the burden of proof of such allegations upon the plaintiff, offered no evidence in
rebuttal, and insists that plaintiff failed in his proof. We think, however, that plaintiff's evidence is sufficient to
sustain a finding in accord with his allegations in this regard.

It was proven that caps, similar to those found by plaintiff, were used, more or less extensively, on the
McKinley extension of the defendant company's track; that some of these caps were used in blasting a well on
the company's premises a few months before the accident; that not far from the place where the caps were
found the company has a storehouse for the materials, supplies and so forth, used by it in its operations as a
street railway and a purveyor of electric light; and that the place, in the neighborhood of which the caps were
found, was being used by the company as a sort of dumping ground for ashes and cinders. Fulminating caps or
detonators for the discharge by electricity of blasting charges by dynamite are not articles in common use by
the average citizen, and under all the circumstances, and in the absence of all evidence to the contrary, we think
that the discovery of twenty or thirty of these caps at the place where they were found by the plaintiff on
defendant's premises fairly justifies the inference that the defendant company was either the owner of the caps
in question or had the caps under its possession and control. We think also that the evidence tends to disclose
that these caps or detonators were willfully and knowingly thrown by the company or its employees at the spot
where they were found, with the expectation that they would be buried out of the sight by the ashes which it
was engaged in dumping in that neighborhood, they being old and perhaps defective; and, however this may
be, we are satisfied that the evidence is sufficient to sustain a finding that the company or some of its
employees either willfully or through an oversight left them exposed at a point on its premises which the
general public, including children at play, where not prohibited from visiting, and over which the company
knew or ought to have known that young boys were likely to roam about in pastime or in play.
Counsel for appellant endeavors to weaken or destroy the probative value of the facts on which these
conclusions are based by intimidating or rather assuming that the blasting work on the company's well and on
its McKinley extension was done by contractors. It was conclusively proven, however, that while the workman
employed in blasting the well was regularly employed by J. G. White and Co., a firm of contractors, he did the
work on the well directly and immediately under the supervision and control of one of defendant company's
foremen, and there is no proof whatever in the record that the blasting on the McKinley extension was done
by independent contractors. Only one witness testified upon this point, and while he stated that he understood
that a part of this work was done by contract, he could not say so of his own knowledge, and knew nothing of
the terms and conditions of the alleged contract, or of the relations of the alleged contractor to the defendant
company. The fact having been proven that detonating caps were more or less extensively employed on work
done by the defendant company's directions and on its behalf, we think that the company should have
introduced the necessary evidence to support its contention if it wished to avoid the not unreasonable inference
that it was the owner of the material used in these operations and that it was responsible for tortious or
negligent acts of the agents employed therein, on the ground that this work had been intrusted to independent
contractors as to whose acts the maxim respondent superior should not be applied. If the company did not in
fact own or make use of caps such as those found on its premises, as intimated by counsel, it was a very simple
matter for it to prove that fact, and in the absence of such proof we think that the other evidence in the record
sufficiently establishes the contrary, and justifies the court in drawing the reasonable inference that the caps
found on its premises were its property, and were left where they were found by the company or some of its
employees.
Plaintiff appears to have rested his case, as did the trial judge his decision in plaintiff's favor, upon the
provisions of article 1089 of the Civil Code read together with articles 1902, 1903, and 1908 of that code.
19
ART. 1089 Obligations are created by law, by contracts, by quasi-contracts, and illicit acts
and omissions or by those in which any kind of fault or negligence occurs.
ART. 1902 A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is
fault or negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done.
ART. 1903 The obligation imposed by the preceding article is demandable, not only for
personal acts and omissions, but also for those of the persons for whom they should be
responsible.
The father, and on his death or incapacity the mother, is liable for the damages caused by
the minors who live with them.
xxx xxx xxx
Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for damages caused
by their employees in the service of the branches in which the latter may be employed or on
account of their duties.
xxx xxx xxx
The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove
that they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage.
ART. 1908 The owners shall also be liable for the damage caused
1 By the explosion of machines which may not have been cared for with due diligence, and
for kindling of explosive substances which may not have been placed in a safe and proper
place.
Counsel for the defendant and appellant rests his appeal strictly upon his contention that the facts proven at the
trial do not established the liability of the defendant company under the provisions of these articles, and since
we agree with this view of the case, it is not necessary for us to consider the various questions as to form and
the right of action (analogous to those raised in the case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil.
Rep., 359), which would, perhaps, be involved in a decision affirming the judgment of the court below.
We agree with counsel for appellant that under the Civil Code, as under the generally accepted doctrine in the
United States, the plaintiff in an action such as that under consideration, in order to establish his right to a
recovery, must establish by competent evidence:
(1) Damages to the plaintiff.

(2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or some person for whose
acts it must respond, was guilty.
(3) The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the damage.
These proposition are, of course, elementary, and do not admit of discussion, the real difficulty arising in the
application of these principles to the particular facts developed in the case under consideration.
It is clear that the accident could not have happened and not the fulminating caps been left exposed at the point
where they were found, or if their owner had exercised due care in keeping them in an appropriate place; but it
is equally clear that plaintiff would not have been injured had he not, for his own pleasure and convenience,
entered upon the defendant's premises, and strolled around thereon without the express permission of the
defendant, and had he not picked up and carried away the property of the defendant which he found on its
premises, and had he not thereafter deliberately cut open one of the caps and applied a match to its contents.
But counsel for plaintiff contends that because of plaintiff's youth and inexperience, his entry upon defendant
company's premises, and the intervention of his action between the negligent act of defendant in leaving the
caps exposed on its premises and the accident which resulted in his injury should not be held to have
contributed in any wise to the accident, which should be deemed to be the direct result of defendant's
negligence in leaving the caps exposed at the place where they were found by the plaintiff, and this latter the
proximate cause of the accident which occasioned the injuries sustained by him.
In support of his contention, counsel for plaintiff relies on the doctrine laid down in many of the courts of last
resort in the United States in the cases known as the "Torpedo" and "Turntable" cases, and the cases based
thereon.
In a typical cases, the question involved has been whether a railroad company is liable for an injury received
by an infant of tender years, who from mere idle curiosity, or for the purposes of amusement, enters upon the
railroad company's premises, at a place where the railroad company knew, or had good reason to suppose,
children would be likely to come, and there found explosive signal torpedoes left unexposed by the railroad
company's employees, one of which when carried away by the visitor, exploded and injured him; or where
such infant found upon the premises a dangerous machine, such as a turntable, left in such condition as to
make it probable that children in playing with it would be exposed to accident or injury therefrom and where
the infant did in fact suffer injury in playing with such machine.
In these, and in great variety of similar cases, the great weight of authority holds the owner of the premises
liable.
As laid down in Railroad Co. vs. Stout (17 Wall. (84 U. S.), 657), wherein the principal question was whether a
railroad company was liable for in injury received by an infant while upon its premises, from idle curiosity, or
for purposes of amusement, if such injury was, under circumstances, attributable to the negligence of the
company), the principles on which these cases turn are that "while a railroad company is not bound to the same
20
degree of care in regard to mere strangers who are unlawfully upon its premises that it owes to passengers
conveyed by it, it is not exempt from responsibility to such strangers for injuries arising from its negligence or
from its tortious acts;" and that "the conduct of an infant of tender years is not to be judged by the same rule
which governs that of adult. While it is the general rule in regard to an adult that to entitle him to recover
damages for an injury resulting from the fault or negligence of another he must himself have been free from
fault, such is not the rule in regard to an infant of tender years. The care and caution required of a child is
according to his maturity and capacity only, and this is to be determined in each case by the circumstances of
the case."
The doctrine of the case of Railroad Company vs. Stout was vigorously controverted and sharply criticized in
several state courts, and the supreme court of Michigan in the case of Ryan vs. Towar (128 Mich., 463)
formally repudiated and disapproved the doctrine of the Turntable cases, especially that laid down in Railroad
Company vs. Stout, in a very able decision wherein it held, in the language of the syllabus: (1) That the owner
of the land is not liable to trespassers thereon for injuries sustained by them, not due to his wanton or willful
acts; (2) that no exception to this rule exists in favor of children who are injured by dangerous machinery
naturally calculated to attract them to the premises; (3) that an invitation or license to cross the premises of
another can not be predicated on the mere fact that no steps have been taken to interfere with such practice; (4)
that there is no difference between children and adults as to the circumstances that will warrant the inference of
an invitation or a license to enter upon another's premises.
Similar criticisms of the opinion in the case of Railroad Company vs. Stout were indulged in by the courts in
Connecticut and Massachusetts. (Nolan vs. Railroad Co., 53 Conn., 461; 154 Mass., 349). And the doctrine has
been questioned in Wisconsin, Pennsylvania, New Hampshire, and perhaps in other States.
On the other hand, many if not most of the courts of last resort in the United States, citing and approving the
doctrine laid down in England in the leading case of Lynch vs. Nurding (1 Q. B., 29, 35, 36), lay down the rule
in these cases in accord with that announced in the Railroad Company vs. Stout (supra), and the Supreme
Court of the United States, in a unanimous opinion delivered by Justice Harlan in the case of Union Pacific
Railway Co. vs. McDonal and reconsidered the doctrine laid down in Railroad Co. vs. Stout, and after an
exhaustive and critical analysis and review of many of the adjudged cases, both English and American,
formally declared that it adhered "to the principles announced in the case of Railroad Co. vs. Stout."
In the case of Union Pacific Railway Co. vs. MacDonald (supra) the facts were as follows: The plaintiff, a boy
12 years of age, out of curiosity and for his own pleasure, entered upon and visited the defendant's premises,
without defendant's express permission or invitation, and while there, was by accident injured by falling into a
burning slack pile of whose existence he had no knowledge, but which had been left by defendant on its
premises without any fence around it or anything to give warning of its dangerous condition, although
defendant knew or had reason the interest or curiosity of passers-by. On these facts the court held that the
plaintiff could not be regarded as a mere trespasser, for whose safety and protection while on the premises in
question, against the unseen danger referred to, the defendant was under no obligation to make provision.

We quote at length from the discussion by the court of the application of the principles involved to the facts in
that case, because what is said there is strikingly applicable in the case at bar, and would seem to dispose of
defendant's contention that, the plaintiff in this case being a trespasser, the defendant company owed him no
duty, and in no case could be held liable for injuries which would not have resulted but for the entry of plaintiff
on defendant's premises.
We adhere to the principles announced in Railroad Co. vs. Stout (supra). Applied to the case
now before us, they require us to hold that the defendant was guilty of negligence in leaving
unguarded the slack pile, made by it in the vicinity of its depot building. It could have
forbidden all persons from coming to its coal mine for purposes merely of curiosity and
pleasure. But it did not do so. On the contrary, it permitted all, without regard to age, to visit
its mine, and witness its operation. It knew that the usual approach to the mine was by a
narrow path skirting its slack pit, close to its depot building, at which the people of the
village, old and young, would often assemble. It knew that children were in the habit of
frequenting that locality and playing around the shaft house in the immediate vicinity of the
slack pit. The slightest regard for the safety of these children would have suggested that they
were in danger from being so near a pit, beneath the surface of which was concealed (except
when snow, wind, or rain prevailed) a mass of burning coals into which a child might
accidentally fall and be burned to death. Under all the circumstances, the railroad company
ought not to be heard to say that the plaintiff, a mere lad, moved by curiosity to see the
mine, in the vicinity of the slack pit, was a trespasser, to whom it owed no duty, or for
whose protection it was under no obligation to make provisions.
In Townsend vs. Wathen (9 East, 277, 281) it was held that if a man dangerous traps, baited
with flesh, in his own ground, so near to a highway, or to the premises of another, that dogs
passing along the highway, or kept in his neighbors premises, would probably be attracted
by their instinct into the traps, and in consequence of such act his neighbor's dogs be so
attracted and thereby injured, an action on the case would lie. "What difference," said Lord
Ellenborough, C.J., "is there in reason between drawing the animal into the trap by means of
his instinct which he can not resist, and putting him there by manual force?" What
difference, in reason we may observe in this case, is there between an express license to the
children of this village to visit the defendant's coal mine, in the vicinity of its slack pile, and
an implied license, resulting from the habit of the defendant to permit them, without
objection or warning, to do so at will, for purposes of curiosity or pleasure? Referring it the
case of Townsend vs. Wathen, Judge Thompson, in his work on the Law of Negligence,
volume 1, page 305, note, well says: "It would be a barbarous rule of law that would make
the owner of land liable for setting a trap thereon, baited with stinking meat, so that his
neighbor's dog attracted by his natural instinct, might run into it and be killed, and which
would exempt him from liability for the consequence of leaving exposed and unguarded on
his land a dangerous machine, so that his neighbor's child attracted to it and tempted to
intermeddle with it by instincts equally strong, might thereby be killed or maimed for life."
21
Chief Justice Cooley, voicing the opinion of the supreme court of Michigan, in the case of Powers vs.
Harlow (53 Mich., 507), said that (p. 515):
Children, wherever they go, must be expected to act upon childlike instincts and impulses;
and others who are chargeable with a duty of care and caution toward them must calculate
upon this, and take precautions accordingly. If they leave exposed to the observation of
children anything which would be tempting to them, and which they in their immature
judgment might naturally suppose they were at liberty to handle or play with, they should
expect that liberty to be taken.
And the same eminent jurist in his treatise or torts, alluding to the doctrine of implied invitation to visit the
premises of another, says:
In the case of young children, and other persons not fully sui juris, an implied license might
sometimes arise when it would not on behalf of others. Thus leaving a tempting thing for
children to play with exposed, where they would be likely to gather for that purpose, may be
equivalent to an invitation to them to make use of it; and, perhaps, if one were to throw
away upon his premises, near the common way, things tempting to children, the same
implication should arise. (Chap. 10, p. 303.)
The reasoning which led the Supreme Court of the United States to its conclusion in the cases of Railroad Co.
vs. Stout (supra) and Union Pacific Railroad Co. vs. McDonald (supra) is not less cogent and convincing in
this jurisdiction than in that wherein those cases originated. Children here are actuated by similar childish
instincts and impulses. Drawn by curiosity and impelled by the restless spirit of youth, boys here as well as
there will usually be found whenever the public is permitted to congregate. The movement of machinery, and
indeed anything which arouses the attention of the young and inquiring mind, will draw them to the
neighborhood as inevitably as does the magnet draw the iron which comes within the range of its magnetic
influence. The owners of premises, therefore, whereon things attractive to children are exposed, or upon which
the public are expressly or impliedly permitted to enter or upon which the owner knows or ought to know
children are likely to roam about for pastime and in play, " must calculate upon this, and take precautions
accordingly." In such cases the owner of the premises can not be heard to say that because the child has entered
upon his premises without his express permission he is a trespasser to whom the owner owes no duty or
obligation whatever. The owner's failure to take reasonable precautions to prevent the child from entering his
premises at a place where he knows or ought to know that children are accustomed to roam about of to which
their childish instincts and impulses are likely to attract them is at least equivalent to an implied license to
enter, and where the child does enter under such conditions the owner's failure to take reasonable precautions
to guard the child against injury from unknown or unseen dangers, placed upon such premises by the owner, is
clearly a breach of duty, responsible, if the child is actually injured, without other fault on its part than that it
had entered on the premises of a stranger without his express invitation or permission. To hold otherwise
would be expose all the children in the community to unknown perils and unnecessary danger at the whim of
the owners or occupants of land upon which they might naturally and reasonably be expected to enter.

This conclusion is founded on reason, justice, and necessity, and neither is contention that a man has a right to
do what will with his own property or that children should be kept under the care of their parents or guardians,
so as to prevent their entering on the premises of others is of sufficient weight to put in doubt. In this
jurisdiction as well as in the United States all private property is acquired and held under the tacit condition
that it shall not be so used as to injure the equal rights and interests of the community (see U. S. vs.
Toribio,1 No. 5060, decided January 26, 1910), and except as to infants of very tender years it would be absurd
and unreasonable in a community organized as is that in which we lived to hold that parents or guardian are
guilty of negligence or imprudence in every case wherein they permit growing boys and girls to leave the
parental roof unattended, even if in the event of accident to the child the negligence of the parent could in any
event be imputed to the child so as to deprive it a right to recover in such cases a point which we neither
discuss nor decide.
But while we hold that the entry of the plaintiff upon defendant's property without defendant's express
invitation or permission would not have relieved defendant from responsibility for injuries incurred there by
plaintiff, without other fault on his part, if such injury were attributable to the negligence of the defendant, we
are of opinion that under all the circumstances of this case the negligence of the defendant in leaving the caps
exposed on its premises was not the proximate cause of the injury received by the plaintiff, which therefore
was not, properly speaking, "attributable to the negligence of the defendant," and, on the other hand, we are
satisfied that plaintiffs action in cutting open the detonating cap and putting match to its contents was the
proximate cause of the explosion and of the resultant injuries inflicted upon the plaintiff, and that the
defendant, therefore is not civilly responsible for the injuries thus incurred.
Plaintiff contends, upon the authority of the Turntable and Torpedo cases, that because of plaintiff's youth the
intervention of his action between the negligent act of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its
premises and the explosion which resulted in his injury should not be held to have contributed in any wise to
the accident; and it is because we can not agree with this proposition, although we accept the doctrine of the
Turntable and Torpedo cases, that we have thought proper to discuss and to consider that doctrine at length in
this decision. As was said in case of Railroad Co. vs. Stout (supra), "While it is the general rule in regard to an
adult that to entitle him to recover damages for an injury resulting from the fault or negligence of another he
must himself have been free from fault, such is not the rule in regard to an infant of tender years. The care and
caution required of a child is according to his maturity and capacity only, and this is to be determined in each
case by the circumstances of the case." As we think we have shown, under the reasoning on which rests the
doctrine of the Turntable and Torpedo cases, no fault which would relieve defendant of responsibility for
injuries resulting from its negligence can be attributed to the plaintiff, a well-grown boy of 15 years of age,
because of his entry upon defendant's uninclosed premises without express permission or invitation' but it is
wholly different question whether such youth can be said to have been free from fault when he willfully and
deliberately cut open the detonating cap, and placed a match to the contents, knowing, as he undoubtedly did,
that his action would result in an explosion. On this point, which must be determined by "the particular
circumstances of this case," the doctrine laid down in the Turntable and Torpedo cases lends us no direct aid,
although it is worthy of observation that in all of the "Torpedo" and analogous cases which our attention has
been directed, the record discloses that the plaintiffs, in whose favor judgments have been affirmed, were of
such tender years that they were held not to have the capacity to understand the nature or character of the
explosive instruments which fell into their hands.
22
In the case at bar, plaintiff at the time of the accident was a well-grown youth of 15, more mature both
mentally and physically than the average boy of his age; he had been to sea as a cabin boy; was able to earn
P2.50 a day as a mechanical draftsman thirty days after the injury was incurred; and the record discloses
throughout that he was exceptionally well qualified to take care of himself. The evidence of record leaves no
room for doubt that, despite his denials on the witness stand, he well knew the explosive character of the cap
with which he was amusing himself. The series of experiments made by him in his attempt to produce an
explosion, as described by the little girl who was present, admit of no other explanation. His attempt to
discharge the cap by the use of electricity, followed by his efforts to explode it with a stone or a hammer, and
the final success of his endeavors brought about by the application of a match to the contents of the caps, show
clearly that he knew what he was about. Nor can there be any reasonable doubt that he had reason to anticipate
that the explosion might be dangerous, in view of the fact that the little girl, 9 years of age, who was within
him at the time when he put the match to the contents of the cap, became frightened and ran away.
True, he may not have known and probably did not know the precise nature of the explosion which might be
expected from the ignition of the contents of the cap, and of course he did not anticipate the resultant injuries
which he incurred; but he well knew that a more or less dangerous explosion might be expected from his act,
and yet he willfully, recklessly, and knowingly produced the explosion. It would be going far to say that
"according to his maturity and capacity" he exercised such and "care and caution" as might reasonably be
required of him, or that defendant or anyone else should be held civilly responsible for injuries incurred by him
under such circumstances.
The law fixes no arbitrary age at which a minor can be said to have the necessary capacity to understand and
appreciate the nature and consequences of his own acts, so as to make it negligence on his part to fail to
exercise due care and precaution in the commission of such acts; and indeed it would be impracticable and
perhaps impossible so to do, for in the very nature of things the question of negligence necessarily depends on
the ability of the minor to understand the character of his own acts and their consequences; and the age at
which a minor can be said to have such ability will necessarily depends of his own acts and their
consequences; and at the age at which a minor can be said to have such ability will necessarily vary in
accordance with the varying nature of the infinite variety of acts which may be done by him. But some idea of
the presumed capacity of infants under the laws in force in these Islands may be gathered from an examination
of the varying ages fixed by our laws at which minors are conclusively presumed to be capable of exercising
certain rights and incurring certain responsibilities, though it can not be said that these provisions of law are of
much practical assistance in cases such as that at bar, except so far as they illustrate the rule that the capacity of
a minor to become responsible for his own acts varies with the varying circumstances of each case. Under the
provisions of the Penal Code a minor over fifteen years of age is presumed to be capable of committing a crime
and is to held criminally responsible therefore, although the fact that he is less than eighteen years of age will
be taken into consideration as an extenuating circumstance (Penal Code, arts. 8 and 9). At 10 years of age a
child may, under certain circumstances, choose which parent it prefers to live with (Code of Civil Procedure,
sec. 771). At 14 may petition for the appointment of a guardian (Id., sec. 551), and may consent or refuse to be
adopted (Id., sec. 765). And males of 14 and females of 12 are capable of contracting a legal marriage (Civil
Code, art. 83; G. O., No. 68, sec. 1).

We are satisfied that the plaintiff in this case had sufficient capacity and understanding to be sensible of the
danger to which he exposed himself when he put the match to the contents of the cap; that he was sui juris in
the sense that his age and his experience qualified him to understand and appreciate the necessity for the
exercise of that degree of caution which would have avoided the injury which resulted from his own deliberate
act; and that the injury incurred by him must be held to have been the direct and immediate result of his own
willful and reckless act, so that while it may be true that these injuries would not have been incurred but for the
negligence act of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises, nevertheless plaintiff's own act
was the proximate and principal cause of the accident which inflicted the injury.
The rule of the Roman law was: Quod quis ex culpa sua damnum sentit, non intelligitur sentire. (Digest, book
50, tit. 17 rule 203.)
The Patidas contain the following provisions:
The just thing is that a man should suffer the damage which comes to him through his own
fault, and that he can not demand reparation therefor from another. (Law 25, tit.
5, Partida 3.)
And they even said that when a man received an injury through his own acts the grievance
should be against himself and not against another. (Law 2, tit. 7, Partida 2.)
According to ancient sages, when a man received an injury through his own acts the
grievance should be against himself and not against another. (Law 2, tit. 7 Partida 2.)
And while there does not appear to be anything in the Civil Code which expressly lays down the law touching
contributory negligence in this jurisdiction, nevertheless, the interpretation placed upon its provisions by the
supreme court of Spain, and by this court in the case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil. Rep.,
359), clearly deny to the plaintiff in the case at bar the right to recover damages from the defendant, in whole
or in part, for the injuries sustained by him.
The judgment of the supreme court of Spain of the 7th of March, 1902 (93 Jurisprudencia Civil, 391), is
directly in point. In that case the court said:
According to the doctrine expressed in article 1902 of the Civil Code, fault or negligence is
a source of obligation when between such negligence and the injury there exists the relation
of cause and effect; but if the injury produced should not be the result of acts or omissions
of a third party, the latter has no obligation to repair the same, although such acts or
omission were imprudent or unlawful, and much less when it is shown that the immediate
cause of the injury was the negligence of the injured party himself.
The same court, in its decision of June 12, 1900, said that "the existence of the alleged fault or negligence is
not sufficient without proof that it, and no other cause, gave rise to the damage."
23
See also judgment of October 21, 1903.
To similar effect Scaevola, the learned Spanish writer, writing under that title in
his Jurisprudencia del Codigo Civil (1902 Anuario, p. 455), commenting on the decision of
March 7, 1902 of the Civil Code, fault or negligence gives rise to an obligation when
between it and the damage there exists the relation of cause and effect; but if the damage
caused does not arise from the acts or omissions of a third person, there is no obligation to
make good upon the latter, even though such acts or omissions be imprudent or illegal, and
much less so when it is shown that the immediate cause of the damage has been the
recklessness of the injured party himself.
And again
In accordance with the fundamental principle of proof, that the burden thereof is upon the
plaintiff, it is apparent that it is duty of him who shall claim damages to establish their
existence. The decisions of April 9, 1896, and March 18, July, and September 27, 1898,
have especially supported the principle, the first setting forth in detail the necessary points
of the proof, which are two: An act or omission on the part of the person who is to be
charged with the liability, and the production of the damage by said act or omission.
This includes, by inference, the establishment of a relation of cause or effect between the act
or omission and the damage; the latter must be the direct result of one of the first two. As
the decision of March 22, 1881, said, it is necessary that the damages result immediately
and directly from an act performed culpably and wrongfully; "necessarily presupposing a
legal ground for imputability." (Decision of October 29, 1887.)
Negligence is not presumed, but must be proven by him who alleges it.
(Scavoela, Jurisprudencia del Codigo Civil, vol. 6, pp. 551-552.)
(Cf. decisions of supreme court of Spain of June 12, 1900, and June 23, 1900.)
Finally we think the doctrine in this jurisdiction applicable to the case at bar was definitely settled in this court
in the maturely considered case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and Pacific Co. (supra), wherein we held that while
"There are many cases (personal injury cases) was exonerated," on the ground that "the negligence of the
plaintiff was the immediate cause of the casualty" (decisions of the 15th of January, the 19th of February, and
the 7th of March, 1902, stated in Alcubilla's Index of that year); none of the cases decided by the supreme court
of Spain "define the effect to be given the negligence of its causes, though not the principal one, and we are left
to seek the theory of the civil law in the practice of other countries;" and in such cases we declared that law in
this jurisdiction to require the application of "the principle of proportional damages," but expressly and
definitely denied the right of recovery when the acts of the injured party were the immediate causes of the
accident.

The doctrine as laid down in that case is as follows:
Difficulty seems to be apprehended in deciding which acts of the injured party shall be
considered immediate causes of the accident. The test is simple. Distinction must be made
between the accident and the injury, between the event itself, without which there could
have been no accident, and those acts of the victim not entering into it, independent of it,
but contributing to his own proper hurt. For instance, the cause of the accident under review
was the displacement of the crosspiece or the failure to replace it. This produces the event
giving occasion for damagesthat is, the sinking of the track and the sliding of the iron
rails. To this event, the act of the plaintiff in walking by the side of the car did not
contribute, although it was an element of the damage which came to himself. Had the
crosspiece been out of place wholly or partly through his act or omission of duty, that would
have been one of the determining causes of the event or accident, for which he would have
been responsible. Where he contributes to the principal occurrence, as one of its
determining factors, he can not recover. Where, in conjunction with the occurrence, he
contributes only to his own injury, he may recover the amount that the defendant
responsible for the event should pay for such injury, less a sum deemed a suitable equivalent
for his own imprudence.
We think it is quite clear that under the doctrine thus stated, the immediate cause of the explosion, the accident
which resulted in plaintiff's injury, was in his own act in putting a match to the contents of the cap, and that
having "contributed to the principal occurrence, as one of its determining factors, he can not recover."
We have not deemed it necessary to examine the effect of plaintiff's action in picking up upon defendant's
premises the detonating caps, the property of defendant, and carrying the relation of cause and effect between
the negligent act or omission of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises and the injuries
inflicted upon the plaintiff by the explosion of one of these caps. Under the doctrine of the Torpedo cases, such
action on the part of an infant of very tender years would have no effect in relieving defendant of
responsibility, but whether in view of the well-known fact admitted in defendant's brief that "boys are
snappers-up of unconsidered trifles," a youth of the age and maturity of plaintiff should be deemed without
fault in picking up the caps in question under all the circumstances of this case, we neither discuss nor decide.
Twenty days after the date of this decision let judgment be entered reversing the judgment of the court below,
without costs to either party in this instance, and ten days thereafter let the record be returned to the court
wherein it originated, where the judgment will be entered in favor of the defendant for the costs in first
instance and the complaint dismissed without day. So ordered.
24
G.R. No. L-50959 July 23, 1980
HEIRS OF PEDRO TAYAG, SR., petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE FERNANDO S. ALCANTARA, PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC. and ROMEO
VILLA Y CUNANAN, respondents.
CONCEPCION JR., J.:
This is a petition for certiorari, premised upon the following facts:
On September 25, 1974, the petitioners, heirs of Pedro Tayag, Sr., namely: Crisanta Salazar, Pedro Tayag, Jr.,
Renato Tayag, Gabriel Tayag, Corazon Tayag and Rodolfo Tayag, filed with the Court of First Instance of
Tarlac, Branch I, presided over by the respondent Judge, a complaint 1 for damages against the private
respondents Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc. and Romeo Villa y Cunanan docketed therein as Civil Case
No. 5114 alleging among others that in the afternoon of September 2, 1974, while Pedro Tayag Sr. was
riding on a bicycle along MacArthur Highway at Bo. San Rafael, Tarlac, Tarlac on his way home, he was
bumped and hit by a Philippine Rabbit Bus bearing Body No. 1107 and Plate No. YL 604 PUB '74, driven by
Romeo Villa, as a result of which he sustained injuries which caused his instantaneous death. In due time, the
private respondents filed their answer, 2 admitting some allegations and denying the other allegations of the
complaint
Thereafter, the private respondents filed a motion to suspend the trial 3 dated April 30, 1975, on the ground that
the criminal case 4 against the driver of the bus Romeo Villa was still pending in said court, and that Section 3,
Rule Ill of the Revised Rules of Court enjoins the suspension of the civil action until the criminal action is
terminated. The respondent Judge granted the motion, and consequently, suspended the hearing of Civil Case
No. 5114. 5
On October 25, 1977, the respondent Judge rendered a decision 6 in Criminal Case No. 836, acquitting the
accused Romeo Villa of the crime of homicide on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Thereafter, the private respondents filed a motion to dismiss 7 Civil Case No. 5114 on the ground that the
petitioners have no cause of action against them the driver of the bus having been acquitted in the criminal
action. The petitioners opposed the motions 8 alleging that their cause of action is not based on crime but
on quasi-delict.
Acting upon the said motion as well as the opposition thereto, the respondent Judge issued an order 9 dated
April 13, 1978, dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. 5114.
The petitioners moved to reconsider; 10 however, the same was denied by respondent Judge in his order 11 dated
May 30, 1979.

Hence, the petitioners interposed the present petition for certiorari, to annul and set aside the order of
respondent Judge dated April 13, 1977, claiming that the respondent Judge acted without or in excess of his
jurisdiction and for with grave abuse of discretion in issuing the disputed order, and that there is no plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law except thru the present petition.
After the private respondents had filed their comment, 12 this Court Resolved to consider the said comment as
answer to the petition, and the case was deemed submitted for decision on September 3, 1979.
The only issue to be resolved in the instant case is whether or not the respondent Judge acted without or in
excess of his jurisdiction and/or with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing Civil Case No. 5114.
The petition is meritorious. Article 31 of the Civil Code provides as follows:
Art. 31. When the civil action is based on an obligation not arising from the act or
commission complained of as a felony. such civil action may proceed independently of the
criminal proceedings and regardless of the result of the latter.
Evidently, the above quoted provision of the Civil Code refers to a civil action based, not on the act or
omission charged as a felony in a criminal case, but one based on an obligation arising from other
sources, 13 like quasi delict. 14
In the case at bar, the allegations of the complaint clearly show that petitioners' cause of action was based upon
a quasi delict. 15 Thus, the complaint alleged among others:
xxxxxxxxx
4. That on September 2, 1974, at about 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon at Sitio Pag-asa, Bo.
San Rafael Tarlac, Tarlac, along MacArthur Highway and while riding on a bicycle on his
way home to Bo. San Sebastian, Tarlac, Tarlac, Pedro Tayag, Sr. was bumped and hit by a
Philippine Rabbit Bus bearing Body No. 1107 and Plate No. YL 604 PUB '74 and as result
of which he sustained physical injuries which cause his instantaneous death and the bicycle
he was riding on was damaged and destroyed;
5. That the Philippine Rabbit Bus ... was at the time of the accident being driven by
defendant Romeo Villa y Cunanan in a faster and greater speed than what was reasonable
and proper and in a gray negligent, careless, reckless and imprudent manner, without due
regards to injuries to persons and damage to properties and in violation of traffic rules and
regulations;
6. That defendant Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines Inc. has failed to exercise the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employees, particularly
25
defendant Romeo Villa y Cunanan otherwise the accident in question which resulted in the
death of Pedro Tayag, Sr. and damage to his property would not have occurred.
xxxxxxxxx
All the essential averments for a quasi delictual action are present, namely: (1) an act or omission constituting
fault or negligence on the part of private respondent; (2) damage caused by the said act or commission; (3)
direct causal relation between the damage and the act or commission; and (4) no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties. In the case of Elcano vs. Hill, 16 this Court held that:
... a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is
criminality prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not
snowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to receiver damages on both scores, and
would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the
awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred
to in Par. (e), Section 3, Rule III, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100
of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-
delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case
that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused.
Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary
and negligent acts which may be punishable by law.
The petitioners' cause of action being based on a quasi delict the acquittal of the driver, private respondent
Romeo Villa, of the crime charged in Criminal Case No. 836 is not a bar to the prosecution of Civil Case No.
5114 for damages based on quasi-delict. 17
In the light of the foregoing, We hold that respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of jurisdiction in dismissing Civil Case No. 5114.
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal should be, as it is hereby set aside, and the case is remanded to the lower
court for further proceedings, with costs against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-39999 May 31, 1984
ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES, ISMAEL GONZALGO and JOSE FARLEY
BEDENIA, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of a Court of Appeals' decision which reversed the trial court's
judgment of conviction and acquitted the petitioners of the crime of grave coercion on the ground of
reasonable doubt but inspite of the acquittal ordered them to pay jointly and severally the amount of P9,000.00
to the complainants as actual damages.
The petitioners were charged under the following information:
The undersigned Fiscal accused ROY PADILLA, FILOMENO GALDONES, PEPITO
BEDENIA, YOLLY RICO, DAVID BERMUNDO, VILLANOAC, ROBERTO ROSALES,
VILLANIA, ROMEO GARRIDO, JOSE ORTEGA, JR., RICARDO CELESTINO,
REALINGO alias "KAMLON", JOHN DOE alias TATO, and FOURTEEN (14) RICARDO
DOES of the crime of GRAVE COERCION, committed as follows:
That on or about February 8, 1964 at around 9:00 o'clock in the morning, in the
municipality of Jose Panganiban, province of Camarines Norte, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- named accused, Roy Padilla, Filomeno
Galdones, Pepito Bedenia, Yolly Rico, David Bermundo, Villanoac, Roberto Rosales,
Villania, Romeo Garrido, Jose Ortega, Jr., Ricardo Celestino, Realingo alias Kamlon, John
Doe alias Tato, and Fourteen Richard Does, by confederating and mutually helping one
another, and acting without any authority of law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously, by means of threats, force and violence prevent Antonio Vergara and his family
to close their stall located at the Public Market, Building No. 3, Jose Panganiban, Camarines
Norte, and by subsequently forcibly opening the door of said stall and thereafter brutally
demolishing and destroying said stall and the furnitures therein by axes and other massive
instruments, and carrying away the goods, wares and merchandise, to the damage and
prejudice of the said Antonio Vergara and his family in the amount of P30,000.00 in concept
of actual or compensatory and moral damages, and further the sum of P20,000.00 as
exemplary damages.
That in committing the offense, the accused took advantage of their public positions: Roy
Padilla, being the incumbent municipal mayor, and the rest of the accused being policemen,
26
except Ricardo Celestino who is a civilian, all of Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte, and
that it was committed with evident premeditation.
The Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte, Tenth Judicial District rendered a decision, the dispositive
portion of which states that:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court finds the accused Roy Padilla, Filomeno Galdonez, Ismael
Gonzalgo and Jose Parley Bedenia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of grave coercion, and hereby
imposes upon them to suffer an imprisonment of FIVE (5) months and One (1) day; to pay a fine of P500.00
each; to pay actual and compensatory damages in the amount of P10,000.00; moral damages in the amount of
P30,000.00; and another P10,000.00 for exemplary damages, jointly and severally, and all the accessory
penalties provided for by law; and to pay the proportionate costs of this proceedings.
The accused Federico Realingo alias 'Kamlon', David Bermundo, Christopher Villanoac,
Godofredo Villania, Romeo Garrido, Roberto Rosales, Ricardo Celestino and Jose Ortega,
are hereby ordered acquitted on grounds of reasonable doubt for their criminal participation
in the crime charged.
The petitioners appealed the judgment of conviction to the Court of Appeals. They contended that the trial
court's finding of grave coercion was not supported by the evidence. According to the petitioners, the town
mayor had the power to order the clearance of market premises and the removal of the complainants' stall
because the municipality had enacted municipal ordinances pursuant to which the market stall was a nuisance
per se. The petitioners stated that the lower court erred in finding that the demolition of the complainants' stall
was a violation of the very directive of the petitioner Mayor which gave the stall owners seventy two (72)
hours to vacate the market premises. The petitioners questioned the imposition of prison terms of five months
and one day and of accessory penalties provided by law. They also challenged the order to pay fines of P500.00
each, P10,000.00 actual and compensatory damages, P30,000.00 moral damages, P10,000.00 exemplary
damages, and the costs of the suit.
The dispositive portion of the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals states:
WHEREFORE, we hereby modify the judgment appealed from in the sense that the
appellants are acquitted on ground of reasonable doubt. but they are ordered to pay jointly
and severally to complainants the amount of P9,600.00, as actual damages.
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the acquittal of the defendants-appellants as
to criminal liability results in the extinction of their civil liability. The Court of Appeals denied the motion
holding that:
xxx xxx xxx

... appellants' acquittal was based on reasonable doubt whether the crime of coercion was
committed, not on facts that no unlawful act was committed; as their taking the law into
their hands, destructing (sic) complainants' properties is unlawful, and, as evidence on
record established that complainants suffered actual damages, the imposition of actual
damages is correct.
Consequently, the petitioners filed this special civil action, contending that:
I us, the petitioners were acquitted not because they did not commit the acts stated in the charge against them.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR OF LAW OR GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN IMPOSING UPON PETITIONERS PAYMENT OF
DAMAGES TO COMPLAINANTS AFTER ACQUITTING PETITIONERS OF THE
CRIME CHARGED FROM WHICH SAID LIABILITY AROSE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING IN ITS RESOLUTION DATED
DECEMBER 26, 1974 THAT SINCE APPELLANTS' ACQUITTAL WAS BASED ON
REASONABLE DOUBT, NOT ON FACTS THAT NO UNLAWFUL ACT WAS
COMMITTED, THE IMPOSITION OF ACTUAL DAMAGES IS CORRECT.
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A LEGAL INCONSISTENCY, IF NOT
PLAIN JUDICIAL ERROR, IN HOLDING IN ITS APPEALED RESOLUTION THAT
PETITIONERS COMMITTED AN UNLAWFUL ACT, THAT IS TAKING THE LAW
INTO THEIR HANDS, DESTRUCTING (sic) 'COMPLAINANTS' PROPERTIES', AFTER
HOLDING IN ITS MAIN DECISION OF NOVEMBER 6,1974 THAT THE ACTS FOR
WHICH THEY WERE CHARGED DID NOT CONSTITUTE GRAVE COERCION AND
THEY WERE NOT CHARGED OF ANY OTHER CRIME.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE PETITIONERS HEREIN,
APPELLANTS IN CA-G.R. NO. 13456CR, JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY, TO PAY
COMPLAINANTS P9,600.00 IN SUPPOSED ACTUAL DAMAGES.
The issue posed in the instant proceeding is whether or not the respondent court committed a reversible error in
requiring the petitioners to pay civil indemnity to the complainants after acquitting them from the criminal
charge.
27
Petitioners maintain the view that where the civil liability which is included in the criminal action is that
arising from and as a consequence of the criminal act, and the defendant was acquitted in the criminal case, (no
civil liability arising from the criminal case), no civil liability arising from the criminal charge could be
imposed upon him. They cite precedents to the effect that the liability of the defendant for the return of the
amount received by him may not be enforced in the criminal case but must be raised in a separate civil action
for the recovery of the said amount (People v. Pantig, 97 Phil. 748; following the doctrine laid down in Manila
Railroad Co. v. Honorable Rodolfo Baltazar, 49 O.G. 3874; Pueblo contra Abellera, 69 Phil. 623; People v.
Maniago 69 Phil. 496; People v. Miranda, 5 SCRA 1067; Aldaba v. Elepafio 116 Phil. 457). In the case before
There is no dispute over the forcible opening of the market stall, its demolition with axes and other
instruments, and the carting away of the merchandize. The petitioners were acquitted because these acts were
denominated coercion when they properly constituted some other offense such as threat or malicious mischief.
The respondent Court of Appeals stated in its decision:
For a complaint to prosper under the foregoing provision, the violence must be employed
against the person, not against property as what happened in the case at bar. ...
xxx xxx xxx
The next problem is: May the accused be convicted of an offense other than coercion?
From all appearances, they should have been prosecuted either for threats or malicious
mischief. But the law does not allow us to render judgment of conviction for either of these
offenses for the reason that they were not indicted for, these offenses. The information under
which they were prosecuted does not allege the elements of either threats or malicious
mischief. Although the information mentions that the act was by means of threats', it does
not allege the particular threat made. An accused person is entitled to be informed of the
nature of the acts imputed to him before he can be made to enter into trial upon a valid
information.
We rule that the crime of grave coercion has not been proved in accordance with law.
While appellants are entitled to acquittal they nevertheless are liable for the actual damages
suffered by the complainants by reason of the demolition of the stall and loss of some of
their properties. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it that of the civil,
unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from
which the civil might arise did not exist. (Rule 111, Sec. 3 (c), Rev. Rules of Court; Laperal
v. Aliza, 51 OG.R. 1311, People v. Velez, 44 OG. 1811). In the instant case, the fact from
which the civil might arise, namely, the demolition of the stall and loss of the properties
contained therein; exists, and this is not denied by the accused. And since there is no
showing that the complainants have reserved or waived their right to institute a separate

civil action, the civil aspect therein is deemed instituted with the criminal action. (Rule 111,
Sec. 1, Rev. Rules of Court).
xxx xxx xxx
Section 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court states the fundamental proposition that when a criminal action is
instituted, the civil action for recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted
with it. There is no implied institution when the offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves his
right to institute it separately. (Morte Sr. v. Alvizo, Jr., 101 SCRA 221).
The extinction of the civil action by reason of acquittal in the criminal case refers exclusively to civil liability
ex delicto founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code. (Elcano v. Hill, 77 SCRA 98; Virata v. Ochoa, 81
SCRA 472). In other words, the civil liability which is also extinguished upon acquittal of the accused is the
civil liability arising from the act as a crime.
As easily as 1942, the Supreme Court speaking through Justice Jorge Bocobo in Barredo v. Garcia, et at. 73
Phil. 607 laid down the rule that the same punishable act or omission can create two kinds of civil liabilities
against the accused and, where provided by law, his employer. 'There is the civil liability arising from the act as
a crime and the liability arising from the same act as a quasi-delict. Either one of these two types of civil
liability may be enforced against the accused, However, the offended party cannot recover damages under both
types of liability. For instance, in cases of criminal negligence or crimes due to reckless imprudence, Article
2177 of the Civil Code provides:
Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding article is entirely separate and
distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code. But the
plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.
Section 3 (c) of Rule 111 specifically provides that:
Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. In all cases not included in the
preceding section the following rules shall be observed:
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the
extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil
might arise did not exist. In other cases, the person entitled to the civil action may institute it
in the Jurisdiction and in the manner provided by law against the person who may be liable
for restitution of the thing and reparation or indemnity for the damage suffered.
28
The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the liability of the accused for damages only when it includes a
declaration that the facts from which the civil might arise did not exist. Thus, the civil liability is not
extinguished by acquittal where the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt (PNB v. Catipon, 98 Phil. 286) as
only preponderance of evidence is required in civil cases; where the court expressly declares that the liability
of the accused is not criminal but only civil in nature (De Guzman v. Alvia, 96 Phil. 558; People v. Pantig,
supra) as, for instance, in the felonies of estafa, theft, and malicious mischief committed by certain relatives
who thereby incur only civil liability (See Art. 332, Revised Penal Code); and, where the civil liability does not
arise from or is not based upon the criminal act of which the accused was acquitted (Castro v. Collector of
Internal Revenue, 4 SCRA 1093; See Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, 1983 ed., p. 623). Article 29 of
the Civil Code also provides that:
When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not
been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or
omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon
motion of the defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for
damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt, the court
shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it may be inferred from the
text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is due to that ground.
More recently, we held that the acquittal of the defendant in the criminal case would not constitute an obstacle
to the filing of a civil case based on the same acts which led to the criminal prosecution:
... The finding by the respondent court that he spent said sum for and in the interest of the
Capiz Agricultural and Fishery School and for his personal benefit is not a declaration that
the fact upon which Civil Case No. V-3339 is based does not exist. The civil action barred
by such a declaration is the civil liability arising from the offense charged, which is the one
impliedly instituted with the criminal action. (Section 1, Rule III, Rules of Court.) Such a
declaration would not bar a civil action filed against an accused who had been acquitted in
the criminal case if the criminal action is predicated on factual or legal considerations other
than the commission of the offense charged. A person may be acquitted of malversation
where, as in the case at bar, he could show that he did not misappropriate the public funds in
his possession, but he could be rendered liable to restore said funds or at least to make a
proper accounting thereof if he shall spend the same for purposes which are not authorized
nor intended, and in a manner not permitted by applicable rules and regulations. (Republic
v. Bello, 120 SCRA 203)
There appear to be no sound reasons to require a separate civil action to still be filed considering that the facts
to be proved in the civil case have already been established in the criminal proceedings where the accused was
acquitted. Due process has been accorded the accused. He was, in fact, exonerated of the criminal charged. The
constitutional presumption of innocence called for more vigilant efforts on the part of prosecuting attorneys

and defense counsel, a keener awareness by all witnesses of the serious implications of perjury, and a more
studied consideration by the judge of the entire records and of applicable statutes and precedents. To require a
separate civil action simply because the accused was acquitted would mean needless clogging of court dockets
and unnecessary duplication of litigation with all its attendant loss of time, effort, and money on the part of all
concerned.
The trial court found the following facts clearly established by the evidence adduced by both the prosecution
and the defense:
xxx xxx xxx
(9) In the morning of February 8, 1964, then Chief Galdones, complying with the
instructions contained in said Memorandum No. 32 of the Mayor, and upon seeing that
Antonio Vergara had not vacated the premises in question, with the aid of his policemen,
forced upon the store or stall and ordered the removal of the goods inside the store of
Vergara, at the same time taking inventory of the goods taken out, piled them outside in
front of the store and had it cordoned with a rope, and after all the goods were taken out
from the store, ordered the demolition of said stall of Antonio Vergara. Since then up to the
trial of this case, the whereabouts of the goods taken out from the store nor the materials of
the demolished stall have not been made known.
The respondent Court of Appeals made a similar finding that:
On the morning of February 8th, because the said Vergaras had not up to that time complied
with the order to vacate, the co-accused Chief of Police Galdones and some members of his
police force, went to the market and, using ax, crowbars and hammers, demolished the stall
of the Vergaras who were not present or around, and after having first inventoried the goods
and merchandise found therein, they had them brought to the municipal building for
safekeeping. Inspite of notice served upon the Vergaras to take possession of the goods and
merchandise thus taken away, the latter refused to do so.
The loss and damage to the Vergaras as they evaluated them were:
Cost of stall construction P1,300.00
Value of furniture and equipment
judgment destroyed 300.00
Value of goods and equipment taken 8,000.00
P9,600.00
29
It is not disputed that the accused demolished the grocery stall of the complainants Vergaras
and carted away its contents. The defense that they did so in order to abate what they
considered a nuisance per se is untenable, This finds no support in law and in fact. The
couple has been paying rentals for the premises to the government which allowed them to
lease the stall. It is, therefore, farfetched to say that the stall was a nuisance per se which
could be summarily abated.
The petitioners, themselves, do not deny the fact that they caused the destruction of the complainant's market
stall and had its contents carted away. They state:
On February 8, 1964, despite personal pleas on Vergaras by the Mayor to vacate the
passageways of Market Building No. 3, the Vergaras were still in the premises, so the
petitioners Chief of Police and members of the Police Force of Jose Panganiban, pursuant to
the Mayor' 6 directives, demolished the store of the Vergaras, made an inventory of the
goods found in said store, and brought these goods to the municipal building under the
custody of the Municipal Treasurer, ...
The only supposed obstacle is the provision of Article 29 of the Civil Code, earlier cited, that "when the
accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted." According to
some scholars, this provision of substantive law calls for a separate civil action and cannot be modified by a
rule of remedial law even in the interests of economy and simplicity and following the dictates of logic and
common sense.
As stated by retired Judge J. Cezar Sangco:
... if the Court finds the evidence sufficient to sustain the civil action but inadequate to
justify a conviction in the criminal action, may it render judgment acquitting the accused on
reasonable doubt, but hold him civilly liable nonetheless? An affirmative answer to this
question would be consistent with the doctrine that the two are distinct and separate actions,
and win (a) dispense with the reinstituting of the same civil action, or one based on quasi-
delict or other independent civil action, and of presenting the same evidence: (b) save the
injured party unnecessary expenses in the prosecution of the civil action or enable him to
take advantage of the free services of the fiscal; and (c) otherwise resolve the unsettling
implications of permitting the reinstitution of a separate civil action whether based on delict,
or quasi-delict, or other independent civil actions.
... But for the court to be able to adjudicate in the manner here suggested, Art. 29 of the
Civil Code should be amended because it clearly and expressly provides that the civil action
based on the same act or omission may only be instituted in a separate action, and therefore,
may not inferentially be resolved in the same criminal action. To dismiss the civil action
upon acquittal of the accused and disallow the reinstitution of any other civil action, would

likewise render, unjustifiably, the acquittal on reasonable doubt without any significance,
and would violate the doctrine that the two actions are distinct and separate.
In the light of the foregoing exposition, it seems evident that there is much sophistry and no
pragmatism in the doctrine that it is inconsistent to award in the same proceedings damages
against the accused after acquitting him on reasonable doubt. Such doctrine must recognize
the distinct and separate character of the two actions, the nature of an acquittal on
reasonable doubt, the vexatious and oppressive effects of a reservation or institution of a
separate civil action, and that the injured party is entitled to damages not because the act or
omission is punishable but because he was damaged or injured thereby (Sangco, Philippine
Law on Torts and Damages, pp. 288-289).
We see no need to amend Article 29 of the Civil Code in order to allow a court to grant damages despite a
judgment of acquittal based on reasonable doubt. What Article 29 clearly and expressly provides is a remedy
for the plaintiff in case the defendant has been acquitted in a criminal prosecution on the ground that his guilt
has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt. It merely emphasizes that a civil action for damages is not
precluded by an acquittal for the same criminal act or omission. The Civil Code provision does not state that
the remedy can be availed of only in a separate civil action. A separate civil case may be filed but there is no
statement that such separate filing is the only and exclusive permissible mode of recovering damages.
There is nothing contrary to the Civil Code provision in the rendition of a judgment of acquittal and a
judgment awarding damages in the same criminal action. The two can stand side by side. A judgment of
acquittal operates to extinguish the criminal liability. It does not, however, extinguish the civil liability unless
there is clear showing that the act from which civil liability might arise did not exist.
A different conclusion would be attributing to the Civil Code a trivial requirement, a provision which imposes
an uncalled for burden before one who has already been the victim of a condemnable, yet non-criminal, act
may be accorded the justice which he seeks.
We further note the rationale behind Art. 29 of the Civil Code in arriving at the intent of the legislator that they
could not possibly have intended to make it more difficult for the aggrieved party to recover just compensation
by making a separate civil action mandatory and exclusive:
The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him from civil
liability is one of the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal system. It has given rise to
numberless instances of miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal was due to a reasonable
doubt in the mind of the court as to the guilt of the accused. The reasoning followed is that
inasmuch as the civil responsibility is derived from the the criminal offense, when the latter
is not proved, civil liability cannot be demanded.
This is one of those cases where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and deplorable
consequences. Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal
30
liability and civil responsibility, and to determine the logical result of the distinction. The
two liabilities are separate and distinct from each other. One affects the social order and the
other, private rights. One is for the punishment or correction of the offender while the other
is for reparation of damages suffered by the aggrieved party... it is just and proper that, for
the purposes of the imprisonment of or fine upon the accused, the offense should be proved
beyond reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of indemnifying the complaining party, why
should the offense also be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the invasion or violation
of every private right to be proved only by preponderance of evidence? Is the right of the
aggrieved person any less private because the wrongful act is also punishable by the
criminal law? (Code Commission, pp. 45-46).
A separate civil action may be warranted where additional facts have to be established or more evidence must
be adduced or where the criminal case has been fully terminated and a separate complaint would be just as
efficacious or even more expedient than a timely remand to the trial court where the criminal action was
decided for further hearings on the civil aspects of the case. The offended party may, of course, choose to file a
separate action. These do not exist in this case. Considering moreover the delays suffered by the case in the
trial, appellate, and review stages, it would be unjust to the complainants in this case to require at this time a
separate civil action to be filed.
With this in mind, we therefore hold that the respondent Court of Appeals did not err in awarding damages
despite a judgment of acquittal.
WHEREFORE, we hereby AFFIRM the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals and dismiss the petition
for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 122445. November 18, 1997]
DR. NINEVETCH CRUZ, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and LYDIA UMALI, respondents.
DECISION

FRANCISCO, J.:
"Doctors are protected by a special law. They are not guarantors of care. They do not even warrant a good
result. They are not insurers against mishap or unusual consequences. Furthermore they are not liable for
honest mistake of judgment"[1]
The present case against petitioner is in the nature of a medical malpractice suit, which in simplest term
is the type of claim which a victim has available to him or her to redress a wrong committed by a medical
professional which has cause bodily harm. [2] In this jurisdiction, however, such claims are most often brought
as a civil action for damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, [3] and in some instances, as a criminal case
under Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code [4] with which the civil action for damages is impliedly
instituted. It is via the latter type of action that the heirs of the deceased sought redress for the petitioner's
alleged imprudence and negligence in treating the deceased thereby causing her death. The petitioner and one
Dr. Lina Ercillo who was the attending anaesthesiologist during the operation of the deceased were charged
with "reckless imprudence and negligence resulting to (sic) homicide" in an information which reads:
"That on or about March 23, 1991, in the City of San Pablo, Republic of the Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused abovenamed, being then the attending anaesthesiologist and
surgeon, respectively, did then and there, in a negligence (sic), careless, imprudent, and incompetent manner,
and failing to supply or store sufficient provisions and facilities necessary to meet any and all exigencies apt to
arise before, during and/or after a surgical operation causing by such negligence, carelessness, imprudence, and
incompetence, and causing by such failure, including the lack of preparation and foresight needed to avert a
tragedy, the untimely death of said Lydia Umali on the day following said surgical operation." [5]
Trial ensued after both the petitioner and Dr. Lina Ercillo pleaded not guilty to the above-mentioned
charge. On March 4, 1994, the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) of San Pablo City rendered a decision,
the dispositive portion of which is hereunder quoted as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused Dr. Lina Ercillo not guilty of the offense charged for insufficiency
of evidence while her co-accused Dra. Ninevetch Cruz is hereby held responsible for the death of Lydia Umali
on March 24, 1991, and therefore guilty under Art. 365 of the Revised Penal Code, and she is hereby sentenced
to suffer the penalty of 2 months and 1 day imprisonment of arresto mayor with costs." [6]
The petitioner appealed her conviction to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) which affirmed in toto the decision of
the MTCC[7] prompting the petitioner to file a petition for review with the Court of Appeals but to no avail.
Hence this petition for review on certiorari assailing the decision promulgated by the Court of Appeals on
October 24, 1995 affirming petitioner's conviction with modification that she is further directed to pay the heirs
of Lydia Umali P50,000.00 as indemnity for her death.[8]
In substance, the petition brought before this Court raises the issue of whether or not petitioner's
conviction of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, arising from an alleged medical
malpractice, is supported by the evidence on record.
31
First the antecedent facts.
On March 22, 1991, prosecution witness, Rowena Umali De Ocampo, accompanied her mother to the
Perpetual Help Clinic and General Hospital situated in Balagtas Street, San Pablo City, Laguna. They arrived at
the said hospital at around 4:30 in the afternoon of the same day. [9] Prior to March 22, 1991, Lydia was
examined by the petitioner who found a "myoma" [10] in her uterus, and scheduled her for a hysterectomy
operation on March 23, 1991.[11] Rowena and her mother slept in the clinic on the evening of March 22, 1991
as the latter was to be operated on the next day at 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon. [12] According to Rowena, she
noticed that the clinic was untidy and the window and the floor were very dusty prompting her to ask the
attendant for a rag to wipe the window and the floor with. [13] Because of the untidy state of the clinic, Rowena
tried to persuade her mother not to proceed with the operation. [14] The following day, before her mother was
wheeled into the operating room, Rowena asked the petitioner if the operation could be postponed. The
petitioner called Lydia into her office and the two had a conversation. Lydia then informed Rowena that the
petitioner told her that she must be operated on as scheduled. [15]
Rowena and her other relatives, namely her husband, her sister and two aunts waited outside the
operating room while Lydia underwent operation. While they were waiting, Dr. Ercillo went out of the
operating room and instructed them to buy tagamet ampules which Rowena's sister immediately bought. About
one hour had passed when Dr. Ercillo came out again this time to ask them to buy blood for Lydia. They
bought type "A" blood from the St. Gerald Blood Bank and the same was brought by the attendant into the
operating room. After the lapse of a few hours, the petitioner informed them that the operation was finished.
The operating staff then went inside the petitioner's clinic to take their snacks. Some thirty minutes after, Lydia
was brought out of the operating room in a stretcher and the petitioner asked Rowena and the other relatives to
buy additional blood for Lydia. Unfortunately, they were not able to comply with petitioner's order as there was
no more type "A" blood available in the blood bank. Thereafter, a person arrived to donate blood which was
later transfused to Lydia. Rowena then noticed her mother, who was attached to an oxygen tank, gasping for
breath. Apparently the oxygen supply had run out and Rowena's husband together with the driver of the
accused had to go to the San Pablo District Hospital to get oxygen. Lydia was given the fresh supply of oxygen
as soon as it arrived.[16] But at around 10:00 o'clock P.M. she went into shock and her blood pressure dropped to
60/50. Lydia's unstable condition necessitated her transfer to the San Pablo District Hospital so she could be
connected to a respirator and further examined. [17] The transfer to the San Pablo City District Hospital was
without the prior consent of Rowena nor of the other relatives present who found out about the intended
transfer only when an ambulance arrived to take Lydia to the San Pablo District Hospital. Rowena and her
other relatives then boarded a tricycle and followed the ambulance. [18]
Upon Lydia's arrival at the San Pablo District Hospital, she was wheeled into the operating room and the
petitioner and Dr. Ercillo re-operated on her because there was blood oozing from the abdominal incision.
[19]
The attending physicians summoned Dr. Bartolome Angeles, head of the Obstetrics and Gynecology
Department of the San Pablo District Hospital. However, when Dr. Angeles arrived, Lydia was already in
shock and possibly dead as her blood pressure was already 0/0. Dr. Angeles then informed petitioner and Dr.
Ercillo that there was nothing he could do to help save the patient. [20] While petitioner was closing the
abdominal wall, the patient died.[21] Thus, on March 24, 1991, at 3:00 o'clock in the morning, Lydia Umali was

pronounced dead. Her death certificate states "shock" as the immediate cause of death and "Disseminated
Intravascular Coagulation (DIC)" as the antecedent cause.[22]
In convicting the petitioner, the MTCC found the following circumstances as sufficient basis to conclude
that she was indeed negligent in the performance of the operation:
"x x x, the clinic was untidy, there was lack of provision like blood and oxygen to prepare for any contingency
that might happen during the operation. The manner and the fact that the patient was brought to the San Pablo
District Hospital for reoperation indicates that there was something wrong in the manner in which Dra. Cruz
conducted the operation. There was no showing that before the operation, accused Dr. Cruz had conducted a
cardio pulmonary clearance or any typing of the blood of the patient. It was (sic) said in medical parlance that
the "abdomen of the person is a temple of surprises" because you do not know the whole thing the moment it
was open (sic) and surgeon must be prepared for any eventuality thereof. The patient (sic) chart which is a
public document was not presented because it is only there that we could determine the condition of the patient
before the surgery. The court also noticed in Exh. "F-1" that the sister of the deceased wished to postpone the
operation but the patient was prevailed upon by Dra. Cruz to proceed with the surgery. The court finds that
Lydia Umali died because of the negligence and carelessness of the surgeon Dra. Ninevetch Cruz because of
loss of blood during the operation of the deceased for evident unpreparedness and for lack of skill, the reason
why the patient was brought for operation at the San Pablo City District Hospital. As such, the surgeon should
answer for such negligence. With respect to Dra. Lina Ercillo, the anaesthesiologist, there is no evidence to
indicate that she should be held jointly liable with Dra. Cruz who actually did the operation." [23]
The RTC reiterated the abovementioned findings of the MTCC and upheld the latter's declaration of
"incompetency, negligence and lack of foresight and skill of appellant (herein petitioner) in handling the
subject patient before and after the operation." [24] And likewise affirming the petitioner's conviction, the Court
of Appeals echoed similar observations, thus:
"x x x. While we may grant that the untidiness and filthiness of the clinic may not by itself indicate negligence,
it nevertheless shows the absence of due care and supervision over her subordinate employees. Did this
unsanitary condition permeate the operating room? Were the surgical instruments properly sterilized? Could
the conditions in the OR have contributed to the infection of the patient? Only the petitioner could answer
these, but she opted not to testify. This could only give rise to the presumption that she has nothing good to
testify on her defense. Anyway, the alleged "unverified statement of the prosecution witness" remains
unchallenged and unrebutted.
Likewise undisputed is the prosecution's version indicating the following facts: that the accused asked the
patient's relatives to buy Tagamet capsules while the operation was already in progress; that after an hour, they
were also asked to buy type "A" blood for the patient; that after the surgery, they were again asked to procure
more type "A" blood, but such was not anymore available from the source; that the oxygen given to the patient
was empty; and that the son-in-law of the patient, together with a driver of the petitioner, had to rush to the San
Pablo City District Hospital to get the much-needed oxygen. All these conclusively show that the petitioner
had not prepared for any unforeseen circumstances before going into the first surgery, which was not
32
emergency in nature, but was elective or pre-scheduled; she had no ready antibiotics, no prepared blood,
properly typed and cross-matched, and no sufficient oxygen supply.
Moreover, there are a lot of questions that keep nagging Us. Was the patient given any cardio-pulmonary
clearance, or at least a clearance by an internist, which are standard requirements before a patient is subjected
to surgery. Did the petitioner determine as part of the pre-operative evaluation, the bleeding parameters of the
patient, such as bleeding time and clotting time? There is no showing that these were done. The petitioner just
appears to have been in a hurry to perform the operation, even as the family wanted the postponement to April
6, 1991. Obviously, she did not prepare the patient; neither did she get the family's consent to the operation.
Moreover, she did not prepare a medical chart with instructions for the patient's care. If she did all these, proof
thereof should have been offered. But there is none. Indeed, these are overwhelming evidence of recklessness
and imprudence."[25]
This court, however, holds differently and finds the foregoing circumstances insufficient to sustain a
judgment of conviction against the petitioner for the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The
elements of reckless imprudence are: (1) that the offender does or fails to do an act; (2) that the doing or the
failure to do that act is voluntary; (3) that it be without malice; (4) that material damage results from the
reckless imprudence; and (5) that there is inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the offender, taking into
consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition, and other
circumstances regarding persons, time and place.
Whether or not a physician has committed an "inexcusable lack of precaution" in the treatment of his
patient is to be determined according to the standard of care observed by other members of the profession in
good standing under similar circumstances bearing in mind the advanced state of the profession at the time of
treatment or the present state of medical science. [26] In the recent case of Leonila Garcia-Rueda v. Wilfred L.
Pacasio, et. al.,[27] this Court stated that in accepting a case, a doctor in effect represents that, having the
needed training and skill possessed by physicians and surgeons practicing in the same field, he will employ
such training, care and skill in the treatment of his patients. He therefore has a duty to use at least the same
level of care that any other reasonably competent doctor would use to treat a condition under the same
circumstances. It is in this aspect of medical malpractice that expert testimony is essential to establish not only
the standard of care of the profession but also that the physician's conduct in the treatment and care falls below
such standard.[28] Further, inasmuch as the causes of the injuries involved in malpractice actions are
determinable only in the light of scientific knowledge, it has been recognized that expert testimony is usually
necessary to support the conclusion as to causation.[29]
Immediately apparent from a review of the records of this case is the absence of any expert testimony on
the matter of the standard of care employed by other physicians of good standing in the conduct of similar
operations. The prosecution's expert witnesses in the persons of Dr. Floresto Arizala and Dr. Nieto Salvador, Jr.
of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) only testified as to the possible cause of death but did not
venture to illuminate the court on the matter of the standard of care that petitioner should have exercised.
 33

All three courts below bewail the inadequacy of the facilities of the clinic and its untidiness; the lack of "Atty. Cachero:
provisions such as blood, oxygen, and certain medicines; the failure to subject the patient to a cardio-
pulmonary test prior to the operation; the omission of any form of blood typing before transfusion; and even Q. You mentioned about your Autopsy Report which has been marked as Exh. "A-1-b". There
the subsequent transfer of Lydia to the San Pablo Hospital and the reoperation performed on her by the appears here a signature above the typewritten name Floresto Arizala, Jr., whose signature is
petitioner. But while it may be true that the circumstances pointed out by the courts below seemed beyond that?
cavil to constitute reckless imprudence on the part of the surgeon, this conclusion is still best arrived at not
through the educated surmises nor conjectures of laymen, including judges, but by the unquestionable A. That is my signature, sir.
knowledge of expert witnesses. For whether a physician or surgeon has exercised the requisite degree of skill
and care in the treatment of his patient is, in the generality of cases, a matter of expert opinion. [30] The Q. Do you affirm the truth of all the contents of Exh. "A-1-b"?
deference of courts to the expert opinion of qualified physicians stems from its realization that the latter
possess unusual technical skills which laymen in most instances are incapable of intelligently evaluating.
[31]
A. Only as to the autopsy report no. 91-09, the time and place and everything after the post mortem
Expert testimony should have been offered to prove that the circumstances cited by the courts below are
findings, sir.
constitutive of conduct falling below the standard of care employed by other physicians in good standing when
performing the same operation. It must be remembered that when the qualifications of a physician are
Q. You mentioned on your "Post Mortem Findings" about surgical incision, 14:0 cm.,
admitted, as in the instant case, there is an inevitable presumption that in proper cases he takes the necessary
infraumbilical area, anterior abdominal area, midline, will you please explain that in your own
precaution and employs the best of his knowledge and skill in attending to his clients, unless the contrary is
language?
sufficiently established.[32] This presumption is rebuttable by expert opinion which is so sadly lacking in the
case at bench.
A. There was incision wound (sic) the area just below the navel, sir.
Even granting arguendo that the inadequacy of the facilities and untidiness of the clinic; the lack of
provisions; the failure to conduct pre-operation tests on the patient; and the subsequent transfer of Lydia to the Q. And the last paragraph of the postmortem findings which I read: Uterus, pear-shaped and pale
San Pablo Hospital and the reoperation performed on her by the petitioner do indicate, even without expert measuring 7.5 x 5.5 x 5.0 cm, with some surface nodulation of the fundic area posteriorly.
testimony, that petitioner was recklessly imprudent in the exercise of her duties as a surgeon, no cogent proof Cut-section shows diffusely pale myometrium with areas of streak induration. The ovaries and
exists that any of these circumstances caused petitioner's death. Thus, the absence of the fourth element of adnexal structures are missing with the raw surfaces patched with clotted blood. Surgical
reckless imprudence: that the injury to the person or property was a consequence of the reckless imprudence. sutures were noted on the operative site.

In litigations involving medical negligence, the plaintiff has the burden of establishing appellant's Intestines and mesenteries are pale with blood clots noted between the mesentric
negligence and for a reasonable conclusion of negligence, there must be proof of breach of duty on the part of folds.
the surgeon as well as a casual connection of such breach and the resulting death of his patient. [33] In Chan
Lugay v. St Luke's Hospital, Inc.,[34] where the attending physician was absolved of liability for the death of the Hemoperitonium: 300 s.s.,
complainant's wife and newborn baby, this court held that:
right paracolic gutter,
"In order that there may be a recovery for an injury, however, it must be shown that the 'injury for which
recovery is sought must be the legitimate consequence of the wrong done; the connection between the 50 c.c., left paracolic gutter
negligence and the injury must be a direct and natural sequence of events, unbroken by intervening efficient
causes.' In other words, the negligence must be the proximate cause of the injury. For, 'negligence, no matter in 200 c.c., mesentric area,
what it consists, cannot create a right of action unless it is the proximate cause of the injury complained of.'
And 'the proximate cause of an injury is that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by 100 c.c., right pelvic gutter
any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred.'''[35] (Underscoring supplied.) stomach empty.

Dr. Arizala who conducted an autopsy on the body of the deceased summarized his findings as follows: Other visceral organs, pale.',

will you please explain that on (sic) your own language or in ordinary
A. There was a uterus which was not attached to the adnexal structures namely ovaries which were
not present and also sign of previous surgical operation and there were (sic) clotted blood, sir.
Q. How about the ovaries and adnexal structures?
A. They are missing, sir.
Q. You mean to say there are no ovaries?
A. During that time there are no ovaries, sir.
Q. And there were likewise sign of surgical sutures?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How about the intestines and mesenteries are place (sic) with blood clots noted between the
mesenteric folds, will you please explain on (sic) this?
A. In the peritoneal cavity, they are mostly perritonial blood.
Q. And what could have caused this blood?
A. Well, ordinarily blood is found inside the blood vessel. Blood were (sic) outside as a result of the
injuries which destroyed the integrity of the vessel allowing blood to sip (sic) out, sir.
Q. By the nature of the postmortem findings indicated in Exh. A-1-B, can you tell the court the
cause of death?
A. Yes, sir. The cause of death is: Gross findings are compatible with hemorrhagic shock.
Q. Can you tell the us what could have caused this hemorrhagic shock?
A. Well hemorrhagic shock is the result of blood loss.
Q. What could have the effect of that loss of blood?
A. Unattended hemorrhage, sir.[36] (Underscoring supplied.)
The foregoing was corroborated by Dr. Nieto Salvador:
34
"Q. And were you able to determine the cause of death by virtue of the examination of the
specimen submitted by Dr. Arizala?
A. Without knowledge of the autopsy findings it would be difficult for me to determine the cause of
death, sir.
Q. Have you examined the post mortem of Dr. Arizala?
A. Yes, sir, and by virtue of the autopsy report in connection with your pathology report.
Q. What could have caused the death of the victim?
A. This pathologic examination are (sic) compatible with the person who died, sir.
Q. Will you explain to us the meaning of hemorrhagic compatible?
A. It means that a person died of blood loss. Meaning a person died of non-replacement of blood
and so the victim before she died there was shock of diminish of blood of the circulation. She
died most probably before the actual complete blood loss, sir.
Court: Is it possible doctor that the loss of the blood was due on (sic) operation?
A. Based on my pathology findings, sir.
Q. What could have caused this loss of blood?
A. Many, sir. A patient who have undergone surgery. Another may be a blood vessel may be cut
while on operation and this cause (sic) bleeding, or may be set in the course of the operation,
or may be (sic) he died after the operation. Of course there are other cause (sic).
Atty. Cachero:
Q. Especially so doctor when there was no blood replacement?
A. Yes, sir."[37] (Underscoring supplied.)
The testimonies of both doctors establish hemorrhage or hemorrhagic shock as the cause of death.
However, as likewise testified to by the expert witnesses in open court, hemorrhage or hemorrhagic shock
during surgery may be caused by several different factors. Thus, Dr. Salvador's elaboration on the matter:
"Atty. Pascual:

Q. Doctor, among the causes of hemorrhage that you mentioned you said that it could be at the
moment of operation when one losses (sic) control of the presence, is that correct? During the
operation there is lost (sic) of control of the cut vessel?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Or there is a failure to ligate a vessel of considerable size?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Or even if the vessel were ligated the knot may have slipped later on?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. And you also mentioned that it may be possible also to some clotting defect, is that correct?
A. May be (sic)."[38] (Underscoring supplied).
Defense witness, Dr. Bu C. Castro also gave the following expert opinion:
"Q. Doctor even a patient after an operations (sic) would suffer hemorrage what would be the
possible causes of such hemorrage (sic)?
A. Among those would be what we call Intravascular Coagulation and this is the reason for the
bleeding, sir, which cannot be prevented by anyone, it will happen to anyone, anytime and to
any persons (sic), sir.
COURT:
What do you think of the cause of the bleeding, the cutting or the operations done in the body?
A. Not related to this one, the bleeding here is not related to any cutting or operation that I (sic)
have done.
Q. Aside from the DIC what could another causes (sic) that could be the cause for the hemorrhage
or bleeding in a patient by an operations (sic)?
A. In general sir, if there was an operations (sic) and it is possible that the ligature in the suture was
(sic) become (sic) loose, it is (sic) becomes loose if proven.
xxxxxxxxx
35
Q. If the person who performed an autopsy does not find any untight (sic) clot (sic) blood vessel or
any suture that become (sic) loose the cause of the bleeding could not be attributed to the fault
of the subject?
A. Definitely, sir."[39] (Underscoring supplied.)
According to both doctors, the possible causes of hemorrhage during an operation are: (1) the failure of
the surgeon to tie or suture a cut blood vessel; (2) allowing a cut blood vessel to get out of control; (3) the
subsequent loosening of the tie or suture applied to a cut blood vessel; and (4) and a clotting defect known as
DIC. It is significant to state at this juncture that the autopsy conducted by Dr. Arizala on the body of Lydia did
not reveal any untied or unsutured cut blood vessel nor was there any indication that the tie or suture of a cut
blood vessel had become loose thereby causing the hemorrhage. [40] Hence the following pertinent portion of Dr.
Arizala's testimony:
"Q: Doctor, in examining these structures did you know whether these were sutured ligature or
plain ligature
A: Ligature, sir.
Q: We will explain that later on. Did you recall if the cut structures were tied by first suturing it and
then tying a knot or the tie was merely placed around the cut structure and tied?
A: I cannot recall, sir.
Q: As a matter of fact, you cannot recall because you did not even bothered (sic) to examine, is that
correct?
A: Well, I bothered enough to know that they were sutured, sir.
Q: So, therefore, Doctor, you would not know whether any of the cut structures were not sutured or
tied neither were you able to determine whether any loose suture was found in the peritoneal
cavity?
A: I could not recall any loose sutured (sic), sir." [41]
On the other hand, the findings of all three doctors do not preclude the probability that DIC caused the
hemorrhage and consequently, Lydia's death. DIC which is a clotting defect creates a serious bleeding tendency
and when massive DIC occurs as a complication of surgery leaving raw surface, major hemorrhage occurs.
[42]
And as testified to by defense witness, Dr. Bu C. Castro, hemorrhage due to DIC "cannot be prevented, it
will happen to anyone, anytime."[43] He testified further:
"Q. Now, under the circumstance one of the possibility as you mentioned in (sic) DIC?
 36

A. Yes, sir. He is only reading the record.

Q. And you mentioned that it cannot be prevented? ATTY. PASCUAL:

A. Yes, sir. Yes, sir.

Q. Can you even predict if it really happen (sic)? A. No, sir, there is no fault on the part of the surgeon, sir." [44]

A. Possible, sir.
Q. Are there any specific findings of autopsy that will tell you whether this patient suffered among
such things as DIC?
A. Well, I did reserve because of the condition of the patient.
Q. Now, Doctor you said that you went through the record of the deceased Lydia Umali looking for
the chart, the operated (sic) records, the post mortem findings on the histophanic (sic)
examination based on your examination of record, doctor, can you more or less says (sic)
what part are (sic) concerned could have been the caused (sic) of death of this Lydia Umali?
A. As far as the medical record is concern (sic) the caused (sic) of death is dessimulated (sic) Intra
Vascular Coagulation or the DIC which resulted to hemorrhage or bleedings, sir.
Q. Doctor based on your findings then there is knowing (sic) the doctor would say whether the
doctor her (sic) has been (sic) fault?
This court has no recourse but to rely on the expert testimonies rendered by both prosecution and defense
witnesses that substantiate rather than contradict petitioner's allegation that the cause of Lydia's death was DIC
which, as attested to by an expert witness, cannot be attributed to the petitioner's fault or negligence. The
probability that Lydia's death was caused by DIC was unrebutted during trial and has engendered in the mind
of this Court a reasonable doubt as to the petitioner's guilt. Thus, her acquittal of the crime of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide. While we condole with the family of Lydia Umali, our hands are bound by
the dictates of justice and fair dealing which hold inviolable the right of an accused to be presumed innocent
until proven guilty beyond reasonable doubt. Nevertheless, this Court finds the petitioner civilly liable for the
death of Lydia Umali, for while a conviction of a crime requires proof beyond reasonable doubt, only a
preponderance of evidence is required to establish civil liability.[45]
The petitioner is a doctor in whose hands a patient puts his life and limb. For insufficiency of evidence
this Court was not able to render a sentence of conviction but it is not blind to the reckless and imprudent
manner in which the petitioner carried out her duties. A precious life has been lost and the circumstances
leading thereto exacerbated the grief of those left behind. The heirs of the deceased continue to feel the loss of
their mother up to the present time [46] and this Court is aware that no amount of compassion and commiseration
nor words of bereavement can suffice to assuage the sorrow felt for the loss of a loved one. Certainly, the
award of moral and exemplary damages in favor of the heirs of Lydia Umali are proper in the instant case.

ATTY. MALVEDA:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioner DR. NINEVETCH CRUZ is hereby ACQUITTED of
the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide but is ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased Lydia
We will moved (sic) to strike out the (sic) based on finding they just read the chart as well as the
Umali the amount of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as civil liability, ONE HUNDRED
other record.
THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00) as moral damages, and FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as
exemplary damages.
ATTY. PASCUAL:
Let the copy of this decision be furnished to the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) for
Precisely based on this examination. appropriate action.

ATTY. MALVEDA: SO ORDERED.

Not finding, there was no finding made.

COURT:

[G.R. No. 147703. April 14, 2004]
PHILIPPINE RABBIT BUS LINES, INC., petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
When the accused-employee absconds or jumps bail, the judgment meted out becomes final and
executory. The employer cannot defeat the finality of the judgment by filing a notice of appeal on its own
behalf in the guise of asking for a review of its subsidiary civil liability. Both the primary civil liability of the
accused-employee and the subsidiary civil liability of the employer are carried in one single decision that has
become final and executory.
The Case
Before this Court is a Petition for Review [1] under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the March 29,
2000 and the March 27, 2001[3] Resolutions of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-GR CV No.
[2]
59390. Petitioners appeal from the judgment of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Fernando, La Union in
Criminal Case No. 2535 was dismissed in the first Resolution as follows:
WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED and the appeal is ordered
DISMISSED.[4]
The second Resolution denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. [5]
The Facts
The facts of the case are summarized by the CA in this wise:
On July 27, 1994, accused [Napoleon Roman y Macadangdang] was found guilty and convicted of the crime of
reckless imprudence resulting to triple homicide, multiple physical injuries and damage to property and was
sentenced to suffer the penalty of four (4) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days to six (6) years, and to
pay damages as follows:
a. to pay the heirs of JUSTINO TORRES the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for his death, plus the
sum of P25,383.00, for funeral expenses, his unearned income for one year at P2,500.00 a
37
month, P50,000.00 as indemnity for the support of Renato Torres, and the further sum
of P300,000.00 as moral damages;
b. to the heirs of ESTRELLA VELERO, the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for her death, the sum
of P237,323.75 for funeral expenses, her unearned income for three years at P45,000.00 per
annum, and the further sum of P1,000,000.00 as moral damages and P200,000.00 as
attorneys fees[;]
c. to the heirs of LORNA ANCHETA, the sum of P50,000.00 as indemnity for her death, the sum
of P22,838.00 as funeral expenses, the sum of P20,544.94 as medical expenses and her loss
of income for 30 years at P1,000.00 per month, and the further sum of P100,000.00 for
moral damages;
d. to MAUREEN BRENNAN, the sum of P229,654.00 as hospital expenses, doctors fees
of P170,000.00 for the orthopedic surgeon, P22,500.00 for the [n]eurologist, an additional
indemnity [of] at least P150,000.00 to cover future correction of deformity of her limbs, and
moral damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00;
e. to ROSIE BALAJO, the sum of P3,561.46 as medical expenses, P2,000.00 as loss of income,
and P25,000.00 as moral damages;
f. to TERESITA TAMONDONG, the sum of P19,800.47 as medical expenses, P800.00 for loss of
income, and P25,000.00 as moral damages;
g. to JULIANA TABTAB, the amount of P580.81 as medical expenses, P4,600.00 as actual damages
and her loss earnings of P1,400.00 as well as moral damages in the amount of P10,000.00;
h. to MIGUEL ARQUITOLA, the sum of P12,473.82 as hospital expenses, P14,530.00 as doctors
fees, P1,000.00 for medicines and P50,000.00 as moral damages;
i. to CLARITA CABANBAN, the sum of P155.00 for medical expenses, P87.00 for
medicines, P1,710.00 as actual damages and P5,000.00 as moral damages;
j. to MARIANO CABANBAN, the sum of P1,395.00 for hospital bills, P500.00 for
medicine, P2,100.00 as actual damages, P1,200.00 for loss of income and P5,000.00 as
moral damages;
k. to La Union Electric Company as the registered owner of the Toyota Hi-Ace Van, the amount
of P250,000.00 as actual damages for the cost of the totally wrecked vehicle; to the owner
of the jeepney, the amount of P22,698.38 as actual damages;
 38

The court further ruled that [petitioner], in the event of the insolvency of accused, shall be liable for the civil The Courts Ruling
liabilities of the accused. Evidently, the judgment against accused had become final and executory.
The Petition has no merit.
Admittedly, accused had jumped bail and remained at-large. It is worth mention[ing] that Section 8, Rule 124
of the Rules of Court authorizes the dismissal of appeal when appellant jumps bail. Counsel for accused, also Main Issue:
admittedly hired and provided by [petitioner], filed a notice of appeal which was denied by the trial court. We
affirmed the denial of the notice of appeal filed in behalf of accused. Propriety of Appeal by the Employer

Simultaneously, on August 6, 1994, [petitioner] filed its notice of appeal from the judgment of the trial Pointing out that it had seasonably filed a notice of appeal from the RTC Decision, petitioner contends
court. On April 29, 1997, the trial court gave due course to [petitioners] notice of appeal. On December 8, that the judgment of conviction against the accused-employee has not attained finality. The former insists that
1998, [petitioner] filed its brief. On December 9, 1998, the Office of the Solicitor General received [a] copy of its appeal stayed the finality, notwithstanding the fact that the latter had jumped bail. In effect, petitioner argues
[petitioners] brief. On January 8, 1999, the OSG moved to be excused from filing [respondents] brief on the that its appeal takes the place of that of the accused-employee.
ground that the OSGs authority to represent People is confined to criminal cases on appeal. The motion was
however denied per Our resolution of May 31, 1999. On March 2, 1999, [respondent]/private prosecutor filed We are not persuaded.
the instant motion to dismiss.[6] (Citations omitted)
Appeals in Criminal Cases
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Section 1 of Rule 122 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure states thus:
The CA ruled that the institution of a criminal case implied the institution also of the civil action arising
from the offense. Thus, once determined in the criminal case against the accused-employee, the employers
Any party may appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the accused will be placed in double jeopardy.
subsidiary civil liability as set forth in Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code becomes conclusive and
enforceable.
Clearly, both the accused and the prosecution may appeal a criminal case, but the government may do so
only if the accused would not thereby be placed in double jeopardy.[9]Furthermore, the prosecution cannot
The appellate court further held that to allow an employer to dispute independently the civil liability
appeal on the ground that the accused should have been given a more severe penalty. [10] On the other hand, the
fixed in the criminal case against the accused-employee would be to amend, nullify or defeat a final
offended parties may also appeal the judgment with respect to their right to civil liability. If the accused has the
judgment. Since the notice of appeal filed by the accused had already been dismissed by the CA, then the
right to appeal the judgment of conviction, the offended parties should have the same right to appeal as much
judgment of conviction and the award of civil liability became final and executory. Included in the civil
of the judgment as is prejudicial to them.[11]
liability of the accused was the employers subsidiary liability.

Appeal by the Accused

Hence, this Petition.[7]

Who Jumps Bail

The Issues

Well-established in our jurisdiction is the principle that the appellate court may, upon motion or motu
Petitioner states the issues of this case as follows:
proprio, dismiss an appeal during its pendency if the accused jumps bail. The second paragraph of Section 8 of
Rule 124 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
A. Whether or not an employer, who dutifully participated in the defense of its accused-employee, may appeal
the judgment of conviction independently of the accused.
The Court of Appeals may also, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, dismiss the appeal if the
appellant escapes from prison or confinement, jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during the pendency of
B. Whether or not the doctrines of Alvarez v. Court of Appeals (158 SCRA 57) and Yusay v. Adil (164 SCRA the appeal.[12]
494) apply to the instant case.[8]

There is really only one issue. Item B above is merely an adjunct to Item A.

This rule is based on the rationale that appellants lose their standing in court when they abscond. Unless
they surrender or submit to the courts jurisdiction, they are deemed to have waived their right to seek judicial
relief.[13]
Moreover, this doctrine applies not only to the accused who jumps bail during the appeal, but also to one
who does so during the trial. Justice Florenz D. Regalado succinctly explains the principle in this wise:
x x x. When, as in this case, the accused escaped after his arraignment and during the trial, but the trial in
absentia proceeded resulting in the promulgation of a judgment against him and his counsel appealed, since he
nonetheless remained at large his appeal must be dismissed by analogy with the aforesaid provision of this
Rule [Rule 124, 8 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure]. x x x[14]
The accused cannot be accorded the right to appeal unless they voluntarily submit to the jurisdiction of
the court or are otherwise arrested within 15 days from notice of the judgment against them. [15] While at large,
they cannot seek relief from the court, as they are deemed to have waived the appeal. [16]
Finality of a Decision
in a Criminal Case
As to when a judgment of conviction attains finality is explained in Section 7 of Rule 120 of the 2000
Rules of Criminal Procedure, which we quote:
A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set aside before it becomes final or
before appeal is perfected. Except where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment becomes final after the lapse
of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or
when the accused has waived in writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation.
In the case before us, the accused-employee has escaped and refused to surrender to the proper
authorities; thus, he is deemed to have abandoned his appeal. Consequently, the judgment against him has
become final and executory.[17]
Liability of an Employer
in a Finding of Guilt
Article 102 of the Revised Penal Code states the subsidiary civil liabilities of innkeepers, as follows:
In default of the persons criminally liable, innkeepers, tavernkeepers, and any other persons or corporations
shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in their establishments, in all cases where a violation of municipal
ordinances or some general or special police regulation shall have been committed by them or their employees.
39
Innkeepers are also subsidiary liable for restitution of goods taken by robbery or theft within their houses from
guests lodging therein, or for payment of the value thereof, provided that such guests shall have notified in
advance the innkeeper himself, or the person representing him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn; and
shall furthermore have followed the directions which such innkeeper or his representative may have given
them with respect to the care and vigilance over such goods. No liability shall attach in case of robbery with
violence against or intimidation of persons unless committed by the innkeepers employees.
Moreover, the foregoing subsidiary liability applies to employers, according to Article 103 which reads:
The subsidiary liability established in the next preceding article shall also apply to employers, teachers,
persons, and corporations engaged in any kind of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils,
workmen, apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.
Having laid all these basic rules and principles, we now address the main issue raised by petitioner.
Civil Liability Deemed Instituted
in the Criminal Prosecution
At the outset, we must explain that the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure has clarified what civil actions
are deemed instituted in a criminal prosecution.
Section 1 of Rule 111 of the current Rules of Criminal Procedure provides:
When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense
charged shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action,
reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
xxxxxxxxx
Only the civil liability of the accused arising from the crime charged is deemed impliedly instituted in a
criminal action, that is, unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it
separately, or institutes it prior to the criminal action. [18] Hence, the subsidiary civil liability of the employer
under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code may be enforced by execution on the basis of the judgment of
conviction meted out to the employee.[19]
It is clear that the 2000 Rules deleted the requirement of reserving independent civil actions and allowed
these to proceed separately from criminal actions. Thus, the civil actions referred to in Articles 32,[20] 33,
[21]
34[22] and 2176[23] of the Civil Code shall remain separate, distinct and independent of any criminal
prosecution based on the same act. Here are some direct consequences of such revision and omission:

1. The right to bring the foregoing actions based on the Civil Code need not be reserved in the criminal
prosecution, since they are not deemed included therein.
2. The institution or the waiver of the right to file a separate civil action arising from the crime charged
does not extinguish the right to bring such action.
3. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot recover more than once for the same act or
omission.[24]
What is deemed instituted in every criminal prosecution is the civil liability arising from the crime or
delict per se (civil liability ex delicto), but not those liabilities arising from quasi-delicts, contracts or quasi-
contracts. In fact, even if a civil action is filed separately, the ex delicto civil liability in the criminal
prosecution remains, and the offended party may -- subject to the control of the prosecutor -- still intervene in
the criminal action, in order to protect the remaining civil interest therein. [25]
This discussion is completely in accord with the Revised Penal Code, which states that [e]very person
criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.[26]
Petitioner argues that, as an employer, it is considered a party to the criminal case and is conclusively
bound by the outcome thereof. Consequently, petitioner must be accorded the right to pursue the case to its
logical conclusion -- including the appeal.
The argument has no merit. Undisputedly, petitioner is not a direct party to the criminal case, which was
filed solely against Napoleon M. Roman, its employee.
In its Memorandum, petitioner cited a comprehensive list of cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of
employers. Thereafter, it noted that none can be applied to it, because in all th[o]se cases, the accuseds
employer did not interpose an appeal. [27] Indeed, petitioner cannot cite any single case in which the employer
appealed, precisely because an appeal in such circumstances is not possible.
The cases dealing with the subsidiary liability of employers uniformly declare that, strictly speaking, they
are not parties to the criminal cases instituted against their employees. [28]Although in substance and in effect,
they have an interest therein, this fact should be viewed in the light of their subsidiary liability. While they may
assist their employees to the extent of supplying the latters lawyers, as in the present case, the former cannot
act independently on their own behalf, but can only defend the accused.
Waiver of Constitutional Safeguard
Against Double Jeopardy
Petitioners appeal obviously aims to have the accused-employee absolved of his criminal responsibility
and the judgment reviewed as a whole. These intentions are apparent from its Appellants Brief [29] filed with the
40
CA and from its Petition [30] before us, both of which claim that the trial courts finding of guilt is not supported
by competent evidence.[31]
An appeal from the sentence of the trial court implies a waiver of the constitutional safeguard against
double jeopardy and throws the whole case open to a review by the appellate court. The latter is then called
upon to render judgment as law and justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to the appellant. [32] This is
the risk involved when the accused decides to appeal a sentence of conviction. [33] Indeed, appellate courts have
the power to reverse, affirm or modify the judgment of the lower court and to increase or reduce the penalty it
imposed.[34]
If the present appeal is given course, the whole case against the accused-employee becomes open to
review. It thus follows that a penalty higher than that which has already been imposed by the trial court may be
meted out to him. Petitioners appeal would thus violate his right against double jeopardy, since the judgment
against him could become subject to modification without his consent.
We are not in a position to second-guess the reason why the accused effectively waived his right to
appeal by jumping bail. It is clear, though, that petitioner may not appeal without violating his right against
double jeopardy.
Effect of Absconding
on the Appeal Process
Moreover, within the meaning of the principles governing the prevailing criminal procedure, the accused
impliedly withdrew his appeal by jumping bail and thereby made the judgment of the court below final.
[35]
Having been a fugitive from justice for a long period of time, he is deemed to have waived his right to
appeal. Thus, his conviction is now final and executory. The Court in People v. Ang Gioc[36] ruled:
There are certain fundamental rights which cannot be waived even by the accused himself, but the right of
appeal is not one of them. This right is granted solely for the benefit of the accused. He may avail of it or not,
as he pleases. He may waive it either expressly or by implication. When the accused flees after the case has
been submitted to the court for decision, he will be deemed to have waived his right to appeal from the
judgment rendered against him. x x x.[37]
By fleeing, the herein accused exhibited contempt of the authority of the court and placed himself in a
position to speculate on his chances for a reversal. In the process, he kept himself out of the reach of justice,
but hoped to render the judgment nugatory at his option. [38] Such conduct is intolerable and does not invite
leniency on the part of the appellate court.[39]
Consequently, the judgment against an appellant who escapes and who refuses to surrender to the proper
authorities becomes final and executory.[40]

Thus far, we have clarified that petitioner has no right to appeal the criminal case against the accused-
employee; that by jumping bail, he has waived his right to appeal; and that the judgment in the criminal case
against him is now final.
Subsidiary Liability
Upon Finality of Judgment
As a matter of law, the subsidiary liability of petitioner now accrues. Petitioner argues that the rulings of
this Court in Miranda v. Malate Garage & Taxicab, Inc.,[41] Alvarez v. CA[42] and Yusay v. Adil[43] do not apply to
the present case, because it has followed the Courts directive to the employers in these cases to take part in the
criminal cases against their employees. By participating in the defense of its employee, herein petitioner tries
to shield itself from the undisputed rulings laid down in these leading cases.
Such posturing is untenable. In dissecting these cases on subsidiary liability, petitioner lost track of the
most basic tenet they have laid down -- that an employers liability in a finding of guilt against its accused-
employee is subsidiary.
Under Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, employers are subsidiarily liable for the adjudicated civil
liabilities of their employees in the event of the latters insolvency. [44] The provisions of the Revised Penal Code
on subsidiary liability -- Articles 102 and 103 -- are deemed written into the judgments in the cases to which
they are applicable.[45] Thus, in the dispositive portion of its decision, the trial court need not expressly
pronounce the subsidiary liability of the employer.
In the absence of any collusion between the accused-employee and the offended party, the judgment of
conviction should bind the person who is subsidiarily liable. [46] In effect and implication, the stigma of a
criminal conviction surpasses mere civil liability.[47]
To allow employers to dispute the civil liability fixed in a criminal case would enable them to amend,
nullify or defeat a final judgment rendered by a competent court. [48] By the same token, to allow them to appeal
the final criminal conviction of their employees without the latters consent would also result in improperly
amending, nullifying or defeating the judgment.
The decision convicting an employee in a criminal case is binding and conclusive upon the employer not
only with regard to the formers civil liability, but also with regard to its amount. The liability of an employer
cannot be separated from that of the employee. [49]
Before the employers subsidiary liability is exacted, however, there must be adequate evidence
establishing that (1) they are indeed the employers of the convicted employees; (2) that the former are engaged
in some kind of industry; (3) that the crime was committed by the employees in the discharge of their duties;
and (4) that the execution against the latter has not been satisfied due to insolvency.[50]
41
The resolution of these issues need not be done in a separate civil action. But the determination must be
based on the evidence that the offended party and the employer may fully and freely present. Such
determination may be done in the same criminal action in which the employees liability, criminal and civil, has
been pronounced;[51] and in a hearing set for that precise purpose, with due notice to the employer, as part of
the proceedings for the execution of the judgment.
Just because the present petitioner participated in the defense of its accused-employee does not mean that
its liability has transformed its nature; its liability remains subsidiary. Neither will its participation erase its
subsidiary liability. The fact remains that since the accused-employees conviction has attained finality, then the
subsidiary liability of the employer ipso factoattaches.
According to the argument of petitioner, fairness dictates that while the finality of conviction could be the
proper sanction to be imposed upon the accused for jumping bail, the same sanction should not affect it. In
effect, petitioner-employer splits this case into two: first, for itself; and second, for its accused-employee.
The untenability of this argument is clearly evident. There is only one criminal case against the accused-
employee. A finding of guilt has both criminal and civil aspects. It is the height of absurdity for this single case
to be final as to the accused who jumped bail, but not as to an entity whose liability is dependent upon the
conviction of the former.
The subsidiary liability of petitioner is incidental to and dependent on the pecuniary civil liability of the
accused-employee. Since the civil liability of the latter has become final and enforceable by reason of his
flight, then the formers subsidiary civil liability has also become immediately enforceable. Respondent is
correct in arguing that the concept of subsidiary liability is highly contingent on the imposition of the primary
civil liability.
No Deprivation
of Due Process
As to the argument that petitioner was deprived of due process, we reiterate that what is sought to be
enforced is the subsidiary civil liability incident to and dependent upon the employees criminal negligence. In
other words, the employer becomes ipso facto subsidiarily liable upon the conviction of the employee and
upon proof of the latters insolvency, in the same way that acquittal wipes out not only his primary civil
liability, but also his employers subsidiary liability for his criminal negligence. [52]
It should be stressed that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process. [53] It is
merely a procedural remedy of statutory origin, a remedy that may be exercised only in the manner prescribed
by the provisions of law authorizing such exercise.[54] Hence, the legal requirements must be strictly complied
with.[55]
 42

It would be incorrect to consider the requirements of the rules on appeal as merely harmless and trivial
technicalities that can be discarded. [56] Indeed, deviations from the rules cannot be tolerated. [57] In these times
when court dockets are clogged with numerous litigations, such rules have to be followed by parties with
greater fidelity, so as to facilitate the orderly disposition of those cases. [58]

After a judgment has become final, vested rights are acquired by the winning party. If the proper losing
party has the right to file an appeal within the prescribed period, then the former has the correlative right to G.R. No. 74041 July 29, 1987
enjoy the finality of the resolution of the case.[59]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
In fact, petitioner admits that by helping the accused-employee, it participated in the proceedings before vs.
the RTC; thus, it cannot be said that the employer was deprived of due process.It might have lost its right to ROGELIO LIGON y TRIAS and FERNANDO GABAT y ALMERA, accused,
appeal, but it was not denied its day in court. [60] In fact, it can be said that by jumping bail, the accused- FERNANDO GABAT y ALMERA, accused-appellant.
employee, not the court, deprived petitioner of the right to appeal.
YAP, J.:
All told, what is left to be done is to execute the RTC Decision against the accused. It should be clear that
only after proof of his insolvency may the subsidiary liability of petitioner be enforced. It has been sufficiently This is an appeal from the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XX, rendered on February
proven that there exists an employer-employee relationship; that the employer is engaged in some kind of 17, 1986, convicting the accused-appellant, Fernando Gabat, of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and
industry; and that the employee has been adjudged guilty of the wrongful act and found to have committed the sentencing him to reclusion perpetua. The victim was Jose Rosales y Ortiz, a ,Seventeen-year old working
offense in the discharge of his duties. The proof is clear from the admissions of petitioner that [o]n 26 August student who was earning his keep as a cigarette vendor. He was allegedly robbed of Es cigarette box containing
1990, while on its regular trip from Laoag to Manila, a passenger bus owned by petitioner, being then cigarettes worth P300.00 more or less. 1
operated by petitioners driver, Napoleon Roman, figured in an accident in San Juan, La Union x x x.
[61]
Neither does petitioner dispute that there was already a finding of guilt against the accused while he was in
Only Fernando Gabat was arrested and brought to trial and convicted. The other accused, Rogelio Ligon, was
the discharge of his duties.
never apprehended and is still at large.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED, and the assailed Resolutions AFFIRMED. Costs against
The fatal incident happened on a Sunday, October 23, 1983 at about 6:10 p.m. The accused, Fernando Gabat,
petitioner.
was riding in a 1978 Volkswagen Kombi owned by his father, Antonio Gabat, and driven by the other accused,
Rogelio Ligon. The Kombi was coming from Espana Street going towards the direction of Quiapo. Fernando
SO ORDERED. Gabat was seated beside the driver, in the front seat by the window on the right side of the Kombi. At the
intersection of Quezon Boulevard and Lerma Street before turning left towards the underpass at C.M. Recto
Avenue, the Kombi had to stop as the traffic light was red. While waiting for the traffic light to change,
Fernando Gabat beckoned a cigarette vendor, Jose Rosales y Ortiz (Rosales for short) to buy some cigarettes
from him. Rosales approached the Kombi and handed Gabat two sticks of cigarettes. While this transaction
was occurring, the traffic light changed to green, and the Kombi driven by Rogelio Ligon suddenly moved
forward. As to what precisely happened between Gabat and Rosales at the crucial moment, and immediately
thereafter, is the subject of conflicting versions by the prosecution and the defense. It is not controverted,
however, that as the Kombi continued to speed towards Quiapo, Rosales clung to the window of the Kombi but
apparently lost his grip and fell down on the pavement. Rosales was rushed by some bystanders to the
Philippine General Hospital, where he was treated for multiple physical injuries and was confined thereat until
his death on October 30, 1983.

Following close behind the Kombi at the time of the incident was a taxicab driven by Prudencio Castillo. He
was behind the Kombi, at a distance of about three meters, travelling on the same lane in a slightly oblique

position ("a little bit to the right"). 2 As the Kombi did not stop after the victim fell down on the pavement near
the foot of the underpass, Castillo pursued it as it sped towards Roxas Boulevard, beeping his horn to make the
driver stop. When they reached the Luneta near the Rizal monument, Castillo saw an owner-type jeep with two
persons in it. He sought their assistance in chasing the Kombi, telling them "nakaaksidente ng tao."3 The two
men in the jeep joined the chase and at the intersection of Vito Cruz and Roxas Boulevard, Castillo was able to
overtake the Kombi when the traffic light turned red. He immediately blocked the Kombi while the jeep pulled
up right behind it. The two men on board the jeep turned out to be police officers, Patrolmen Leonardo Pugao
and Peter Ignacio. They drew their guns and told the driver, Rogelio Ligon, and his companion, Fernando
Gabat, to alight from the Kombi. It was found out that there was a third person inside the Kombi, a certain
Rodolfo Primicias who was sleeping at the rear seat. 4 The three were all brought by the police officers to the
Western Police District and turned over to Pfc. Fernan Payuan. The taxicab driver, Prudencio Castillo, also
went along with them. The written statements of Castillo and Rodolfo Primicias were taken by the traffic
investigator, Pfc. Fernan Payuan.5 Payuan also prepared a Traffic Accident Report, dated October 23,
1983.6 Fernando Gabat and Rodolfo Primicias were released early morning the following day, but Rogelio
Ligon was detained and turned over to the City Fiscal's Office for further investigation.
Investigating Fiscal Alfredo Cantos, filed an information in court against Rogelio Ligon dated December 6,
1983 charging him with Homicide thru Reckless Imprudence. 7 Six months later, however, or on June 28, 1984,
Assistant Fiscal Cantos filed another information against Rogelio Ligon and Fernando Gabat for Robbery with
Homicide.8 He filed the latter information on the basis of a Supplemental Affidavit of Prudencio Castillo 9 and a
joint affidavit of Armando Espino and Romeo Castil, cigarette vendors, who allegedly witnessed the incident
on October 23, 1983.10 These affidavits were already prepared and merely sworn to before Fiscal Cantos on
January 17, 1984.
On October 31, 1983, an autopsy was conducted by the medico-legal officer of the National Bureau of
Investigation, Dr. Orlando V. Salvador, who stated in his autopsy report that the cause of death of Rosales was
"pneumonia hypostatic, bilateral, secondary to traumatic injuries of the head." 11
The prosecution tried to establish, through the sole testimony of the taxicab driver, Prudencio Castillo, that
Gabat grabbed the box of cigarettes from Rosales and pried loose the latter's hand from the window of the
Kombi, resulting in the latter falling down and hitting the pavement. In its decision, the trial court summarized
the testimony of Castillo as follows: At about 6:00 o'clock in the evening of October 23, 1983, Castillo was
then driving his taxicab along Lerma Street near Far Eastern University, and at the intersection of Lerma and
Quezon Boulevard, the traffic light changed from green to red. The vehicular traffic stopped and Prudencio
Castillo's taxi was right behind a Volkswagen Kombi. While waiting for the traffic light to change to green,
Castillo Idly watched the Volkswagen Kombi and saw Gabat, the passenger sitting beside the driver, signal to a
cigarette vendor. The cigarette vendor, Rosales, approached the right side of the Kombi. While Rosales was
handing the cigarettes to Gabat, the traffic light suddenly changed to green. When the Kombi moved forward,
Gabat suddenly grabbed the cigarette box held by Rosales. Taken aback, Jose Rosales ran beside the Kombi
and was able to hold on to the windowsill of the right front door with his right hand. While Rosales was
clinging to the windowsill, with both feet off the ground, the Kombi continued to speed towards the C.M.
Recto underpass. Castillo, who was closely following the Kombi, then saw Gabat forcibly remove the hand of
Rosales from the windowsill and the latter fell face down on Quezon Boulevard near the Recto underpass. 12
43
The version of the defense, on the other hand, was summarized by the court as follows: On the date and time in
question, Fernando Gabat, 31 years old, an underwriter, was on board the Volkswagen Kombi driven by
Rogelio Ligon. The Kombi had to stop at the intersection of Lerma Street and Quezon Boulevard when the
traffic light turned red. Fernando Gabat, who wanted to buy cigarettes, called a cigarette vendor who
approached the right side of the Kombi. Gabat bought two sticks of cigarettes and handed to the cigarette
vendor, Rosales, a P5.00 bill. In order to change the P5.00 big, Rosales placed his cigarette box containing
assorted cigarettes on the windowsill of the front door of the Kombi between the arm of Gabat and the window
frame. Suddenly, the traffic light changed from red to green and Rogelio Ligon moved the vehicle forward,
heedless of the transaction between Gabat and the cigarette vendor. As the vehicle sped onward, the cigarette
box which was squeezed between the right arm of Gabat and the window frame fell inside the Kombi. Rosales
then ran beside the vehicle and clung to the windowsill of the moving vehicle. Gabat testified that when he saw
the cigarette vendor clinging on the side of the front door, he told Ligon to veer to the right in order that
Rosales could get off at the sidewalk. However, Gabat declared, that Ligon said that it could not be done
because of the moving vehicular traffic. Then, while the vehicle slowed down and Ligon was maneuvering to
the right in an attempt to go toward the sidewalk, Rosales lost his grip on the window frame and fell to the
pavement of Quezon Boulevard. Gabat allegedly shouted at Ligon to stop but Ligon replied that they should go
on to Las Pinas and report the incident to the parents of Gabat, and later they would come back to the scene of
the incident. However, while the Kombi was speeding along Dewey Boulevard, it was blocked by the taxi of
Prudencio Castillo and a jeep driven by policemen. Gabat and Ligon were brought to police headquarters, but
neither of them executed any written statement. 13
The trial court gave full credence to the prosecution's version, stating that there can be no doubt that Gabat
forcibly took or grabbed the cigarette box from Rosales because, otherwise, there could be no reason for the
latter to run after the Kombi and hang on to its window. The court also believed Castillo's testimony that Gabat
forcibly removed or pried off the right hand of Rosales from the windowsill of the Kombi, otherwise, the latter
could not have fallen down, having already been able to balance himself on the stepboard.
On the other hand, the trial court dismissed as incredible the testimony of Gabat that the cigarette vendor
placed the cigarette box on the windowsill of the Kombi, holding it with his left hand, while he was trying to
get from his pocket the change for the 5-peso bill of Gabat. The court said that it is of common knowledge that
cigarette vendors plying their trade in the streets do not let go of their cigarette box; no vendor lets go of his
precious box of cigarettes in order to change a peso bin given by a customer.
As a rule, the findings of fact of the trial court are accorded great respect and are not disturbed on appeal,
unless it is shows that the findings are not supported by the evidence, or the court failed to consider certain
material facts and circumstances in its evaluation of the evidence. In the case at bar, a careful review of the
record shows that certain material facts and circumstances had been overlooked by the trial court which, if
taken into account, would alter the result of the case in that they would introduce an element of reasonable
doubt which would entitle the accused to acquittal.
While the prosecution witness, Castillo, may be a disinterested witness with no motive, according to the
court a quo, "other than to see that justice be done," his testimony, even if not tainted with bias, is not entirely
free from doubt because his observation of the event could have been faulty or mistaken. The taxicab which

Castillo was driving was lower in height compared to the Kombi in which Gabat was riding-a fact admitted by
Castillo at the trial.14 Judicial notice may also be taken of the fact that the rear windshield of the 1978
Volkswagen Kombi is on the upper portion, occupying approximately one-third (1/3) of the rear end of the
vehicle, thus making it visually difficult for Castillo to observe clearly what transpired inside the Kombi at the
front end where Gabat was seated. These are circumstances which must be taken into consideration in
evaluating Castillo's testimony as to what exactly happened between Gabat and the cigarette vendor during that
crucial moment before the latter fell down. As the taxicab was right behind the Kombi, following it at a
distance of about three meters, Castillo's line of vision was partially obstructed by the back part of the Kombi.
His testimony that he saw Gabat grab the cigarette box from Rosales and forcibly pry loose the latter's hand
from the windowsill of the Kombi is thus subject to a reasonable doubt, specially considering that this
occurrence happened in just a matter of seconds, and both vehicles during that time were moving fast in the
traffic.
We find it significant that in his statement given to the police that very evening, 15 Castillo did not mention that
he saw Gabat forcibly prying off the hand of Rosales from the windowsill of the Kombi, although the police
report prepared by the investigating officer, Pfc. Fermin M. Payuan, on the same date, stated that when the
traffic signal changed to green and the driver stepped on the gas, the cigarette box of the cigarette vendor
(Rosales) was grabbed by the passenger Gabat and "instantly the former clung to the door and was dragged at a
distance while at the same time the latter punched the vendor's arm until the same (sic) fell to the pavement,"
thus showing that during the police investigation Castillo must have given a statement to the police which
indicated that Gabat did something to cause Rosales to fall from the Kombi. 16 It was by way of a
supplementary affidavit prepared by the lawyer of the complainant and sworn to by Castillo before the
Assistant City Fiscal on January 17, 1984 that this vital detail was added. This supplementary affidavit was
made the basis for filing another information charging both Gabat and the driver with the crime of Robbery
with Homicide.
Considering the above circumstances, the Court is not convinced with moral certainty that the guilt of the
accused Fernando Gabat has been established beyond reasonable doubt. In our view, the quantum of proof
necessary to sustain Gabat's conviction of so serious a crime as robbery with homicide has not been met in this
case. He is therefore entitled to acquittal on reasonable doubt.
However, it does not follow that a person who is not criminally liable is also free from civil
liability.1avvphi1 While the guilt of the accused in a criminal prosecution must be established beyond
reasonable doubt, only a preponderance of evidence is required in a civil action for damages. 17 The judgment
of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when it includes a declaration that the facts from
which the civil liability might arise did not exist.18
The reason for the provisions of Article 29 of the Civil Code, which provides that the acquittal of the accused
on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt does not necessarily exempt him
from civil liability for the same act or omission, has been explained by the Code Commission as follows:
44
The old rule that the acquittal of the accused in a criminal case also releases him from civil liability is
one of the most serious flaws in the Philippine legal system. It has given rise to numberless instances
of miscarriage of justice, where the acquittal was due to a reasonable doubt in the mind of the court as
to the guilt of the accused. The reasoning followed is that inasmuch as the civil responsibility is
derived from the criminal offense, when the latter is not proved, civil liability cannot be demanded.
This is one of those cases where confused thinking leads to unfortunate and deplorable consequences.
Such reasoning fails to draw a clear line of demarcation between criminal liability and civil
responsibility, and to determine the logical result of the distinction. The two liabilities are separate
and distinct from each other. One affects the social order and the other, private rights. One is for the
punishment or correction of the offender while the other is for reparation of damages suffered by the
aggrieved party. The two responsibilities are so different from each other that article 1813 of the
present (Spanish) Civil Code reads thus: "There may be a compromise upon the civil action arising
from a crime; but the public action for the imposition of the legal penalty shall not thereby be
extinguished." It is just and proper that, for the purposes of the imprisonment of or fine upon the
accused, the offense should be proved beyond reasonable doubt. But for the purpose of indemnifying
the complaining party, why should the offense also be proved beyond reasonable doubt? Is not the
invasion or violation of every private right to be proved only by a preponderance of evidence? Is the
right of the aggrieved person any less private because the wrongful act is also punishable by the
criminal law?
For these reasons, the Commission recommends the adoption of the reform under discussion. It will
correct a serious defect in our law. It will close up an inexhaustible source of injustice a cause for
disillusionment on the part of the innumerable persons injured or wronged. 19
In the instant case, we find that a preponderance of evidence exists sufficient to establish the facts from which
the civil liability of Gabat arises. On the basis of the trial court's evaluation of the testimonies of both
prosecution and defense witnesses at the trial and applying the quantum of proof required in civil cases, we
find that a preponderance of evidence establishes that Gabat by his act and omission with fault and negligence
caused damage to Rosales and should answer civilly for the damage done. Gabat's wilfull act of calling
Rosales, the cigarette vendor, to the middle of a busy street to buy two sticks of cigarettes set the chain of
events which led to the death of Rosales. Through fault and negligence, Gabat (1) failed to prevent the driver
from moving forward while the purchase was completed; (2) failed to help Rosales while the latter clung
precariously to the moving vehicle, and (3) did not enforce his order to the driver to stop. Finally, Gabat
acquiesced in the driver's act of speeding away, instead of stopping and picking up the injured victim. These
proven facts taken together are firm bases for finding Gabat civilly liable under the Civil Code 20 for the
damage done to Rosales.
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered acquitting the appellant Gabat for the crime of Robbery with Homicide.
However, he is hereby held civilly liable for his acts and omissions, there being fault or negligence, and
sentenced to indemnify the heirs of Jose Rosales y Ortiz in the amount of P15.000.00 for the latter's death,
P1,733.35 for hospital and medical expenses, and P4,100.00 for funeral expenses. The alleged loss of income
amounting to P20,000.00, not being supported by sufficient evidence, is DENIED. Costs de officio.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-12191 October 14, 1918
JOSE CANGCO, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
MANILA RAILROAD CO., defendant-appellee.
FISHER, J.:
At the time of the occurrence which gave rise to this litigation the plaintiff, Jose Cangco, was in the
employment of Manila Railroad Company in the capacity of clerk, with a monthly wage of P25. He lived in
the pueblo of San Mateo, in the province of Rizal, which is located upon the line of the defendant railroad
company; and in coming daily by train to the company's office in the city of Manila where he worked, he used
a pass, supplied by the company, which entitled him to ride upon the company's trains free of charge. Upon the
occasion in question, January 20, 1915, the plaintiff arose from his seat in the second class-car where he was
riding and, making, his exit through the door, took his position upon the steps of the coach, seizing the upright
guardrail with his right hand for support.
On the side of the train where passengers alight at the San Mateo station there is a cement platform which
begins to rise with a moderate gradient some distance away from the company's office and extends along in
front of said office for a distance sufficient to cover the length of several coaches. As the train slowed down
another passenger, named Emilio Zuiga, also an employee of the railroad company, got off the same car,
alighting safely at the point where the platform begins to rise from the level of the ground. When the train had
proceeded a little farther the plaintiff Jose Cangco stepped off also, but one or both of his feet came in contact
with a sack of watermelons with the result that his feet slipped from under him and he fell violently on the
platform. His body at once rolled from the platform and was drawn under the moving car, where his right arm
was badly crushed and lacerated. It appears that after the plaintiff alighted from the train the car moved
forward possibly six meters before it came to a full stop.
The accident occurred between 7 and 8 o'clock on a dark night, and as the railroad station was lighted dimly by
a single light located some distance away, objects on the platform where the accident occurred were difficult to
discern especially to a person emerging from a lighted car.
The explanation of the presence of a sack of melons on the platform where the plaintiff alighted is found in the
fact that it was the customary season for harvesting these melons and a large lot had been brought to the station
for the shipment to the market. They were contained in numerous sacks which has been piled on the platform
in a row one upon another. The testimony shows that this row of sacks was so placed of melons and the edge of
platform; and it is clear that the fall of the plaintiff was due to the fact that his foot alighted upon one of these
45
melons at the moment he stepped upon the platform. His statement that he failed to see these objects in the
darkness is readily to be credited.
The plaintiff was drawn from under the car in an unconscious condition, and it appeared that the injuries which
he had received were very serious. He was therefore brought at once to a certain hospital in the city of Manila
where an examination was made and his arm was amputated. The result of this operation was unsatisfactory,
and the plaintiff was then carried to another hospital where a second operation was performed and the member
was again amputated higher up near the shoulder. It appears in evidence that the plaintiff expended the sum of
P790.25 in the form of medical and surgical fees and for other expenses in connection with the process of his
curation.
Upon August 31, 1915, he instituted this proceeding in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila to
recover damages of the defendant company, founding his action upon the negligence of the servants and
employees of the defendant in placing the sacks of melons upon the platform and leaving them so placed as to
be a menace to the security of passenger alighting from the company's trains. At the hearing in the Court of
First Instance, his Honor, the trial judge, found the facts substantially as above stated, and drew therefrom his
conclusion to the effect that, although negligence was attributable to the defendant by reason of the fact that the
sacks of melons were so placed as to obstruct passengers passing to and from the cars, nevertheless, the
plaintiff himself had failed to use due caution in alighting from the coach and was therefore precluded form
recovering. Judgment was accordingly entered in favor of the defendant company, and the plaintiff appealed.
It can not be doubted that the employees of the railroad company were guilty of negligence in piling these
sacks on the platform in the manner above stated; that their presence caused the plaintiff to fall as he alighted
from the train; and that they therefore constituted an effective legal cause of the injuries sustained by the
plaintiff. It necessarily follows that the defendant company is liable for the damage thereby occasioned unless
recovery is barred by the plaintiff's own contributory negligence. In resolving this problem it is necessary that
each of these conceptions of liability, to-wit, the primary responsibility of the defendant company and the
contributory negligence of the plaintiff should be separately examined.
It is important to note that the foundation of the legal liability of the defendant is the contract of carriage, and
that the obligation to respond for the damage which plaintiff has suffered arises, if at all, from the breach of
that contract by reason of the failure of defendant to exercise due care in its performance. That is to say, its
liability is direct and immediate, differing essentially, in legal viewpoint from that presumptive responsibility
for the negligence of its servants, imposed by article 1903 of the Civil Code, which can be rebutted by proof of
the exercise of due care in their selection and supervision. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to
obligations arising ex contractu, but only to extra-contractual obligations or to use the technical form of
expression, that article relates only to culpa aquiliana and not to culpa contractual.
Manresa (vol. 8, p. 67) in his commentaries upon articles 1103 and 1104 of the Civil Code, clearly points out
this distinction, which was also recognized by this Court in its decision in the case of Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf
and Pacific Co. (7 Phil. rep., 359). In commenting upon article 1093 Manresa clearly points out the difference
between "culpa, substantive and independent, which of itself constitutes the source of an obligation between

persons not formerly connected by any legal tie" and culpa considered as an accident in the performance of an
obligation already existing . . . ."
In the Rakes case (supra) the decision of this court was made to rest squarely upon the proposition that article
1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to acts of negligence which constitute the breach of a contract.
Upon this point the Court said:
The acts to which these articles [1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code] are applicable are understood to be
those not growing out of pre-existing duties of the parties to one another. But where relations already
formed give rise to duties, whether springing from contract or quasi-contract, then breaches of those
duties are subject to article 1101, 1103, and 1104 of the same code. (Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf and
Pacific Co., 7 Phil. Rep., 359 at 365.)
This distinction is of the utmost importance. The liability, which, under the Spanish law, is, in certain cases
imposed upon employers with respect to damages occasioned by the negligence of their employees to persons
to whom they are not bound by contract, is not based, as in the English Common Law, upon the principle
of respondeat superior if it were, the master would be liable in every case and unconditionally but upon
the principle announced in article 1902 of the Civil Code, which imposes upon all persons who by their fault or
negligence, do injury to another, the obligation of making good the damage caused. One who places a powerful
automobile in the hands of a servant whom he knows to be ignorant of the method of managing such a vehicle,
is himself guilty of an act of negligence which makes him liable for all the consequences of his imprudence.
The obligation to make good the damage arises at the very instant that the unskillful servant, while acting
within the scope of his employment causes the injury. The liability of the master is personal and direct. But, if
the master has not been guilty of any negligence whatever in the selection and direction of the servant, he is
not liable for the acts of the latter, whatever done within the scope of his employment or not, if the damage
done by the servant does not amount to a breach of the contract between the master and the person injured.
It is not accurate to say that proof of diligence and care in the selection and control of the servant relieves the
master from liability for the latter's acts on the contrary, that proof shows that the responsibility has never
existed. As Manresa says (vol. 8, p. 68) the liability arising from extra-contractual culpa is always based upon
a voluntary act or omission which, without willful intent, but by mere negligence or inattention, has caused
damage to another. A master who exercises all possible care in the selection of his servant, taking into
consideration the qualifications they should possess for the discharge of the duties which it is his purpose to
confide to them, and directs them with equal diligence, thereby performs his duty to third persons to whom he
is bound by no contractual ties, and he incurs no liability whatever if, by reason of the negligence of his
servants, even within the scope of their employment, such third person suffer damage. True it is that under
article 1903 of the Civil Code the law creates a presumption that he has been negligent in the selection or
direction of his servant, but the presumption is rebuttable and yield to proof of due care and diligence in this
respect.
46
The supreme court of Porto Rico, in interpreting identical provisions, as found in the Porto Rico Code, has held
that these articles are applicable to cases of extra-contractual culpa exclusively. (Carmona vs. Cuesta, 20 Porto
Rico Reports, 215.)
This distinction was again made patent by this Court in its decision in the case of Bahia vs. Litonjua and
Leynes, (30 Phil. rep., 624), which was an action brought upon the theory of the extra-contractual liability of
the defendant to respond for the damage caused by the carelessness of his employee while acting within the
scope of his employment. The Court, after citing the last paragraph of article 1903 of the Civil Code, said:
From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by the negligence of a
servant or employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part
of the master or employer either in selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision over him
after the selection, or both; and (2) that that presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure, and
consequently, may be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the employer shows to the satisfaction of
the court that in selection and supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father of
a family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieved from liability.
This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately on his own negligence and not on that of
his servant. This is the notable peculiarity of the Spanish law of negligence. It is, of course, in striking
contrast to the American doctrine that, in relations with strangers, the negligence of the servant in
conclusively the negligence of the master.
The opinion there expressed by this Court, to the effect that in case of extra-contractual culpa based upon
negligence, it is necessary that there shall have been some fault attributable to the defendant personally, and
that the last paragraph of article 1903 merely establishes a rebuttable presumption, is in complete accord with
the authoritative opinion of Manresa, who says (vol. 12, p. 611) that the liability created by article 1903 is
imposed by reason of the breach of the duties inherent in the special relations of authority or superiority
existing between the person called upon to repair the damage and the one who, by his act or omission, was the
cause of it.
On the other hand, the liability of masters and employers for the negligent acts or omissions of their servants or
agents, when such acts or omissions cause damages which amount to the breach of a contact, is not based upon
a mere presumption of the master's negligence in their selection or control, and proof of exercise of the utmost
diligence and care in this regard does not relieve the master of his liability for the breach of his contract.
Every legal obligation must of necessity be extra-contractual or contractual. Extra-contractual obligation has its
source in the breach or omission of those mutual duties which civilized society imposes upon it members, or
which arise from these relations, other than contractual, of certain members of society to others, generally
embraced in the concept of status. The legal rights of each member of society constitute the measure of the
corresponding legal duties, mainly negative in character, which the existence of those rights imposes upon all
other members of society. The breach of these general duties whether due to willful intent or to mere
inattention, if productive of injury, give rise to an obligation to indemnify the injured party. The fundamental

distinction between obligations of this character and those which arise from contract, rests upon the fact that in
cases of non-contractual obligation it is the wrongful or negligent act or omission itself which creates
the vinculum juris, whereas in contractual relations the vinculum exists independently of the breach of the
voluntary duty assumed by the parties when entering into the contractual relation.
With respect to extra-contractual obligation arising from negligence, whether of act or omission, it is
competent for the legislature to elect and our Legislature has so elected whom such an obligation is
imposed is morally culpable, or, on the contrary, for reasons of public policy, to extend that liability, without
regard to the lack of moral culpability, so as to include responsibility for the negligence of those person who
acts or mission are imputable, by a legal fiction, to others who are in a position to exercise an absolute or
limited control over them. The legislature which adopted our Civil Code has elected to limit extra-contractual
liability with certain well-defined exceptions to cases in which moral culpability can be directly imputed
to the persons to be charged. This moral responsibility may consist in having failed to exercise due care in the
selection and control of one's agents or servants, or in the control of persons who, by reason of their status,
occupy a position of dependency with respect to the person made liable for their conduct.
The position of a natural or juridical person who has undertaken by contract to render service to another, is
wholly different from that to which article 1903 relates. When the sources of the obligation upon which
plaintiff's cause of action depends is a negligent act or omission, the burden of proof rests upon plaintiff to
prove the negligence if he does not his action fails. But when the facts averred show a contractual
undertaking by defendant for the benefit of plaintiff, and it is alleged that plaintiff has failed or refused to
perform the contract, it is not necessary for plaintiff to specify in his pleadings whether the breach of the
contract is due to willful fault or to negligence on the part of the defendant, or of his servants or agents. Proof
of the contract and of its nonperformance is sufficientprima facie to warrant a recovery.
As a general rule . . . it is logical that in case of extra-contractual culpa, a suing creditor should
assume the burden of proof of its existence, as the only fact upon which his action is based; while on
the contrary, in a case of negligence which presupposes the existence of a contractual obligation, if
the creditor shows that it exists and that it has been broken, it is not necessary for him to prove
negligence. (Manresa, vol. 8, p. 71 [1907 ed., p. 76]).
As it is not necessary for the plaintiff in an action for the breach of a contract to show that the breach was due
to the negligent conduct of defendant or of his servants, even though such be in fact the actual cause of the
breach, it is obvious that proof on the part of defendant that the negligence or omission of his servants or
agents caused the breach of the contract would not constitute a defense to the action. If the negligence of
servants or agents could be invoked as a means of discharging the liability arising from contract, the
anomalous result would be that person acting through the medium of agents or servants in the performance of
their contracts, would be in a better position than those acting in person. If one delivers a valuable watch to
watchmaker who contract to repair it, and the bailee, by a personal negligent act causes its destruction, he is
unquestionably liable. Would it be logical to free him from his liability for the breach of his contract, which
involves the duty to exercise due care in the preservation of the watch, if he shows that it was his servant
whose negligence caused the injury? If such a theory could be accepted, juridical persons would enjoy
practically complete immunity from damages arising from the breach of their contracts if caused by negligent
47
acts as such juridical persons can of necessity only act through agents or servants, and it would no doubt be
true in most instances that reasonable care had been taken in selection and direction of such servants. If one
delivers securities to a banking corporation as collateral, and they are lost by reason of the negligence of some
clerk employed by the bank, would it be just and reasonable to permit the bank to relieve itself of liability for
the breach of its contract to return the collateral upon the payment of the debt by proving that due care had
been exercised in the selection and direction of the clerk?
This distinction between culpa aquiliana, as the source of an obligation, and culpa contractual as a mere
incident to the performance of a contract has frequently been recognized by the supreme court of Spain.
(Sentencias of June 27, 1894; November 20, 1896; and December 13, 1896.) In the decisions of November 20,
1896, it appeared that plaintiff's action arose ex contractu, but that defendant sought to avail himself of the
provisions of article 1902 of the Civil Code as a defense. The Spanish Supreme Court rejected defendant's
contention, saying:
These are not cases of injury caused, without any pre-existing obligation, by fault or negligence, such
as those to which article 1902 of the Civil Code relates, but of damages caused by the defendant's
failure to carry out the undertakings imposed by the contracts . . . .
A brief review of the earlier decision of this court involving the liability of employers for damage done by the
negligent acts of their servants will show that in no case has the court ever decided that the negligence of the
defendant's servants has been held to constitute a defense to an action for damages for breach of contract.
In the case of Johnson vs. David (5 Phil. Rep., 663), the court held that the owner of a carriage was not liable
for the damages caused by the negligence of his driver. In that case the court commented on the fact that no
evidence had been adduced in the trial court that the defendant had been negligent in the employment of the
driver, or that he had any knowledge of his lack of skill or carefulness.
In the case of Baer Senior & Co's Successors vs. Compania Maritima (6 Phil. Rep., 215), the plaintiff sued the
defendant for damages caused by the loss of a barge belonging to plaintiff which was allowed to get adrift by
the negligence of defendant's servants in the course of the performance of a contract of towage. The court held,
citing Manresa (vol. 8, pp. 29, 69) that if the "obligation of the defendant grew out of a contract made between
it and the plaintiff . . . we do not think that the provisions of articles 1902 and 1903 are applicable to the case."
In the case of Chapman vs. Underwood (27 Phil. Rep., 374), plaintiff sued the defendant to recover damages
for the personal injuries caused by the negligence of defendant's chauffeur while driving defendant's
automobile in which defendant was riding at the time. The court found that the damages were caused by the
negligence of the driver of the automobile, but held that the master was not liable, although he was present at
the time, saying:
. . . unless the negligent acts of the driver are continued for a length of time as to give the owner a
reasonable opportunity to observe them and to direct the driver to desist therefrom. . . . The act

complained of must be continued in the presence of the owner for such length of time that the owner
by his acquiescence, makes the driver's acts his own.
In the case of Yamada vs. Manila Railroad Co. and Bachrach Garage & Taxicab Co. (33 Phil. Rep., 8), it is true
that the court rested its conclusion as to the liability of the defendant upon article 1903, although the facts
disclosed that the injury complaint of by plaintiff constituted a breach of the duty to him arising out of the
contract of transportation. The express ground of the decision in this case was that article 1903, in dealing with
the liability of a master for the negligent acts of his servants "makes the distinction between private individuals
and public enterprise;" that as to the latter the law creates a rebuttable presumption of negligence in the
selection or direction of servants; and that in the particular case the presumption of negligence had not been
overcome.
It is evident, therefore that in its decision Yamada case, the court treated plaintiff's action as though founded in
tort rather than as based upon the breach of the contract of carriage, and an examination of the pleadings and of
the briefs shows that the questions of law were in fact discussed upon this theory. Viewed from the standpoint
of the defendant the practical result must have been the same in any event. The proof disclosed beyond doubt
that the defendant's servant was grossly negligent and that his negligence was the proximate cause of plaintiff's
injury. It also affirmatively appeared that defendant had been guilty of negligence in its failure to exercise
proper discretion in the direction of the servant. Defendant was, therefore, liable for the injury suffered by
plaintiff, whether the breach of the duty were to be regarded as constituting culpa aquiliana or culpa
contractual. As Manresa points out (vol. 8, pp. 29 and 69) whether negligence occurs an incident in the course
of the performance of a contractual undertaking or its itself the source of an extra-contractual undertaking
obligation, its essential characteristics are identical. There is always an act or omission productive of damage
due to carelessness or inattention on the part of the defendant. Consequently, when the court holds that a
defendant is liable in damages for having failed to exercise due care, either directly, or in failing to exercise
proper care in the selection and direction of his servants, the practical result is identical in either case.
Therefore, it follows that it is not to be inferred, because the court held in the Yamada case that defendant was
liable for the damages negligently caused by its servants to a person to whom it was bound by contract, and
made reference to the fact that the defendant was negligent in the selection and control of its servants, that in
such a case the court would have held that it would have been a good defense to the action, if presented
squarely upon the theory of the breach of the contract, for defendant to have proved that it did in fact exercise
care in the selection and control of the servant.
The true explanation of such cases is to be found by directing the attention to the relative spheres of contractual
and extra-contractual obligations. The field of non- contractual obligation is much more broader than that of
contractual obligations, comprising, as it does, the whole extent of juridical human relations. These two fields,
figuratively speaking, concentric; that is to say, the mere fact that a person is bound to another by contract does
not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such person. When such a contractual relation exists the
obligor may break the contract under such conditions that the same act which constitutes the source of an
extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed between the parties.
The contract of defendant to transport plaintiff carried with it, by implication, the duty to carry him in safety
and to provide safe means of entering and leaving its trains (civil code, article 1258). That duty, being
48
contractual, was direct and immediate, and its non-performance could not be excused by proof that the fault
was morally imputable to defendant's servants.
The railroad company's defense involves the assumption that even granting that the negligent conduct of its
servants in placing an obstruction upon the platform was a breach of its contractual obligation to maintain safe
means of approaching and leaving its trains, the direct and proximate cause of the injury suffered by plaintiff
was his own contributory negligence in failing to wait until the train had come to a complete stop before
alighting. Under the doctrine of comparative negligence announced in the Rakes case (supra), if the accident
was caused by plaintiff's own negligence, no liability is imposed upon defendant's negligence and plaintiff's
negligence merely contributed to his injury, the damages should be apportioned. It is, therefore, important to
ascertain if defendant was in fact guilty of negligence.
It may be admitted that had plaintiff waited until the train had come to a full stop before alighting, the
particular injury suffered by him could not have occurred. Defendant contends, and cites many authorities in
support of the contention, that it is negligence per se for a passenger to alight from a moving train. We are not
disposed to subscribe to this doctrine in its absolute form. We are of the opinion that this proposition is too
badly stated and is at variance with the experience of every-day life. In this particular instance, that the train
was barely moving when plaintiff alighted is shown conclusively by the fact that it came to stop within six
meters from the place where he stepped from it. Thousands of person alight from trains under these conditions
every day of the year, and sustain no injury where the company has kept its platform free from dangerous
obstructions. There is no reason to believe that plaintiff would have suffered any injury whatever in alighting
as he did had it not been for defendant's negligent failure to perform its duty to provide a safe alighting place.
We are of the opinion that the correct doctrine relating to this subject is that expressed in Thompson's work on
Negligence (vol. 3, sec. 3010) as follows:
The test by which to determine whether the passenger has been guilty of negligence in attempting to
alight from a moving railway train, is that of ordinary or reasonable care. It is to be considered
whether an ordinarily prudent person, of the age, sex and condition of the passenger, would have
acted as the passenger acted under the circumstances disclosed by the evidence. This care has been
defined to be, not the care which may or should be used by the prudent man generally, but the care
which a man of ordinary prudence would use under similar circumstances, to avoid injury."
(Thompson, Commentaries on Negligence, vol. 3, sec. 3010.)
Or, it we prefer to adopt the mode of exposition used by this court in Picart vs. Smith (37 Phil. rep., 809), we
may say that the test is this; Was there anything in the circumstances surrounding the plaintiff at the time he
alighted from the train which would have admonished a person of average prudence that to get off the train
under the conditions then existing was dangerous? If so, the plaintiff should have desisted from alighting; and
his failure so to desist was contributory negligence.1awph!l.net
As the case now before us presents itself, the only fact from which a conclusion can be drawn to the effect that
plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence is that he stepped off the car without being able to discern

clearly the condition of the platform and while the train was yet slowly moving. In considering the situation
thus presented, it should not be overlooked that the plaintiff was, as we find, ignorant of the fact that the
obstruction which was caused by the sacks of melons piled on the platform existed; and as the defendant was
bound by reason of its duty as a public carrier to afford to its passengers facilities for safe egress from its
trains, the plaintiff had a right to assume, in the absence of some circumstance to warn him to the contrary, that
the platform was clear. The place, as we have already stated, was dark, or dimly lighted, and this also is proof
of a failure upon the part of the defendant in the performance of a duty owing by it to the plaintiff; for if it were
by any possibility concede that it had right to pile these sacks in the path of alighting passengers, the placing of
them adequately so that their presence would be revealed.
As pertinent to the question of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff in this case the following
circumstances are to be noted: The company's platform was constructed upon a level higher than that of the
roadbed and the surrounding ground. The distance from the steps of the car to the spot where the alighting
passenger would place his feet on the platform was thus reduced, thereby decreasing the risk incident to
stepping off. The nature of the platform, constructed as it was of cement material, also assured to the passenger
a stable and even surface on which to alight. Furthermore, the plaintiff was possessed of the vigor and agility
of young manhood, and it was by no means so risky for him to get off while the train was yet moving as the
same act would have been in an aged or feeble person. In determining the question of contributory negligence
in performing such act that is to say, whether the passenger acted prudently or recklessly the age, sex,
and physical condition of the passenger are circumstances necessarily affecting the safety of the passenger, and
should be considered. Women, it has been observed, as a general rule are less capable than men of alighting
with safety under such conditions, as the nature of their wearing apparel obstructs the free movement of the
limbs. Again, it may be noted that the place was perfectly familiar to the plaintiff as it was his daily custom to
get on and of the train at this station. There could, therefore, be no uncertainty in his mind with regard either to
the length of the step which he was required to take or the character of the platform where he was alighting.
Our conclusion is that the conduct of the plaintiff in undertaking to alight while the train was yet slightly under
way was not characterized by imprudence and that therefore he was not guilty of contributory negligence.
The evidence shows that the plaintiff, at the time of the accident, was earning P25 a month as a copyist clerk,
and that the injuries he has suffered have permanently disabled him from continuing that employment.
Defendant has not shown that any other gainful occupation is open to plaintiff. His expectancy of life,
according to the standard mortality tables, is approximately thirty-three years. We are of the opinion that a fair
compensation for the damage suffered by him for his permanent disability is the sum of P2,500, and that he is
also entitled to recover of defendant the additional sum of P790.25 for medical attention, hospital services, and
other incidental expenditures connected with the treatment of his injuries.
The decision of lower court is reversed, and judgment is hereby rendered plaintiff for the sum of P3,290.25,
and for the costs of both instances. So ordered.
49
G.R. No. L-12163 March 4, 1959
PAZ FORES, petitioner,
vs.
IRENEO MIRANDA, respondent.
.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Defendant-petitioner Paz Fores brings this petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals (C.A.
Case No. 1437-R) awarding to the plaintiff-respondent Ireneo Miranda the sums of P5,000 by way of actual
damages and counsel fees, and P10,000 as moral damages, with costs.
Respondent was one of the passengers on a jeepney driven by Eugenio Luga. While the vehicle was
descending the Sta. Mesa bridge at an excessive rate of speed, the driver lost control thereof, causing it to
swerve and to his the bridge wall. The accident occurred on the morning of March 22, 1953. Five of the
passengers were injured, including the respondent who suffered a fracture of the upper right humerus. He was
taken to the National Orthopedic Hospital for treatment, and later was subjected to a series of operations; the
first on May 23, 1953, when wire loops were wound around the broken bones and screwed into place; a
second, effected to insert a metal splint, and a third one to remove such splint. At the time of the trial, it
appears that respondent had not yet recovered the use of his right arm.
The driver was charged with serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence, and upon interposing a
plea of guilty was sentenced accordingly.
The contention that the evidence did not sufficiently establish the identity of the vehicle as the belonging to the
petitioner was rejected by the appellate court which found, among other things, that is carried plate No. TPU-
1163, SERIES OF 1952, Quezon City, registered in the name of Paz Fores, (appellant herein) and that the
vehicle even had the name of "Doa Paz" painted below its wind shield. No evidence to the contrary was
introduced by the petitioner, who relied on an attack upon the credibility of the two policemen who went to the
scene of the incident.
A point to be further remarked is petitioner's contention that on March 21, 1953, or one day before the accident
happened, she allegedly sold the passenger jeep that was involved therein to a certain Carmen Sackerman.
The initial problem raised by the petitioner in this appeal may be formulated thus "Is the approval of the
Public Service Commission necessary for the sale of a public service vehicle even without conveying therewith

the authority to operate the same?" Assuming the dubious sale to be a fact, the court of Appeals answered the
query in the affirmative. The ruling should be upheld.
Section 20 of the Public Service Act (Commonwealth Act No. 146) provides:
Sec. 20. Subject to established limitations and exceptions and saving provisions to the
contrary, it shall be unlawful for any public service or for the owner, lessee or operator
thereof, without the previous approval and authority of the Commission previously had
xxx xxx xxx
(g) To sell, alienate, mortgage, encumber or lease its property, franchises, certificates,
privileges, or rights, or any part thereof; or merge or consolidate its property, franchises,
privileges or rights, or any part thereof, with those of any other public service. The approval
herein required shall be given, after notice to the public and after hearing the persons
interested at a public hearing, if it be shown that there are just and reasonable grounds for
making the mortgage or encumbrance, for liabilities of more than one year maturity, or the
sale, alienation, lease, merger, or consolidation to be approved and that the same are not
detrimental to the public interest, and in case of a sale, the date on which the same is to be
consummated shall be fixed in the order of approval: Provided, however, That nothing
herein contained shall be construed to prevent the transaction from being negotiated or
completed before its approval or to prevent the sale, alienation, or lease by any public
service of any of its property in the ordinary course of its business.
Interpreting the effects of this particular provision of law, we have held in the recent cases of Montoya vs.
Ignacio, * 50 Off. Gaz. No. 1, p. 108; Timbol vs. Osias, et al., G. R. No. L-7547, April 30, 1955, and Medina
vs. Cresencia, 99 Phil., 506; 52 Off. Gaz. No. 10, p. 4606, that a transfer contemplated by the law, if made
without the requisite approval of the Public Service Commission, is not effective and binding in so far as the
responsibility of the grantee under the franchise in relation to the public is concerned. Petitioner assails,
however, the applicability of these rulings to the instant case, contending that in those cases, the operator did
not convey, by lease or by sale, the vehicle independently of his rights under the franchise. This line of
reasoning does not find support in the law. The provisions of the statute are clear and prohibit the sale,
alienation, lease, or encumbrance of the property, franchise, certificate, privileges or rights, or any part thereof
of the owner or operator of the public service Commission. The law was designed primarily for the protection
of the public interest; and until the approval of the public Service Commission is obtained the vehicle is, in
contemplation of law, still under the service of the owner or operator standing in the records of the
Commission which the public has a right to rely upon.
The proviso contained in the aforequoted law, to the effect that nothing therein shall be construed "to prevent
the transaction from being negotiated or complete before its approval", means only that the sale without the
required approval is still valid and binding between the parties (Montoya vs. Ignacio, supra). The phrase "in
the ordinary course of its business" found in the other proviso" or to prevent the sale, alienation, or lease by
50
any public service of any of its property". As correctly observed by the lower court, could not have been
intended to include the sale of the vehicle itself, but at most may refer only to such property that may be
conceivably disposed or by the carrier in the ordinary course of its business, like junked equipment or spare
parts.
The case of Indalecio de Torres vs. Vicente Ona (63 Phil., 594, 597) is enlightening; and there, it was held:
Under the law, the Public Service Commission has not only general supervision and
regulation of, but also full jurisdiction and control over all public utilities including the
property, equipment and facilities used, and the property rights and franchise enjoyed by
every individual and company engaged i the performance of a public service in the sense
this phrase is used in the Public Service Act or Act No. 3108). By virtue of the provisions of
said Act, motor vehicles used in the performance of a service, as the transportation of
freightfrom one point to another, have to this date been considered and they cannot but
be so considered-public service property; and, by reason of its own nature, a TH truck,
which means that the operator thereof places it at the disposal of anybody who is willing to
pay a rental of its use, when he desires to transfer or carry his effects, merchandise or any
other cargo from one place to another, is necessarily a public service property. (Emphasis
supplied)
Of course, this court has held in the case of Bachrach Motor co. vs. Zamboanga Transportation Co., 52 Phil.,
244, that there may be a nunc pro tunc authorization which has the effect of having the approval retroact to the
date of the transfer; but such outcome cannot prejudice rights intervening in the meantime. It appears that no
such approval was given by the Commission before the accident occurred.
The P10,000 actual damages awarded by the Court of First Instance of Manila were reduced by the Court of
Appeals to only P2,000, on the ground that a review of the records failed to disclose a sufficient basis for the
trial court's appraisal, since the only evidence presented on this point consisted of respondent's bare statement
that his expenses and loss of income amounted to P20,000. On the other hand, "it cannot be denied," the lower
court said, "that appellee (respondent) did incur expenses"' It is well to note further that respondent was a
painter by profession and a professor of Fine Arts, so that the amount of P2,000 awarded cannot be said to be
excessive (see Arts. 2224 and 2225, Civil Code of the Philippines). The attorney's fees in the sum of P3,000
also awarded to the respondent are assailed on the ground that the Court of First Instance did not provided for
the same, and since no appeal was interposed by said respondent, it was allegedly error for the Court of
Appeals to award them motu proprio. Petitioner fails to note that attorney's fees are included in the concept of
actual damages under the Civil Code and may be awarded whenever the court deems it is just and equitable
(Art. 2208, Civil Code of the Philippines). We see no reason to alter these awards.
Anent the moral damages ordered to be paid to the respondent, the same must be discarded. We have
repeatedly ruled (Cachero vs. Manila Yellow Taxicab Co. Inc., 101 Phil., 523; 54 Off. Gaz., [26], 6599;
Necesito, et al vs. Paras, 104 Phil., 75; 56 Off. Gaz., [23] 4023, that moral damages are not recoverable in
 51

damage actions predicted on a breach of the contract of transportation, in view of Articles 2219 and 2220 of the The Court of Appeals has invoked our rulings in Castro vs. Acro Taxicab Co., G.R. No. 49155, December 14,
new Civil Code, which provide as follows: 1948 and Layda vs. Court of Appeals, 90 Phil., 724; but these doctrines were predicated upon our former law
of damages, before judicial discretion in fixing them became limited by the express provisions of the new Civil
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases: Code (previously quoted). Hence, the aforesaid rulings are now inapplicable.

(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries; Upon the other hand, the advantageous position of a party suing a carrier for breach of the contract of
transportations explains, to some extent, the limitations imposed by the new Code on the amount of the
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries; recovery. The action for breach of contract imposes on the defendant carrier a presumption of liability upon
mere proof of injury to the passenger; that latter is relieved from the duty to established the fault of the carrier,
xxx xxx xxx or of his employees, and the burden is placed on the carrier to prove that it was due to an unforseen event or
to force majeure (Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co., 38 Phil., 768, 777). Moreover, the carrier, unlike in suits for
quasi-delict, may not escape liability by proving that it has exercised due diligence in the selection and
Art. 2220. Willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if
supervision of its employees (Art. 1759, new civil code; Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co., supra; Prado vs.
the court should find that, under circumstances, such damages are justify due. The same rule
Manila Electric Co., 51 Phil., 900).
applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith.

The difference in conditions, defenses and proof, as well as the codal concept of quasi-delict as
By contrasting the provisions of these two article it immediately becomes apparent that:
essentially extracontractual negligence, compel us to differentiate between action ex contractu, and
actions quasi ex delicto, and prevent us from viewing the action for breach of contract as simultaneously
(a) In case of breach of contract (including one of transportation) proof of bad faith or fraud (dolus), i.e.,
embodying an action on tort. Neither can this action be taken as one to enforce on employee's liability under
wanton or deliberately injurious conduct, is essential to justify an award of moral damages; and
Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code, since the responsibility is not alleged to be subsidiary, nor is there on
record any averment or proof that the driver of appellant was insolvent. In fact, he is not even made a party to
(b) That a breach of contract can not be considered included in the descriptive term "analogous cases" used in the suit.
Art. 2219; not only because Art. 2220 specifically provides for the damages that are caused by contractual
breach, but because the definition of quasi-delict in Art. 2176 of the Code expressly excludes the cases where
It is also suggested that a carrier's violation of its engagement to safety transport the passenger involves a
there is a "preexisting contractual relation between the parties."
breach of the passenger's confidence, and therefore should be regarded as a breach of contract in bad faith,
justifying recovery of moral damages under Art. 2220. This theory is untenable, for under it the carrier would
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or always be deemed in bad faith, in every case its obligation to the passenger is infringed, and it would be never
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage dome. Such fault or negligence, if there is no accountable for simple negligence; while under the law (Art. 1756). the presumption is that common carriers
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed acted negligently(and not maliciously), and Art. 1762 speaks of negligence of the common carrier.
by the provisions of this Chapter.
ART. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to
The exception to the basic rule of damages now under consideration is a mishap resulting in the death of a have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed
passenger, in which case Article 1764 makes the common carrier expressly subject to the rule of Art. 2206, that extraordinary diligence as prescribed in article 1733 and 1755.
entitles the deceased passenger to "demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the
deceased" (Necesito vs. Paras, 104 Phil., 84, Resolution on motion to reconsider, September 11, 1958). But the
ART. 1762. The contributory negligence of the passenger does not bar recovery of damages
exceptional rule of Art. 1764 makes it all the more evident that where the injured passenger does not die, moral
for his death or injuries, if the proximate cause thereof is the negligence of the common
damages are not recoverable unless it is proved that the carrier was guilty of malice or bad faith. We think it is
carrier, but the amount of damages shall be equitably reduced.
clear that the mere carelessness of the carrier's driver does not per se constitute of justify an inference of
malice or bad faith on the part of the carrier; and in the case at bar there is no other evidence of such malice to
The distinction between fraud, bad faith or malice in the sense of deliberate or wanton wrong doing and
support the award of moral damages by the Court of Appeals. To award moral damages for breach of contract,
negligence (as mere carelessness) is too fundamental in our law to be ignored (Arts. 1170-1172); their
therefore, without proof of bad faith or malice on the part of the defendant, as required by Art. 220, would be
consequences being clearly differentiated by the Code.
to violate the clear provisions of the law, and constitute unwarranted judicial legislation.

ART. 2201. In contracts and quasi-contracts, the damages for which the obligor who acted
in good faith is liable shall be those that are the natural and probable consequences of the
breach of the obligation, and which the parties have foreseen or could have reasonably
foreseen at the time the obligation was constituted.
In case of fraud, bad faith, malice or wanton attitude, the obligor shall be responsible for all
damages which may be reasonably attributed to the non-performance of the obligation.
It is to be presumed, in the absence of statutory provision to the contrary, that this difference was in the mind of
the lawmakers when in Art. 2220 they limited recovery of moral damages to breaches of contract in bad faith.
It is true that negligence may be occasionally so gross as to amount to malice; but that fact must be shown in
evidence, and a carrier's bad faith is not to be lightly inferred from a mere finding that the contract was
breached through negligence of the carrier's employees.
In view of the foregoing considerations, the decision of the Court of Appeals is modified by eliminating the
award of P5,000.00 by way of moral damages. (Court of Appeals Resolution of May 5, 1957). In all other
respects, the judgment is affirmed. No costs in this instance. So ordered.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion and Endencia,
JJ.,concur.
52
G.R. No. L-21438 September 28, 1966
AIR FRANCE, petitioner,
vs.
RAFAEL CARRASCOSO and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
SANCHEZ, J.:
The Court of First Instance of Manila 1 sentenced petitioner to pay respondent Rafael Carrascoso P25,000.00 by
way of moral damages; P10,000.00 as exemplary damages; P393.20 representing the difference in fare
between first class and tourist class for the portion of the trip Bangkok-Rome, these various amounts with
interest at the legal rate, from the date of the filing of the complaint until paid; plus P3,000.00 for attorneys'
fees; and the costs of suit.
On appeal,2 the Court of Appeals slightly reduced the amount of refund on Carrascoso's plane ticket from
P393.20 to P383.10, and voted to affirm the appealed decision "in all other respects", with costs against
petitioner.
The case is now before us for review on certiorari.
The facts declared by the Court of Appeals as " fully supported by the evidence of record", are:
Plaintiff, a civil engineer, was a member of a group of 48 Filipino pilgrims that left Manila for
Lourdes on March 30, 1958.
On March 28, 1958, the defendant, Air France, through its authorized agent, Philippine Air Lines,
Inc., issued to plaintiff a "first class" round trip airplane ticket from Manila to Rome. From Manila to
Bangkok, plaintiff travelled in "first class", but at Bangkok, the Manager of the defendant airline
forced plaintiff to vacate the "first class" seat that he was occupying because, in the words of the
witness Ernesto G. Cuento, there was a "white man", who, the Manager alleged, had a "better right"
to the seat. When asked to vacate his "first class" seat, the plaintiff, as was to be expected, refused,
and told defendant's Manager that his seat would be taken over his dead body; a commotion ensued,
and, according to said Ernesto G. Cuento, "many of the Filipino passengers got nervous in the tourist
class; when they found out that Mr. Carrascoso was having a hot discussion with the white man

[manager], they came all across to Mr. Carrascoso and pacified Mr. Carrascoso to give his seat to the
white man" (Transcript, p. 12, Hearing of May 26, 1959); and plaintiff reluctantly gave his "first
class" seat in the plane.3
1. The trust of the relief petitioner now seeks is that we review "all the findings" 4 of respondent Court of
Appeals. Petitioner charges that respondent court failed to make complete findings of fact on all the issues
properly laid before it. We are asked to consider facts favorable to petitioner, and then, to overturn the appellate
court's decision.
Coming into focus is the constitutional mandate that "No decision shall be rendered by any court of record
without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based". 5 This is echoed in
the statutory demand that a judgment determining the merits of the case shall state "clearly and distinctly the
facts and the law on which it is based"; 6 and that "Every decision of the Court of Appeals shall contain
complete findings of fact on all issues properly raised before it". 7
A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity. It is open to direct attack. 8 The law, however,
solely insists that a decision state the "essential ultimate facts" upon which the court's conclusion is drawn. 9 A
court of justice is not hidebound to write in its decision every bit and piece of evidence 10 presented by one
party and the other upon the issues raised. Neither is it to be burdened with the obligation "to specify in the
sentence the facts" which a party "considered as proved". 11 This is but a part of the mental process from which
the Court draws the essential ultimate facts. A decision is not to be so clogged with details such that prolixity, if
not confusion, may result. So long as the decision of the Court of Appeals contains the necessary facts to
warrant its conclusions, it is no error for said court to withhold therefrom "any specific finding of facts with
respect to the evidence for the defense". Because as this Court well observed, "There is no law that so
requires". 12 Indeed, "the mere failure to specify (in the decision) the contentions of the appellant and the
reasons for refusing to believe them is not sufficient to hold the same contrary to the requirements of the
provisions of law and the Constitution". It is in this setting that in Manigque, it was held that the mere fact that
the findings "were based entirely on the evidence for the prosecution without taking into consideration or even
mentioning the appellant's side in the controversy as shown by his own testimony", would not vitiate the
judgment. 13 If the court did not recite in the decision the testimony of each witness for, or each item of
evidence presented by, the defeated party, it does not mean that the court has overlooked such testimony or
such item of evidence. 14 At any rate, the legal presumptions are that official duty has been regularly
performed, and that all the matters within an issue in a case were laid before the court and passed upon by it. 15
Findings of fact, which the Court of Appeals is required to make, maybe defined as "the written statement of
the ultimate facts as found by the court ... and essential to support the decision and judgment rendered
thereon". 16They consist of the court's "conclusions" with respect to the determinative facts in issue". 17 A
question of law, upon the other hand, has been declared as "one which does not call for an examination of the
probative value of the evidence presented by the parties." 18
53
2. By statute, "only questions of law may be raised" in an appeal by certiorari from a judgment of the Court of
Appeals. 19 That judgment is conclusive as to the facts. It is not appropriately the business of this Court to alter
the facts or to review the questions of fact. 20
With these guideposts, we now face the problem of whether the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals
support its judgment.
3. Was Carrascoso entitled to the first class seat he claims?
It is conceded in all quarters that on March 28, 1958 he paid to and received from petitioner a first class ticket.
But petitioner asserts that said ticket did not represent the true and complete intent and agreement of the
parties; that said respondent knew that he did not have confirmed reservations for first class on any specific
flight, although he had tourist class protection; that, accordingly, the issuance of a first class ticket was no
guarantee that he would have a first class ride, but that such would depend upon the availability of first class
seats.
These are matters which petitioner has thoroughly presented and discussed in its brief before the Court of
Appeals under its third assignment of error, which reads: "The trial court erred in finding that plaintiff had
confirmed reservations for, and a right to, first class seats on the "definite" segments of his journey, particularly
that from Saigon to Beirut". 21
And, the Court of Appeals disposed of this contention thus:
Defendant seems to capitalize on the argument that the issuance of a first-class ticket was no
guarantee that the passenger to whom the same had been issued, would be accommodated in the first-
class compartment, for as in the case of plaintiff he had yet to make arrangements upon arrival at
every station for the necessary first-class reservation. We are not impressed by such a reasoning. We
cannot understand how a reputable firm like defendant airplane company could have the indiscretion
to give out tickets it never meant to honor at all. It received the corresponding amount in payment of
first-class tickets and yet it allowed the passenger to be at the mercy of its employees. It is more in
keeping with the ordinary course of business that the company should know whether or riot the
tickets it issues are to be honored or not.22
Not that the Court of Appeals is alone. The trial court similarly disposed of petitioner's contention, thus:
On the fact that plaintiff paid for, and was issued a "First class" ticket, there can be no question. Apart from his
testimony, see plaintiff's Exhibits "A", "A-1", "B", "B-1," "B-2", "C" and "C-1", and defendant's own witness,
Rafael Altonaga, confirmed plaintiff's testimony and testified as follows:
Q. In these tickets there are marks "O.K." From what you know, what does this OK mean?
A. That the space is confirmed.

Q. Confirmed for first class?
A. Yes, "first class". (Transcript, p. 169)
xxx xxx xxx
Defendant tried to prove by the testimony of its witnesses Luis Zaldariaga and Rafael Altonaga that although
plaintiff paid for, and was issued a "first class" airplane ticket, the ticket was subject to confirmation in
Hongkong. The court cannot give credit to the testimony of said witnesses. Oral evidence cannot prevail over
written evidence, and plaintiff's Exhibits "A", "A-l", "B", "B-l", "C" and "C-1" belie the testimony of said
witnesses, and clearly show that the plaintiff was issued, and paid for, a first class ticket without any
reservation whatever.
Furthermore, as hereinabove shown, defendant's own witness Rafael Altonaga testified that the reservation for
a "first class" accommodation for the plaintiff was confirmed. The court cannot believe that after such
confirmation defendant had a verbal understanding with plaintiff that the "first class" ticket issued to him by
defendant would be subject to confirmation in Hongkong. 23
We have heretofore adverted to the fact that except for a slight difference of a few pesos in the amount
refunded on Carrascoso's ticket, the decision of the Court of First Instance was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals in all other respects. We hold the view that such a judgment of affirmance has merged the judgment of
the lower court. 24Implicit in that affirmance is a determination by the Court of Appeals that the proceeding in
the Court of First Instance was free from prejudicial error and "all questions raised by the assignments of error
and all questions that might have been raised are to be regarded as finally adjudicated against the appellant".
So also, the judgment affirmed "must be regarded as free from all error". 25 We reached this policy construction
because nothing in the decision of the Court of Appeals on this point would suggest that its findings of fact are
in any way at war with those of the trial court. Nor was said affirmance by the Court of Appeals upon a ground
or grounds different from those which were made the basis of the conclusions of the trial court. 26
If, as petitioner underscores, a first-class-ticket holder is not entitled to a first class seat, notwithstanding the
fact that seat availability in specific flights is therein confirmed, then an air passenger is placed in the hollow of
the hands of an airline. What security then can a passenger have? It will always be an easy matter for an airline
aided by its employees, to strike out the very stipulations in the ticket, and say that there was a verbal
agreement to the contrary. What if the passenger had a schedule to fulfill? We have long learned that, as a rule,
a written document speaks a uniform language; that spoken word could be notoriously unreliable. If only to
achieve stability in the relations between passenger and air carrier, adherence to the ticket so issued is
desirable. Such is the case here. The lower courts refused to believe the oral evidence intended to defeat the
covenants in the ticket.
The foregoing are the considerations which point to the conclusion that there are facts upon which the Court of
Appeals predicated the finding that respondent Carrascoso had a first class ticket and was entitled to a first
class seat at Bangkok, which is a stopover in the Saigon to Beirut leg of the flight. 27 We perceive no "welter of
54
distortions by the Court of Appeals of petitioner's statement of its position", as charged by petitioner. 28 Nor do
we subscribe to petitioner's accusation that respondent Carrascoso "surreptitiously took a first class seat to
provoke an issue". 29 And this because, as petitioner states, Carrascoso went to see the Manager at his office in
Bangkok "to confirm my seat and because from Saigon I was told again to see the Manager". 30 Why, then, was
he allowed to take a first class seat in the plane at Bangkok, if he had no seat? Or, if another had a better right
to the seat?
4. Petitioner assails respondent court's award of moral damages. Petitioner's trenchant claim is that
Carrascoso's action is planted upon breach of contract; that to authorize an award for moral damages there
must be an averment of fraud or bad faith; 31 and that the decision of the Court of Appeals fails to make a
finding of bad faith. The pivotal allegations in the complaint bearing on this issue are:
3. That ... plaintiff entered into a contract of air carriage with the Philippine Air Lines for a valuable
consideration, the latter acting as general agents for and in behalf of the defendant, under which said
contract, plaintiff was entitled to, as defendant agreed to furnish plaintiff, First Class passage on
defendant's plane during the entire duration of plaintiff's tour of Europe with Hongkong as starting
point up to and until plaintiff's return trip to Manila, ... .
4. That, during the first two legs of the trip from Hongkong to Saigon and from Saigon to Bangkok,
defendant furnished to the plaintiff First Class accommodation but only after protestations, arguments
and/or insistence were made by the plaintiff with defendant's employees.
5. That finally, defendant failed to provide First Class passage, but instead furnished plaintiff
only TouristClass accommodations from Bangkok to Teheran and/or Casablanca, ... the plaintiff has
been compelled by defendant's employees to leave the First Class accommodation berths at
Bangkok after he was already seated.
6. That consequently, the plaintiff, desiring no repetition of the inconvenience and embarrassments
brought by defendant's breach of contract was forced to take a Pan American World Airways plane on
his return trip from Madrid to Manila.32
xxx xxx xxx
2. That likewise, as a result of defendant's failure to furnish First Class accommodations aforesaid, plaintiff
suffered inconveniences, embarrassments, and humiliations, thereby causing plaintiff mental anguish, serious
anxiety, wounded feelings, social humiliation, and the like injury, resulting in moral damages in the amount of
P30,000.00. 33
xxx xxx xxx
The foregoing, in our opinion, substantially aver: First, That there was a contract to furnish plaintiff a first
class passage covering, amongst others, the Bangkok-Teheran leg; Second, That said contract was breached

when petitioner failed to furnish first class transportation at Bangkok; and Third, that there was bad faith when
petitioner's employee compelled Carrascoso to leave his first class accommodation berth "after he was already,
seated" and to take a seat in the tourist class, by reason of which he suffered inconvenience, embarrassments
and humiliations, thereby causing him mental anguish, serious anxiety, wounded feelings and social
humiliation, resulting in moral damages. It is true that there is no specific mention of the term bad faith in the
complaint. But, the inference of bad faith is there, it may be drawn from the facts and circumstances set forth
therein. 34 The contract was averred to establish the relation between the parties. But the stress of the action is
put on wrongful expulsion.
Quite apart from the foregoing is that (a) right the start of the trial, respondent's counsel placed petitioner on
guard on what Carrascoso intended to prove: That while sitting in the plane in Bangkok, Carrascoso
was oustedby petitioner's manager who gave his seat to a white man; 35 and (b) evidence of bad faith in the
fulfillment of the contract was presented without objection on the part of the petitioner. It is, therefore,
unnecessary to inquire as to whether or not there is sufficient averment in the complaint to justify an award for
moral damages. Deficiency in the complaint, if any, was cured by the evidence. An amendment thereof to
conform to the evidence is not even required. 36 On the question of bad faith, the Court of Appeals declared:
That the plaintiff was forced out of his seat in the first class compartment of the plane belonging to
the defendant Air France while at Bangkok, and was transferred to the tourist class not only without
his consent but against his will, has been sufficiently established by plaintiff in his testimony before
the court, corroborated by the corresponding entry made by the purser of the plane in his notebook
which notation reads as follows:
"First-class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the
captain refused to intervene",
and by the testimony of an eye-witness, Ernesto G. Cuento, who was a co-passenger. The captain of
the plane who was asked by the manager of defendant company at Bangkok to intervene even refused
to do so. It is noteworthy that no one on behalf of defendant ever contradicted or denied this evidence
for the plaintiff. It could have been easy for defendant to present its manager at Bangkok to testify at
the trial of the case, or yet to secure his disposition; but defendant did neither. 37
The Court of appeals further stated
Neither is there evidence as to whether or not a prior reservation was made by the white man. Hence,
if the employees of the defendant at Bangkok sold a first-class ticket to him when all the seats had
already been taken, surely the plaintiff should not have been picked out as the one to suffer the
consequences and to be subjected to the humiliation and indignity of being ejected from his seat in
the presence of others. Instead of explaining to the white man the improvidence committed by
defendant's employees, the manager adopted the more drastic step of ousting the plaintiff who was
then safely ensconsced in his rightful seat. We are strengthened in our belief that this probably was
what happened there, by the testimony of defendant's witness Rafael Altonaga who, when asked to
55
explain the meaning of the letters "O.K." appearing on the tickets of plaintiff, said "that the space is
confirmed for first class. Likewise, Zenaida Faustino, another witness for defendant, who was the
chief of the Reservation Office of defendant, testified as follows:
"Q How does the person in the ticket-issuing office know what reservation the passenger
has arranged with you?
A They call us up by phone and ask for the confirmation." (t.s.n., p. 247, June 19, 1959)
In this connection, we quote with approval what the trial Judge has said on this point:
Why did the, using the words of witness Ernesto G. Cuento, "white man" have a "better
right" to the seat occupied by Mr. Carrascoso? The record is silent. The defendant airline did
not prove "any better", nay, any right on the part of the "white man" to the "First class" seat
that the plaintiff was occupying and for which he paid and was issued a corresponding "first
class" ticket.
If there was a justified reason for the action of the defendant's Manager in Bangkok, the
defendant could have easily proven it by having taken the testimony of the said Manager by
deposition, but defendant did not do so; the presumption is that evidence willfully
suppressed would be adverse if produced [Sec. 69, par (e), Rules of Court]; and, under the
circumstances, the Court is constrained to find, as it does find, that the Manager of the
defendant airline in Bangkok not merely asked but threatened the plaintiff to throw him out
of the plane if he did not give up his "first class" seat because the said Manager wanted to
accommodate, using the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, the "white man". 38
It is really correct to say that the Court of Appeals in the quoted portion first transcribed did not use
the term "bad faith". But can it be doubted that the recital of facts therein points to bad faith? The
manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a first class seat; worse, he
imposed his arbitrary will; he forcibly ejected him from his seat, made him suffer the humiliation of
having to go to the tourist class compartment - just to give way to another passenger whose right
thereto has not been established. Certainly, this is bad faith. Unless, of course, bad faith has assumed
a meaning different from what is understood in law. For, "bad faith" contemplates a "state of mind
affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some motive of self-interest or will or for ulterior
purpose." 39
And if the foregoing were not yet sufficient, there is the express finding of bad faith in the judgment
of the Court of First Instance, thus:
The evidence shows that the defendant violated its contract of transportation with plaintiff
in bad faith, with the aggravating circumstances that defendant's Manager in Bangkok went
to the extent of threatening the plaintiff in the presence of many passengers to have him

thrown out of the airplane to give the "first class" seat that he was occupying to, again using
the words of the witness Ernesto G. Cuento, a "white man" whom he (defendant's Manager)
wished to accommodate, and the defendant has not proven that this "white man" had any
"better right" to occupy the "first class" seat that the plaintiff was occupying, duly paid for,
and for which the corresponding "first class" ticket was issued by the defendant to him. 40
5. The responsibility of an employer for the tortious act of its employees need not be essayed. It is well settled
in law. 41 For the willful malevolent act of petitioner's manager, petitioner, his employer, must answer. Article
21 of the Civil Code says:
ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage.
In parallel circumstances, we applied the foregoing legal precept; and, we held that upon the provisions of
Article 2219 (10), Civil Code, moral damages are recoverable. 42
6. A contract to transport passengers is quite different in kind and degree from any other contractual
relation. 43And this, because of the relation which an air-carrier sustains with the public. Its business is mainly
with the travelling public. It invites people to avail of the comforts and advantages it offers. The contract of air
carriage, therefore, generates a relation attended with a public duty. Neglect or malfeasance of the carrier's
employees, naturally, could give ground for an action for damages.
Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be treated by the carrier's employees
with kindness, respect, courtesy and due consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal
misconduct, injurious language, indignities and abuses from such employees. So it is, that any rule or
discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the latter an action for damages
against the carrier. 44
Thus, "Where a steamship company 45 had accepted a passenger's check, it was a breach of contract and a tort,
giving a right of action for its agent in the presence of third persons to falsely notify her that the check was
worthless and demand payment under threat of ejection, though the language used was not insulting and she
was not ejected." 46 And this, because, although the relation of passenger and carrier is "contractual both in
origin and nature" nevertheless "the act that breaks the contract may be also a tort". 47 And in another case,
"Where a passenger on a railroad train, when the conductor came to collect his fare tendered him the cash fare
to a point where the train was scheduled not to stop, and told him that as soon as the train reached such point
he would pay the cash fare from that point to destination, there was nothing in the conduct of the passenger
which justified the conductor in using insulting language to him, as by calling him a lunatic," 48 and the
Supreme Court of South Carolina there held the carrier liable for the mental suffering of said
passenger.1awphl.nt
56
Petitioner's contract with Carrascoso is one attended with public duty. The stress of Carrascoso's action as we
have said, is placed upon his wrongful expulsion. This is a violation of public duty by the petitioner air carrier
a case of quasi-delict. Damages are proper.
7. Petitioner draws our attention to respondent Carrascoso's testimony, thus
Q You mentioned about an attendant. Who is that attendant and purser?
A When we left already that was already in the trip I could not help it. So one of the flight
attendants approached me and requested from me my ticket and I said, What for? and she said, "We
will note that you transferred to the tourist class". I said, "Nothing of that kind. That is tantamount to
accepting my transfer." And I also said, "You are not going to note anything there because I am
protesting to this transfer".
Q Was she able to note it?
A No, because I did not give my ticket.
Q About that purser?
A Well, the seats there are so close that you feel uncomfortable and you don't have enough leg room, I
stood up and I went to the pantry that was next to me and the purser was there. He told me, "I have
recorded the incident in my notebook." He read it and translated it to me because it was recorded
in French "First class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the
captain refused to intervene."
Mr. VALTE
I move to strike out the last part of the testimony of the witness because the best evidence would be
the notes. Your Honor.
COURT
I will allow that as part of his testimony. 49
Petitioner charges that the finding of the Court of Appeals that the purser made an entry in his notebook
reading "First class passenger was forced to go to the tourist class against his will, and that the captain refused
to intervene" is predicated upon evidence [Carrascoso's testimony above] which is incompetent. We do not
think so. The subject of inquiry is not the entry, but the ouster incident. Testimony on the entry does not come
within the proscription of the best evidence rule. Such testimony is admissible. 49a

Besides, from a reading of the transcript just quoted, when the dialogue happened, the impact of the startling
occurrence was still fresh and continued to be felt. The excitement had not as yet died down. Statements then,
in this environment, are admissible as part of the res gestae. 50 For, they grow "out of the nervous excitement
and mental and physical condition of the declarant". 51 The utterance of the purser regarding his entry in the
notebook was spontaneous, and related to the circumstances of the ouster incident. Its trustworthiness has been
guaranteed. 52 It thus escapes the operation of the hearsay rule. It forms part of the res gestae.
At all events, the entry was made outside the Philippines. And, by an employee of petitioner. It would have
been an easy matter for petitioner to have contradicted Carrascoso's testimony. If it were really true that no
such entry was made, the deposition of the purser could have cleared up the matter.
We, therefore, hold that the transcribed testimony of Carrascoso is admissible in evidence.
8. Exemplary damages are well awarded. The Civil Code gives the court ample power to grant exemplary
damages in contracts and quasi- contracts. The only condition is that defendant should have "acted in a
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive, or malevolent manner." 53 The manner of ejectment of respondent
Carrascoso from his first class seat fits into this legal precept. And this, in addition to moral damages. 54
9. The right to attorney's fees is fully established. The grant of exemplary damages justifies a similar judgment
for attorneys' fees. The least that can be said is that the courts below felt that it is but just and equitable that
attorneys' fees be given. 55 We do not intend to break faith with the tradition that discretion well exercised as
it was here should not be disturbed.
10. Questioned as excessive are the amounts decreed by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals, thus:
P25,000.00 as moral damages; P10,000.00, by way of exemplary damages, and P3,000.00 as attorneys' fees.
The task of fixing these amounts is primarily with the trial court. 56 The Court of Appeals did not interfere with
the same. The dictates of good sense suggest that we give our imprimatur thereto. Because, the facts and
circumstances point to the reasonableness thereof.57
On balance, we say that the judgment of the Court of Appeals does not suffer from reversible error. We
accordingly vote to affirm the same. Costs against petitioner. So ordered.
57
G.R. No. 84698 February 4, 1992
PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, JUAN D. LIM, BENJAMIN P.
PAULINO, ANTONIO M. MAGTALAS, COL. PEDRO SACRO and LT. M. SORIANO, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, HON. REGINA ORDOEZ-BENITEZ, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of
Branch 47, Regional Trial Court, Manila, SEGUNDA R. BAUTISTA and ARSENIA D.
BAUTISTA, respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
A stabbing incident on 30 August 1985 which caused the death of Carlitos Bautista while on the second-floor
premises of the Philippine School of Business Administration (PSBA) prompted the parents of the deceased to
file suit in the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch 47) presided over by Judge (now Court of Appeals
justice) Regina Ordoez-Benitez, for damages against the said PSBA and its corporate officers. At the time of
his death, Carlitos was enrolled in the third year commerce course at the PSBA. It was established that his
assailants were not members of the school's academic community but were elements from outside the school.
Specifically, the suit impleaded the PSBA and the following school authorities: Juan D. Lim (President),
Benjamin P. Paulino (Vice-President), Antonio M. Magtalas (Treasurer/Cashier), Col. Pedro Sacro (Chief of
Security) and a Lt. M. Soriano (Assistant Chief of Security). Substantially, the plaintiffs (now private
respondents) sought to adjudge them liable for the victim's untimely demise due to their alleged negligence,
recklessness and lack of security precautions, means and methods before, during and after the attack on the
victim. During the proceedings a quo, Lt. M. Soriano terminated his relationship with the other petitioners by
resigning from his position in the school.
Defendants a quo (now petitioners) sought to have the suit dismissed, alleging that since they are presumably
sued under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, the complaint states no cause of action against them, as
jurisprudence on the subject is to the effect that academic institutions, such as the PSBA, are beyond the ambit
of the rule in the afore-stated article.

The respondent trial court, however, overruled petitioners' contention and thru an order dated 8 December
1987, denied their motion to dismiss. A subsequent motion for reconsideration was similarly dealt with by an
order dated 25 January 1988. Petitioners then assailed the trial court's disposition before the respondent
appellate court which, in a decision * promulgated on 10 June 1988, affirmed the trial court's orders. On 22
August 1988, the respondent appellate court resolved to deny the petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.
At the outset, it is to be observed that the respondent appellate court primarily anchored its decision on the law
of quasi-delicts, as enunciated in Articles 2176 and 2180 of the Civil Code. 1 Pertinent portions of the appellate
court's now assailed ruling state:
Article 2180 (formerly Article 1903) of the Civil Code is an adoption from the old Spanish
Civil Code. The comments of Manresa and learned authorities on its meaning should give
way to present day changes. The law is not fixed and flexible (sic); it must be dynamic. In
fact, the greatest value and significance of law as a rule of conduct in (sic) its flexibility to
adopt to changing social conditions and its capacity to meet the new challenges of progress.
Construed in the light of modern day educational system, Article 2180 cannot be construed
in its narrow concept as held in the old case of Exconde vs. Capuno 2 and Mercado
vs. Court of Appeals; 3hence, the ruling in the Palisoc 4 case that it should apply to all kinds
of educational institutions, academic or vocational.
At any rate, the law holds the teachers and heads of the school staff liable unless they
relieve themselves of such liability pursuant to the last paragraph of Article 2180 by
"proving that they observed all the diligence to prevent damage." This can only be done at a
trial on the merits of the case. 5
While we agree with the respondent appellate court that the motion to dismiss the complaint was correctly
denied and the complaint should be tried on the merits, we do not however agree with the premises of the
appellate court's ruling.
Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes the rule of in loco parentis. This
Court discussed this doctrine in the afore-cited cases of Exconde, Mendoza, Palisoc and, more recently,
in Amadora vs.Court of Appeals. 6 In all such cases, it had been stressed that the law (Article 2180) plainly
provides that the damage should have been caused or inflicted by pupils or students of he educational
institution sought to be held liable for the acts of its pupils or students while in its custody. However, this
material situation does not exist in the present case for, as earlier indicated, the assailants of Carlitos were not
students of the PSBA, for whose acts the school could be made liable.
However, does the appellate court's failure to consider such material facts mean the exculpation of the
petitioners from liability? It does not necessarily follow.
58
When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is established a contract between them,
resulting in bilateral obligations which both parties are bound to comply with. 7 For its part, the school
undertakes to provide the student with an education that would presumably suffice to equip him with the
necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a profession. On the other hand, the student covenants
to abide by the school's academic requirements and observe its rules and regulations.
Institutions of learning must also meet the implicit or "built-in" obligation of providing their students with an
atmosphere that promotes or assists in attaining its primary undertaking of imparting knowledge. Certainly, no
student can absorb the intricacies of physics or higher mathematics or explore the realm of the arts and other
sciences when bullets are flying or grenades exploding in the air or where there looms around the school
premises a constant threat to life and limb. Necessarily, the school must ensure that adequate steps are taken to
maintain peace and order within the campus premises and to prevent the breakdown thereof.
Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual relation between the PSBA and Carlitos
Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do not really govern. 8 A perusal of Article 2176 shows that obligations
arising from quasi-delicts or tort, also known as extra-contractual obligations, arise only between parties not
otherwise bound by contract, whether express or implied. However, this impression has not prevented this
Court from determining the existence of a tort even when there obtains a contract. In Air France
vs. Carrascoso (124 Phil. 722), the private respondent was awarded damages for his unwarranted expulsion
from a first-class seat aboard the petitioner airline. It is noted, however, that the Court referred to the
petitioner-airline's liability as one arising from tort, not one arising from a contract of carriage. In effect, Air
France is authority for the view that liability from tort may exist even if there is a contract, for the act that
breaks the contract may be also a tort. (Austro-America S.S. Co. vs. Thomas, 248 Fed. 231).
This view was not all that revolutionary, for even as early as 1918, this Court was already of a similar mind.
In Cangco vs. Manila Railroad (38 Phil. 780), Mr. Justice Fisher elucidated thus:
The field of non-contractual obligation is much broader than that of contractual obligation,
comprising, as it does, the whole extent of juridical human relations. These two fields,
figuratively speaking, concentric; that is to say, the mere fact that a person is bound to
another by contract does not relieve him from extra-contractual liability to such person.
When such a contractual relation exists the obligor may break the contract under such
conditions that the same act which constitutes a breach of the contract would have
constituted the source of an extra-contractual obligation had no contract existed between
the parties.
Immediately what comes to mind is the chapter of the Civil Code on Human Relations, particularly Article 21,
which provides:
Any person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to
morals, good custom or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damage. (emphasis
supplied).
 59

Air France penalized the racist policy of the airline which emboldened the petitioner's employee to forcibly
oust the private respondent to cater to the comfort of a white man who allegedly "had a better right to the seat."
In Austro-American, supra, the public embarrassment caused to the passenger was the justification for the
Circuit Court of Appeals, (Second Circuit), to award damages to the latter. From the foregoing, it can be
concluded that should the act which breaches a contract be done in bad faith and be violative of Article 21,
then there is a cause to view the act as constituting a quasi-delict.

In the circumstances obtaining in the case at bar, however, there is, as yet, no finding that the contract between
the school and Bautista had been breached thru the former's negligence in providing proper security measures. G.R. No. 98695 January 27, 1993
This would be for the trial court to determine. And, even if there be a finding of negligence, the same could
give rise generally to a breach of contractual obligation only. Using the test of Cangco, supra, the negligence
JUAN J. SYQUIA, CORAZON C. SYQUIA, CARLOTA C. SYQUIA, CARLOS C. SYQUIA and
of the school would not be relevant absent a contract. In fact, that negligence becomes material only because of
ANTHONY C. SYQUIA, petitioners,
the contractual relation between PSBA and Bautista. In other words, a contractual relation is a condition sine
vs.
qua nonto the school's liability. The negligence of the school cannot exist independently of the contract, unless
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and THE MANILA MEMORIAL PARK CEMETERY,
the negligence occurs under the circumstances set out in Article 21 of the Civil Code.
INC.,respondents.

This Court is not unmindful of the attendant difficulties posed by the obligation of schools, above-mentioned,
CAMPOS, JR., J.:
for conceptually a school, like a common carrier, cannot be an insurer of its students against all risks. This is
specially true in the populous student communities of the so-called "university belt" in Manila where there
Herein petitioners, Juan J. Syquia and Corazon C. Syquia, Carlota C. Syquia, Carlos C. Syquia, and Anthony
have been reported several incidents ranging from gang wars to other forms of hooliganism. It would not be
Syquia, were the parents and siblings, respectively, of the deceased Vicente Juan Syquia. On March 5, 1979,
equitable to expect of schools to anticipate all types of violent trespass upon their premises, for
they filed a complaint 1 in the then Court of First Instance against herein private respondent, Manila Memorial
notwithstanding the security measures installed, the same may still fail against an individual or group
Park Cemetery, Inc. for recovery of damages arising from breach of contract and/or quasi-delict. The trial court
determined to carry out a nefarious deed inside school premises and environs. Should this be the case, the
dismissed the complaint.
school may still avoid liability by proving that the breach of its contractual obligation to the students was not
due to its negligence, here statutorily defined to be the omission of that degree of diligence which is required
by the nature of the obligation and corresponding to the circumstances of persons, time and place. 9 The antecedent facts, as gathered by the respondent Court, are as follows:

As the proceedings a quo have yet to commence on the substance of the private respondents' complaint, the On March 5, 1979, Juan, Corazon, Carlota and Anthony all surnamed Syquia, plaintiff-
record is bereft of all the material facts. Obviously, at this stage, only the trial court can make such a appellants herein, filed a complaint for damages against defendant-appellee, Manila
determination from the evidence still to unfold. Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc.

WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The court of origin (RTC, Manila, The complaint alleged among others, that pursuant to a Deed of Sale (Contract No. 6885)
Br. 47) is hereby ordered to continue proceedings consistent with this ruling of the Court. Costs against the dated August 27, 1969 and Interment Order No. 7106 dated July 21, 1978 executed between
petitioners. plaintiff-appellant Juan J. Syquia and defendant-appellee, the former, father of deceased
Vicente Juan J. Syquia authorized and instructed defendant-appellee to inter the remains of
deceased in the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery in the morning of July 25, 1978
SO ORDERED.
conformably and in accordance with defendant-appellant's (sic) interment procedures; that
on September 4, 1978, preparatory to transferring the said remains to a newly purchased
family plot also at the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, the concrete vault encasing the
coffin of the deceased was removed from its niche underground with the assistance of
certain employees of defendant-appellant (sic); that as the concrete vault was being raised to
the surface, plaintiffs-appellants discovered that the concrete vault had a hole approximately
three (3) inches in diameter near the bottom of one of the walls closing out the width of the

vault on one end and that for a certain length of time (one hour, more or less), water drained
out of the hole; that because of the aforesaid discovery, plaintiffs-appellants became agitated
and upset with concern that the water which had collected inside the vault might have risen
as it in fact did rise, to the level of the coffin and flooded the same as well as the remains of
the deceased with ill effects thereto; that pursuant to an authority granted by the Municipal
Court of Paraaque, Metro Manila on September 14, 1978, plaintiffs-appellants with the
assistance of licensed morticians and certain personnel of defendant-appellant (sic) caused
the opening of the concrete vault on September 15, 1978; that upon opening the vault, the
following became apparent to the plaintiffs-appellants: (a) the interior walls of the concrete
vault showed evidence of total flooding; (b) the coffin was entirely damaged by water, filth
and silt causing the wooden parts to warp and separate and to crack the viewing glass panel
located directly above the head and torso of the deceased; (c) the entire lining of the coffin,
the clothing of the deceased, and the exposed parts of the deceased's remains were damaged
and soiled by the action of the water and silt and were also coated with filth.
Due to the alleged unlawful and malicious breach by the defendant-appellee of its obligation
to deliver a defect-free concrete vault designed to protect the remains of the deceased and
the coffin against the elements which resulted in the desecration of deceased's grave and in
the alternative, because of defendant-appellee's gross negligence conformably to Article
2176 of the New Civil Code in failing to seal the concrete vault, the complaint prayed that
judgment be rendered ordering defendant-appellee to pay plaintiffs-appellants P30,000.00
for actual damages, P500,000.00 for moral damages, exemplary damages in the amount
determined by the court, 20% of defendant-appellee's total liability as attorney's fees, and
expenses of litigation and costs of suit. 2
In dismissing the complaint, the trial court held that the contract between the parties did not guarantee that the
cement vault would be waterproof; that there could be no quasi-delict because the defendant was not guilty of
any fault or negligence, and because there was a pre-existing contractual relation between the Syquias and
defendant Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc.. The trial court also noted that the father himself, Juan Syquia,
chose the gravesite despite knowing that said area had to be constantly sprinkled with water to keep the grass
green and that water would eventually seep through the vault. The trial court also accepted the explanation
given by defendant for boring a hole at the bottom side of the vault: "The hole had to be bored through the
concrete vault because if it has no hole the vault will (sic) float and the grave would be filled with water and
the digging would caved (sic) in the earth, the earth would caved (sic) in the (sic) fill up the grave." 3
From this judgment, the Syquias appealed. They alleged that the trial court erred in holding that the contract
allowed the flooding of the vault; that there was no desecration; that the boring of the hole was justifiable; and
in not awarding damages.
4
The Court of Appeals in the Decision dated December 7, 1990 however, affirmed the judgment of dismissal.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated April 25, 1991. 5
60
Unsatisfied with the respondent Court's decision, the Syquias filed the instant petition. They allege herein that
the Court of Appeals committed the following errors when it:
1. held that the contract and the Rules and Resolutions of private respondent allowed the
flooding of the vault and the entrance thereto of filth and silt;
2. held that the act of boring a hole was justifiable and corollarily, when it held that no act of
desecration was committed;
3. overlooked and refused to consider relevant, undisputed facts, such as those which have
been stipulated upon by the parties, testified to by private respondent's witnesses, and
admitted in the answer, which could have justified a different conclusion;
4. held that there was no tort because of a pre-existing contract and the absence of
fault/negligence; and
5. did not award the P25,000.00 actual damages which was agreed upon by the parties,
moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.
At the bottom of the entire proceedings is the act of boring a hole by private respondent on the vault of the
deceased kin of the bereaved petitioners. The latter allege that such act was either a breach of private
respondent's contractual obligation to provide a sealed vault, or, in the alternative, a negligent act which
constituted a quasi-delict. Nonetheless, petitioners claim that whatever kind of negligence private respondent
has committed, the latter is liable for desecrating the grave of petitioners' dead.
In the instant case, We are called upon to determine whether the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc.,
breached its contract with petitioners; or, alternatively, whether private respondent was guilty of a tort.
We understand the feelings of petitioners and empathize with them. Unfortunately, however, We are more
inclined to answer the foregoing questions in the negative. There is not enough ground, both in fact and in law,
to justify a reversal of the decision of the respondent Court and to uphold the pleas of the petitioners.
With respect to herein petitioners' averment that private respondent has committed culpa aquiliana, the Court
of Appeals found no negligent act on the part of private respondent to justify an award of damages against it.
Although a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties does not preclude the existence of a culpa
aquiliana, We find no reason to disregard the respondent's Court finding that there was no negligence.
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict . . . .
(Emphasis supplied).

In this case, it has been established that the Syquias and the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc.,
entered into a contract entitled "Deed of Sale and Certificate of Perpetual Care" 6 on August 27, 1969.
That agreement governed the relations of the parties and defined their respective rights and
obligations. Hence, had there been actual negligence on the part of the Manila Memorial Park
Cemetery, Inc., it would be held liable not for a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, but
for culpa contractual as provided by Article 1170 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay,
and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.
The Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. bound itself to provide the concrete box to be send in the interment.
Rule 17 of the Rules and Regulations of private respondent provides that:
Rule 17. Every earth interment shall be made enclosed in a concrete box, or in an outer wall
of stone, brick or concrete, the actual installment of which shall be made by the employees
of the Association. 7
Pursuant to this above-mentioned Rule, a concrete vault was provided on July 27, 1978, the day before the
interment, and was, on the same day, installed by private respondent's employees in the grave which was dug
earlier. After the burial, the vault was covered by a cement lid.
Petitioners however claim that private respondent breached its contract with them as the latter held out in the
brochure it distributed that the . . . lot may hold single or double internment (sic) underground
in sealed concrete vault." 8 Petitioners claim that the vault provided by private respondent was not sealed, that
is, not waterproof. Consequently, water seeped through the cement enclosure and damaged everything inside it.
We do not agree. There was no stipulation in the Deed of Sale and Certificate of Perpetual Care and in the
Rules and Regulations of the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. that the vault would be waterproof. Private
respondent's witness, Mr. Dexter Heuschkel, explained that the term "sealed" meant "closed." 9 On the other
hand, the word "seal" is defined as . . . any of various closures or fastenings . . . that cannot be opened without
rupture and that serve as a check against tampering or unauthorized opening." 10 The meaning that has been
given by private respondent to the word conforms with the cited dictionary definition. Moreover, it is also quite
clear that "sealed" cannot be equated with "waterproof". Well settled is the rule that when the terms of the
contract are clear and leave no doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, then the literal meaning of
the stipulation shall control. 11 Contracts should be interpreted according to their literal meaning and should not
be interpreted beyond their obvious intendment. 12 As ruled by the respondent Court:
When plaintiff-appellant Juan J. Syquia affixed his signature to the Deed of Sale (Exhibit
"A") and the attached Rules and Regulations (Exhibit "1"), it can be assumed that he has
accepted defendant-appellee's undertaking to merely provide a concrete vault. He can not
now claim that said concrete vault must in addition, also be waterproofed (sic). It is basic
that the parties are bound by the terms of their contract, which is the law between them
61
(Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al. 178 SCRA 739).
Where there is nothing in the contract which is contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order, or public policy, the validity of the contract must be sustained (Phil. American
Insurance Co. vs. Judge Pineda, 175 SCRA 416). Consonant with this ruling, a contracting
party cannot incur a liability more than what is expressly specified in his undertaking. It
cannot be extended by implication, beyond the terms of the contract (Rizal Commercial
Banking Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, supra). And as a rule of evidence, where the
terms of an agreement are reduced to writing, the document itself, being constituted by the
parties as the expositor of their intentions, is the only instrument of evidence in respect of
that agreement which the law will recognize, so long as its (sic) exists for the purpose of
evidence (Starkie, Ev., pp. 648, 655, Kasheenath vs. Chundy, 5 W.R. 68 cited in Francisco,
Revised Rules of Court in the Phil. p. 153, 1973 Ed.). And if the terms of the contract are
clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of
its stipulations shall control (Santos vs. CA, et al., G. R. No. 83664, Nov. 13, 1989;
Prudential Bank & Trust Co. vs. Community Builders Co., Inc., 165 SCRA 285; Balatero
vs. IAC, 154 SCRA 530). 13
We hold, therefore, that private respondent did not breach the tenor of its obligation to the Syquias. While this
may be so, can private respondent be liable for culpa aquiliana for boring the hole on the vault? It cannot be
denied that the hole made possible the entry of more water and soil than was natural had there been no hole.
The law defines negligence as the "omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation
and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place." 14 In the absence of
stipulation or legal provision providing the contrary, the diligence to be observed in the performance of the
obligation is that which is expected of a good father of a family.
The circumstances surrounding the commission of the assailed act boring of the hole negate the
allegation of negligence. The reason for the act was explained by Henry Flores, Interment Foreman, who said
that:
Q It has been established in this particular case that a certain Vicente
Juan Syquia was interred on July 25, 1978 at the Paraaque Cemetery of
the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., will you please tell the Hon.
Court what or whether you have participation in connection with said
internment (sic)?
A A day before Juan (sic) Syquia was buried our personnel dug a grave.
After digging the next morning a vault was taken and placed in the grave
and when the vault was placed on the grave a hole was placed on the
vault so that water could come into the vault because it was raining
heavily then because the vault has no hole the vault will float and the
grave would be filled with water and the digging would caved (sic) in
 62

and the earth, the earth would (sic) caved in and fill up the
grave. 15 (Emphasis ours)

Except for the foreman's opinion that the concrete vault may float should there be a heavy rainfall, from the
above-mentioned explanation, private respondent has exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in
preventing the accumulation of water inside the vault which would have resulted in the caving in of earth
around the grave filling the same with earth.

Thus, finding no evidence of negligence on the part of private respondent, We find no reason to award damages
in favor of petitioners.

In the light of the foregoing facts, and construed in the language of the applicable laws and jurisprudence, We
are constrained to AFFIRM in toto the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated December 7, 1990. G.R. No. 98695 January 27, 1993
No costs.
JUAN J. SYQUIA, CORAZON C. SYQUIA, CARLOTA C. SYQUIA, CARLOS C. SYQUIA and
SO ORDERED. ANTHONY C. SYQUIA, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and THE MANILA MEMORIAL PARK CEMETERY,
INC.,respondents.

CAMPOS, JR., J.:

Herein petitioners, Juan J. Syquia and Corazon C. Syquia, Carlota C. Syquia, Carlos C. Syquia, and Anthony
Syquia, were the parents and siblings, respectively, of the deceased Vicente Juan Syquia. On March 5, 1979,
they filed a complaint 1 in the then Court of First Instance against herein private respondent, Manila Memorial
Park Cemetery, Inc. for recovery of damages arising from breach of contract and/or quasi-delict. The trial court
dismissed the complaint.

The antecedent facts, as gathered by the respondent Court, are as follows:

On March 5, 1979, Juan, Corazon, Carlota and Anthony all surnamed Syquia, plaintiff-
appellants herein, filed a complaint for damages against defendant-appellee, Manila
Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc.

The complaint alleged among others, that pursuant to a Deed of Sale (Contract No. 6885)
dated August 27, 1969 and Interment Order No. 7106 dated July 21, 1978 executed between
plaintiff-appellant Juan J. Syquia and defendant-appellee, the former, father of deceased
Vicente Juan J. Syquia authorized and instructed defendant-appellee to inter the remains of
deceased in the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery in the morning of July 25, 1978
conformably and in accordance with defendant-appellant's (sic) interment procedures; that
on September 4, 1978, preparatory to transferring the said remains to a newly purchased
family plot also at the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, the concrete vault encasing the

coffin of the deceased was removed from its niche underground with the assistance of
certain employees of defendant-appellant (sic); that as the concrete vault was being raised to
the surface, plaintiffs-appellants discovered that the concrete vault had a hole approximately
three (3) inches in diameter near the bottom of one of the walls closing out the width of the
vault on one end and that for a certain length of time (one hour, more or less), water drained
out of the hole; that because of the aforesaid discovery, plaintiffs-appellants became agitated
and upset with concern that the water which had collected inside the vault might have risen
as it in fact did rise, to the level of the coffin and flooded the same as well as the remains of
the deceased with ill effects thereto; that pursuant to an authority granted by the Municipal
Court of Paraaque, Metro Manila on September 14, 1978, plaintiffs-appellants with the
assistance of licensed morticians and certain personnel of defendant-appellant (sic) caused
the opening of the concrete vault on September 15, 1978; that upon opening the vault, the
following became apparent to the plaintiffs-appellants: (a) the interior walls of the concrete
vault showed evidence of total flooding; (b) the coffin was entirely damaged by water, filth
and silt causing the wooden parts to warp and separate and to crack the viewing glass panel
located directly above the head and torso of the deceased; (c) the entire lining of the coffin,
the clothing of the deceased, and the exposed parts of the deceased's remains were damaged
and soiled by the action of the water and silt and were also coated with filth.
Due to the alleged unlawful and malicious breach by the defendant-appellee of its obligation
to deliver a defect-free concrete vault designed to protect the remains of the deceased and
the coffin against the elements which resulted in the desecration of deceased's grave and in
the alternative, because of defendant-appellee's gross negligence conformably to Article
2176 of the New Civil Code in failing to seal the concrete vault, the complaint prayed that
judgment be rendered ordering defendant-appellee to pay plaintiffs-appellants P30,000.00
for actual damages, P500,000.00 for moral damages, exemplary damages in the amount
determined by the court, 20% of defendant-appellee's total liability as attorney's fees, and
expenses of litigation and costs of suit. 2
In dismissing the complaint, the trial court held that the contract between the parties did not guarantee that the
cement vault would be waterproof; that there could be no quasi-delict because the defendant was not guilty of
any fault or negligence, and because there was a pre-existing contractual relation between the Syquias and
defendant Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc.. The trial court also noted that the father himself, Juan Syquia,
chose the gravesite despite knowing that said area had to be constantly sprinkled with water to keep the grass
green and that water would eventually seep through the vault. The trial court also accepted the explanation
given by defendant for boring a hole at the bottom side of the vault: "The hole had to be bored through the
concrete vault because if it has no hole the vault will (sic) float and the grave would be filled with water and
the digging would caved (sic) in the earth, the earth would caved (sic) in the (sic) fill up the grave." 3
From this judgment, the Syquias appealed. They alleged that the trial court erred in holding that the contract
allowed the flooding of the vault; that there was no desecration; that the boring of the hole was justifiable; and
in not awarding damages.
63
The Court of Appeals in the Decision 4 dated December 7, 1990 however, affirmed the judgment of dismissal.
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a Resolution dated April 25, 1991. 5
Unsatisfied with the respondent Court's decision, the Syquias filed the instant petition. They allege herein that
the Court of Appeals committed the following errors when it:
1. held that the contract and the Rules and Resolutions of private respondent allowed the
flooding of the vault and the entrance thereto of filth and silt;
2. held that the act of boring a hole was justifiable and corollarily, when it held that no act of
desecration was committed;
3. overlooked and refused to consider relevant, undisputed facts, such as those which have
been stipulated upon by the parties, testified to by private respondent's witnesses, and
admitted in the answer, which could have justified a different conclusion;
4. held that there was no tort because of a pre-existing contract and the absence of
fault/negligence; and
5. did not award the P25,000.00 actual damages which was agreed upon by the parties,
moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.
At the bottom of the entire proceedings is the act of boring a hole by private respondent on the vault of the
deceased kin of the bereaved petitioners. The latter allege that such act was either a breach of private
respondent's contractual obligation to provide a sealed vault, or, in the alternative, a negligent act which
constituted a quasi-delict. Nonetheless, petitioners claim that whatever kind of negligence private respondent
has committed, the latter is liable for desecrating the grave of petitioners' dead.
In the instant case, We are called upon to determine whether the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc.,
breached its contract with petitioners; or, alternatively, whether private respondent was guilty of a tort.
We understand the feelings of petitioners and empathize with them. Unfortunately, however, We are more
inclined to answer the foregoing questions in the negative. There is not enough ground, both in fact and in law,
to justify a reversal of the decision of the respondent Court and to uphold the pleas of the petitioners.
With respect to herein petitioners' averment that private respondent has committed culpa aquiliana, the Court
of Appeals found no negligent act on the part of private respondent to justify an award of damages against it.
Although a pre-existing contractual relation between the parties does not preclude the existence of a culpa
aquiliana, We find no reason to disregard the respondent's Court finding that there was no negligence.
Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
 64

pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict . . . .
(Emphasis supplied).
In this case, it has been established that the Syquias and the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc.,
entered into a contract entitled "Deed of Sale and Certificate of Perpetual Care" 6 on August 27, 1969.
That agreement governed the relations of the parties and defined their respective rights and
obligations. Hence, had there been actual negligence on the part of the Manila Memorial Park
Cemetery, Inc., it would be held liable not for a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, but
for culpa contractual as provided by Article 1170 of the Civil Code, to wit:
Those who in the performance of their obligations are guilty of fraud, negligence, or delay,
and those who in any manner contravene the tenor thereof, are liable for damages.
The Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. bound itself to provide the concrete box to be send in the interment.
Rule 17 of the Rules and Regulations of private respondent provides that:
Rule 17. Every earth interment shall be made enclosed in a concrete box, or in an outer wall
of stone, brick or concrete, the actual installment of which shall be made by the employees
of the Association. 7
accepted defendant-appellee's undertaking to merely provide a concrete vault. He can not
now claim that said concrete vault must in addition, also be waterproofed (sic). It is basic
that the parties are bound by the terms of their contract, which is the law between them
(Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, et al. 178 SCRA 739).
Where there is nothing in the contract which is contrary to law, morals, good customs,
public order, or public policy, the validity of the contract must be sustained (Phil. American
Insurance Co. vs. Judge Pineda, 175 SCRA 416). Consonant with this ruling, a contracting
party cannot incur a liability more than what is expressly specified in his undertaking. It
cannot be extended by implication, beyond the terms of the contract (Rizal Commercial
Banking Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, supra). And as a rule of evidence, where the
terms of an agreement are reduced to writing, the document itself, being constituted by the
parties as the expositor of their intentions, is the only instrument of evidence in respect of
that agreement which the law will recognize, so long as its (sic) exists for the purpose of
evidence (Starkie, Ev., pp. 648, 655, Kasheenath vs. Chundy, 5 W.R. 68 cited in Francisco,
Revised Rules of Court in the Phil. p. 153, 1973 Ed.). And if the terms of the contract are
clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of
its stipulations shall control (Santos vs. CA, et al., G. R. No. 83664, Nov. 13, 1989;
Prudential Bank & Trust Co. vs. Community Builders Co., Inc., 165 SCRA 285; Balatero
vs. IAC, 154 SCRA 530). 13

We hold, therefore, that private respondent did not breach the tenor of its obligation to the Syquias. While this
Pursuant to this above-mentioned Rule, a concrete vault was provided on July 27, 1978, the day before the
may be so, can private respondent be liable for culpa aquiliana for boring the hole on the vault? It cannot be
interment, and was, on the same day, installed by private respondent's employees in the grave which was dug
denied that the hole made possible the entry of more water and soil than was natural had there been no hole.
earlier. After the burial, the vault was covered by a cement lid.

The law defines negligence as the "omission of that diligence which is required by the nature of the obligation
Petitioners however claim that private respondent breached its contract with them as the latter held out in the
and corresponds with the circumstances of the persons, of the time and of the place." 14 In the absence of
brochure it distributed that the . . . lot may hold single or double internment (sic) underground
stipulation or legal provision providing the contrary, the diligence to be observed in the performance of the
in sealed concrete vault." 8 Petitioners claim that the vault provided by private respondent was not sealed, that
obligation is that which is expected of a good father of a family.
is, not waterproof. Consequently, water seeped through the cement enclosure and damaged everything inside it.

The circumstances surrounding the commission of the assailed act boring of the hole negate the
We do not agree. There was no stipulation in the Deed of Sale and Certificate of Perpetual Care and in the
allegation of negligence. The reason for the act was explained by Henry Flores, Interment Foreman, who said
Rules and Regulations of the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc. that the vault would be waterproof. Private
that:
respondent's witness, Mr. Dexter Heuschkel, explained that the term "sealed" meant "closed." 9 On the other
hand, the word "seal" is defined as . . . any of various closures or fastenings . . . that cannot be opened without
rupture and that serve as a check against tampering or unauthorized opening." 10 The meaning that has been Q It has been established in this particular case that a certain Vicente
given by private respondent to the word conforms with the cited dictionary definition. Moreover, it is also quite Juan Syquia was interred on July 25, 1978 at the Paraaque Cemetery of
clear that "sealed" cannot be equated with "waterproof". Well settled is the rule that when the terms of the the Manila Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., will you please tell the Hon.
contract are clear and leave no doubt as to the intention of the contracting parties, then the literal meaning of Court what or whether you have participation in connection with said
the stipulation shall control. 11 Contracts should be interpreted according to their literal meaning and should not internment (sic)?
be interpreted beyond their obvious intendment. 12 As ruled by the respondent Court:
A A day before Juan (sic) Syquia was buried our personnel dug a grave.
When plaintiff-appellant Juan J. Syquia affixed his signature to the Deed of Sale (Exhibit After digging the next morning a vault was taken and placed in the grave
"A") and the attached Rules and Regulations (Exhibit "1"), it can be assumed that he has and when the vault was placed on the grave a hole was placed on the
 65

vault so that water could come into the vault because it was raining
heavily then because the vault has no hole the vault will float and the
grave would be filled with water and the digging would caved (sic) in
and the earth, the earth would (sic) caved in and fill up the
grave. 15 (Emphasis ours)

Except for the foreman's opinion that the concrete vault may float should there be a heavy rainfall, from the
above-mentioned explanation, private respondent has exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in
preventing the accumulation of water inside the vault which would have resulted in the caving in of earth
around the grave filling the same with earth.

Thus, finding no evidence of negligence on the part of private respondent, We find no reason to award damages
in favor of petitioners.

In the light of the foregoing facts, and construed in the language of the applicable laws and jurisprudence, We
[G.R. No. 122039. May 31, 2000]
are constrained to AFFIRM in toto the decision of the respondent Court of Appeals dated December 7, 1990.
No costs.
VICENTE CALALAS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ELIZA JUJEURCHE SUNGA and
FRANCISCO SALVA, respondents.
SO ORDERED.

D E C I S I ON

MENDOZA, J.:
SECOND DIVISION

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals, dated March 31, 1991,
reversing the contrary decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36, Dumaguete City, and awarding
damages instead to private respondent Eliza Jujeurche Sunga as plaintiff in an action for breach of contract of
carriage.

The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:

At 10 oclock in the morning of August 23, 1989, private respondent Eliza Jujeurche G. Sunga, then a college
freshman majoring in Physical Education at the Siliman University, took a passenger jeepney owned and
operated by petitioner Vicente Calalas. As the jeepney was filled to capacity of about 24 passengers, Sunga was
given by the conductor an "extension seat," a wooden stool at the back of the door at the rear end of the
vehicle. Sclaw

On the way to Poblacion Sibulan, Negros Occidental, the jeepney stopped to let a passenger off. As she was
seated at the rear of the vehicle, Sunga gave way to the outgoing passenger. Just as she was doing so, an Isuzu
truck driven by Iglecerio Verena and owned by Francisco Salva bumped the left rear portion of the jeepney. As
a result, Sunga was injured. She sustained a fracture of the "distal third of the left tibia-fibula with severe
necrosis of the underlying skin." Closed reduction of the fracture, long leg circular casting, and case wedging

were done under sedation. Her confinement in the hospital lasted from August 23 to September 7, 1989. Her
attending physician, Dr. Danilo V. Oligario, an orthopedic surgeon, certified she would remain on a cast for a
period of three months and would have to ambulate in crutches during said period.
On October 9, 1989, Sunga filed a complaint for damages against Calalas, alleging violation of the contract of
carriage by the former in failing to exercise the diligence required of him as a common carrier. Calalas, on the
other hand, filed a third-party complaint against Francisco Salva, the owner of the Isuzu truck. Korte
The lower court rendered judgment against Salva as third-party defendant and absolved Calalas of liability,
holding that it was the driver of the Isuzu truck who was responsible for the accident. It took cognizance of
another case (Civil Case No. 3490), filed by Calalas against Salva and Verena, for quasi-delict, in which
Branch 37 of the same court held Salva and his driver Verena jointly liable to Calalas for the damage to his
jeepney. Rtcspped
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the ruling of the lower court was reversed on the ground that Sungas cause
of action was based on a contract of carriage, not quasi-delict, and that the common carrier failed to exercise
the diligence required under the Civil Code. The appellate court dismissed the third-party complaint against
Salva and adjudged Calalas liable for damages to Sunga. The dispositive portion of its decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and
another one is entered ordering defendant-appellee Vicente Calalas to pay plaintiff-
appellant:
(1) P50,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages;
(2) P50,000.00 as moral damages;
(3) P10,000.00 as attorneys fees; and
(4) P1,000.00 as expenses of litigation; and
(5) to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490 that the negligence of Verena
was the proximate cause of the accident negates his liability and that to rule otherwise would be to make the
common carrier an insurer of the safety of its passengers. He contends that the bumping of the jeepney by the
truck owned by Salva was a caso fortuito. Petitioner further assails the award of moral damages to Sunga on
the ground that it is not supported by evidence. Sdaadsc
The petition has no merit.
66
The argument that Sunga is bound by the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490 finding the driver and the owner of the
truck liable for quasi-delict ignores the fact that she was never a party to that case and, therefore, the principle
of res judicata does not apply. Missdaa
Nor are the issues in Civil Case No. 3490 and in the present case the same. The issue in Civil Case No. 3490
was whether Salva and his driver Verena were liable for quasi-delict for the damage caused to petitioners
jeepney. On the other hand, the issue in this case is whether petitioner is liable on his contract of carriage. The
first, quasi-delict, also known as culpa aquiliana or culpa extra contractual, has as its source the negligence of
the tortfeasor. The second, breach of contract or culpa contractual, is premised upon the negligence in the
performance of a contractual obligation.
Consequently, in quasi-delict, the negligence or fault should be clearly established because it is the basis of the
action, whereas in breach of contract, the action can be prosecuted merely by proving the existence of the
contract and the fact that the obligor, in this case the common carrier, failed to transport his passenger safely to
his destination.[2] In case of death or injuries to passengers, Art. 1756 of the Civil Code provides that common
carriers are presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently unless they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence as defined in Arts. 1733 and 1755 of the Code. This provision necessarily shifts to the
common carrier the burden of proof. Slxmis
There is, thus, no basis for the contention that the ruling in Civil Case No. 3490, finding Salva and his driver
Verena liable for the damage to petitioners jeepney, should be binding on Sunga. It is immaterial that the
proximate cause of the collision between the jeepney and the truck was the negligence of the truck driver. The
doctrine of proximate cause is applicable only in actions for quasi-delict, not in actions involving breach of
contract. The doctrine is a device for imputing liability to a person where there is no relation between him and
another party. In such a case, the obligation is created by law itself. But, where there is a pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties, it is the parties themselves who create the obligation, and the function
of the law is merely to regulate the relation thus created. Insofar as contracts of carriage are concerned, some
aspects regulated by the Civil Code are those respecting the diligence required of common carriers with regard
to the safety of passengers as well as the presumption of negligence in cases of death or injury to passengers. It
provides: Slxsc
Art. 1733. Common carriers, from the nature of their business and for reasons of public
policy, are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods and for
the safety of the passengers transported by them, according to all the circumstances of each
case.
Such extraordinary diligence in the vigilance over the goods is further expressed in articles
1734, 1735, and 1746, Nos. 5,6, and 7, while the extraordinary diligence for the safety of
the passengers is further set forth in articles 1755 and 1756.

Art. 1755. A common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as human care
and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due
regard for all the circumstances.
Art. 1756. In case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are presumed to
have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence as prescribed by articles 1733 and 1755.
In the case at bar, upon the happening of the accident, the presumption of negligence at once arose, and it
became the duty of petitioner to prove that he had to observe extraordinary diligence in the care of his
passengers. Scslx
Now, did the driver of jeepney carry Sunga "safely as far as human care and foresight could provide, using the
utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances" as required by Art. 1755?
We do not think so. Several factors militate against petitioners contention. Slx
First, as found by the Court of Appeals, the jeepney was not properly parked, its rear portion being exposed
about two meters from the broad shoulders of the highway, and facing the middle of the highway in a diagonal
angle. This is a violation of the R.A. No. 4136, as amended, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code,
which provides:
Sec. 54. Obstruction of Traffic. - No person shall drive his motor vehicle in such a manner
as to obstruct or impede the passage of any vehicle, nor, while discharging or taking on
passengers or loading or unloading freight, obstruct the free passage of other vehicles on the
highway.
Second, it is undisputed that petitioners driver took in more passengers than the allowed seating capacity of the
jeepney, a violation of 32(a) of the same law. It provides: Mesm
Exceeding registered capacity. - No person operating any motor vehicle shall allow more
passengers or more freight or cargo in his vehicle than its registered capacity.
The fact that Sunga was seated in an "extension seat" placed her in a peril greater than that to which the other
passengers were exposed. Therefore, not only was petitioner unable to overcome the presumption of
negligence imposed on him for the injury sustained by Sunga, but also, the evidence shows he was actually
negligent in transporting passengers. Calrky
We find it hard to give serious thought to petitioners contention that Sungas taking an "extension seat"
amounted to an implied assumption of risk. It is akin to arguing that the injuries to the many victims of the
tragedies in our seas should not be compensated merely because those passengers assumed a greater risk of
drowning by boarding an overloaded ferry. This is also true of petitioners contention that the jeepney being
bumped while it was improperly parked constitutes caso fortuito. A caso fortuito is an event which could not
67
be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, was inevitable. [3] This requires that the following requirements be
present: (a) the cause of the breach is independent of the debtors will; (b) the event is unforeseeable or
unavoidable; (c) the event is such as to render it impossible for the debtor to fulfill his obligation in a normal
manner, and (d) the debtor did not take part in causing the injury to the creditor. [4]Petitioner should have
foreseen the danger of parking his jeepney with its body protruding two meters into the highway. Kycalr
Finally, petitioner challenges the award of moral damages alleging that it is excessive and without basis in law.
We find this contention well taken.
In awarding moral damages, the Court of Appeals stated: Kyle
Plaintiff-appellant at the time of the accident was a first-year college student in that school
year 1989-1990 at the Silliman University, majoring in Physical Education. Because of the
injury, she was not able to enroll in the second semester of that school year. She testified
that she had no more intention of continuing with her schooling, because she could not walk
and decided not to pursue her degree, major in Physical Education "because of my leg
which has a defect already."
Plaintiff-appellant likewise testified that even while she was under confinement, she cried in
pain because of her injured left foot. As a result of her injury, the Orthopedic Surgeon also
certified that she has "residual bowing of the fracture side." She likewise decided not to
further pursue Physical Education as her major subject, because "my left leg x x x has a
defect already."
Those are her physical pains and moral sufferings, the inevitable bedfellows of the injuries
that she suffered. Under Article 2219 of the Civil Code, she is entitled to recover moral
damages in the sum of P50,000.00, which is fair, just and reasonable.
As a general rule, moral damages are not recoverable in actions for damages predicated on a breach of contract
for it is not one of the items enumerated under Art. 2219 of the Civil Code. [5] As an exception, such damages
are recoverable: (1) in cases in which the mishap results in the death of a passenger, as provided in Art. 1764,
in relation to Art. 2206(3) of the Civil Code; and (2) in the cases in which the carrier is guilty of fraud or bad
faith, as provided in Art. 2220.[6]
In this case, there is no legal basis for awarding moral damages since there was no factual finding by the
appellate court that petitioner acted in bad faith in the performance of the contract of carriage. Sungas
contention that petitioners admission in open court that the driver of the jeepney failed to assist her in going to
a nearby hospital cannot be construed as an admission of bad faith. The fact that it was the driver of the Isuzu
truck who took her to the hospital does not imply that petitioner was utterly indifferent to the plight of his
injured passenger. If at all, it is merely implied recognition by Verena that he was the one at fault for the
accident. Exsm
 68

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals, dated March 31, 1995, and its resolution, dated
September 11, 1995, are AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the award of moral damages is
DELETED.

SO ORDERED.