UNIVERSITY OF STIRLING

EXAMINATIONS: SPRING SEMESTER 2011

PHILOSOPHY: Materialism and Idealism PHI9HJ

210511

Saturday 21 May 2011 09.00 12.00

Answer THREE questions, drawn from AT LEAST TWO sections.

Section A

1. Is it Lockes view that things are not really coloured? Is such a view defensible?

2. An obscure and relative idea of substance in general being thus made (Locke,
Essay, II xxiii 3). What does Locke mean in calling the general notion of substance a
relative idea? Why does he think it is obscure? Is he right?

3. Either

(a) It has often been suggested that Lockes general account of knowledge is better
suited to a priori knowledge than to empirical knowledge of the world around us. Is
this right?

Or

(b) Assess Lockes response to the scepticism of Descartes dreaming argument.

Section B

4. Is Berkeley right to hold that Lockes materialism leads inevitably to scepticism?

5. Either

(a) An idea can be like nothing but an idea (Berkeley, Principles, 8). Discuss this
principle and the role it plays in Berkeleys argument against the notion of material
substance.

Or

(b) Would it be right to say that, in his initial arguments against the notion of material
substance, Berkeley simply conflates ideas with the qualities they represent?

6. Fourthly, it will be objected that from the foregoing principles it follows, things are
every moment annihilated and created anew (Berkeley, Principles, 45). Evaluate
Berkeleys response to this objection.

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Section C

7. What is the problem addressed in Kants Transcendental Deduction of the categories?

How might a comparison with the earlier theories of Locke and Berkeley help in
explaining Kants approach to this problem?

8. Consequently there must be found in the objects of perception, that is, in the
appearances, the substratum which represents time in general (Kant, Critique of Pure
Reason, B225). Discuss this backdrop thesis and the role it plays in the argument
of the First Analogy.

9. Explain and assess Kants remark that, in the argument of his Refutation of Idealism,
the game played by idealism has been turned against itself (Kant, Critique of Pure
Reason, B276).

PMS

END OF EXAMINATION

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