RULE X of DO No 40-03, Series of 2013

RULE X RUN-OFF ELECTIONS

Section 1. When proper. - When an election which provides for three (3) or more
choices results in none of the contending unions receiving a majority of the valid
votes cast, and there are no objections or challenges which if sustained can
materially alter the results, the Election Officer shall motu propio conduct a run-off
election within ten (10) days from the close of the election proceedings between the
labor unions receiving the two highest number of votes; provided, that the total
number of votes for all contending unions is at least fifty (50%) percent of the
number of votes cast. "No Union" shall not be a choice in the run-off election. Notice
of run-off elections shall be posted by the Election Officer at least five (5) days
before the actual date of run-off election.

Section 2. Qualification of voters. - The same voters' list used in the certification
election shall be used in the run-off election. The ballots in the run-off election shall
provide as choices the unions receiving the highest and second highest number of
the votes cast. The labor union receiving the greater number of valid votes cast
shall be certified as the winner, subject to Section 20, Rule IX.

RULE XVII REGISTRATION OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENTS

Section 1. Where to file. - Within thirty (30) days from execution of a collective
bargaining agreement, the parties thereto shall submit two (2) duly signed copies of
the agreement to the Regional Office which issued the certificate of
registration/certificate of creation of chartered local of the labor unionparty to the
agreement. Where the certificate of creation of the concerned chartered local was
issued by the Bureau, the agreement shall be filed with the Regional Office which
has jurisdiction over the place where it principally operates. Multi-employer
collective bargaining agreements shall be filed with the Bureau.

Section 2. Requirements for registration. - The application for CBA registration shall
be accompanied by the original and two (2) duplicate copies of the following
documents which must be certified under oath by the representative(s) of the
employer(s) and labor union(s) concerned (a) the collective bargaining agreement;
(b) a statement that the collective bargaining agreement was posted in at least two
(2) conspicuous places in the establishment or establishments concerned for at
least five (5) days before its ratification; and (c) a statement that the collective
bargaining agreement was ratified by the majority of the employees in the
bargaining unit of the employer or employers concerned. No other document shall
be required in the registration of collective bargaining agreements.

Section 3. Payment of registration fee. - The certificate of registration of collective

bargaining agreement shall be issued by the Regional Office upon payment of the
prescribed registration fee.

Section 4. Action on the application. - The Regional Office and the Bureau shall act
on applications for registration of collective bargaining agreements within five (5)
days from receipt thereof, either by: (a) approving the application and issuing the
certificate of registration; or (b) denying the application for failure of the applicant
to comply with the requirements for registration. Where the documents supporting
the application are not complete or are not verified under oath, the Regional Office
or the Bureau shall, within five (5) days from receipt of the application, notify the
applicants in writing of the requirements needed to complete the application. Where
the applicants fail to complete the requirements within ten (10) days from receipt of
notice, the application shall be denied without prejudice.

Section 5. Denial of registration; grounds for appeal. - The denial of registration

shall be in writing, stating in clear terms the reasons therefor and served upon the
applicant union and employer within twenty-four (24) hours from issuance. The
denial by the Regional Office of the registration of single enterprise collective
bargaining agreements may be appealed to the Bureau within ten (10) days from
receipt of the notice of denial. The denial by the Bureau of the registration of multi-
employer collective bargaining agreements may be appealed to the Office of the
Secretary within the same period.

The memorandum of appeal shall be filed with the Regional Office or the Bureau, as
the case may be. The same shall be transmitted, together with the entire records of
the application, to the Bureau or the Office of the Secretary, as the case may be,
within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of the memorandum of appeal.

Section 6. Period and manner of disposition of appeal. - The Bureau and the Office
of the Secretary shall resolve the appeal within the same period and in the same
manner prescribed in Rule XI of these Rules. Section 7. Term of representation
status; contract bar rule. - The representation status of the incumbent exclusive
bargaining agent which is a party to a duly registered collective bargaining
agreement shall be for a term of five (5) years from the date of the effectivity of the
collective bargaining agreement. No petition questioning the majority status of the
incumbent exclusive bargaining agent or petition for certification election filed
outside of the sixty-day period immediately preceding the expiry date of such five-
year term shall be entertained by the Department. The five-year representation
status acquired by an incumbent bargaining agent either through single enterprise
collective bargaining or multi-employer bargaining shall not be affected by a
subsequent collective bargaining agreement executed between the same
bargaining agent and the employer during the same five-year period.

Section 8. Re-negotiation of collective bargaining agreements. - All provisions of a

collective bargaining agreement, except the representation status of the incumbent
bargaining agent shall, as a matter of right, be renegotiated not later than three (3)
years after its execution. The re-negotiated collective bargaining agreement shall
be ratified and registered with the same Regional Office where the preceding
agreement was registered. The same requirements and procedure in the
registration of collective bargaining agreements prescribed in the preceding rules
shall be applied.

PHILIPPINE AIRLINES vs. NLRC et al

G.R. No. 132805

Feb. 2, 1999

FACTS: Private respondent Dr. Fabros was employed as flight surgeon at

petitioner company. He was assigned at the PAL Medical Clinic and was on
duty from 4:00 in the afternoon until 12:00 midnight.

On Feb.17, 1994, at around 7:00 in the evening, Dr. FAbros left the clinic to
have his dinner at his residence, which was abou t5-minute drive away. A few
minutes later, the clinic received an emergency call from the PAL Cargo
Services. One of its employeeshad suffered a heart attack. The nurse on duty,
Mr. Eusebio, called private respondent at home to inform him of the
emergency. The patient arrived at the clinic at 7:50 in the evening and Mr.
Eusebio immediately rushed him to the hospital. When Dr. Fabros reached the
clinic at around 7:51 in the evening, Mr. Eusebio had already left with the
patient to the hospital. The patient died the following day.

Upon learning about the incident, PAL Medical Director ordered the Chief
Flight Surgeon to conduct an investigation. In his explanation, Dr. Fabros
asserted that he was entitled to a thirty-minute meal break; that he
immediately left his residence upon being informed by Mr. Eusebio about the
emergency and he arrived at the clinic a few minutes later; that Mr. Eusebio
panicked and brought the patient to the hospital without waiting for him.

Finding private respondents explanation unacceptable, the management

charged private respondent with abandonment of post while on duty. He
denied that he abandoned his post on February 17, 1994. He said that he only
left the clinic to have his dinner at home. In fact, he returned to the clinic at
7:51 in the evening upon being informed of the emergency.

After evaluating the charge as well as the answer of private respondent, he was
given a suspension for three months effective December 16, 1994.

Private respondent filed a complaint for illegal suspension against petitioner.

On July 16, 1996, the Labor Arbiter rendered a decision declaring the
suspension of private respondent illegal. It also ordered petitioner to pay
private respondent the amount equivalent to all the benefits he should have
received during his period of suspension plus P500,000.00 moral damages.

Petitioner appealed to the NLRC.

The NLRC, however, dismissed the appeal after finding that the decision of the
Labor Arbiter is supported by the facts on record and the law on the matter.
The NLRC likewise denied petitioners motion for reconsideration.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

1. WON the nullifying of the 3-month suspension by the NLRC erroneous.

2. WON the awarding of moral damages is proper.

HELD: The petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The portion of the assailed
decision awarding moral damages to private respondent is DELETED. All
other aspects of the decision are AFFIRMED

1. The legality of private respondents suspension: Dr. Fabros left the clinic
that night only to have his dinner at his house, which was only a few minutes
drive away from the clinic. His whereabouts were known to the nurse on duty
so that he could be easily reached in case of emergency. Upon being informed
of Mr. Acostas condition, private respondent immediately left his home and
returned to the clinic. These facts belie petitioners claim of abandonment.
Petitioner argues that being a full-time employee, private respondent is
obliged to stay in the company premises for not less than eight (8) hours.
Hence, he may not leave the company premises during such time, even to take
his meals. We are not impressed. Art. 83 and 85 of the Labor Code read: Art.
83. Normal hours of work. The normal hours of work of any employee shall
not exceed eight (8) hours a day. Health personnel in cities and municipalities
with a population of at least one million (1,000,000) or in hospitals and clinics
with a bed capacity of at least one hundred (100) shall hold regular office
hours for eight (8) hours a day, for five (5) days a week, exclusive of time for
meals, except where the exigencies of the service require that such personnel
work for six (6) days or forty-eight (48) hours, in which case they shall be
entitled to an additional compensation of at least thirty per cent (30%) of their
regular wage for work on the sixth day. For purposes of this Article, health
personnel shall include: resident physicians, nurses, nutritionists, dieticians,
pharmacists, social workers, laboratory technicians, paramedical technicians,
psychologists, midwives, attendants and all other hospital or clinic personnel.
(emphasis supplied) Art. 85. Meal periods. Subject to such regulations as
the Secretary of Labor may prescribe, it shall be the duty of every employer to
give his employees not less than sixty (60) minutes time-off for their regular
meals. Sec. 7, Rule I, Book III of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor
Code further states: Sec. 7. Meal and Rest Periods. Every employer shall
give his employees, regardless of sex, not less than one (1) hour time-off for
regular meals, except in the following cases when a meal period of not less
than twenty (20) minutes may be given by the employer provided that such
shorter meal period is credited as compensable hours worked of the employee;
(a) Where the work is non-manual work in nature or does not involve
strenuous physical exertion; (b) Where the establishment regularly operates
not less than sixteen hours a day; (c) In cases of actual or impending
emergencies or there is urgent work to be performed on machineries,
equipment or installations to avoid serious loss which the employer would
otherwise suffer; and (d) Where the work is necessary to prevent serious loss
of perishable goods. Rest periods or coffee breaks running from five (5) to
twenty (20) minutes shall be considered as compensable working time. Thus,
the eight-hour work period does not include the meal break. Nowhere in the
law may it be inferred that employees must take their meals within the
company premises. Employees are not prohibited from going out of the
premises as long as they return to their posts on time. Private respondents
act, therefore, of going home to take his dinner does not constitute
abandonment. 2. The award of moral damages: Not every employee who is
illegally dismissed or suspended is entitled to damages. As a rule, moral
damages are recoverable only where the dismissal or suspension of the
employee was attended by bad faith or fraud, or constituted an act oppressive
to labor, or was done in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy In the case at bar, there is no showing that the management of
petitioner company was moved by some evil motive in suspending private
respondent. It suspended private respondent on an honest, albeit erroneous,
belief that private respondents act of leaving the company premises to take
his meal at home constituted abandonment of post which warrants the penalty
of suspension. Under the circumstances, we hold that private respondent is
not entitled to moral damages.

G.R. No. 130693 March 4, 2004

MINDANAO STEEL CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
MINSTEEL FREE WORKERS ORGANIZATION (MINFREWO-NFL) CAGAYAN DE
ORO, respondent.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

At bar is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended, assailing the Decision1 dated May 30, 1997 and Resolution2 dated August 22, 1997
rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 40919, entitled "Mindanao Steel Corporation
vs. Atty. Marieto Gallego and Minsteel Free Workers Organization MINFREWO-NFL, Cagayan de
Oro City."
The undisputed facts of this case are as follows:

On June 29, 1990, Mindanao Steel Corporation (herein petitioner) and Minsteel Free Workers
Organization MINFREWO-NFL Cagayan de Oro City (herein respondent) executed a collective
bargaining agreement (CBA) providing for an increase of P20.00 in the workers daily wage.

Prompted by the December 5, 1990 fuel price increase, the Regional Tripartite Wages and
Productivity Board (RTWPB) of Region X, Northern Mindanao, Cagayan de Oro City, issued Interim
Wage Order No. RX-023. This Interim Wage Order granted to all workers4 an emergency cost of
living allowance (ECOLA)5 for three (3) months or from January 7, 1991 to April 6, 1991.

Petitioner refused to implement the Interim Wage Order, prompting respondent to file with the
National Mediation and Conciliation Board (NCMB) a complaint for payment of ECOLA against the
former. Then the parties, in a Submission Agreement dated April 8, 1991, agreed to submit the case
for voluntary arbitration.

After the parties had submitted their position papers and other pleadings, the Voluntary Arbitrator
rendered a Decision dated January 8, 1992 ordering petitioner to pay respondents members and
other workers their ECOLA. Petitioner then filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied in an
Order dated January 28, 1992.

Thereafter, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari with prayer for issuance
of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction.

On May 30, 1997, the Appellate Court promulgated its Decision affirming the Voluntary Arbitrators
Decision dated January 8, 1992 and Order dated January 28, 1992. The Court of Appeals
ratiocinated as follows:

"In the case at bench, Interim Wage Order No. RX-02 was issued specifically to grant
employees a temporary allowance pending the approval of the wage increase being
petitioned by them due to the fuel price hike on December 5, 1990.

"The grant of the P20.00 wage increase under the CBA did not have the purpose of granting
such temporary allowance due to the contingency stated in the subject wage order, but was
actually intended as wage increase to be effective January 1, 1991. Thus, as stated by the
Supreme Court, it should be termed as wage increase, pure and simple, and not part of the
emergency allowance.

"Not to be overlooked is the provision under the CBA which was executed between the
parties herein, Section 3, Article VII of which provides that:

It is hereby agreed that these salary increases shall be exclusive of any wage that may be provided
by law as a result of economic change. (p. 55, rollo)

"There indeed is nothing contrary to law, customs, public order or public policy in a
stipulation subordinating, as does the aforesaid provision in the collective bargaining
 agreement, contractual wage increases to those imposed or prescribed by law. They were
therefore perfectly free to agree thereon, and having thus agreed, are bound by such
stipulation as constituting the law between them." (Filipinas Golf and Country Club, Inc. vs.
NLRC, 176 SCRA 625)

"The increase provided by the subject wage order, moreover, was not intended to be purely a
wage increase, that may be credited to any wage increase granted by employers because of
or in anticipation of the fuel price hike, but for emergency purposes for only three months.

"The petitioner should, therefore, not be entitled to the creditable benefit provided by the
implementing rules and regulations of interim wage order no. RX-02.

"This Court thus finds no grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of excess of jurisdiction
on the part of the respondent voluntary arbitrator in issuing the questioned decision.

"WHEREFORE, THE INSTANT PETITION IS HEREBY DISMISSED FOR LACK OF MERIT.

"SO ORDERED."

On August 22, 1997, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution denying petitioners motion for
reconsideration.

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.

Petitioner contends that it is exempt from paying the ECOLA because pursuant to the CBA, it
already granted a wage increase of P20.00 a day or P523.20 a month effective January 1, 1991.
Likewise, petitioner claims it is entitled to creditable benefits on the basis of Section 7 of Interim
Wage Order No. RX-02 which provides:

"(W)age increases, rice allowance (in kind or cash), and other allowances granted by
employers to their workers because of, or in anticipation of the fuel price hikes on
December 05, 1990 and exclusive of compliance with Wage Order Nos. RX-01 and RX-01-A
are creditable, provided that if the amount is less than that prescribed in this Interim Wage
Order, the employer shall give the difference."

Along the same line, petitioner maintains that under Section 5 of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of Wage Order No. RX-02, its grant of wage increase to its workers pursuant to
the CBA is considered compliance with the Order, thus:

"Section 5. Creditable Benefits - Any wage increases or adjustments granted between

November 22, 1990 and January 06, 1991 shall be considered as compliance with the Order
provided that if the amount is less than that prescribed, the employer shall pay the
difference.

"In addition, any of the following shall be considered as compliance:

 "a. All forms of wage increases granted unilaterally or under collective bargaining
agreement excluding company anniversary increases and those resulting from
regularization, promotion and merit increases.

"b. All kinds of allowances in cash or in kind for whatever purpose, such as
transportation, meal allowance, rice subsidy and others.

"c. All forms of economic assistance such as productivity bonus, housing, bus
services for the family and other similar activities."

Petitioners contentions lack merit.

To begin with, any doubt or ambiguity in the contract between management and the union members
should be resolved in the light of Article 1702 of the Civil Code which provides: "(I)n case of doubt,
all labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be construed in favor of the safety and decent living
for the laborer."6

The basic issue for our resolution is whether or not petitioner is exempt from paying the ECOLA in
light of the CBA entered into by the parties.

Pertinent is Section 3, Article VII of the CBA which provides:

"It is hereby agreed that these salary increases shall be exclusive of any wage increase that may be
provided by law as a result of any economic change."

The above provision is clear that the salary increases, such as the P20.00 provided under the CBA,
shall not include any wage increase that may be provided by law as a result of any economic
change. Hence, aside from the P20.00 CBA wage increase, respondents members are also entitled
to the ECOLA under the Interim Wage Order.

The CBA provision under Section 3, Article VII needs no interpretation. Contracts which are not
ambiguous are to be interpreted according to their literal meaning and not beyond their obvious
intendment. 7

In Mactan Workers Union vs. Aboitiz,8 we held that "the terms and conditions of a collective
bargaining contract constitute the law between the parties. Those who are entitled to its benefits can
invoke its provisions. In the event that an obligation therein imposed is not fulfilled, the aggrieved
party has the right to go to court for redress."

Finally, the P20.00 daily wage increase granted by petitioner to its employees under the CBA can
not be considered as creditable benefit or compliance with the Interim Wage Order because such
was intended as a CBA or negotiated wage increase and not "because of, or in anticipation of the
fuel price hikes on December 5, 1990 x x x."

Thus, the Court of Appeals did not commit any error when it rendered the assailed Decision and
Resolution, the same being consistent with law and jurisprudence.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated May 30, 1997 and Resolution
dated August 22, 1997 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 40919 are AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA SA SULPICIO LINES, INC.NAFLU, RODOLFO ALINDATO,

ROQUE TAN, JESSIE LIM, SUSAN TOPACIO, LYDDA PASCUAL, BERNARDO ALCANTARA,
GELACIO DESQUITADO, RODRIGO AVELINO, LEONARDO ANDRADE, DANILO CHUA,
AMANDO EUGENIO, CALVIN LOPEZ, ANDRES BASCO, JR., and CIRILO ALON, petitioners,
vs.
SULPICIO LINES, INC., respondent.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

A strike is a powerful weapon of the working class. But like a sensitive explosive, it must be handled
carefully, lest it blows up in the workers own hands.1 Thus, the right to strike has to be pursued
within the bounds of law.

For our resolution is the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, as amended, assailing the Decision2 dated May 28, 1999 and the Resolution3 dated
November 25, 1999 rendered by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 51322, entitled
"Samahang Manggagawa sa Sulpicio Lines, Inc. NAFLU vs. National Labor Relations Commission
and Sulpicio Lines, Inc."

The factual antecedents as gleaned from the records are:

On February 5, 1991, Sulpicio Lines, Inc. (herein respondent) and the Samahang Manggagawa sa
Sulpicio Lines Inc. NAFLU (herein petitioner) executed a collective bargaining agreement (CBA)
with a term of five (5) years (from October 17, 1990 to October 16, 1995).

After three (3) years or on December 15, 1993, petitioner union and respondent company started
their negotiation on the CBAs economic provisions.4 But this negotiation remained at stalemate.

On March 1, 1994, petitioner filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation Board (NCMB),
National Capital Region, a notice of strike due to collective bargaining deadlock, docketed as NCMB-
NCR-NS-03-118-94.

For its part, respondent, on March 21, 1994, filed with the Office of the Secretary, Department of
Labor and Employment a petition praying that the Labor Secretary assume jurisdiction over the
controversy.
On March 23, 1994, former Labor Secretary Nieves R. Confesor issued an Order assuming
jurisdiction over the labor dispute pursuant to Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, as amended, thus:

"WHEREFORE PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Office assumes jurisdiction over the labor
dispute at Sulpicio Lines, Inc. pursuant to Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code, as amended.

"Accordingly, any strike or lockout whether actual or intended is hereby enjoined.

"Further, the parties are directed to cease and desist from committing any and all acts that
might exacerbate the situation.

"SO ORDERED."

Meanwhile, on May 20, 1994, petitioner filed with the NCMB a second notice of strike alleging that
respondent company committed acts5 constituting unfair labor practice amounting to union busting,
docketed as NCMB NCR-05-261-94.

Provoked by respondents alleged unfair labor practice/s, petitioner union immediately conducted a
strike vote. Thus, on May 20, 1994, about 9:30 oclock in the morning, 167 rank-and-file employees,
officers and members of petitioner, did not report for work and instead gathered in front of Pier 12,
North Harbor at Manila.

As a remedial measure, former Labor Secretary Confesor issued an Order dated May 20, 1994
directing the striking employees to return to work; and certifying the labor dispute to the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for compulsory arbitration. This certified labor dispute was
docketed as NLRC Case No. CC-0083-94.

Meanwhile, respondent company filed with the NLRC a complaint for "illegal strike/clearance for
termination," docketed as NLRC NCR Case No. 00-05-04705-94.

On September 29, 1995, the NLRC issued a Resolution 6 declaring the strike of petitioners officers
and members illegal, with notice to respondent of the option to terminate their (petitioners officers)
employment. In the same Resolution, the NLRC dismissed petitioners complaint against
respondent, thus:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, after a careful and judicious consideration of the facts,
arguments and evidence thus adduced, it is the considered opinion of thie Commission that
the union (Samahang Manggagawa sa Sulpicio Lines, Inc.) had clearly engaged in an illegal
strike on May 20, 1994, when its officers and members actively participated in a well
concerted refusal, stoppage and cessation to render work at Sulpicio Lines, Inc.. In clear
violation not only of the procedural requirements of a valid strike, but worse, in clear and
blatant contravention of the assumption order of the Secretary of Labor and Employment.
Consequently, the following union officers named in the complaint, to wit:

1) Allan F. Aguhar 9) Rodrigo Avelino

2) Rodolfo Alindato 10) Leonardo Andrade

 3) Roque Tan 11) Danilo Chua

4) Jessie Lim 12) Amando Eugenio

5) Susan Topacio 13) Calvin Lopez

6) Lydda Pascual 14) Andres Rasco, Jr.

7) Bernardo Alcantara 15) Cirilo Alon

8) Gelacio Dequitado

are declared to have lost their employment status with the company, and the latter
may now, if it so desires, terminate their employment with it. The unions complaint
against the company is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

"SO ORDERED."

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the NLRC in a Resolution 7 dated
January 15, 1996.

On March 19, 1996, petitioner filed with this Court a petition for certiorari assailing the NLRC
Resolutions. Pursuant to our ruling in St. Martins Funeral Home vs. NLRC,8 we referred the petition
to the Court of Appeals for its appropriate action and disposition.

On May 28, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision affirming the NLRC Resolutions. The
Appellate Court held (1) that the NLRC has jurisdiction to resolve the issue of legality of the strike;
(2) that the May 20, 1994 temporary work stoppage by the officers and members of petitioner
amounted to an illegal strike; (3) that even assuming that respondent committed unfair labor
practice/s, still, the strike is illegal because it failed to comply with the mandatory procedural
requirements of a valid strike under Article 263 (c) and (f) of the Labor Code, as amended; and (4)
that the dismissal of petitioners officers who knowingly participated in an illegal strike is in
accordance with Article 264 (a) of the Labor Code, as amended.
On October 20, 1995, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the Court of
Appeals in a Resolution dated November 25, 1999.

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner alleged that the Court of Appeals seriously
erred (1) in holding that the one-day work stoppage of petitioners officers and members is an illegal
strike; (2) in sustaining the dismissal from the service of its officers; and (3) in ruling that the NLRC
has jurisdiction over a petition to declare the strike illegal.

The basic issue for our determination is whether the strike staged by petitioners officers and
members is illegal. Articles 263 and 264 of the Labor Code, as amended, provide:

"ART. 263. STRIKES, PICKETING AND LOCKOUTS.

xxx

(c) In cases of bargaining deadlocks, the duly certified or recognized bargaining agent may
file a notice of strike x x x with the Ministry (now Department) at least 30 days before the
intended date thereof. In cases of unfair labor practice, the period of notice shall be 15
days and in the absence of a duly certified or recognized bargaining agent, the notice of
strike may be filed by any legitimate labor organization in behalf of its members. However, in
case of dismissal from employment of union officers duly elected in accordance with the
union constitution and by-laws, which may constitute union busting where the existence
of the union is threatened, the 15-day cooling-off period shall not apply and the union
may take action immediately.

xxx

(f) A decision to declare a strike must be approved by a majority of the total union
membership in the bargaining unit concerned, obtained by secret ballot in meetings
or referenda called for that purpose. x x x. The decision shall be valid for the duration of
the dispute based on substantially the same grounds considered when the strike or lockout
vote was taken. The Ministry (now Department) may at its own initiative or upon the request
of any affected party, supervise the conduct of the secret balloting. In every case, the union
x x x shall furnish the Ministry (now Department) the results of the voting at least
seven days before the intended strike or lockout, subject to the cooling-off period
herein provided.

x x x.

ART. 264. PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES.

(a) No labor organization or employer shall declare a strike or lockout without first having
bargained collectively in accordance with Title VII of this Book or without first having filed the
notice required in the preceding article or without the necessary strike or lockout vote
first having been obtained and reported to the Ministry (now Department).

x x x."

Following are the Implementing Guidelines of the above provisions issued by the Department of
Labor and Employment:
 1. A strike shall be filed with the Department of Labor and Employment at least 15 days if the
issues raised are unfair labor practice or at least 30 days if the issue involved bargaining
deadlock. However, in case of dismissal from employment of union officers duly elected in
accordance with the union constitution and by-laws, which may constitute union busting
where the existence of the union is threatened, the 15-day cooling-off period shall not apply
and the union may take action immediately;

2. The strike shall be supported by a majority vote of the members of the union obtained by
secret ballot in a meeting called for the purpose; and

3. A strike vote shall be reported to the Department of Labor and Employment at least seven
(7) days before the intended strike.

There is no showing that the petitioner union observed the 7-day strike ban; and that the results of
the strike vote were submitted by petitioners to the Department of Labor and Employment at least
seven (7) days before the strike.

We thus hold that for failing to comply with the mandatory requirements of Article 263 (c) and (f) of
the Labor Code, the strike mounted by petitioner union on May 20, 1994 is illegal.

In Gold City Integrated Port Service, Inc. vs. NLRC,9 we stressed that "the language of the law
leaves no room for doubt that the cooling-off period and the seven-day strike ban after the strike-
vote report were intended to be mandatory."

But petitioner insists that the strike can still be declared legal for it was done in good faith, being in
response to what its officers and members honestly perceived as unfair labor practice or union
busting committed by respondent.

Petitioners accusation of union busting is bereft of any proof. We scanned the records very carefully
and failed to discern any evidence to sustain such charge.

In Tiu vs. NLRC,10 we held:

"x x x. It is the union, therefore, who had the burden of proof to present substantial
evidence to support its allegations (of unfair labor practices committed by
management).

"x x x.

"x x x, but in the case at bar the facts and the evidence did not establish even at least a
rational basis why the union would wield a strike based on alleged unfair labor practices it
did not even bother to substantiate during the conciliation proceedings. It is not enough
that the union believed that the employer committed acts of unfair labor practice when
the circumstances clearly negate even a prima facie showing to warrant such a belief."

We explained in National Federation of Labor vs. NLRC11 that "with the enactment of Republic Act
No. 6715 which took effect on March 21, 1989, the rule now is that such requirements as the filing
of a notice of strike, strike vote, and notice given to the Department of Labor are mandatory
in nature. Thus, even if the union acted in good faith in the belief that the company was
committing an unfair labor practice, if no notice of strike and a strike vote were conducted,
the said strike is illegal."
In a desperate attempt to justify its position, petitioner insists that what transpired on May 20, 1994
was not a strike but merely a "one-day work absence" 12 or a "simple act of absenteeism".13

We are not convinced. A strike, as defined in Article 212 (o) of the Labor Code, as amended, means
"any temporary stoppage of work by the concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or
labor dispute." The term "strike" shall comprise not only concerted work stoppages, but also
slowdowns, mass leaves, sitdowns, attempts to damage, destroy or sabotage plant equipment and
facilities, and similar activities.14

The basic elements of a strike are present in the case at bar. First, petitioners officers and members
numbering 167, in a concerted manner, did not report for work on May 20, 1994; second, they
gathered in front of respondents office at Pier 12, North Harbor at Manila to participate in a strike
voting conducted by petitioner; and third, such union activity was an aftermath of petitioners second
notice of strike by reason of respondents unfair labor practice/s. Clearly, what transpired then was a
strike because the cessation of work by petitioners concerted action resulted from a labor dispute.

Invoking compassion, petitioner pleads that its officers who participated in the one-day strike should
not be dismissed from the service, considering that respondents business activities were not
interrupted, much less paralyzed. While we sympathize with their plight, however, we must take care
that in the contest between labor and capital, the results achieved are fair and in conformity with the
law.15

Pertinent is Article 264 (a) of the same Code, thus:

"ART. 264. PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES.

"x x x. Any union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker
or union officer who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a
strike may be declared to have lost his employment status: Provided, That mere
participation of a worker in a lawful strike shall not constitute sufficient ground for termination
of his employment, even if a replacement had been hired by the employer during such lawful
strike.

x x x."

It is worth reiterating that the strike is illegal for failure of petitioner to submit the strike vote to the
Department of Labor and Employment at least seven (7) days prior thereto. Also, petitioner failed to
prove that respondent company committed any unfair labor practice. Amid this background,
the participation of the union officers in an illegal strike forfeits their employment status.

In Telefunken Semiconductors Employees Union-FFW vs. Secretary of Labor and Employment,16 we

explained

"The effects of such illegal strikes, outlined in Article 265 (now Article 264) of the Labor Code,
make a distinction between workers and union officers who participate therein.

"A union officer who knowingly participates in an illegal strike and any worker or union officer
who knowingly participates in the commission of illegal acts during a strike may be declared
to have lost their employment status. An ordinary striking worker cannot be terminated
for mere participation in an illegal strike. There must be proof that he committed
illegal acts during a strike. A union officer, on the other hand, may be terminated from
 work when he knowingly participates in an illegal strike, and like other workers, when
he commits an illegal act during a strike."

Moreover, petitioner maintains that the Labor Arbiter, not the NLRC, should have taken cognizance
of the case at bar. We do not agree.

In International Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor and Employment,17 we held:

x x x [T]he Secretary was explicitly granted by Article 263 (g) of the Labor Code the authority
to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an
industry indispensable to the national interest, and decide the same accordingly.
Necessarily, this authority to assume jurisdiction over the said labor dispute must
include and extend to all questions and controversies arising therefrom, including
cases over which the Labor Arbiter has exclusive jurisdiction (underscoring supplied).

"In the same manner, when the Secretary of Labor and Employment certifies the labor
dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration the latter is concomitantly empowered
to resolve all questions and controversies arising therefrom including cases
otherwise belonging originally and exclusively to the Labor Arbiter."

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated
May 28, 1999 and November 25, 1999 are hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.