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DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197690468.001.0001
CONTENTS
Most days, union negotiations don’t end with assault and battery
charges. But I will not forget one that did: May 2, 2006. Instead of
winding up the day as usual, writing follow-up notes after sitting
down across the negotiations table from the hospital management
and their hired guns, I was writing a statement for the police about
being assaulted by an infamous professional union buster; his
sidekick, a convicted international gunrunner; and seven private
security guards. I had been corralled by these men toward an
elevator in Desert Spring Hospital in Las Vegas. It wasn’t until I
entered it and they piled in behind me that I realized I needed to get
out of the elevator as quickly as possible. But they wouldn’t allow it.
I was positioned at the corner in front of the elevator’s controls
because I had hit the ground-floor button even before they entered.
Once I realized they were all getting into the elevator too, flight-or-
fight panic gripped me, and as the doors began to shut, I reached my
arm out to stop the doors from closing. But Brent Yessin, the chief
union buster, smacked my arm down and turned to pin me against
the wall. I was lifting weights in those days, so I was strong enough
that he had to grab hard and yank to lower my arm, bruising me and
stopping me from moving; that is technically what constitutes assault
and battery in police report lingo. As I later testified in legal
proceedings, the worst wasn’t the hit to the arm. What left me
shaking for months was an even more malicious, insidious act:
pressing his body, with an erect penis, into my body and holding me
there until the doors opened. That elevator ride under him may have
been a minute. It felt like hours.
This was explicit sexual violence. If the Me Too movement had
been more prominent in 2006, surely the incident would have been
national news—had we chosen to publicize it. But we didn’t, because
to call any media attention to it would be a win for the employer in a
set of the hardest negotiations I’ve ever led. Fights with union
busters, even if today’s Pinkertons are less likely to use machine guns
in the United States, really are that ugly.
The union buster’s goal was only partially to intimidate me directly.
Any fire he could start between me as the workers’ chief negotiator
and the negotiating committee—or between the negotiating
committee and the rest of the workforce—would do. Any cloud of
suspicion, whatever sexist nonsense he tried to leverage, could be
lethal to my legitimacy among the workers. This is all par for the
course in the repertoire of the nation’s top “union avoidance”
consultants, and it meant, as disgusting as it was, that we had to be
extremely disciplined. Thus, our strategy was to move right past the
attack, publicly, and keep focused on the immediate challenge:
beating an election to decertify the union that was to be held forty-
eight hours later under the auspices of the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB).
I had come to that United Health Services (UHS) hospital that
fateful day in May at the behest of several well-respected nurses who
had been in negotiations with me since that morning. The session
had been a useless slog, since the hospital’s negotiators believed that
just two days later, they were going to win the decertification
election. In their minds, how could they lose? They’d been running a
terror campaign inside the hospital for several months up to that
point, behaving in slightly less offensive but no less intimidating ways
than I had experienced in the elevator. From their vantage point, why
bother offering anything at negotiations on May 2 when, on May 4,
they would be done with having to negotiate with their workers
altogether?
During our lunch caucus on May 2, nurses were getting calls that
there were more private security guards and men in suits stationed
all over the facility than they had ever seen. The nurses asked me to
go to the hospital after negotiations to do a walk-through to
encourage the troops right before the vote. That was how I came to
end a long day of negotiations giving a statement to the police.
Two days later, the workers, having built a rock-solid organization,
would handily defeat their employer and retain their union. This was
no small feat. But they would soon learn that the decertification
election was only the opening salvo in management’s attempt to
destroy their organization, and their hopes for improving patient care
outcomes and winning better wages, not to mention a healthcare
plan that would allow them to afford the kind of health care that they
themselves provided. Over the course of the next nine months, the
union busters never gave up. Hospital management swapped out the
first lawyer they had hired (apparently he was too polite to the
nurses) for a legendarily ruthless lawyer named Larry Arnold.
Employers who hired Arnold had one objective only: destroy the
union by negotiating them to death. Never arrive at a deal, wait until
the contract has expired, declare impasse, and implement their last-
best-final offer.
Six months later, by early November, we were still in negotiations.
Although we had reached tentative agreements on some minor
articles in the contract—for example, drug-testing rules and paid time
off for jury duty—practically speaking we were nowhere. It was time
for us to put an end to the nonsense the only way we could: by
informing the employer that we would be holding a vote among all
workers on the current proposal from management. If the workers
accepted management’s offer on the table, we’d wrap it up. But if
they voted it down, the next vote would be a vote to authorize a
strike. By early December, the first hospital strikes Las Vegas had
ever seen were underway. By the second day, with two important
emergency departments in downtown Vegas semi–out of commission,
Nevada’s governor invoked a little-used part of the state constitution
to declare a state of emergency, mandating us to go back to work for
a defined sixty-day cooling-off period while the contract would be
decided in negotiations with a gubernatorially appointed mediator.
That the workers, after months of employer abuse, were strong and
strike ready is a reflection of the level of organization they had built.
Never letting a delay go to waste, the employer ratcheted up the
sense of futility inside the hospitals, driving a message that the
nurses would never win, no matter what. The governor’s order
afforded that I could pick one person only—not a worker—to join me
to go up against Larry Arnold and whoever else Arnold chose for our
two-on-two match-up. My choice was Larry Fox, a former leader of
District 1199 New England and one of the smartest negotiators alive.
The governor’s special mediator, however, was to be the longtime and
highly respected CEO of the Harrah’s casino empire, Phil Satre.1 Satre
gave us a fighting chance because he came with prestige, influence,
and power, quite unlike a typical mediator assigned by, say, the
Federal Mediation and Conciliation Services (FMCS). We had already
been using a good mediator, the best the FMCS had, assigned for
many months before the strike; obviously that hadn’t helped. Satre
was perfect for the case because he understood how to work with a
strong union and prove a company could still make boatloads of
profit while respecting the basic needs of his employees through
collective bargaining, because he had been doing it with the powerful
casino workers’ union for over a decade.
Satre accepted the formidable task of mediating this dispute on
condition that it take place in Reno, where he lived, and he offered
some executive meeting space in the basement of Harrah’s world
headquarters. This put 420-plus miles between me and the workers,
the entire basis of our power. I was regularly reporting via
videoconferencing with them in big group meetings where they sat
together in Vegas, but being locked in a room with two of the most
immoral and offensive management types I’d ever encountered was
as far from my vision of negotiations as one could imagine. The
agreement we achieved on day sixty was historic for our side, but not
because I was especially clever in that room. It was because the
workers had built real power in the workplace over the course of the
negotiations, intensively involved a broad base of workers in hashing
out our demands, and made clear that our ability to execute and
sustain a supermajority strike was the bedrock of our power in
negotiations and beyond. In the end, we won and won big.
Merely winning any contract, and thus the right to save the union
and fight another day, was the minimum goal the national union had
hoped for, and that alone would have been a success. But after the
yearlong war waged by hired consultants with a blank check for
spending, we were determined to do justice by these hospital
workers, win real material gains, and restore the dignity and respect
that the twelve hundred nurses and skilled technicians who had been
put through hell deserved. It was historic because it involved the first
hospital strikes in Vegas, because we beat one of the most notorious
union-busting consultants and one of the most vicious lawyers, and
also because the gains were huge, including 100 percent fully
employer-paid family healthcare plans, staffing rules the nurses never
imagined winning, and eyepopping raises. The ratification votes were
overwhelming, and the joy, not just relief, led to days of parties and
celebrations inside and outside the hospitals.
Working on a few parallel campaigns in different Nevada hospitals
and with some large public sector units that year, I gained a lot of
experience with a wide variety of employers, who took some
dramatically different approaches to negotiating. Not all of the fights
were as brutal as the battle royale at Desert Spring, but across the
board I found that certain patterns led to durable success. Because
my early observations and experiences of union negotiations were
with what is now called SEIU 1199 New England (1199NE)—a division
of the national union known colloquially as 1199 in the old days—I
had already learned that having more workers in the room was a
good idea. It provided efficiencies by enabling real-time fact-checking
of management’s claims. Having every type of worker and worker
classification present allowed for faster, better decision-making. If my
early training in 1199NE had predisposed me toward electing
representative committees of workers, my experience in a right-to-
work-for-less state where union membership and dues are opt-in
would quickly dispose me to fully open the negotiations process to all
workers whom the contract covered.
My own practice has evolved from opening the negotiations room
itself to setting a goal of having every worker show up at
negotiations at least once, even if only for one hour at a shift change.
I developed tools like Article Committees, which involved loads of
workers not formally elected to the negotiations teams but structured
into negotiations by becoming resident experts on the issues they
cared most about in the contract. The more that workers participate,
the more they understand, and the more action they’re willing to take
to win. With time I learned that, to build maximum power, every
single step of the negotiating process—from information requests and
member surveys to offering counterproposals and ultimatums at the
table—must be made into an opportunity for organizing through
intentional, mass participation. The informed, invested, and conscious
worker organization built by structured high-participation negotiations
is then also ready and willing to exercise that power lying behind its
demands, to move a stonewalling employer, to deflate the fiercest
union busters, and to turn the words on the page into conditions
enforced in practice.
Given how the United States had developed by the time I became
a negotiator in the early 2000s, the ideological terrain was and still is
such that negotiations must have other goals, including strengthening
the workers’ organization and the labor movement as a whole. At a
minimum, this is because enforcing even the best labor contract
relies primarily on the workers themselves. Given the grip that social
media and huge misinformation campaigns have on the population at
large, workers included, negotiations must also be used as a central
tool for mass-scale political education. What scenario could be better
for workers to learn which side politicians are on than when
delegations of workers themselves seek their active support in trying
to reach an agreement against large, intransigent multinational
corporations making record profits?
The best advice in print that a union negotiator serious about
winning can turn to was written by David Rosenfeld, one of the
smartest labor lawyers in the United States. In his 1995 report titled
“Offensive Bargaining,” he lays out how to turn employers’ vicious
tactics against them, how to use information requests to avert an
impasse, and much more. It is brilliant as a starting guide, but it has
long been tough to find. You had to have a mentor like mine who
shoves it in your hands and says, “Read this, build power, get to
work.”
This book is a continuation of the core thesis laid out in No
Shortcuts: Organizing for Power in the New Gilded Age. In that
volume, I argue that the chief factor that scholars overlook and that
is absent from the literature on union decline is the one factor that
unions and workers can control: our own strategy. Obviously,
globalization and automation have had a profound impact, along with
an ever more hostile legal climate. This book continues to address
the primary and insufficiently addressed question of what to do given
the endlessly analyzed structural constraints. Thus, this book is also
about changing existing union strategy, but this time the focus is on
the collective bargaining process.
The devastating impact of the COVID pandemic—the unequal
access to vaccines, needed care, and income supports—is a
disgusting reminder of why the working class the world over needs
more power. One result of the pandemic, however, is a new upsurge
in worker organizing. Forced to labor without basic safety protections
while upper management sheltered in place, including on their
yachts, workers began to fight back. By the summer of 2022, workers
in over two hundred Starbucks stores; Amazon workers in Staten
Island, New York; and workers at Apple, Trader Joe’s, and REI retail
stores, to name a few, succeeded in winning NLRB elections in
sectors of the economy previously immune to unions. How they
negotiate their first contracts will be crucial to determining the kinds
of unions they become: implements that workers actively use to
change their lives, or sluggish organizations that settle for much less
than can be won. This book is for every worker already in a union, for
every worker fighting to get one, and for the many workers who will
be in tough negotiations with employers as workers battle for justice
on the other end of the pandemic. This book extends the theory and
logic of high-participation organizing into high-participation
negotiations.
—Jane F. McAlevey
Notes on Methodology
This book began as a report for the University of California, Berkeley
Labor Center. It grew out of an interest in studying how a high-
participation approach to negotiations—particularly big, transparent,
and open contract campaigns—transformed the balance of power at
the bargaining table and strength of the unions involved.
Surveying the terrain of recent contract struggles in the United
States, we first created a survey interview tool that aimed to dissect
each aspect of the collective bargaining process. (The survey
interview tool is included in the appendix.) After reworking this core
document several times, based on feedback from practitioners and
academic researchers alike, we used the survey to identify cases that
could meet most if not all the criteria we deemed vital to a high-
participation negotiations process. It was challenging to find many
cases that met our minimum threshold to exemplify high-participation
campaigns, which reflects the paucity of worker involvement in
today’s union negotiations. We explicitly set out to include a mix of
types of workers by sector, geography, gender, race, and ethnicity,
though fully representative coverage was not possible, given the
limited number of cases in which this approach has been applied.
Then we conducted semistructured interviews with fifty-eight rank-
and-file workers and current lead strategists in the contract
campaigns selected, identifying their strategic decisions and their
evaluations of the nature of and reasons for their success. This was
complemented with archival research on each case’s strategic
planning documents to develop a concrete timeline, and to evaluate
the turning points in the campaigns as participants identified them.
Analysis of this data identified the mechanisms of their wins,
examining how high levels of participation were built, and the effect
of such participation on the process of negotiations.
This book covers public sector and private sector workplaces in
small towns, big cities, and two countries. It covers single-employer
and multiemployer negotiations. It spans workforces that have high
levels of ethnic, racial, and gender diversity, and others that are less
diverse. Some of the unions are wall-to-wall units, meaning all the
workers are in the union except those in management (referred to as
an industrial approach), and some of the unions involve only a
portion of the workforce, such as nurses or teachers (known as craft
unionism). In these case studies, some workers struck to win
contract demands; others took strike votes and won their demands
on the power of a credible strike threat. In all of these cases, the
application of high-participation methods to contract negotiations, in
different combinations, were the key to a transformative settlement.
In selecting our cases, we sought radical transparency as the
starting point for the negotiations process: this foundational practice
can kick off the transformation of a union and lead to greater overall
worker participation in the life of the organization, but transparency
absent robust organizing is insufficient. From the baseline of
transparency, we then added other criteria and elements that
enhance workers’ understanding of what it means to be unionized.
We sought unions that hold elections for their negotiations teams. We
looked for unions that have big bargaining teams, as opposed to the
typical small ones. We searched for unions that practice open
negotiations, by which we mean open to all workers covered by the
collective bargaining agreement. The nine sets of negotiations
discussed in this book were conducted between 2016 and 2021; they
involve six unions in which workers achieved breakthroughs of all
sorts and in some negotiations achieved the best standards in their
industry in their country. These case studies show that even among a
smaller set of unions practicing a quite different approach to the
closed, top-down version of negotiations, significant variation exists.
Our work is in the tradition of scholar-activist action research,
where skills from academic training are put to use to produce
actionable knowledge, in collaboration with practitioners in the field,
about how to make change happen.18 Central to this methodology—
as much as to the book’s core argument—is the recognition that
people in their day-to-day working lives are developing knowledge
about how their workplace, employer, and community all operate.
The role of the researcher, like the role of an organizer in the high-
participation approach, is to help workers systematize that
knowledge, sharing specialized experience and methods learned in
years of studying and testing approaches to change on the ground.
Funnily enough, most of the action research around workplaces
focuses on scholars assisting management in accomplishing their
goals.19 The little that is focused on action research in collaboration
with unions concentrates more tightly on studying work processes
and working conditions—important research, but different from the
goal of this book.20 This book applies the methodology to the efforts
workers undertake to change those conditions, in organizing
themselves through their unions into structures capable of
negotiating with their employers in a highly unfavorable legal
environment. In doing so, it examines how the mechanisms for
creating a high-participation union transform the negotiations process
in the workers’ favor.
It is crucial to recognize that each of these cases features
intelligent people—workers—adapting the methods indicated by the
high-participation theory of change to their own circumstances, and
thus a great deal of the testing of the theory in the process takes
place by the actors themselves. By engaging in detailed process
tracing in each of these diverse cases, the most striking thing we
noted was the similarity of outcomes and of worker leaders’
explanations for why they succeeded. Presenting these cases in
narrative form, then, allows for broader readership for the worker
leaders’ insights, which is consistent with our goal to make the
knowledge generated by the researchers and the worker leaders
relevant to workers in a variety of settings trying to see how they can
build power to win, as much as to researchers seeking to understand
how these processes can work.
This research is, of course, partisan. We aren’t interested in hiding
that we want the workers to win—and win big. By presenting in detail
how each of these successful unions’ high-participation activities
helped propel them toward transformative victories in contract
negotiations across very different industrial, political, and legal
terrains, we hope to show the myriad ways that people in these
campaigns turned their diverse starting situations into durable
victories by applying a series of principles to the work.
Anyone studying society is part of the very thing they’re studying.
In action research, this situation is not only unavoidable but serves as
an enabling condition for work as a scholar-activist.21 As a longtime
practitioner in the field, who has also trained many organizers on the
basis of practical theory-testing in the field, the influence of the
approach McAlevey has been refining can be documented even in
cases in which she was not directly involved. This is another
difference in action research: the workers are made aware of the
theory of change and are actively applying and revising it. We see
this as an asset to the relevance of this kind of writing to researchers
as well, even if it may come in an unfamiliar format.
This kind of study naturally produces a different form of knowledge
from a controlled set of case studies. There is indeed no official
control group here, other than the obvious background of decades of
concessionary contracts and declining union power, which McAlevey
has argued elsewhere has more to do with a no- to low-participation
strategy rather than simply a hostile legal climate, globalization, or
automation.22 Even critics of this approach agree that these
campaigns—where McAlevey has worked as organizer, negotiator, or
coach—stand out against a widespread norm of failure and
compromise.23
Certainly, we need more data, more research, and more future
evidence. We hope this book expands the use of the high-
participation approach in the field and sharpens reflection on how
workers can win big in negotiations. So far, the earlier report from
which this book was hatched, as well as national and international
online discussion groups around it, have already begun to have an
impact in the field. We hope more will join the conversation and,
more importantly, join in winning.
The Chapters
The book is structured as follows. In chapter 1, we lay out the
playbook, element by element, of the kind of approach to
negotiations this book discusses. From experience and from close
study of our cases of successful contract negotiations where masses
of workers took the central role, we distill the principal components
into a kind of ideal type of a maximal and comprehensive high-
participation, transparent, big, and open approach to negotiations.
In the following chapters, we present in narrative form our findings
about how the process of winning unfolded in each case, highlighting
the high-participation factors workers whom we interviewed and we
agree most contributed to worker power at the negotiating table. The
cases we profile each demonstrate key components of the approach
we are studying, testing in practice, and improving.
The first and final cases (chapters 2 and 7), in which McAlevey was
a central participant, show a self-consciously maximalist application
of the high-participation model, as close as it gets to methodically
reproducing an ideal type in the messiness and rapidly shifting
timelines of actually existing fights (see Chart 2).
CHART 2. Negotiations Discussed in This Book
This is a very funny contract. It’s very different than a contract that you will sign for anything
else. If you sign a contract to buy furniture, a car, a house, or anything else, and if the
contract isn’t lived up to, you go to court and you ask a judge to enforce it. This contract is
enforced by somebody else. It is enforced by you.
Bernie Mintor, 1199 Handbook, Members Basic Information (undated, about 1973)
31. Sitting over the fire will make her chilly, nervous, dyspeptic,
and dispirited. It will cause her to be more chilly, and thus will make
her more susceptible of catching cold; and it will frequently produce
chilblains. If she be cold, the sitting over the fire will only warm her
for the time, and will make her feel more starved when she leaves it.
Crouching over the fire, as many do, is ruination to health and
strength and comeliness! Sitting over the fire will make her nervous:
the heat from the fire is weakening beyond measure to the nerves. It
will disorder and enfeeble her stomach—for nothing debilitates the
stomach like great heat—and thus make her dyspeptic; and if she be
dyspeptic, she will, she must be dispirited. The one follows the other
as surely as the night follows the day.
32. If sitting over the fire be hurtful, sitting with the back to the
fire is still more so. The back to the fire often causes both sickness
and faintness, injures the spine, and weakens the spinal marrow, and
thus debilitates the whole frame.
33. A walk on a clear, frosty morning is as exhilarating to the
spirits as the drinking of champagne—with this difference, that on
the day following the head is improved by the one, but not always by
the other. Simple nature’s pleasures are the most desirable—they
leave no sting behind them!
34. There is nothing like a long walk to warm the body and to
make the blood course merrily through the blood-vessels. I consider
it to be a great misfortune that my fair countrywomen do not use
their legs more and their carriages less. “As to exercise, few women
care to take it for mere health’s sake. The rich are too apt to think
that riding in a close varnish-smelling carriage ought to be a very
good substitute for muscular struggles in the open air.”[9]
35. Unfortunately this is an age of luxury. Everything is artificial,
and disease and weakness, and even barrenness, follow as a matter of
course. In proof of my assertion that this is an age of luxury, look at
the present sumptuous style of living: carriages rolling about in every
direction; dining-tables groaning under the weight of rich dinners,
and expensive wines flowing like water; grand dresses sweeping the
streets, almost doing away with the necessity for scavengers. I say,
advisedly, streets; for green fields are, unfortunately, scarcely ever
visited by ladies. We are almost, in extravagance, rivaling ancient
Rome just before luxury sapped her strength and laid her in ruins!
36. If a lady has to travel half a mile she must have her carriage.
Strange infatuation! Is she not aware that she has hundreds of
muscles that want exercising? that she has lungs that require
expanding? that she has nerves that demand bracing? that she has
blood that needs circulating? And how does she think that the
muscles can be exercised, that the lungs can be expanded, that the
nerves can be braced, and that the blood can be properly circulated,
unless these are all made to perform their proper functions by an
abundance of walking exercise? It is utterly impossible!
37. Does she desire to be strong? Then let her take exercise! Does
she hope to retain her bloom and her youthful appearance, and still
to look charming in the eyes of her husband? Then let her take
exercise! Does she wish to banish nervousness and low spirits? Then
let her take exercise! There is nothing standing still in Nature: if it
were, creation would languish and die. There is a perpetual motion!
And so must we be constantly employed (when not asleep), if we are
to be healthy and strong! Nature will not be trifled with; these are
her laws[10]—immutable and unchangeable, and we cannot infringe
them with impunity:
“Labor is life! ’Tis the still water faileth;
Idleness ever despaireth, bewaileth;
Keep the watch wound, for the dark night assaileth;
Flowers droop and die in the stillness of noon.
Labor is glory! The flying cloud lightens;
Only the waving wing changes and brightens;
Idle hearts only the dark future frightens;
Play the sweet keys, would’st thou keep them in tune!”