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Pluralisms in Truth
and Logic
Edited by
Jeremy Wyatt
Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen
Nathan Kellen
Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy
Series Editors
Vincent Hendricks
University of Copenhagen
Copenhagen, Denmark
Duncan Pritchard
University of Edinburgh
Edinburgh, UK
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Jeremy Wyatt
Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen • Nathan Kellen
Editors
Pluralisms in Truth
and Logic
Editors
Jeremy Wyatt Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen
Underwood International College Underwood International College
Yonsei University Yonsei University
Incheon, South Korea Incheon, South Korea
Nathan Kellen
University of Connecticut,
Storrs, CT, USA
Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy

ISBN 978-3-319-98345-5 ISBN 978-3-319-98346-2 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98346-2
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Preface
Pluralism has made inroads into a number of areas in philosophy. This

edited collection brings together 18 state-of-the-art articles on pluralism
about truth and logic.
We first discussed the possibility of an edited collection shortly after
the Truth Pluralism and Logical Pluralism Conference, held at the
University of Connecticut in April of 2015. Following this conference,
several additional pluralism-related events took place, including three
workshops hosted by the Cogito Research Centre at the University of
Bologna in 2015 and 2016 and Pluralisms Week, hosted by the Pluralisms
Global Research Network and the Veritas Research Center at Yonsei
University in June of 2016. A fair number of contributors were given the
chance to present and discuss their work at one or several of these events.
The University of Connecticut, University of Bologna, and Yonsei
University all provided financial support. We gratefully acknowledge
their support. Two of the editors, Pedersen and Wyatt, would also like to
thank the National Research Foundation of Korea for support (grants no.
2013S1A2A2035514 and 2016S1A2A2911800).
We are grateful to many colleagues who share our interest in pluralism.
Their collegial, constructive ways of conducting research and discussions
are much appreciated. We are grateful to many people who, in some way
or another, have helped along the way. These include Jc Beall, Elke
Brendel, Colin Caret, Roy Cook, Douglas Edwards, Will Gamester,
v
vi Preface
Patrick Greenough, Sungil Han, Jinho Kang, Jiwon Kim, Junyeol Kim,
Seahwa Kim, Teresa Kouri Kissel, Kris McDaniel, Graham Priest, Agustín
Rayo, Greg Restall, Jisoo Seo, Stewart Shapiro, Gila Sher, Paul Simard
Smith, Erik Stei, Elena Tassoni, Pilar Terrés, Cory D. Wright, Crispin
Wright, Andy D. Yu, Luca Zanetti, and Elia Zardini. Special thanks go to
Filippo Ferrari, Michael P. Lynch, Sebastiano Moruzzi, and Joe Ulatowski.
Incheon, South Korea Jeremy Wyatt

Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen
Storrs, CT, USA Nathan Kellen
Contents
Part I Truth 1
Introduction 3
Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen, Jeremy Wyatt, and Nathan Kellen
Truth: One or Many or Both? 35

Dorit Bar-On and Keith Simmons
Truth Pluralism, Quasi-Realism, and the Problem of Double-

Counting 63
Michael P. Lynch
The Metaphysics of Domains 85

Douglas Edwards
Strong Truth Pluralism107

Seahwa Kim and Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen
vii
viii Contents
Methodological Pluralism About Truth131

Nathan Kellen
Normative Alethic Pluralism145

Filippo Ferrari
Truth in English and Elsewhere: An Empirically-Informed

Functionalism169
Jeremy Wyatt
Part II Logic 197
Core Logic: A Conspectus199

Neil Tennant
Connective Meaning in Beall and Restall’s Logical Pluralism217

Teresa Kouri Kissel
Generalised Tarski’s Thesis Hits Substructure237

Elia Zardini
Logical Particularism277
Gillman Payette and Nicole Wyatt
Logical Nihilism301
Aaron J. Cotnoir
Varieties of Logical Consequence by Their Resistance to

Logical Nihilism331
Gillian Russell
Contents ix
Part III Connections 363
Pluralism About Pluralisms365

Roy T. Cook
A Plea for Immodesty: Alethic Pluralism, Logical Pluralism,

and Mixed Inferences387
Chase B. Wrenn
Logic for Alethic, Logical, and Ontological Pluralists407

Andy D. Yu
Pluralisms: Logic, Truth and Domain-Specificity429

Rosanna Keefe
Aletheic and Logical Pluralism453

Kevin Scharp
Index473
Notes on Contributors
Dorit Bar-On is Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, and

Director of the Expression, Communication, and the Origins of Meaning
Research Group, University of Connecticut. Bar-On is well known for her work
in philosophy of language, mind, and metaethics. She is author of Speaking My
Mind: Expression and SelfKnowledge (Clarendon Press, 2004) and has published
in journals such as The Journal of Philosophy, Mind & Language, Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research, Noûs, Synthese, and Philosophical Studies.
Roy T. Cook is Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, University
of Minnesota. Cook specializes in the philosophy of logic, philosophical logic,
philosophy of mathematics, and aesthetics. He is the author of Paradoxes (Polity,
2013) and The Yablo Paradox: An Essay on Circularity (OUP, 2014), as well as
many papers in journals such as Mind, Analysis, Journal of Symbolic Logic,
Philosophia Mathematica, and Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
Aaron J. Cotnoir is Senior Lecturer, Department of Philosophy, University of
St Andrews. Cotnoir’s work is centered around metaphysics and philosophical
logic. He is the editor of Composition as Identity (OUP, 2014, with Donald
Baxter) and co-author of Mereology (OUP, forthcoming). His articles have
appeared in Journal of Philosophy, Mind, Noûs, Australasian Journal of Philosophy,
and more.
Douglas Edwards is Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Department of
Philosophy, Utica College. Edwards’ research centers around metaphysics, the
philosophy of language, and metaethics. He is the author of Properties (Polity,
xi
xii Notes on Contributors
2014) and The Metaphysics of Truth (OUP, 2018) and the editor of Truth: A
Contemporary Reader (Bloomsbury, under contract). His articles have appeared
in a number of journals, including the Journal of Philosophy, Australasian Journal
of Philosophy, and Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, amongst others.
Filippo Ferrari is Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the Institute of Philosophy,
University of Bonn. His research focuses primarily on two clusters of topics: the
normative aspects of enquiry and the debate about the nature of truth. He has
published his work in journals such as Mind, Synthese, Analysis, and Philosophical
Quarterly.
Rosanna Keefe is Professor of Philosophy and Head, Department of
Philosophy, University of Sheffield. Keefe specializes in philosophy of logic, phi-
losophy of language, and metaphysics. She is the author of Theories of Vagueness
(Cambridge, 2000) and numerous articles in journals such as Mind, Analysis,
Philosophical Studies, Australasian Journal of Philosophy, and Synthese.
Nathan Kellen works at the Department of Philosophy, University of
Connecticut. Kellen’s work is on truth, the philosophy of logic, philosophy of
mathematics, and ethics. Currently his main research project is an investigation
of truth pluralism and logical pluralism. He explores both of these views indi-
vidually but likewise examines how they might be connected.
Seahwa Kim is Professor of Philosophy and Dean, Scranton College, Ewha
Womans University. Kim specializes in metaphysics and the philosophy of
mathematics. Her articles have appeared in journals such as Australasian Journal
of Philosophy, Philosophical Studies, and Erkenntnis.
Teresa Kouri Kissel is Assistant Professor, Department of Philosophy, Old
Dominion University. Kouri Kissel specializes in philosophy of logic, philoso-
phy of mathematics, and mathematical and philosophical logic. Her dissertation
develops a new, neoCarnapian form of logical pluralism. Her articles have
appeared in Philosophia Mathematica, Erkenntnis, and Topoi.
Michael P. Lynch is Professor of Philosophy and Director, Humanities
Institute, University of Connecticut. Lynch’s work focuses on questions in meta-
physics, the philosophy of language, epistemology, and metaethics. He is author
of Truth in Context (MIT, 1998), True to Life (MIT, 2004), and Truth as One
and Many (OUP, 2009), as well as two books for popular audiences and a num-
ber of different articles in journals such as Philosophical Quarterly, Australasian
Journal of Philosophy, and Philosophical Studies.
Notes on Contributors xiii
Gillman Payette is Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of British Columbia.

His main research interests are philosophical logic and the philosophy of logic.
He has published in journals such as Journal of Philosophical Logic, Australasian
Journal of Philosophy, Synthese, Logique et Analyse, and Notre Dame Journal of
Formal Logic.
Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen is Associate Professor of Philosophy and Director of
the UIC Research Institute and Veritas Research Center, Underwood
International College, Yonsei University. He has been the principal investigator
of several collaborative research projects. Pedersen’s main research areas are truth,
epistemology, and metaphysics. He has published in journals such as Noûs,
Analysis, Philosophical Quarterly, Synthese, Erkenntnis, and The Monist. He is a
coeditor of New Waves in Truth (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), Truth and Pluralism:
Current Debates (Oxford University Press, 2013), Epistemic Pluralism (Palgrave
Macmillan, 2017), Epistemic Entitlement (Oxford University Press, 2019), and
The Routledge Handbook of Social Epistemology (2019).
Gillian Russell is Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy,
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. Russell specializes on the philoso-
phy of language, philosophy of logic, and epistemology. She is the author of
Truth in Virtue of Meaning: A Defence of the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction (OUP,
2008) and her articles have appeared in journals such as Journal of Philosophical
Logic, Philosophical Studies, and Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
Kevin Scharp is Reader in Philosophy, Department of Philosophy and Director,
Arché Philosophical Research Centre, University of St Andrews. Scharp special-
izes in the philosophy of language, logic, metaphysics, philosophy of science,
and the history of analytic philosophy. He is the author of Replacing Truth (OUP,
2013) and numerous articles in journals such as The Philosophical Review,
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Erkenntnis, and Philosophical Studies.
Keith Simmons is Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy,
University of Connecticut. Simmons specializes in logic, philosophy of lan-
guage, and metaphysics. He is the author of Universality and the Liar (OUP,
1993) and has had articles appear in Philosophical Studies, Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research, and Journal of Philosophical Logic, amongst other
journals.
Neil Tennant is Arts and Humanities Distinguished Professor of Philosophy,
Department of Philosophy, Ohio State University. Tennant specializes in logic,
philosophy of mathematics, and the philosophy of language. He is the author of
xiv Notes on Contributors
a number of books, including The Taming of the True (OUP, 2002) and Changes
of Mind: An Essay on Rational Belief Revision (OUP, 2012). His articles have
appeared in many journals, including Mind, Philosophia Mathematica, Review of
Symbolic Logic, and Noûs.
Chase B. Wrenn is Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy,
University of Alabama. Wrenn’s research focuses on truth, epistemology, and the
philosophy of mind and cognitive science. He is the author of Truth (Polity,
2014) and has had articles appear in journals including Australasian Journal of
Philosophy, Erkenntnis, Synthese, and The Philosophical Quarterly.
Jeremy Wyatt is Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Underwood International
College, Yonsei University. Wyatt’s main research interests are the philosophy of
language, metaphysics, and truth. His articles have appeared in Philosophical
Studies, Philosophical Quarterly, American Philosophical Quarterly, and Inquiry.
Andy D. Yu is JD student, University of Toronto. Yu completed a D.Phil. the-
sis (Fragmented Truth) at the University of Oxford. He works on philosophical
logic, the philosophy of language, metaphysics, and epistemology. He has pub-
lished in the Journal of Philosophy, Philosophical Quarterly, and Thought.
Elia Zardini is MidCareer FCT Fellow, LanCog Research Group, University of
Lisbon. Zardini specializes in logic and epistemology and has had articles appear
in many journals, including The Review of Symbolic Logic, Philosophical Studies,
Analysis, and Journal of Philosophical Logic. He is also the editor or coeditor of
Scepticism and Perceptual Justification (OUP, 2014), Substructural Approaches to
Paradox (special issue of Synthese, forthcoming), The Sorites Paradox (CUP, forth-
coming), and The A Priori: Its Significance, Grounds, and Extent (OUP,
forthcoming).
List of Figures
Truth in English and Elsewhere: An Empirically-Informed

Functionalism
Fig. 1 Alethic functionalism 173
Fig. 2 Consistency of interlinguistic and intralinguistic pluralism 177
Fig. 3 Updated functionalism 184
Core Logic: A Conspectus
Fig. 1 From classical logic to core logic 203
Fig. 2 Important system containments 204
Varieties of Logical Consequence by Their Resistance to Logical
Nihilism
Fig. 1 A truth-table proof of Modus tollens 343
Fig. 2 A paraconsistent truth-table of Modus tollens 344
xv
Part I
Truth
Introduction
Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen, Jeremy Wyatt,
and Nathan Kellen
1 Pluralisms
The history of philosophy displays little consensus or convergence when
it comes to the nature of truth. Radically different views have been pro-
posed and developed. Some have taken truth to be correspondence with
reality, while others have taken it to be coherence with a maximally coher-
ent set of beliefs. Yet others have taken truth to be what it is useful to
believe, or what would be believed at the end of enquiry.1 While these
views differ very significantly in terms of their specific philosophical com-
mitments, they all share two fundamental assumptions: monism and sub-
stantivism. The views all assume that truth is to be accounted for in the
N. J. L. L. Pedersen (*)
Underwood International College, Yonsei University, Incheon, South Korea
e-mail: nikolaj@yonsei.ac.kr
J. Wyatt
Underwood International College, Yonsei University, Incheon, South Korea
N. Kellen
University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT, USA
© The Author(s) 2018 3

J. Wyatt et al. (eds.), Pluralisms in Truth and Logic, Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98346-2_1
4 N. J. L. L. Pedersen et al.
same way across the full range of truth-apt discourse (monism) and that
truth is a substantive property or relation (substantivism).
The deflationist reaction to the traditional debate is to reject substantiv-
ism and, in some cases, to endorse monism. Truth, if it has a nature at all,
has a uniform nature across all truth-apt discourse, but there is not much
to say about it. The traditional debate went off-track exactly because
truth theorists thought that there was a whole lot to say about truth—
that somehow it had a deep or underlying nature that could be uncovered
through philosophical theorizing. Instead, according to many deflation-
ists, the (non-paradoxical) instances of the disquotational schema (“p” is
true if and only p) or the equivalence schema (it is true that p if and only
if p) exhaust what there is to say about truth.2
The pluralist reaction to the traditional debate is to reject monism and
endorse substantivism. Truth pluralists, encouraged by the seminal work
of Crispin Wright and Michael Lynch, appeal to more than one property
in their account of truth. Propositions from different domains of dis-
course are true in different ways. The truth of propositions concerning
the empirical world (e.g., 〈There are mountains〉) might be accounted
for in terms of correspondence, while the truth of legal propositions (e.g.,
〈Speeding is illegal〉) might be accounted for in terms of coherence with
the body of law.3 This amounts to a rejection of monism. By contrast,
truth pluralists have traditionally endorsed substantivism. They have
appealed to properties or relations that are substantive in nature (where
this means, at least, that they directly explain certain facts entirely in
virtue of characteristics pertaining to their natures).4
The history of logic, like the history of truth, displays little consensus.
Advocates of classical logic, intuitionistic logic, and relevant logic, for
instance, have argued back and forth about the merits and demerits of their
preferred systems. Again, as in the case of truth, this seems to suggest a shared
underlying assumption of monism: there is a uniquely correct logic, and
advocates of different systems are disagreeing about which one it is. The plu-
ralist reaction—notably advocated by Jc Beall and Greg Restall (2006)—is
to reject monism and maintain that there are several equally correct logics.
Speaking more generally, pluralist views are becoming increasingly
prominent in different areas of philosophy. Pluralism about truth has been
extensively developed, defended, and critically discussed. The same goes
Introduction 5
for pluralism about logic.5 Pluralism has also made inroads into ontology
where the idea that there are several ways of being has been defended, sup-
ported, and articulated in various ways. The work of Kris McDaniel is a
particularly rich source.6 In epistemology, a variety of pluralist theses can
likewise be found in the literature. The idea that there are several epistemi-
cally good-making features of belief can be found in different guises, as
pluralism about epistemic justification, warrant, desiderata, and value.
Prominent epistemologists such as Alvin Goldman, Tyler Burge, William
Alston, and Crispin Wright all endorse one of these forms of pluralism.7
These pluralist trends are philosophically significant. They go against a
one-size-fits-all conception of their relevant areas and invite a reconsid-
eration of the nature and character of some of the most fundamental
notions in core areas of philosophy—including truth, validity, being, and
justification. This volume takes as its focus two of kinds of pluralism:
pluralism about truth and pluralism about logic. It brings together 18
original, state-of-the-art essays. The essays are divided into three parts.
Part I is dedicated to truth pluralism, Part II to logical pluralism, and Part
III to the question as to what connections might exist between these two
kinds of pluralism.
2 Truth Pluralism (Part I)

In this section, we will briefly introduce a range of ideas and issues that
have served to shape and define the debate concerning truth pluralism.
We will then introduce the contributions to Part I of the volume.
Background
Truth pluralists are engaged in critical debates on two fronts—one exter-

nal and the other internal. On the external front, we find pluralists debat-
ing monists as to which of these views of truth is superior. The argument
most commonly deployed by pluralists is the scope problem. Pluralists argue
that monist theories do not have a scope that is sufficiently wide to plau-
sibly accommodate all truth-apt discourse. Perhaps the correspondence
theory can be plausibly applied to empirical discourse, accounting for the

truth of propositions such as 〈Mt. Everest is extended in space〉. However,
it cannot plausibly cover the truth of legal propositions such as 〈Breaking
and entering is illegal〉. Now, maybe coherence with the body of law can
plausibly be applied to legal discourse. However, coherence does not seem
easily extendable to the empirical domain. Pluralists take this point to
generalize and conclude that monism is unsatisfactory. Instead, they let
several theories of truth work in tandem, restricting their range of applica-
bility to certain domains.
In connection with the internal debate, we see advocates of so-called
strong pluralism and moderate pluralism pitched against one another. They
agree that truth pluralism is the right view, but disagree over the details.
According to strong pluralists, there is no single truth property that
applies to all true propositions. Rather, there is a range of properties that
reduce or constitute truth for different propositions belonging to differ-
ent domains. Thus, the truth of 〈There are mountains〉 may reduce to
this proposition’s corresponding to reality while the truth of 〈Speeding is
illegal〉 may reduce to this proposition’s cohering with the body of law.
Crucially, there is no single property that reduces or constitutes the truth
of every true proposition. Moderate pluralists, on the other hand, endorse
a single, generic truth property. This property is possessed by every true
proposition, so that for the moderate pluralist, truth itself is one. However,
moderate pluralists also think that instances of generic truth are grounded
by instances of different truth-relevant properties. In this sense, for the
moderate pluralist, truth is also many. Thus, according to moderate plu-
ralism, truth is both one and many.8
Despite their different views on how to best articulate truth pluralism,
strong and moderate pluralists share significant commitments. One such
commitment is the commitment to domains. Domains are a crucial com-
ponent of the theoretical framework of pluralism, as reflected by the fact
that the core pluralist thesis is that the nature of truth varies across
domains.
Domains also feature prominently in some of the main challenges
faced by truth pluralists. Problems concerning mixed discourse are cases in
point. Mixed discourse is discourse that cuts across domains. Such
discourse occurs at three different levels: the levels of atomics, com-
pounds, and inferences. Consider the propositions that are expressed in:
Introduction 7
(mix-atom) π is beautiful.
(mix-comp) Mt. Everest is extended in space and Bob’s drunk driving is

illegal.
(mix-inf ) If Mt. Everest is extended in space, then Bob’s drunk driv-

ing is illegal.
Mr. Everest is extended in space.
Bob’s drunk driving is illegal.
〈π is beautiful〉 is a mixed atomic proposition. It features a mathemati-

cal concept (π) and an aesthetic concept (beauty).9 However, in light of
this, should 〈π is beautiful〉 be classified as belonging to the mathemati-
cal domain, the aesthetic domain, both of these domains, or perhaps
some other domain? This question by no means seems to be a straight-
forward one to answer. However, there seems to be considerable pressure
on the pluralist to provide an answer. After all, for atomic propositions
such as 〈π is beautiful〉, the domain membership of the proposition is
meant to determine the property that is relevant to its truth. Hence,
absent a principled story about the domain membership of mixed atom-
ics, there would be a whole cluster of propositions whose truth would
remain unaccounted for. This is the problem of mixed atomics.
〈Mt. Everest is extended in space and Bob’s drunk driving is illegal〉 is
a mixed conjunction. Its first conjunct belongs to the empirical domain,
and its second conjunct to the legal domain. The conjunction is true, as
both of its conjuncts are. However, it is not clear what story the pluralist
is going to tell about this. We can suppose that correspondence to reality
and coherence with the body of law are, respectively, the truth-relevant
properties for the two conjuncts. However, neither correspondence nor
coherence seems like a plausible candidate when we try to account for the
truth of the conjunction itself. Now, if the truth-relevant property of
neither the first nor the second conjunct is the right property, the con-
junction must have some third property. However, what property would
that be? The problem of mixed compounds challenges pluralists to tell a
story about the truth of mixed compounds.
The inference from 〈If Mt. Everest is extended in space, then Bob’s
drunk driving is illegal〉 and 〈Mr. Everest is extended in space〉 to 〈Bob’s
drunk driving is illegal〉 is a mixed inference. It is also a valid inference—
that is, necessarily, if the premises are true, then so is the conclusion. In
order to account for the validity of the inference, it would seem that there
must be some truth-relevant property that the premises and conclusion
all share which ensures that truth is preserved from premises to conclu-
sion. However, the pluralist seems to be unable to point to a property
that satisfies this constraint. For, as before, we can suppose that corre-
spondence to reality is the truth-relevant property for 〈Mr. Everest is
extended in space〉 and coherence with the body of law for 〈Bob’s drunk
driving is illegal〉. This means that one of the premises and the conclu-
sion have different truth-relevant properties. The problem of mixed infer-
ences challenges the pluralist to tell a story about the validity of mixed
inferences.10
Another fundamental problem confronting pluralists is what is some-
times called the “double-counting objection.” In essence, the objection is
that pluralists count two differences where only one is needed. They
endorse significant metaphysical differences regarding the nature of vari-
ous subject matters and, in addition, they endorse differences in the
nature of truth. However, in order to accommodate wide-ranging truth-
aptitude, differences need only be countenanced at one level—at the level
of the things themselves (numbers, trees, moral properties, laws, etc.) or
at the level of the content associated with different domains (expressivist
content vs. representational content). Drawing distinctions at the level of
truth, the objection goes, is superfluous.11
The Contributions
Dorit Bar-On and Keith Simmons’ contribution “Truth: One or

Many?” runs a version of the double-counting objection. Prominent
pluralists such as Wright and Lynch claim that one motivation for
adopting truth pluralism is that it puts one in a position to make
sense of disputes between realists and anti-realists. Adopting the the-
sis that the nature of truth varies across domains, it is possible for the
Introduction 9
pluralist to account for the “differential appeal of realist and anti-

realist intuitions” about them.12 Bar-On and Simmons counter by
arguing that truth pluralism offers no distinctive explanatory power
vis-à-vis the realism/anti-realism debate. Rather, all that is needed is a
plurality of kinds of worldly conditions that track metaphysical differ-
ences. Bar-On and Simmons’ version of the double-counting objec-
tion targets not only truth pluralists but also certain kinds of truth
monists—namely, those who think that a distinction between differ-
ent kinds of content or meaning offers explanatory power vis-à-vis the
realism/anti-realism debate. Bar-On and Simmons spell out in con-
siderable detail how their proposal differs from those of truth monists
who seek to accommodate realism/anti-realism disputes by appealing
to semantic differences.
Michael P. Lynch’s contribution “Truth Pluralism, Quasi-Realism and
the Problem of Double-Counting” offers a pluralist response to the dou-
ble-counting objection—in particular, as it might be pressed by quasi-
realists such as Simon Blackburn and global expressivists such as Huw
Price. Lynch argues that semantic diversity and cognitive unity are theses
that quasi-realists, global expressivists, and truth pluralists all seek to
accommodate and explain:
(SD) There are real differences in kind between the contents of our
beliefs and indicative statements.
(CU) All beliefs and indicative statements are subject to a single

type of cognitive normative assessment of correctness.
Blackburn proposes to accommodate semantic diversity by appealing to

two sorts of propositions or two sorts of truth-aptitude. Price proposes to
accommodate semantic diversity by appealing to two kinds of representa-
tion: i-representation and e-representation. A proposition i-represents in
virtue of its inferential or functional role, while e-representation is cashed
out in terms of co-variance with the environment. Lynch argues that, in
effect, both Blackburn’s proposal and Price’s proposal result in a form of
truth pluralism. Hence, when it comes to double-counting, truth plural-
ists turn out to be no worse off than quasi-realists or global expressivists.
Douglas Edwards’ contribution “The Metaphysics of Domains” pro-

vides a systematic account of domains and thus addresses a major lacuna
in the theoretical framework of truth pluralism. Edwards distinguishes
between a semantic and a metaphysical aspect of domains. He accounts
for these via a discussion of, respectively, singular terms and predicates
and their metaphysical counterparts, objects and properties. Edwards
argues that his proposed notion of domain is not a commitment of
pluralists only—it is implicit in a number of philosophical views.
Edwards demonstrates the significance of his account of domains by
arguing that it delivers a solution to two major challenges to truth plu-
ralism: the problem of mixed atomics and the problem of mixed
compounds.
Seahwa Kim and Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen’s contribution
“Strong Truth Pluralism” provides a pluralist solution to the problem of
mixed compounds. Kim and Pedersen offer their solution against the
background of a certain form of strong pluralism. They thus deny that
there is any generic truth property that applies across all domains.
Instead they think that an atomic proposition’s being true reduces to its
corresponding to reality, cohering, or having some other “base-level
truth property.” The truth of a compound reduces to its having a com-
pound-specific truth-reducing property. For example, the truth of the
mixed conjunction 〈Mt. Everest is extended in space and Bob’s drunk
driving is illegal〉 reduces to its being a conjunction with conjuncts that
have their respective truth-reducing properties. Note that in this regard
mixed conjunctions are no different from pure conjunctions. Hence,
Kim and Pedersen’s response to the problem of mixed compounds is
that there is nothing special or problematic about them. They are true
in the same way that their pure counterparts are.
The contributions by Nathan Kellen, Filippo Ferrari, and Jeremy
Wyatt explore different ways to reconfigure or add a new dimension to
the debate concerning truth pluralism.
Kellen’s contribution “Methodological Pluralism About Truth” introduces
a meta-perspective on the truth pluralism debate. According to Kellen,
Wright takes anti-realism to be methodologically fundamental. He does so
in the sense that anti-realist truth is taken to be the default for all domains.
Introduction 11
This is not to say that Wright is opposed to giving truth a “non-default”

treatment within some domains. However, in order for truth to receive
this kind of treatment, there must be reasons why, within that particular
domain, the default should be abandoned. Kellen likewise attributes a
thesis of methodological fundamentality to Edwards although, in con-
trast to Wright, the default is realist truth. Kellen proposes methodological
pluralism as an alternative to anti-realist and realist default forms of plu-
ralism. According to this methodological doctrine, the pluralist should
have no default for any domain but should remain neutral until reasons
have been given one way or the other.
Filippo Ferrari’s contribution “Normative Alethic Pluralism” articu-
lates a novel view concerning the normativity of truth—what he calls
“normative alethic pluralism.” He articulates this view against the back-
ground of a rejection of normative alethic monism, the view that truth’s
normative profile is uniform across all domains, and can be captured by
a single principle that connects truth and judgment. Ferrari targets nor-
mative alethic monism by employing a normative analogue of the scope
problem. By appealing to disagreements pertaining to different domains,
Ferrari argues that the normative profile of truth varies across domains. If
people disagree over whether, for example, oysters are tasty, there is no
strong sense of fault in play. On the other hand, if two parties disagree as
to whether abortion is a morally acceptable practice, there is a strong
sense of fault in play. This is reflected by each party’s tendency toward
condemnation of the other party. This normative variability cannot satis-
factorily be accommodated within the framework of normative alethic
monism. Hence, according to Ferrari, there is reason to adopt normative
alethic pluralism. There are several ways for truth to normatively regulate
judgment. Having motivated and articulated normative alethic plural-
ism, Ferrari discusses the issue of whether it might bear significant con-
nections to pluralism about truth. He concludes that the two kinds of
pluralism are compatible and may nicely complement one another. Yet,
one does not imply the other.
Jeremy Wyatt’s contribution “Truth in English and Elsewhere: An
Empirically-Informed Functionalism” presents a refined framework that
should help to shape future work on both pluralism and functionalism
about truth. Wyatt argues that a proper defense of alethic functional-

ism—a view that was pioneered by Lynch—must be informed by empiri-
cal data. The alethic functionalist puts forward an account of the folk
theory of truth, which is meant to consist of the propositions about truth
that those who possess the folk concept of truth are ipso facto disposed to
believe upon reflection. The functionalist’s view on the folk theory of
truth is thus empirical in nature and should be evaluated using empirical
data. Wyatt discusses two kinds of existing data: data pertaining to alethic
vocabulary in English and preliminary data pertaining to the Ghanaian
language Akan. The English-related data suggest variation in the use of
alethic vocabulary among male and female English speakers. The prelimi-
nary data concerning Akan suggest that there are significant differences in
the alethic vocabulary that is used, respectively, by native Akan and native
English speakers. Wyatt argues that these lines of data lend support to
two kinds of pluralism regarding ordinary thought about truth—what he
calls intralinguistic and interlinguistic conceptual pluralism. In addition to
motivating these two sorts of pluralism, Wyatt shows how the functional-
ist, by adopting a more nuanced version of Lynch’s framework, can nicely
accommodate these pluralistic hypotheses.
3 Logical Pluralism (Part II)

Over the past decade, there has been a surge of interest in logical plural-
ism, one major factor being the publication of JC Beall and Greg Restall’s
Logical Pluralism.13 In this section, we will briefly introduce Beall and
Restall’s logical pluralism and the contributions to Part II of the volume.
In one way or another, most of these contributions engage with promi-
nent themes from Beall and Restall’s work.
Background
According to Beall and Restall, logic is plural in the sense that there are
several equally legitimate instances of what they call Generalized Tarski’s
Thesis (GTT):
Introduction 13
(GTT) An argument is validx if and only if in every casex in which

the premises are true, so is the conclusion.
Beall and Restall argue that there are at least three equally legitimate ways
to construe casex in GTT: cases as (consistent and complete) possible
worlds, cases as (possibly incomplete) constructions, and cases as (possibly
inconsistent) situations. These three notions of case deliver different log-
ics—respectively classical logic, intuitionistic logic, and relevant logic.
To shed further light on the nature of Beall and Restall’s logical plural-
ism, let us highlight a number of key features of their view: legitimacy,
logical functionalism, logical generalism, logical relativism, meaning con-
stancy, and structural rules and properties.
Legitimacy The standard of legitimacy for cases is given by three features

that Beall and Restall call “necessity”, “formality”, and “normativity.”
Roughly stated, necessity is the idea that valid arguments must be neces-
sarily truth-preserving; formality is the idea that validity is neutral with
respect to content; and normativity is the idea that invalid arguments
must involve a kind of mistake or fault.
Logical Functionalism The network approach to conceptual analysis can

be regarded as a form of conceptual functionalism. A target concept C is
characterized by a set of principles that connect C to other concepts. In
this way, C is characterized through its role or function within a larger
conceptual network. Beall and Restall’s view can be regarded as an
instance of the network approach. Generalized Tarski’s Thesis and the
three constraints of necessity, formality, and normativity characterize the
concept of validity via its connection to other concepts such as case,
truth, necessity, formality, and normativity. In this way, validity
is characterized through its function or role within a larger conceptual
network, and for this reason Beall and Restall’s logical pluralism involves
a form of functionalism.
Logical Generalism To borrow a phrase from Hartry Field, Beall and

Restall’s logical pluralism is a pluralism about all-purpose logics.14 Their
view is not that classical logic, intuitionistic logic, and relevant logic are
legitimate only when restricted to certain domains or when used for certain
purposes. Rather, their view is that classical logic, intuitionistic logic, and
relevant logic are equally legitimate across the board. This idea can be
regarded as a form of logical generalism. The legitimacy of the logics admit-
ted by (GTT) and the three constraints is meant to be completely general.
Logical Relativism Beall and Restall’s logical pluralism involves a form of

logical relativism: statements concerning the validity of arguments only
have a truth-value relative to a particular system.15 Thus, for example, as
far as logic is concerned, there is no absolute fact of the matter as to
whether double negation elimination is valid. Instead there are logic-
relative facts: in classical logic, double negation elimination is valid while
in intuitionistic logic, it is not.16
Meaning Constancy Beall and Restall are pluralists about validity and
logical consequence. However, they maintain that the meaning of the
logical connectives is constant across the various logics that qualify as
legitimate. This view contrasts with a view often attributed to Carnap—
namely, that different logics have different connectives.17 According to
the latter view, the meaning of “and”, “not”, “or”, etc. changes from one
logic to another. By contrast, on Beall and Restall’s view, logical expres-
sions share the same—but incomplete—meaning across logics. However,
clauses that govern the connectives in different logics capture different
aspects of that shared meaning.
Structural Rules and Properties It is common to distinguish between the

operational rules and the structural rules of a system. Operational rules
and properties concern specific logical operations (e.g., negation).
Structural rules and properties of a logic capture general features that
hold purely in virtue of premises and conclusions being structures of
unstructured objects that can be manipulated in certain ways. The fol-
lowing list specifies five well-known structural rules:
(Reflexivity) ϕ⊨ϕ
(Monotonicity) If Γ ⊨ ϕ, then Γ, Δ ⊨ ϕ
Introduction 15
(Transitivity) If Γ ⊨ ϕ and Δ, ϕ ⊨ ψ, then Δ, Γ ⊨ ψ
(Contraction) If Γ, ϕ, ϕ ⊨ ψ, then Γ, ϕ ⊨ ψ
(Commutativity) If Γ, ϕ, ψ, Δ ⊨ χ, then Γ, ψ, ϕ, Δ ⊨ χ
Reflexivity says that anything is a logical consequence of itself.

Monotonicity says that, if ϕ is a logical consequence of Γ, adding more
premises Δ does not change anything (i.e., ϕ is also logical of a conse-
quence of Γ, Δ). Transitivity says that, if ϕ is a logical consequence of Γ
and ψ is a logical consequence of Δ, ϕ, then ψ is a logical consequence of
just Δ, Γ. Contraction says that multiple occurrences of the same premise
can be cut to a single occurrence without impacting consequence.
Commutativity says that the order of premises does not matter: it can be
switched without impacting consequence. Any system that fails to accom-
modate any of the five structural rules listed above is a substructural logic.18
The Contributions
Neil Tennant’s contribution “Core Logic: A Conspectus” presents an

“absolutist pluralist” view on logic. It is absolutist in the sense that there is
a core to logic or deductive reasoning—core logic in Tennant’s terminology.
However, Tennant’s view is pluralist in that there are several legitimate
extensions of the core. Tennant is particularly interested in providing an
account of logic for mathematics. He wants to accommodate both con-
structive and non-constructive (or classical) mathematics, but argues that
all proofs should be “relevantized.” For this reason, core logic is relevant.
Thus, Tennant’s view is revisionist, as he thinks that the logics of construc-
tive and classical mathematics should be revised along relevantist lines.
The logic suitable for c onstructive mathematics is relevantized intuitionis-
tic logic (the core logic C) while the logic suitable for non-constructive (or
classical) mathematics is relevantized classical logic (the core logic C+).
Teresa Kouri Kissel’s contribution “Connective Meanings in Beall and
Restall’s Logical Pluralism” contests Beall and Restall’s meaning con-
stancy thesis, that is, their claim that logical expressions have the same
meaning across logics. She argues that this cannot be the case for intu-
itionistic negation and relevant negation. Thus, contrary to their own
claims, Beall and Restall’s logical pluralism ends up having a Carnapian
flavor.
Elia Zardini’s contribution “Generalised Tarski’s Thesis Hits
Substructure” offers an extended argument to the effect that Beall and
Restall’s logical pluralism is overly restrictive. He shows that (GTT)
implies that logical consequence has the structural features mentioned
above, that is, reflexivity, monotonicity, transitivity, contraction, and
commutativity. For instance, in every casex in which ϕ is true, ϕ is true—
thus (GTT) implies reflexivity. By the lights of Beall-Restall logical plu-
ralism, then, any system that fails to satisfy reflexivity cannot qualify as
logic properly so-called. Similarly, for any system that fails to satisfy
monotonicity, transitivity, contraction, or commutativity. In general,
Beall-Restall logical pluralism disqualifies any substructural logic from
qualifying as logic proper. Zardini argues that there are philosophical rea-
sons to doubt each of reflexivity, monotonicity, transitivity, contraction,
and commutativity. For instance, one might wish to abandon transitivity
in order to give an account of vagueness, and one might wish to abandon
contraction in order to address the semantic paradoxes. In light of these
considerations, Zardini deems Beall-Restall pluralism unacceptably
restrictive.
Gillman Payette and Nicole Wyatt’s contribution “Logical
Particularism” introduces and spells out a particularist view on logic.
According to logical particularism, there are no completely general
principles concerning validity. Rather, validity is a property of particu-
lar arguments or inferences. Since Payette and Wyatt think that differ-
ent, specific arguments call for different treatments vis-à-vis validity,
their logical particularism goes hand in hand with a particularist ver-
sion of logical pluralism. This particularist pluralism is at odds with the
kind of logical pluralism endorsed by Beall and Restall—which, as seen
above, involves a commitment to logical generalism. Logics on the
Beall-Restall view are all-purpose logics, which means that their rules
are completely general principles concerning validity. Payette and
Wyatt’s particularist pluralism is also at odds with domain-based forms
Introduction 17
of logical pluralism. Unlike logical generalists, domain-based logical

pluralists do not think that there are completely general logical prin-
ciples. However, they do think that there are somewhat general prin-
ciples, as the rules of a domain-specific logic hold for all arguments or
inferences within the specific domain to which the logic applies. This
commitment, although weaker than generalism, is likewise at odds
with logical particularism.
Aaron Cotnoir’s contribution “Logical Nihilism” makes a case for a
species of logical nihilism. According to this view, there is no logical
consequence relation that correctly represents natural language infer-
ence; formal logics are inadequate to capture informal inference.
Cotnoir gives two clusters of arguments that lend support to logical
nihilism. The first cluster consists of arguments from diversity, the sec-
ond of arguments from expressive limitations. Arguments from diver-
sity contain two steps. The first step is an argument to the effect that no
single logic can provide an adequate account of natural language infer-
ence. The second step is an argument to the effect that at most one logic
can provide an adequate account of natural language inference.
However, nothing satisfies both of these requirements—so, no formal
logic can provide an adequate account of natural language inference.
Arguments from expressive limitations also consist of two steps. The
first is an observation to the effect that natural language contains infer-
ences involving a certain phenomenon. The second step is an argument
to the effect that no formal logic has the expressive resources to capture
inferences of that kind. Hence, due to the expressive limitations of for-
mal logics, no formal logic can provide an adequate account of natural
language inference.
Gillian Russell’s contribution “Varieties of Logical Consequence by
Their Resistance to Logical Nihilism” also speaks to the theme of logi-
cal nihilism, although a different variety than the one d iscussed by
Cotnoir. Logical nihilism, as Russell approaches the view, has it that
there are no valid arguments. This view has emerged as a discussion
point in the logical pluralism debate. A criticism of Beall and Restall
is that validity should be conceived as truth-preservation across all
cases, in contrast to Beall and Restall’s strategy of pairing each type of
case with a corresponding, case-specific type of validity. If validity is

thus conceived, logical nihilism (or “minimalism”) threatens—maybe
no (or only very few) arguments are truth-preserving across all cases.
Russell investigates what resources different accounts of logical conse-
quence offer when it comes to resisting the threat of nihilism. She con-
siders Etchemendy’s interpretational and representational accounts,
Quine’s substitutional account, and Williamson’s universalist account.
Williamson’s account is found to be the one that offers the strongest
path of resistance to the threat of logical nihilism. However, Russell sug-
gests that the universalist path of resistance may come at a high cost. It
may only work because the universalist account operates at a level that
does not fully engage with the problematic phenomena that fuel the
move toward nihilism (such as empty names, vagueness and incomplete
predicates, and self-reference and overdetermination).
4 Connections (Part III)

Parts I and II of the volume respectively concern truth pluralism and logi-
cal pluralism, considered and discussed (mostly) in isolation from one
another. The contributions in Part III explore potential connections
between these two kinds of pluralism.
Background
The most widely explored form of truth pluralism is domain-based. The

core idea, as we have seen, is that the nature of truth varies across domains.
Several authors have connected domain-based truth pluralism and logic,
arguing that pluralism in the case of truth supports pluralism about logic.
The target kind of logical pluralism inherits a crucial feature from its
alethic counterpart: it is domain-based. Different domains have different
logics.
The kind of argument that truth pluralists have given to support
domain-based logical pluralism can be presented as follows19:
Introduction 19
(1) If truth is epistemically constrained in one domain and epistemically

unconstrained in another domain, then different logics govern these
domains.
(2) Truth is epistemically constrained in one domain and epistemically
unconstrained in another domain.
(3) So, there are domains that are governed by different logics.
(2) is accepted by most (domain-based) truth pluralists. Many of them take

the realism/anti-realism debate as background for their truth pluralism.
They want to accommodate the appeal of realism and anti-realism with
respect to different domains. It is an integral part of the realism/anti-realism
debate that anti-realist truth is epistemically constrained while realist truth
is epistemically unconstrained. It is with this in mind that many domain-
based truth pluralists go in for (2). The idea behind (1) is that the logic of
epistemically constrained truth is intuitionistic while the logic of epistemi-
cally unconstrained truth is classical. Both (1) and (2) can be regarded as
reflections of Dummett’s influence on the realism/anti-realism debate, as it
figures in the theoretical foundations of the pluralist program.20
Domain-based logical pluralism raises some tough questions. The view
pairs individual domains with logics. However, what is to be said about
the logic of mixed inferences (sec. 2.1)? What logic governs inferences
that cut across domains with different logics? Lynch has proposed the
following principle of modesty:
(mod) The logic of a mixed compound or inference that involves

propositions from domains with distinct logics L1, …, Ln is
the intersection of L1, …, Ln.
The logic of a given mixed compound or inference is thus minimal—it is

the core shared by all the logics of the domains involved in the com-
pound or inference. Lynch himself officially endorses two logics within
his domain-based pluralist framework, viz. intuitionistic and classical
logic. This means that there is only one way for a compound or inference
to be “logically mixed”—namely, by involving those two logics. The
modesty principle tells us, then, that the logic of mixed compounds and
inferences is always intuitionistic logic.21
We have just reflected on the potential connections between domain-

based pluralisms about truth and logic. However, what other paths into
pluralist territory might there be? There are several, it would seem. For
Beall and Restall, it is cases, rather than domains, that play an integral
role in delivering pluralism about logic. One might also think that logical
pluralism can be supported by appealing to considerations regarding con-
text. Different contexts might be governed by different logics, even if the
domain at issue is the same. Consider two contexts that both involve
mathematics. It may be that in one context, proofs are subject to the
standards of intuitionistic logic because informativeness matters and con-
structive proofs are more informative. In that context, for instance, indi-
rect proofs would not be counted as valid. However, in a different context,
proofs may be subject to the standards of classical logic, so that in that
context, indirect proofs are counted as valid.22
How about truth? Here, too, there are several paths into pluralist ter-
ritory. Let us mention three. On the basis of empirical data, Robert
Barnard and Joseph Ulatowski have suggested that there are significant
differences in ordinary people’s thought and talk about truth along vari-
ous dimensions. One such dimension is gender. In connection with cer-
tain statements, male subjects’ thought and talk about truth look to align
with a correspondence conception of truth. By contrast, female subjects’
thought and talk about truth seem to not align with a correspondence
conception in these cases. At the very least, then, these data suggest that
two different notions of truth are in play.23
John MacFarlane is well-known for advocating an assessment-sensitive
brand of relativism about truth, according to which the truth of some
statements is relative to a context of assessment. However, MacFarlane
also wants to leave room for truth simpliciter. The combination of these
two commitments suggests a form of truth pluralism, which has it that
there are two basic ways of being true: being true relative to a context of
assessment and being true simpliciter.24
Several authors have argued that the semantic paradoxes—including,
famously, the liar paradox—motivate a pluralistic account of truth. One
such author is Kevin Scharp, who has recently proposed a novel approach
to the semantic paradoxes.25 Classical logic and the unrestricted
T-schema (T(ϕ) ⟷ ϕ) generate the liar paradox.26 According to Scharp,
Introduction 21
the ordinary concept of truth is characterized by the unrestricted

T-schema. This concept is rendered inconsistent by the liar paradox and
other paradoxes. Scharp’s solution is to adopt a replacement theory. The
ordinary concept of truth should be replaced by two new concepts,
descending truth and ascending truth. The axiomatic theory that goes
with Scharp’s proposal includes the following two conditionals (but
excludes the converse conditionals):
(TD) TD(ϕ) → ϕ
(TA) ϕ → TA(ϕ)
The combination of (TD) and (TA) looks superficially like the T-schema,
but it is not. The subscripts make all the difference in the world. They
indicate that the two conditionals involve different concepts—the con-
cepts that, on Scharp’s view, should replace the inconsistent, ordinary
concept of truth. Hence, the two conditionals cannot be combined into
a biconditional to yield the T-schema. Rather, according to Scharp, truth
theorists should rest content with (TD) and (TA) and the concepts of
descending and ascending truth that they respectively concern. It is in
this sense that Scharp puts forward a pluralistic account of truth—
whereas we might have thought that we could get along with a single
truth concept, Scharp’s contention is that we actually need a pair of
replacement concepts to adequately resolve the semantic paradoxes.
Insofar as Scharp’s views are motivated by the semantic paradoxes, they
represent yet another path into pluralist territory.27
The Contributions
Roy T. Cook’s contribution “Pluralism About Pluralisms” investigates

the issue of what connections, if any, there might be between truth
pluralism and logical pluralism. His investigation focuses on domain-
based versions of both views, according to which different domains
involve respectively different ways of being true and different logics. As
seen earlier, some pluralists (e.g., Lynch and Pedersen) have argued that
domain-based truth pluralism supports domain-based logical plural-
ism. Cook contests this claim by constructing a formal model in which

domain-based truth pluralism holds, but domain-based logical plural-
ism fails. He also constructs a model in which domain-based logical
pluralism holds, but domain-based truth pluralism fails. On the basis
of these two models, he concludes that domain-based truth pluralism
and domain-based logical pluralism are independent. Neither entails
the other.
Lynch has two key commitments regarding logic. First, he is a
domain-based logical pluralist. Different domains have different log-
ics. Second, he endorses (mod) for mixed inferences: the logic of a
mixed inference is the intersection of the logics of the domains
involved in the inference. Chase Wrenn’s contribution “A Plea for
Immodesty: Alethic Pluralism, Logical Pluralism, and Mixed
Inferences” critically discusses Lynch’s commitments vis-à-vis logic.
Wrenn argues that (mod) renders intuitively valid inferences invalid
and also renders intuitively invalid inferences valid. Furthermore, he
argues that it seems natural to combine (mod) with virtual logic plu-
ralism. Virtual logic pluralism is the thesis that there is just one proper
logic, but that domains may have certain features that make them
appear to be governed by a stronger logic. Thus, for example, while
logic proper may be intuitionistic, reasoning within some domains
may conform to classical logic (for non-logical reasons). As Wrenn
notes, virtual logical pluralism goes against domain-based logical plu-
ralism. These considerations leave someone like Lynch in a tough
spot. He wants to be a domain-based logical pluralist, but domain-
based logical pluralism will not do on its own. It remains silent on
mixed inferences, so in order to deal with such inferences, (mod) is
adopted. Unfortunately, however, (mod) seems to get both certain
validity verdicts and certain invalidity verdicts wrong. Crucially, once
(mod) is adopted, virtual logical pluralism strongly suggests itself to
the self-professed domain-based logical pluralist—undermining, it
would seem, their domain-based logical pluralism.
Andy Yu’s contribution “Logic for Alethic, Logical, and Ontological
Pluralists” is primarily concerned with the issue of how truth pluralists
can provide an account of logic. Yu sets himself the task of responding to
Introduction 23
the challenges of providing a uniform, standard account of the truth of

atomics, compounds, and quantified statements, as well as a standard
account of logical consequence as necessary truth-preservation. One might
expect this to be a tall order, especially bearing in mind that mixed dis-
course has traditionally been a major obstacle for truth pluralists. Yu pres-
ents a formal framework that he takes to capture the commitments of
truth pluralists. The proposed framework behaves like classical first-order
logic and has a logical consequence relation that behaves like classical
consequence. In light of this, Yu takes his account to provide an adequate
response to the challenge of providing a pluralist account of logic that is
both uniform and standard. At the end of his contribution, Yu extends
the framework so that it can accommodate logical pluralism and sketches
how to accommodate ontological pluralism as well. He does the former
by defining a domain-specific notion of validity that allows different
domains to traffic in different kinds of validity. This amounts to a formal
model of what we have called “domain-based logical pluralism” above.
Ontological pluralism is often taken to be the view that there are several
equally fundamental existential quantifiers. Yu proposes to accommodate
this view as well by introducing domain-specific quantifiers. Following
our earlier labeling conventions, the resulting view would be a form of
domain-based ontological pluralism.
Rosanna Keefe’s contribution “Pluralisms: Logic, Truth and
DomainSpecificity” also explores domain-based logical pluralism. She criti-
cally discusses two attempts by domain-based truth pluralists to give an
account of logic: Cotnoir’s algebraic account and domain-based logical plu-
ralism. Cotnoir’s account treats semantic values as n-tuples where n is the
number of domains. Each position in an n-tuple is 1 or 0. If a proposition
belongs to the i-th domain and is true, it has 1 in the i-th position of the
n-tuple and 0 in all other places. The framework incorporates classical clauses
for the connectives and sustains a classical consequence relation, although
Cotnoir also presents a modified framework meant to allow for other log-
ics. Keefe argues that Cotnoir’s account fails. The adoption of n-tuples as
semantic values forces each sentence to have a (“sub”)semantic value in each
place of its n-tuple, and that brings about odd results. Keefe likewise
presses several objections against domain-based logical pluralism. First,
she observes that the view clashes with the widely held view that logic is
topic neutral. Second, like others, she observes that (mod)—a natural candi-
date for addressing the issue of mixed inferences—threatens to undermine
domain-based logical pluralism. Third, building on the two first points,
Keefe offers the following collapse argument: mixed inferences can cut across
all domains. By (mod), the logic of this inference would be the intersection
of all logics that hold for some domain. However, since this logic is topic
neutral, this is what logic proper is—and hence, logical monism is correct.
Fourth, Keefe questions an implicit assumption behind domain-based logi-
cal pluralism, viz. that domain membership suffices to fix the logic of infer-
ences. She points to vagueness as a phenomenon that tells against this
assumption, as this phenomenon that cuts across domains and has tradition-
ally been thought to be of relevance to logic. Lastly, Keefe presents a positive
proposal: validity is assessed relative to context. This allows for logical plural-
ism because the rules or assumptions justified in different contexts may vali-
date different arguments. Keefe observes that (1) her context-based
framework can accommodate domain-based logical pluralism in the sense
that different context-domain pairs may validate different inferences, and (2)
the context-based approach allows for logical pluralism with respect to a
single domain since different contexts may validate different inferences per-
taining to the same domain. Furthermore, Keefe suggests that the context-
based approach is also better suited to deal with vagueness.
Kevin Scharp’s contribution “Aletheic and Logical Pluralism” explores
what he calls coordinated pluralism and compares it to his own replace-
ment theory. Coordinated pluralism is the combination of context-based
truth pluralism and context-based logical pluralism. Coordinated plural-
ism is motivated by considerations related to the semantic paradoxes. As
observed earlier, if truth is characterized by the unrestricted T-schema
and classical logic or certain other logics hold, you end up with paradox.
The double-barreled pluralism that coordinated pluralism offers is meant
to block paradox by letting the nature of truth and the nature of logic
vary across contexts in such a way that there is no context in which truth
and logic have natures that generate paradox. This is meant to happen in
virtue of their natures being coordinated in any given context. If, in a
given context, truth is strong, logic is weak and vice versa. This coordi-
nated pluralism seems like a promising approach to paradox. Might it be
Introduction 25
better than Scharp’s replacement theory? Scharp shows that coordinated

pluralism falls prey to a revenge paradox, that is, a paradox generated
using the very resources that were supposed to block paradox. In light of
this, Scharp concludes that his replacement theory is in fact superior to
coordinated pluralism.
Acknowledgements Nikolaj J. L. L. Pedersen and Jeremy Wyatt have both ben-

efited from support from the National Research Foundation of Korea (grants
no. 2013S1A2A2035514 and 2016S1A2A2911800). This support is gratefully
acknowledged.
Notes
1. David 1994; Devitt 1984; Newman 2007; Rasmussen 2014; Russell
1912; Vision 2004; and Wittgenstein 1921 all endorse versions of the
correspondence theory. Coherence theorists include Blanshard 1939;
Joachim 1906; and Young 2001. (Neo-)pragmatists include James 1907,
1909; Peirce 1878; and Putnam 1981.
2. Deflationists of various stripes include Field 1986, 1994a, b; Grover
1992; Horwich 1998; Quine 1970; Ramsey 1927; Strawson 1950. For a
systematic treatment of deflationary metaphysics of truth, see Wyatt
2016.
3. We use angle brackets to represent propositions.
4. See Wright 1992, 2001; Lynch 2001, 2004b, 2009.
5. Works on pluralism about truth include Asay 2018; Beall 2000, 2013;
Cook 2011; Cotnoir 2009, 2013a, b; Edwards 2008, 2009, 2011,
2012a, b, 2013a, b, 2018; Engel 2013; David 2013; Dodd 2013; Kölbel
2008, 2013; Lynch 2000, 2001, 2004a, b, 2005a, b, 2006, 2008, 2009,
2013; Newhard 2013, 2017; Pedersen 2006, 2010, 2012a, b, 2014;
Pedersen and Edwards 2011; Pedersen and Wright 2010, 2012, 2013a,
b; Shapiro 2011; Sher 1998, 2005, 2013, 2016; Stewart-Wallace 2016;
Tappolet 1997, 2000, 2010; Williamson 1994; (C.D.) Wright 2005,
2010, 2012; Wright 1992, 1996a, b, 1998, 2001, 2013; Wyatt 2013;
Wyatt and Lynch 2016; and Yu 2017a, b. Works on logical pluralism
include Beall 2014; Beall and Restall 2000, 2001, 2006; Bueno and
Shalkowski 2009; Carnielli and Coniglio 2016; Ciprotti and Moretti
2009; Cook 2010, 2014; Eklund 2012; Field 2009; Goddu 2002;
Hjortland 2013; Humberstone 2009; Keefe 2014; Kouri 2016; Kouri
and Shapiro forthcoming; Payette and Wyatt 2018; Priest 2001, 2008,
2014; Read 2006a, b; Restall 2001, 2002, 2012, 2014; Russell 2008,
2014; Shapiro 2014; Sher forthcoming; Terrés forthcoming; van
Benthem 2008; Varzi 2002; and Wyatt 2004.
6. MacDaniel’s work on ontological pluralism spans about a decade. His
book The Fragmentation of Being (2017) brings together much of his
earlier work on the topic. See also. Turner 2010, 2012; Eklund 2009.
7. Alston 2005; Burge 2003; Goldman 1988; Wright 2004. Pedersen 2017
formulates and defends pluralism about fundamental or non-derivative
epistemic goods.
8. This slogan is the title of Lynch 2009. Having advocated moderate plu-
ralism for nearly two decades in a wide range of works, Lynch is the most
prominent advocate of the view. The distinction between these two
forms of pluralism is due to Pedersen 2006.
9. We will use small caps to denote concepts.
10. Sher 2005 raises the problem of mixed atomics. For the problems of
mixed compounds and inferences, see respectively Tappolet 2000 and
Tappolet 1997.
11. Versions of the double-counting objection have been presented by Asay
2018; Blackburn 1998, 2013; Dodd 2013, Horwich 1996; Pettit 1996;
Quine 1960; and Sainsbury 1996.
12. Wright 1998. See also Wright 1992 (Chap. 1, II) and Lynch 2004b: 386.
13. Beall and Restall 2006.
14. Field 2009.
15. In attributing a logical relativist view to Beall and Restall, we follow
Shapiro 2014.
16. It may seem odd to attribute both logical generalism and logical relativ-
ism to Beall and Restall. For, isn’t the idea that logic is general in tension
with the idea that it is relative? No. Logical generalism, as we have char-
acterized it, concerns whether a given logic legitimately issues (in)valid-
ity verdicts across the board (in the technical sense of legitimacy tied to
Generalized Tarski’s Thesis and the constraints of necessity, formality,
and normativity). For logics that are general in this sense, there is a fur-
ther issue as to the semantic status of their (in)validity verdicts—in par-
ticular, whether those verdicts have absolute or relativized truth-values.
17. Carnap 1937, 1950.
18. For a comprehensive introduction to substructural logics, see Restall
2000.
19. Lynch 2009, Pedersen 2014. The version of logical pluralism presented
in Shapiro 2014 can also be regarded as a kind of domain-based logical
Introduction 27
pluralism, although the various domains that Shapiro considers are all
mathematical.
20. The realism/anti-realism debate is, of course, one of the major themes in
Dummett’s corpus of work. See e.g., the essays in Dummett 1978.
21. See Lynch 2009 for details. The set of intuitionistic validities is a proper
subset of the set of classical validities, and hence, (mod) delivers the ver-
dict that the logic of any mixed compound or inference is intuitionistic
logic. In cases where there is overlap between two logics but no subset
relation, the intersection is identical to neither of the domain-specific
logics. This applies in the case of intuitionistic logic and relevant logic.
22. Smith forthcoming supports logical pluralism via logical contextualism.
While Beall and Restall never themselves present their logical pluralism
as a form of logical contextualism, Caret 2017 offers a contextualist read-
ing of their view and argues that it can be used to block a certain funda-
mental objection.
23. Barnard and Ulatowski 2013, Ulatowski 2017. See Kölbel 2008, 2013
for another empirically-based form of truth pluralism.
24. For details concerning MacFarlane’s assessment-sensitive relativism, see
MacFarlane 2014. Wyatt and Lynch 2016 suggest that MacFarlane is
committed to the kind of truth pluralism described.
25. Scharp 2013.
26. We’re blurring the line between use and mention here, but we trust that
the idea is clear.
27. See Wyatt and Lynch 2016 for further discussion of the relations between
truth pluralism and Scharp’s replacement theory. See also Beall 2013 and
Cotnoir 2013b for paradox-based motivations for truth pluralism.
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Silence reigned, save for the murmur of voices down-stairs—far,
indistinct.
The hall was glorious with indirect rays of the sun. It had wonderful
spaciousness, too. Bonnie May gazed down the broad stairway,
duskily bright and warm and silent, and her expression was quite
blissful. She turned and looked up to the landing above—reached by
a narrower flight of stairs. It seemed splendidly remote, and here the
sunlight fell in a riotous flood.
Her sensations must have been something akin to those of a
mocking-bird that inspects the vernal world in May. She released the
folds of the nightgown and “paraded” to and fro in the hall, looking
back over her shoulder at the train. She had put the garment on
again, after Flora’s advent with the gingham dress, primarily for the
purpose of making the journey from her room to her bath. But there
had been a distinct pleasure in wearing it, too. She thought it made
her look like a fairy queen. She felt the need of a tinsel crown and a
wand with a gilded star at its end.
She was executing a regal turn in the hall when her glance was
attracted upward to some moving object on the landing above.
A most extraordinary ancient man stood there watching her.
Realizing that he had been discovered, he turned in a kind of panic
and disappeared into regions unknown. His mode of locomotion was
quite unusual. If Bonnie May had been familiar with nautical terms
she would have said that he was tacking, as he made his agitated
exit.
As for Bonnie May, she scampered into the bathroom, the flowing
train suddenly gripped in her fingers.
Down-stairs they were listening for her, though they pretended not to
be doing so. They heard her in the bathroom; later they heard
movements in her bedroom. And at last she was descending the
stairs leisurely, a care-free song on her lips.
She invaded the dining-room. Mr. Baron had been lingering over his
coffee. The various parts of the morning paper were all about him.
“Good morning,” was Bonnie May’s greeting. She nodded brightly. “I
hope I’m not intruding?”
“Not at all!” Mr. Baron glanced at her with real friendliness. It had not
occurred to him that her dress was fantastic. What he had noticed
was that her face was positively radiant, and that she spoke as he
imagined a duchess might have done.
“You might like to look at the colored supplement,” he added, fishing
around through the various sections of the paper at his feet.
“I thank you, I’m sure; but isn’t it rather silly?” She added
deferentially: “Is there a theatrical page?”
Mr. Baron coughed slightly, as he always did when he was
disconcerted. “There is, I believe,” he said. He glanced over his
shoulder toward a closed door. “I’m not sure Mrs. Baron would
approve of your looking at the theatrical department on Sunday,” he
added.
“Really! And you don’t think she’d see any harm in looking at the
comic pictures?”
Mr. Baron removed his glasses and wiped them carefully. “She
would probably regard the comic pictures as the lesser of two evils,”
he said.
“Well, I never did like to be a piker. If I’m going into a thing, I like to
go in strong.” She made this statement pleasantly.
A most extraordinary ancient man stood there watching
her.
Mr. Baron put his glasses on somewhat hurriedly and looked hard at
the child. He perceived that she was looking at him frankly and with
a slight constriction at her throat, as was always the case when she
felt she must hold her ground against attack.
“I rather think you’re right,” he said reassuringly. “I’m not sure I know
how to find the theatrical page. Would you mind looking?”
But Flora interrupted here. She entered the room with the air of one
who has blessings to bestow.
“You’re invited to go to Sunday-school with us after a while,” she
informed the guest.
“You’re very kind, I’m sure. What’s it like?”
“Oh, there are children, and music, and—” Flora paused. She wished
to make her statement attractive as well as truthful.
“A kind of spectacle?” suggested the guest.
“Hardly that. But there’s somebody to tell stories. It’s very nice, I
think.”
“It certainly sounds good to me. If they’ve got any good people I
might like to get into it, until I find an opening in my own line.”
Mr. Baron removed his glasses again. “Flora, would you undertake to
tell me what she means?” he inquired.
Miss Baron pinched her lips and looked at him with a kind of ripple of
joy in her eyes. “Isn’t it plain?” she asked. She went out of the room
then, and he heard her laughing somewhere in the distance.
He coughed again and turned to his paper, and so, for the first time
in her life, Bonnie May was in a fair way of going to Sunday-school.
Victor didn’t approve of the idea at all, when it was presently made
known to him. He waylaid his mother in the dining-room at a time
when there was no one else about.
“Why not wait until she can get some things?” he asked.
“Victor,” replied Mrs. Baron, holding her head very high, “you’re
assuming that that extraordinary little creature is going to stay here. I
assure you, she’s not. This may be the only chance she’ll ever have
to place herself in the way of a helpful influence on Sunday. She’s
going to Sunday-school to-day.”
“Governess,” responded Victor, smiling steadily, “if you don’t quit
getting angry with me I mean to sue for separate maintenance. Mark
my words.” After which nothing more was said on the subject.
Victor betook himself to the library, however, and indulged in a
moment of fidgeting. Breakers were ahead—that was certain.
It was forcing things, anyway. He took down his Emerson and turned
to a passage which his mother long ago had pronounced a thing
holding low heathen sentiments. He read:
“And why drag this dead weight of a Sunday-school over the whole
of Christendom? It is beautiful and natural that children should
inquire and maturity should teach, but it is time enough to answer
questions when they are asked. Do not shut up the young people
against their will in a pew and force the children to ask them
questions against their will.”
He could not dismiss from his mind the picture of Bonnie May asking
questions in her elfin yet penetrating way, and he realized that the
answers she would get in that place of ordered forms and
conventions might be very far from satisfactory to one of her
somewhat fearful frankness and honesty.
But suddenly he smiled at the pictures he was drawing in his mind.
“She seems pretty well able to take care of herself,” he concluded.
He came upon the heaped sections of the newspapers he had
examined. That reminded him. The newspapers were not the only
source of information—nor perhaps the most likely source—so far as
his immediate needs were concerned.
No, there was a certain visit he must make that morning.
A little later he emerged from the mansion and stood for an instant
on the steps in the brilliant sunlight. Then he descended the steps
and was gone.
CHAPTER VIII
STILL UNCLAIMED
Baron was on his way to see Thornburg.

On six days and seven nights Thornburg was one of the busiest men
in town. But there was one day in the week when he liked to pose as
a man of leisure. From ten or eleven o’clock on Sunday morning,
and until the latter part of the afternoon, there were few people about
the theatre to disturb him or to claim his attention. And during these
hours it was his practise to lean back in the comfortable chair in his
private office in the theatre and look through old letters and
souvenirs, if there were no callers, or to exchange current gossip or
old reminiscences with the people of his profession who dropped in
to see him. Usually these were managers or agents who happened
to be in town, and sometimes there were veteran players who were
retired, or who were temporarily unemployed. And occasionally there
were politicians who liked to keep on affable terms with the source of
free passes.
When Baron entered the manager’s presence he found that usually
engaged person quite at liberty.
The little office was a place which was not without its fascination to
most people. On the walls there were framed photographs of
Jefferson as Rip Van Winkle, of Booth as Richard III, of Modjeska as
Portia, and of other notable players. In many cases the pictures bore
sprawling autographs across their faces, low enough not to hurt.
Between these authentic ornaments there were fanciful sketches of
dancing girls in extravagant costumes and postures, and a general
ornamentation scheme of masks and foils and armor.
So complacent and open-minded was Thornburg when Baron
appeared that the latter came to a swift, seemingly irrelevant
conclusion.
“Nobody has claimed her! She’s going to stay!” were the words that
formed themselves in Baron’s mind. The dull, monotonous aspects
of the old mansion were to be changed. A new voice, like a melody
rising above droning chords, was to greet his ears at morning and
night. A thing of beauty was to take its place before the background
of dull, long-established things.
No one had come to Thornburg to demand of him the child who had
disappeared from his premises—Baron could read as much in the
manager’s expression. Wonderful! Truly wonderful!
“You haven’t had any word yet?” he began.
Thornburg was used to Baron’s ways. He had a friendly contempt for
the dilettante young man about town and newspaper writer who
could have made a place for himself, as everybody agreed, if he had
chosen to do so, but who indulged himself by following his own ill-
directed bent, merely because he was—well, because he was Baron
—or a Baron.
“Not a word,” he replied, smiling indulgently, as if the matter were
really not at all surprising.
Baron read the other’s thought. “But a child like that!” he exclaimed.
“People are sometimes strange,” said Thornburg. “Now, if she had
been a trained dog, or a cat with an unusual pedigree, or a horse
with power to draw loads—then she would have been hunted up
quick enough. But you see, she’s only a child.”
Baron shook his head. He was rejecting all this as inadequate.
“She’s still with you?” continued the manager.
“Yes. I’m hoping she’ll remain with us.”
“She like it there?”
“Like it?” echoed Baron. He couldn’t answer the question. He
thought of something more pertinent to say. “It means that she will
have a home—if we can keep her.”
Thornburg nodded slowly. “I don’t think anything better could happen
to her than for you to keep her,” he said. “I suppose she’ll get the
kind of care a little girl of her kind needs. If she’s just a waif of the
theatre she probably has a lot to learn about—oh, about life and real
things.”
“Very likely,” Baron agreed. He added: “I was hoping you might throw
some light on the case—as to who she is and where she came
from.”
Thornburg shook his head. “No, I couldn’t,” he said.
“About her coming to the theatre——”
“A woman brought her to the theatre and asked to be admitted. She
belonged to the profession—the woman. We usually pass them in if
there’s any room. There happened to be just one seat left down-
stairs—in the back row—and I told her she could have that. I
supposed she would hold the little girl on her lap. I was provoked
when I saw she had let her wander up into the box where you were.
In fact, I spoke to her about it.”
“And you don’t know who the woman was—even by reputation?”
“Oh, there are thousands of such people—people who are ‘of the
profession.’ Vaudeville people, circus performers, members of little
stock companies, third-rate travelling troupes—they all ask for free
seats.”
Baron reflected. “I suppose,” he said at length, “such people are
often in financial straits?”
“My goodness, yes! Almost always.”
“If she—this actress—had really wanted to find the child, she surely
would have made inquiries here at the theatre before now, wouldn’t
she?”
“It would seem so—certainly.”
“What I’m getting at is this: It looks a good deal like deliberate
desertion, doesn’t it?”
“Yes, I should say so.”
“And that’s what I simply can’t believe,” declared Baron. “Still,” he
added, “under the circumstances, I ought to be justified in not saying
anything—in assuming that I have a right to keep what has come
into my possession?”
“Well, for the time being, certainly. Of course, there may be
developments sooner or later. She must belong to somebody; I
mean, she must have a home somewhere.”
“No, she hasn’t.”
“But of course you can’t be sure of that.”
“I am. She’s my authority.”
“You mean she told you that? It was probably a childish fancy—or a
downright falsehood. You have to take into account all manner of
possible circumstances.”
“I think she told me the truth. She doesn’t seem fanciful, in that way.
She has the most remarkable sort of intelligence—of frankness.”
Thornburg’s eyes brightened with interest. “Has she, really?” he
asked. There was an interval of silence and then the manager
laughed. “It strikes me that you’re an odd sort of a chap, Baron,” he
said. “What was your idea in taking her home—a stray child like
that?”
“I don’t think it was so very remarkable. She wanted to go with me,
for one thing. She seemed quite delighted at the prospect of having
a real home.”
The manager turned this statement over in his mind so long that
Baron supposed he was thinking of something else. He sat, his
hands clasped behind his head, regarding one of the pictures on the
wall, well over Baron’s head. Then he aroused himself abruptly.
“What’s your plan regarding her?” he asked.
“I don’t know that I’ve got that far yet. She’ll have the usual schooling
and the sort of training that is customary. When she’s grown—Well,
it’s hard to look far ahead, where a child like that is concerned. Of
course, if Miss Barry ever turns up.... She would have claims we
couldn’t ignore.”
“Who’s Miss Barry?”
“She’s the woman who brought Bonnie May to the theatre. If you
know of an actress by that name——”
“I don’t.”
“She probably hasn’t very much standing. From what Bonnie May
said I judge she belongs to that vast army we never hear much
about in the cities.”
“It’s like this, Baron,” said the manager, with the air of a man who
hasn’t time for useless speculations, “I’m thinking, and I suppose
you’re thinking, that under the circumstances I ought to assume
some of the responsibility for a waif who was lost on my premises.
I’d want to be fair about it, you know.”
“But I wasn’t thinking anything of the kind,” declared Baron.
Thornburg frowned impatiently. “She’ll be a burden to you, of
course,” he argued. “And there’s clearly my share of the
responsibility——”
“I didn’t say anything about a burden. The word was yours. Of
course I had to take her home with me. Or at least that’s the way I
felt about it. You simply couldn’t turn a child like that over to an
orphan asylum, or to the police. You would as readily think of asking
some grand dame to turn a handspring as to expect Bonnie May to
put on a uniform with a lot of other unclaimed children, and go
through the usual order of childish occupations. Somebody has got
to look after her in a different way: somebody who understands. But I
wouldn’t think of her being a burden any more than I would think of
pigeons or flowers being a burden.”
Again Thornburg laughed. “Still, most people are pretty willing not to
have white elephants thrust upon them.”
Baron regarded him steadily, in silence. There was a sort of threat in
that—or a prophecy. And there was indicated that attitude of mind
which sees no beauty in a generous deed. And these were
reflections which Baron did not care to put into words.
The manager became uncomfortable under that glance. “You see,”
he explained, “I can’t help thinking.... Is it possible that a little
footlight butterfly will be comfortable very long in a home like—in a
home where everything is—is just so?” He flushed a little from the
effort to avoid offensive inferences or words. “Won’t she be
lonesome and out of place after the novelty of the thing passes?”
Baron liked that. It was frank and honest. “I don’t think she’ll be
lonesome,” he declared. “Mother will see that she gets interested in
things: in music, probably, or anything she manifests a taste for.
She’s too bright to feel out of place, if she’s helped in the right way.”
“It might work out all right.” Thornburg nodded. “I’ll tell you,” he
added, “suppose you let me help with the job.”
“Help!” echoed Baron. “You mean——”
“By writing a little check once a month.”
“That won’t be necessary. So far as the expense is concerned that
will scarcely be worth considering.”
“Nonsense! You could use it, if only for extra dresses and trinkets.
I’ve no doubt she’ll want a lot of things.”
That was exactly like a theatrical man’s ideas, Baron thought. But he
couldn’t tell Thornburg that his mother would be sure to oppose
anything that would tend to promote childish vanity, especially in the
case of one who was already inclined to overestimate mere
appearances. The gewgaws of the average petted and spoiled child
would have to give place to simplicity and true childishness. Still, he
didn’t wish to offend Thornburg, whose suggestion had doubtless
been based upon a generous impulse.
“It might be managed,” he said. “We’ll speak of that another time.”
He arose and began to shape a casual exit. “There’s nobody now to
take their places,” he said, indicating the portraits of Jefferson and
Booth and the others.
“Not by a thousand miles,” agreed Thornburg. His thoughts seemed
to have been transferred easily to the players who were gone.
But when Baron emerged from the theatre and lost himself in the
throng which the fine May forenoon had attracted from hotels and
side streets, his face brightened with the joy which he felt he need no
longer conceal.
“She’s ours!” were the words that sang within him. “We’re going to
keep her!”
CHAPTER IX
A DISAPPOINTING PERFORMANCE
Baron looked at his watch twice as he climbed the stairs. Yes, the
family had had time to return from church; but they had not done so.
Mrs. Shepard was busy in the dining-room, but otherwise the house
was unoccupied. Silence reigned in the upper regions.
Thomason, the houseman, was looking impatiently down from the
upper landing; but Thomason didn’t count. He was probably hungry.
Baron realized that he, too, was hungry.
He went into the cheerful sitting-room and looked down upon the
street, and instantly his attitude changed.
There they came! And something was wrong. Oh, plainly, something
was wrong.
Mrs. Baron’s head was held high; she was pale; her lips were
compressed. There was nothing gracious in her carriage. She was
marching.
By her side walked Flora, keeping step with difficulty. She appeared
to be fighting off all realization of her mother’s state.
Mrs. Shepard was no longer present to lend her support to Bonnie
May. The faithful servitor had come home immediately after Sunday-
school to look after the dinner, and the child walked alone, behind
her silent elders. Her whole being radiated defiance. She was
apparently taking in every aspect of the street, but her casual
bearing was obviously studied; the determined effort she was
making was not to be concealed.
Baron hurried down-stairs so that he might meet them in the hall,
and engineer a temporary dispersement. He was affecting a calm
and leisurely demeanor when the door opened and Mrs. Baron,
followed by the others, entered.
There was an ominous silence. Bonnie May caught sight of Baron
and approached him with only a partial concealment of eagerness
and hurry.
Mrs. Baron and Flora ascended the stairs: the former leading the
way sternly; the latter moving upward with wan cheeks and bowed
head.
Baron led the way into the sitting-room, Bonnie May following. He
pretended not to see or to apprehend anything unusual. “Well, what
do you think of Sunday-school?” he began gayly.
“I think it’s fierce!” This took the form of an explosion. “It wouldn’t do
even for one-night stands!”
Baron felt the need of an admonitory attitude. “Bonnie May,” he said,
“you should have discovered that it wasn’t a play. It was something
real. It’s a place where people go to help each other.”
“They certainly need help all right enough.” This with a quite unlovely
jeering laugh.
“I wonder what you mean by that?”
“I suppose I meant the same thing you meant yourself.”
Baron paused, frowning. “I meant,” he explained patiently, “that they
are people who want to be as good as they can, and who want to
give one another encouragement.”
The child was conscious of his wish to be conciliatory. She tried to
restrain herself. “Well,” she asked, “if they want to be good, why
don’t they just be good? What’s the use of worrying about it?”
“I’m afraid it isn’t quite so simple a matter as all that.”
Bonnie May’s wrath arose in spite of herself. She was recalling
certain indignities. “I don’t see anything in it but a bum performance.
Do you know what I think they go there for?”
“That’s what I’m trying to find out.”
“I think they go there to watch each other—to find out something bad
about each other.”
“Bonnie May!”
“I do! And I’ve had pretty near enough, too. You asked me and I told
you. You’re all asking me to do things, and asking me questions; and
then if I don’t agree with you in every way I’m wrong. That may look
all right to you, but it doesn’t to me. If I’ve got to take everything, I
mean to be on my way.”
Baron remained silent a full minute. When he spoke again his voice
was persuasive, gentle. “I’m anxious to understand your difficulties,”
he said. “I’m anxious to have you understand ours. I’m sorry I
criticised you. I’m sure you mean to be fair.”
She looked at him with a light of gratitude in her eyes, a quiver of
emotion passing over her face. She had an intense desire to justify
herself—at least to him.
“Do you know what was the first thing they asked me?”
“Your name, probably.”
“No, Mrs. Shepard told them that. They asked me if I was a good
little girl!”
“But I don’t see any harm in that. Why shouldn’t they have asked
you?”
“You don’t! Do you suppose that I was going to tell them that I was—
or that I wasn’t? What nonsense! Are you ‘a good young man’? How
does a question like that sound?”
Baron pondered. “Well—” he suggested.
“Well, I wouldn’t stand it. I asked her if she was ‘a good old
woman’—and the frowzy old thing stared at me just as ugly! She
walked way down into the parquet without looking back. She’d been
grinning when she asked me. I’ll bet she won’t grin like that very
soon again.”
Baron walked to the window and looked out dully, to gain time.
How extraordinary the child’s attitude was! And yet.... He could
understand that she might have been the only child in the troupe with
which she travelled, and that her older companions, weary of
mimicry and make-believe when their work was done, might have
employed very frank, mature speech toward each other and their
young companion.
He turned away from the window with a sigh. “Won’t you take my
word for it, Bonnie May, that these people mean well, and that one
should speak of them with respect, even if one cannot speak of them
with affection?”
“But they don’t mean well. What’s the good of stalling?” She turned
until her back was toward him, and sat so, her cheek in her hand,
and her whole body eloquent of discouragement.
An instant later she turned toward him with the first evidence of
surrender she had shown. Her chin quivered and her eyes were filled
with misery. “Did you tell the man where I was, so they can come for
me if they want me?” she asked.
Here spoke the child, Baron thought. His resentment fled instantly.
“Truly I did,” he assured her. “I have been doing everything I could
think of to help. I want you to believe that.”
“Oh, I do; but you all put too much on me. I want to go back to where
things are real——”
“Real, child? The theatre, and plays, and make-believe every day?”
“It’s the only thing that’s real. You’d know that if you were an artist. It
means what’s true—that’s what it means. Do you mean to tell me
there’s anything real in all the putting on here in this house—the way
you hide what you mean and what you believe and what you want?
Here’s where the make-believe is: just a mean make-believe that
nothing comes of. The theatre has a make-believe that everybody
understands, and so it really isn’t a make-believe, and something
good and true comes of it.”
Her eyes were flashing. Her hands had been clasped while she
spoke until she came to the final clause. Then she thrust her arms
forward as if she would grasp the good and true thing which came of
the make-believe she had defended.
When Baron spoke again his words came slowly. “Bonnie May,” he
said, “I wish that you and I might try, like good friends, to understand
each other, and not to say or think anything bitter or unkind. Maybe
there will be things I can teach you. I’m sure there are things you can
teach me! And the others ... I honestly believe that when we all get
better acquainted we’ll love one another truly.”
She hung her head pensively a moment, and then, suddenly, she
laughed heartily, ecstatically.
“What is it?” he asked, vaguely troubled.
“I’m thinking it’s certainly a pretty kettle of fish I’ve got into. That’s
all.”
“You know I don’t quite understand that.”
“The Sunday-school, I mean, and your mother, and everything. They
put me in with a lot of children”—this somewhat scornfully—“and a
sort of leading lady asked us riddles—is that what you call them?
One of them was: ‘How long did it take to make the world?’”
“But that wasn’t a riddle.”
“Well, whatever it was; and they caught one Smart Alec. She said,
‘Forty days and forty nights,’ and they all laughed—so you could see
it was just a catch. As if anybody knew! That was the only fun I could
see to the whole performance, and it sounded like Rube fun at that.
One odious little creature looked at my dress a long time. Then she
said: ‘I’ve got a new dress.’ Another looked at me and sniffed, and
sniffed, and sniffed. She wrinkled her nose and lifted her lip every
time she sniffed. It was like a kind of signal. Then she said: ‘My papa
has got a big store, and we’ve got a horse and buggy.’ She sniffed
again and looked just as spiteful! I had to get back at that one. ‘Don’t
cry, little one,’ I said. ‘Wait until it’s a pretty day and I’ll come around
and take you out in my automobile.’”
“But you haven’t any automobile!”
“That,” with great emphasis, “doesn’t make any difference. There’s
no harm in stringing people of a certain kind.”
“Oh, Bonnie May!” cried Baron reproachfully, and with quickly
restored calm he added: “Surely one should tell the truth!”
“Yes, one should, if two would. But you can’t afford to show your
hand to every Bedelia that gets into your troupe. No, you can’t,” she
repeated defiantly, reading the pained look in his eyes.
Baron knew that he should have expressed his disapproval of such a
vagrant philosophy as this; but before he had time to frame a tactful
response the child continued:
“Then the leading lady turned to me, thinking up another question. I
made up my mind to be on hand if I had to sleep in the wings. ‘Why
were Adam and Eve driven out of the garden?’ was mine. I said:
‘Because they couldn’t make good!’ She looked puzzled, and I
patted her on the knee. ‘You can’t put over anything on me,’ I said. I
think I shouted it. That stopped the whole show for a minute, and an
old character man up near the stage got up and said: ‘A little less
noise, please.’ Then your mother came back.” (Baron had
anticipated this detail.) “She had been taking the leading part in a
little sketch up in front.” (Teaching her class, Baron reflected, and
smiled wryly in spite of himself.) “She had got through with her
musical turn, and—well, I don’t want to talk about her. She told me I
must sit still and listen to what the others said. Why? I’d like to know.
I couldn’t agree with her at all. I told her I was a professional and
didn’t expect to pick up anything from a lot of amateurs. And then,”
she added dejectedly, “the trouble began.”
Baron groaned. He had hoped the worst had been told. What in the
world was there to follow?
“Your mother,” resumed Bonnie May, “spoke to the woman who had
been asking questions. She said—so that the children could hear
every word—‘She’s a poor little thing who’s had no bringing up.
She’ll have to learn how to behave.’”
She hung her head in shame at the recollection of this. For the
moment she seemed unwilling to proceed.
“And what happened then?” Baron asked persuasively.
“Oh—I was getting—rattled! She had no right to work in a line like
that.”
“But what did you do?”
“I told her.... You know I am sorry, don’t you?”
“Maybe you’d rather not tell me?”
“You’d better know. I told her that when it came to doing the nasty
stuff I had seen pupils from the dramatic schools that looked like
headliners compared with her.”
Baron stiffened. “Goodness! You couldn’t have said that!”
“Yes, I did. And I didn’t have to wait to hear from any prompter,
either. And she—you know she won’t take anything. The way she
looked! She said she was glad to say she didn’t have any idea what I
was talking about. Just a stall, you know. Oh, these good people!
She called Flora and said I was to be taken into a corner, and that I
was to sit there until we went home. And Flora led me into a corner
and the others looked back as if they were afraid of me. They all
sang after a while—a kind of ensemble affair. Flora held the music
over and invited me to sing. I told her musical turns were not in my
line. She just kept on holding the music for me—honestly, she’s the
dearest thing!—and singing herself. It was a crime, the noise she
made. Isn’t it awful when people try to sing and can’t? As if they had
to. Why do they do it? I felt like screaming to her to stop. But she
looked as if she might be dreaming, and I thought if anybody could
dream in that terrible place it would be a crime to wake them, even if
they did make a noise. They had an intermission, and then a man
down in front delivered a monologue.... Oh, me! Talk about the
moving-picture shows! Why, they’re artistic....”
What, Baron wondered, was one to say to a child who talked in such
a fashion?
Nothing—nothing at all. He groaned. Then, to his great relief, Flora
appeared.
“Dinner is ready,” she said, standing in the doorway. There was a
flush on her cheeks and an odd smile on her lips.
Baron took Bonnie May by the hand—he could not quite understand
the impulse which prompted him to do so—and led her into the
dining-room.
He saw that she bore her face aloft, with a painful effort at
unconcern. He was glad that she was given a place next to him, with
the elder Baron on her right, and Flora across the table from her.
He was dismayed to note that his mother was quite beside herself.
He had expected a certain amount of irritation, of chagrin, but not
this ominous, pallid silence. She avoided her son’s eyes, and this
meant, of course, that her wrath would sooner or later be visited
upon his head.
He sighed with discouragement. He realized sadly that his mother’s
heaviest crosses had always come to her from such trivial causes!
She was oddly childish—just as Bonnie May was strangely
unchildlike. Still, she had all the traditions of propriety, of a rule-made
demeanor, behind her. Strange that she could not have risen to the
difficulty that had confronted her, and emerged from a petty
predicament without so much of loss!
The meal progressed in a constrained silence. Bonnie May
concerned herself with her napkin; she admired the design on the
china; she appeared to appraise the dishes with the care of an
epicure. And at last, unfortunately, she spoke.
“Don’t you think, Mr. Baron”—to the master of the house—“that it is a
pretty custom to converse while at table?”
Mr. Baron coughed. He was keenly aware that something had gone
wrong; he was shrewd enough to surmise that Bonnie May had
offended. But he was in the position of the passenger below decks
who senses an abnormal atmosphere but who is unadvised as to the
nature of the storm.
“I’m afraid I’m not a very reliable hand at small talk,” he said
guardedly. “I think my idea is that you ought to talk when you have
something to say.”
“Very good!” agreed Bonnie May, nodding brightly. She patted her
lips daintily with the corner of her napkin. “Only it seems like

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Pluralisms in Truth and Logic 1st ed.

Edition Jeremy Wyatt

More information about this series at

Palgrave Innovations in Philosophy

Library of Congress Control Number: 2018963837

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2018

Cover illustration: Bashutskyy shutterstock.com

Pluralism has made inroads into a number of areas in philosophy. This

Incheon, South Korea Jeremy Wyatt

Part I Truth 1

Truth: One or Many or Both? 35

Truth Pluralism, Quasi-Realism, and the Problem of Double-­

The Metaphysics of Domains 85

Strong Truth Pluralism107

Methodological Pluralism About Truth131

Normative Alethic Pluralism145

Truth in English and Elsewhere: An Empirically-Informed

Part II Logic 197

Core Logic: A Conspectus199

Connective Meaning in Beall and Restall’s Logical Pluralism217

Generalised Tarski’s Thesis Hits Substructure237

Varieties of Logical Consequence by Their Resistance to

Part III Connections 363

Pluralism About Pluralisms365

A Plea for Immodesty: Alethic Pluralism, Logical Pluralism,

Logic for Alethic, Logical, and Ontological Pluralists407

Pluralisms: Logic, Truth and Domain-Specificity429

Aletheic and Logical Pluralism453

Dorit Bar-On is Professor of Philosophy, Department of Philosophy, and

Gillman Payette is Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of British Columbia.

Truth in English and Elsewhere: An Empirically-Informed

© The Author(s) 2018 3

2 Truth Pluralism (Part I)

Truth pluralists are engaged in critical debates on two fronts—one exter-

theory can be plausibly applied to empirical discourse, accounting for the

(mix-comp) Mt. Everest is extended in space and Bob’s drunk driving is

(mix-inf ) If Mt. Everest is extended in space, then Bob’s drunk driv-

〈π is beautiful〉 is a mixed atomic proposition. It features a mathemati-

Dorit Bar-On and Keith Simmons’ contribution “Truth: One or

pluralist to account for the “differential appeal of realist and anti-

(CU) All beliefs and indicative statements are subject to a single

Blackburn proposes to accommodate semantic diversity by appealing to

Douglas Edwards’ contribution “The Metaphysics of Domains” pro-

This is not to say that Wright is opposed to giving truth a “non-default”

about truth. Wyatt argues that a proper defense of alethic functional-

3 Logical Pluralism (Part II)

(GTT) An argument is validx if and only if in every casex in which

Legitimacy The standard of legitimacy for cases is given by three features

Logical Functionalism The network approach to conceptual analysis can

Logical Generalism To borrow a phrase from Hartry Field, Beall and

Logical Relativism Beall and Restall’s logical pluralism involves a form of

Structural Rules and Properties It is common to distinguish between the

(Transitivity) If Γ ⊨ ϕ and Δ, ϕ ⊨ ψ, then Δ, Γ ⊨ ψ

Reflexivity says that anything is a logical consequence of itself.

Neil Tennant’s contribution “Core Logic: A Conspectus” presents an

of logical pluralism. Unlike logical generalists, domain-based logical

case with a corresponding, case-specific type of validity. If validity is

4 Connections (Part III)

The most widely explored form of truth pluralism is domain-based. The

(1) If truth is epistemically constrained in one domain and epistemically

(2) is accepted by most (domain-based) truth pluralists. Many of them take

(mod) The logic of a mixed compound or inference that involves

The logic of a given mixed compound or inference is thus minimal—it is

Incheon, South Korea Jeremy Wyatt

Part I Truth 1

Truth: One or Many or Both? 35

Truth Pluralism, Quasi-Realism, and the Problem of Double-

The Metaphysics of Domains 85

Strong Truth Pluralism107

Methodological Pluralism About Truth131

Normative Alethic Pluralism145

Part II Logic 197

Core Logic: A Conspectus199

Connective Meaning in Beall and Restall’s Logical Pluralism217

Generalised Tarski’s Thesis Hits Substructure237

Part III Connections 363

Pluralism About Pluralisms365

Logic for Alethic, Logical, and Ontological Pluralists407

Pluralisms: Logic, Truth and Domain-Specificity429

Aletheic and Logical Pluralism453

2 Truth Pluralism (Part I)

3 Logical Pluralism (Part II)

4 Connections (Part III)

We have just reflected on the potential connections between domain-