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Power of Logic
This fifth edition of The Power of Logic offers an introduction to
informal logic, traditional categorical logic, and modern symbolic
The
The
logic. The authors’ direct and accessible writing style, along with
a wealth of engaging examples and challenging exercises, makes
this an ideal text for today’s logic classes.
Howard-Snyder
Howard-Snyder
Wasserman
Brief Contents
Preface xv
Glossary/Index 629
vii
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Contents
Preface xv
viii
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Contents ix
x Contents
Composition 171
Division 173
■ Summary of Definitions 174
Exercise 4.2 174
4.3 Fallacies Involving Unwarranted Assumptions 177
Begging the Question ( Petitio Principii ) 177
False Dilemma 180
Appeal to Unreliable Authority (Ad Verecundiam Fallacy) 182
False Cause Fallacy 183
Complex Question 186
■ Summary of Definitions 188
Exercise 4.3 189
Notes 195
Contents xi
xii Contents
Contents xiii
xiv Contents
Preface
C ritical thinking skills are some of the most prized commodities in today’s
knowledge-based economy, and the study of logic is one of the best ways to de-
velop these skills. With its emphasis on presenting, understanding, and evaluat-
ing arguments, logic has the power to make us quicker, clearer, and more cre-
ative thinkers. It can help us to articulate and support our own views, and to
analyze the views of others.
In short, there are many benefits to the study of logic. But there are also
potential obstacles. Logic can be intimidating. It can be frustrating. It can even
be boring.
The Power of Logic is written with the hopes of removing these kinds of
obstacles. The book features a simple and direct writing style that helps makes
even the most technical matters approachable. It features a wealth of helpful tips
and on-line resources to combat common frustrations. And it includes hundreds
of examples and exercises that give readers the opportunity to apply their critical
thinking skills to interesting arguments from philosophy, politics, and religion.
Our hope is that these features help to make logic accessible and interesting, and
that they enable you to put the power of logic to work in your own life.
New Features
We have made many improvements in light of critical reviews and our class-
room experience with previous editions. We have also made some very specific
improvements as follows:
■ The book has been heavily rewritten, with a focus on eliminating excess
verbiage, repetitive passages, and outdated material.
■ There are dozens of new definition boxes, which emphasize key concepts
and important distinctions.
■ There are over a dozen new summary boxes, including summaries of the
abbreviated truth-table method and the finite universe method. These
boxes contain simple, clear descriptions for quick reference and study.
■ Chapter 2, Identifying Arguments, provides a clearer explanation of how
to reconstruct an argument.
■ Chapter 3, Logic and Language, expands the discussion of propositions,
sentences, and truth.
■ Chapter 4, Informal Fallacies, now emphasizes how sound or cogent argu-
ments can resemble fallacies and explains how to avoid identifying them
as fallacies. It also includes a new discussion of some purported fallacies
xv
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xvi Preface
such as the “Intentional fallacy” and the “is-ought fallacy” that are some-
times invoked to avoid a more substantive discussion.
■ Chapter 9, Predicate Logic, contains a revised definition of a WFF for the
language of predicate logic. Section 9.3 includes five new sets of exercises,
which allows students to master the quantifier rules one at a time.
■ Chapter 10, Induction, has been reorganized and refocused. It includes a
new discussion of arguments from authority, and a greater emphasis on
the connection between probability and inductive logic.
Enduring Features
We have retained many of the features that have made The Power of Logic suc-
cessful in the past.
■ Early chapters focus on relatively informal methods. More technical
material is introduced gradually, with symbolic logic receiving thorough
treatment in Chapters 7 to 9.
■ The writing is concise and lively throughout the text. The chapter on truth
tables includes a discussion of the material conditional and its relation to
the English “if-then” and emphasizes abbreviated truth tables.
■ The system of natural deduction for statement logic is entirely standard,
consisting of 8 implicational rules, 10 equivalence rules, conditional
proof, and reductio ad absurdum.
■ The chapter on inductive logic includes standard material on statistical
syllogisms, induction by enumeration, arguments from authority, Mill’s
methods, scientific reasoning, and arguments from analogy. It also
includes an accessible introduction to the probability calculus.
■ The exercises on arguments from analogy require students to evaluate a
stated criticism of each argument, which makes the exercises relatively
easy to grade.
As in previous editions, various paths through this book are possible, de-
pending on the time available, the needs of the students, and the interests of the
instructor. Here are three possibilities:
■ A course emphasizing traditional and informal logic, covering Chapters 1
to 6 and 10: Basic Concepts, Identifying Arguments, Logic and Language,
Informal Fallacies, Categorical Logic: Statements, Categorical Logic:
Syllogisms, and Inductive Logic
■ A course giving roughly equal emphasis to informal and symbolic logic,
covering Chapters 1 to 4, 7, and 8: Basic Concepts, Identifying Argu-
ments, Logic and Language, Informal Fallacies, Statement Logic: Truth
Tables, and Statement Logic: Proofs
■ A course emphasizing symbolic methods, covering Chapters 1 and 2, 7 to
9, and 10.4: Basic Concepts, Identifying Arguments, Statement Logic:
Truth Tables, Statement Logic: Proofs, Predicate Logic, and Probability
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Preface xvii
Supplements
An Online Learning Center accompanies this text at www.mhhe.com/
howardsnyder5e. For instructors the site includes an updated solutions manual,
a test bank, computerized test bank, and a complete chapter on modal logic
for those who wish to cover this material. For students, the site offers learning
objectives, and chapter summaries.
The site also provides accessibility to an online Logic Tutor, allowing stu-
dents to do the vast majority of the book’s exercises online with feedback. This
includes creating Venn diagrams, truth tables, and proofs. Additionally, instruc-
tors can build proof, truth, and symbolization questions of their own that can
also be graded by the Logic Tutor.
Acknowledgments
Many people have helped improve this text throughout the years. Our greatest
debt is to C. Stephen Layman, who authored the first three editions of The Power
of Logic and is responsible for many of its best features. We also thank Allison
Rona, Anne L. Bezuidenhout, Benjamin Schaeffer, Bernard F. Keating, Charles
R. Carr, Charles Seymour, Cynthia B. Bryson, Darian C. De Bolt, Eric Kraemer,
Eric Saidel, George A. Spangler, Greg Oakes, Gulten Ilhan, James K. Derden, Jr.,
Jason Turner, Jeffrey Roland, Jen Mills, John Casey, Jon-David Hague, Jordan J.
Lindberg, Joseph Le Fevre, Keith W. Krasemann, Ken Akiba, Ken King, Maria
Cimitile, Mark Storey, Martin Frické, Michael F. Wagner, Michael Rooney,
Mitchell Gabhart, Nancy Slonneger Hancock, Neal Hogan, Ned Markosian,
Nils Rauhut, Otávio Bueno, Patricia A. Ross, Paul Draper, Paul M. Jurczak,
Peter Dlugos, Phil Schneider, Phillip Goggans, Rachel Hollenberg, Richard
McClelland, Rico Vitz, Robert Boyd Skipper, Ron Jackson, Sander Lee, Sandra
Johanson, Ted Sider, Terence Cuneo, Tom Downing, Ty Barnes, William J. Doulan,
and Xinmin Zhu.
For the fifth edition, we thank our project team at McGraw-Hill Higher
Education: Jessica Cannavo, Sponsoring Editor; Robin Reed, Developmental
Editor; Angela FitzPatrick, Marketing Campaign Coordinator; Jane Mohr, Lead
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xviii Preface
Project Manager; and Margarite Reynolds, Design Coordinator. We are also very
grateful to the following reviewers for their time, effort, and expertise:
INFERENCE RULES FOR STATEMENT LOGIC Conditional Proof (CP) Reductio ad Absurdum (RAA)
Premises To prove a negation: ⬃p To prove a statement
Implicational Rules p Assume (for CP) that is not a negation: p
. Premises Premises
Modus Ponens (MP) Modus Tollens (MT) .
p→q p→q . p Assume (for RAA) ⬃p Assume (for RAA)
p ,q . .
q
∴q ∴ ,p . .
p → q CP
. .
Disjunctive Syllogism (DS) Simplification (Simp) (q • ⬃q) (q • ⬃q)
p∨q p∨q p•q p•q ⬃p RAA p RAA
,p ,q ∴p ∴q
∴q ∴p
MHID: 0078038197 / Author: Howard-Snyder / Color: 1-color Black / Endsheets to print: Front 2, 3
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C HA P TE R 1
Basic Concepts
To get a better grasp of what logic is, then, we need to understand the key con-
cepts involved in this definition: argument, conclusion, premise, and support.
This chapter will give you an initial understanding of these basic concepts.
An argument is a set of statements where some of the statements are
intended to support another. The conclusion is the claim to be supported. The
premises are the statements offered in support. In some arguments, the conclu-
sion is adequately supported by the premises; in other cases it is not. But a set of
1
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1. Every logic book contains at least one silly example. The Power of Logic is
a logic book. So, The Power of Logic contains at least one silly example.
The word “so” indicates that the conclusion of this argument is “The Power of
Logic contains at least one silly example.” The argument has two premises—
“Every logic book contains at least one silly example” and “The Power of Logic is
a logic book.” Of course, many arguments deal with very serious matters. Here
are two examples:
As with argument (1), the sentences that precede the word “so” in arguments
(2) and (3) are the premises and the sentence that follows the word “so” is the
conclusion.
(4) is true because it describes things as they are. (5) is false because it describes
things as other than they are. Truth and falsehood are the two possible truth
values. So, we can say that a statement is a declarative sentence that has a truth
value. The truth value of (4) is true while the truth value of (5) is false, but
(4) and (5) are both statements. Is (6) a statement? Yes. No one may know its
truth value, but (6) is either true or false, and hence it is a statement.
No. (7) is a command, which could be obeyed or disobeyed. But it makes no sense
to say that a command is true or false, so it is not a statement. (8) is a question,
which could be answered or unanswered. But a question cannot be true or false,
so it is not a statement. Finally, (9) is a proposal, which could be accepted or
rejected. But a proposal cannot be true or false, so it also fails to be a statement.
We have said that an argument is a set of statements, where some of the
statements (the premises) are intended to support another (the conclusion).1
We must now distinguish two ways the premises can be intended to support the
conclusion, and hence two different kinds of arguments. A deductive argument
is one in which the premises are intended to guarantee the conclusion. An
inductive argument is one in which the premises are intended to make the
conclusion probable, without guaranteeing it. The following two examples illus-
trate this distinction:
10. All philosophers like logic. Ned is a philosopher. So, Ned likes logic.
11. Most philosophers like logic. Ned is a philosopher. So, Ned likes logic.
The premises of argument (10) are intended to support the conclusion in this
sense: It is guaranteed that, if they are true, then the conclusion is true as well.
(10) is an example of a deductive argument. The premises of argument (11) do
not support the conclusion in this same sense. Even if Ned is a philosopher and
even if the majority of philosophers enjoy logic, it is not guaranteed that Ned
enjoys logic; he might be among the minority who do not care for logic at all.
The premises of (11) support the conclusion in a different sense, however: It is
probable that if they are true, then the conclusion is true as well. (11) is an
example of an inductive argument.
whether the premises of an argument make its conclusion probable, without guar-
anteeing it.2 The first three sections of this chapter introduce some of the key
elements of deductive logic. The fourth section focuses on inductive logic.
Two key aspects of this definition should be noted immediately. First, note
the important word “necessary.” In a valid argument, there is a necessary connection
between the premises and the conclusion. The conclusion doesn’t just happen to be
true given the premises; rather, the truth of the conclusion is absolutely guaranteed
given the truth of the premises. That is, a valid argument is one in which it is abso-
lutely impossible for the premises to be true while the conclusion is false. Second, note
the conditional (if-then) aspect of the definition. It does not say that the premises
and conclusion of a valid argument are in fact true. Rather, the definition says that,
necessarily, if the premises are true, then the conclusion is true. In other words, if an
argument is valid, then it is necessary that, on the assumption that its premises are
true, its conclusion is true also. Each of the following arguments is valid:
12. All biologists are scientists. John is not a scientist. So, John is not a
biologist.
13. If Alice stole the diamonds, then she is a thief. And Alice did steal the
diamonds. Hence, Alice is a thief.
14. Either Bill has a poor memory or he is lying. Bill does not have a poor
memory. Therefore, Bill is lying.
In each case, it is necessary that if the premises are true, then the conclusion is
true. Thus, in each case, the argument is valid.
In everyday English, the word “valid” is often used simply to indicate
one’s overall approval of an argument. But the methods logicians develop for
assessing arguments focus on the link between the premises and the conclusion
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rather than on the actual truth or falsity of the statements composing the
argument.
The following observations about validity may help prevent some com-
mon misunderstandings. First, notice that an argument can have one or more
false premises and still be valid. For instance:
15. All birds are animals. Some cats are birds. So, some cats are animals.
Here, the second premise is plainly false, and yet the argument is valid, for it is
necessary that if the premises are true, the conclusion is true also. And in the
following argument, both premises are false, but the argument is still valid:
16. All sharks are birds. All birds are predators. So, all sharks are predators.
Although the premises of this argument are in fact false, it is impossible for the
conclusion to be false while the premises are true. So, it is valid.
Second, we cannot rightly conclude that an argument is valid simply on
the grounds that its premises are all true. For example:
The premises here are true, but the conclusion is false. So, obviously, it is possible
that the conclusion is false while the premises are true; hence, (17) is not valid.
Is the following argument valid?
Here, we have true premises and a true conclusion. But it is not necessary that,
if the premises are true, then the conclusion is true. (Ms. DeGeneres could
switch to another line of work while remaining an American.) So, even if an
argument has true premises and a true conclusion, it might not be valid. Thus,
the question “Are the premises and the conclusion actually true?” is distinct
from the question “Is the argument valid?”
Third, suppose an argument is valid and has a false conclusion. Must it then
have at least one false premise? Yes. If it had true premises, then it would have to
have a true conclusion because it is valid. Validity preserves truth; that is, if we
start with truth and reason in a valid fashion, we will always wind up with truth.
Fourth, does validity also preserve falsehood? In other words, if we start
with false premises and reason validly, are we bound to wind up with a false
conclusion? No. Consider the following argument:
19. All Martians are Republicans. All Republicans are extraterrestrials. So, all
Martians are extraterrestrials.
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Is this argument valid? Yes. It is impossible for the conclusion to be false assum-
ing that its premises are true. However, the premises here are false while the
conclusion is true. So, validity does not preserve falsehood. In fact, false premises
plus valid reasoning may lead to either truth or falsity, depending on the case.
Here is a valid argument with false premises and a false conclusion:
20. All highly intelligent beings are from outer space. Some armadillos are highly
intelligent beings. So, some armadillos are from outer space.
The lesson here is that although valid reasoning guarantees that we will end up
with truth if we start with it, valid reasoning does not guarantee that we will end
up with falsehood if we start with it.
Fifth, notice that we can know whether an argument is valid or invalid even
if we do not know the truth value of the conclusion and all of the premises. Con-
sider this example:
21. All Schnitzers are BMWs. Emily Larson owns a Schnitzer. So, Emily Larson
owns a BMW.
Chances are that you have no idea whether the conclusion and all of the premises
are true, but this argument is obviously valid; it is not possible for Emily not to
own a BMW on the assumption that she owns a Schnitzer and all Schnitzers are
BMWs. Here is another example:
You probably haven’t the foggiest idea what the truth values of these statements
are; indeed, you might not even know what they mean. Nevertheless, you can
tell that this argument is invalid because the premises do not rule out the pos-
sibility that Alston is a foundationalist of a nonreliabilist stripe.
Earlier, we said that an invalid argument is a deductive argument in which
the premises fail to guarantee the conclusion. More formally, an invalid argu-
ment is one in which it is not necessary that, if the premises are true, then the
conclusion is true.
In other words, an invalid argument is one in which it is possible for the prem-
ises to be true while the conclusion is false. Even on the assumption that the
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premises are true, the conclusion could still be false. Each of the following argu-
ments is invalid:
23. All dogs are animals. All cats are animals. Hence, all dogs are cats.
24. If Pat is a wife, then Pat is a woman. But Pat is not a wife. So, Pat is not a
woman.
25. Phil likes Margo. Therefore, Margo likes Phil.
Since the premises of argument (23) are in fact true but its conclusion is false, it is
obviously possible for its premises to be true while its conclusion is false; so, it is
invalid. Argument (24) is invalid because its premises leave open the possibility
that Pat is an unmarried woman. And (25) is invalid because even if Phil does like
Margo, it remains open whether she feels the same way toward him. In each of
these cases, then, the conclusion could be false while the premises are true.
The foregoing five points about validity, invalidity, and truth are summa-
rized by the following table:
Notice that validity is not enough all by itself for a good deductive argu-
ment. A valid argument with false premises can lead to a false conclusion (box 2).
Moreover, truth is not enough all by itself for a good deductive argument. An
invalid argument with all true premises can lead to a false conclusion (box 9).
We want our deductive arguments to be valid and to have all true premises. An
argument that has both is a sound argument. In other words, a valid argument in
which all of the premises are true is a sound argument.
A sound argument is a valid argument in which all of the premises are true.
Because a sound argument is valid and has only true premises, its conclusion will
also be true. Validity preserves truth. That’s why there is nothing in box 4. The
argument in box 1 is sound; here are two more sound arguments:
26. All collies are dogs. All dogs are animals. So, all collies are animals.
27. If Mozart was a composer, then he understood music. Mozart was a
composer. Hence, Mozart understood music.
In each case, it is necessary that, if the premises are true, then the conclusion is true;
moreover, in each case, all of the premises are true. Thus, each argument is sound.
In other words, an unsound argument is one that either is invalid or has at least
one false premise.
An unsound argument is one that either is invalid or has at least one false
premise.
28. All birds are animals. Some grizzly bears are not animals. Therefore, some
grizzly bears are not birds.
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29. All birds are animals. All grizzly bears are animals. So, all grizzly bears are
birds.
30. All trees are animals. All bears are animals. So, all bears are trees.
Arguments
we will get a better handle on the basic concepts that we have introduced thus far.
But first, a note on terminology is in order. Given our definitions, arguments are
neither true nor false, but each statement is either true or false. On the other hand,
arguments can be valid, invalid, sound, or unsound, but statements cannot be
valid, invalid, sound, or unsound. Therefore, a given premise (or conclusion) is
either true or false, but it cannot be valid, invalid, sound, or unsound.
Summary of Definitions
EXERCISE 1.1
Note: For each exercise item preceded by an asterisk, the answer appears in the
Answer Key at the end of the book.
PART B: True or False? Which of the following statements are true? Which
are false?
* 1. All valid arguments have at least one false premise.
2. An argument is a set of statements where some of the statements, called the
premises, are intended to support another, called the conclusion.
3. Every valid argument has true premises and only true premises.
* 4. Logic is the study of methods for evaluating whether the premises of an
argument adequately support its conclusion.
5. Some statements are invalid.
6. Every valid argument has true premises and a true conclusion.
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PART C: Valid or Invalid? Much of this text concerns methods of testing argu-
ments for validity. Although we have not yet discussed any particular methods of test-
ing arguments for validity, we do have definitions of “valid argument” and “invalid
argument.” Based on your current understanding, which of the following arguments
are valid? Which are invalid? (Hint: Use the definitions that have been provided.)
* 1. If Lincoln was killed in an automobile accident, then Lincoln is dead.
Lincoln was killed in an automobile accident. Hence, Lincoln is dead.
2. If Lincoln was killed in an automobile accident, then Lincoln is dead. Lincoln
was not killed in an automobile accident. Therefore, Lincoln is not dead.
3. If Lincoln was killed in an automobile accident, then Lincoln is dead.
Lincoln is dead. So, Lincoln was killed in an automobile accident.
* 4. If Lincoln was killed in an automobile accident, then Lincoln is dead. Lincoln
is not dead. Hence, Lincoln was not killed in an automobile accident.
5. Either 2 plus 2 equals 22 or Santa Claus is real. But 2 plus 2 does not equal
22. Therefore, Santa Claus is real.
6. Either we use nuclear power or we reduce our consumption of energy. If we
use nuclear power, then we place our lives at great risk. If we reduce our con-
sumption of energy, then we place ourselves under extensive governmental
control. So, either we place our lives at great risk or we place ourselves under
extensive governmental control.
* 7. All birds are animals. No tree is a bird. Therefore, no tree is an animal.
8. Some humans are comatose. But no comatose being is rational. So, not every
human is rational.
9. All animals are living things. At least one cabbage is a living thing. So, at
least one cabbage is an animal.
* 10. Alvin likes Jane. Jane likes Chris. So, Alvin likes Chris.
11. All murderers are criminals. Therefore, all nonmurderers are noncriminals.
12. David is shorter than Saul. Saul is shorter than Goliath. It follows that David
is shorter than Goliath.
* 13. It is possible that McGraw will win the next presidential election. It is pos-
sible that Lambert will win the next presidential election. Thus, it is possible
that both McGraw and Lambert will win the next presidential election.
14. All physicians are singers. Lady Gaga is a physician. Therefore, Lady Gaga is
a singer.
15. Samuel Morse invented the telegraph. Alexander Graham Bell did not
invent the telegraph. Consequently, Morse is not identical with Bell.
I see increasing reason to believe that the view formed some time
back as to the origin of the Makonde bush is the correct one. I have
no doubt that it is not a natural product, but the result of human
occupation. Those parts of the high country where man—as a very
slight amount of practice enables the eye to perceive at once—has not
yet penetrated with axe and hoe, are still occupied by a splendid
timber forest quite able to sustain a comparison with our mixed
forests in Germany. But wherever man has once built his hut or tilled
his field, this horrible bush springs up. Every phase of this process
may be seen in the course of a couple of hours’ walk along the main
road. From the bush to right or left, one hears the sound of the axe—
not from one spot only, but from several directions at once. A few
steps further on, we can see what is taking place. The brush has been
cut down and piled up in heaps to the height of a yard or more,
between which the trunks of the large trees stand up like the last
pillars of a magnificent ruined building. These, too, present a
melancholy spectacle: the destructive Makonde have ringed them—
cut a broad strip of bark all round to ensure their dying off—and also
piled up pyramids of brush round them. Father and son, mother and
son-in-law, are chopping away perseveringly in the background—too
busy, almost, to look round at the white stranger, who usually excites
so much interest. If you pass by the same place a week later, the piles
of brushwood have disappeared and a thick layer of ashes has taken
the place of the green forest. The large trees stretch their
smouldering trunks and branches in dumb accusation to heaven—if
they have not already fallen and been more or less reduced to ashes,
perhaps only showing as a white stripe on the dark ground.
This work of destruction is carried out by the Makonde alike on the
virgin forest and on the bush which has sprung up on sites already
cultivated and deserted. In the second case they are saved the trouble
of burning the large trees, these being entirely absent in the
secondary bush.
After burning this piece of forest ground and loosening it with the
hoe, the native sows his corn and plants his vegetables. All over the
country, he goes in for bed-culture, which requires, and, in fact,
receives, the most careful attention. Weeds are nowhere tolerated in
the south of German East Africa. The crops may fail on the plains,
where droughts are frequent, but never on the plateau with its
abundant rains and heavy dews. Its fortunate inhabitants even have
the satisfaction of seeing the proud Wayao and Wamakua working
for them as labourers, driven by hunger to serve where they were
accustomed to rule.
But the light, sandy soil is soon exhausted, and would yield no
harvest the second year if cultivated twice running. This fact has
been familiar to the native for ages; consequently he provides in
time, and, while his crop is growing, prepares the next plot with axe
and firebrand. Next year he plants this with his various crops and
lets the first piece lie fallow. For a short time it remains waste and
desolate; then nature steps in to repair the destruction wrought by
man; a thousand new growths spring out of the exhausted soil, and
even the old stumps put forth fresh shoots. Next year the new growth
is up to one’s knees, and in a few years more it is that terrible,
impenetrable bush, which maintains its position till the black
occupier of the land has made the round of all the available sites and
come back to his starting point.
The Makonde are, body and soul, so to speak, one with this bush.
According to my Yao informants, indeed, their name means nothing
else but “bush people.” Their own tradition says that they have been
settled up here for a very long time, but to my surprise they laid great
stress on an original immigration. Their old homes were in the
south-east, near Mikindani and the mouth of the Rovuma, whence
their peaceful forefathers were driven by the continual raids of the
Sakalavas from Madagascar and the warlike Shirazis[47] of the coast,
to take refuge on the almost inaccessible plateau. I have studied
African ethnology for twenty years, but the fact that changes of
population in this apparently quiet and peaceable corner of the earth
could have been occasioned by outside enterprises taking place on
the high seas, was completely new to me. It is, no doubt, however,
correct.
The charming tribal legend of the Makonde—besides informing us
of other interesting matters—explains why they have to live in the
thickest of the bush and a long way from the edge of the plateau,
instead of making their permanent homes beside the purling brooks
and springs of the low country.
“The place where the tribe originated is Mahuta, on the southern
side of the plateau towards the Rovuma, where of old time there was
nothing but thick bush. Out of this bush came a man who never
washed himself or shaved his head, and who ate and drank but little.
He went out and made a human figure from the wood of a tree
growing in the open country, which he took home to his abode in the
bush and there set it upright. In the night this image came to life and
was a woman. The man and woman went down together to the
Rovuma to wash themselves. Here the woman gave birth to a still-
born child. They left that place and passed over the high land into the
valley of the Mbemkuru, where the woman had another child, which
was also born dead. Then they returned to the high bush country of
Mahuta, where the third child was born, which lived and grew up. In
course of time, the couple had many more children, and called
themselves Wamatanda. These were the ancestral stock of the
Makonde, also called Wamakonde,[48] i.e., aborigines. Their
forefather, the man from the bush, gave his children the command to
bury their dead upright, in memory of the mother of their race who
was cut out of wood and awoke to life when standing upright. He also
warned them against settling in the valleys and near large streams,
for sickness and death dwelt there. They were to make it a rule to
have their huts at least an hour’s walk from the nearest watering-
place; then their children would thrive and escape illness.”
The explanation of the name Makonde given by my informants is
somewhat different from that contained in the above legend, which I
extract from a little book (small, but packed with information), by
Pater Adams, entitled Lindi und sein Hinterland. Otherwise, my
results agree exactly with the statements of the legend. Washing?
Hapana—there is no such thing. Why should they do so? As it is, the
supply of water scarcely suffices for cooking and drinking; other
people do not wash, so why should the Makonde distinguish himself
by such needless eccentricity? As for shaving the head, the short,
woolly crop scarcely needs it,[49] so the second ancestral precept is
likewise easy enough to follow. Beyond this, however, there is
nothing ridiculous in the ancestor’s advice. I have obtained from
various local artists a fairly large number of figures carved in wood,
ranging from fifteen to twenty-three inches in height, and
representing women belonging to the great group of the Mavia,
Makonde, and Matambwe tribes. The carving is remarkably well
done and renders the female type with great accuracy, especially the
keloid ornamentation, to be described later on. As to the object and
meaning of their works the sculptors either could or (more probably)
would tell me nothing, and I was forced to content myself with the
scanty information vouchsafed by one man, who said that the figures
were merely intended to represent the nembo—the artificial
deformations of pelele, ear-discs, and keloids. The legend recorded
by Pater Adams places these figures in a new light. They must surely
be more than mere dolls; and we may even venture to assume that
they are—though the majority of present-day Makonde are probably
unaware of the fact—representations of the tribal ancestress.
The references in the legend to the descent from Mahuta to the
Rovuma, and to a journey across the highlands into the Mbekuru
valley, undoubtedly indicate the previous history of the tribe, the
travels of the ancestral pair typifying the migrations of their
descendants. The descent to the neighbouring Rovuma valley, with
its extraordinary fertility and great abundance of game, is intelligible
at a glance—but the crossing of the Lukuledi depression, the ascent
to the Rondo Plateau and the descent to the Mbemkuru, also lie
within the bounds of probability, for all these districts have exactly
the same character as the extreme south. Now, however, comes a
point of especial interest for our bacteriological age. The primitive
Makonde did not enjoy their lives in the marshy river-valleys.
Disease raged among them, and many died. It was only after they
had returned to their original home near Mahuta, that the health
conditions of these people improved. We are very apt to think of the
African as a stupid person whose ignorance of nature is only equalled
by his fear of it, and who looks on all mishaps as caused by evil
spirits and malignant natural powers. It is much more correct to
assume in this case that the people very early learnt to distinguish
districts infested with malaria from those where it is absent.
This knowledge is crystallized in the
ancestral warning against settling in the
valleys and near the great waters, the
dwelling-places of disease and death. At the
same time, for security against the hostile
Mavia south of the Rovuma, it was enacted
that every settlement must be not less than a
certain distance from the southern edge of the
plateau. Such in fact is their mode of life at the
present day. It is not such a bad one, and
certainly they are both safer and more
comfortable than the Makua, the recent
intruders from the south, who have made USUAL METHOD OF
good their footing on the western edge of the CLOSING HUT-DOOR
plateau, extending over a fairly wide belt of
country. Neither Makua nor Makonde show in their dwellings
anything of the size and comeliness of the Yao houses in the plain,
especially at Masasi, Chingulungulu and Zuza’s. Jumbe Chauro, a
Makonde hamlet not far from Newala, on the road to Mahuta, is the
most important settlement of the tribe I have yet seen, and has fairly
spacious huts. But how slovenly is their construction compared with
the palatial residences of the elephant-hunters living in the plain.
The roofs are still more untidy than in the general run of huts during
the dry season, the walls show here and there the scanty beginnings
or the lamentable remains of the mud plastering, and the interior is a
veritable dog-kennel; dirt, dust and disorder everywhere. A few huts
only show any attempt at division into rooms, and this consists
merely of very roughly-made bamboo partitions. In one point alone
have I noticed any indication of progress—in the method of fastening
the door. Houses all over the south are secured in a simple but
ingenious manner. The door consists of a set of stout pieces of wood
or bamboo, tied with bark-string to two cross-pieces, and moving in
two grooves round one of the door-posts, so as to open inwards. If
the owner wishes to leave home, he takes two logs as thick as a man’s
upper arm and about a yard long. One of these is placed obliquely
against the middle of the door from the inside, so as to form an angle
of from 60° to 75° with the ground. He then places the second piece
horizontally across the first, pressing it downward with all his might.
It is kept in place by two strong posts planted in the ground a few
inches inside the door. This fastening is absolutely safe, but of course
cannot be applied to both doors at once, otherwise how could the
owner leave or enter his house? I have not yet succeeded in finding
out how the back door is fastened.