Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp
.
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of
content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms
of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.
The University of Chicago Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The
Journal of Religion.
http://www.jstor.org
436
437
not merely a human phenomenon; it is, rather, the phenomenon of being fully
human. Religion is understood to be the deepest form of self-inquiry.
As the sensitive and accurate translation of Van Bragt reveals so well,
Nishitani's style of thought and presentation derives from his two main
mentors, Martin Heidegger and Kitar6 Nishida. As might be expected of a
Heideggerian, Nishitani's analysis of religion emerges out of a Daseinanalysis
of human existence, that is, out of an existential anthropology. To the
Western theologian groomed on such thinkers as Rudolph Bultmann, Karl
Rahner, or Paul Tillich, for example, Nishitani's analysis has, at first a com-
fortable familiarity. The radical foreignness of Nishitani's position becomes
evident soon enough, however. Nishitani's initial questions are recognizably
Heideggerian, but his answers end up being somehow Japanese or Buddhist:
the individualism of Heidegger's Daseingives way to an analysis of the primacy
of the interpersonal;the nihilistic implications of nothingness blossom into the
ontological richness of the Buddhist notion of emptiness; the self defined
by Heideggerian projects is supersededby the primordialnon-ego experienced
in religious praxis. In short, Nishitani transforms some of existentialism's
great negations into Buddhist or, more generally, religious affirmations.In so
doing, Nishitani reveals unmistakably his membership in the Kyoto School of
philosophy and religion founded by Kitar6 Nishida.
The Kyoto School's hallmark is its profoundly new ways of discussing
knowledge, action, and ontology. In his introduction, Van Bragt pithily
summarizes the central notions of basho(place) and the logic of soku (here
translated as the Latin sive). For further background on the development and
assumptions of this school as well as a discussion of works available in English,
the interested reader can refer to my review article "The Kyoto School and the
West" (EasternBuddhist,vol. 15 [Autumn, 1982]). Nishitani's book is an
excellent example of the provocative thinking taking place in Japan today. His
reformulation of Nishida's categories in terms of a vocabulary and style more
suitable to dialogue with the West is a philosophical accomplishment of the
first magnitude. Any scholar or philosophical reader will undoubtedly find
many specific points with which to take issue, but in the final analysis, the level
of cross-culturalunderstanding and brilliance of analysis is light years beyond
almost any other book in the field. Indeed, it has taken three decades for that
brilliance to make its way into our English-speaking world. The Western
philosophical and theological world owes a debt of gratitude to the Nanzan
Institute, and to Professor Van Bragt in particular, for making this work
available to the wider audience it deserves.
THOMAS P. KASULIS, Northland College.
438