Professional Documents
Culture Documents
-AND-
EVE WARLOW
(DEFENDANT)
____________________________________
I, Martin Gardner, of 47 William Sparrow Works, Bower Hinton, TA12 6LG WILL SAY AS FOLLOWS:
1. I am the Director of the Claimant Company (my Company) and I am duly authorised to make
this statement on its behalf. The facts and matters set out in this statement are within my own
knowledge unless otherwise stated and I believe them to be true. Where I refer to information
supplied by others, the source of the information is identified; facts and matters derived from
other sources are true to the best of my knowledge and belief.
2. The Defendant is liable for a parking charge relating to the parking of a vehicle on the Relevant
Land in a manner so as to incur the same pursuant to the Contract (i.e. the Sign). Set out in the
Schedule below are details of the parking charge;
PCN NUMBER DATE OF CHARGE LOCATION DESCRIPTION
GLENAUB HOUSE
910210061 17th May 2016 MANAGEMENT CO - Not Clearly Displaying a Valid
GROUND FLOOR OFFICE Permit
OLD SCHOOL ROAD
PORTHCAWL CF36 3AW.
Defence
3. The Defendant is keen to use numerous County Court decisions as a precedent in this case. I
didnt know this was permitted, but if it is Id also like to bring a number of cases where my
Company has obtained Judgment at a hearing on the Relevant Land to the Courts attention. I
have attached a schedule of the other cases (Schedule A). There are many more cases where
charges have been paid without fuss and the motorists have accepted why the charges were
issued & why the parking management scheme was necessary.
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4. My Company acts as principal in the contract with the motorist on the Relevant Land. However,
without concession, I have set out below how my Company came about operating there.
5. As a result of the above, in February 2015 my Company was instructed to manage the Relevant
Land and signs were erected. The agreement was finalised in writing and is attached at Exhibit
MG1. Patrols begun on 16 February 2015.
6. In view of the above, each of the tenants at the properties (or in the odd case, the owner
occupiers), were sent notification and a permit. Signs were erected on the Relevant Land and a
copy of the sign, together with a site plan are attached at Exhibit MG2.
7. As the contract is between my Company and the Defendant, my Company does have the
authority to enforce parking charges. However, both VCS v HM Revenue & Customs (2013) and
Parking Eye v Beavis (CA 2015) made it clear that a contracting party need not show they have a
right to do what they have promised in the performance of a contract, nor is (in the case of a
parking operator) the agreement between Operator and Landowner of any relevance. In any
event, and without concession, the Agreement exhibited to this Witness Statement evidences
my Companys authorisation to operate / manage the Relevant Land on behalf of the
Landowner.
8. Lord Justice Lewison commented in VCS v HM Revenue & Customs [2013] EWCA Civ 186
1. The Upper Tribunals reasoning on this part of the case was that since VCS did not have
the right under its contract with the car park owner to grant a licence to park, it could not
have contracted with the motorist to grant such a right. In my judgment there is a serious
flaw in this reasoning.
2. The flaw in the reasoning is that it confuses the making of a contract with the power to
perform it. There is no legal impediment to my contracting to sell you Buckingham Palace.
If (inevitably) I fail to honour my contract then I can be sued for damages. On the stock
market it is commonplace for traders to sell short; in other words to sell shares that they
do not own in the hope of buying them later at a lower price. In order to perform the
contract the trader will have to acquire the required number of shares after the contract
of sale is made. Moreover, in some cases a contracting party may not only be able to
contract to confer rights over property that he does not own, but may also be able to
perform the contract without acquiring any such right. Thus in Bruton v London and
Quadrant Housing Trust [2000] 1 AC 406 a housing trust with no interest in land was held
to have validly granted a tenancy of the land to a residential occupier. The tenancy would
not have been binding on the landowner, but bound the two contracting parties in
precisely the same way as it would have done if the grantor had had an interest in the
land.
Thus in my judgment the Upper Tribunal were wrong to reverse the decision of the FTT on
the question whether VCS had the power to enter into a contract. Having the power to
enter into a contract does not, of course, mean that VCS necessarily did enter into a
contract with the motorist to permit parking.
9. The Defence fundamentally ignores the fact that there are two distinct relationships;
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i. The relationship between my Company and the Landowner/ person with the best
title (Relationship 1)
ii. The relationship between my Company (acting as Principal) and the motorists
(Relationship 2)
10. Without concession, if at any point my Company was failing to comply with its contractual
obligations with the Landowner, or if indeed it had no contractual relationship with the
Landowner at all, then that would be a dispute between it and the Landowner. It would bear no
relevance upon the contractual relationship between my Company and the motorist.
11. The Defendants allege to have had permission to park in the residents bay to unload items and
relies upon the lease agreement. I have not distinguished these as;
The Permit
12. The Defendant refers to the wording on the back of the permit. Without concession, the contract
between my Company and the Defendant is the sign and not the permit.
Tenancy Agreement
13. The Defendant states that it is her son who is a tenant of the building and that she was visiting
him the day the charge was issued. The Defendant refers to parts of the Tenancy Agreement
however she has failed to provide a copy.
14. Notwithstanding the above, without concession, even if the Defendants son had any rights, their
right was varied at the point he was advised parking rules were to be introduced. In any event,
without concessions the Defendant cannot oppose this variation as they are not a resident. This
would be the tenants right.
15. In view of the above, I submit that my Company was asked to manage the Relevant Land and
managed it as principal, not agent. Accordingly, the Defendant is liable for the parking charge.
The signs
16. The signs and the site plan are independently audited and approved by an Accredited Trade
Association, the International Parking Community. It is rejected that the signs are at an
inappropriate height. The photographs evidence that the sign was within eye-level/eye-sight of a
motorist.
17. It is also rejected that the signs are forbidding for non-permit holders. The sign offers all
motorists to park on the Relevant Land and those who park not in accordance with the terms on
the signs agree to pay a charge of 100.00.
Unfair/immoral/unethical
18. The Defendants opinion on the fairness of the parking charge cannot impact their liability to
pay. Quite simply, in parking in the manner they did, they understood a charge would apply. My
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Companys charges are issued in accordance with the guidelines set out by its trade association
and are industry standard.
19. Paragraph 108 of the Judgment in the recent Supreme Court case of Parking Eye and Beavis
(2015) said the concept of a negotiated agreement to enter a car park is somewhat artificial but
it is perfectly workable provided one bears in mind it is objective In our view a reasonable
motorist would have agreed to the term. I submit that the term in my Companys contract was
no more, or no less unreasonable than that in the ParkingEye case.
20. The charge sought is industry standard and is set at a rate so as to suitably satisfy my Companys
legitimate interest. In the case of ParkingEye v Beavis 2015 it was held that an 85.00 charge was
neither extravagant nor unconscionable. The Accredited Trade Associations of which parking
operators must be a member in order to apply for DVLA data prescribe a maximum charge of
100. My Companys charges are within this level. The charge is not, therefore, excessive.
21. The recent decision of the Supreme Court also made it clear that the charges are not penal nor
do they have to be reflective of the parking operators loss. Furthermore, they are they are
entitled to be at a level that provides a deterrent effect.
22. In view of the Defendant not paying the charge within the 28 days allowed they are in breach of
the contract. Breach of contract entitles the innocent party to damages as of right in addition to
the parking charge incurred.
23. In view of the Defendant not paying the charge the matter was passed to my Companys legal
representatives, Gladstones Solicitors Ltd. The debt has, as a result of this referral risen as my
Companys staff have spent time and material in facilitating the recovery of this debt. This time
could have been better spent on other elements of my Companys business. My Company
believes the costs associated with such time spent were incurred naturally as a direct result of
the Defendants breach and as such asks that this element of the claim be awarded as a damage.
The costs claimed are a pre-determined and nominal contribution to the actual losses.
Alternatively, my Company does have a right to costs pursuant to the sign (i.e. the contract).
STATEMENT OF TRUTH
I believe that the facts stated in this witness statement are true.
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NOTICE TO KEEPER
DO NOT IGNORE THIS NOTICE
Dear Eve Warlow Please be advised that all card payments are
subject to a 2.50 processing charge
Payment for the Parking Charge Notice 910210061 is overdue.
Please pay the charge of 100.00 now.
We recently issued Parking Charge Notice 910210061 to a vehicle you have been named as driving
because it was parked in a manner whereby the driver became liable for a parking charge at GLENAUB
HOUSE MANAGEMENT CO that we are authorised to manage by our client. This PCN was issued on the
17th May 2016 at 10:08 and has not been paid. The reason we issued a PCN to the vehicle is as follows:
Not Clearly Displaying a Valid Permit.
A Parking Charge Notice (Notice to Driver) was affixed to the windscreen of the vehicle at the Time of Issue.
This charge relates to the period of parking that immediately preceded the issue of that Notice, the charge
having been incurred for the reason as stated above and liability for the same having been brought to the
attention of the driver by clear signage in and around the site at the time of parking. You have been named
as the driver of the vehicle at the time of the contravention.
If you were not the driver (even though you have been named as being the driver) of the vehicle at the time
it was parked or if the vehicle was stolen prior to the beginning of the period of parking which is the subject
of this Notice, please let us know. If you were not the driver we ask you to pass this notice on to the driver
and to supply us with the full name and current serviceable postal address of the driver so that we may
address this request to them.
We now request this amount is paid using one of the payment methods described overleaf. If within 28 days
we have not received full payment, we have the right to recover the parking charge amount that remains
unpaid from the driver of the vehicle. The case will then be passed to our Debt Recovery Agent which may
escalate to court proceedings to recover the amount owed. The overdue charge will increase to 150.00 in
the first instance of further action.
Address:
Post Code:
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Schedule A
C7GF50J8 Link Parking Limited v I 16th November 2016 Cardiff Civil and Family Justice
Centre
C1GF34H7 Link Parking Limited v A 23rd November 2016 Cardiff Civil and Family Justice
Centre
C9GF53X4 Link Parking Limited v A 20th September 2016 Worcester Combined Court
C9GF9T89 Link Parking Limited v B 05th October 2016 Cardiff Civil and Family Justice
Centre
C2GF767Z Link Parking Limited v F 14th September 2016 Worcester Combined Court
C9GF51X4 Link Parking Limited v D 09th November 2016 Cardiff Civil and Family Justice
Centre
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