TodayisThursday,March02,2017

Custom Search

RepublicofthePhilippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila

THIRDDIVISION

G.R.No.L59266February29,1988

SILVESTREDIGNOSandISABELLUMUNGSOD,petitioners,
vs.
HON.COURTOFAPPEALSandATILANOG.JABIL,respondents.

BIDIN,J.:

Thisisapetitionforreviewoncertiorariseekingthereversalofthe:(1)Decision*ofthe9thDivision,CourtofAppealsdatedJuly
31,1981,affirmingwithmodificationtheDecision,datedAugust25,1972oftheCourtofFirstInstance**ofCebuincivilCaseNo.23LentitledAtilanoG.Jabilvs.
Silvestre T. Dignos and Isabela Lumungsod de Dignos and Panfilo Jabalde, as AttorneyinFact of Luciano Cabigas and Jovita L. de Cabigas and (2) its
ResolutiondatedDecember16,1981,denyingdefendantappellant's(Petitioner's)motionforreconsideration,forlackofmerit.

TheundisputedfactsasfoundbytheCourtofAppealsareasfollows:

TheDignosspouseswereownersofaparcelofland,knownasLotNo.3453,ofthecadastralsurvey
of Opon, LapuLapu City. On June 7, 1965, appellants (petitioners) Dignos spouses sold the said
parceloflandtoplaintiffappellant(respondentAtilanoJ.Jabil)forthesumofP28,000.00,payablein
twoinstallments,withanassumptionofindebtednesswiththeFirstInsularBankofCebuinthesumof
P12,000.00,whichwaspaidandacknowledgedbythevendorsinthedeedofsale(Exh.C)executedin
favor of plaintiffappellant, and the next installment in the sum of P4,000.00 to be paid on or before
September15,1965.

On November 25, 1965, the Dignos spouses sold the same land in favor of defendants spouses,
LucianoCabigasandJovitaL.DeCabigas,whowerethenU.S.citizens,forthepriceofP35,000.00.A
deedofabsolutesale(Exh.J,alsomarkedExh.3)wasexecutedbytheDignosspousesinfavorofthe
Cabigas spouses, and which was registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds pursuant to the
provisionsofActNo.3344.

AstheDignosspousesrefusedtoacceptfromplaintiffappellantthebalanceofthepurchasepriceof
theland,andasplaintiffappellantdiscoveredthesecondsalemadebydefendantsappellantstothe
Cabigasspouses,plaintiffappellantbroughtthepresentsuit.(Rollo,pp.2728)

Afterduetrial,theCourtoffirstInstanceofCeburendereditsDecisiononAugust25,1972,thedecretalportionof
whichreads:

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the deed of sale executed on November 25, 1965 by
defendantIsabelaL.deDignosinfavorofdefendantLucianoCabigas,acitizenoftheUnitedStatesof
America,nullandvoidabinitio,andthedeedofsaleexecutedbydefendantsSilvestreT.Dignosand
Isabela Lumungsod de Dignos not rescinded. Consequently, the plaintiff Atilano G. Jabil is hereby
orderedtopaythesum,ofSixteenThousandPesos(P16,000.00)tothedefendantsspousesuponthe
executionoftheDeedofabsoluteSaleofLotNo.3453,OponCadastreandwhenthedecisionofthis
casebecomesfinalandexecutory.

TheplaintiffAtilanoG.JabilisorderedtoreimbursethedefendantsLucianoCabigasandJovitaL.de
Cabigas, through their attorneyinfact, Panfilo Jabalde, reasonable amount corresponding to the
expensesorcostsofthehollowblockfence,sofarconstructed.

It is further ordered that defendantsspouses Silvestre T. Dignos and Isabela Lumungsod de Dignos
should return to defendantsspouses Luciano Cabigas and Jovita L. de Cabigas the sum of
P35,000.00,asequitydemandsthatnobodyshallenrichhimselfattheexpenseofanother.
 ThewritofpreliminaryinjunctionissuedonSeptember23,1966,automaticallybecomespermanentin
virtueofthisdecision.

Withcostsagainstthedefendants.

From the foregoing, the plaintiff (respondent herein) and defendantsspouss (petitioners herein) appealed to the
Court of Appeals, which appeal was docketed therein as CAG.R. No. 54393R, "Atilano G. Jabil v. Silvestre T.
Dignos,etal."

On July 31, 1981, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the lower court except as to the portion ordering
JabiltopayfortheexpensesincurredbytheCabigasspousesforthebuildingofafenceuponthelandinquestion.
ThedisposiveportionofsaiddecisionoftheCourtofAppealsreads:

INVIEWOFTHEFOREGOINGCONSIDERATIONS,exceptastothemodificationofthejudgmentas
pertainstoplaintiffappellantaboveindicated,thejudgmentappealedfromisherebyAFFIRMEDinall
otherrespects.

Withcostsagainstdefendantsappellants.

SOORDERED.

JudgmentMODIFIED.

Amotionforreconsiderationofsaiddecisionwasfiledbythedefendantsappellants(petitioners)Dignosspouses,
butonDecember16,1981,aresolutionwasissuedbytheCourtofAppealsdenyingthemotionforlackofmerit.

Hence,thispetition.

In the resolution of February 10, 1982, the Second Division of this Court denied the petition for lack of merit. A
motion for reconsideration of said resolution was filed on March 16, 1982. In the resolution dated April 26,1982,
respondentswererequiredtocommentthereon,whichcommentwasfiledonMay11,1982andareplytheretowas
filedonJuly26,1982incompliancewiththeresolutionofJune16,1982.OnAugust9,1982,actingonthemotion
forreconsiderationandonallsubsequentpleadingsfiled,thisCourtresolvedtoreconsideritsresolutionofFebruary
10,1982andtogiveduecoursetotheinstantpetition.OnSeptember6,1982,respondentsfiledarejoindertoreply
ofpetitionerswhichwasnotedontheresolutionofSeptember20,1982.

Petitionersraisedthefollowingassignmentoferrors:

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR OF LAW IN GROSSLY, INCORRECTLY

INTERPRETING THE TERMS OF THE CONTRACT, EXHIBIT C, HOLDING IT AS AN ABSOLUTE SALE,
EFFECTIVETOTRANSFEROWNERSHIPOVERTHEPROPERTYINQUESTIONTOTHERESPONDENTAND
NOTMERELYACONTRACTTOSELLORPROMISETOSELLTHECOURTALSOERREDINMISAPPLYING
ARTICLE1371ASWARRANTINGREADINGOFTHEAGREEMENT,EXHIBITC,ASONEOFABSOLUTESALE,
DESPITETHECLARITYOFTHETERMSTHEREOFSHOWINGITISACONTRACTOFPROMISETOSELL.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW IN INCORRECTLY APPLYING AND OR IN

MISAPPLYINGARTICLE1592OFTHENEWCIVILCODEASWARRANTINGTHEERRONEOUSCONCLUSION
THAT THE NOTICE OF RESCISSION, EXHIBIT G, IS INEFFECTIVE SINCE IT HAS NOT BEEN JUDICIALLY
DEMANDEDNORISITANOTARIALACT.

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW IN REJECTING THE APPLICABILITY OF

ARTICLES 2208,2217 and 2219 OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE AND ESTABLISHED JURISPRUDENCE AS TO
WARRANTTHEAWARDOFDAMAGESANDATTORNEY'SFEESTOPETITIONERS.

IV

PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT FOR SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED, HE HAVING
COMETOCOURTWITHUNCLEANHANDS.

V
BY AND LARGE, THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR IN AFFIRMING WITH MODIFICATION
THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT DUE TO GRAVE MISINTERPRETATION, MISAPPLICATION AND
MISAPPREHENSION OF THE TERMS OF THE QUESTIONED CONTRACT AND THE LAW APPLICABLE
THERETO.

Theforegoingassignmentoferrorsmaybesynthesizedintotwomainissues,towit:

I.WhetherornotsubjectcontractisadeedofabsolutesaleoracontractLotsell.

II.Whetherornottherewasavalidrescissionthereof.

Thereisnomeritinthispetition.

It is significant to note that this petition was denied by the Second Division of this Court in its Resolution dated
February10,1982forlackofmerit,butonmotionforreconsiderationandonthebasisofallsubsequentpleadings
filed,thepetitionwasgivenduecourse.

I.

Thecontractinquestion(ExhibitC)isaDeedofSale,withthefollowingconditions:

1. That Atilano G..Jabilis to pay the amount of Twelve Thousand Pesos P12,000.00) Phil. Philippine
Currencyasadvancepayment

2.ThatAtilanoG.JabilistoassumethebalanceofTwelveThousandPesos(P12,000.00)Loanfrom
theFirstInsularBankofCebu

3.ThatAtilanoG.JabilistopaythesaidspousesthebalanceofFour.ThousandPesos(P4,000.00)on
orbeforeSeptember15,1965

4. That the said spouses agrees to defend the said Atilano G. Jabil from other claims on the said
property

5. That the spouses agrees to sign a final deed of absolute sale in favor of Atilano G. Jabil over the
abovementioned property upon the payment of the balance of Four Thousand Pesos. (Original
Record,pp.1011)

Intheirmotionforreconsideration,petitionersreiteratedtheircontentionthattheDeedofSale(Exhibit"C")isamere
contracttosellandnotanabsolutesalethatthesameissubjecttotwo(2)positivesuspensiveconditions,namely:
the payment of the balance of P4,000.00 on or before September 15,1965 and the immediate assumption of the
mortgage of P12,000.00 with the First Insular Bank of Cebu. It is further contended that in said contract, title or
ownership over the property was expressly reserved in the vendor, the Dignos spouses until the suspensive
conditionoffullandpunctualpaymentofthebalanceofthepurchasepriceshallhavebeenmet.Sothatthereisno
actualsaleuntilfullpaymentismade(Rollo,pp.5152).

In bolstering their contention that Exhibit "C" is merely a contract to sell, petitioners aver that there is absolutely
nothinginExhibit"C"thatindicatesthatthevendorstherebysell,conveyortransfertheirownershiptothealleged
vendee. Petitioners insist that Exhibit "C" (or 6) is a private instrument and the absence of a formal deed of
conveyance is a very strong indication that the parties did not intend "transfer of ownership and title but only a
transfer after full payment" (Rollo, p. 52). Moreover, petitioners anchored their contention on the very terms and
conditionsofthecontract,moreparticularlyparagraphfourwhichreads,"thatsaidspouseshasagreedtosellthe
hereinmentionedpropertytoAtilanoG.Jabil..."andconditionnumberfivewhichreads,"thatthespousesagreesto
signafinaldeedofabsolutesaleoverthementionedpropertyuponthepaymentofthebalanceoffourthousand
pesos."

Suchcontentionisuntenable.

Byandlarge,theissuesinthiscasehavealreadybeensettledbythisCourtinanalogouscases.

Thus, it has been held that a deed of sale is absolute in nature although denominated as a "Deed of Conditional
Sale"wherenowhereinthecontractinquestionisaprovisoorstipulationtotheeffectthattitletothepropertysold
isreservedinthevendoruntilfullpaymentofthepurchaseprice,noristhereastipulationgivingthevendortheright
tounilaterallyrescindthecontractthemomentthevendeefailstopaywithinafixedperiodTagubav.Vda.deLeon,
132SCRA722LuzonBrokerageCo.,Inc.v.MaritimeBuildingCo.,Inc.,86SCRA305).

Acarefulexaminationofthecontractshowsthatthereisnosuchstipulationreservingthetitleofthepropertyonthe
vendorsnordoesitgivethemtherighttounilaterallyrescindthecontractuponnonpaymentofthebalancethereof
withinafixedperiod.
Onthecontrary,alltheelementsofavalidcontractofsaleunderArticle1458oftheCivilCode,arepresent,such
as: (1) consent or meeting of the minds (2) determinate subject matter and (3) price certain in money or its
equivalent. In addition, Article 1477 of the same Code provides that "The ownership of the thing sold shall be
transferred to the vendee upon actual or constructive delivery thereof." As applied in the case of Froilan v. Pan
OrientalShippingCo.,etal.(12SCRA276),thisCourtheldthatintheabsenceofstipulationtothecontrary,the
ownershipofthethingsoldpassestothevendeeuponactualorconstructivedeliverythereof.

Whileitmaybeconcededthattherewasnoconstructivedeliveryofthelandsoldinthecaseatbar,assubjectDeed
of Sale is a private instrument, it is beyond question that there was actual delivery thereof. As found by the trial
court,theDignosspousesdeliveredthepossessionofthelandinquestiontoJabilasearlyasMarch27,1965so
thatthelatterconstructedthereonSally'sBeachResortalsoknownasJabil'sBeachResortinMarch,1965Mactan
White Beach Resort on January 15,1966 and Bevirlyn's Beach Resort on September 1, 1965. Such facts were
admittedbypetitionerspouses(Decision,CivilCaseNo.23LRecordonAppeal,p.108).

Moreover, the Court of Appeals in its resolution dated December 16,1981 found that the acts of petitioners,
contemporaneouswiththecontract,clearlyshowthatanabsolutedeedofsalewasintendedbythepartiesandnot
acontracttosell.

Be that as it may, it is evident that when petitioners sold said land to the Cabigas spouses, they were no longer
ownersofthesameandthesaleisnullandvoid.

II.

PetitionersclaimthatwhentheysoldthelandtotheCabigasspouses,thecontractofsalewasalreadyrescinded.

ApplyingtherationaleofthecaseofTagubav.Vda.deLeon(supra)whichisonallfourswiththecaseatbar,the
contract of sale being absolute in nature is governed by Article 1592 of the Civil Code. It is undisputed that
petitionersnevernotifiedprivaterespondentsJabilbynotarialactthattheywererescindingthecontract,andneither
didtheyfileasuitincourttorescindthesale.ThemostthattheywereabletoshowisaletterofCiprianoAmistad
who,claimingtobeanemissaryofJabil,informedtheDignosspousesnottogotothehouseofJabilbecausethe
latterhadnomoneyandfurtheradvisedpetitionerstosellthelandinlitigationtoanotherparty(RecordonAppeal,
p.23).AscorrectlyfoundbytheCourtofAppeals,thereisnoshowingthatAmistadwasproperlyauthorizedbyJabil
tomakesuchextrajudicialrescissionforthelatterwho,onthecontrary,vigorouslydeniedhavingsentAmistadto
tellpetitionersthathewasalreadywaivinghisrightstothelandinquestion.UnderArticle1358oftheCivilCode,it
is required that acts and contracts which have for their object the extinguishment of real rights over immovable
propertymustappearinapublicdocument.

PetitionerslaidconsiderableemphasisonthefactthatprivaterespondentJabilhadnomoneyonthestipulateddate
ofpaymentonSeptember15,1965andwasabletoraisethenecessaryamountonlybymidOctober1965.

Ithasbeenruled,however,that"wheretimeisnotoftheessenceoftheagreement,aslightdelayonthepartofone
partyintheperformanceofhisobligationisnotasufficientgroundfortherescissionoftheagreement"(Tagubav.
Vda. de Leon, supra). Considering that private respondent has only a balance of P4,000.00 and was delayed in
paymentonlyforonemonth,equityandjusticemandateasintheaforecitedcasethatJabilbegivenanadditional
periodwithinwhichtocompletepaymentofthepurchaseprice.

WHEREFORE, the petition filed is hereby Dismissed for lack of merit and the assailed decision of the Court of
AppealsisAffirmedintoto.

SOORDERED.

Fernan(Chairman),Gutierrez,Jr.,FelicianoandCortes,JJ.,concur.

Footnotes

*PennedbyJusticeEliasB.AsuncionandconcurredbyJusticesPorfirioV.SisonandVicenteV.
Mendoza.

**PennedbyJudgeRamonE.Nazareno.

TheLawphilProjectArellanoLawFoundation