Deoferio v. Intel Tech.

Philippines
G.R. No. 202996
June 18, 2014

Facts:
On Feb 1996, respondent employed Deoferio as an engineer. Intel assigned him to US and was repatriated the
following year after he suffered depression with psychosis. He resumed his work for Intel in the PH.

Deoferio underwent a series of medical and psychiatric treatment at Intels expense. A psychiatrist of the
Philippines General Hospital, concluded that he was suffering from schizophrenia and issued a psychiatric
report.

Pursuant to these findings, Intel issued a notice of termination.

Deoferio responded to his termination of employment by filing a complaint for illegal dismissal.

Issue:
Whether the twin-notice requirement in dismissals applies to terminations due to disease

Ruling:
For authorized causes of termination under Article 289, due process consists of notices furnished to the DOLE
and the employee 30 days prior to the effective date of termination.

However, Article 290 or terminations due to disease, presents curious case for procedural due process
requirements.

While jurisprudence has consistently regarded Article 290 as an authorized cause for termination, the Supreme
Court, in this case, has mandated that the twin-notice requirement for just causes of termination likewise
applies to cases of termination due to disease.

In Sy v. Court of Appeals39 and Manly Express, Inc. v. Payong, Jr., the Court pronounced the rule that the
employer must furnish the employee two written notices in terminations due to disease, namely:
(1) the notice to apprise the employee of the ground for which his dismissal is sought; and
(2) the notice informing the employee of his dismissal, to be issued after the employee has been given
reasonable opportunity to answer and to be heard on his defense

Article 290 allows an employer to terminate the services of an employee who has been found to be suffering
from any disease and whose continued employment is prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his health as well as
to the health of his co-employees upon payment of the required separation pay. A competent public health
authority must certify that the disease is of such nature that it cannot be cured within a period of six months
even with proper medical treatment.

The observations of the Supreme Court in this care are apt in that the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules
and Regulations are, indeed, silent on the procedural due process required in terminations due to disease.

Hence, the Court ruled that because an employee should be afforded procedural due process in all cases of
dismissal, the failure of the company to furnish the employee the twin-notice rule entitled the latter
to nominal damages for a violation of his right to procedural due process.

The Supreme Court held that the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion when it ruled that the twin-
notice requirement does not apply to terminations due to disease, as a conclusion that is unsupported by law
and jurisprudence.