[MANAGEMENT PREROGATIVES]
The union filed with the NCMB a notice of strike citing
INTERPHIL LABORATORIES EMPLOYEES UNION-FFW VS. INTERPHIL LAB.
INC.
DEC. 19, 2001 | KAPUNAN, J.
Petitioner/s: INTERPHIL LABORATORIES EMPLOYEES UNION-FFW
Respondents: INTERPHIL LAB. INC.
Doctrine:
Application of Management Prerogative to this case:
The Respondent company may change the prevailing work hours at its discretion
should such change be necessary in its operations.
Facts:
 Interphil Lab Employees Union – FFW is the sole and exclusive bargaining
agent of the rank-and-file employees of Interphil Laboratories, Inc., a
company engaged in the business of manufacturing and packaging
pharmaceutical products. They had a CBA effective from August 1, 1990 to
July 31, 1993.
 Prior to the expiration of the CBA, Nestor Ocampo, the union president, and
Hernando Clemente, a union director inquired with the HR Department about
the stand of the company regarding the duration of the CBA which was set to
expire in a few months. Salazar, the VP-HR Department said that the matter
could be best discussed during the formal negotiations.
 In March 1993, Ocampo and Clemente again approached Salazar. Later, a
meeting was held on April 15, 1993 where the union officers asked whether
Salazar would be amenable to make the new CBA effective for 2 years, but
Salazar declared that it would still be premature to discuss the matter and
that the company could not make the decision at the moment.
 The next day, all R&F employees of the company refused to follow their
regular work schedule of 6AM-6PM and from 6PM to 6AM. At 2PM and 2AM,
respectively, the employees stopped working and left their workplace without
sealing the containers and securing the raw materials they were working on.
 In a meeting, Gonzales, the union director, told Salazar that the employees
would only return to their normal work schedule if the company would agree
to their demands as to the effectivity and duration of the new CBA. The
union was unsatisfied when Salazar told them that their demands would be
better discussed in formal negotiations. This, the overtime boycott continued.
The employees also started to engage in a work slowdown campaign during
the time they were working, substantially delating the production of the
company.
 On May 14, 1993, the union submitted its CBA proposal to the company and
the R company filed its counter-proposal.
 On Sept. 3, 1993, R filed with NLRC a petition to declare illegal P union’s
overtime boycott and work slowdown, which, according to R, amounted to
illegal strike.
 The R company also later filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation
Board an urgent request for preventive mediation but the parties failed to
arrive at an agreement, so the R company filed with the Office of the SOLE a
petition for assumption of jurisdiction.
 On Jan. 24, 1994.
ULP allegedly committed by the company. On Feb. 12, the union staged a
strike.
 On Feb.14, SOLE issued an assumption order over the labor dispute. Later,
SOLE Confesor issued an order directing the company to immediately
accept all striking workers, including 53 terminated union officers, shop
stewards and union members back to work.
 The proceedings before the Labor Arbiter were held in abeyance but the LA
was later instructed to proceed with the hearing.
 On Sept. 5, 1995, LA submitted his recommendation to then SOLE
Quisumbing, who in turn, approved and adopted the report in his Order
declaring the overtime boycott and work slowdown as illegal strike and
declaring several union officers to have lost their employment. It also
approved the finding that the respondent union officers were guilty of ULP for
violating their CBA.
 Union  MR but denied.
 Union  CA. CA dismissed.
Petitioner Union’s argument:
 The LA and the CA disregarded the “parol evidence rule” when they upheld
the allegation of respondent company that the work schedule of its
employees was from 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. and from 6:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m.
According to petitioner union, the provisions of their CBA on working hours
clearly stated that the normal working hours were “from 7:30 a.m. to 4:30
p.m.” Petitioner union underscored that the regular work hours for the
company was only eight (8) hours.
Issues/Ruling:
W/N the LA and the CA disregarded the “parol evidence rule” when they
upheld the allegation of respondent company that the work schedule of its
employees was from 6:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m. and from 6:00 p.m. to 6:00 a.m. –
NO, the CBA states that the company may change the prevailing work time at its
discretion should such change be necessary in the operations of the Company.
 The parties stipulated:
Section 1. Regular Working Hours—A normal workday shall consist
of not more than eight (8) hours. The regular working hours for the
Company shall be from 7:30 A.M. to 4:30 P.M. The schedule of shift
work shall be maintained; however the company may change the
prevailing work time at its discretion, should such change be
necessary in the operations of the Company. All employees shall
observe such rules as have been laid down by the company for the
purpose of effecting control over working hours.
 It is evident from the foregoing provision that the working hours may be
changed, at the discretion of the company, should such change be
necessary for its operations, and that the employees shall observe such
rules as have been laid down by the company.
 Labor Arbiter Caday found that respondent company had to adopt a
continuous 24-hour work daily schedule by reason of the nature of its
business and the demands of its clients. It was established that the
 employees adhered to the said work schedule since 1988. The employees
are deemed to have waived the eight-hour schedule since they followed,
without any question or complaint, the two-shift schedule while their CBA
was still in force and even prior thereto. The two-shift schedule effectively
changed the working hours stipulated in the CBA.
 As the employees assented by practice to this arrangement, they cannot
now be heard to claim that the overtime boycott is justified because they
were not obliged to work beyond eight hours.
o Proof of this is the case undisputedly filed by the union for and in
behalf of its members, wherein it is claimed that the company has
not been computing correctly the night premium and overtime pay
for work rendered between 2:00 A.M. and 6:00 A.M. of the 6:00
P.M. to 6:00 A.M. shift, (tsn pp. 9-10, testimony of Alessandro G.
Salazar during hearing on August 9, 1994). In fact, the union Vice-
President Carmelo C. Santos, demanded that the company make a
recomputation of the overtime records of the employees from 1987.

W/N the union members have engaged in “overtime boycott” and “work
slowdown”? YES. The members of the union by their own volition decided not to
render overtime services in April 1993.
 Petitioner union even admitted this in its Memorandum, dated 12 April 1999,
filed with the CA, as well as in the petition before this Court, which both
stated that “(s)ometime in April 1993, members of herein petitioner, on their
own volition and in keeping with the regular working hours in the Company
decided not to render overtime.” Such admission confirmed the allegation of
respondent company that petitioner engaged in “overtime boycott” and “work
slowdown” which, to use the words of Labor Arbiter Caday, was taken as a
means to coerce respondent company to yield to its unreasonable demands.

W/N in extending substantial separation package to some officers of P union

during the pendency of the case, R, in effect, condoned the illegal acts they
committed? NO. At the time these union officers obtained their separation benefits,
they were still considered employees of the company. Hence, the company was
merely complying with its legal obligations.
 Respondent company could have withheld these benefits pending the final
resolution of this case. Yet, considering perhaps the financial hardships
experienced by its employees and the economic situation prevailing,
respondent company chose to let its employees avail of their separation
benefits. The Court views the gesture of respondent company as an act of
generosity for which it should not be punished.

Dispositive
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED DUE COURSE and the 29 December 1999
decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.