CHAPTER 7

PROTOCOL STATEMENTS

(Remarks about Rudolf Camap's essay 'Die physikalische Sprache als Universal-
sprache der Wissenschaft' (1932a). As we thoroughly agree with Carnap, our
terminology is linked t o his. To avoid repetition, reference may be made to
two of our papers 'Physicalism', [pp. 52-57] and 'Sociology in the Frame-
work of Physicalism' [pp. 58-90] .)
In the interest of scientific work, more and more formulations in the
unified language of unified science are becoming increasingly precise. No
term of unified science, however, is free from imprecision, since all terms
are based on terms that are essential for protocol statements whose impreci-
sion must be immediately obvious to everyone.
The fiction of an ideal language composed of neat atomic statements
is as metaphysical as the fiction of Laplace's spirit. Scientific language,
with its ever growing equipment of systematic symbol formations, can by
no means be regarded as an approximation to such an ideal language. The
statement, 'Otto observes an angry man' is less precise than the statement,
'Otto observes a thermometer registering 24 degrees' inasmuch as 'angry man'
must be less precisely defined than a 'thermometer reading of 24 degrees';
but 'Otto' itself is in many respects an imprecise term; the statement, 'Otto
observes', can be replaced by the statement, 'The man whose carefully taken
photo is No. 16 in the file, observes'; but the term 'photo No. 16 in the file'
has not yet been replaced by a system of mathematical formulas that is
unambiguously coordinated to another system of mathematical formulas
that takes the place of 'Otto', of 'angry Otto', 'kind Otto', etc.
What is first given us is our historical ordinary language with a multitude
of imprecise, unanalysed terms VBallungen'] .
We start by purifying this ordinary language of metaphysical components
and thus arrive at the physicalist ordinary language. A list of forbidden words
can serve us well in doing this.
In addition, there is the physicalist language of advanced science that we
can design to be free of metaphysics from the very start. It is at our disposal
only for special sciences, indeed only parts of sciences.

Translation of Neurath 1932133 [ON2101.

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If we want to embrace the entire unified science of our age, we must

combine terms of ordinary and advanced scientific languages, since in practice,
the terms of both languages overlap. There are certain terms that are used
only in ordinary language, others that occur only in scientific language, and
finally terms that appear in both. In a scientific treatise that touches upon
the whole range of unified science, therefore, only a 'jargon' that contains
terms of both languages will do.
We expect that it will be possible to replace each word of the physicalist
ordinary language by terms of scientific language - just as it is also possible
to formulate the terms of scientific language with the help of terms of ordinary
language. We are not very used to the latter and sometimes do not find it
easy. Einstein can somehow be expressed by means of Bantu language, but
not Heidegger, unless one first introduces misuses into the Bantu language
which have been adapted to those of the German. A physicist should, in
principle, be able to satisfy the witty thinker's demand: "It must be possible
to make the main features of any strictly scientific theory plain to a hackney-
coachdriver in his own language."
Highly scientific and ordinary languages are in harmony today especially
in the field of calculation with figures. But even the expression 'two times
two is four' - a tautology - is linked to protocol statements in the system
of radical physicalism. Tautologies are defined by statements that record
what effect tautologies have if they are inserted as additional stimuli to
certain commands under certain conditions: "Otto says to Karl: go outside
when the flag waves and when two times two is four." The effect of the
command is not affected by the addition of the tautology.
Even on the basis of the strictest scientific principle, in unified science,
we can only use a 'universal jargon'. Since there is as yet no agreement
as to what it should be like, each scholar who turns to these problems must
use a universal jargon for which he for the most part has to create some
new terms.
There is no way to establish fully secured, neat protocol statements as
starting points of the sciences. There is no tabula rasa. We are like sailors
who have to rebuild their ship on the open sea, without ever being able
to dismantle it in drydock and reconstruct it from the best components.
Only metaphysics can disappear without trace. Imprecise 'verbal clusters'
['Ballungen'] are somehow always part of the ship. If imprecision is dimin-
ished at one place, it may well re-appear at another place to a stronger degree.
From the beginning we shall teach children the universal jargon - purged
of metaphysics - as the language of unified science which has been historically
 PROTOCOL STATEMENTS 93

provided. Each child can thus be 'trained' to start with a simplified universal
jargon and gradually advance to the universal jargon of adults. It makes no
sense in our discussion to segregate this children's language as a special
language. Otherwise one would have to distinguish all sorts of universal
jargons. The child does not learn a 'primitive' universal jargon from which
the grown-ups' universal jargon derives; the child learns a 'poorer' universal
jargon, which is gradually enriched. The term 'ball of iron' is also used in
adults' language; while here it is defined by a sentence in which words like
'radius' and 'piy occur, in the definition for children words like 'nine-pins',
'gift from uncle Rudi', etc., occur.
But 'uncle Rudi' is not absent from the language of strict science either,
if the physical ball is defined by protocol statements in which 'uncle Rudi'
appears as an 'observer' who 'perceives a ball'.
Carnap, however, speaks of a 'primitive' protocol language (Carnap 1934~'
p. 42ff and p. 76ff). His remarks on the 'primitivey protocol language, on the
protocol statements that 'require no verification', are only marginal to
his significant anti-metaphysical expositions where the basic idea is not
touched by the misgivings brought forward here. Carnap speaks of a "first
language" also called "language of experience" or "phenomenalist language".
Here he stresses that "the question of a more precise characterisation of this
language cannot yet be answered at the present state of inquiry".
These remarks might induce younger people to search for this protocol
language, and this easily leads to metaphysical digressions. Although meta-
physics essentially cannot be defeated by arguments, it is important for the
sake of the vacillators to press for physicalism in its most radical version.
Leaving tautologies aside, unified science consists of factual statements.
These are either protocol statements or non-protocol statements.
Protocol statements are factual statements of the same linguistic form
as other factual statements, but in them a personal name always occurs
several times, in a definite connection with other terms. A complete protocol
statement might for example be worded like this: "Otto's protocol at 3: 17
o'clock: [Otto's speech-thinking at 3: 16 o'clock was: (at 3 :l5 o'clock there
was a table in the room perceived by Otto)]". This factual statement is so
constructed that, after 'deletion of the brackets', further factual statements
appear, which, however, are not protocol statements: "Otto's speech-thinking
was at 3:16 o'clock: (at 3: 15 o'clock there was a table in the room perceived
by Otto)" and further: "At 3:15 o'clock there was a table in the room
perceived by Otto".
From the start, each of the terms occurring in these statements can to a
94 PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS

certain degree be replaced by a group of terms of the highly scientific lan-

guage. Instead of 'Otto' a system of physicalist d e f ~ t i o n can
s be introduced;
this system of p h y s i d s t defmitions can be further defmed by the 'place'
of the name 'Otto' in a group formed of the names 'Karl', 'Heinrich', etc.
All words used in the protocol statement above either are words of the
universal jargon or can easily be replaced by words of the universal jargon
from the outset.
It is essential for a complete protoc01 statement that the name of a person
occur in it. 'Now joyy or 'now red circle' or 'a red cube is lying on the
tabley (see Camap 1934c, pp. 46-47) are not complete protocol statements.
Even as expressions within the innermost brackets they are not acceptable.
According to our version it should at least be said - in rough correspondence
with children's language - "Otto now joy", "Otto sees a red circle now",
''Otto sees E red cube lying on the table now". That is, for the protocol
statement to be complete, the expression within the innermost bracket is
a statement that again features a personal name and a term that belongs to
the sphere of perception terms. The extent to which ordinary terms or highly
scientific terms are used is of no essential importance, since linguistic usages
within the universal jargon are highly flexible.
The expression after the first bracket, 'speech-thinking', recommends itseK
this becomes apparent if one wants to form different groups of sentences,
for example, sentences with 'reality terms', with 'hallucination terms', with
'dream terms', and especially if, moreover, one wants to segregate 'untruth',
One could say for example: "Though Otto's 'speech-thinking' was: In the
room there was only a bird perceived by Otto, he wrote down, as a joke:
In the room there was only a table perceived by Otto." This is important,
especially for the discussions in the next section, in which we reject Carnap's
claim that protocol statements are statements that "need no verification".
The process of change in the sciences is like this: statements that were
used at a certain age drop out at a later age and are often replaced by other
statements. Sometimes the wording remains, but the defmitions are changed.
Each hw and each physicalist statement of unified science or o f one of its
factual sciences is subject to such change. The same is true for each protocol
statement.
In unified science we try (see Carnap 1934c, p, 43fQ to create a consistent
system of protocol statements and noneprotocol statements (including
laws). When a new statement is presented to us we compare it with the
system at our disposal and check whether the new statement is in contradic-
tion with the system or not. If the new statement is in contradiction with
 PROTOCOL STATEMENTS 95

the system, we can discard this statement as unusable ('false'), for example,
the statement: 'In Africa lions sing only in major chords'; however, one
can also 'accept' the statement and change the system accordingly so that
it remains consistent if this statement is added. The statement may then
be called 'true'.
The fate of being discarded may befall even a protocol statement. There is
no 'noli me tangere' for any statement though Carnap claims it for protocol
statements. An especially drastic example: Let us assume that we know
a scholar called Kalon who can write with both hands simultaneously, and
that he writes with his left hand: "Kalon's protocol at 3 hours, 17 minutes:
[Kalon's speech-thinking was at 3 hours, 16 minutes 30 seconds: (At 3
hours, l6 minutes there was only a table in the room perceived by Kalon)]",
and with his right hand: ''Kalon's protocol at 3 hours, 17 minutes: [Kdon's
speech-thinking was at 3 hours, 16 minutes, 30 seconds: (At 3 hours, 16
minutes there was onZy a bird in the room perceived by Kalon)]", What
can he and what can we do with these two protocol statements? We can
of course make statements of the following kind: Certain marks are on
paper, sometimes shaped like this, sometimes shaped like that. With reference
to these marks on paper the word 'verification' used by Carnap can, however,
fmd no application. 'Verification' can only be used with reference to 'state-
ments', that is, with reference to rows of signs that can be used in the context
of a reaction-test and can be systematically replaced by other signs (see
'Physicalism7pp. 55). 'Synonomous statements' are to be defmed as stimuli,
which, under defdte reaction-tests, evoke equal reactions. Strings of 'ink
blobs on paper' and strhgs of 'air perturbations', which can be considered
equal under certain circumstances, are called statements.
Two conflicting protocol statements cannot be used in the system of
unified science. Though we cannot say which of the two statements is to
be excluded, or whether both are to be excluded, we can be sure that not
both can be 'verified', that is, it is not the case that both statements can be
incorporated into the system.
If, in such a case, a protocol statement has to be given up, why not also
sometimes when, only after long chains of logical argumentation, contradic-
tions appear between protocol statements on the one hand and a system of
protocol statements and non-protocol statements (laws, etc.) on the other
hand? According to Camap we could only be forced to change non-protocol
statements and laws. But in our view the cancelling of protocol statements
is a possibility as well. It is part of the definition of a statement that it
requires verification and therefore can be cancelled.
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Carnap's claim that protoml statements 'need no verification', however

it may be understood, can easily be related to traditional philosophy's belief
in 'immediate experience'. For these there were of course certain 'ultimate
elements' out of which the 'world picture' was composed. According to this
traditional philosophy these 'atomic experiences' were obviously above any
criticism and required no verification.
Camap tries to introduce a kind of 'atomic protocol' by demanding that
"a strict distinction be made between the making of a protocol and the
processing of the statement in the scientific procedure"; accordiig to h i m
this will be achieved by "not adopting any statements gained indirectly
into the protocol'' (Carnap 1932a, p. 4371.l The formulation of a complete
protocol statement given above shows that insofar as personal names occur
in protocol statements, 'processing' must always have taken place. In scientific
protocols it may be useful to phrase the expression within the innermost
brackets as simply as possible, for example: "At 3 o'clock Otto was seeing
red", and a further protocol: "At 3 o'clock Otto was hearing C sharp",
etc.; but such a protocol is not ' p w t i v e ' in Camap's sense, because one
cannot get around the 'Otto' and the 'perceiving'. Within the universal jargon
there are no statements that could be characterised as 'more primitive', all are
factual statements of equal primitiveness; in all factual statements words
occur like 'men', 'acts of perception' and other words of little primitiveness,
at least under the presuppositions from which they are derived. That is to
say: there are neither 'primitive protocol statements' nor any statements t h t
'do not require verification'
The universal jargon, in the sense explained above, is the same for the child
and for the adult. It is the same for a Robinson Crusoe as for a human society.
If Robinson wants to join what is in his protocol of yesterday with what
is in his protocol today, that is, if he wants to make use of a language at all,
he must make use of the 'inter-subjective' language. The Robinson of yester-
day and the Robinson of today stand in precisely the same relation in which
Robinson stands to Friday. Let us assume a man who 'has lost his memory'
and 'his eyesight', and at the same time learns afresh to read and write. His
own notes of earlier times, which he can read with the help of special ap-
paratus, will for him be those of 'another' person as much as the notes of
any contemporary. This remains true even if he afterwards becomes aware
of the continuity of fate and writes his own biography.
In other words, every language as such is 'inter-subjective'; it must be
possible to incorporate the protocols of one moment into the protocols
of the next moment, just as the protocols of A can be incorporated into the
 PROTOCOL STATEMENTS 97

protocols of B. nerefore it does not make sense to speuk of monologising

brivate] l a n ~ g e s yas Carnap doesy nor of different protocol languages
that are later related to each other. The protocol languages of the Robinson
of yesterday and of today are as close or distant as those. of Robinson and
Friday. Ifyunder certain circumstancesyone calls Robinson's protocol language
of yesterday and today the same language thenyunder the same conditionsy
one can call Robinson's and Friday's the same language.
Also in Carnap's writings we encounter here the emphasis on the 'I'
familiar to us from idealist philosophy. In the universal jargony one cannot
speak meaningfully of one's 'own' ['eigeneny] protocol, nor of 'now' and
'herey. In the physicalist language, personal names are replaced by coordinates
and coefficients of physical states. One can only distinguish an 'Otto-protocol'
from a 'Karl-protocol' but, in the universal jargony not one's 'own protocol'
from 'another's protocol'. The whole problematic connected with one's
'own mind' and 'other minds' does not arise.
The 'methodological' solipsism and 'methodological' positivism (see
C a m p 1932ayp. 461) do not become more usable by the addition of the
word 'methodological' (see 'Sociology in Physicalism' p. 65).
If, for example? I had said earlier: "Todayy 27 July, I am busy with
protocols of my own and of others", it would be more correct to say: "Otto
Neurath's protocol at l 0 a m v yJuly 27 1932: [Otto Neurath's speech-thinking
at 9 hoursy55 minutes was: (Otto Neurath occupied himself between 9 hoursy
40 minutes and 9 hoursy 54 minutes with a protocol by Neurath and with
a protocol by Kalon both of which contained the following two sentences
. . ,)l ". Although Otto Neurath words the protocol concerning the applica-
tion of the protocols, he incorporates his own protocol into the system of
unified science in the same way as that of Kalon. It may very well happen
that Neurath deletes one of Neurath's protocol statements and adopts one of
Kalon's in its stead. That a man clings more obstinately to his own protocol
statements than to those of another, in generalyis a historical fact - without
any fundamental significance for our discussion. Carnap's contention: "Each
individual can only use his own protocol as a basis" cannot be acceptedyfor
his argument is not conclusive: "Slcan certainly also utilise S2's protocoly
and this utilisation becomes especially simple through the incorporation
of both protocol languages into the physical language. Still, it is made in-
directly: S, has to describe in his protocol that he sees a piece of writing of
such and such a shape" (Carnap 1932a, p. 461 .l2 But Neurath has to give the
same description of Neurath's protocol as of Kalon's protocol. He describes
how he sees the Neurath-protocol as well as how he sees the Kalon-protocol.
98 PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS

In further developments the protocol statements of all men will be treated

alike. Fundamentally it makes no difference at all whether Kalon works
with Kalon's or with Neurath's protocols, or whether Neurath occupies
himself with Neurath's or with Kalon's protocols. In order to make this quite
clear7 one could think of a scientific cleaning machine into which protocol
statements are thrown. The 'laws' and other 'factual statements', including
'protocol statements', which have their effect through the arrangement of
the wheels of the machine, clean the stock of protocol statements thrown in
and make a bell ring when a 'contradiction' appears. Now either the protocol
statement has to be replaced by another or the machine has t o be recon-
structed. Who reconstructs the machine, whose protocol statements are
thrown in, is of no consequence at all; everybody can test his 'own' as well
as 'others' ' protocol statements.

To sum up:
Unified science uses a universal jargon in which terms of the physicalist
ordinary language also must occur.
Children can be trained in the use of the universal jargon. Apart from
it we do not use any specially separable 'primitive' protocol statements,
nor 'protocol languages of different persons'.
Within unified science we have no use for the terms 'methodological
solipsism' or 'methodological positivism'.
It is impossible to start from fmally secured, pure protocol statements.
Protocol statements are factual statements like other factual statements,
in which personal names or names of groups of persons appear in a certain
connection with other terms that are also otherwise used by the universal
jargon.
The work of the Vienna Circle is concentrating more and more on the
task of presenting unified science (sociology as well as chemistry, biology
as well as mechanics, psychology - preferably called behaviouristics - as
well as optics) in a unified language, and of creating the often neglected
'cross-connections' between the individual sciences so that it is possible
to relate the terms of each science to the terms of every other science with-
out effort. The word 'man7, which is connected with 'making statements'
is to be defmed in the same way as the word 'man' that occurs in statements
containing words like 'economic order', 'production', etc.
The Vienna Circle has received powerfid stimuli from different sides.
The achievements of Mach, Poincark, Duhem were utilised as well as the
contributions of Frege, Schroder, Russell and others. Wittgenstein had an