Vertudes vs Bureau of ImmigrationFacts:

Before us is a petition for review by

certiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of C o u r t , s e e k i n g t o r e v i e w a n d
set aside the decision
and resolution o f t h e Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed the decision of
the Civil Service
Commission( C S C ) fi n d i n g p e t i t i o n e r g u i l t y o f g r a v e m i s c o n d u c t
a n d d i s m i s s i n g h e r f r o m government service.Private respondent
Buenafl or complained of having been convinced by petitionerinto
paying the total amount of P79,000.00 in exchange for the
processing of hervisa, passport and other travel documents for Japan.
Private respondent deliveredto petitioner Security Bank (SB) Check Nos.
0014797 and 0014798 in the amountsof P30,000.00 and P20,000.00,
respectively, and cash worth P29,000.00. However,no visa was delivered.
Private respondent insisted that petitioner return her money,to no
avail.Special Prosecutor dela Cruz found petitioner guilty of grave
misconduct andrecommended her dismissal from the service.Petitioner filed a
Motion to Re-open with the BI, wherein Commissioner Rodriguezissued an
order, adopting the resolution of Special Prosecutor dela Cruz.Subsequently,
the assailed order of dismissal was affirmed by then Department of Justice
Secretary Serafin Cuevas.Petitioner appealed to the CSC,

raising the issues of lack of due process andlack of substantial evidence,

which dismissed the petitioners appeal. Thereafter, petitioner filed a
petition for review before the CA, raising the issue:whether or not the
BI and CSC violated petitioner's right to due process. the CAdismissed the
petition for lack of merit.Issue: Whether or not petitioner was accorded due
processHeld: The petition is denied. She contends that she was denied of
her right to a fullhearing when she was not accorded the opportunity to
cross-examine the witnessesagainst her. The argument
is unmeritorious. The right of a party to confront and cross-examine
opposing witnesses in a judiciallitigation is a fundamental right which is
part of due process. However,
the right isa personal one which may be waived expressly or
impliedly by
conducta m o u n t i n g t o a r e n u n c i a t i o n o f t h e r i g h t o f c r o s s
- e x a m i n a t i o n . T h u s , where a party has had the opportunity to
cross-examine a witness
butf a i l e d t o a v a i l h i m s e l f o f i t , h e n e c e s s a r i l y f o r f e i t s t h
e r i g h t t o c r o s s - examine
. The right to cross-examination being a personal right, petitioner
must bedeemed to have waived this right by agreeing to submit the case
for resolution andnot questioning the lack of it in the proceedings before
the BI.
Diosdado Guzman vs. National University
Facts:

Petitioners Diosdado Guzman, Ulysses Urbiztondo and Ariel Ramacula,

students of respondent National University, seek relief from what they
described as their school's "continued and persistent refusal to allow them
to enrol."

In their petition on August 7, 1984 for extraordinary legal and equitable

remedies with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction, they alleged
that they were denied due to the fact that they were active participation in
peaceful mass actions within the premises of the University.

The respondents on the other hand claimed that the petitioners failure to
enroll for the first semester of the school year 1984-1985 is due to their own
fault and not because of their alleged exercise of their constitutional and
human rights. As regards to Guzman, his academic showing was poor due to
his activities in leading boycotts of classes. They said that Guzman is facing
criminal charges for malicious mischief before the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Manila in connection with the destruction of properties of respondent
University.

The petitioners have failures in their records, and are not of good scholastic
standing.

Issue:

Whether or Not there is violation of the due process clause.

Held:

Immediately apparent from a reading of respondents' comment and

memorandum is the fact that they had never conducted proceedings of any
sort to determine whether or not petitioners-students had indeed led or
participated in activities within the university premises, conducted without
prior permit from school authorities, that disturbed or disrupted classes
therein or perpetrated acts of vandalism, coercion and intimidation, slander,
noise barrage and other acts showing disdain for and defiance of University
authority. The pending civil case for damages and a criminal case for
malicious mischief against petitioner Guzman, cannot, without more,
furnish sufficient warrant for his expulsion or debarment from re-
enrollment. Also, apparent is the omission of respondents to cite this Court
to any duly published rule of theirs by which students may be expelled or
refused re-enrollment for poor scholastic standing.
To satisfy the demands of procedural due process, the following requisites
must be met:
1. the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of
any accusation against them;
2. they shag have the right to answer the charges against them, with the
assistance of counsel, if desired;
3. they shall be informed of the evidence against them;
4. they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and
5. the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee
or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.
RULING:

The petition was granted wherein the respondents are directed to allow the
petitioners (students) to re-enrol without prejudice to any disciplinary
proceedings.

CORONA VS UNITED HARBOUR PILOT GR NO 127980 CASE DIGEST

FACTS: : IN ISSUING ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER NO. 04-92 (PPA-AO NO.

04-92), LIMITING THE TERM OF APPOINTMENT OF HARBOR PILOTS TO
ONE YEAR SUBJECT TO YEARLY RENEWAL OR CANCELLATION

ON AUGUST 12, 1992, RESPONDENTS UNITED HARBOUR PILOTS

ASSOCIATION AND THE MANILA PILOTS ASSOCIATION, THROUGH
CAPT. ALBERTO C. COMPAS, QUESTIONED PPA-AO NO. 04-92

ON DECEMBER 23, 1992, THE OP ISSUED AN ORDER DIRECTING THE

PPA TO HOLD IN ABEYANCE THE IMPLEMENTATION OF PPA-AO NO. 04-
92ON

MARCH 17, 1993, THE OP, THROUGH THEN ASSISTANT EXECUTIVE

SECRETARY FOR LEGAL AFFAIRS RENATO C. CORONA, DISMISSED THE
APPEAL/PETITION AND LIFTED THE RESTRAINING ORDER ISSUED
EARLIER

RESPONDENTS FILED A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND

INJUNCTION WITH PRAYER FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A TEMPORARY
RESTRAINING ORDER AND DAMAGES, BEFORE BRANCH 6 OF THE
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT

ISSUE: WON PPA-AO-04-92 IS CONSTITUTIONAL

HELD: THE COURT IS CONVINCED THAT PPA-AO NO. 04-92 WAS ISSUED
IN STARK DISREGARD OF RESPONDENTS' RIGHT AGAINST
DEPRIVATION OF PROPERTY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW. THE
SUPREME COURT SAID THAT IN ORDER TO FALL WITHIN THE AEGIS OF
THIS PROVISION, TWO CONDITIONS MUST CONCUR, NAMELY, THAT
THERE IS A DEPRIVATION AND THAT SUCH DEPRIVATION IS DONE
WITHOUT PROPER OBSERVANCE OF DUE PROCESS. AS A GENERAL
RULE, NOTICE AND HEARING, AS THE FUNDAMENTAL REQUIREMENTS
OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS, ARE ESSENTIAL ONLY WHEN AN
ADMINISTRATIVE BODY EXERCISES ITS QUASI-JUDICIAL FUNCTION. IN
THE PERFORMANCE OF ITS EXECUTIVE OR LEGISLATIVE FUNCTIONS,
SUCH AS ISSUING RULES AND REGULATIONS, AN ADMINISTRATIVE
BODY NEED NOT COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF NOTICE AND
HEARING

THERE IS NO DISPUTE THAT PILOTAGE AS A PROFESSION HAS TAKEN

ON THE NATURE OF A PROPERTY RIGHT. IT IS READILY APPARENT THAT
PPA-AO NO. 04-92 UNDULY RESTRICTS THE RIGHT OF HARBOR PILOTS
TO ENJOY THEIR PROFESSION BEFORE THEIR COMPULSORY
RETIREMENT

PHILCOMSAT VS. ALCUAZ 180 SCRA 218; GR NO 84818 18 DEC 1989 CASE
DIGEST

Facts: The petition before us seeks to annul and set aside an Order 1 issued by
respondent Commissioner Jose Luis Alcuaz of the National Telecommunications
Commission

Herein petitioner is engaged in providing for services involving

telecommunications. Charging rates for certain specified lines that were reduced
by order of herein respondent Jose AlcuazCommissioner of the National
Telecommunications Commission. The rates were ordered to be reduced by fifteen
percent (15%) due to Executive Order No. 546 which granted the NTC the power
to fix rates. Said order was issued without prior notice and hearing.
Under Section 5 of Republic Act No. 5514, petitioner was exempt from the
jurisdiction of the then Public Service Commission, now respondent NTC. However,
pursuant to Executive Order No. 196 issued on June 17, 1987, petitioner was
placed under the jurisdiction, control and regulation of respondent NTC

Issue: Whether or Not E.O. 546 is unconstitutional.

Held: In Vigan Electric Light Co., Inc. vs. Public Service Commission the Supreme
Court said that although the rule-making power and even the power to fix rates-
when such rules and/or rates are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given kind
throughout the Philippines-may partake of a legislative character. Respondent
Alcuaz no doubt contains all the attributes of a quasi-judicial adjudication.
Foremost is the fact that said order pertains exclusively to petitioner and to no
other

The respondent admits that the questioned order was issued pursuant to its quasi-
judicial functions. It, however, insists that notice and hearing are not necessary
since the assailed order is merely incidental to the entire proceedings and,
therefore, temporary in nature but the supreme court said that While respondents
may fix a temporary rate pending final determination of the application of
petitioner, such rate-fixing order, temporary though it may be, is not exempt from
the statutory procedural requirements of notice and hearing

The Supreme Court Said that it is clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent
has no authority to make such order without first giving petitioner a hearing,
whether the order be temporary or permanent. In the Case at bar the NTC didnt
scheduled hearing nor it did give any notice to the petitioner

US vs. Toribio
Post under case digests, Political Law at Sunday, February 26, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind

Facts: Respondent Toribio is an owner of carabao,

residing in the town of Carmen in the province of Bohol.
The trial court of Bohol found that the respondent
slaughtered or caused to be slaughtered a carabao
without a permit from the municipal treasurer of the
municipality wherein it was slaughtered, in violation of
Sections 30 and 33 of Act No. 1147, an Act regulating the
registration, branding, and slaughter of Large Cattle. The
act prohibits the slaughter of large cattle fit for agricultural
work or other draft purposes for human consumption.

The respondent counters by stating that what the Act is (1)

prohibiting is the slaughter of large cattle in the municipal
slaughter house without a permit given by the municipal
treasurer. Furthermore, he contends that the municipality
of Carmen has no slaughter house and that he
slaughtered his carabao in his dwelling, (2) the act
constitutes a taking of property for public use in the
exercise of the right of eminent domain without providing
for the compensation of owners, and it is an undue and
unauthorized exercise of police power of the state for it
deprives them of the enjoyment of their private property.

Issue: Whether or not Act. No. 1147, regulating the

registration, branding and slaughter of large cattle, is an
undue and unauthorized exercise of police power.

Held: It is a valid exercise of police power of the state.

Police power is the inherent power of the state to legislate

laws which may interfere with personal liberties. To justify
the state in the exercise of its sovereign police power it
must appear (1) that the interest of the general public
requires it and (2) that the means are reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals.
The court is of the opinion that the act applies generally to
the slaughter of large cattle for human consumption,
ANYWHERE, without a permit duly secured from the
municipal treasurer, For to do otherwise is to defeat the
purpose of the law and the intent of the law makers. The
act primarily seeks to protect large cattle against theft to
make it easy for the recovery and return to owners, which
encouraged them to regulate the registration and
slaughter of large cattle.

Several years prior to the enactment of the said law, an

epidemic struck the Philippine islands which threatened
the survival of carabaos in the country. In some provinces
seventy, eighty and even one hundred percent of their
local carabaos perished due to the said epidemic. This
drove the prices of carabaos up to four or five-fold, as a
consequence carabao theft became rampant due to the
luxurious prices of these work animals. Moreover, this
greatly affected the food production of the country which
prompted the government to import rice from its
neighboring countries.

As these work animals are vested with public interest for

they are of fundamental use for the production of crops,
the government was prompted to pass a law that would
protect these work animals. The purpose of the law is to
stabilize the number of carabaos in the country as well as
to redistribute them throughout the entire archipelago. It
was also the same reason why large cattles fit for farm
work was prohibited to be slaughtered for human
consumption. Most importantly, the respondents carabao
was found to be fit for farm work.

These reasons satisfy the requisites for the valid exercise

of police power.

Act No. 1147 is not an exercise of the inherent power of

eminent domain. The said law does not constitute the
taking of carabaos for public purpose; it just serves as a
mere regulation for the consumption of these private
properties for the protection of general welfare and public
interest. Thus, the demand for compensation of the owner
must fail.

Restituto Ynot Vs IAC GR NO 74457 March 20 1987 CASE

DIGEST
Facts

On January 13, 1984, the petitioner transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo when
the same was confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for the violation of
E.O. 626-A. A case was filed by the petitioner questioning the constitutionality of executive order and the
recovery of the carabaos. After considering the merits of the case, the confiscation was sustained and the
court declined to rule on the constitutionality issue. The petitioner appealed the decision to the
Intermediate Appellate Court but it also upheld the ruling of RTC.

Issue:

Is E.O. 626-A unconstitutional?

Ruling:

The Respondent contends that it is a valid exercise of police power to justify EO 626-A amending EO 626
in asic rule prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions. The supreme court said
that The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by
the questioned measure is missing the Supreme Court do not see how the prohibition of the inter-
provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be
killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining the carabaos
in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will
make it easier to kill them there

The Supreme Court found E.O. 626-A unconstitutional. The executive act defined the prohibition,
convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. Due
process was not properly observed. In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the
police station commander, were returned to the petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery
and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. The measure struck at once and pounced upon the
petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying due process.

Lupangco vs CA Case Digest

Lupangco vs Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 77372 April 29, 1988

Facts: PRC issued Resolution No. 105 as parts of its "Additional Instructions to Examiness," to all
those applying for admission to take the licensure examinations in accountancy.

Petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the licensure examinations in accountancy, filed with the
RTC a complaint for injunction with a prayer with the issuance of a writ of a preliminary injunction
against respondent PRC to restrain the latter from enforcing the above-mentioned resolution and to
declare the same unconstitutional.

Issue: Can the Professional Regulation Commission lawfully prohibit the examiness from attending
review classes, receiving handout materials, tips, or the like 3 days before the date of the
examination?

Ruling: We realize that the questioned resolution was adopted for a commendable purpose which is
"to preserve the integrity and purity of the licensure examinations." However, its good aim cannot be
a cloak to conceal its constitutional infirmities. On its face, it can be readily seen that it is
unreasonable in that an examinee cannot even attend any review class, briefing, conference or the
like, or receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or any
review center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor, official or employee of any of the
aforementioned or similar institutions.

The unreasonableness is more obvious in that one who is caught committing the prohibited acts
even without any ill motives will be barred from taking future examinations conducted by the
respondent PRC. Furthermore, it is inconceivable how the Commission can manage to have a
watchful eye on each and every examinee during the three days before the examination period.

It is an aixiom in administrative law that administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and
capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid, such rules and regulations must be
reasonable and fairly adapted to the end in view. If shown to bear no reasonable relation to the
purposes for which they are authorized to be issued, then they must be held to be invalid.

Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the examinees' right to
liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. Respondent PRC has no authority to dictate on the reviewees
as to how they should prepare themselves for the licensure examinations. They cannot be restrained
from taking all the lawful steps needed to assure the fulfillment of their ambition to become public
accountants. They have every right to make use of their faculties in attaining success in their
endeavors