A.

Interpleader (Rule 62)

A.1. Wack-Wack Golf and Country Club vs. Won

WACK WACK GOLF & COUNTRY CLUB, INC., plaintiff-appellant, vs. LEE E. WON
alias RAMON LEE and BIENVENIDO A. TAN, defendants-appellees.
G.R. No. L-23851; March 26, 1976

FACTS: The WackWack Golf & Country Club, Inc., a non-stock, civic and athletic corporation
duly organized under the laws of the Philippines, with principal office in Mandaluyong, Rizal,
alleged for its first cause of action, that the defendant Lee E. Won claims ownership of its
membership fee certificate 201, by virtue of the decision rendered in civil case 26044 of the CFI
of Manila, entitled "Lee E. Won alias Ramon Lee vs. WackWack Golf & Country Club, Inc."
and also by virtue of membership fee certificate 201-serial no. 1478 issued on October 17, 1963
by Ponciano B. Jacinto, deputy clerk of court of the said CFI of Manila, for and in behalf of the
president and the secretary of the Corporation and of the People's Bank & Trust Company as
transfer agent of the said Corporation, pursuant to the order of September 23, 1963 in the said
case; that the defendant Bienvenido A. Tan, on the other hand, claims to be lawful owner of its
aforesaid membership fee certificate 201 by virtue of membership fee certificate 201-serial no.
1199 issued to him on July 24, 1950 pursuant to an assignment made in his favor by "Swan,
Culbertson and Fritz," the original owner and holder of membership fee certificate 201.

For its second cause of action. it alleged that the membership fee certificate 201-serial no. 1478
issued by the deputy clerk of court of court of the CFI of Manila in behalf of the Corporation is
null and void because issued in violation of its by-laws, which require the surrender and
cancellation of the outstanding membership fee certificate 201 before issuance may be made to
the transferee of a new certificate duly signed by its president and secretary, aside from the fact
that the decision of the CFI of Manila in civil case 26044 is not binding upon the defendant Tan,
holder of membership fee certificate 201-serial no. 1199; that Tan is made a party because of his
refusal to join it in this action or bring a separate action to protect his rights despite the fact that
he has a legal and beneficial interest in the subject matter of this litigation; and that he is made a
part so that complete relief may be accorded herein.

The Corporation prayed that (a) an order be issued requiring Lee and Tan to interplead and
litigate their conflicting claims; and (b) judgment. be rendered, after hearing, declaring who of
the two is the lawful owner of membership fee certificate 201, and ordering the surrender and
cancellation of membership fee certificate 201-serial no. 1478 issued in the name of Lee.

ISSUE: Whether or not the instant interpleader will prosper?

HELD: NO.The action of interpleader, under section 120 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is a
remedy whereby a person who has personal property in his possession, or an obligation to render
wholly or partially, without claiming any right to either, comes to court and asks that the persons
who claim the said personal property or who consider themselves entitled to demand compliance
with the obligation, be required to litigate among themselves in order to determine finally who is
entitled to tone or the one thing.

There is no question that the subject matter of the present controversy, i.e., the membership fee
certificate 201, is proper for an interpleader suit. What is here disputed is the propriety and
timeliness of the remedy in the light of the facts and circumstances obtaining.

A stakeholder should use reasonable diligence to hale the contending claimants to court. He
need not await actual institution of independent suits against him before filing a bill of
interpleader. He should file an action of interpleader within a reasonable time after a dispute has
arisen without waiting to be sued by either of the contending claimants. Otherwise, he may be
barred by laches or undue delay. But where he acts with reasonable diligence in view of the
environmental circumstances, the remedy is not barred.

Has the Corporation in this case acted with diligence, in view of all the circumstances, such that
it may properly invoke the remedy of interpleader? We do not think so. It was aware of the
conflicting claims of the appellees with respect to the membership fee certificate 201 long before
it filed the present interpleader suit. It had been recognizing Tan as the lawful owner thereof. It
was sued by Lee who also claimed the same membership fee certificate. Yet it did not interplead
Tan. It preferred to proceed with the litigation (civil case 26044) and to defend itself therein. As
a matter of fact, final judgment was rendered against it and said judgment has already been
executed. It is not therefore too late for it to invoke the remedy of interpleader.

It has been held that a stakeholder's action of interpleader is too late when filed after judgment
has been rendered against him in favor of one of the contending claimants, 13 especially where
he had notice of the conflicting claims prior to the rendition of the judgment and neglected the
opportunity to implead the adverse claimants in the suit where judgment was entered. This must
be so, because once judgment is obtained against him by one claimant he becomes liable to the
latter.
A.2. Eternal Gardens vs. IAC

ETERNAL GARDENS MEMORIAL PARKS CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. FIRST

SPECIAL CASES DIVISION INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and NORTH
PHILIPPINE UNION MISSION OF THE SEVENTH-DAY ADVENTISTS, respondents.

G.R. No. 73794 September 19, 1988

FACTS: Eternal Garden and Philippine Union Mission Corporation of the Seventh Day
Adventists (MISSION), executed a Land Development Agreement, whereby Eternal Garden
would construct at its own expense a memorial park subdivided into and sold as memorial plot
lots, on the property owned by MISSION. 40% of the proceeds be remitted monthly by Eternal
Garden to MISSION through a designated depositary trustee bank.

They also executed a Deed of Absolute Sale with Mortgage on said lots. All went well until
Maysilo Estate asserted its claim of ownership over the land in question.Confronted with such
conflicting claims, petitioner filed a complaint for interpleader against MISSION and Maysilo
Estate. Alleging among others that petitioner was not yet the owner but a purchaser thereof, and
its willingness to pay to whoever will be declared as owner. Trial granted the interpleader.

MISSION filed a motion for the placing on judicial deposit the amounts due and unpaid from
petitioner.The motion was denied. An amended order was issued, still in favor of Eternal Garden.
Trial court passed a resolution reversing the judgment and ruled in favour of MISSION ordering
the judicial deposit and dismissal of the interpleader.

The Supreme Court in another case involving the same parties, ordered that Eternal Gardens to
deposit the amounts due and unpaid.

ISSUE: Whether Eternal Gardens should deposit the amounts due and unpaid.

HELD: YES.As correctly observed by the Court of Appeals, the essence of an interpleader, aside
from the disavowal of interest in the property in litigation on the part of the petitioner, is the deposit
of the property or funds in controversy with the court. it is a rule founded on justice and equity:
"that the plaintiff may not continue to benefit from the property or funds in litigation during the
pendency of the suit at the expense of whoever will ultimately be decided as entitled thereto."

The case at bar was elevated to the Court of Appeals on certiorari with prohibitory and mandatory
injunction. Said appellate court found that more than twenty million pesos are involved; so that on
interest alone for savings or time deposit would be considerable, now accruing in favor of the
Eternal Gardens. Finding that such is violative of the very essence of the complaint for interpleader
as it clearly runs against the interest of justice in this case, the Court of Appeals cannot be faulted
for finding that the lower court committed a grave abuse of discretion which requires correction
by the requirement that a deposit of said amounts should be made to a bank approved by the Court.
DOCTRINE: Deposit is proper in interpleader since the petitioner may not continue to benefit
from the property/funds in litigation during the pendency of the suit at the expense of whoever will
ultimately be decided as entitled thereto.
A.3. Pasricha vs. Don Luis Dizon Realty
A.4. Bank of Commerce vs. Planters Devt. Bank

BANK OF COMMERCE, Petitioner, vs. PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT BANK and

BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS, Respondent.
G.R. Nos. 154470-71; September 24, 2012
x-----------------------x
BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS, Petitioner, vs. PLANTERS DEVELOPMENT
BANK, Respondent.
G.R. Nos. 154589-90

BRION, J.:

FACTS: Before the Court are two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari under Rule
45on pure questions of law, filed by the petitioners Bank of Commerce (BOC) and the
BangkoSentralngPilipinas (BSP), assailing the January 10, 2002 and July 23, 2002 RTC of
Makati City, dismissing (i) the petition filed by the Planters Development Bank (PDB), (ii) the
"counterclaim" filed by the BOC, and (iii) the counter-complaint/cross-claim for interpleader
filed bythe BSP; and denied the BOC’s and the BSP’s motions for reconsideration.

Rizal Commercial Banking Corporation (RCBC) was the registered owner of 2 sets of Central
Bank (CB) bills, with total face value of ₱ 70 million and ₱ 20 million, which were eventually
negotiated to Planters Development Bank (PDB). After different transfers/ negotiations
involving several banks/institutions, the CBs were ultimately acquired bythe Bank of Commerce
(BOC). Upon learning of the transfers involving the CB bills, the PDB informed the Officer-in-
Charge of the BSP’s Government Securities Department, Nuqui, of the PDB’s claim over these
CB bills, based on the Detached Assignments in its possession. It requested the BSP to record its
claim in the BSP’s books, explaining that its non-possession of the CB bills is "on account of
imperfect negotiations thereof and/or subsequent setoff or transfer” and that, subsequent
transferees thereof were not holders in due course. Nuqui denied the request, invoking Section 8
of CB Circular No. 28, the existing BSP Regulation, which requires the presentation of the bond
before a registered bond may be transferred on the books of the BSP. This prompted PDB to file
with the RTC petitions for mandamus, prohibition, and injunction against BSP and BOC
reiterating that there was no intent on its part to transfer title of the CB bills, as shown by its non-
issuance of a detached assignment, particularly alleging that it merely "warehoused" the first set
of CB bills with the BOC, as security collateral.

BOC filed its answer, praying for the dismissal of the case, alleging that PDB has no cause of
action considering that PDB is no longer the owner of the CBs. Alternatively, the BSP in its
counter-complaint/cross-claim, asked that an interpleader suit be allowed between and among the
claimants to the subject CB bills on the position that while it is able and willing to pay the
subject CBs, it is duty bound to ensure that payment is made to the rightful owner.

ISSUE: Whether or not an interpleader suit may be initiated through the petitioner’s
answer
HELD: YES. The remedy of interpleader, as a special civil action, is primarily governed by the
specific provisions in Rule 62 of the Rules of Court and secondarily by the provisions applicable
to ordinary civil actions. Indeed, Rule 62 does not expressly authorize the filing of a complaint-
in-interpleader as part of, although separate and independent from, the answer. Similarly, Section
5, Rule 6, in relation to Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court does not include a complaint-in-
interpleader as a claim, a form of defense, or as an objection that a defendant may be allowed to
put up in his answer or in a motion to dismiss. This does not mean, however, that the BSP’s
"counter-complaint/cross-claim for interpleader" runs counter to general procedures.

Apart from a pleading, the rules allow a party to seek an affirmative relief from the court through
the procedural device of a motion. While captioned "Answer with counter complaint/cross-claim
for interpleader," the RTC understood this as in the nature of a motion, seeking relief which
essentially consists in an order for the conflicting claimants to litigate with each other so that
"payment is made to the rightful or legitimate owner" of the subject CB bills.

The rules define a "civil action" as "one by which a party sues another for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong." Interpleader may be considered as
a stakeholder’s remedy to prevent a wrong, that is, from making payment to one not entitled to it,
thereby rendering itself vulnerable to lawsuit/s from those legally entitled to payment.

Interpleader is a civil action made special by the existence of particular rules to govern the
uniqueness of its application and operation. Under Section 2, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court,
governing ordinary civil actions, a party’s claim is asserted "in a complaint, counterclaim, cross-
claim, third (fourth, etc.)-party complaint, or complaint-in-intervention." In an interpleader suit,
however, a claim is not required to be contained in any of these pleadings but in the answer-(of
the conflicting claimants)-in-interpleader. This claim is different from the counter-claim (or
cross-claim, third party-complaint) which is separately allowed under Section 5, par. 2 of Rule
62.

WHEREFORE, premises considered the consolidated PETITIONS are GRANTED. The Planters
Development Bank is hereby REQUIRED to file with the Regional Trial Court its comment or
answer-in-interpleader to Bank of Commerce’s Amended Consolidated Answer with
Compulsory Counterclaim, as previously ordered by the Regional Trial Court. The Regional
Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 143, is hereby ORDERED to assess the docket fees due from
Planters Development Bank and Bank of Commerce and order their payment, and to resolve with
DELIBERATE DISPATCH the parties’ conflicting claims of ownership over the proceeds of the
Central Bank bills.

The Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 143, or his duly
authorized representative is hereby ORDERED to assess and collect the appropriate amount of
docket fees separately due the Bank of Commerce and Planters Development Bank as conflicting
claimants in BangkoSentralngPilipinas’ interpleader suit, in accordance with this decision. SO
ORDERED.

DOCTRINE: Interpleader is a civil action made special by the existence of particular rules to
govern the uniqueness of its application and operation. Under Section 2, Rule 6 of the Rules of
Court, governing ordinary civil actions, a party’s claim is asserted "in a complaint,
counterclaim, cross-claim, third (fourth, etc.)-party complaint, or complaint-in-intervention." In
an interpleader suit, however, a claim is not required to be contained in any of these pleadings
but in the answer-(of the conflicting claimants)-in-interpleader. This claim is different from the
counter-claim (or cross-claim, third party-complaint) which is separately allowed under Section
5, par. 2 of Rule 62.
 B. Declaratory Relief and Similar Remedies

B.1. Almeda vs. Bathala Marketing Ind.

B.2. Republic vs. Orbecido

Republic vs. Orbecido III, 472 SCR 114,

G.R. No. 154380; October 5, 2005

FACTS: Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Villanueva in the Philippines. They had a son and a
daughter, Kristoffer and Kimberly. But, Cipriano’s wife left for USA bringing along Kristoffer. A
few years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.
Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce decree and then married a certain
Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him currently live in California. Cipriano thereafter
filed with the RTC a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the
Family Code. No opposition was filed. The RTC granted the same.

In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the decision and resolution of the RTC that
herein respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry. The OSG contends that
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to the instant case because it only
applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an
alien. The proper remedy, according to the OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for legal
separation. Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that governs respondents situation. The
OSG posits that this is a matter of legislation and not of judicial determination.

On the other hand, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but insists
that when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry,
he is likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.

ISSUE/S:Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later
naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to
remarry, can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code?

HELD: Remanded to lower court for further submission of evidence. Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of
the Family Code, should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a
spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However, considering
that in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted, this Court is unable to declare,
based on respondents bare allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an American citizen,
had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an American, that respondent is now capacitated
to remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly upon respondent’s submission of the
evidence in his favor.

DOCTRINE: Civil Procedure; Declaratory Relief; Requisites of a Petition for Declaratory

Relief.- The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable
controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the
party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue is ripe for
judicial determination.
B.3. Malana vs. Tappa

G.R. No. 181303; September 17, 2009

Chico-Nazario, J.

FACTS: Petitioners alleged in their Complaint that they are the owners of a parcel of situated in
Tuguegarao City, Cagayan (subject property). Petitioners inherited the subject property from
Anastacio Danao (Anastacio), who died intestate. During the lifetime of Anastacio, he had
allowed Consuelo Pauig (Consuelo), who was married to Joaquin Boncad, to build on and
occupy the southern portion of the subject property. Anastacio and Consuelo agreed that the
latter would vacate the said land at any time that Anastacio and his heirs might need it.
Petitioners claimed that respondents, Consuelos family members, continued to occupy the
subject property even after her death, already building their residences thereon using permanent
materials.

Petitioners referred their land dispute with respondents to the Lupong Tagapamayapa of
Barangay Annafunan West for conciliation. During the conciliation proceedings, respondents
asserted that they owned the subject property and presented documents ostensibly supporting
their claim of ownership.
According to petitioners, respondent’s documents were highly dubious, falsified, and incapable
of proving the latters claim of ownership over the subject property; nevertheless, they created a
cloud upon petitioner’s title to the property. Thus, petitioners were compelled to file before the
RTC a Complaint to remove such cloud from their title. Before respondents could file their
answer, the RTC issued an Order dated 4 May 2007 dismissing petitioners Complaint on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the aforementioned RTC Order dismissing their
Complaint. They argued that their principal cause of action was for quieting of title; the accion
reivindicacion was included merely to enable them to seek complete relief from respondents.
Petitioners Complaint should not have been dismissed, since Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of
Court states that an action to quiet title falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC. In an Order dated
30 May 2007, the RTC denied petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. It reasoned that an action
to quiet title is a real action. Pursuant to Republic Act No. 7691, it is the Municipal Trial Court
(MTC) that exercises exclusive jurisdiction over real actions where the assessed value of real
property does not exceed P20,000.00. Since the assessed value of subject property per Tax
Declaration No, 02-48386 was P410.00, the real action involving the same was outside the
jurisdiction of the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether the RTC has jurisdiction in the instant case.

HELD: Yes, the dismissal of the instant case is valid. Moreover, the remedy of
declaratory relief is not proper.

Issue on jurisdiction
An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person interested under a deed, a will, a
contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute, an executive
order, a regulation or an ordinance. The relief sought under this remedy includes the
interpretation and determination of the validity of the written instrument and the judicial
declaration of the parties rights or duties there under.

Petitions for declaratory relief are governed by Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. The RTC correctly
made a distinction between the first and the second paragraphs of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules
of Court.

As the afore-quoted provision states, a petition for declaratory relief under the first paragraph of
Section 1, Rule 63 may be brought before the appropriate RTC.

The second paragraph of Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court specifically refers to (1) an
action for the reformation of an instrument, recognized under Articles 1359 to 1369 of the Civil
Code; (2) an action to quiet title, authorized by Articles 476 to 481 of the Civil Code; and (3) an
action to consolidate ownership required by Article 1607 of the Civil Code in a sale with a right
to repurchase.

These three remedies are considered similar to declaratory relief because they also result in the
adjudication of the legal rights of the litigants, often without the need of execution to carry the
judgment into effect.

To determine which court has jurisdiction over the actions identified in the second paragraph of
Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court, said provision must be read together with those of the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended.

In contrast, the mandatory provision of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, as amended,
uses the word shall and explicitly requires the MTC to exercise exclusive original jurisdiction
over all civil actions which involve title to or possession of real property where the assessed
value does not exceed P20,000.00,

As found by the RTC, the assessed value of the subject property as stated in Tax Declaration No.
02-48386 is only P410.00; therefore, petitioners Complaint involving title to and possession of
the said property is within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the MTC, not the RTC.
Proper remedy on the instant case
Furthermore, an action for declaratory relief presupposes that there has been no actual breach of
the instruments involved or of rights arising thereunder. Since the purpose of an action for
declaratory relief is to secure an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the
parties under a statute, deed, or contract for their guidance in the enforcement thereof, or
compliance therewith, and not to settle issues arising from an alleged breach thereof, it may be
entertained only before the breach or violation of the statute, deed, or contract to which it refers.
A petition for declaratory relief gives a practical remedy for ending controversies that have not
reached the state where another relief is immediately available; and supplies the need for a form
of action that will set controversies at rest before they lead to a repudiation of obligations, an
invasion of rights, and a commission of wrongs.

Where the law or contract has already been contravened prior to the filing of an action for
declaratory relief, the courts can no longer assume jurisdiction over the action. In other words, a
court has no more jurisdiction over an action for declaratory relief if its subject has already been
infringed or transgressed before the institution of the action.

In the present case, petitioners Complaint for quieting of title was filed after petitioners already
demanded and respondents refused to vacate the subject property. In fact, said Complaint was
filed only subsequent to the latters express claim of ownership over the subject property before
the Lupong Tagapamayapa, in direct challenge to petitioners title.

Since petitioners averred in the Complaint that they had already been deprived of the possession
of their property, the proper remedy for them is the filing of an accion publiciana or an accion
reivindicatoria, not a case for declaratory relief
B.4. Chavez vs. Judicial and Bar Council
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner, vs. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS
JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C. TUPAS, JR., Respondents.
G.R. No. 202242; April 16, 2013

MENDOZA, J.:

FACTS: The issue at hand has been in hibernation until the unexpected departure of Chief Justice
Renato C. Corona on May 29, 2012, and the nomination of former Solicitor General Francisco I.
Chavez (petitioner), as his potential successor, triggered the filing of this case. The issue has
constantly been nagging legal minds, yet remained dormant for lack of constitutional challenge.

Prompted by the clamor to rid the process of appointments to the Judiciary from political pressure
and partisan activities, the members of the Constitutional Commission saw the need to create a
separate, competent and independent body to recommend nominees to the President. Thus, it
conceived of a body representative of all the stakeholders in the judicial appointment process and
called it the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC). Its composition, term and functions are provided
under Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution, viz: Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution,
viz:

“Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of
the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary
of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a representative
of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and
a representative of the private sector.

(2) The regular members of the Council shall be appointed by the President for a term
of four years with the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Of the Members
first appointed, the representative of the Integrated Bar shall serve for four years, the
professor of law for three years, the retired Justice for two years, and the representative
of the private sector for one year.

(3) The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex officio of the Council and
shall keep a record of its proceedings.

(4) The regular Members of the Council shall receive such emoluments as may be
determined by the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court shall provide in its annual
budget the appropriations for the Council.

(5) The Council shall have the principal function of recommending appointees to the
Judiciary. It may exercise such other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may
assign to it.”

In compliance therewith, Congress, from the moment of the creation of the JBC, designated one
representative to sit in the JBC to act as one of the ex officio members. Perhaps in order to give
equal opportunity to both houses to sit in the exclusive body, the House of Representatives and the
Senate would send alternate representatives to the JBC. In other words, Congress had only one (1)
representative.

In 1994, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered. Instead of having only seven (7)
members, an eighth (8th) member was added to the JBC as two (2) representatives from Congress
began sitting in the JBC - one from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with
each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. Then, curiously, the JBC En Banc, in separate meetings held
in 2000 and 2001, decided to allow the representatives from the Senate and the House of
Representatives one full vote each. At present, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and
Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of
the legislature. It is this practice that petitioner has questioned in this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the petition is in the nature of an action under declaratory relief under
Rule 63?

RULING: YES, the Court views the petition as essentially an action for declaratory relief under
Rule 63 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Before addressing the above issues in seriatim, the Court deems it proper to first ascertain the
nature of the petition. Pursuant to the rule that the nature of an action is determined by the
allegations therein and the character of the relief sought, the Court views the petition as essentially
an action for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

The Constitution as the subject matter, and the validity and construction of Section 8 (1), Article
VIII as the issue raised, the petition should properly be considered as that which would result in
the adjudication of rights sans the execution process because the only relief to be granted is the
very declaration of the rights under the document sought to be construed. It being so, the original
jurisdiction over the petition lies with the appropriate Regional Trial Court (RTC).
Notwithstanding the fact that only questions of law are raised in the petition, an action for
declaratory relief is not among those within the original jurisdiction of this Court as provided in
Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution.

At any rate, due to its serious implications, not only to government processes involved but also to
the sanctity of the Constitution, the Court deems it more prudent to take cognizance of it. After all,
the petition is also for prohibition under Rule 65 seeking to enjoin Congress from sending two (2)
representatives with one (1) full vote each to the JBC.

DOCTRINE:An action for declaratory relief is not among those within the original jurisdiction
of this Court as provided in Section 5, Article VIII of the Constitution.
B.5. Sabitsanavs.Muertegui
B.6. Republic vs. Roque (In relation to southern Hemisphere case)
B.7. Dept. of Finance vs. Dela Cruz, Jr.
B.8. Umali vs. JBC

REP. REYNALDO V. UMALI, in his capacity as Chairman of the House of

Representatives Committee on Justice and Ex Officio Member of the JBC, Petitioner vs.
THE JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, chaired by THE HON. MARIA LOURDES P.A.
SERENO, Chief Justice and Ex Officio Chairperson, Respondent
G.R. No. 228628; July 25, 2017

VELASCO, JR., J.

FACTS: This Court, in a Decision dated July 17, 2012, declared the said practice of having two
representatives from Congress with one vote each in the JBC unconstitutional. This Court
enunciated that the use of the singular letter "a" preceding "representative of the Congress" in the
aforequoted provision is unequivocal and leaves no room for any other construction or
interpretation. The same is indicative of the Framers' intent that Congress may designate only one
representative to the JBC. Had it been otherwise, they could have, in no uncertain terms, so
provided. This Court further articulated that in the context of JBC representation, the term
"Congress" must be taken to mean the entire legislative department as no liaison between the two
houses exists in the workings of the JBC. There is no mechanism required between the Senate and
the House of Representatives in the screening and nomination of judicial officers. Moreover, this
Court, quoting the keen observation of Retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Consuelo Ynares-
Santiago, who is also a JBC Consultant, stated that the ex officio members of the JBC consist of
representatives from the three main branches of government, to wit: the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court representing the judiciary, the Secretary of Justice representing the executive, and
a representative of the Congress representing the legislature. It can be deduced therefrom that the
unmistakable tenor of Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution was to treat each ex
officio member as representing one co-equal branch of government having equal say in the choice
of judicial nominees. Now, to allow the legislature to have more than one representative in the
JBC would negate the principle of equality among these three branches of the government, which
is enshrined in the Constitution.

In light of these Decision and Resolution, both Houses of Congress agreed on a six-month
rotational representation in the JBC, wherein the House of Representatives will represent Congress
from January to June and the Senate from July to December. This is now the current practice in
the JBC. It is by reason of this arrangement that the votes cast by the petitioner for the selection of
nominees for the vacancies of then retiring Supreme Court Associate Justices Jose P. Perez (Perez)
and Arturo Brion (Brion) were not counted by the JBC during its En Banc deliberations held last
December 2 and 9, 2016. Instead, the petitioner's votes were simply placed in an envelope and
sealed subject to any further disposition as this Court may direct in a proper proceeding. This is
the root of the present controversy that prompted the petitioner to file the instant Petition for
Certiorari and Mandamus

ISSUE:
1. Whether the petitioner's direct resort to this Court via a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus
is the plain, speedy and adequate remedy available to him to assail the JBC's adoption of the
rotational representation leading to the non-counting of his votes in its En Banc deliberations

2. Whether the JBC can be compelled through mandamus to count the petitioner's votes in its En
Banc deliberations

HELD:
1. Yes. Generally, the writ of certiorari can only be availed of in the absence of an appeal or any
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. In Bordomeo v. Court of Appeals,
however, this Court clarified that it is inadequacy that must usually determine the propriety of
certiorari and not the mere absence of all other remedies and the danger of failure of justice
without the writ. A remedy is considered plain, speedy and adequate if it will promptly relieve the
petitioner from the injurious effects of the judgment, order, or resolution of the lower court or
agency.

This Court took pains in enumerating the circumstances that would warrant a direct resort to this
Court, to wit: (1) when there are genuine issues of constitutionality that must be addressed at the
most immediate time; (2) when the issues involved are of transcendental importance; (3) cases of
first impression as no jurisprudence yet exists that will guide the lower courts on this matter; (4)
the constitutional issues raised are better decided by this court; (5) the time element presented in
this case cannot be ignored; (6) the filed petition reviews the act of a constitutional organ; (7)
petitioners rightly claim that they had no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law; and (8) the petition includes questions that are dictated by public welfare and the
advancement of public policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice, or the orders
complained of were found to be patent nullities, or the appeal was considered as clearly an
inappropriate remedy.

While this Court agrees with the JBC that the petitioner's preliminary remedy to question the
rotational arrangement of Congress is to ask the latter to repudiate the same, this, however, cannot
be considered plain, speedy and adequate. This Court is, thus, inclined to sustain the petitioner's
direct resort to this Court not only because it is the plain, speedy and adequate remedy available
to him but also by reason of the constitutional issues involved herein and the urgency of the matter.
As correctly pointed out by the OSG, the Constitution mandates that any vacancy to the office of
an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court must be filled up within the 90-day period from its
occurrence. Therefore, the JBC must submit the list of nominees prior to the start of that period.
As the nominations covered by the questioned December 2016 JBC En Banc deliberations were
intended for vacancies created by then Associate Justices Perez and Brion, who respectively retired
last December 14 and 29, 2016, hence, any resort to Congress during that time would already be
inadequate since the JBC list of nominees would be submitted any moment to the Office of the
President for the appointment of the next Associate Justices of the Supreme Court. Since time is
of the essence, the petitioner's direct resort to this Court is warranted.

2. No. It is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that the applicant has a clear legal right
to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act
required. The burden is on the petitioner to show that there is such a clear legal right to the
performance of the act, and a corresponding compelling duty on the part of the respondent to
perform the act. As an extraordinary writ, it lies only to compel an officer to perform a
ministerial duty, not a discretionary one. A clear line demarcates a discretionary act from a
ministerial one. A purely ministerial act is one which an officer or tribunal performs in a given
state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate of legal authority, without regard
to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. On the
other hand, if the law imposes a duty upon a public officer and gives him the right to decide how
or when the duty shall be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is
ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of official discretion
or judgment. Clearly, the use of discretion and the performance of a ministerial act are mutually
exclusive. Further, the writ of mandamus does not issue to control or review the exercise of
discretion or to compel a course of conduct.

In the case at bench, the counting of votes in the selection of the nominees to the judiciary may
only be considered a ministerial duty of the JBC if such votes were cast by its rightful members
and not by someone, like the petitioner, who is not considered a member during the En Banc
deliberations last December 2 and 9, 2016. For during the questioned period, the lawful
representative of Congress to the JBC is a member of the Senate and not of the House of
Representatives as per their agreed rotational scheme. Considering that a member of the Senate
already cast his vote therein, the JBC has the full discretion not to count the votes of the petitioner
for it is mandated by both the Constitution and jurisprudence to maintain that Congress will only
have one representative in the JBC. As the act of the JBC involves a discretionary one, accordingly,
mandamus will not lie.
 C. Review of Judgments and Final Orders of the COMELEC and CoA
C.1. Alliance for Nationalism and Democracy vs. Comelec
 D. Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus
D.1.1. Ampil vs. Ombudsman

OSCAR R. AMPIL vs. THE HON. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, et al.

G.R. No. 192685; July 31, 2013

Ponente: Perez, J.

FACTS: ASB Realty Corporation (ASB) and Malayan Insurance Company (MICO) entered into
a Joint Project Development Agreement (JPDA) for the construction of "The Malayan Tower."
wherein the latter shall provide the real property while former would construct and shoulder the
cost of construction and development of the condominium building. Due to financial difficulties,
ASB was unable to perform its obligations to MICO. Thus, MICO and ASB executed a
Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), allowing MICO to assume the entire responsibility for the
development and completion of The Malayan Tower. The MOA specifies the entitlement of both
ASB and MICO to net saleable areas of The Malayan Tower representing their investments.

On 11 March 2005, two sets of Condominium Certificates of Title (CCTs) were issued by
Espenesin for 38 units and the allotted parking spaces in Malayan Tower. The first was in the name
of MICO and the second in the name of ASB. The second set of CCTs was issued upon the
instruction of Serrano an officer of MICO. Ampil, unsecured creditor of the ASB charged
Espenesin with violation of Sections 3(a) and (e) of Republic Act No. 3019 before the Office of
the Ombudsman
.
Ombudsman dismissed Ampil’s complaint on the ground of lack of probable cause for the alleged
commission of falsification. Thereafter, Ampil filed a petition for review under Rule 43 of the
Rules of Court before the appellate court. And as already stated, the appellate court affirmed the
Ombudsman’s resolution.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ombudsman’s discretionary power to determine the existence of probable
cause may be assailed via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court

HELD:The Supreme Court have consistently hewed to the policy of non-interference with the
Ombudsman’s exercise of its constitutionally mandated powers. The Ombudsman’s finding to
proceed or desist in the prosecution of a criminal case can only be assailed through certiorari
proceedings before this Court on the ground that such determination is tainted with grave abuse of
discretion which contemplates an abuse so grave and so patent equivalent to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.

However, on several occasions, the court have interfered with the Ombudsman’s discretion in
determining probable cause: (a) To afford protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; (b)
When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of
actions; (c) When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice; (d) When the acts of the
officer are without or in excess of authority; (e) Where the prosecution is under an invalid law,
ordinance or regulation; (f) When double jeopardy is clearly apparent; (g) Where the court has no
jurisdiction over the offense; (h) Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution; (i)
Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance.

The fourth circumstance is present in this case. Despite the admission by Espenesin that he had
altered the CCTs and the Ombudsman’s findings thereon, the Ombudsman abruptly dismissed
Ampil’s complaint-affidavit. A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing
that more likely than not a crime has been committed and there is enough reason to believe that it
was committed by the accused. It need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt,
neither on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt.

As Registrar of Deeds, Espenesin was duty bound to inquire and ascertain the reason for Serrano’s
new instruction on those specific set of CCTs and not just heed Serrano’s bidding. He heads the
Office of Register of Deeds which is constituted by law as "a public repository of records of
instruments affecting registered or unregistered lands x xx in the province or city wherein such
office is situated." He should not have so easily taken Serrano’s word that the amendment Serrano
sought was to correct simple and innocuous error.

Espenesin could have then easily asked, as he is obliged to, for a contract or an authenticated
writing to ascertain which units and parking slots were really allotted for ASB and MICO. His
actions would then be based on what is documented and not merely by a lame claim of bona fides
mistake.
D.1.2. A.L. Ang Network, Inc. vs. Mondejar

A.L. ANG NETWORK, INC., Petitioner, vs. EMMA MONDEJAR, accompanied by her
husband, EFREN MONDEJAR, Respondent
G.R. No. 200804; January 22, 2014

FACTS: On March 23, 2011, petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money under the Rule of
Procedure for Small Claims Cases before the MTCC, seeking to collect from respondent the
amount of ₱23,111.71 which represented her unpaid water bills for the period June 1, 2002 to
September 30, 2005.

Petitioner claimed that it was duly authorized to supply water to and collect payment therefor
from the homeowners of Regent Pearl Subdivision, one of whom is respondent who owns and
occupies Lot 8, Block 3 of said subdivision. From June 1, 2002 until September 30, 2005,
respondent and her family consumed a total of 1,150 cubic meters (cu. m.) of water, which upon
application of the agreed rate of ₱113.00 for every 10 cu. m. of water, plus an additional charge
of ₱11.60 for every additional cu. m. of water, amounted to ₱28,580.09.8 However, respondent
only paid the amount of ₱5,468.38, thus, leaving a balance of ₱23,111.71 which was left unpaid
despite petitioner’s repeated demands.

In defense, respondent contended that since April 1998 up to February 2003, she religiously paid
petitioner the agreed monthly flat rate of ₱75.00 for her water consumption. Notwithstanding
their agreement that the same would be adjusted only upon prior notice to the homeowners,
petitioner unilaterally charged her unreasonable and excessive adjustments (at the average of 40
cu. m. of water per month or 1.3 cu. m. of water a day) far above the average daily water
consumption for a household of only 3 persons. She also questioned the propriety and/or basis of
the aforesaid ₱23,111.71 claim.

In the interim, petitioner disconnected respondent’s water line for not paying the adjusted water
charges since March 2003 up to August 2005.

ISSUE:WON RTC is correct in denying petitioner’s recourse under Rule 65 assailing the MTCC
decision in the small claims case.

HELD: YES.Section 23 of the Rule of Procedure for Small Claims Cases states that:

SEC. 23.Decision. — After the hearing, the court shall render its decision on the same day, based
on the facts established by the. The decision shall immediately be entered by the Clerk of Court
in the court docket for civil cases and a copy thereof forthwith served on the parties.

The decision shall be final and unappealable.

Considering the final nature of a small claims case decision under the above-stated rule, the
remedy of appeal is not allowed, and the prevailing party may, thus, immediately move for its
execution. Nevertheless, the proscription on appeals in small claims cases, similar to other
proceedings where appeal is not an available remedy, does not preclude the aggrieved party from
filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. This general rule has been
enunciated in the case of Okada v. Security Pacific Assurance Corporation, wherein it was held
that:

In a long line of cases, the Court has consistently ruled that "the extraordinary writ of certiorari is
always available where there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law."In Jaca v. Davao Lumber Co.In view of the foregoing, the Court thus
finds that petitioner correctly availed of the remedy of certiorari to assail the propriety of the
MTCC Decision in the subject small claims case, contrary to the RTC’s ruling.

Likewise, the Court finds that petitioner filed the said petition before the proper forum. To be
sure, the Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction
to issue a writ of certiorari. Such concurrence of jurisdiction, however, does not give a party
unbridled freedom to choose the venue of his action lest he ran afoul of the doctrine of hierarchy
of courts. Instead, a becoming regard for judicial hierarchy dictates that petitions for the issuance
of writs of certiorari against first level courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and
those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals, before resort may be had before the Court.
This procedure is also in consonance with Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.

Hence, considering that small claims cases are exclusively within the jurisdiction of the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts in Cities, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, certiorari petitions assailing its dispositions should be filed
before their corresponding Regional Trial Courts. This petitioner complied with when it
instituted its petition for certiorari before the RTC which, as previously mentioned, has
jurisdiction over the same. In fine, the RTC erred in dismissing the said petition on the ground
that it was an improper remedy, and, as such, RTC Case No. 11-13833 must be reinstated and
remanded thereto for its proper disposition.
D.1.3. Maglalang vs. PAGCOR

MARK JEROME S. MAGLALANG, PETITIONER VS.PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND

GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR), AS REPRESENTEDBY ITS INCUMBENT
CHAIRMAN EFRAIM GENUINO, RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 190566; December 11, 2013

FACTS: Mark Maglalang was a teller at the Casino Filipino operated by PAGCOR. In December
2008, he committed an error counting the money of a lady customer. Due to tension that arose
between the two, they were invited to the casino’s Internal Security Office in order to air their
respective sides. He was required to file an Incident Report. By January 2009, he was issued a
memo charging him with Discourtesy. He was later on found guilty of the same and 30-day
suspension was imposed. He filed MR seeking reversal of the decision and also Motion for
Production to be furnished with documents relative to the case. Both were denied. He then filed
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA. He ascribed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction to the acts of PAGCOR in adjudging him guilty of the
charge, in failing to observe the proper procedure in the rendition of its decision and in imposing
the harsh penalty of a 30-day suspension. He further explained that he did not appeal to the Civil
Service Commission because the penalty imposed on him was only a 30-day suspension which is
not within the CSC’s appellate jurisdiction. CA outrightly dismissed the petition for certiorari for
being premature as petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking recourse
from the CA.

ISSUE: WON CA was correct in outrightly dismissing the petition for certiorari filed before it
on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies.

HELD: CA’s outright dismissal of the petition for certiorari on the basis of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies is bereft of any legal standing

Under the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies, before a party is allowed to seek the
intervention of the court, he or she should have availed himself or herself of all the means of
administrative processes afforded him or her.

The case falls squarely under exception “where no administrative review is provided by law” since
the law per se provides no administrative review for administrative cases whereby an employee
like petitioner is covered by Civil Service law, rules and regulations and penalized with a
suspension for not more than 30 days.
The judicial recourse petitioner availed of in this case before the CA is a special civil action for
certiorari ascribing grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of PAGCOR, not an appeal.

As there being no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law
in view of petitioner’s allegation that PAGCOR has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the CA’s outright
dismissal of the petition for certiorari on the basis of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies is
bereft of any legal standing and should therefore be set aside.
Finally, as a rule, a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is valid only when the question involved
is an error of jurisdiction, or when there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of the court or tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions.
Occasionally, however, they are constrained to wade into factual matters when the evidence on
record does not support those factual findings; or when too much is concluded, inferred or deduced
from the bare or incomplete facts appearing on record. Considering the circumstances and since
this Court is not a trier of facts, remand of this case to the CA for its judicious resolution is in
order.

DOCTRINE: An appeal and a special civil action such as certiorari under Rule 65 are entirely
distinct and separate from each other. One cannot file petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules where appeal is available, even if the ground availed of is grave abuse of discretion. A
special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 lies only when there is no appeal, or plain, speedy
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Certiorari cannot be allowed when a party to
a case fails to appeal a judgment despite the availability of that remedy, as the same should not be
a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal. The remedies of appeal and certiorari are mutually
exclusive and not alternative or successive.
D.1.4. People vs. Castaneda

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE JUANITO C.

CASTANEDA, JR., HONORABLE CAESAR A. CASANOVA, HONORABLE CIELITO
N. MINDARO-GRULLA, AS ASSOCIATE JUSTICES OF THE SPECIAL SECOND
DIVISION, COURT OF TAX APPEALS; and MYRNA M. GARCIA AND CUSTODIO
MENDOZA VESTIDAS, JR., Respondents.
G.R. No. 208290; December 11, 2013

FACTS: Myrna M. Garcia and Custodio Mendoza Vestidas, Jr. as owner/proprietress and broker
of Plinth Enterprise were charged with violation of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines
when they imported into the Port of Manila, 858 cartons containing 17,160 pieces of Anti-Virus
Software Kaspersky Internet Security Premium 2012, and falsely declaring them to contain 40
pallets/1,690 cartons of CD kit cleaner and plastic CD case, said imported items (Kaspersky)
having customs duties amounting to Three Million Three Hundred Forty One Thousand Two
Hundred Forty Five Pesos (Php 3,341,245) of which only the amount of One Hundred Thousand
Three Hundred Sixty Two Pesos (Php100,362) was paid.

Garcia and Vestidas, Jr. filed their Omnibus Motion to File Demurrer to Evidence with Leave of
Court to Cancel Hearing Scheduled on January 21, 2013,which was granted by the CTA.
Thereafter, they filed the Demurrer to Evidence, dated January 13, 2012, claiming that the
prosecution failed to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

On July 24, 2013, the Run After the Smugglers (RATS) Group, Revenue Collection Monitoring
Group (RCMG), as counsel for the BOC, received a copy of the July 15, 2013 Resolution of the
CTA ordering the entry of judgment in the case.

The BOC then filed a petition for certiorari, ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
CTA.

At the outset, it should be noted that the petition was filed beyond the reglementary period for the
filing thereof under Rule 65. The petition itself stated that a copy of the May 15, 2013 Resolution
was received by the BOC two (2) days after its promulgation, or on May 17, 2013. Nonetheless,
the RATS was only alerted by the developments in the case on July 24, 2013, when Atty. Danilo
M. Campos Jr. (Atty. Campos) received the July 15, 2013 Resolution of the CTA ordering the
entry of judgment in the case, considering that no appeal was taken by any of the parties. According
to Atty. Campos, it was only on that occasion when he discovered the May 15, 2013 Resolution
of the CTA.

ISSUE: Whether the petition for certiorari should be given due course despite its late filing.
HELD: No, Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is explicit in stating that
certiorari should be instituted within a period of 60 days from notice of the judgment, order or
resolution sought to be assailed. The 60-day period is inextendible to avoid any unreasonable delay
that would violate the constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition of their case. While
there are recognized exceptions to such strict observance, there should be an effort on the part of
the party invoking liberality to advance a reasonable or meritorious explanation for his/her failure
to comply with the rules.

In the case at bench, no convincing justification for the belated filing of the petition was advanced
to warrant the relaxation of the Rules. Notably, the records show that the petition was filed only
on August 12, 2013, or almost a month late from the due date which fell on July 16, 2013. To
excuse this grave procedural lapse will not only be unfair to the other party, but it will also sanction
a seeming rudimentary attempt to circumvent standing rules of procedure. Suffice it to say, the
reasons proffered by the petitioner do not carry even a tinge of merit that would deserve leniency.
The late filing of the petition was borne out of the petitioner’s failure to monitor incoming court
processes that needed to be addressed by the office. Clearly, this is an admission of inefficiency,
if not lack of zeal, on the part of an office tasked to effectively curb smuggling activities which
rob the government of millions of revenue every year.

The display of patent violations of even the elementary rules leads the Court to suspect that the
case against Garcia and Vestidas Jr. was doomed by design from the start. The failure to present
the certified true copies of documentary evidence; the failure to competently and properly identify
the misdeclared goods; the failure to identify the accused in court; and, worse, the failure to file
this petition on time challenging a judgment of acquittal, are tell-tale signs of a reluctant and
subdued attitude in pursuing the case. This stance taken by the lawyers in government service
rouses the Court’s vigilance against inefficiency in the administration of justice.

Even the error committed by the RATS in filing a motion for reconsideration with the CTA
displays gross ignorance as to the effects of an acquittal in a criminal case and the constitutional
proscription on double jeopardy. Had the RATS been eager and keen in prosecuting the
respondents, it would have, in the first place, presented its evidence with the CTA in strict
compliance with the Rules.

In any case, even if the Court decides to suspend the rules and permit this recourse, the end result
would remain the same. While a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be assailed in a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,it must be shown that there was grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process.In this
case, a perusal of the challenged resolutions of the CTA does not disclose any indication of grave
abuse of discretion on its partor denial of due process.The records are replete with indicators that
the petitioner actively participated during the trial and, in fact, presented its offer of evidence and
opposed the demurrer.

Grave abuse of discretion is defined as capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is

equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at
all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner
by reason of passion and hostility. Here, the subject resolutions of the CTA have been issued in
accordance with the rules on evidence and existing jurisprudence.

DOCTRINE: Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is explicit in stating that
certiorari should be instituted within a period of 60 days from notice of the judgment, order or
resolution sought to be assailed. The 60-day period is inextendible to avoid any unreasonable
delay that would violate the constitutional rights of parties to a speedy disposition of their case.
D.1.5. UP Board of Regents vs. Ligot-Teylan
D.1.6. Tuazon vs. RD of Caloocan
D.1.7. Province of Leyte vs. Energy Devt.Corp.

Province of Leyte versus Energy Development Corporation (EDC)

G.R. No. 203124; June 22, 2015

Perlas-Bernabe, J.

FACTS: The Province of Leyte issued separate franchise tax assessments against EDC which
the latter, in turn, protested separately. When the Province of Leyte effectively denied all
protests, EDC appealed such denials with the RTC of Tacloban City. Notwithstanding the
pendency of the cases with the RTC, the Province of Leyte continued to issued franchise tax
assessments against EDC which prompted the latter to file a Motion for Issuance of Writ of
Preliminary Injunction praying that the Province of Leyte be ordered to enjoin from further
assessing and collecting franchise taxes against EDC until the RTC shall have resolved the cases
with finality. In support thereof, EDC averred that it does not have a franchise, thus, the
Province of Leyte’s assessment of franchise taxes against it is contrary to law. It further claimed
that should the Province of Leyte’s action continue, EDC’s operations will cease resulting in the
losses of substantial revenues and jobs for its employees. Also, the damage that it stands to
suffer from the Province of Leyte’s acts is irreparable as there is no assurance that it will be able
to recover such losses.

The RTC initially denied the foregoing motion for preliminary injunction but on motion of EDC,
the RTC issued another order granting the issuance of writ of preliminary injunction
ratiocinating that in case EDC will be held liable for the said franchise taxes, the injunction bond
would answer for the claim of the Province of Leyte whereas if EDC is compelled to pay such
taxes pending resolution of the cases with the RTC and is subsequently adjudged to be not liable
to pay the same, there is no assurance that it could recover its operational losses. This, prompted
the Province of Leyte to file a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 with the CA.

The CA, then, dismissed the Petition for Certiorari on the ground that “there was no proper proof
of service of the Petition to the adverse party” as the registry receipts can hardly be considered as
sufficient and proper proof of receipt by the addressee of registered mail. Hence, this Petition for
Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 by the Province of Leyte.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA is correct in dismissing the Petition for Certiorari on the ground
that there was no sufficient proof of service of the Petition to the private respondent.

HELD: NO. The instant case was elevated to the CA via a petition for certiorari which is, by
nature, an original and independent action, and therefore, not considered as part of the trial that
had resulted in the rendition of the judgment or order complained of. Being an original action,
there is a need for the CA to acquire jurisdiction over the person of the parties to the case before
it can resolve the same on the merits. Thus, the CA acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioner (Province of Leyte) upon the filing of the certiorari petition. On the other hand, the
CA acquires jurisdiction over the person of the respondent upon: (a) the service of the order or
resolution indicating the CA's initial action on the petition to the respondent; or (b) the voluntary
submission of the respondent to the CA's jurisdiction.

In the case at bar, records reveal that the CA served its Resolution indicating its initial action on
the Province of Leyte's certiorari petition before it, i.e., directing EDC to file a comment to the
petition, among others. In fact, the EDC complied with such directive by filing its comment to
such petition. When EDC filed its comment to the Petition for Certiorari, it voluntarily submitted
itself to the jurisdiction of the CA. Thus, the CA had already acquired jurisdiction over both
parties to the instant case.

Hence, the Petition for Review is GRANTED. Accordingly, the pertinent Resolutions of the CA
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
D.1.8. Cawad vs. Abad
D.2.1. Vivas vs. Monetary Board of BSP
D.2.2. Corales vs. Republic
D.2.3. Tan vs. CA

Tan vs. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 164966; June 8, 2007

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.

FACTS: In 2002, James L. King (King) charged Roderick Lim-Go, et al. with violation B.P. 22
and Estafa involving two checks both dated June 21, 2002.Subsequently, King filed a
Supplemental Complaint-Affidavit involving five additional checks. King filed a Second
Supplemental Complaint-Affidavit for Estafa impleading Grace Tan-Go, and herein petitioners
Rolando Tan, Elena Tan, and Lamberto Tan, as additional respondents.

King averred that in 2002, the spouses Go, together with herein petitioners Rolando Tan (father of
Grace Tan-Go), Elena Tan (mother of Grace Tan-Go), asked ₱100 Million from King allegedly
for the renovation of their movie houses in Butuan City. However, King could only accommodate
₱40 Million, in exchange for which, Roderick Go issued several checks to King in the amount of
₱61.28 Million, inclusive of the interest for three months.

At first, the checks issued by Go were honored by the drawee bank when presented. However,
when several of the checks he issued were about to fall due, Roderick Go requested King for a
meeting. While at the agreed meeting place, Roderick Go allegedly attacked King with a box cutter
and told him that all the checks that he issued would be dishonored and for this reason he had to
injure, kidnap and kill him. Thereafter, all the checks dated June 21, 23 and 24, 2002 issued by
Roderick Go were dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds. Despite repeated
demands, no payment was made; hence, King filed a complaint for violation of BP Blg. 22 and
Estafa.

On November 11, 2002, five informations for estafa were filed against Roderick L. Go et al., and
herein petitioners, and was raffled to the RTC, Branch 5 of Cebu City.On November 18, 2002,
before any warrant of arrest could be issued, petitioners posted bail. The following day, they were
arraigned and pleaded not guilty.

On December 17, 2002, petitioners filed a Petition for Prohibition and Injunction with Preliminary
Injunction and Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order before the Court of Appeals. They sought
to restrain the trial court from proceeding with the subject criminal cases against them and prayed
that the same be dismissed.
On November 24, 2003, the Court of Appeals issued the assailed Decision dismissing the petition
for lack of merit. It found, among others, that: petitioners failed to avail themselves of other plain,
speedy and adequate remedies to challenge the public prosecutor’s finding of probable cause; the
petition failed to establish that it falls under any of the exceptions to the general rule that the court
will not issue writs of prohibition or injunction, preliminary or final, to enjoin or restrain a criminal
prosecution; and petitioners’ claims contesting the public prosecutor’s finding of probable cause
are matters of defense that should be threshed out during the trial of the criminal cases and not
through the extraordinary remedy of prohibition.

ISSUE: Whether petitioners’ resort to the extraordinary remedy of prohibition was proper.

HELD: No. Basic is the rule that the writ of prohibition is an extraordinary remedy to prevent the
unlawful and oppressive exercise of legal authority and to provide for a fair and orderly
administration of justice. It is available only when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, and when the proceedings are done without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. The petitioner must allege in his petition
and establish facts to show that any other existing remedy is not speedy or adequate. A remedy is
plain, speedy and adequate if it will promptly relieve the petitioner from the injurious effects of
that judgment and the acts of the tribunal or inferior court.

Further, the writ will not lie to correct errors of judgment but only errors of jurisdiction. As long
as the tribunal acts within its jurisdiction, any alleged errors committed in the exercise of its
discretion will amount to nothing more than mere errors of judgment which are correctible by a
timely appeal. In determining whether a tribunal acted in grave abuse of discretion, mere abuse of
discretion is not enough. There must be grave abuse of discretion as where the tribunal exercised
its power in an arbitrary or despotic manner, by reason of passion or personal hostility, and it must
be so patent or gross as would amount to an evasion, or virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined,
or to act in contemplation of law.

Petitioners admitthat they received a copy of the Joint Resolution dated November 8, 2002 as early
as November 13, 2002. However, from the time they received the copy of the aforesaid Resolution
to the time they were arraigned on November 19, 2002, petitioners did not take steps to move for
reconsideration, or appeal the aforesaid Resolution to the Secretary of Justice.

In fine, the arguments raised in their petition for prohibition ineluctably shows that petitioners are
principally questioning the factual and legal bases of the finding of probable cause against them.
This is but a veiled attempt to litigate issues which should have been timely appealed to the
Secretary of Justice via a petition for review. However, petitioners, through their own fault, failed
to avail themselves of this remedy. Countless times we have ruled that the extraordinary remedy
of certiorari or prohibition is not a substitute for a lost appeal. This case is no different.

DOCTRINE: Basic is the rule that the writ of prohibition is an extraordinary remedy to prevent
the unlawful and oppressive exercise of legal authority and to provide for a fair and orderly
administration of justice. It is available only when there is no appeal or any plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, and when the proceedings are done without or in
excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.
D.3.1. Hipos, Sr. vs. Bay
D.3.2. Sanchez vs. Lastimosa
D.3.3. Social Justice vs. Atienza

SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY (SJS) et al. vs. HON. JOSE L. ATIENZA, JR.
G.R. No. 156052; March 7, 2007

Ponente: Corona, J.

FACTS:SangguniangPanlungsod of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 8027 which becameeffective

on December 28, 2001. Ordinance No. 8027 reclassified the areadescribed therein from industrial
to commercial and directed the owners andoperators of businesses disallowed under Section 1 to
cease and desist fromoperating their businesses within six months from the date of effectivity of
theordinance. Among the businesses situated in the area are the so-called"Pandacan Terminals" of
the oil companies Caltex (Philippines), Inc., PetronCorporation and Pilipinas Shell Petroleum
Corporation.

However, implementation of the ordinance was repeatedly postponed. Thus,petitioners filed this
original action for mandamus on December 4, 2002 prayingthat Mayor Atienza be compelled to
enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and order theimmediate removal of the terminals of the oil companies.
Petitioners contendthat respondent has the mandatory legal duty, under Section 455 (b) (2) of
theLocal Government Code (RA 7160), to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 and orderthe removal of
the Pandacan Terminals of the oil companies. Instead, he hasallowed them to stay.

ISSUE: Whether or not mandamus may be issued in order to compel theenforcement of an

ordinance.

HELD:The answer is in the affirmative. Mandamus is an extraordinary writ that isemployed to

compel the performance, when refused, of a ministerial duty thatis already imposed on the
respondent and there is no other plain, speedy andadequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.
The petitioner should have awell-defined, clear and certain legal right to the performance of the
act and itmust be the clear and imperative duty of respondent to do the act required to bedone.

When a mandamus proceeding concerns a public right and its object is tocompel a public duty, the
people who are interested in the execution of the lawsare regarded as the real parties in interest
and they need not show any specificinterest. Besides, as residents of Manila, petitioners have a
direct interest in theenforcement of the city’s ordinances. Respondent never questioned the right
ofpetitioners to institute this proceeding.

On the other hand, the Local Government Code imposes upon respondent theduty, as city mayor,
to "enforce all laws and ordinances relative to thegovernance of the city." One of these is Ordinance
No. 8027. As the chiefexecutive of the city, he has the duty to enforce Ordinance No. 8027 as long
asit has not been repealed by the Sanggunian or annulled by the courts. He hasno other choice. It
is his ministerial duty to do so.
These officers cannot refuse to perform their duty on the ground of an allegedinvalidity of the
statute imposing the duty. The reason for this is obvious. Itmight seriously hinder the transaction
of public business if these officers wereto be permitted in all cases to question the constitutionality
of statutes andordinances imposing duties upon them and which have not judicially beendeclared
unconstitutional. Officers of the government from the highest to thelowest are creatures of the law
and are bound to obey it.
D.3.4. Funa vs. Manila Economic and Cultural Office
D.3.5. Cudia vs. Superintendent fo PMA
D.3.6. Villanueva vs. JBC

FERDINAND R. VILLANUEVA, PRESIDING JUDGE, MCTC, COMPOSTELA-NEW

BATAAN, COMPOSTELA VALLEY PROVINCE,v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL

G.R. No. 211833; April 07, 2015

REYES, J.:

FACTS: The petitioner was appointed as the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
Compostela-New Bataan, Poblacion, Compostela Valley Province, Region XI, which is a first-
level court. More thana year later, he applied for the vacant position of Presiding Judge in various
Regional Trial Courts.

Petitioner was not included in the list of applicants due to the JBC's long-standing policy of
opening the chance for promotion to second-level courts to, among others, incumbent judges who
have served in their current position for at least five years, and since the petitioner has been a judge
only for more than a year, he was excluded from the list. This caused the petitioner to take recourse
to this Court.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are tenable.
2. Whether or not the remedy of mandamus is tenable.

HELD:
One. The remedies of certiorari and prohibition are tenable. "The present Rules of Court uses two
special civil actions for determining and correcting grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction. These are the special civil actions for certiorari and prohibition, and both
are governed by Rule 65."As discussed in the case of Maria Carolina P. Araullo, etc., et al. v.
Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, etc., et al., this Court explained that:

With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily
broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors
of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial,
quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also to set right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the
Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.
This application is expressly authorized by the text of the second paragraph of Section 1, supra.

Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues
and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and executive officials. (Citation
omitted)
In this case, it is clear that the JBC does not fall within the scope of a tribunal, board, or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. In the process of selecting and screening applicants,
the JBC neither acted in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor assumed unto itself any
performance of judicial or quasi-judicial prerogative. However, since the formulation of guidelines
and criteria, including the policy that the petitioner now assails, is necessary and incidental to the
exercise of the JBC's constitutional mandate, a determination must be made on whether the JBC
has acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing and
enforcing the said policy.

Two. The remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by the petitioner in assailing JBC's policy.

It is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that the applicant should have a clear legal
right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the
act required.The petitioner bears the burden to show that there is such a clear legal right to the
performance of the act, and a corresponding compelling duty on the part of the respondent to
perform the act. The remedy of mandamus, as an extraordinary writ, lies only to compel an officer
to perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one.Clearly, the use of discretion and the
performance of a ministerial act are mutually exclusive.

The writ of mandamus does not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion or to compel
a course of conduct, which, it quickly seems to us, was what the petitioner would have the JBC do
in his favor. The function of the JBC to select and recommend nominees for vacant judicial
positions is discretionary, not ministerial. Moreso, the petitioner cannot claim any legal right to be
included in the list of nominees for judicial vacancies. Possession of the constitutional and
statutory qualifications for appointment to the judiciary may not be used to legally demand that
one's name be included in the list of candidates for a judicial vacancy. One's inclusion in the list
of the candidates depends on the discretion of the JBC. XXX