KMU v.

GARCIA

FACTS:

The Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) and the Land Transportation
Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) released memoranda allowing provincial bus
operators to charge passengers rates within 15% above and below the official LTFRB rate for
a period of one year. Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines applied for fare
rate increase. This was opposed by the Philippine Consumer Foundation, Inc. and Perla
Bautista as they were exorbitant and unreasonable.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the provincial bus operators have authority to reduce and increase fare rates
based on the order of the LTFRB

HELD:

The Legislature delegated to the defunct Public Service Commission the power of fixing rates
of public services and the LTFRB is likewise vested with the same. Such delegation is
permitted in order to adapt to the increasing complexity of modern life. The authority given
by the LTFRB to the provincial bus operators to set a fare range is illegal and invalid as it is
tantamount to an undue delegation of legislative authority. Potestas delegata non delegari
protest. What has been delegated cannot be delegated. A further delegation of power would
constitute a negation of the duty in violation of the trust reposed in the delegate mandated
to discharge it directly. The policy of allowing the provincial bus operators to change their
fares would lead to a chaotic situation and would leave the riding public at the mercy of
transport operators.

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC., petitioner, vs. HON.

RUBEN D. TORRES, as Secretary of the Department of Labor & Employment, and
JOSE N. SARMIENTO, as Administrator of the PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT
ADMINISTRATION, respondents.

Facts:

This petition for prohibition with temporary restraining order was filed by the Philippine
Association of Service Exporters (PASEI, for short), to prohibit and enjoin the Secretary of the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) and the Administrator of the Philippine
Overseas Employment Administration (or POEA) from enforcing and implementing DOLE
Department Order No. 16, Series of 1991 and POEA Memorandum Circulars Nos. 30 and 37,
Series of 1991, temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of
Filipino domestic helpers for Hong Kong and vesting in the DOLE, through the facilities of the
POEA, the task of processing and deploying such workers.

PASEI is the largest national organization of private employment and recruitment agencies
duly licensed and authorized by the POEA, to engaged in the business of obtaining overseas
employment for Filipino landbased workers, including domestic helpers. Petitioner contends
that respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of their rule-making
authority in issuing said circulars.

Issue:

1) WON the assailed DOLE and POEA circulars are contrary to the Constitution, are
unreasonable, unfair and oppressive
2) WON the requirements of publication and filing with the Office of the National
Administrative Register were not complied with

Held:

1) No. The vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in administrative bodies is

not unconstitutional, unreasonable and oppressive. It has been necessitated by "the growing
complexity of the modern society" (Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Payawal, 177 SCRA 72, 79). More
and more administrative bodies are necessary to help in the regulation of society's ramified
activities. "Specialized in the particular field assigned to them, they can deal with the
problems thereof with more expertise and dispatch than can be expected from the
legislature or the courts of justice" (Ibid.).

It is noteworthy that the assailed circulars do not prohibit the petitioner from engaging in the
recruitment and deployment of Filipino landbased workers for overseas employment. A
careful reading of the challenged administrative issuances discloses that the same fall within
the "administrative and policing powers expressly or by necessary implication conferred"
upon the respondents (People vs. Maceren, 79 SCRA 450). The power to "restrict and
regulate conferred by Article 36 of the Labor Code involves a grant of police power (City of
Naga vs. Court of Appeals, 24 SCRA 898). To "restrict" means "to confine, limit or stop" (p.
62, Rollo) and whereas the power to "regulate" means "the power to protect, foster,
promote, preserve, and control with due regard for the interests, first and foremost, of the
public, then of the utility and of its patrons" (Philippine Communications Satellite
Corporation vs. Alcuaz, 180 SCRA 218).

2) Yes. The questioned circulars are therefore a valid exercise of the police power as
delegated to the executive branch of Government.

Nevertheless, they are legally invalid, defective and unenforceable for lack of power
publication and filing in the Office of the National Administrative Register as required in
Article 2 of the Civil Code, Article 5 of the Labor Code and Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2,
Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987

Sec. 4. Effectivity. In addition to other rule-making requirements provided by law not

inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days from the date
of filing as above provided unless a different date is fixed by law, or specified in the rule in
cases of imminent danger to public health, safety and welfare, the existence of which must
be expressed in a statement accompanying the rule. The agency shall take appropriate
measures to make emergency rules known to persons who may be affected by them.
(Emphasis supplied, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987).

Santiago vs. COMELEC

FACTS:

On December 6, 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin, founding member of the Movement for People's
Initiative, filed with the COMELEC a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of
Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" citing Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.
Acting on the petition, the COMELEC set the case for hearing and directed Delfin to have the
petition published. After the hearing the arguments between petitioners and opposing
parties, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to file their "memoranda and/or
oppositions/memoranda" within five days. On December 18, 1996, Senator Miriam Defensor
Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed a special civil action for prohibition
under Rule 65 raising the following arguments, among others:

1.) That the Constitution can only be amended by peoples initiative if there is an enabling
law passed by Congress, to which no such law has yet been passed; and
2.) That R.A. 6735 does not suffice as an enabling law on peoples initiative on the
Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative.

ISSUE:

WON R.A. No. 6735 sufficient to enable amendment of the Constitution by peoples initiative.

WON RA 6735 was intended to include initiative on amendments to the Constitution, and if
so WON the Act as worded adequately covers such initiative.

WON COMELEC Res. No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the
constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on the conduct
of such initiative?

WON the lifting of term limits of elective national and local official, as proposed in the draft
petition would constitute a revision of , or an amendment of the constitution.

WON the COMELEC can take cognizance of or has jurisdiction over the petition.

WON it is proper for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of the petition when there is a
pending case before the COMELEC.

HELD:

NO. R.A. 6735 is inadequate to cover the system of initiative on amendments to the
Constitution.

Under the said law, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The
people are not accorded the power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole
or in part, the Constitution" through the system of initiative. They can only do so with
respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions." The use of the clause "proposed laws sought to
be enacted, approved or rejected, amended or repealed" denotes that R.A. No. 6735
excludes initiative on amendments to the Constitution. Also, while the law provides subtitles
for National Initiative and Referendum and for Local Initiative and Referendum, no subtitle is
provided for initiative on the Constitution. This means that the main thrust of the law is
initiative and referendum on national and local laws. If R.A. No. 6735 were intended to fully
provide for the implementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could
have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of
interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to
the Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and local laws.

While R.A. No. 6735 specially detailed the process in implementing initiative and referendum
on national and local laws, it intentionally did not do so on the system of initiative on
amendments to the Constitution. COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is hereby declared void and
orders the respondent to forthwith dismiss the Delfin Petition . TRO issued on 18 December
1996 is made permanent. WHEREFORE, petition is GRANTED.

United States vs Ang Tang Ho

Facts:

In July 1919, the Philippine Legislature (during special session) passed and approved Act No.
2868 entitled An Act Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice, Palay and Corn. The said
act, under extraordinary circumstances, authorizes the Governor General (GG) to issue the
necessary Rules and Regulations in regulating the distribution of such products. Pursuant to
this Act, in August 1919, the GG issued Executive Order No. 53 which was published on
August 20, 1919. The said EO fixed the price at which rice should be sold. On the other
hand, Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, sold a ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price of eighty
centavos. The said amount was way higher than that prescribed by the EO. The sale was
done on the 6th of August 1919. On August 8, 1919, he was charged for violation of the said
EO. He was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5 months imprisonment plus a
P500.00 fine. He appealed the sentence countering that there is an undue delegation of
power to the Governor General.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is undue delegation to the Governor General.

HELD: First of, Ang Tang Hos conviction must be reversed because he committed the act
prior to the publication of the EO. Hence, he cannot be ex post facto charged of the crime.
Further, one cannot be convicted of a violation of a law or of an order issued pursuant to the
law when both the law and the order fail to set up an ascertainable standard of guilt.

Anent the issue of undue delegation, the said Act wholly fails to provide definitely and
clearly what the standard policy should contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform
policy required to take the place of all others without the determination of the insurance
commissioner in respect to matters involving the exercise of a legislative discretion that
could not be delegated, and without which the act could not possibly be put in use. The law
must be complete in all its terms and provisions when it leaves the legislative branch of the
government and nothing must be left to the judgment of the electors or other appointee or
delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its details in
presenti, but which may be left to take effect in future, if necessary, upon the ascertainment
of any prescribed fact or event.

Restituto Ynot vs Intermediate Appellate Court

Facts:

There had been an existing law which prohibited the slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626). To
strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO 626-A which not only banned the movement of
carabaos from interprovinces but as well as the movement of carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot
was caught transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He was then charged in violation
of EO 626-A. Ynot averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional for it violated his right to be heard or
his right to due process. He said that the authority provided by EO 626-A to outrightly
confiscate carabaos even without being heard is unconstitutional. The lower court ruled
against Ynot ruling that the EO is a valid exercise of police power in order to promote
general welfare so as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of carabaos.

ISSUE: Whether or not the law is valid.

HELD: The SC ruled that the EO is not valid as it indeed violates due process. EO 626-A
ctreated a presumption based on the judgment of the executive. The movement of carabaos
from one area to the other does not mean a subsequent slaughter of the same would ensue.
Ynot should be given to defend himself and explain why the carabaos are being transferred
before they can be confiscated. The SC found that the challenged measure is an invalid
exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not
reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due
process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be
heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the
administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a
clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of
powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers
mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties
arbitrarily taken.

DAR VS Sutton

Facts:

This is a petition for review filed by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) of the Decision
and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated September 19, 2003 and February 4, 2004,
respectively, which declared DAR Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 9, series of 1993, null and
void for being violative of the Constitution.

The case at bar involves a land in Aroroy, Masbate, inherited by respondents which has been
devoted exclusively to cow and calf breeding. On October 26, 1987, pursuant to the then
existing agrarian reform program of the government, respondents made a voluntary offer to
sell (VOS)[1] their landholdings to petitioner DAR to avail of certain incentives under the law.

On June 10, 1988, a new agrarian law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, also known as the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988, took effect. It included in its coverage
farms used for raising livestock, poultry and swine. On December 21, 1992, the Municipal
Agrarian Reform Officer of Aroroy, Masbate, inspected respondents land and found that it
was devoted solely to cattle-raising and breeding. He recommended to the DAR Secretary
that it be exempted from the coverage of the CARL. On September 14, 1995, then DAR
Secretary Ernesto D. Garilao issued an Order[7] partially granting the application of
respondents for exemption from the coverage of CARL. Applying the retention limits outlined
in the DAR A.O. No. 9, petitioner exempted 1,209 hectares of respondents land for grazing
purposes, and a maximum of 102.5635 hectares for infrastructure. Petitioner ordered the
rest of respondents landholding to be segregated and placed under Compulsory Acquisition.

Respondents moved for reconsideration. They contend that their entire landholding should
be exempted as it is devoted exclusively to cattle-raising. Their motion was denied.[8] They
filed a notice of appeal[9] with the Office of the President assailing: (1) the reasonableness
and validity of DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, which provided for a ratio between land and livestock
in determining the land area qualified for exclusion from the CARL, and (2) the
constitutionality of DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993, in view of the Luz Farms case which declared
cattle-raising lands excluded from the coverage of agrarian reform.

Issue: WON DAR A.O. No. 9, s. 1993 is valid

Held: No. The fundamental rule in administrative law is that, to be valid, administrative
rules and regulations must be issued by authority of a law and must not contravene the
provisions of the Constitution.[13] The rule-making power of an administrative agency may
not be used to abridge the authority given to it by Congress or by the Constitution. Nor can
it be used to enlarge the power of the administrative agency beyond the scope intended.
Constitutional and statutory provisions control with respect to what rules and regulations
may be promulgated by administrative agencies and the scope of their regulations.[14]

In the case at bar, we find that the impugned A.O. is invalid as it contravenes the
Constitution. The A.O. sought to regulate livestock farms by including them in the coverage
of agrarian reform and prescribing a maximum retention limit for their ownership. However,
the deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional Commission show a clear intent to exclude, inter
alia, all lands exclusively devoted to livestock, swine and poultry- raising. The Court clarified
in the Luz Farms case that livestock, swine and poultry-raising are industrial activities and do
not fall within the definition of agriculture or agricultural activity. The raising of livestock,
swine and poultry is different from crop or tree farming. It is an industrial, not an
agricultural, activity. A great portion of the investment in this enterprise is in the form of
industrial fixed assets, such as: animal housing structures and facilities, drainage, waterers
and blowers, feedmill with grinders, mixers, conveyors, exhausts and generators, extensive
warehousing facilities for feeds and other supplies, anti-pollution equipment like bio-gas and
digester plants augmented by lagoons and concrete ponds, deepwells, elevated water tanks,
pumphouses, sprayers, and other technological appurtenances.[15]

SOLICITOR GENERAL V METROPOLITAN MANILA AUTHORITY (1991) (hindi ko

mahanap full text)

Facts: In Metropolitan Traffic Command, West Traffic District vs. Hon. Arsenio M. Gonong, the
Court held that the confiscation of the license plates of motor vehicles for traffic violations
was not among the sanctions that could be imposed by the Metro Manila Commission under
PD 1605 and was permitted only under the conditions laid dowm by LOI 43 in the case of
stalled vehicles obstructing the public streets. It was there also observed that even the
confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations was not directly prescribed by the
decree nor was it allowed by the decree to be imposed by the Commission. However,
petitioners alleged that Traffic Enforces continued with the confiscation of drivers licenses
and removal of license plates. Dir General Cesar P. Nazareno of the PNP assured the Court
that his office had never authorized the removal of the license plates of illegally parked
vehicles.

Later, the Metropolitan Manila Authority issued Ordinance No. 11, authorizing itself "to
detach the license plate/tow and impound attended/ unattended/ abandoned motor vehicles
illegally parked or obstructing the flow of traffic in Metro Manila." The Court issued a
resolution requiring the Metropolitan Manila Authority and the SolGen to submit separate
comments in light of the contradiction between the Ordinance and the SC ruling. The MMA
defended the ordinance on the ground that it was adopted pursuant to the power conferred
upon it by EO 32 (formulation of policies, promulgation of resolutions). The Sol Gen
expressed the view that the ordinance was null and void because it represented an invalid
exercise of a delegated legislative power. The flaw in the measure was that it violated
existing law, specifically PD 1605, which does not permit, and so impliedly prohibits, the
removal of license plates and the confiscation of driver's licenses for traffic violations in
Metropolitan Manila. He made no mention, however, of the alleged impropriety of examining
the said ordinance in the absence of a formal challenge to its validity.

Issue: WON Ordinance 11 is justified on the basis of the General Welfare Clause
embodied in the LGC

Held: No. Ratio: The Court holds that there is a valid delegation of legislative power to
promulgate such measures, it appearing that the requisites of such delegation are present.
These requisites are. 1) the completeness of the statute making the delegation; and 2) the
presence of a sufficient standard.

The measures in question are enactments of local governments acting only as agents of the
national legislature. Necessarily, the acts of these agents must reflect and conform to the
will of their principal. To test the validity of such acts in the specific case now before us, we
apply the particular requisites of a valid ordinance as laid down by the accepted principles
governing municipal corporations. According to Elliot, a municipal ordinance, to be valid: 1)
must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; 2) must not be unfair or oppressive; 3)
must not be partial ordiscriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; 5) must
not be unreasonable; and 6) must be general and consistent with public policy.

A careful study of the Gonong decision will show that the measures under consideration do
not pass the first criterion because they do not conform to existing law. The pertinent law is
PD 1605. PD 1605 does not allow either the removal of license plates or the confiscation of
driver's licenses for traffic violations committed in Metropolitan Manila. There is nothing in
the following provisions of the decree authorizing the Metropolitan Manila Commission to
impose such sanctions. In fact, the provisions prohibit the imposition of such sanctions in
Metropolitan Manila. The Commission was allowed to "impose fines and otherwise discipline"
traffic violators only "in such amounts and under such penalties as are herein prescribed,"
that is, by the decree itself. Nowhere is the removal of license plates directly imposed by the
decree or at least allowed by it to be imposed by the Commission. Notably, Section 5 thereof
expressly provides that "in case of traffic violations, the driver's license shall not be
confiscated." These restrictions are applicable to the Metropolitan Manila Authority and all
other local political subdivisions comprising Metropolitan Manila, including the Municipality
of Mandaluyong. `The requirement that the municipal enactment must not violate existing
law explains itself. Local political subdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid
delegation of legislative power from the national legislature. They are mere agents vested
with what is called the power of subordinate legislation. As delegates of the Congress, the
local government unit cannot contravene but must obey at all times the will of their
principal. In the case before us, the enactments in question, which are merely local in origin,
cannot prevail against the decree, which has the force and effect of a statute. To sustain the
ordinance would be to open the floodgates to other ordinances amending and so violating
national laws in the guise of implementing them. Thus, ordinances could be passed imposing
additional requirements for the issuance of marriage licenses, to prevent bigamy; the
registration of vehicles, to minimize carnapping; the execution of contracts, to forestall
fraud; the validation of parts, to deter imposture; the exercise of freedom of speech, to
reduce disorder; and so on. The list is endless, but the means, even if the end be valid,
would be ultra vires. The measures in question do not merely add to the requirement of PD
1605 but, worse, impose sanctions the decree does not allow and in fact actually prohibits.
In so doing, the ordinances disregard and violate and in effect partially repeal the law. We
here emphasize the ruling in the Gonong case that PD 1605 applies only to the Metropolitan
Manila area. It is an exception to the general authority conferred by R.A. No. 413 on the
Commissioner of Land Transportation to punish violations of traffic rules elsewhere in the
country with the sanction therein prescribed, including those here questioned. The Court
agrees that the challenged ordinances were enacted with the best of motives and shares the
concern of the rest of the public for the effective reduction of traffic problems in Metropolitan
Manila through the imposition and enforcement of more deterrent penalties upon traffic
violators. At the same time, it must also reiterate the public misgivings over the abuses that
may attend the enforcement of such sanction in eluding the illicit practices described in
detail in the Gonong decision. At any rate, the fact is that there is no statutory authority for
and indeed there is a statutory prohibition against the imposition of such penalties in the
Metropolitan Manila area. Hence, regardless of their merits, they cannot be impose by the
challenged enactments by virtue only of the delegated legislative powers. It is for Congress
to determine, in the exercise of its own discretion, whether or not to impose such sanctions,
either directly through a statute or by simply delegating authority to this effect to the local
governments in Metropolitan Manila. Without such action, PD 1605 remains effective and
continues prohibit the confiscation of license plates of motor vehicles (except under the
conditions prescribed in LOI 43) and of driver licenses as well for traffic violations in
Metropolitan Manila.

OIE-TAKEDA CHEMICALS, INC., Pettoner, vs. HON. DIONISIO DE LA SERNA, Actng

Secrearyof he Department of Labor and Employment

Facts:

Presidental Decree No. 851, The thirteenth Month Pay Law, defines "Basic Salary" as which
shall include all remunerations or earnings paid by an employer to an employee For services
rendered but may not include cost of living allowances profit sharing payments, and all
allowances and moneTary benefits which are not considered or integrated as part of The
regular or basic salary of The employee. While on The, Revised Guidelines on The
Implementation of The 13Th Month Pay Law promulgated by Then Labor Secretary
FranklinDrilon included The These salary-related benefits as part of The basic salary in The
computation The 13Th month pay. Petitioners in this case were ordered to pay their
employees due to underpayment of 13 Th month pay pursuant to the Revised Guidelines.
Petitioners contended however under P.D. 851, the 13Th month pay is based solely on basic
salary. As defined by The law itself and clarified by The implementing and Supplementary
Rules as well as by The Supreme Court in a long line of decisions, remunerations which do
not form part of The basic or regular salary of an employee, such as commissions, should
not be considered in The computation of The 13Th month pay. this being The case, The
Revised Guidelines on The Implementation of The13Th Month Pay Law issued by Then
Secretary Drilon providing For The inclusion of commissions in The 13Th month pay, were
issued in excess of The statutory authority conferred by P.D. 851.

Issue: WON Revised Guidelines on The Implementation of The 13Th Month Pay
Law issued by Then Secretary Drilon providing For The inclusion of commissions in
The 13ThmonTh pay, were issued in excess of The statutory authority conferred
by P.D. 851

Held:

In including commissions in the computation of the 13Th month pay, the second paragraph
of Section 5(a) of The Revised Guidelines on The Implementation of the 13Th Month Pay Law
unduly expanded the concept of "basic salary" as defined in P.D. 851. IT is a fundamental
rule that implementing rules cannot add to or detract from the provisions of the law it is
designed to implement. Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a
particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law they are intended
carry into effect. They cannot widen its scope. An administrative agency cannot amend an
act of Congress.

Lupangco vs. CA (G.R. No. 77372)

Facts:

On or about October 6, 1986, herein respondent Professional Regulation Commission (PRC)

issued Resolution No. 105 as parts of its "Additional Instructions to Examinees," to all those
applying for admission to take the licensure examinations in accountancy: No examinee shall
attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like conducted by, or shall receive any
hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or any review
center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor official or employee of any of the
aforementioned or similar institutions during the three days immediately proceeding every
examination day including examination day. Any examinee violating this instruction shall be
subject to the sanctions prescribed by Sec. 8, Art. III of the Rules and Regulations of the
Commission.

On October 16, 1986, herein petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the licensure
examinations in accountancy schedule on October 25 and November 2 of the same year,
filed on their own behalf of all others similarly situated like them, with the Regional Trial
Court of Manila a complaint for injunction with a prayer with the issuance of a writ of a
preliminary injunction against respondent PRC to restrain the latter from enforcing the
above-mentioned resolution and to declare the same unconstitutional.

Respondent PRC filed a motion to dismiss on October 21, 1987 on the ground that the lower
court had no jurisdiction to review and to enjoin the enforcement of its resolution. In an
Order of October 21, 1987, the lower court declared that it had jurisdiction to try the case
and enjoined the respondent commission from enforcing and giving effect to Resolution No.
105 which it found to be unconstitutional. Not satisfied therewith, respondent PRC, on
November 10, 1986, an appeal with the Court of Appeals. The petition was granted.
Issue: Whether or not Resolution No. 105 is constitutional.

Held: CA stated as basis its conclusion that PCS and RTC are co-equal branches. They relied
heavily on the case of National Electrification Administration vs. Mendoza where the Court
held that a Court of First Instance cannot interfere with the orders of SEC, the two being a
co-equal branch.

SC said the cases cited by CA are not in point. It is glaringly apparent that the reason why
the Court ruled that the Court of First Instance could not interfere with the orders of SEC was
that this was provided for by the law. Nowhere in the said cases was it held that a Court of
First Instance has no jurisdiction over all other government agencies. On the contrary, the
ruling was specifically limited to the SEC. The respondent court erred when it place he SEC
and PRC in the same category. There is no law providing for the next course of action for a
party who wants to question a ruling or order of the PRC. What is clear from PD No. 223 is
that PRC is attached to the Office of the President for general direction and coordination.
Well settled in our jurisprudence the view that even acts of the Office of the President may
be reviewed by the RTC. In view of the foregoing, SC rules that RTC has jurisdiction to
entertain the case and enjoin PRC from enforcing its resolution.

As to the validity of Resolution No. 105, although the resolution has a commendable purpose
which is to preserve the integrity and purity of the licensure examinations, the resolution is
unreasonable in that an examinee cannot even attend and review class, briefing, conference
or the like or receive hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school, college or
university, or any review center. The unreasonableness is more obvious in that one who is
caught committing the prohibited acts even without ill motives will be barred from taking
future examinations. Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also
infringes on the examinees right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. PRC has no
authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how they should prepare themselves for the
licensure examinations specially if the steps they take are lawful.

Another evident objection to Resolution No. 105 is that it violates the academic freedom of
the schools concerned. PRC cannot interfere with the conduct of review that review schools
and centers believe would best enable their enrollees to pass the examination. Unless the
means and methods of instruction are clearly found to be inefficient, impractical, or riddled
with corruption, review schools and centers may not be stopped from helping out their
students. The enforcement of Resolution No. 105 is not a guarantee that the alleged
leakages in the licensure examinations will be eradicated or at least minimized. What is
needed to be done by the respondent is to find out the source of such leakages and stop it
right there.

People vs Que Po Lay

Facts:

The appellant was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of US dollars, US checks and
US money orders amounting to about $7000 but failed to sell the same to the Central Bank
as required under Circular No. 20. Circular No. 20 was issued in the year 1949 but was
published in the Official Gazette only on Nov. 1951 after the act or omission imputed to Que
Po Lay.

Que Po Lay appealed from the decision of the lower court finding him guilty of violating
Central Bank Circular No. 20 in connection with Sec 34 of RA 265 sentencing him to suffer 6
months imprisonment, pay fine of P1,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs.
ISSUE: Whether or not publication of Circular 20 in the Official Gazette is needed
for it to become effective and subject violators to corresponding penalties.

HELD: It was held by the Supreme Court, in an en banc decision, that as a rule, circular and
regulations of the Central Bank in question prescribing a penalty for its violation should be
published before becoming effective. This is based on the theory that before the public is
bound by its contents especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first
be published for the people to be officially and specifically informed of such contents
including its penalties.

Taada vs. Tuvera

FACTS: Petitioners sought a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to

publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees,
letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of
implementation and administrative orders, invoking the right to be informed on matters of
public concern as recognized by the 1973 constitution.

ISSUE: Whether or not the publication of presidential decrees, letters of

instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of
implementation and administrative orders is necessary before its enforcement.

Held: Yes, publication is necessary.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided The
Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the
legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication is
material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its
publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect. Article
2 does not dismiss with the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law
itself provides for the date of its effectivity.

The publication of all presidential issuances of a public nature or of general applicability

is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or
penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and
revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to
particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not
be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned.
Publication is, therefore, mandatory.

US VS. PANLILIO

FACTS:

The accused was convicted of violation of Act 1760 relating to the quarantining of animals
suffering from dangerous communicable or contagious diseases and sentencing him to pay a
fine of P40 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs of trial. It
is alleged that the accused illegally and without being authorized to do so, and while
quarantine against the said carabaos exposed to rinder pest was still in effect, permitted and
ordered said carabaos to be taken from the corral in which they were quarantined and drove
them from one placeto another. The accused contends that the facts alleged in the
information and proved on the trial do not constitute a violation of Act No. 1760

ISSUE: Won the administrative order penalizing electro fishing is valid

HELD:
NO. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries
exceeded their authority in issuing the administrative order. The old Fisheries Law does not
expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under that law, the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are
powerless to penalize it. Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal
provision to that effect could have been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law. The
lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to declare what acts
should constitute an offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the imposition
of the penalty provided for in the law itself. Where the legislature has delegated to executive
or administrative officers and boards authority to promulgate rules to carry out an express
legislative purpose, the rules of administrative officers and boards, which have the effect of
extending, or which conflict with the authority granting statute, do not represent a valid
precise of the rule-making power

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellant, vs.AUGUSTO A.

SANTOS, defendant-appellee.

Facts:

Section 28 of Administrative Order No. 2 relative to fish and game, issued by the Secretary
of Agriculture and Commerce, provides as follows:

28. Prohibited fishing areas. No boats licensed in accordance with the provisions of Act
No. 4003 and this order to catch, collect, gather, take, or remove fish and other sea
products from Philippine waters shall be allowed to fish, loiter, or anchor within 3 kilometers
of the shore line of islands and reservations over which jurisdiction is exercised by naval or
military authorities of the United States, particularly Corregidor, Pulo Caballo, La Monja, El
Fraile, and Carabao, and all other islands and detached rocks lying between Mariveles
Reservation on the north side of the entrance to Manila Bay and Calumpan Point
Reservation on the south side of said entrance: Provided, That boats not subject to license
under Act No. 4003 and this order may fish within the areas mentioned above only upon
receiving written permission therefor, which permission may be granted by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Commerce upon recommendation of the military or naval authorities
concerned.

A violation of this paragraph may be proceeded against under section 45 of the Federal
Penal Code.

The above quoted provisions of Administrative, Order No. 2 were issued by the then
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, now Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce,
by virtue of the authority vested in him by section 4 of Act No. 4003 which reads as follows:

SEC. 4. Instructions, orders, rules and regulations. The Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources shall from time to time issue such instructions, orders, rules and
regulations consistent with this Act, as may be necessary and proper to carry into effect the
provisions thereof and for the conduct of proceedings arising under such provisions.

The herein accused and appellee Augusto A. Santos is charged with having ordered his
fishermen to manage and operate the motor launches Malabon II and Malabon Ill registered
in his name and to fish, loiter and anchor within three kilometers of the shore line of the
Island of Corregidor over which jurisdiction is exercised by naval and military authorities of
the United States, without permission from the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce.

These acts constitute a violation of the conditional clause of section 28 above quoted, which
reads as follows:
Provided, That boats not subject to license under Act No. 4003 and this order may fish within
the areas mentioned above (within 3 kilometers of the shore line of islands and reservations
over which jurisdiction is exercised by naval and military authorities of the United States,
particularly Corregidor) only upon receiving written permission therefor, which permission
may be granted by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce upon recommendation of the
military and naval authorities of concerned.

Issue: WON section 28 of Administrative Order No. 2 is valid

Held:

No. Act No. 4003 contains no similar provision prohibiting boats not subject to license from
fishing within three kilometers of the shore line of islands and reservations over which
jurisdiction is exercised by naval and military authorities of the United States, without
permission from the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce upon recommendation of the
military and naval authorities concerned. Inasmuch as the only authority granted to the
Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, by section 4 of Act No. 4003, is to issue from time
to time such instructions, orders, rules, and regulations consistent with said Act, as may be
necessary and proper to carry into effect the provisions thereof and for the conduct of
proceedings arising under such provisions; and inasmuch as said Act No. 4003, as stated,
contains no provisions similar to those contained in the above quoted conditional clause of
section 28 of Administrative Order No. 2, the conditional clause in question supplies a defect
of the law, extending it. This is equivalent to legislating on the matter, a power which has
not been and cannot be delegated to him, it being exclusively reserved to the then
Philippine Legislature by the Jones Law, and now to the National Assembly by the
Constitution of the Philippines. Such act constitutes not only an excess of the regulatory
power conferred upon the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, but also an exercise of a
legislative power which he does not have, and therefore said conditional clause is null and
void and without effect (12 Corpus Juris, 845; Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil.,
660; U.S. vs. Ang Tang Ho, 43 Phil., 1; U.S. vs. Barrias, 11 Phil., 327).

For the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and so hold that the conditional
clause of section 28 of Administrative Order No. 2. issued by the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce, is null and void and without effect, as constituting an excess of the regulatory
power conferred upon him by section 4 of Act No. 4003 and an exercise of a legislative
power which has not been and cannot be delegated to him.

Sec. Perez vs LPG Refillers

Facts:

Batas Pambansa Blg. 33, as amended, penalizes illegal trading, hoarding, overpricing,
adulteration, under delivery, and underfilling of petroleum products, as well as possession
for trade of adulterated petroleum products and of underfilled liquefied petroleum gas (LPG)
cylinder. The said law sets the monetary penalty for violators to a minimum of P 20,000 and
a maximum of P 50,000. Respondent LPG Refillers Association of the Philippines asked the
DOE to set aside the Circular for being contrary to law but to no avail; hence they filed an
action before the RTC to nullify the circular.

Issue: Whether or not the circular is valid

Held:

For an administrative regulation, to have the force of penal law, the following must concur:

1.) the violation of the administrative regulation must be made a crime by the delegating
statute itself; and
2.) the penalty for such violation must be provided by the statute itself. As to the first
requirement, BP Blg 33 only states merely lists the various modes by which the said criminal
acts may be perpetrated, namely: no price display board, no weighing scale, no tare weight
or incorrect tare weight markings, no authorized LPG seal, no trade name, unbranded LPG
cylinders, no serial number, no distinguishing color, no embossed identifying markings on
cylinder, under filling LPG cylinders, tampering LPG cylinders, and unauthorized decanting of
LPG cylinders. The acts and omissions stated in the circular are well within the modes
contemplated by the law and serve the purpose of curbing pernicious practices of LPG
dealers. As for the second requirement, the statute provides a minimum and maximum
amount as penalties. The maximum pecuniary penalty for retail outlets is P20,000, an
amount within the range allowed by law. While the circular is silent as to the max penalty for
refillers, marketers, and dealers, such does not amount to violation of the statutory
maximum limit. The mere fact that the Circular provides penalties on a per cylinder basis
does not in itself run counter to the law since all that B.P. Blg. 33 prescribes are the
minimum and the maximum limits of penalties. Nothing in the Circular contravenes the law.
Noteworthy, the enabling laws on which the Circular is based were specifically intended to
provide the DOE with increased administrative and penal measures with which to effectively
curtail rampant adulteration and short selling, as well as other acts involving petroleum
products, which are inimical to public interest. To nullify the Circular in this case would be to
render inutile government efforts to protect the general consuming public against the
nefarious practices of some unscrupulous LPG traders

People vs Maceren

Facts:

This is a case involving the validity of a 1967 regulation, penalizing electro fishing in fresh
water fisheries, promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the
Commissioner of Fisheries under the old Fisheries Law and the law creating the Fisheries
Commission.

On March 7, 1969 Jose Buenaventura, Godofredo Reyes, Benjamin Reyes, Nazario Aquino
and Carlito del Rosario were charged by a Constabulary investigator in the municipal court of
Sta. Cruz, Laguna with having violated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1.

It was alleged in the complaint that the five accused in the morning of March 1, 1969
resorted to electro fishing in the waters of Barrio San Pablo Norte, Sta. Cruz by "using their
own motor banca, equipped with motor; with a generator colored green with attached
dynamo colored gray or somewhat white; and electrocuting device locally known as
sensored with a somewhat webbed copper wire on the tip or other end of a bamboo pole
with electric wire attachment which was attached to the dynamo direct and with the use of
these devices or equipments catches fish thru electric current, which destroy any aquatic
animals within its cuffed reach, to the detriment and prejudice of the populace" (Criminal
Case No. 5429).

Upon motion of the accused, the municipal court quashed the complaint. The prosecution
appealed. The Court of First Instance of Laguna affirmed the order of dismissal (Civil Case
No. SC-36). The case is now before this Court on appeal by the prosecution under Republic
Act No. 5440. The lower court held that electro fishing cannot be penalize because electric
current is not an obnoxious or poisonous substance as contemplated in section I I of the
Fisheries Law and that it is not a substance at all but a form of energy conducted or
transmitted by substances. The lower court further held that, since the law does not clearly
prohibit electro fishing, the executive and judicial departments cannot consider it unlawful.
As legal background, it should be stated that section 11 of the Fisheries Law prohibits "the
use of any obnoxious or poisonous substance" in fishing.
Issue: WON the administrative order penalizing electro fishing is valid

Held:

No. In this appeal, the prosecution argues that Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1 were
not issued under section 11 of the Fisheries Law which, as indicated above, punishes fishing
by means of an obnoxious or poisonous substance. This contention is not well-taken
because, as already stated, the Penal provision of Administrative Order No. 84 implies that
electro fishing is penalized as a form of fishing by means of an obnoxious or poisonous
substance under section 11.

The prosecution cites as the legal sanctions for the prohibition against electro fishing in fresh
water fisheries (1) the rule-making power of the Department Secretary under section 4 of
the Fisheries Law; (2) the function of the Commissioner of Fisheries to enforce the provisions
of the Fisheries Law and the regulations Promulgated thereunder and to execute the rules
and regulations consistent with the purpose for the creation of the Fisheries Commission and
for the development of fisheries (Sec. 4[c] and [h] Republic Act No. 3512; (3) the declared
national policy to encourage, Promote and conserve our fishing resources (Sec. 1, Republic
Act No. 3512), and (4) section 83 of the Fisheries Law which provides that "any other
violation of" the Fisheries Law or of any rules and regulations promulgated thereunder "shall
subject the offender to a fine of not more than two hundred pesos, or imprisonment for not
more than six months, or both, in the discretion of the court."

As already pointed out above, the prosecution's reference to section 83 is out of place
because the penalty for electro fishing under Administrative order No. 84 is not the same as
the penalty fixed in section 83.

We are of the opinion that the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the
Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing Fisheries Administrative Orders
Nos. 84 and 84-1 and that those orders are not warranted under the Fisheries Commission,
Republic Act No. 3512.

The reason is that the Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro
fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and
the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. In other words, Administrative
Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1, in penalizing electro fishing, are devoid of any legal basis.

Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect
could have been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law.

That law punishes (1) the use of obnoxious or poisonous substance, or explosive in fishing;
(2) unlawful fishing in deepsea fisheries; (3) unlawful taking of marine molusca, (4) illegal
taking of sponges; (5) failure of licensed fishermen to report the kind and quantity of fish
caught, and (6) other violations.

Nowhere in that law is electro fishing specifically punished. Administrative Order No. 84, in
punishing electro fishing, does not contemplate that such an offense fails within the
category of "other violations" because, as already shown, the penalty for electro fishing is
the penalty next lower to the penalty for fishing with the use of obnoxious or poisonous
substances, fixed in section 76, and is not the same as the penalty for "other violations" of
the law and regulations fixed in section 83 of the Fisheries Law.

The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to declare what acts
should constitute an offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the imposition
of the penalty provided for in the law itself.