WHAT IS SCIENCE?

History and Philosophy of Science

We begin our study of biology by asking: What is science? How did it originate?
How did it develop?

You may be surprised to learn that the origin of science lies in the supernatural.
Several thousand years ago people lacked the knowledge necessary to explain the
universe and its workings in "scientific" terms. To early humans, the forces of
nature were both powerful and unexplainable. Yet their origin and control must
exist somewhere, perhaps in some being - or beings - more powerful than man
himself. Undoubtedly, such reasoning led to the establishment of primitive religions
and the belief that the world and all happenings in it were under the controlling
influence of spirits and gods.

Many primitive cultures believed that events beneficial to human welfare were
controlled by benevolent spirits. Other spirits, such as those bringing sickness and
death, were evil and malicious. Still others appeared exceedingly unpredictable,
friendly one moment and hostile the next. The impulsive character of these beings
explained why a gentle rain might eventually develop into a disastrous flood. Such
is the origin of myths.

Early humans never held out hope of understanding such gods. These people did
attempt, however, to appease and influence them through creation of various rites
and rituals. For instance, the earliest farmers believed that the phenomenon of
rainfall was similar to a sexual act; sex and rainfall were both associated with
fertilization, reproduction and growth. Indeed, many early cultures believed that sex

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and rainfall were under the control of identical or similar gods. Farmers thereby
could not only "explain" the phenomenon of rainfall but also had "discovered" the
god with the appropriate rites. Thus, in many cultures, attempts to bring rain were
accompanied by rituals involving intense sexual activity.

On many occasions the ritual appeared to succeed. Rains often did come a few
days following the ritual. Such results reinforced the idea that sex and rainfall were
indeed related and that unseen spirits could be influenced. Rituals, however, did
not produce desired results in all cases. In time, more perceptive individuals
realized that rituals played no role in controlling the forces of nature. This was a
momentous discovery and a scientific one.

The first to make and record this discovery were the ancient Greek philosophers.
Most of these men became convinced that the universe was a great machine
governed by inflexible laws. They began the exciting intellectual exercise of
attempting to discover the nature of those laws. They established an orderly
system of logic essential to anyone trying to determine underlying laws of nature
from observed data.

The rules of this system, or philosophia ("philosophy") as it came to be called, were

threefold: Observation, categorizing and deduction. First, the "philosopher" must
collect observations about some aspect of nature. For example, a stone sinks in
water, wood floats, an iron bar sinks, a drop of salad oil floats, a drop of mercury
sinks. Next, the observations must be organized in an ordered fashion. All objects
that sink in water are listed in a column; all objects that float are placed in an
adjacent column. Finally, an underlying principle of nature is obtained by examining
relationships between the ordered items. Thus, heavy objects sink in water and
light objects float.

Such sets of "philosophical rules" constitute what later came to be called inductive
and deductive logic. The significance of the establishment of these contrasting
kinds of logic cannot be overstated. As you will find later in this paper, inductive

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logic is used in formulating most scientific theories. Deductive logic provides the
basis for the design of virtually all experiments in modern science.

Mechanism versus Vitalism

The second major Greek contribution to what was to become science was the
philosophy of mechanism, which officially marks the initial divergence of "science"
from its supernatural heritage. In the mechanistic view of nature, the universe is
governed by a set of natural laws, namely, the laws of physics and chemistry. The
mechanistic philosophy holds that if all physical and chemical events in the
universe can be accounted for, no other events will remain. Therefore, life, too,
must be a result of physical and chemical processes only, and the course of life
must be determined automatically by the physical and chemical occurrences within
living matter.

This mechanistic philosophy stands in opposition to vitalism, which maintains that

the universe, and particularly its living components, are controlled by supernatural
powers. Such powers are held to guide the behavior of atoms, planets, stars, living
things and indeed all components of the universe. Most religious philosophies are
inherently vitalistic.

Clearly, these differences between vitalism and mechanism point up a conceptual

conflict between religion and science. However, this conflict is not necessarily
irreconcilable. To bridge the conceptual gap, one might ask how the natural laws of
the universe came into being to begin with. A possible answer is that they were
created by God. On this view, it could be argued that the universe ran vitalistically
up to the time that natural laws were created and mechanistically thereafter. The
mechanist would then have to admit the existence of a supernatural Creator at the

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beginning of time (even though he has no scientific basis for either affirming or
denying this; mechanism cannot, by definition, tell anything about a time at which
natural laws might not have been in operation). Correspondingly, the vitalist would
have to admit that, so long as the natural laws continue to operate without change,
supernatural control would not be demonstrable.

Thus it is necessarily illogical to accept both scientific and religious philosophies at

the same time. However, it is decidedly illogical to try to use religious ideas as
explanations of scientific problems or scientific ideas as explanations of religious
problems.

Yet many people, some scientists included, still find it exceedingly difficult to keep
vitalism out of science. Biological events, undoubtedly the most complex of all
known events in the universe, have been particularly subject to attempts at vitalistic
interpretation.

Teleology versus Causalism

Even a casual observer must be impressed by the apparent non-randomness of

natural events. Every part of nature seems to follow a plan, and there is a definite
directedness to any given process. In living processes, for example, developing
eggs behave as if they knew exactly what the plan of the adult is to be. A chicken
soon produces two wings and two legs, as if it knew that these appendages were
to be part of the adult. All known natural processes, living or otherwise, similarly
start at given beginnings and proceed to particular end-points. This observation
poses a philosophical problem: How is a starting condition directed toward a
specific terminal condition? How does a starting point appear to "know" what the
endpoint is to be?

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Such questions have to do with a detailed aspect of the more general problem of
the controlling forces of the universe. We should expect, therefore, that two sets of
answers would be available, one vitalistic and the other mechanistic. This is the
case. According to vitalistic doctrines, natural events appear to be planned
because they actually are planned. A supernatural "divine plan" is held to fix the
fate of every part of the universe, and all events in nature, past, present, and
future, are programmed in this plan. All nature is therefore directed toward a
preordained goal, the fulfillment of the divine plan. As a consequence, nothing
happens by chance but everything happens on purpose.

Being a vitalistic, experimentally untestable concept, the notion of purpose in

natural events has no place in science. Does the universe exist for a purpose? Do
people live for a purpose? Science is not designed to tackle such questions.
Moreover, if you already hold certain beliefs in these areas, you cannot expect
science either to prove or to disprove them for you.

Yet many arguments have been attempted to show purpose from science. For
example, it has been maintained by some that the whole purpose of the evolution
of living things was to produce people - the predetermined goal from the very
beginning. This conceit implied not only that people are the finest product of
creation but also that nothing could ever come after human beings, for we are
supposed to be the last word in living magnificence. As a matter of record, people
are sometimes plagued by parasites that cannot live anywhere except inside
human beings. And it is clear that you cannot have a person-requiring parasite
before you have a person.

The form of argumentation that has recourse to purposes and supernatural

planning is generally called teleology. In one system of teleology, the preordained
plan resides within objects themselves. According to this view, a starting condition
of an event proceeds toward a particular end condition because the starting object
has built into its supernatural foreknowledge of the end condition. For example, an
egg develops toward the goal of the adult because the egg is endowed with

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information about the precise nature of the adult state. Clearly, this and all other
forms of teleology "explain" an end state by simply asserting it to be already
mapped out at the beginning. And in thereby putting the future in the past, the
effect before the cause, teleology negates time.

The scientifically useful alternative to teleology is Causalism, a form of thought

based on mechanistic philosophy. Causalism denies foreknowledge of terminal
states, preordination, purposes, goals and fixed fates. It holds instead that natural
events take place step-wise, each one conditioned by, and dependent on, earlier
ones. Events occur only as previous events permit them to occur, not as
preordained goals or purposes make them occur. End states are consequences,
not foregone conclusions, of beginning states. A headless earthworm regenerates
a new head because conditions in the headless worm are such that only a head -
one head - can develop. It becomes the task of the biologist to find out what these
conditions are and to see if, by changing the condition, two heads or another tail
could be produced. Because scientists actually can obtain different end states by
changing the conditions of initial states, the idea of predetermined goals loses all
validity in scientific thought.

Care must therefore by taken in scientific endeavors not to fall unwittingly into the
teleological trap. Consider often-heard statements such as: "The purpose of the
heart is to pump blood;" "the ancestors of birds evolved wings so that they could
fly;" "eggs have yolk in order to provide food for development." The last statement,
for example, implies that eggs can "foresee" that food will be required in
development and they, therefore, store up some. In effect, eggs are given human
mentality. Teleologists are always anthropocentric, that is, they imply that the
natural events they discuss are governed by minds like theirs. In making biological
statements some of the theological implications can be avoided by replacing every
"purpose" with "function," every "so that" or "in order to" with "and."

Clearly then, science in its present state of development must operate within
carefully specified, self-imposed limits. The basic philosophic attitude must be

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mechanistic and causalistic, and we note that the results obtained through science
are inherently without truth, without value and without purpose. But it is precisely
because science is limited in this fashion that it advances. Truth is as subjective as
ever, values change with time and place, and purposes basically express little
more than our desire to make the universe behave accordingly to our own very
primitive understanding. It has therefore proved difficult to build a knowledge of
nature on the shifting foundation of values and truth or on the dogma of purpose.
What little of nature we really know and are likely to know in the foreseeable future
stands on the bedrock of science.

Methods of Science

Although many roots of modern science can be traced to the early Greeks, their
"natural philosophy" was marred by one highly significant defect - they regarded
experimental testing of their conclusions as unnecessary. To a Greek philosopher,
arrival at "absolute truth" through deductive reasoning was the height of intellectual
excellence. It was absurd and degrading to suggest that conclusions resulting from
such a perfect system of logic required confirmation through direct testing.

Indeed, many of their original conclusions about the operations of the universe are
consistent with those derived through more recent experimental testing. There is
no doubt that Aristotle and many of his colleagues were extraordinarily gifted in
their use of deductive logic. But use of deductive logic is not infallible. As you will
note presently, some of Aristotle's absolute truths later were found to be neither
absolute nor valid.

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Natural philosophy became less popular during the rise of the Roman Empire, and
following the collapse of Roman rule and the rise of Christianity, moral philosophy,
based on vitalistic arguments, was the chief intellectual pursuit. Natural philosophy
was virtually forgotten until the beginning of the Renaissance in the fourteenth
century.

Primarily it was Galileo, who delivered the death blow to the ancient Greek practice
of establishing conclusions without experimental evidence. For example, Galileo
provided a direct test of Aristotle's idea that objects would fall at a rate directly
proportional to their weight, an "absolute truth" that had gone unchallenged for
nearly 2000 years. Galileo is reported to have climbed to the top of the leaning
tower of Pisa and dropped two balls of unequal weight. Aristotelian science died
the instant the two balls struck the ground simultaneously.

In view of the significance of this result, it is ironic that Galileo probably never
actually performed the experiment as reported. It was so typical of his dramatic
exploits, however, that this legend has survived for centuries. Undoubtedly, Galileo
conducted equally valid experiments disproving Aristotle's theory by rolling balls
down inclined planes. From Galileo's day to the present time, everything that is
properly called science has been based on experiments designed in accordance
with scientific methods.

Modern scientists often solve problems and make discoveries through use of a
sequence of interrelated steps outlined below. Such steps sometimes are
erroneously termed the scientific method, but it soon will become apparent that
scientists do not always follow the order of steps listed, nor are all of these steps
always included in the solution of every problem. There is no single, uniform, or
absolute scientific method, and no research scientist follows a formalized ritual in
performing experiments. Indeed, there is wide disagreement among scientists
about the nature of scientific methodology. Nevertheless, observations of natural
phenomena often set in motion a series of subsequent mental and physical

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activities among scientists that eventually lead to the uncovering of new facts and
the refining of old principles.

Observation, Definition of a Problem

Observation immediately puts a boundary around the scientific domain; something

that cannot be observed cannot be investigated by science.

Everybody observes - with eyes, ears, touch and all other senses - and, therefore,
everyone has the potential to be a scientist. It is important to observe correctly,
however. Unsuspected bias can seriously impede good observation. People often
see only what they want to see or what they think they ought to see. It is extremely
hard to rid oneself of such unconscious prejudice and to see just what is actually
there, no more and no less. Past experience, "common knowledge," and often
teachers can be subtle obstacles to correct observation, and even experienced
scientists may not always avoid them. That is why a scientific observation is not
fully accepted until several scientists have repeated it independently and have
reported the same thing. That is also a major reason why one-time, unrepeatable
events generally cannot be investigated scientifically.

After an observation has been made, a second usual step of scientific procedure is
to define a problem; one asks a question about the observation. Again, most
people already possess the basic skills to define problems. Having a curious and
inquisitive nature is really the most important element for this step. If you have
wondered why leaves turn color in fall, or why sap flows in trees, or how homing
pigeons navigate, you are implicitly asking a question about a natural process.

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Postulating a Hypothesis

Once a proper question has been asked, the common third step of scientific
methodology usually involves the seemingly quite unscientific procedure of
guessing what the answer to the question might conceivably be. Scientists refer to
this as postulating a hypothesis. To have scientific value, hypotheses must be both
logical and testable. It must be possible to evaluate the validity of a hypothesis;
otherwise it is impossible to determine whether a proposed explanation is right or
wrong.

Scientists generally use inductive logic in the formulation of hypotheses. Inductive

logic involves coming to a general premise on the basis of many individual
observations. For example, a person might notice that water in a nearby stream
flows downhill. The person might then observe that water in sink, in a river, and in
a drainpipe also flows downhill. From these several observations, the person might
use inductive logic to conclude that water always flows downhill. Knowingly or
unknowingly, this person has established a testable hypothesis: "Water always
flows downhill."

A further example will illustrate how inductive reasoning can be used to establish
hypotheses that relate to biological processes. Consider the phenomenon of
seasonal changes in coat coloration of snowshoe hares, animals found in Canada
and the northern United States. The fur of these animals appear white in winter
and brown in summer. This trait provides considerable survival potential, for their
coats blend with the background coloration of the environment at any season. This
observation has been made repeatedly by trappers, hunters, and others living in
the northern latitudes, and many of these people undoubtedly have marveled as
snowshoe hares change coat color in concert with the changing seasons.

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An obvious question about this phenomenon arises in the mind of an inquisitive
observer: What is responsible for the seasonal change in coat color among
snowshoe hares? There are several possible answers to this question. We might
note that steadily decreasing temperatures in fall and increasing temperatures in
spring are responsible for many environmental changes. Ice forms as winter
approaches, and it melts in spring. The ground freezes in winter, thaws in spring.
Using inductive reasoning, we might hypothesize that seasonal changes in
temperature are also responsible for observed changes in the coat color in
snowshoe hares.

The tentative conclusions about the flow of water and coat-coloration changes in
snowshoe hares are examples of the two kinds of hypotheses usually formulated
by scientists. The first, called generalizing hypotheses, simply summarize a group
of specific observations and permit logical, summary conclusions to be tested. The
conclusion "water always flows downhill" is a generalizing hypothesis. The second
kind of hypothesis, explanatory hypotheses, generally have greater scientific
importance. They do more than generalize from a group of similar observations.
Explanatory hypotheses are tentative explanations of causes of natural
phenomena. The suggestion that "changes in temperature trigger seasonal coat-
color changes in snowshoe hares" can be categorized as an explanatory
hypothesis.

As scientists, we have no way of knowing whether our hypotheses are correct or

incorrect. A given question can have thousands of logical answers but often only a
single right one. Thus, chances are excellent that a random guess will be wrong.
To distinguish between wrong hypotheses and right ones, we must establish tests
of individual hypotheses. Testing hypotheses often is the most tedious part of
science. Yet in science there is no other way. Science proceeds solely by
postulating hypotheses. Testing hypotheses often is the most tedious part of
science. Yet in science there is no other way. Science proceeds solely by

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postulating hypotheses and testing their predictions, and it is this quality which
distinguishes science from most other disciplines.

There are two general ways of testing hypotheses. The first is by looking for
naturally occurring observations that either support or invalidate a hypothesis.
Many generalizing hypotheses lend themselves to such testing. For example, the
hypothesis "water always flows downhill" can be tested simply by looking a large
numbers of naturally flowing bodies of water. All bodies of water that flow downhill
provide additional support for the hypothesis. However, bodies of water
occasionally do flow uphill, as when incoming tides force water upstream in
tributaries emptying into oceans along coastal shores. They hypothesis as stated is
therefore false, disproved by a single contradictory observation.

Some hypotheses, explanatory ones in particular, often cannot be tested by

naturally occurring observations. For these, observations must be generated by
experimentation.

Experiment, Theory

Guesses that are correct explainations of natural phenomena can be termed true
hypotheses. The major principle underlying the experimentation step of scientific
inquiry is that true hypotheses can never give rise to a prediction that can be
proved false.

This principle can be illustrated through our hypothesis that temperature is the
environmental factor responsible for triggering seasonal color changes in
snowshoe hares. A testable prediction of this hypothesis can be obtained through
deductive logic. This kind of reasoning proceeds from a general premise to specific
conclusions that are based on the premise and therefore is the opposite of

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inductive logic (Table 1, p. 13). Sometimes called "if...then..." reasoning, deductive
logic is used extensively by scientists to obtain predictions from hypotheses. For
example: If temperature is the environmental factor responsible for triggering
seasonal color changes of snowshoe hares, then hares kept at winter
temperatures in spring and summer will retain their white coat and will not change
to brown. The portion of the preceding sentence following the word "then" is a
logical conclusion of the portion stated before the word "then." All that a scientist
need do now is test the validity of the conclusion (prediction) to ascertain the
validity of the accompanying hypothesis.

Usually, predictions from hypotheses can be obtained easily through application of

the "if...then..." deductive format. Most scientists are so accustomed to deductive
reasoning that formal construction of "if...then..." statements is unnecessary in
setting up experiments. However, formal construction of "if...then..." statements is
helpful in gaining an appreciation of how scientists design experiments.

Use the following procedure to accustom yourself to this format. First, write down a
testable hypothesis. Place the word "if" before the hypothesis, and follow it with the
word "then." Complete the now unfinished sentence with a logical conclusion. As a
scientists, your next task would be to construct an experiment to provide a "yes" or
"no" answer to your prediction.

Our hypothesis regarding coat-coloration changes in snowshoe hares can be used

to illustrate this next step of scientific inquiry. Assume that an experimenter takes a
white snowshoe hare from the field in December and places it in a refrigerated
room where "winter" temperatures can be maintained indefinitely. The hare is
retained in this room until late the following summer. Suppose the hare's coat color
remain white. Would this prove that change in temperature is the environmental
factor responsible for triggering the seasonal color changes? Certainly not.

Temperature is only one of several environmental changes that could have

accounted for the hare keeping its white coat. Perhaps some factor in the hare's

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natural diet is responsible for changes in coat color. This factor may not have been
present in the laboratory food after the hare was moved to the refrigerated room.
Or perhaps the longer daylight hour in spring are responsible for triggering the
coat-coloration changes. Lack of change might have been a result of illumination
patterns in the refrigerated room that differed from those in nature.

What is clearly needed here is experimental control - for every snowshoe hare
maintained in the refrigerated room, a precisely qual group must be maintained in
another room where all environmental conditions are identical except for
temperature. If the two groups respond differently, the responsible factor must be
temperature because all other factors are identical for both groups.

Thus, every experiment requires at least two parallel test identical in all respects
except one. One set of tests is the control series, to provide a standard of
reference for assessing the results of the experimental series. Such procedures
are often laborious, expensive, and time-consuming. In drug experiments on
people, for example, up to 100,000 to 200,000 tests, half of them controls and a
half of them experimentals, must sometimes be performed. And despite a most
ingenious design and a most careful execution, the result may still not be a clear
"yes" or "no." In a drug testing experiment, for example, it is virtually certain that
some of the ill test subjects in the experiment, for example, t is virtually certain the
some of the ill test subjects in the experimental group will not respond to the drug
treatment, while some of the control subjects will bet better even without the drug.

The result of any experiment represents evidence, scientific evidence can be

strong and convincing, or merely suggestive, or poor. With regard to snowshoe
hares, the evidence is strong that temperature is not the main environmental factor
responsible for triggering seasonal coat-color changes. Hares maintained at
"winter" temperatures in greenhouse environments undergo a spring change to
brown coats at the same time as hares maintained in the same greenhouse at
outside temperatures. Evidence obtained through other experiments supports the
hypothesis that seasonal change in day length is the environmental factor

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responsible for triggering coat-color changes. This hypothesis has been endorsed
by most scientists because of the strength and consistency of the experimental
evidence. It is incorrect to conclude, however, that the hypothesis has been
"proved." No scientific evidence, regardless of strength, can ever prove the
absolute validity of any hypothesis. This inability is inherent in the nature of
scientific methodology.

Recall that science proceeds by testing predictions deduced from hypothesis and
that true hypotheses can never give rise to false predictions. However, false
hypotheses can give rise to predictions that will be supported by the results of valid
experiments. This principle can be illustrated through another of Aristotle's
erroneous absolute truths. The Greek philosophers believed that the earth was the
center of the universe and that the sun circled the earth daily. Apply deductive
reasoning to this hypothesis to obtain a testable prediction: If the earth is the center
of the universe, then the sun should rise on one horizon in the morning, move
across the sky, and set on the opposite horizon. So it does. Thus, predictions that
are verified by the results of experiments do not prove hypotheses. At best, we can
only state that experimental evidence "supports" or "is consistent with" specific
hypotheses. There is always room for more and better evidence or for new
contradictory evidence or for better hypotheses.

Experimental evidence is the basis for the final step in scientific procedure, the
formulation of a theory, a broadly based hypothesis supported by many tests that
usually have been conducted over several years. Theories that withstand the test
of thousands of individual experiments are sometimes called scientific laws. The
law of gravity and the second law of thermodynamics are common examples.

Most theories, however, have brief life-spans. For example, consider the simple
theory "Day length is the environmental factor responsible for triggering seasonal
coat-coloration changes in all mammals that are white in winter and brown in
summer." This theory requires immediate modification since the coat colors of
many mammals are influenced by factors other than day length. Such exceptions

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to theories become new observations, which often lead to new hypotheses, new
experiments, and new or revised theories.

As mentioned earlier, however, it is incorrect to conclude that scientists usually

follow an ordered list of steps in solving problems. How testable hypotheses are
formulated and experiments designed varies considerably from one scientist to
another and from one situation to another. this is because hypothesis formation
and experimental design are activities that are essentially creative, not prescribed.

To be sure, good scientists usually are expert at formulating generalizing and

explanatory hypotheses. They often are quick to develop ways of testing
hypotheses that are both reliable and effective. In addition, good scientists
generally take immediate advantage of situations that provide unique opportunities
for making new observations about natural processes, and they recognize that
scientific inquiry is not restricted to bright, modern laboratories filled with complex
and expensive equipment. But why some scientists are more perceptive than
others is not well understood.

It should now be clear that scientists cannot be the cold, inhuman automatons they
are so often pictured to be. Scientists are essentially artists who require a
sensitivity of eye and of mind as great as that of any master painter, and an
imagination and keen inventiveness as powerful as that of any master poet.

LIMITATIONS OF SCIENCE

Science and Religion

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Because of the enormous impact of science on modern society, there exists a
tendency among many people to regard science as potentially unlimited in its
capacity to solve problems. Others look on science as an all-powerful force whose
capacity to destroy and corrupt is infinite. Our examination of scientific
methodology has revealed several limitations that nullify both of these views.

First, science cannot answer all categories of questions. Thus, questions that do
not lead to testable hypotheses are outside the domain of science. How often have
you heard that "science argues against the existence of God" or that "science is
antireligious?" Such statements assume that science can prove or disprove the
existence of God. Consider how science would attempt to answer this question. A
hypothesis is needed. Suppose we "guess" that God does not exist. Being
untested, this hypothesis might be right or wrong. Regardless of any prediction
obtained through deductive logic, an experiment about God would require
experimental control, that is, two situations, one with God and one without, but
otherwise identical.

If our hypothesis is correct, God would not exist anywhere. Hence He would not be
present in any test we might conduct. Yet for a controlled experiment, we would
need a test in which God was present. On the other hand, if our hypothesis is
wrong, He would exist everywhere and would be present in every control situation
we might devise. Yet for a controlled experiment, we would need to construct a
situation in which God was not present. Clearly, the quesiton of God's existence is
untestable scientifically.

Science is useless as a tool to discover or evaluate any truth that cannot be tested
experimentally. Moreover, we have already learned that scientific truths are rarely
absolute. Theories are being modified continually in the light of new evidence.
Frustration awaits all who look to science for absolute truth.

Pure and Applied Science

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Second, science cannot guarantee quick solutions to troublesome problems. No
scientist, for example, can guarantee that the results of an experiment will support
a hypothesis. Often there are hundreds of wrong hypotheses for every correct one,
and experiments that prove hypotheses incorrect usually take as much time to
carry out as those that provide supporting evidence. Proving hypotheses incorrect,
however, usually does little to increase our ability to solve practical problems.

It is equally impossible for scientists to predict the potential usefulness of their

experimental results. Many non-scientists fail to recognize this limitation and
sometimes complain about their tax dollars being spent on research having no
direct, practical "relevance." The frequently argue that most of their tax dollars
should be spent on applied science, which concerns itself with immediate human
needs; corresponding little should be expended on basic or pure science, which
seeks to develop knowledge about the operation of the universe and its parts,
without regard to practical application. Why support studies of coat-color changes
in snowshoe hares or the behavior patterns of fish when a much more pressing
concern is to find cures for cancer and other diseases?

Such arguments reflect two basic misconceptions about the interdependence

between pure an applied science. One is the assumption that knowledge having
direct human application derives exclusively from applied research. Very often the
results of basic research prove this assumption false.

For example, much applied research has been carried out to discover an effective
and safe shark repellent. such a chemical would have obvious practical value in
ensuring the safety of swimmers in shark-inhabited waters. However, most
chemicals that have been tested have proved ineffective or unreliable. Recently, an
extremely potent shark repellent was found in the secretions of a small flouderlike
fish inhabiting the Red Sea. This secretion apparently protects the fish from attacks

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by sharks and probably from other predators as well. The scientists who made this
discovery were engaged in basic research and were not attempting to isolate a
shark repellent. Their discovery was accidental and could not have been predicted
in advance. Yet their findings could lead to the eventual development of a highly
effective agent against sharks. The point is clear; if support is given exclusively to
research dealing with "practical" problems, society will deprive itself of many
unpredictable applications of knowledge derived from basic research.

The argument that applied science is "more important" than basic science contains
a second and more serious flaw. Study of seasonal coat-color changes in
snowshoe hares, for example, may not provide any information of immediate
usefulness to human being. However, it does provide a small piece of information
about the way living systems react to their environment. Coupled with countless
other pieces of information, gathered through years of painstaking efforts, a more
complete understanding of the general principles governing the operation of living
systems - living human systems included - are bound to emerge. Entirely new and
different application can then result from this more complete understanding,
perhaps generating solutions to many different human problems. A scientific
"breakthrough" will have been achieved many times in the past, almost invariably
with diverse "practical" benefits for humanity.

Contrary to popular opinion, such breakthroughs do not develop suddenly. They

almost always rest upon a bedrock of fundamental knowledge developed slowly
through years of basic research. Discovery of the Salk vaccine against polio, for
example, depended on a fundamental understanding of the nature and life cycle of
viruses. Development of this understanding took years and hundreds of
experiments.

The moral of this lesson is not that society must support all experiments of all
scientists. As human beings, some scientists are more gifted and productive than
others. Certain experimental approaches are more likely to succeed than others.
But we must always recognize the interdependence of applied and basic science.

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Neither can exist without the other. Every basic scientist depends on equipment
and techniques developed by applied science, and every applied scientist depends
on ideas, insights, and knowledge generated by basic research. Starve either form
of science and both will suffer. Failure to recognize this fundamental
interdependence will frustrate all long-term attempts to speed application of
science to human problems by increasing support of applied research at the
expense of basic research.

Application of science to human needs is also slowed by the collaborative nature of

the discipline. As applied and basic research are interdependent, so are scientists
themselves interdependent. No experimental result is ever accepted by the
scientific community at large unless and until is has been repeated by a second,
independent scientist. This practice helps to ensure that the body of facts
composing scientific knowledge is accurate and unbiased. In effect, the ability of
science to solve problems quickly is sacrificed deliberately to ensure orderly,
steady and reliable progress and to avoid the wastefulness and chaos that
otherwise would result.

Science and Society

Finally, science is limited by its inability to make moral or value judgments.

Scientific results by themselves do not contain any built-in values, and nowhere in
scientific inquiry is there a value-revealing step. As a tool, like a hammer or a paint-
brush, science is inherently neither good nor evil, responsible or irresponsible,
powerful or impotent. Those who perceive such values or purposes in science are,
in reality, merely viewing a reflection of human values and purposes. Thus, the
science that produces weapons for destroying and killing and weapons for healing

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and creating cannot, of itself, determine whether such tools are good or bad. The
decision in each case must rest on the moral opinions of people.

If human beings must determine the uses of science, how should such decisions
be made? It might be possible, for example, to give scientists the exclusive right to
make all decisions related to social applications of scientific theory. But most
people, most scientists included, do not believe that such decisions should be left
to any one segment of society. Scientists are no better suited to make decisions
involving the justice or injustice of, say, abortion than lawyers, plumbers, or
bricklayers. Science and technology have made the abortion of human fetuses
relatively safe and practicable, but science does not and cannot establish moral
and societal standards for the practice itself.

Nevertheless, some scientists argue that they have a special responsibility to

influence public decisions that relate to uses of scientific knowledge. Such
scientists believe that this responsibility grows out of their special training and their
ability to perceive social implications of developing technologies before they are
recognized by the general public. Others question the motivation of these often
outspoken individuals and believe that scientists should merely present unbiased
information and leave all final decisions concerning the uses of scientific
knowledge to the public.

There are similar disagreements concerning the role of the lay citizen in science.
some scientists insist that nonscientists should have little input into decisions
relating to scientific experimentation. These scientists argue, for example, that
issues relating to the dangers of specific experimental techniques are too complex
for people who lack formal scientific training. Others reply that nonscientists can
make rational policy judgements regarding scientific procedures and issues if they
have an opportunity to hear articulate advocates present their case and respond to
opposing arguments. Indeed, many who support an increased role for the
nonscientist in decisions involving scientific matters favor creation of special
adversary forums where significant questions of science and technology can be

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debated in front of panels of impartial judges. Such panels might issue judgments
that pertain to disputed technical issues, and these opinions could then be used in
the drafting of local, state or national laws.

Proposals for the establishment of such forums stem in part from the demands of
increasing numbers of nonscientists who want greater participation in decisions
involving the use of certain kinds of experimental procedures in research
laboratories. Other lay citizens have witnessed the environmental and human
devastation that can result from misuse of scientific knowledge and now wish a
formal role in directing science toward more "responsible" goals.

Despite protestations by some and misinformed views of science by others, this

recent trend toward a democratization" of science is likely to become more
pronounced in the years to come. In the United States and many other countries,
relationships between the discovery and use of scientific knowledge probably will
be defined increasingly by "science courts," boards of review, legislative
committees and city councils.

Although such "democratization" can do much to increase public respect and

support of science, it cannot be accomplished unless scientists remain attentive to
the views and fears of the lay citizen concerning the discovery and use of scientific
knowledge, and scientists must do more to educate the public about the nature of
science and specific scientific issues. For their part, nonscientists must obtain at
least a rudimentary knowledge of scientific principles, understand the relationships
between basic and applied science and be aware of both the potentials and
limitations of science. Only then will scientists and nonscientists be able to work
cooperatively and intelligently criticize, question and evaluate future applications of
scientific theory.

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TABLE 1

Comparison of Inductive and Deductive Logic

Inductive Deductive

Begins with observations; leads to hypothesis Begins with hypothesis; leads to predictions
Proceeds from specific to general Proceeds from general to specific
A method of discovery A method of verification

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