PADILLA-RUMBAUA VS.

RUMBAUA
G.R. No. 166738 August 14, 2009

TOPIC: New Trial; Pleadings and Practice; Attorneys;

FACTS:

The present petition traces its roots to the petitioners complaint for the
declaration of nullity of marriage against the respondent before the RTC. The
petitioner alleged that the respondent was psychologically incapacitated to
exercise the essential obligations of marriage.

The RTC nullified the parties marriage. The Republic, through the OSG,
appealed the RTC decision to the CA. In its ruling, the CA observed that the
psychiatric report did not mention the cause of the respondents so-called
narcissistic personality disorder; and failed to explain why petitioner came to the
conclusion that the respondents incapacity was deep-seated and incurable.

The CA held that Article 36 of the Family Code requires the incapacity to
be psychological, although its manifestations may be physical. The illness must
be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not a refusal, neglect, or difficulty to
perform. Hence, the petition to SC.

The petitioner maintains that vacating the lower courts decisions and the
remand of the case to the RTC for further reception of evidence are procedurally
permissible. She argues that the inadequacy of her evidence during the trial was
the fault of her former counsel, Atty. Richard Tabago, and asserts that remanding
the case to the RTC would allow her to cure the evidentiary insufficiencies. She
posits in this regard that while mistakes of counsel bind a party, the rule should
be liberally construed in her favor to serve the ends of justice.

ISSUE: Whether the case should be remanded back to the RTC;

HELD:

NO. A remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings amounts to
the grant of a new trial that is not procedurally proper at this stage. Section 1 of
Rule 37 provides that an aggrieved party may move the trial court to set aside a
judgment or final order already rendered and to grant a new trial within the period
for taking an appeal. In addition, a motion for new trial may be filed only on the
grounds of (1) fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence that could not
have been guarded against by ordinary prudence, and by reason of which the
aggrieved partys rights have probably been impaired; or (2) newly discovered
evidence that, with reasonable diligence, the aggrieved party could not have
discovered and produced at the trial, and that would probably alter the result if
presented.
In the present case, the petitioner cites the inadequacy of the evidence
presented by her former counsel as basis for a remand. She did not, however,
specify the inadequacy. That the RTC granted the petition for declaration of
nullity prima facie shows that the petitioners counsel had not been negligent in
handling the case. Granting arguendo that the petitioners counsel had been
negligent, the negligence that would justify a new trial must be excusable, i.e.
one that ordinary diligence and prudence could not have guarded against. The
negligence that the petitioner apparently adverts to is that cited in Uy v. First
Metro Integrated Steel Corporation, 503 SCRA 704 (2006), where we explained:
Blunders and mistakes in the conduct of the proceedings in the trial court as a
result of the ignorance, inexperience or incompetence of counsel do not qualify
as a ground for new trial. If such were to be admitted as valid reasons for re-
opening cases, there would never be an end to litigation so long as a new
counsel could be employed to allege and show that the prior counsel had not
been sufficiently diligent, experienced or learned. This will put a premium on the
willful and intentional commission of errors by counsel, with a view to securing
new trials in the event of conviction, or an adverse decision, as in the instant
case.