Digested Cases in Wills and Succession

ATUN v. NUEZ
GR No.L-8018, October 26, 1955
87 PHIL 762

FACTS: Estefania Atun died without any issue leaving in the possession of the plaintiffs, her
neices and nephews, a parcel of land. Such land was delivered by plaintiff Gil Atun to Silvestra
Nuez (sister of defendant-appellee Eusebio Nuez) for cultivation, for which Silvestra paid the
Atuns a part of the harvest as rental. In 1940, Silvestra turned over the land to defendant Eusebio
Nuez, who thereafter refused to recognize plaintiffs' ownership or to deliver their share of the
produce. The defendant turn sold the land to his co-defendant Diego Belga, who took the
property with the knowledge that it belonged, not to Nuez, but to plaintiffs. There was no prior
judicial declaration, however, that the plaintiffs were the legal heirs of the decedent.

ISSUE: Has plaintiffs the right to recover the property as a successor of the decedent?

HELD: Yes. In the instant case, as the land in question still stands registered in the name of
Estefania Atun, now deceased, the present owners thereof would be her legal heirs. It is of record
that Estefania Atun died without any issue or ascendants and left as her only surviving heirs the
children of her brother Nicolas, plaintiffs herein; and the rule is settled that the legal heirs of a
deceased may file an action arising out of a right belonging to their ancestor, without a separate
judicial declaration of their status as such, provided there is no pending special proceeding for
the settlement of the decedent's estate.

LEDESMA v. MCLACHLIN
GR No.L-44837, November 23, 1938
66 PHIL 547

FACTS: Lorenzo Quitco, died in 1930, leaving defendant Mclachlin and her children as heirs.
Plaintiff Ana Ledesma, spurious/illegitimate child of Lorenzo Quitco, and her mother, sued to
declare her as compulsory heir which the court however denied. Two years later, Lorenzo's father
Eusebio died, and because he left some personal and real properties without a will, an intestate
proceeding was instituted and a court order declaring his compulsory heirs did not of course
include Ana as one. Following such court action, the plaintiff proceeded to collect the sum
payable on a promissory note then issued in favor of her by Lorenzo by filing a claim in the
intestate proceedings of Eusebio's Estate claiming that the sum be paid out of the properties
inherited by the defendants represents that of the successional rights of Lorenzo as a compulsory
heir of his father Eusebio.

ISSUE: Has plaintiff the right collect the sum promised by her father from her grandfather's
estate?
HELD: No. The properties inherited by the defendants from their deceased grandfather by
representation are not subject to the payment of debts and obligations of their deceased father,
who died without leaving any property. While it is true that under the provisions of Articles 924
to 927 of the Civil Code, a child presents his father or mother who died before him in the
properties of his grandfather or grandmother, this right of representation does not make the said
child answerable for the obligations contracted by his deceased father or mother, because, as may
be seen from the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure referring to partition of inheritances,
the inheritance is received with the benefit of inventory, that is to say, the heirs only answer with
the properties received from their predecessor. The herein defendants, as heirs of Eusebio Quitco,
in representation of their father Lorenzo M. Quitco, are not bound to pay the indebtedness of
their father from whom they did not inherit anything.

LIMJOCO v. INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO FRAGRANTE

GR No.L-770, April 27, 1948
80 PHIL 776

FACTS: Petitioner opposed the issuance by the Public Service Commission of a certificate of
public convenience to install, maintain and operate an ice plant in San Juan to the respondent
despite his demise, contending that the Commission erred in allowing the substitution of the
legal representative of the estate of Pedro O. Fragante for the latter as party applicant in the case
then pending before the commission, and in subsequently granting to said estate the certificate
applied for, which is said to be in contravention of law.

ISSUE: Is the decision of the Commission correct and with basis?

HELD: Yes. If the respondent had not died, there can be no question that he would have had the
right to prosecute his application before the commission to its final conclusion. No one would
have denied him that right... The aforesaid right of respondent to prosecute said application to its
conclusion was one which by its nature did not lapse through his death. Hence, it constitutes a
part of the assets of his estate, for which right was a property despite the possibility that in the
end the commission might have denied his application, although under the facts of the case, the
commission granted the application in view of the financial ability of the estate to maintain and
operate the ice plant.

USON v. DEL ROSARIO

GR No.L-4963, January 29, 1953
92 PHIL 530

FACTS: Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 leaving as an only heir his estranged wife Maria Uson,
the petitioner. The latter sued to recover the ownership and possession of five parcels of land
occupied by defendant Maria del Rosario, decedent's common-law-spouse and her children. As a
defense, defendant presented a deed of separation agreed upon and signed Faustino and Uson
containing among others an statement giving a parcel of land to Uson as an alimony and the
latter renouncing her rights to any inheritance from Faustino.
 The defendant also contends that while it is true that the four minor defendants are illegitimate
children of the decedent and under the old Civil Code are not entitled to any successional rights,
however, under the new Civil Code they are given the status and rights of natural children and
are entitled to the successional rights which the law accords to the latter (article 2264 and article
287, new Civil Code), and because these successional rights were declared for the first time in
the new code, they shall be given retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to
them may have occurred under the prior legislation (Article 2253, new Civil Code).

ISSUE: Are the contentions of the defendants correct?

HELD: No. It is evident that when the decedent died in 1945 the five parcels of land he was
seized of at the time passed from the moment of his death to his only heir, his widow Maria Uson
(Article 657, old Civil Code). As this Court aptly said, "The property belongs to the heirs at the
moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered
to them a deed for the same before his death" (Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321). From
that moment, therefore, the rights of inheritance of Maria Uson over the lands in question
became vested.
The claim of the defendants that Uson had relinquished her right over the lands in question in
view of her expressed renunciation to inherit any future property that her husband may acquire
and leave upon his death in the deed of separation they had entered into cannot be entertained for
the simple reason that future inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract nor can it be
renounced.
Nor does the contention that the provisions of the New Civil Code shall apply and be given
retroactive effect. Article 2253 above referred to provides indeed that rights which are declared
for the first time shall have retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them may
have occurred under the former legislation, but this is so only when the new rights do not
prejudice any vested or acquired right of the same origin... As already stated in the early part of
this decision, the right of ownership of Maria Uson over the lands in question became vested in
1945 upon the death of her late husband and this is so because of the imperative provision of the
law which commands that the rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of death
(Article 657, old Civil Code). The new right recognized by the new Civil Code in favor of the
illegitimate children of the deceased cannot, therefore, be asserted to the impairment of the
vested right of Maria Uson over the lands in dispute.

LITONJUA v. MONTILLA
GR No.L-4170, January 31, 1952, 90PHIL757
90 PHIL 757

FACTS: Pedro Litonjua obtained a judgment against Claudio Montilla for the payment of a sum
of P4,039. Failing to find or identify a property of Claudio to be levied, petitioner then proceeded
to file a claim in the intestate proceeding of the estate of Agustin Montilla Sr, father of the
deceased. The estate has not yet been properly probated.

ISSUE: Could the petitioner succeed in collecting the debt as against the estate of the debtor's
deceased parent?
HELD: No. In the case of Ortiga Brothers and Co. vs. Enage and Yap Tico, 18 Phil. 345, it was
held that the creditor of the heirs of a deceased person is entitled to collect his claim out of the
property which pertains by inheritance to said heirs, only after the debts of the testate or intestate
have been paid and when the net assets that are divisible among the heirs are known, because the
debts of the deceased must first be paid before his heirs can inherit. It was therein also held that a
person who is not a creditor of a deceased, testate or intestate, has no right to intervene either in
the proceedings brought in connection with the estate or in the settlement of the succession. The
foregoing pronouncements are perfectly applicable to the case at bar, because the appellant is not
a creditor of the deceased Agustin Montilla, Sr. and he seeks to collect his claim out of the
inheritance of Claudio Montilla, an heir, before the net assets of the intestate estate have been
determined.

DE GUZMAN vda. DE CARRILLO v. DE PAZ

GR No.L-4133, May 13, 1952
91 PHIL 265

FACTS: A lot had been mortgaged by spouses Severino Salak and Petra Garcia to Pedro Magat;
the latter then assigned the mortgage to Honoria Salak. After the death Petra, Severino
transferred 1/2 of his rights to the property to Honoria for the sum representing 1/2 of the
consideratioin paid by her to the mortgagees Magat. Severino later died leaving the defendants as
heirs. Honoria also died, with the plaintiff as heir. Intestate proceedings were instituted for the
settlement and distribution of the estate of the deceased Severino and Petra, including the lot in
question which was adjudicated, after proper proceedings in favor of the defendants. Plaintiff
sued for reconveyance of the 1/2 of the portion of the lot in her favor as heir of Honoria.

ISSUE: May the petition prosper?

HELD: No. The property now sought to be recovered from the defendants was adjudicated in
their favor after all claims, indebtedness and obligations chargeable against the intestate estate of
the deceased Severino Salak and Petra Garcia had been all paid and accounted for out of the
estate of the deceased; so that, in the eyes of the law, the properties now in the hands of the
defendants are presumed to be free from all claims whatsoever. The claim of the plaintiff set up
in the complaint should have been interposed during the pendency and progress of Special
Proceeding No. 3; but plaintiff not having done so, she cannot now bring this action against the
defendants, for it is clear that there exists no privity of contract between plaintiff and defendants
upon which plaintiff can predicate her action against the present defendants.

IBARLE v. PO
GR No.L-5064, February 27, 1953
92 PHIL 721

FACTS: Leonardo Winstanley died leaving a parcel of land to his surviving spouse Catalina
Navarro and some minor children. Catalina sold the entire parcel of land to Maria Canoy who
later sold the same land to the plaintiff Bienvenido Ibarle. After some time, after her appointment
as guardian of her minor children, Catalina again sold 1/2 of the land in question, which portion
now belonged to the children as heirs, to herein defendant Esperanza Po.

ISSUE: Which sale was valid, and who has the rightful claim to the property?

HELD: The sale to defendant is valid. Article 657 of the old Civil Code provides: "The rights to
the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of his death." in a slightly different
language, this article is incorporated in the new Civil Code as article 777.
The above provision and comment make it clear that when Catalina Navarro Vda. de
Winstanley sold the entire parcel to the Canoy spouses, one-half of it already belonged to the
seller's children. No formal or judicial declaration being needed to confirm the children's title, it
follows that the first sale was null and void in so far as it included the children's share.
On the other hand, the sale to the defendant having been made by authority of the competent
court was undeniably legal and effective. The fact that it has not been recorded is of no
consequence. If registration were necessary, still the non-registration would not avail the plaintiff
because it was due to no other cause than his own opposition.

OSORIO v. OSORIO
GR No.L-10474, March 29, 1916
41 PHIL 531

FACTS: Francisco Osorio y Garcia filed a written complaint alleging that he is a natural son of
one Francisco Osorio y Reyes who died in 1896; and that he had been in continuous possession
of the status of natural son of said Osorio y Reyes, as proven by direct acts of the latter and of his
family; that the defendant Soledad Osorio, lawful daughter and lawful heir of said Osorio y
Reyes, be ordered to recognize the plaintiff as a natural son of said Osorio y Reyes, and is
entitled to share in his father's estate; and, furthermore, that said defendant be ordered to furnish
subsistence to plaintiff in such amount as the court might deem proper to fix. The evidence
offered relating to the fact of filiation of Osorio y Garcia to Osorio Reyes is strong and
unimpeachable, so that the court found the legitimacy of claim of Osorio y Garcia to be properly
established.

ISSUE: Has the plaintiff the right to be recognized as co-heir and be entitled to the rights
appertaining to his deceased father's estate?

HELD: Yes. Recognition of the child as a natural child must be made if he has been in
continuous possession of his filiation, proven by the attendance of his father at his baptism, in the
certificate in which his name and that of his mother appear, though the document contains errors,
and by his father's statement to various friends that the boy was his natural son, and by his
father's always having attended to the care, education and support of his son.
So that the plaintiff, Francisco Osorio y Garcia, according to the facts proven in this case and
the law on the subject, is entitled to have his half sister Soledad Osorio, a legitimate daughter of
the father of both of them, recognize him as being the natural, recognized son of Francisco
Osorio y Reyes and as entitled to the rights granted him by law in respect to his deceased father's
estate, all of which is in possession of the defendant spouses.

RAMIREZ v. BALTAZAR
GR No.L-25049, August 30, 1968
22 SCRA 918

FACTS: Victoriana Eguaras, single, mortgaged a real estate to spouses Baltazar, defendants in
this case. Upon demise of Victoriana, the mortgagees, as creditors of the deceased, filed a
petition for the intestate proceedings of Victoriana's estate, alleging further that plaintiffs
Felimon and Monica Ramirez are heirs of the deceased. Felimon was later appointed as
adminstrator but did not qualify so that Artemio Diawan was appointed as judicial administrator
of the estate. The mortgagees then filed a foreclosure of the property in question and succeeded,
after Diawan failed to file an answer against the petition. The foreclosure sale ensued, the
property was bought by the mortgagees themselves and the sale was confirmed by the court.
Felimon sued for the annulment of the entire foreclosure proceedings, alleging among others the
failure of the judicial administrator to protect their interests. Defendants contended that plaintiffs
have no legal capacity to sue and hava no cause of action.

ISSUE: Have the plaintiffs the cause of action against the defendant?

HELD: Yes. There is no question that the rights to succession are automatically transmitted to the
heirs from the moment of the death of the decedent. While, as a rule, the formal declaration or
recognition to such successional rights needs judicial confirmation, this Court has, under special
circumstances, protected these rights from encroachments made or attempted before the judicial
declaration. In Pascual vs. Pascual, it was ruled that although heirs have no legal standing in
court upon the commencement of testate or intestate proceedings, this rule admits of an
exception as "when the administrator fails or refuses to act in which event the heirs may act in
his place."

DE BORJA v. MENCIAS
GR No.L-20609, September 29, 1966
21 SCRA 1133

FACTS: Petitioners Juan De Borja et al. petitioned for the reversal of the order of Judge
Mencias, denying their petition cause the sale of the properties levied upon to satisfy the money
judgment in a civil case rendered in favor of petitioners against respondent Crisanto de Borja.
Petitioners levied aganst the rights, interest and
participation which Crisanto de Borja had in certain real properties, as an heir of the decedents
Josefa Tangco and Francisco de Borja, whose estates were then pending settlement in Special
Proceedings Nos. F-7866 and 1955 of the aforementioned court, respectively.
this Court hereby holds that whatever interest, claim or right which Crisanto de Borja may have
in the testate estate of Josefa Tangco and in the intestate estate of Francisco de Borja are subject
to attachment and execution for the purpose of satisfying the money judgment rendered against
the said heir
ISSUE: May the sale of the property levied for execution proceed?

HELD: The above question must be answered in the affirmative, provided it is understood that
the sale shall be only of whatever rights, interest and participation may be adjudicated to said
heir as a result of the final settlement of the estates, and that delivery thereof to the judgment
creditor or to the purchaser at the public sale thereof shall be made only after the final settlement
of the estates and in the manner provided by the legal provision mentioned above.

RODRIGUEZ v. DE BORJA
GR No.L-21993, June 21, 1966
17 SCRA 418

FACTS: Private respondents Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan delivered to the Clerk of
Court of Bulacan a purported last will and testament of Fr. Rodriguez, meanwhile the petitioners
filed a petition before the court to examine the purported will but which was later withdrawn,
and a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of Fr. Rodriguez was subsequently field in
a another court in Rizal. The petitioners now sought the dismissal of the special proceeding on
the settlement of the decedent's estate based on the purported will, questioning therefore the
jurisdiction of CFI Bulacan.

ISSUE: Does CFI Bulacan have jurisdiction to proceed with the testate proceedings?

HELD: Yes. The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan became vested upon the
delivery thereto of the will of the late Father Rodriguez, even if no petition for its allowance was
filed until later, because upon the will being deposited the court could, motu proprio, have taken
steps to fix the time and place for proving the will, and issued the corresponding notices
conformably to what is prescribed by section 3, Rule 76, of the Revised Rules of Court.
Moreover, aside from the rule that the Court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the
estate of a decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts, intestate
succession is only subsidiary or subordinate to the testate, since intestacy only takes place in the
absence of a valid operative will.

CHAVEZ v. IAC
GR No. L-68282, November 8, 1990

FACTS: Manuela Buenavista assigned her paraphernal property in equal pro-diviso among her 6
children, while possession of such property still remains with her. Three of her children sold each
their share to private respondent Concepcion, consolidating 4/6 portion thereof. Deeds of sale
were therefor executed with the conformity of Manuela. Despite such transfers, the latter sold the
entire property to one of the siblings, herein petitioner Raquel Chavez. Respondent sued for the
annulment of the later sale to Raquel which was denied by the trail court but which later decision
overturned by the Court of Appeals. On appeal, petitioner also contends that their mother has left
a last will and this will supercedes the earlier transfers.

ISSUE: Is partition inter-vivos, and sale based on such partition valid? Does a last will supercede
that of the partition inter-vivos?

HELD: Yes. When a person makes a partition by will, it is imperative that such partition must be
executed in accordance with the provisions of the law on wills; however, when a person makes
the partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, such partition may even be oral or written, and
need not be in the form of a will, provided that the partition does not prejudice the legitime of
compulsory heirs. xxx The Deeds of Sale are not contracts entered into with respect to future
inheritance but a contract perfected and consummated during the lifetime of Manuela Buenavista
who signed the same and gave her consent thereto. Such partition inter vivos, executed by the
property owner herself, is valid.
It would be unjust and inequitable to allow Manuela Buenavista Vda. de Chavez to revoke the
sales she herself authorized as well as the sale she herself executed in favor of her son only to
execute a simulated sale in favor of her daughter Raquel who had already profited from the sale
she made of the property she had received in the partition inter vivos.

NERI v. AKUTIN
GR No.L-47799, May 21, 1943
74 PHIL 185

FACTS: This is a case where the testator Agripino Neri in his will left all his property by
universal title to the children by his second marriage, the herein respondents, with omission of
the children by his first marriage, the herein petitioner. The omission of the heirs in the will was
contemplated by the testator with the belief that he had already given each of the children portion
of the inheritance, particularly a land he had abandoned was occupied by the respondents over
which registration was denied for it turned out to be a public land, and an aggregate amount of
money which the respondents were indebted to their father.

ISSUE: Should there be cancellation of the will, in view of the omission of heirs? Is there
disinheritance in this case?

HELD: Yes. The Court annulled the institution of heirs and declared a total intestacy on the
ground that testator left all his property by universal title to the children by his second marriage,
without expressly disinheriting the children by his first marriage but upon the erroneous belief
that he had given them already more shares in his property than those given to the children by his
second marriage. Disinheritance made without a statement of the cause, if contested, shall annul
the institution of heirs in so far as it is prejudicial to the disinherited person. This is but a case of
preterition which annuls the institution of heirs.

BARANDA v. BARANDA
GR No.73275 May 20, 1987
FACTS: Paulina Baranda died without issue, but before her demise, two of her supposed heirs,
the herein respondents Evangelina and Elisa Baranda, have already taken possession of 6 parcels
of land and caused the transfer of such by virtue of questionable sales which the late widow had
also sought the reconveyance which did not however materialized. The petitioners, siblings of
the decedent, now sought the annulment of the supposed sale or transfers. Respondents question
the petitioners legal standing, them being not a party-in-interest in the deed of sale.

ISSUE: Can the petitioners impugn the validity of the sales?

HELD: This Court has repeatedly held that "the legal heirs of a decedent are the parties in
interest to commence ordinary actions arising out of the rights belonging to the deceased,
without separate judicial declaration as to their being heirs of said decedent, provided that there
is no pending special proceeding for the settlement of the decedent's estate.
There being no pending special proceeding for the settlement of Paulina Baranda's estate, the
petitioners, as her intestate heirs, had the right to sue for the reconveyance of the disputed
properties, not to them, but to the estate itself of the decedent, for distribution later in accordance
with law. Otherwise, no one else could question the simulated sales and the subjects thereof
would remain in the name of the alleged vendees, who would thus have been permitted to benefit
from their deception, In fact, even if it were assumed that those suing through attorneys-in-fact
were not properly represented, the remaining petitioners would still have sufficed to impugn the
validity of the deeds of sale.

BALAIS v. BALAIS
GR No.L-33924, March 18, 1988
159 SCRA 47

FACTS: On an action for recovery of real property filed by the respondents, spurious children of
the late Escolastico Balais who died in 1948, against the petitioners, legitimate children of the
deceased, the trial court decreed reconveyance of the portion of the property belonging to the
legitime and further declaring partition that sent 1/4 portion of the legitime to the respondents.
Petitioners come now questioning the partition and seeking the reconveyance of the 1/4 share
that went to the spurious children, relying on the provisions of the old civil code, and thereby
questioning the competence and jurisdiction of the trial court,

ISSUE: Is the court competent to decree the partition, without it being asked in the complaint?
Could the provisions of the new civil code be applied over a case which occurs prior to its
effectivity?

HELD: 1. Yes. The court acquired jurisdiction by estoppel. It must be noted that, in spite of the
broad challenge the appellants present against the jurisdiction of the trial court to order the
distribution of the property, they, in reality, question only that part of the decision awarding a
one-fourth part of the property to the illegitimate children of the deceased, upon the ground that
under the old Civil Code illegitimate children other than natural enjoyed no successionary rights.
They do not contest the delivery of the estate to the deceased's widow or to themselves in the
proportions decreed by the court.
2. No. The court erred in applying the provisions of the new code. But as stated, the error of the
court notwithstanding, the case is a closed chapter, the decision having been rendered by a court
of competent jurisdiction, have become final and executory. A decision, no matter how
erroneous, becomes the law of the case between the parties upon attaining finality.

CONDE v. ABAYA
GR No.L-4275, March 23, 1909
13 PHIL 249

FACTS: Casiano Abaya died unmarried however leaving two unaknowledged children by herein
plaintiff-appellee Paula Conde. The latter, as a ascendant heir of her children, sued for the
settlement of the intestate estate of Casiano along with the acknowledgment of the two as natural
children of the deceased. The trial court, with the opposition of the defendant-appellant Roman
Abaya, brother of the deceased, rendered judgment bestowing the estate of Casiano to Conde as
legitimate heir of the decedent's natural children.

ISSUE: May the mother of a natural child now deceased, bring an action for the
acknowledgment of the natural filiation in favor of such child in order to appear in his behalf to
receive the inheritance from the deceased natural father.

HELD: The right of action that devolves upon the child to claim his legitimacy lasts during his
whole life, while the right to claim the acknowledgment of a natural child lasts only during the
life of his presumed parents. An action for the acknowledgment of a natural child may, as an
exception, be exercised against the heirs of the presumed parents in two cases: first, in the event
of the death of the latter during the minority of the child, and second, upon the discovery of some
instrument of express acknowledgment of the child, executed by the father or mother, the
existence of which was unknown during the life of the latter.
But such action for the acknowledgment of a natural child can only be exercised by him. It
cannot be transmitted to his descendants, or his ascendants.

REIRA v. PALMAROLI
GR No.14851, September 13, 1919
40 PHIL 105

FACTS: Antonia Reira, widow of Juan Pons who was at the time of the latter's death residing at
Palma de Mallorca, sought the annulment of the order of the trial court admitting the probate of a
purported will of her husband. The purported will was submitted to be admitted to probate by
respondent Consul General Palmaroli. The petitioner contends that the probate of the will, in
view of her absence, deprived her of her right to contest the original application.

ISSUE: Should the probated will yield to the rights of the decedent's heir?
HELD: Yes. A will is nothing more than a species of conveyance whereby a person is permitted,
with the formalities prescribed by law, to control in a certain degree the disposition of his
property after his death. Out of consideration for the important interests involved the execution
and proof of wills has been surrounded by numerous safeguards, among which is the provision
that after death of the testator his will may be judicially established in court. xxx The probate of a
will, while conclusive as to its due execution, in no wise involves the intrinsic validity of its
provisions. If, therefore, upon the distribution of the estate of the decedent, it should appear that
any provision of his will is contrary to the law applicable to his case, the will must necessarily
yield upon that point and the disposition made by law must prevail.

MONTINOLA v. HERBOSA

FACTS: Montinola filed an action against the heirs of Dr. Jose Rizal for recovery of possession
of personal property (the RIZAL RELICS) allegedly sold to him by Doa Trinidad Rizal. The
trial court held that neither party is entitled to the possession of such property, relying principally
on the fact that in Rizal's Mi Ultimo Adios, there is a line where Rizal bequeathed all his
property to the Filipino people. The court argued that the handwritten work of Rizal constitutes a
holographic will giving the State all his property.

ISSUE: Does Mi Ultimo Adios constitute a last will?

HELD: No. An instrument which merely expresses a last wish as a thought or advice but does
not contain a disposition of property, and executed without Animus Standi cannot be legally
considered a will. Rizal's Mi Ultimo Adios is but a literary piece of work, and was so intended. It
may be considered a will in a grammatical sense but not in a legal or juridical sense. Moreover, it
also lacks the requirements of a holographic will such as a statement of the year month and day
of its execution and his signature.

MERZA v. PORRAS
GR No.L-4888, May 25, 1953
93 PHIL 142

FACTS: Pilar Montealegre died leaving a will (Exhibit A) and a so-called codicil (Exhibit B),
disinheriting her husband Pedro Porras and some of her relatives. The two documents were
submitted to probate but were denied by the trial court, upon the grounds such as the defect of
the attestation clause on Exh. A and that Exh. cannot be considered a codicil for it was executed
by the testator a day before Exhibit A, thus it cannot be included in the probate proceedings.

ISSUE: Should a document, expressly disinheriting certain heirs, executed by the testator prior to
a supposed last will, be probated?

HELD: Yes. The trial court and the CA is correct that Exhibit B having been executed one day
before Exhibit A could not be considered as a codicil "because a codicil, as the word implies, is
only an addition to, or modification of, the will." The Court of Appeals added that "the contents
of Exhibit B are couched in the language ordinarily used in a simple affidavit and as such, may
not have the legal effect and force to a testamentary disposition."
However, Exhibit B does partake of the nature of a will. A will is defined in article 667 of the
Civil code of Spain as "the act by which a person dispose of all his property or a portion of it,"
and in article 783 of the new Civil Code as "an act whereby a person is permitted, with the
formalities prescribed by law, to control to a certain degree the disposition of his estate, to take
effect after his death. Exhibit B comes within this definition.

CASTAEDA v. ALEMANY
GR No.1439, March 19, 1904
3 PHIL 426

FACTS: Appellant constested the validity of the will of Doa Juana Moreno upon the ground that
although the attestation clause in the will states that the testator signed the will in the presence of
three witnesses who also each signed in each presence, the will was not actually written by the
testator.

ISSUE: Is it necessary that a will be written by the testator herself?

HELD: No. Section 618 of the Civil Code requires (1) that the will be in writing and (2) either
that the testator sign it himself or, if he does not sign it, that it be signed by some one in his
presence and by his express direction. Who does the mechanical work of writing the will is a
matter of indifference. The fact, therefore, that in this case the will was typewritten in the office
of the lawyer for the testratrix is of no consequence.

MICIANO v. BRIMO
GR No.L-22595, November 1, 1927
50 PHIL 867

FACTS: Joseph Brimo, a Turkish national, died leaving a will which one of the clauses states
that the law of the Philippines shall govern the partition and not the law of his nationality, and
that legatees have to respect the will, otherwise the dispositions accruing to them shall be
annulled. By virtue of such condition, his brother, Andre Brimo, an instituted heir was thus
excluded because, by his action of having opposed the partition scheme, he did not respect the
will. Andre sued contending that the conditions are void being contrary to law which provides
that the will shall be probated according to the laws of the nationality of the decedent.

ISSUE: Is the condition as set by the testator valid?

HELD: No. A foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance
with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot
be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 of the Civil Code states said national law
should govern. Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is considered
unwritten, and the institution of legatees in said will is unconditional and consequently valid and
effective even as to the herein oppositor.

BELLIS v. BELLIS
GR No.L-23678, June 6, 1967
20 SCRA 358

FACTS: Amos G. Bellis, a native of Texas and US national, executed a will in the Philippines
that specifies legacies for his first wife and three illegitimate children, and the residue estate be
divided among his legitimate children. When he died, the executor administered the will but his
illegitimate children opposed the partition claiming that aside from the legacies, they should still
have a share from the legitime as complusory heirs of the decedent. Texas law, however, does not
provide for the legitime.

ISSUE: Are the decedent's illegitimate children entitled to such portion of the legitime? What
law shall govern the decendent's will?

HELD: No. The parties admit that the decedent was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and
that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes. Accordingly, since the
intrinsic validity of the provision of the will and the amount of successional rights are to be
determined under Texas law, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of
Amos G. Bellis. Hence, the illegitimate children of the decedent has no claim to the inheritance
aside from those expressly provided legacies.

ATUN v. NUEZ
GR No.L-8018, October 26, 1955
87 PHIL 762

FACTS: Estefania Atun died without any issue leaving in the possession of the plaintiffs, her
neices and nephews, a parcel of land. Such land was delivered by plaintiff Gil Atun to Silvestra
Nuez (sister of defendant-appellee Eusebio Nuez) for cultivation, for which Silvestra paid the
Atuns a part of the harvest as rental. In 1940, Silvestra turned over the land to defendant Eusebio
Nuez, who thereafter refused to recognize plaintiffs' ownership or to deliver their share of the
produce. The defendant turn sold the land to his co-defendant Diego Belga, who took the
property with the knowledge that it belonged, not to Nuez, but to plaintiffs. There was no prior
judicial declaration, however, that the plaintiffs were the legal heirs of the decedent.

ISSUE: Has plaintiffs the right to recover the property as a successor of the decedent?

HELD: Yes. In the instant case, as the land in question still stands registered in the name of
Estefania Atun, now deceased, the present owners thereof would be her legal heirs. It is of record
that Estefania Atun died without any issue or ascendants and left as her only surviving heirs the
children of her brother Nicolas, plaintiffs herein; and the rule is settled that the legal heirs of a
deceased may file an action arising out of a right belonging to their ancestor, without a separate
judicial declaration of their status as such, provided there is no pending special proceeding for
the settlement of the decedent's estate.

LEDESMA v. MCLACHLIN
GR No.L-44837, November 23, 1938
66 PHIL 547

FACTS: Lorenzo Quitco, died in 1930, leaving defendant Mclachlin and her children as heirs.
Plaintiff Ana Ledesma, spurious/illegitimate child of Lorenzo Quitco, and her mother, sued to
declare her as compulsory heir which the court however denied. Two years later, Lorenzo's father
Eusebio died, and because he left some personal and real properties without a will, an intestate
proceeding was instituted and a court order declaring his compulsory heirs did not of course
include Ana as one. Following such court action, the plaintiff proceeded to collect the sum
payable on a promissory note then issued in favor of her by Lorenzo by filing a claim in the
intestate proceedings of Eusebio's Estate claiming that the sum be paid out of the properties
inherited by the defendants represents that of the successional rights of Lorenzo as a compulsory
heir of his father Eusebio.

ISSUE: Has plaintiff the right collect the sum promised by her father from her grandfather's
estate?

HELD: No. The properties inherited by the defendants from their deceased grandfather by
representation are not subject to the payment of debts and obligations of their deceased father,
who died without leaving any property. While it is true that under the provisions of Articles 924
to 927 of the Civil Code, a child presents his father or mother who died before him in the
properties of his grandfather or grandmother, this right of representation does not make the said
child answerable for the obligations contracted by his deceased father or mother, because, as may
be seen from the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure referring to partition of inheritances,
the inheritance is received with the benefit of inventory, that is to say, the heirs only answer with
the properties received from their predecessor. The herein defendants, as heirs of Eusebio Quitco,
in representation of their father Lorenzo M. Quitco, are not bound to pay the indebtedness of
their father from whom they did not inherit anything.

LIMJOCO v. INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO FRAGRANTE

GR No.L-770, April 27, 1948
80 PHIL 776

FACTS: Petitioner opposed the issuance by the Public Service Commission of a certificate of
public convenience to install, maintain and operate an ice plant in San Juan to the respondent
despite his demise, contending that the Commission erred in allowing the substitution of the
legal representative of the estate of Pedro O. Fragante for the latter as party applicant in the case
then pending before the commission, and in subsequently granting to said estate the certificate
applied for, which is said to be in contravention of law.
ISSUE: Is the decision of the Commission correct and with basis?

HELD: Yes. If the respondent had not died, there can be no question that he would have had the
right to prosecute his application before the commission to its final conclusion. No one would
have denied him that right... The aforesaid right of respondent to prosecute said application to its
conclusion was one which by its nature did not lapse through his death. Hence, it constitutes a
part of the assets of his estate, for which right was a property despite the possibility that in the
end the commission might have denied his application, although under the facts of the case, the
commission granted the application in view of the financial ability of the estate to maintain and
operate the ice plant.

USON v. DEL ROSARIO

GR No.L-4963, January 29, 1953
92 PHIL 530

FACTS: Faustino Nebreda died in 1945 leaving as an only heir his estranged wife Maria Uson,
the petitioner. The latter sued to recover the ownership and possession of five parcels of land
occupied by defendant Maria del Rosario, decedent's common-law-spouse and her children. As a
defense, defendant presented a deed of separation agreed upon and signed Faustino and Uson
containing among others an statement giving a parcel of land to Uson as an alimony and the
latter renouncing her rights to any inheritance from Faustino.
The defendant also contends that while it is true that the four minor defendants are illegitimate
children of the decedent and under the old Civil Code are not entitled to any successional rights,
however, under the new Civil Code they are given the status and rights of natural children and
are entitled to the successional rights which the law accords to the latter (article 2264 and article
287, new Civil Code), and because these successional rights were declared for the first time in
the new code, they shall be given retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to
them may have occurred under the prior legislation (Article 2253, new Civil Code).

ISSUE: Are the contentions of the defendants correct?

HELD: No. It is evident that when the decedent died in 1945 the five parcels of land he was
seized of at the time passed from the moment of his death to his only heir, his widow Maria Uson
(Article 657, old Civil Code). As this Court aptly said, "The property belongs to the heirs at the
moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered
to them a deed for the same before his death" (Ilustre vs. Alaras Frondosa, 17 Phil., 321). From
that moment, therefore, the rights of inheritance of Maria Uson over the lands in question
became vested.
The claim of the defendants that Uson had relinquished her right over the lands in question in
view of her expressed renunciation to inherit any future property that her husband may acquire
and leave upon his death in the deed of separation they had entered into cannot be entertained for
the simple reason that future inheritance cannot be the subject of a contract nor can it be
renounced.
Nor does the contention that the provisions of the New Civil Code shall apply and be given
retroactive effect. Article 2253 above referred to provides indeed that rights which are declared
for the first time shall have retroactive effect even though the event which gave rise to them may
have occurred under the former legislation, but this is so only when the new rights do not
prejudice any vested or acquired right of the same origin... As already stated in the early part of
this decision, the right of ownership of Maria Uson over the lands in question became vested in
1945 upon the death of her late husband and this is so because of the imperative provision of the
law which commands that the rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of death
(Article 657, old Civil Code). The new right recognized by the new Civil Code in favor of the
illegitimate children of the deceased cannot, therefore, be asserted to the impairment of the
vested right of Maria Uson over the lands in dispute.

LITONJUA v. MONTILLA
GR No.L-4170, January 31, 1952, 90PHIL757
90 PHIL 757

FACTS: Pedro Litonjua obtained a judgment against Claudio Montilla for the payment of a sum
of P4,039. Failing to find or identify a property of Claudio to be levied, petitioner then proceeded
to file a claim in the intestate proceeding of the estate of Agustin Montilla Sr, father of the
deceased. The estate has not yet been properly probated.

ISSUE: Could the petitioner succeed in collecting the debt as against the estate of the debtor's
deceased parent?

HELD: No. In the case of Ortiga Brothers and Co. vs. Enage and Yap Tico, 18 Phil. 345, it was
held that the creditor of the heirs of a deceased person is entitled to collect his claim out of the
property which pertains by inheritance to said heirs, only after the debts of the testate or intestate
have been paid and when the net assets that are divisible among the heirs are known, because the
debts of the deceased must first be paid before his heirs can inherit. It was therein also held that a
person who is not a creditor of a deceased, testate or intestate, has no right to intervene either in
the proceedings brought in connection with the estate or in the settlement of the succession. The
foregoing pronouncements are perfectly applicable to the case at bar, because the appellant is not
a creditor of the deceased Agustin Montilla, Sr. and he seeks to collect his claim out of the
inheritance of Claudio Montilla, an heir, before the net assets of the intestate estate have been
determined.

DE GUZMAN vda. DE CARRILLO v. DE PAZ

GR No.L-4133, May 13, 1952
91 PHIL 265

FACTS: A lot had been mortgaged by spouses Severino Salak and Petra Garcia to Pedro Magat;
the latter then assigned the mortgage to Honoria Salak. After the death Petra, Severino
transferred 1/2 of his rights to the property to Honoria for the sum representing 1/2 of the
consideratioin paid by her to the mortgagees Magat. Severino later died leaving the defendants as
heirs. Honoria also died, with the plaintiff as heir. Intestate proceedings were instituted for the
settlement and distribution of the estate of the deceased Severino and Petra, including the lot in
question which was adjudicated, after proper proceedings in favor of the defendants. Plaintiff
sued for reconveyance of the 1/2 of the portion of the lot in her favor as heir of Honoria.

ISSUE: May the petition prosper?

HELD: No. The property now sought to be recovered from the defendants was adjudicated in
their favor after all claims, indebtedness and obligations chargeable against the intestate estate of
the deceased Severino Salak and Petra Garcia had been all paid and accounted for out of the
estate of the deceased; so that, in the eyes of the law, the properties now in the hands of the
defendants are presumed to be free from all claims whatsoever. The claim of the plaintiff set up
in the complaint should have been interposed during the pendency and progress of Special
Proceeding No. 3; but plaintiff not having done so, she cannot now bring this action against the
defendants, for it is clear that there exists no privity of contract between plaintiff and defendants
upon which plaintiff can predicate her action against the present defendants.

IBARLE v. PO
GR No.L-5064, February 27, 1953
92 PHIL 721

FACTS: Leonardo Winstanley died leaving a parcel of land to his surviving spouse Catalina
Navarro and some minor children. Catalina sold the entire parcel of land to Maria Canoy who
later sold the same land to the plaintiff Bienvenido Ibarle. After some time, after her appointment
as guardian of her minor children, Catalina again sold 1/2 of the land in question, which portion
now belonged to the children as heirs, to herein defendant Esperanza Po.

ISSUE: Which sale was valid, and who has the rightful claim to the property?

HELD: The sale to defendant is valid. Article 657 of the old Civil Code provides: "The rights to
the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of his death." in a slightly different
language, this article is incorporated in the new Civil Code as article 777.
The above provision and comment make it clear that when Catalina Navarro Vda. de
Winstanley sold the entire parcel to the Canoy spouses, one-half of it already belonged to the
seller's children. No formal or judicial declaration being needed to confirm the children's title, it
follows that the first sale was null and void in so far as it included the children's share.
On the other hand, the sale to the defendant having been made by authority of the competent
court was undeniably legal and effective. The fact that it has not been recorded is of no
consequence. If registration were necessary, still the non-registration would not avail the plaintiff
because it was due to no other cause than his own opposition.

OSORIO v. OSORIO
GR No.L-10474, March 29, 1916
41 PHIL 531
FACTS: Francisco Osorio y Garcia filed a written complaint alleging that he is a natural son of
one Francisco Osorio y Reyes who died in 1896; and that he had been in continuous possession
of the status of natural son of said Osorio y Reyes, as proven by direct acts of the latter and of his
family; that the defendant Soledad Osorio, lawful daughter and lawful heir of said Osorio y
Reyes, be ordered to recognize the plaintiff as a natural son of said Osorio y Reyes, and is
entitled to share in his father's estate; and, furthermore, that said defendant be ordered to furnish
subsistence to plaintiff in such amount as the court might deem proper to fix. The evidence
offered relating to the fact of filiation of Osorio y Garcia to Osorio Reyes is strong and
unimpeachable, so that the court found the legitimacy of claim of Osorio y Garcia to be properly
established.

ISSUE: Has plaintiff the right to be recognized as co-heir and be entitled to the rights
appertaining to his deceased father's estate?

HELD: Yes. Recognition of the child as a natural child must be made if he has been in
continuous possession of his filiation, proven by the attendance of his father at his baptism, in the
certificate in which his name and that of his mother appear, though the document contains errors,
and by his father's statement to various friends that the boy was his natural son, and by his
father's always having attended to the care, education and support of his son.
So that the plaintiff, Francisco Osorio y Garcia, according to the facts proven in this case and
the law on the subject, is entitled to have his half sister Soledad Osorio, a legitimate daughter of
the father of both of them, recognize him as being the natural, recognized son of Francisco
Osorio y Reyes and as entitled to the rights granted him by law in respect to his deceased father's
estate, all of which is in possession of the defendant spouses.

RAMIREZ v. BALTAZAR
GR No.L-25049, August 30, 1968
22 SCRA 918

FACTS: Victoriana Eguaras, single, mortgaged a real estate to spouses Baltazar, defendants in
this case. Upon demise of Victoriana, the mortgagees, as creditors of the deceased, filed a
petition for the intestate proceedings of Victoriana's estate, alleging further that plaintiffs
Felimon and Monica Ramirez are heirs of the deceased. Felimon was later appointed as
adminstrator but did not qualify so that Artemio Diawan was appointed as judicial administrator
of the estate. The mortgagees then filed a foreclosure of the property in question and succeeded,
after Diawan failed to file an answer against the petition. The foreclosure sale ensued, the
property was bought by the mortgagees themselves and the sale was confirmed by the court.
Felimon sued for the annulment of the entire foreclosure proceedings, alleging among others the
failure of the judicial administrator to protect their interests. Defendants contended that plaintiffs
have no legal capacity to sue and hava no cause of action.

ISSUE: Have plaintiffs the cause of action against the defendant?

HELD: Yes. There is no question that the rights to succession are automatically transmitted to the
heirs from the moment of the death of the decedent. While, as a rule, the formal declaration or
recognition to such successional rights needs judicial confirmation, this Court has, under special
circumstances, protected these rights from encroachments made or attempted before the judicial
declaration. In Pascual vs. Pascual, it was ruled that although heirs have no legal standing in
court upon the commencement of testate or intestate proceedings, this rule admits of an
exception as "when the administrator fails or refuses to act in which event the heirs may act in
his place."

DE BORJA v. MENCIAS
GR No.L-20609, September 29, 1966
21 SCRA 1133

FACTS: Petitioners Juan De Borja et al. petitioned for the reversal of the order of Judge
Mencias, denying their petition cause the sale of the properties levied upon to satisfy the money
judgment in a civil case rendered in favor of petitioners against respondent Crisanto de Borja.
Petitioners levied aganst the rights, interest and
participation which Crisanto de Borja had in certain real properties, as an heir of the decedents
Josefa Tangco and Francisco de Borja, whose estates were then pending settlement in Special
Proceedings Nos. F-7866 and 1955 of the aforementioned court, respectively.
this Court hereby holds that whatever interest, claim or right which Crisanto de Borja may have
in the testate estate of Josefa Tangco and in the intestate estate of Francisco de Borja are subject
to attachment and execution for the purpose of satisfying the money judgment rendered against
the said heir
ISSUE: May the sale of the property levied for execution proceed?

HELD: The above question must be answered in the affirmative, provided it is understood that
the sale shall be only of whatever rights, interest and participation may be adjudicated to said
heir as a result of the final settlement of the estates, and that delivery thereof to the judgment
creditor or to the purchaser at the public sale thereof shall be made only after the final settlement
of the estates and in the manner provided by the legal provision mentioned above.

RODRIGUEZ v. DE BORJA
GR No.L-21993, June 21, 1966
17 SCRA 418

FACTS: Private respondents Apolonia Pangilinan and Adelaida Jacalan delivered to the Clerk of
Court of Bulacan a purported last will and testament of Fr. Rodriguez, meanwhile the petitioners
filed a petition before the court to examine the purported will but which was later withdrawn,
and a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of Fr. Rodriguez was subsequently field in
a another court in Rizal. The petitioners now sought the dismissal of the special proceeding on
the settlement of the decedent's estate based on the purported will, questioning therefore the
jurisdiction of CFI Bulacan.

ISSUE: Does CFI Bulacan have jurisdiction to proceed with the testate proceedings?
HELD: Yes. The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan became vested upon the
delivery thereto of the will of the late Father Rodriguez, even if no petition for its allowance was
filed until later, because upon the will being deposited the court could, motu proprio, have taken
steps to fix the time and place for proving the will, and issued the corresponding notices
conformably to what is prescribed by section 3, Rule 76, of the Revised Rules of Court.
Moreover, aside from the rule that the Court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the
estate of a decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts, intestate
succession is only subsidiary or subordinate to the testate, since intestacy only takes place in the
absence of a valid operative will.

CHAVEZ v. IAC
GR No. L-68282, November 8, 1990

FACTS: Manuela Buenavista assigned her paraphernal property in equal pro-diviso among her 6
children, while possession of such property still remains with her. Three of her children sold each
their share to private respondent Concepcion, consolidating 4/6 portion thereof. Deeds of sale
were therefor executed with the conformity of Manuela. Despite such transfers, the latter sold the
entire property to one of the siblings, herein petitioner Raquel Chavez. Respondent sued for the
annulment of the later sale to Raquel which was denied by the trail court but which later decision
overturned by the Court of Appeals. On appeal, petitioner also contends that their mother has left
a last will and this will supercedes the earlier transfers.

ISSUE: Is partition inter-vivos, and sale based on such partition valid? Does a last will supercede
that of the partition inter-vivos?

HELD: Yes. When a person makes a partition by will, it is imperative that such partition must be
executed in accordance with the provisions of the law on wills; however, when a person makes
the partition of his estate by an act inter vivos, such partition may even be oral or written, and
need not be in the form of a will, provided that the partition does not prejudice the legitime of
compulsory heirs. xxx The Deeds of Sale are not contracts entered into with respect to future
inheritance but a contract perfected and consummated during the lifetime of Manuela Buenavista
who signed the same and gave her consent thereto. Such partition inter vivos, executed by the
property owner herself, is valid.
It would be unjust and inequitable to allow Manuela Buenavista Vda. de Chavez to revoke the
sales she herself authorized as well as the sale she herself executed in favor of her son only to
execute a simulated sale in favor of her daughter Raquel who had already profited from the sale
she made of the property she had received in the partition inter vivos.

NERI v. AKUTIN
GR No.L-47799, May 21, 1943
74 PHIL 185

FACTS: This is a case where the testator Agripino Neri in his will left all his property by
universal title to the children by his second marriage, the herein respondents, with omission of
the children by his first marriage, the herein petitioner. The omission of the heirs in the will was
contemplated by the testator with the belief that he had already given each of the children portion
of the inheritance, particularly a land he had abandoned was occupied by the respondents over
which registration was denied for it turned out to be a public land, and an aggregate amount of
money which the respondents were indebted to their father.

ISSUE: Should there be cancellation of the will, in view of the omission of heirs? Is there
disinheritance in this case?

HELD: Yes. The Court annulled the institution of heirs and declared a total intestacy on the
ground that testator left all his property by universal title to the children by his second marriage,
without expressly disinheriting the children by his first marriage but upon the erroneous belief
that he had given them already more shares in his property than those given to the children by his
second marriage. Disinheritance made without a statement of the cause, if contested, shall annul
the institution of heirs in so far as it is prejudicial to the disinherited person. This is but a case of
preterition which annuls the institution of heirs.

BARANDA v. BARANDA
GR No.73275 May 20, 1987

FACTS: Paulina Baranda died without issue, but before her demise, two of her supposed heirs,
the herein respondents Evangelina and Elisa Baranda, have already taken possession of 6 parcels
of land and caused the transfer of such by virtue of questionable sales which the late widow had
also sought the reconveyance which did not however materialized. The petitioners, siblings of
the decedent, now sought the annulment of the supposed sale or transfers. Respondents question
the petitioners legal standing, them being not a party-in-interest in the deed of sale.

ISSUE: Can the petitioners impugn the validity of the sales?

HELD: This Court has repeatedly held that "the legal heirs of a decedent are the parties in
interest to commence ordinary actions arising out of the rights belonging to the deceased,
without separate judicial declaration as to their being heirs of said decedent, provided that there
is no pending special proceeding for the settlement of the decedent's estate.
There being no pending special proceeding for the settlement of Paulina Baranda's estate, the
petitioners, as her intestate heirs, had the right to sue for the reconveyance of the disputed
properties, not to them, but to the estate itself of the decedent, for distribution later in accordance
with law. Otherwise, no one else could question the simulated sales and the subjects thereof
would remain in the name of the alleged vendees, who would thus have been permitted to benefit
from their deception, In fact, even if it were assumed that those suing through attorneys-in-fact
were not properly represented, the remaining petitioners would still have sufficed to impugn the
validity of the deeds of sale.
BALAIS v. BALAIS
GR No.L-33924, March 18, 1988
159 SCRA 47

FACTS: On an action for recovery of real property filed by the respondents, spurious children of
the late Escolastico Balais who died in 1948, against the petitioners, legitimate children of the
deceased, the trial court decreed reconveyance of the portion of the property belonging to the
legitime and further declaring partition that sent 1/4 portion of the legitime to the respondents.
Petitioners come now questioning the partition and seeking the reconveyance of the 1/4 share
that went to the spurious children, relying on the provisions of the old civil code, and thereby
questioning the competence and jurisdiction of the trial court,

ISSUE: Is the court competent to decree the partition, without it being asked in the complaint?
Could the provisions of the new civil code be applied over a case which occurs prior to its
effectivity?

HELD: 1. Yes. The court acquired jurisdiction by estoppel. It must be noted that, in spite of the
broad challenge the appellants present against the jurisdiction of the trial court to order the
distribution of the property, they, in reality, question only that part of the decision awarding a
one-fourth part of the property to the illegitimate children of the deceased, upon the ground that
under the old Civil Code illegitimate children other than natural enjoyed no successionary rights.
They do not contest the delivery of the estate to the deceased's widow or to themselves in the
proportions decreed by the court.
2. No. The court erred in applying the provisions of the new code. But as stated, the error of the
court notwithstanding, the case is a closed chapter, the decision having been rendered by a court
of competent jurisdiction, have become final and executory. A decision, no matter how
erroneous, becomes the law of the case between the parties upon attaining finality.

CONDE v. ABAYA
GR No.L-4275, March 23, 1909
13 PHIL 249

FACTS: Casiano Abaya died unmarried however leaving two unaknowledged children by herein
plaintiff-appellee Paula Conde. The latter, as a ascendant heir of her children, sued for the
settlement of the intestate estate of Casiano along with the acknowledgment of the two as natural
children of the deceased. The trial court, with the opposition of the defendant-appellant Roman
Abaya, brother of the deceased, rendered judgment bestowing the estate of Casiano to Conde as
legitimate heir of the decedent's natural children.

ISSUE: May the mother of a natural child now deceased, bring an action for the
acknowledgment of the natural filiation in favor of such child in order to appear in his behalf to
receive the inheritance from the deceased natural father.

HELD: The right of action that devolves upon the child to claim his legitimacy lasts during his
whole life, while the right to claim the acknowledgment of a natural child lasts only during the
life of his presumed parents. An action for the acknowledgment of a natural child may, as an
exception, be exercised against the heirs of the presumed parents in two cases: first, in the event
of the death of the latter during the minority of the child, and second, upon the discovery of some
instrument of express acknowledgment of the child, executed by the father or mother, the
existence of which was unknown during the life of the latter.
But such action for the acknowledgment of a natural child can only be exercised by him. It
cannot be transmitted to his descendants, or his ascendants.

REIRA v. PALMAROLI
GR No.14851, September 13, 1919
40 PHIL 105

FACTS: Antonia Reira, widow of Juan Pons who was at the time of the latter's death residing at
Palma de Mallorca, sought the annulment of the order of the trial court admitting the probate of a
purported will of her husband. The purported will was submitted to be admitted to probate by
respondent Consul General Palmaroli. The petitioner contends that the probate of the will, in
view of her absence, deprived her of her right to contest the original application.

ISSUE: Should the probated will yield to the rights of the decedent's heir?

HELD: Yes. A will is nothing more than a species of conveyance whereby a person is permitted,
with the formalities prescribed by law, to control in a certain degree the disposition of his
property after his death. Out of consideration for the important interests involved the execution
and proof of wills has been surrounded by numerous safeguards, among which is the provision
that after death of the testator his will may be judicially established in court. xxx The probate of a
will, while conclusive as to its due execution, in no wise involves the intrinsic validity of its
provisions. If, therefore, upon the distribution of the estate of the decedent, it should appear that
any provision of his will is contrary to the law applicable to his case, the will must necessarily
yield upon that point and the disposition made by law must prevail.

MONTINOLA v. HERBOSA

FACTS: Montinola filed an action against the heirs of Dr. Jose Rizal for recovery of possession
of personal property (the RIZAL RELICS) allegedly sold to him by Doa Trinidad Rizal. The
trial court held that neither party is entitled to the possession of such property, relying principally
on the fact that in Rizal's Mi Ultimo Adios, there is a line where Rizal bequeathed all his
property to the Filipino people. The court argued that the handwritten work of Rizal constitutes a
holographic will giving the State all his property.

ISSUE: Does Mi Ultimo Adios constitute a last will?

HELD: No. An instrument which merely expresses a last wish as a thought or advice but does
not contain a disposition of property, and executed without Animus Standi cannot be legally
considered a will. Rizal's Mi Ultimo Adios is but a literary piece of work, and was so intended. It
may be considered a will in a grammatical sense but not in a legal or juridical sense. Moreover, it
also lacks the requirements of a holographic will such as a statement of the year month and day
of its execution and his signature.

MERZA v. PORRAS
GR No.L-4888, May 25, 1953
93 PHIL 142

FACTS: Pilar Montealegre died leaving a will (Exhibit A) and a so-called codicil (Exhibit B),
disinheriting her husband Pedro Porras and some of her relatives. The two documents were
submitted to probate but were denied by the trial court, upon the grounds such as the defect of
the attestation clause on Exh. A and that Exh. cannot be considered a codicil for it was executed
by the testator a day before Exhibit A, thus it cannot be included in the probate proceedings.

ISSUE: Should a document, expressly disinheriting certain heirs, executed by the testator prior to
a supposed last will, be probated?

HELD: Yes. The trial court and the CA is correct that Exhibit B having been executed one day
before Exhibit A could not be considered as a codicil "because a codicil, as the word implies, is
only an addition to, or modification of, the will." The Court of Appeals added that "the contents
of Exhibit B are couched in the language ordinarily used in a simple affidavit and as such, may
not have the legal effect and force to a testamentary disposition."
However, Exhibit B does partake of the nature of a will. A will is defined in article 667 of the
Civil code of Spain as "the act by which a person dispose of all his property or a portion of it,"
and in article 783 of the new Civil Code as "an act whereby a person is permitted, with the
formalities prescribed by law, to control to a certain degree the disposition of his estate, to take
effect after his death. Exhibit B comes within this definition.

CASTAEDA v. ALEMANY
GR No.1439, March 19, 1904
3 PHIL 426

FACTS: Appellant constested the validity of the will of Doa Juana Moreno upon the ground that
although the attestation clause in the will states that the testator signed the will in the presence of
three witnesses who also each signed in each presence, the will was not actually written by the
testator.

ISSUE: Is it necessary that a will be written by the testator herself?

HELD: No. Section 618 of the Civil Code requires (1) that the will be in writing and (2) either
that the testator sign it himself or, if he does not sign it, that it be signed by some one in his
presence and by his express direction. Who does the mechanical work of writing the will is a
matter of indifference. The fact, therefore, that in this case the will was typewritten in the office
of the lawyer for the testratrix is of no consequence.
MICIANO v. BRIMO
GR No.L-22595, November 1, 1927
50 PHIL 867

FACTS: Joseph Brimo, a Turkish national, died leaving a will which one of the clauses states
that the law of the Philippines shall govern the partition and not the law of his nationality, and
that legatees have to respect the will, otherwise the dispositions accruing to them shall be
annulled. By virtue of such condition, his brother, Andre Brimo, an instituted heir was thus
excluded because, by his action of having opposed the partition scheme, he did not respect the
will. Andre sued contending that the conditions are void being contrary to law which provides
that the will shall be probated according to the laws of the nationality of the decedent.

ISSUE: Is the condition as set by the testator valid?

HELD: No. A foreigner's will to the effect that his properties shall be distributed in accordance
with Philippine law and not with his national law, is illegal and void, for his national law cannot
be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 10 of the Civil Code states said national law
should govern. Said condition then, in the light of the legal provisions above cited, is considered
unwritten, and the institution of legatees in said will is unconditional and consequently valid and
effective even as to the herein oppositor.

Miciano vs Brimo

TITLE: Juan Miciano v Andre Brimo

CITATION: GR No.22595, November 1, 1927| 50 Phil 867

FACTS:

Juan Miciano, judicial administrator of the estate in question, filed a scheme of partition. Andre
Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased (Joseph Brimo) opposed Micianos participation in
the inheritance. Joseph Brimo is a Turkish citizen.

ISSUE: Whether Turkish law or Philippine law will be the basis on the distribution of Joseph
Brimos estates.

HELD:

Though the last part of the second clause of the will expressly said that it be made and disposed
of in accordance with the laws in force in the Philippine Island, this condition, described as
impossible conditions, shall be considered as not imposed and shall not prejudice the heir or
legatee in any manner whatsoever, even should the testator otherwise provide. Impossible
conditions are further defined as those contrary to law or good morals. Thus, national law of the
testator shall govern in his testamentary dispositions.
The court approved the scheme of partition submitted by the judicial administrator, in such
manner as to include Andre Brimo, as one of the legatees.

Minciano vs. Brimo

50 Phil. 867, November 1, 1924

Facts:

Joseph G. Brimo, a citizen of Turkey, died and left a partition of the estate. Juan
Miciano, the judicial administrator of the estate left filed a scheme of partition. However,
Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the deceased, opposed it. Brimos opposition is
based on the fact that the partition in question puts into effect the provisions of Joseph
Brimos will which are not in accordance with the laws of his Turkish nationality, for
which reason they are void as being in violation of Article 10 of the Civil Code.

Issue:

Whether or not the national law of the testator is the one to govern his
testamentary disposition.

Held:

Joseph Brimo, a Turkish citizen , though he declared in his will that Philippine
laws must govern the disposition of his estate; however, it must not prejudice the heir or
legatee of the testator. Therefore, the testators national law must govern in accordance
with Article 10 of the Civil Code

Bellis vs. Bellis [20 SCRA 358]

Post under case digests, Civil Law at Saturday, February 25, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind

Facts: Amos G. Bellis, a citizen of the State of Texas, died a

resident of Texas. The will he had executed in the Philippines
directed that his distributable Philippine estate should be divided
in trusts. In the project of partition, the executor of the will
pursuant to the Twelfth clause of the testators Last Will and
Testament- divided the residuary estate into 7 equal portions for
the benefit of the testators seven legitimate children. Maria
Christina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective
oppositions on the ground that they were deprived of their
legitimes as illegitimate children, and, therefore, compulsory
heirs of the deceased.
Issue: Whether or not the Texas law or the Philippine Law
should be applied in the case at bar.
Held: The Court held that since decedent is a citizen of the State
of Texas and is domiciled therein at the time of his death, Texas
law should apply. Article 16 (2) and Art 1039 render applicable
the national law of the decedent, in intestate or testamentary
successions, with regard to 4 items: (a) the order of succession;
(b) the amount of successional rights ; (c)intrinsic validity of the
provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed. Under the
laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or legitimes.
Garcia v. Lacuesta
G.R. L-4067 November 29, 1951
Ponente: Paras, C.J.

Facts:
1. The CA disallowed the probate of the will of Antero Mercado dated Jan 1943. The said will
was written in Ilocano dialect.

2. The will appears to have been signed by Atty. Florentino Javier who wrote the name of the
testator followed below by 'A ruego del testador' and the name of Florentino Javier. In effect, it
was signed by another although under the express direction of the testator. This fact however was
not recited in the attestation clause. Mercado also affixed a cross on the will.

3. The lower court admitted the will to probate but this order was reversed by the Court of
Appeals on the ground that the attestation failed to recite the facts surrounding the signing of the
testator and the witnesses.

Issue: Whether or not the attestation clause in the will is valid

HELD: NO the attestation is fatally defective for its failure to state that Antero or the testator
caused Atty. Javier to write the former's name under his express direction as required by Sec. 618
of the Civil Procedure. Finally, on the cross affixed on the will by the testator, the Court held that
it is not prepared to liken the mere sign of a cross to a thumbmark for obvious reasons- the cross
does not have the trustworthiness of a thumbmark so it is not considered as a valid signature.
ANDALIS VS. PULGUERAS
59 Phil 643
FACTS:
1. The alleged will of Victor Pulgueras was admitted to probate.
2. The testimony of only one to the attesting witnesses was taken.
3. The testimony was:
a) that the 6 pages of the will were signed on the margin by the testator and two of
the witnesses on January 4, 1931;
b) the remaining three pages were signed by the testator and the three attesting
witnesses on January 11, 1931, and that the third attesting witness then signed the
first six pages.

ISSUE:
Was the will executed properly?

HELD:
Such an execution of the will was not in conformity with the law. Under our statute,
the execution of a will is supposed to be one act and cannot be legally effective if
the various participants sign on various days and in various combinations of those
present.

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SUCCESSION
BAGTAS VS. PAGUIO
22 Phil 227

FACTS:
1. Pioquinto Paguio died on September 28, 1909.
2. For some 14 or 15 years prior to the time of his death, he suffered from a
paralysis of the left side of his body; that a few years prior to his death his hearing
became impaired and that he lost the power of speech.
3. He retained the use of his right hand and was able to write fairly well.
4. Through the medium of signs he was able to indicate his wishes to his wife and to
other members of his family.
5. The testator wrote out on several pieces of paper the disposition of his property.
6. The same was in turn delivered to one Seor Marco who transcribed and put
them in form.
7. The pieces of paper were then delivered to a lawyer who read them to the
testator asking if they were his dispositions.
8. The testator assented each time with an affirmative movement of his head.
9. The widow of the decedent Juliana Bagtas then sought the probate of the
purported last will and testament of Pioquinto.
10. The CFI of Bataan admitted the same for probate.
11. Isidoro Paguio, a son of the decedent by a former marriage, opposed the
probation on the ground that the testator was not n full enjoyment and use of his
mental faculties and was without mental capacity necessary to execute a valid will.

ISSUE:
Was the will was validly executed?

HELD:
The rule of law relating to the presumption of mental soundness is well-established,
and the testator in the case at bar never having been adjudged insane by the court
of competent jurisdiction , this presumption continues, and it is therefore incumbent
upon the opponents to overcome this legal presumption by proper evidence. The
opponents failed to do this.

The courts have repeatedly held that mere weakness of mind and body , induced by
age and disease does not render a person incapable of making a will. The law does
not require that a person shall continue in the full enjoyment and use of his pristine
physical and mental powers in order to execute a valid will. If such were the legal
standard , few indeed would be the number of wills that could meet such exacting
requirements. The authorities, both medical and legal, are universal in the
statement that the question of mental capacity is one of degree, and that there are
many gradations from the highest degree of mental soundness to the lowest
conditions of diseased mentality which are denominated insanity or idiocy.

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SUCCESSION
ACOP VS. PIRASO
52 Phil 660

FACTS:
1. The CFI of Benguet denied the probate of the last will and testament of the
deceased Piraso because the will sought to be probated was written in English.
2. Evidence showed that Piraso knew how to speak the Ilocano dialect, although
imperfectly, and could make himself understood in that dialect.
3. Proponent-appellant Sixto Acop alleged that the lower court erred in not holding
that the testator did not know the Ilocano dialect well enough to understand a will
drawn up in said dialect.

ISSUE:
Should the will be probated?

HELD:
The testator is presumed to know the dialect of the locality where he resides, unless
there is proof to the contrary.

In the instant case, not only is it not proven the English is the language of the City
of Baguio where the deceased Piraso lived and where the will was drawn, but the
record contains positive proof that said Piraso knew no other language than the
Igorotte dialect, with a smattering of Ilocano; that is, he did not know the English
language in which the will is written.

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SUCCESSION
LEANO VS. LEANO
30 Phil 612

FACTS:
1. Cristina Valdes executed a will.
2. She then placed a cross against her name, attached by some other person, in the
presence of the three witnesses whose name are attached to the attesting clause,
and that they attested and subscribed the instrument in her presence and in the
presence of each other.
3. Mariano Leao sought the probate of the will.
4. Arcadio Leao objected on the ground that the execution of the last will and
testament was not in the manner and form prescribed by law.
5. The trial court denied the probate of the will.
6. Hence this appeal

ISSUE:
Was the will was executed in the manner and form prescribed by law?

HELD:
The placing of the cross opposite her name at the conclusion of the instrument was
sufficient compliance with the requirements of the law, which prescribes that except
where wills are signed by some other person than the testator in the manner and
form therein indicated, a valid will must be signed by the testator.

It is the right of a testator to sign his will by mark, executed anima testandi.

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SUCCESSION
IN RE WILL OF TAN DIUCO
45 Phil 807

FACTS:
1. Mamerta Base instituted an action for the probate of the will of Chinaman Tan
Duico.
2. The court denied the probate of the will on the ground that said will was not
signed by three instrumental witnesses.
3. The document was signed by Simplicia Sala by order of the testator, whose name
is before the said signature, by reason of the latters incapacity on account of his
weakness and the trembling of his hand.
4. The testator also stated that he directed Simplicio Sala to sign it in his name and
in the presence of three witnesses who also signed with him at the bottom of said
document, and on the left margin of each of its three pages correlatively numbered
in letter by Simplicio Sala in the name of the testator Tan Duico and by the three
other witnesses.

ISSUE:
Was the will not signed by three instrumental witnesses?

HELD:
In dealing with attestation, the law does not say that the instrumental witnesses
must be different from those who signed the attestation clause, for in the first part
of said section, after speaking of the signature of the testator or the person signing
in his place, it adds and attested and subscribed by three or more credible
witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other, from which it clearly
follows that the same witnesses who signed on the left margin of each page of the
document presented by the testator to them as his will, must be the ones who
should sign the attestation clause, inasmuch as they alone can certify the facts to
be stated in said clause, for having taken a direct part therein, as they saw the
testator sign the will, or the person requested by him to sign all the sheets of the
will and affirm that it was signed under his express direction in the presence of said
witnesses and that all the sheets thereof had also been signed by them in the
presence of said testator and of each of them.
Testate Estate of Cagro v. Cagro Digest

Testate Estate of Cagro vs. Cagro

G.R. L-5826

Facts:
1. The case is an appeal interposed by the oppositors from a decision of the CFI of Samar which
admitted to probate a will allegedly executed by Vicente Cagro who died in Pambujan, Samar on
Feb. 14, 1949.

2. The appellants insisted that the will is defective because the attestation was not signed by the
witnesses at the bottom although the page containing the same was signed by the witnesses on
the left hand margin.

3. Petitioner contended that the signatures of the 3 witnesses on the left hand margin conform
substantially to law and may be deemed as their signatures to the attestation clause.

Issue: Whether or not the will is valid

HELD: Will is not valid. The attestation clause is a memorandum of the facts attending the
execution of the will. It is required by law to be made by the attesting witnesses and it must
necessarily bear their signatures.
An unsigned attestation clause cannot be considered as an act of the witnesses since the omission
of their signatures at the bottom negatives their participation.

Moreover, the signatures affixed on the let hand margin is not substantial conformance to the
law. The said signatures were merely in conformance with the requirement that the will must be
signed on the left-hand margin of all its pages. If the attestation clause is unsigned by the 3
witnesses at the bottom, it would be easier to add clauses to a will on a subsequent occasion and
in the absence of the testator and any or all of the witnesses.

The probate of the will is denied.

Javellana v. Ledesma Digest

Javellana vs. Ledesma

G.R. No. L-7179

Facts:

1. The CFI of Iloilo admitted to probate a will and codicil executed by the deceased
Apolinaria Ledesma in July 1953. This testament was deemed executed on May
1950 and May 1952. The contestant was the sister and nearest surviving relative of
the deceased. She appealed from this decision alleging that the will were not
executed in accordance with law.

2. The testament was executed at the house of the testatrix. One the other hand,
the codicil was executed after the enactment of the New Civil Code (NCC), and
therefore had to be acknowledged before a notary public. Now, the contestant, who
happens to be one of the instrumental witnesses asserted that after the codicil was
signed and attested at the San Pablo hospital, that Gimotea (the notary) signed and
sealed it on the same occasion. Gimotea, however, said that he did not do so, and
that the act of signing and sealing was done afterwards.

2. One of the allegations was that the certificate of acknowledgement to the codicil
was signed somewhere else or in the office of the notary. The ix and the witnesses
at the hospital, was signed and sealed by the notary only when he brought it in his
office.

Issue: Whether or not the signing and sealing of the will or codicil in the
absence of the testator and witnesses affects the validity of the will

RULING: NO. Unlike in the Old Civil Code of 1899, the NCC does not require that the
signing of the testator, the witnesses and the notary be accomplished in one single
act. All that is required is that every will must be acknowledged before a notary
public by the testator and witnesses. The subsequent signing and sealing is not part
of the acknowledgement itself nor of the testamentary act. Their separate execution
out of the presence of the testator and the witnesses cannot be a violation of the
rule that testaments should be completed without interruption.

JOSE RIVERA, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ADELAIDO

J.RIVERA, respondents
February 15, 1990

FACTS:

On May 30, 1975, a prominent and wealthy resident of that town named
Venancio Rivera died. On July 28, 1975, Jose Rivera, claiming to be the only surviving
legitimate son of the deceased, filed a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration over Venancios estate. Docketed as SP No. 1076, this petition was
opposed by Adelaido J. Rivera. Who denied that Jose was the son of the decedent.
Adelaido averred that Venancio was his father and did not die interstate but in fact left
two holographic wills

ISSUE: Whether or not Jose Rivera was the legitimate son of the deceased Venancio
Rivera.

RULING:

In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the solidarity of the family. Thus every
intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of marriage the legitimacy of
children. Even in the absence of any certificate of marriage or other documentary proof
of the existence of marriage, the law presumes a man and woman cohabiting with each
other as being married, in the absence of proof to the contrary. Based on this unrefuted
legal presumption, Jose Rivera is not the son of the deceased Venancio Rivera whose
estate is in question. Hence, being a mere stranger, he had no personality to contest the
wills and his opposition thereto did not have the legal effect of requiring the three
witnesses. The testimony of Zenaida and Venancio Rivera, Jr. who authenticated the
wills as having been written and signed by their father, was sufficient.

Rodelas v. Aranza Digest

Rodelas v. Aranza

G.R. No. L-58509 December 7, 1982

Relova, J. (Ponente)

Facts:

1. The appellant filed a petition for the probate of the holographic will of Ricardo
Bonilla in 1977. The petition was opposed by the appellees on the ground that the
deceased did not leave any will, holographic or otherwise.

2. The lower court dismissed the petition for probate and held that since the original
will was lost, a photostatic copy cannot stand in the place of the original.

Issue: Whether or not a holographic will can be proved by means of a photocopy

RULING: Yes. A photocopy of the lost or destroyed holographic will may be admitted
because the authenticity of the handwriting of the deceased can be determined by
the probate court with the standard writings of the testator.

Kalaw v. Relova Digest

Kalaw v. Relova

G.R. No. L-40207 September 28, 1984

Melencio-Herrera, J. (Ponente)

Facts:

1. Gregorio Kalaw, the private respondent, claiming to be the sole heir of sister
Natividad, filed a peition for probate of the latter's holographic will in 1968. The will
contained 2 alterations: a) Rosa's name, designated as the sole heir was crossed out
and instead "Rosario" was written above it. Such was not initialed, b) Rosa's name
was crossed out as sole executrix and Gregorio's ma,e was written above it. This
alteration was initialed by the testator.

2. Rosa contended that the will as first written should be given effect so that she
would be the sole heir. The lower court denied the probate due to the
unauthenticated alterations and additions.

Issue: Whether or not the will is valid

RULING: No, the will is voided or revoked since nothing remains in the will which
could remain valid as there was only one disposition in it. Such was altered by the
substitution of the original heir with another. To rule that the first will should be
given effect is to disregard the testatrix' change of mind. However, this change of
mind cannot be given effect either as she failed to authenticate it in accordance
with Art. 814, or by affixing her full signature.

Cruz v. Villasor
G.R. L-32213 November 26, 1973
Ponente: Esguerra, J.:
Facts:
1. The CFI of Cebu allowed the probate of the last will and testament of the late Valenti Cruz.
However, the petitioner opposed the allowance of the will alleging that it was executed through
fraud, deceit, misrepresentation, and undue influence. He further alleged that the instrument was
executed without the testator having been informed of its contents and finally, that it was not
executed in accordance with law.

2. One of the witnesses, Angel Tevel Jr. was also the notary before whom the will was
acknowledged. Despite the objection, the lower court admitted the will to probate on the ground
that there is substantial compliance with the legal requirements of having at least 3 witnesses
even if the notary public was one of them.

Issue: Whether or not the will is valid in accordance with Art. 805 and 806 of the NCC

HELD: NO.
The will is not valid. The notary public cannot be considered as the third instrumental witness
since he cannot acknowledge before himself his having signed the said will. An acknowledging
officer cannot serve as witness at the same time.

To acknowledge before means to avow, or to own as genuine, to assent, admit, and 'before'
means in front of or preceding in space or ahead of. The notary cannot split his personality into
two so that one will appear before the other to acknowledge his participation int he making of the
will. To permit such situation would be absurd.

Finally, the function of a notary among others is to guard against any illegal or immoral
arrangements, a function defeated if he were to be one of the attesting or instrumental witnesses.
He would be interested in sustaining the validity of the will as it directly involves himself and the
validity of his own act. he would be in an inconsistent position, thwarting the very purpose of the
acknowledgment, which is to minimize fraud.

Gonzales v. Court of Appeals (CA) Digest

Gonzales v. CA

G.R. No. L-37453 May 25, 1979

Guerrero, J. (Ponente)

Facts:

1. Petitioner Rizalina Gonzales and Lutgarda Santiago (Private respondent) are the
nieces of the deceased Isabel Gabriel who died a widow. A will was thereafter
submitted to probate. The said will was typewritten, in Tagalog and appeared to
have been executed in April 1961 or two months prior to the death of Isabel. It
consisted of 5 pages including the attestation and acknowledgment, with the
signature of testatrix on page 4 and the left margin of all the pages.

2. Lutgarda was named as the universal heir and executor. The petitioner opposed
the probate.

3. The lower court denied the probate on the ground that the will was not executed
and attested in accordance with law on the issue of the competency and credibility
of the witnesses.

Issue: Whether or not the credibility of the subscribing witnesses is material to the
validity of a will

RULING: No. The law requires only that witnesses posses the qualifications under
Art. 820 (NCC) and none of the disqualifications of Art. 802. There is no requirement
that they are of good standing or reputation in the community, for trustworthiness,
honesty and uprightness in order that his testimony is believed and accepted in
court. For the testimony to be credible, it is not mandatory that evidence be
established on record that the witnesses have good standing in the the community.
Competency is distinguished from credibility, the former being determined by Art.
820 while the latter does not require evidence of such good standing. Credibility
depends on the convincing weight of his testimony in court.

Dela Cerna v. Potot Digest

Dela Cerna v. Potot Digest

Facts:

1. The spouses Bernabe Dela Serna and Gerasisa Rebabca executed a joint will
where they gave two (2) parcels of land to manuela Rebaca, a niece, as they didn't
have their own child. When Bernabe died, the said will was probated in 1939.

2. Another petition for probate of the same will insofar as Gervasia was concerned
was filed in 1952 but due to the failure of the petitioner (Manuela) to appears, the
same was dismissed in 1954.
3. The CFI held the petition (Bernabe probate) to be null and void as it is contrary to
law. While the Court of Appeals reversed and held that the decree of probate in
1939 was issued by a court of probate jurisdiction and conclusive as to the due
execution of the will. Hence this appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the will is valid

RULING: The Supreme Court affirmed the CA decision and held that Once a decree
of probate becomes final in accordance with the rules of procedure, it is res
judicata. THe final decree of probate entered in 1939 in the CFI of Cebu is
conclusive as to the last will of Bernabe despite the fact that even then the Civil
Code already decreed the invalidity of joint wills. (There was an error on the court
but the decree has now become final.)

The probate court committed an error of law which should have been corrected on
appeals but which did not affect the jurisdiction of the probate court, nor the
conclusive effect of its final decision. A decision which is binding upon the whole
world.

Nevertheless, the probate in 1939 only affected the share of Bernabe and could not
include the disposition of the share of his wife which was still alive then, her
properties were still not within the jurisdiction of the court. Hence, the validity of the
will with respect to her, must be on her death, be re-examined and adjudicated de
novo -- since a joint will is considered a separate will of each testator.

ADDITIONAL 24 CASES WILLS!!!

SICAD V. CA
294 SCRA 183
FACTS:
Aurora executed a deed entitled donation inter vivos in favor of her grandchildren. There was
reservation of right of disposition in her favor and the property may not be disposed of after 10
years from her death. Thereafter, the title were registered in the donees name yet the owners
duplicate is with Aurora. Thereafter, the grandchildren sold the land to Sicad and Aurora sought
to reinstate TCT in her name.

HELD:

If there is reservation of disposition with donor, then the donation is of mortis causa and not inter
vivos. A document is what the law defines it to be and not what the parties call it.

NOCEDA V. CA
313 SCRA 504
FACTS:

Directo together with her nephew and another, extrajudicially partitioned the land donated to
them. On the same date, she donated in favor of Noceda a part of her land. On her share of the
land, she fenced it and constructed three huts therein. On a later date, Noceda removed the fence,
entered the premises and used the three lots. Despite demands for him to vacate, he refused to do
so, prompting Directo to file a case against him and revoke the donation made by her.

HELD:

The acts of Noceda are acts of usurpation which is an offense against the property of Directo and
considered an act of ingratitude of a donee against a donor. The law doesnt require conviction of
the donee, it is enough that his offense is proved in the action for revocation.

NOCEDA vs CA

[G.R. No. 119730. September 2, 1999]

FACTS: Plaintiff Aurora Directo, defendant Rodolfo Noceda, and Maria Arbizo, the daughter,
grandson, and widow, respectively, of the late Celestino Arbizo extrajudicially settled a parcel of
land located at Bitaog, San Isidro, Cabangan, Zambales, which was said to have an area of
66,530 square meters. Plaintiff Directos share was 11,426 square meters, defendant Noceda got
13,294 square meters, and the remaining 41,810 square meters went to Maria Arbizo. Plaintiff
Directo donated 625 square meters of her share to defendant Noceda, who is her nephew being
the son of her deceased sister, Carolina. However, another extrajudicial settlement-partition of
Lot 1121 was executed by plaintiff Directo, defendant Noceda, and Maria Arbizo. Three fifths of
the said land went to Maria Arbizo while plaintiff Directo and defendant Noceda got only one-
fifth each. In said extrajudicial settlement-partition as well as in the Tax Declaration 16-0032
over Lot 1121 in the name of the late Celestino Arbizo, the said parcel of land was said to have
an area of only 29,845 square meters.

Sometime in 1981, defendant Noceda constructed his house on the land donated to him by
plaintiff Directo. Plaintiff Directo fenced the portion allotted to her in the extrajudicial
settlement, excluding the donated portion, and constructed thereon three huts. But in 1985,
defendant Noceda removed the fence earlier constructed by plaintiff Directo, occupied the three
huts (3) and fenced the entire land of plaintiff Directo without her consent. Plaintiff Directo
demanded from defendant Noceda to vacate her land, but the latter refused.

Hence, plaintiff Directo filed the present suit, a complaint for the recovery of possession and
ownership and rescission/annulment of donation, against defendant Noceda before the lower
court.

Trial court ruled in favor of plaintiff Directo ordering the revocation of the donation.

ISSUE: W/N petitioner Nocedas acts of usurpation constitute an act of ingratitude sufficient to
grant the revocation of the donation?

HELD: YES. It was established that petitioner Noceda occupied not only the portion donated to
him by private respondent Aurora Arbizo-Directo but he also fenced the whole area of Lot C
which belongs to private respondent Directo, thus petitioners act of occupying the portion
pertaining to private respondent Directo without the latters knowledge and consent is an act of
usurpation which is an offense against the property of the donor and considered as an act of
ingratitude of a donee against the donor.[31] The law does not require conviction of the donee; it
is enough that the offense be proved in the action for revocation.

Blas et al vs Santos et al
On July 2, 2012

1 SCRA 899 Succession Promise

Sometime before 1898, Simeon Blas married Marta Cruz with whom he had three children. He
also had grandchildren from his children with Marta Cruz. In 1898, Marta Cruz died. In 1899,
Blas married Maxima Santos (they had no children) but the properties he and his former wife
acquired during the first marriage were not liquidated.
In 1936, Simeon Blas executed a will disposing half of his properties in favor of Maxima the
other half for payment of debts, Blas also named a few devisees and legatees therein. In lieu of
this, Maxima executed a document whereby she intimated that she understands the will of her
husband; that she promises that shell be giving, upon her death, one-half of the properties shell
be acquiring to the heirs and legatees named in the will of his husband; that she can select or
choose any of them depending upon the respect, service, and treatment accorded to her by said
legatees/heirs/devisees.

In 1937, Simeon Blas died. In 1956, Maxima died and Rosalina Santos became administratrix of
her estate. In the same year, Maria Gervacio Blas, child of Simeon Blas in his first marriage,
together with three other grandchildren of Simeon Blas (heirs of Simeon Blas), learned that
Maxima did not fulfill her promise as it was learned that Maxima only disposed not even one-
tenth of the properties she acquired from Simeon Blas.

The heirs are now contending that they did not partition Simeon Blas property precisely because
Maxima promised that theyll be receiving properties upon her death.

ISSUE: Whether or not the heirs should receive properties based on the promise of Maxima.

HELD: Yes. The promise is valid and enforceable upon her death. Though it is not a will (it
lacks the formality) nor a donation, it is still enforceable because said promise was actually
executed to avoid litigation (partition of Simeon Blas estate) hence it is a compromise.

It is not disputed that this document was prepared at the instance of Simeon Blas for the reason
that the conjugal properties of his first marriage had not been liquidated. It is an obligation or
promise made by the maker to transmit one-half of her share in the conjugal properties acquired
with her husband, which properties are stated or declared to be conjugal properties in the will of
the husband.

SUCCESSION SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE

In Dy Yieng Seangio, et al. v. Hon. Amor Reyes, et al., G.R. No. 140371-72, November 27,
2006, there was a petition for the probate of an alleged holographic will which was denominated
as Kasulatan sa pag-aalis ng mana. The private respondents moved for the dismissal of the
probate proceedings primarily on the ground that the document purporting to be the holographic
will of Segundo did not contain any disposition of the estate of the deceased and thus did not
meet the definition of a will under Article 783 of the Civil Code. According to private
respondents, the will only showed an alleged act of disinheritance by the decedent of his eldest
son, Alfredo, and nothing else; that all other compulsory heirs were not named nor instituted as
heir, devisee or legatee, hence there was preterition which would result to intestacy. Such being
the case, private respondents maintained that while procedurally the court is called upon to rule
only on the extrinsic validity of the will, it is not barred from delving into the intrinsic validity of
the same, and ordering the dismissal of the petition for probate when on the face of the will it is
clear that it contains no testamentary disposition of the property of the decedent.

Petitioners filed their opposition to the motion to dismiss contending that: (1) generally,
the authority of the probate court is limited only to a determination of the extrinsic validity of the
will; (2) private respondents question the intrinsic and not the extrinsic validity of the will; (3)
disinheritance constitutes a disposition of the estate of a decedent; and (4) the rule on
preterition did not apply because Segundos will did not constitute a universal heir or heirs to the
exclusion of one or more compulsory heirs.

The RTC issued an order dismissing the petition for probate proceedings, hence, a
petition for certiorari was filed where petitioners argued as follows:

First, respondent judge did not comply with Sections 3 and 4 of the Rule 76 of the Rules
of Court which respectively mandate the court to: (a) fix the time and place for proving the will
when all concerned may appear to contest the allowance thereof, and cause notice of such time
and place to be published three weeks successively previous to the appointed time in a
newspaper of general circulation; and (b) cause the mailing of said notice to the heirs, legatee
and devisees of the testator Segundo;

Second, the holographic will does not contain any institution of an heir, but rather, as its
title clearly states, Kasulatan ng Pag-alis ng Mana, simply contains a disinheritance of a
compulsory heir. Thus, there is no preterition in the decedents will and the holographic will on
its face is not intrinsically void;

Third, the testator intended all his compulsory heirs, petitioners and private respondents
alike, with the sole exception of Alfredo, to inherit his estate. None of the compulsory heirs in the
direct line of Segundo were preterited in the holographic will since there was no institution of an
heir;

Fourth, as it clearly appears from the face of the holographic will that it is both
intrinsically and extrinsically valid, respondent judge was mandated to proceed with the hearing
of the testate case; and,

Lastly, the continuation of the proceedings in the intestate case will work injustice to
petitioners, and will render nugatory the disinheritance of Alfredo.

Now, the critical issue to be determined is whether the document executed by Segundo
can be considered as a holographic will.

Held: A holographic will, as provided under Article 810 of the Civil Code, must be entirely
written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and
may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.
 The document, although it may initially come across as a mere disinheritance
instrument, conforms to the formalities of a holographic will prescribed by law. It is written, dated
and signed by the hand of the testator himself. An intent to dispose mortis causa (Article 783)
can be clearly deduced from the terms of the instrument, and while it does not make an
affirmative disposition of the latters property, the disinheritance of the son nonetheless, is an act
of disposition in itself. In other words, the disinheritance results in the disposition of the property
of the testator in favor of those who would succeed in the absence of the eldest son.

Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that the intent or the will of the testator,
expressed in the form and within the limits prescribed by law, must be recognized as the
supreme law in succession. All rules of construction are designed to ascertain and give effect to
that intention. It is only when the intention of the testator is contrary to law, morals, or public
policy that it cannot be given effect.

Holographic wills, therefore, being usually prepared by one who is not learned in the law
should be construed more liberally than the ones drawn by an expert, taking into account the
circumstances surrounding the execution of the instrument and the intention of the testator. In
this regard, the document, even if captioned as Kasulatan ng Pag-alis ng Mana, was intended
by the testator to be his last testamentary act and was executed by him in accordance with law
in the form of a holographic will. Unless the will is probated, the disinheritance cannot be given
effect.

Gago vs. Mamuyac

G.R. No. L-26317 January 29, 1927
Johnson, J. (Ponente)

Facts:
1. Previously, Francisco Gago filed a petition for the probate of a will of Miguel Mamuyac
executed on July 27, 1918. The oppositors alleged that the said will was already annulled and
revoked. It appeared that on April 16, 1919, the deceased executed another will. The lower court
denied the probate of the first will on the ground of the existence of the second will.

2. Another petition was filed to seek the probate of the second will. The oppositors alleged that
the second will presented was merely a copy. According to the witnesses, the said will was
allegedly revoked as per the testimony of Jose Tenoy, one of the witnesses who typed the
document. Another witness testified that on December 1920 the original will was actually
cancelled by the testator.

3. The lower court denied the probate and held that the same has been annulled and revoked.

Issue: Whether or not there was a valid revocation of the will

RULING: Yes. The will was already cancelled in 1920. This was inferred when after due search,
the original will cannot be found. When the will which cannot be found in shown to be in the
possession of the testator when last seen, the presumption is that in the absence of other
competent evidence, the same was deemed cancelled or destroyed. The same presumption
applies when it is shown that the testator has ready access to the will and it can no longer be
found after his death.