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Laura Bohorquez, Paul Conway, Lindsay Hottovy, Melissa Link


The Constructivist Theory

We look at a person and immediately a certain impression of his character forms itself in

us (Asch, 1964, p. 258). Where do these impressions come from? How are they formed?

Shannon (1948) was the first to propose the standard model of communication. In what is

commonly called the transmission model, a process occurs in which a sender transmits a

message after having first encoded it, through a channel to a receiver, who decodes it and who

responds (Beamer, 1995, p. 142). Human perception is one of the many forms of

communication that takes place through this model. According to Wood (2015), perception is the

active process of creating meaning by selecting, organizing, and interpreting people, objects,

events, situations, and other phenomena (p. 75). When people organize these concepts, they are

participating in what is the basis of the constructivist theory. According to Burleson and Rack

(2008), the theory of constructivism suggests that people organize and interpret experience by

applying cognitive structures called schemata. This theory stems from Triandis (1987)

definition of schemata as organized categories and their associations, held in a cognitive

framework, possessing affect, and forming values, attitudes, expectations, norms, roles, and

unstated assumptions (p. 265). Lying within the categories and associations theorized by

Triandis (1987) are implicit biases.

Unlike explicit biases, implicit biases are those that an individual does not consciously

control. These biases are thought to be automatic not only in the sense that they are fast-acting,

but also because they can operate without (1) intention (i.e., are involuntary and uncontrollable),

and (2) conscious awareness (Rudman, 2004, p. 133). It has been theorized that the causes for

implicit and explicit biases differ in that implicit orientations stem from past experiences,

perhaps within a persons development, whereas explicit orientations may reflect more recent
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events (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; & Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000). The developmental

experiences that are said to be a source of implicit bias lead to the idea that a childs upbringing

impacts the development of his or her implicit racial biases. For example, Sinclair, Dunn, and

Lowery (2005) found that children with a positive attachment style with their parents have a

positive correlation to the implicit biases of their parents. Furthermore, Banduras (1999) social

learning theory posits that much human learning occurs either deliberately or inadvertently by

observing the actual behavior of others and the consequences for them (p. 25).

Human perception and learning are interrelated processes. Ackermann (2001) compares

the relation between the two theories on how a person learns and grows: constructivism and

constructionism. Ackermann (2001) explains how the theory of constructivism describes how

childrens ways of doing and thinking evolve over time, and under which circumstance children

are more likely to let go ofor hold onto their currently held views (p. 1). Thus, in the

organizing of schemata, children form their various perceptions and views. Constructionism, on

the other hand, focuses more on the art of learning, or learning to learn, and on the

significance of making things in learning (Ackermann, 2001, p. 1). Ackermanns (2001)

explanation of constructivism lays a foundation that may help explain how humans form the

concept of race.

Machery and Faucher (2005) explored social construction and the concept of race. After

looking at the two different views held by social constructionists and evolutionary-minded social

scientists, Machery and Faucher (2005) concluded:

Concepts of race are culturally transmitted. The cultural transmission of these concepts is

shaped by several biases. It is biased by conformism and prestige-dependent imitation.

These two biases are supplemented by an evolved ethnic cognitive system that is
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misapplied to races. This system, the ethnic concepts acquisition device, results from the

exaptation of our folk biology. Together, these biases determine whether skin color and

other superficial properties are treated as ethnic markers (p. 1217-1218).

Thus, through an analysis and understanding of human cognitive development and perception,

one can begin to understand the source and formation of biases, whether open or implicit.

Open Racial Bias

Open biases against Blacks in the United States date back many years throughout the

history of the nation. Studies began after the existence and acknowledgement of Jim Crow laws,

which are explained by McConahay (1986):

The Jim Crow system that developed over the following century legalized racial

segregation and discrimination, especially but not exclusively in the South. The civil

rights revolution effectively ended that two caste system of race relations, replacing it

with a universal system of formal legal equality. Nevertheless, considerable racial

inequality remains in many areas of the society, such as in income, wealth, educational

attainment, health, crime, and so forth. The demise of Jim Crow was accompanied by a

sharp decline in the prevalence of its supporting belief system. This has sometimes been

described as old-fashioned racism, incorporating both a biologically based theory of

African racial inferiority and support for racial segregation and formal racial

discrimination (p. 16).

Even after Jim Crow laws had been abolished, explicit open bias remained ever present in

the United States against Blacks. Race riots in Wilmington, North Carolina, in 1898 and Atlanta,

Georgia, in 1906 did little to improve the situation (Franklin, 1994, p. 265). The riots failed to

resolve open bias and thus they continued into the beginning of the 20th century. The Guardian
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was the first black radical publication, appearing as a weekly in Boston in November 1901. It

was called one of the most poorly-written Negro sheets in America (Gordon, 1926, p. 214).

Whites still displayed no fear to voice their opinions and use the racial term Negro at this time.

Stereotypes also contributed to open bias on the screen stage in the 20th century. In this

regard, the censors worked hard to make sure that Virginians saw only stereotypical images of

Blacks on the screen: the faithful servant, the ignorant child, and the loathsome criminal (Smith,

2001, p. 273). Smith (2001) found:

The growth of film in the 1920s as a purveyor of popular culture presented white

Virginians, especially those devoted to racial integrity, with a new challenge in their

determination to maintain rigid separation between the races. New and more humane

images of blacks threatened to undermine accepted assumptions central to the Old

Dominions commitment to white supremacy. (p. 287)

By the end of the 1920s, explicit racial bias remained powerful in the consciousness of White

U.S. Americans but began its first steps in its evolution toward implicit bias.

During the next decade, while the open bias remained strongly explicit with the next

generation, both negative and positive characteristics were used by Whites to describe Blacks.

According to Katz and Braly (1933), the characteristics ascribed to the Negroes are somewhat

similar to the picture of the Negro as furnished by the Saturday Evening Post: highly

superstitious, lazy, happy-go-lucky, ignorant, musical, and ostentatious (p. 286). Katz and Braly

(1933) tested one hundred college students at Princeton University and the above characteristics

were the most agreed upon terms by the college students. With most of these characteristics

describing Blacks negatively, the explicit bias expressed here reflects a strong view from the

United States in the 1930s. The scholars drew different conclusions from the article about this
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explicit bias; one of their suggestions was that location has an influence on this negative view

towards Blacks. According to Katz and Braly (1933), it may be noted in passing that for a

northern college, Princeton draws heavily upon the South for her enrollment so that this

characterization of Negroes is not exclusively a Northern description (p. 286). Another

conclusion from Katz and Braly (1933) stated, People may have a vague idea of the essential

characteristics of a race, as judged not by its truth but by their ability to agree on its typical traits,

and yet show extreme prejudice toward that group (p. 290). This conclusion suggests that by

the 1930s, racial bias began to evolve from very explicit individual bias to a group explicit bias.

Entering the mid-20th century, explicit bias greatly subsided in speech but White U.S.

Americans still carried out explicit biases toward Blacks through actions. According to

Williams, Jr. (1964), White interviewers biased the responses of high-status Negro respondents

less than those of low-status Negroes (p. 339). Although Whites were not biased toward every

Black U.S. American at this point, some explicit biases emerged from their views. White

interviewers obtained more biased answers from low-status Negro respondents than from high-

status Negroes (Dohrenwend, Colombotos, & Dohrenwend, 1968, p. 223).

In the late 20th century in the United States, implicit bias became increasingly integrated

in the minds of White U.S. Americans, although explicit bias remained in a vocal minority.

These explicit attitudes predicted how much friendlier Whites felt that they behaved toward

White than Black partners (Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2002, p. 62). The study continued

with the response latency measure significantly predicting Whites nonverbal friendliness

extending to other Whites but not the same attitudes towards Blacks (Dovidio, Kawakami, &

Gaertner, 2002, p. 62). These measurements to test racial bias remain in use today with Nevid

and McClellands (2010) study of implicit and explicit behavior within the 2008 election of
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President Obama. Nevid and McClelland (2010) found that the explicit behaviors painted

President Obama in negative light and images throughout his election process.

In the 1980s and 1990s, the explicit bias against Blacks remained in the United States.

According to Sears, Van Laar, Carrillo, and Kosterman (1997), some political observers contend

that racism continues to motivate much of the considerable white opposition to racial policies

and black candidates (p. 17). Negative racial stereotypes did not disappear (Bobo, Kluegel, &

Smith 1997; Devine & Elliot 1995; Kinder & Mendelberg 1995; & Sniderman & Piazza 1993).

Whites have been found to be more opposed to racially targeted policies at their own race as

compared to the poor of all races (Bobo & Kluegel, 1993).

Another way explicit bias emerged in the 1980s and 1990s is through negative images in

the media:

Despite marked improvements in white Americans racial attitudes over the last several

decades, derogatory images of minority groups remain commonplace. These negative

images have important consequences. They not only contribute to a hostile racial

climate, but also shape whites thinking on a range of other racially relevant issues,

including attitudes toward affirmative action programs, preferences for neighborhood and

school integration, and support for equal opportunity and multiculturalism (Sigelman &

Tuch, 1997, p. 98-99).

Explicit bias that stemmed from the racist past in the United States still affects modern society.

For example, Whites who view Blacks as lazy and welfare dependent are significantly less likely

than other Whites to support government programs designed to help Blacks escape from poverty,

and Whites who view Blacks as unintelligent and violent are less favorably disposed toward

school integration (Smith, 1990). Negative stereotypes of Blacks also promote White resistance
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to neighborhood integration and thereby contribute to the persistence of racial segregation (Bobo

& Zubrinsky 1996; & Farley, Reynolds, Steeh, Krysan, Jackson, & Reeves, 1994). Such biases

shaped the geography and economy of the United States to maintain a bias towards race.

In the late 1990s, research erupted regarding Blacks biases on themselves and the way

they thought that Whites perceived their race. According to Sigelman and Tuchs (1997) studies,

they gathered:

The percentage of survey respondents who agreed that most white Americans hold a

given stereotype of blacks in order of the perceived acceptance of the stereotype by

whites. At least two thirds of blacks saw whites as endorsing every uncomplimentary

stereotype about which they were asked; that is, sizable majorities of blacks perceived

that most whites view them as violent, unintelligent, immoral, lazy, undisciplined whiners

who abuse drugs and alcohol and would rather live off welfare than work. To be sure,

most blacks also perceived that most whites view them as religious and athleticthough

whether blacks were complemented or offended by the latter description is a matter about

which we will, for the moment, defer judgment (p. 89).

Sigelman and Tuch (1997) found that Blacks who interact with Whites for extended periods of

time are less likely to assume Whites will paint a negative image of Blacks.

Today, in the 21st century, explicit biases still reside across the United States in many

geographical areas and social environments. In a study done by Correll, Park, Judd, and

Wittenbrink (2002), White U.S. Americans were more likely to shoot Black armed targets earlier

than White armed targets. There is reason to believe the effect is present simply as a function of

stereotypic associations that exist in our culture (Correll, et al., 2002, p. 1328). Social

psychological theory and research may prove invaluable in the effort to identify, understand and
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eventually control processes that bias decisions to shoot (and possibly kill) a person, as a

function of his or her ethnicity (Correll, et al., 2002, p. 1328). Correll, et al. (2002) stated

examples in their studies of White U.S. American officers actually killing unarmed Blacks,

which provided support for the idea that this explicit bias still existed in the United States.

Not only does todays law enforcement face accusations of explicit racial bias, but

politics face trouble in the United States as well, as explained by Drakulich (2015):

Thus, while the Republican southern strategy was an attempt to recruit voters with

feelings of racial bias towards African Americans, changing social norms about race

encouraged the employment of racial dog whistlestopics like urban crime or

welfare fraud, which signaled those with racial biases while avoiding specifically

mentioning race (p. 392).

With this new way of approaching racism, we can begin to see how human perception has

changed from an explicit bias to implicit bias.

Hidden/Implicit Bias

Implicit bias is the bias in judgement and/or behavior that results from subtle cognitive

processes that often operate at a level below conscious awareness and without intentional

control (Casey, Warren, Cheesman, & Elek, 2012, p. 55). Even if a person does not necessarily

endorse the culture stereotype, they are still pervasive in our culture and the knowledge of that

can foster implicit bias (Devine, 1989; & Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995). An

explanation of this concept states:

People implicitly make associations and evaluations based on cultural knowledge in a

way that may not be available to introspection and may not be wanted or endorsed but is
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still attitudinal because of its potential to influence individual perception, judgement, or

action (Nosek, 2007, p. 68).

Many people credit Freud for making the term unconscious a common phrase (Banaji

& Greenwald, 2013). It was later proven that a different German physicist and physiologist

named Von Helmholtz, was the one who created this term and the phrase unconscious

inference, which is used to describe the means by which the mind creates from physical data

the conscious perceptions that define our ordinary and subjective experiences of seeing

(Banaji & Greenwald, 2013, p. 6).

On the scientific scale, the concept of attitudes toward race was relatively new, as the first

studies of this topic occurred in the 1920s and 1930s (Banaji & Greenwald, 2013). Banaji and

Greenwald (2013) described the work done by Bogardus, an U.S. American sociologist, as being

the first to study racial attitudes by asking U.S. Americans to say how close they were willing to

be members of forty racesalmost all of which were groups that present-day U.S. Americans

refer to as nationalities or ethnicities rather than as races (Banaji & Greenwald, 2013, p.

170). The results of that initial study showed that more than half of the respondents did not want

contact with Greeks, Mexicans, or Blacks, and they did not even want those groups of people to

even visit the United States (Bogardus, 1925).

A few years later, psychologist Thurstone measured preferences based on nationalities,

where the subjects were asked to underline the one nationality, or race, of each pair that you

would rather associate with (Banaji & Greenwald, 2013, p. 171). His study, which involved

210 White male undergraduate students, showed that U.S. Americans were the preferred race of

the subjects (Thurstone, 1928).


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The results of the studies from both Bogardus and Thurstone indicated that the less-liked

groups were extreme in their negativity (Banaji & Greenwald, 2013, p. 173). In Bogardus

study, his respondents did not welcome more than half the groups as coworkers, or even

neighbors (Banaji & Greenwald, 2013).

In 1929, Hinckley introduced a study that measured a persons attitude towards Blacks, in

which subjects were asked to agree or disagree with questions regarding Blacks (Hinckley,

1932). The statements ranged from The educated Negro is less of a burden on the courts and is

less likely to become a dependent or a defective than the educated white man to The feeble-

mindedness of the Negro limits him to a social level just a little above that of the higher animals

(Banaji & Greenwald, 2013, p. 174). The results of the survey told Hinckley that although

people did not show racial prejudice, they still had strong opinions about people of a different

race (Banaji & Greenwald, 2013).

Katz and Braly (1933) believe that public and private attitudes may well be applied to

the problem of racial prejudice (p. 281). The basis of this argument is grounded in a study in

which students were asked to disclose why various racial and social groups would be excluded

from their respective fraternity and boarding houses (Allport & Katz, 1931). Over half of the

students in the study responded:

I have no personal objection to social contacts, such as in the classroom or dining hall,

with most of these people; but as things are at present in society it would lower the

reputation of my fraternity to admit those I have not checked (Allport & Katz, 1931, p.

151).

Allport and Katz (1931) took this to mean that although students do not object to associating

with a person based on their racial or social status, they do not want to be publicly known for
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associating with them. This shows that a persons racial prejudice was part of their everyday life

choices in the early 20th century.

The term mind bugs has been incorporated into the existing knowledge and study of

implicit bias. It was first coined by VanLehn (1990), who was a computer scientist at Arizona

State University (Banaji & Greenwald, 2013). Mind bugs is used to describe systematic errors

that young children make when learning arithmetic (VanLehn, 1990). The term social mind

bugs has been derived from this and is used to describe ingrained habits of thought that lead to

errors in how we perceive, remember, reason, and make decisions (Banaji & Greenwald, 2013,

p. 4).

Banaji and Greenwald (2013), explain that economists, sociologists, and psychologists

have confirmed that the way a person is treated stems from the social group that he or she comes

from, due to mind bugs in peoples mind. This affects peoples behaviors in different scenarios

that they encounter in their daily lives.

This is especially true in the case of a tragedy. When tragedy strikes, individuals are no

longer perceived as individuals, but instead viewed as representatives of a social group (Correll,

Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2002). An example such tragedy is being involved in the criminal

justice system. Racial bias is an extreme issue in the criminal justice system, in which it is found

that armed Black people are more likely to be shot at by police officers than a White person

(Correll, et al., 2002). In fact, an officer is more likely to make the decision to not shoot an

armed White person, as opposed to an armed Black person (Correll, et al., 2002). Correll, et al.

(2002) have found that more often than not, unarmed Black people will be shot more often than

unarmed White people.


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An implicit racial bias has also been found in judges and jurors (Casey, et al., 2012, p.

60). In death penalty cases, more than half of those judged as being stereotypically Black were

sentenced to death, as opposed to less than 25% of people perceived as less stereotypically

Black (Casey, et al., 2012, p. 60). Eberhardt, Goff, Pudie, and Davies (2004) have found that

Blacks are more implicitly associated with crime than other races.

Another arena in which implicit bias is seen is in politics. Implicit bias has been known

to predict voting intentions and behaviors (Casey, et al., 2012). It has been demonstrated that

voters who are more implicitly prejudiced against Blacks were less likely to vote for someone

who was Black (Payne, et al. 2010). Furthermore, this study led to implications that implicit

biases may have helped tip the scales for undecided decision-makers (Galdi, Arcuri, &

Gawronski, 2008).

Implicit racial bias has played a role in the medical field. In the case of physicians

making treatment decisions in the emergency room, Green, et al. (2007) explain that fewer

thrombolysis treatment recommendations are made when the patient was described as Black as

opposed to White (p. 1235). Penner, et al. (2010), further explained that implicit racial biases of

White physicians played a role in how positively or negatively Blacks responded to medical

interaction.

Drakulich (2015) believes that social problems in the United States, mainly labor market

inequalities and crime, are linked to racial discrimination against Blacks. These social issues

have been the subject of social and political disagreement since the 1960s (Beckett & Sasson,

2004; Hagan, 2010; Simon, 2007; Tonry, 2011; & Wacquant, 2005). Drakulich (2015), explains:

These debates and disagreements--both historical and contemporary--are rooted in

fundamentally disparate understandings of the nature of these social problems.


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Individuals, for instance, may disagree over the true severity of the problems, whether the

problems are rooted individual failings or structural inequities, or the potential

consequences of these problems for white U.S. Americans (p. 391).

The difference between the 1960s and the present day is whether or not an issue is rooted in

racism or whether it is rooted in racial bias (Drakulich, 2015).

Drakulich (2015) wanted to know to what degree are popular understandings of major

social problems like crime and inequality rooted in racial animosity or bias, which is not as easy

to answer with the decline of open racial bias against Blacks (p. 392). It is suggested that racial

bias underlies frames people hold of two interrelated social problems: the overrepresentation of

African Americans among the poor and in the criminal justice system (Drakulich, 2015, p. 392).

Examples such as this, where peoples implicit racial bias affect the way they view people from a

certain race, happen in all kinds of cases in life.

After reviewing the history of open and implicit biases, Casey, et al. (2012) have

developed ideas on how a person can possibly change his or her implicit biases. The following

has been suggested:

Consciously acknowledge group and individual differences (i.e., adopt a multiculturalism

approach to egalitarianism rather than a color-blindness strategy in which one tries to

ignore these differences); routinely check thought processes and decisions for possible

bias (i.e., adopt a thoughtful, deliberative, and self-aware process for inspecting how

ones decisions were made); identify sources of stress and reduce them in the decision-

making environment; identify sources of ambiguity and impose greater structure in the

decision-making context; institute feedback mechanisms; increase exposure to


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stereotyped group members (e.g., seek out greater contact with the stigmatized group in a

positive context) (Casey, et al., 2012, p. 61).

Although these suggestions have been made, the question lies in whether these can actually

change or eliminate an implicit bias (Casey, et al., 2012). Binder, et al. (2009), suggest that

increased contact or exposure in a positive context to a group that is generally stigmatized may

reduce prejudice towards that group over time. It is also suggested that spending time with a

stigmatized social group in a positive setting will help to reduce prejudice toward other out

groups in general (Tausch, et al., 2010). Other research suggests that people who have

developed chronic egalitarian goals may be able to beat implicit bias at its own game by

automatically inhibiting implicit stereotypes (Moskowitz & Li, 2011, p. 110).

In trying to understand how to change or reduce implicit biases, it is also important to

find and understand a way to measure the implicit biases a person holds.

Measuring Implicit Bias

Finding a way to measure implicit biases has presented many difficulties over time. One

of these difficulties is that in self-reported studies, it is not often easy for people to access their

implicit thoughts, and instead they think about their conscious values and ideas (Banaji &

Greenwald, 2013). Hahn, Judd, Hirsh and Blair (2014) tried to craft tests and studies that assess

implicit attitudes in contrast to explicit attitudes, which are measured by self-report and

necessarily involve respondents knowing that their attitudes are being assessed (p. 1).

Moreover, one of the biggest obstacles in the study of implicit bias is that individuals who

answer questionnaires and tests tend to consciously or unconsciously avoid truthfully answering

questions about their unconscious attitudes, because they do not want to be perceived as racist

(Banaji & Greenwald, 2013). OShea, Watson, and Brown (2016) suggest that one reason for
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measuring implicit attitudes is that participants may use self-presentation tactics or respond in a

socially desirable manner on explicit self-reports to avoid being perceived as prejudiced (p.

158). For these reasons, social psychologists have come up with different ways to test implicit

associations without explicitly asking participants about their biases. As Hahn, et al. (2014)

explained, much of the interest in implicit attitudes stems from findings that they capture

aspects of human thought and behavior that are not revealed by self-reported explicit attitudes

(p. 2). Discovering these implicit attitudes has led to development in physiological,

computerized, and paper and pencil measures.

Physiological measures test the reaction of the bodies in response to different stimuli.

Since the concept of implicit bias started to be studied, Rankin and Campbell (1955); Vanman,

Saltz, Nathan and Warren (2004); and Phelps, OConnor, Cunningham, Funayama, Gatenby,

Gore and Banaji (2002) have found a relation between unconscious attitudes and sweat

production, muscle movement, and amygdala activity.

Galvanic skin response (GSR) measures sweat production through the skins conductance

(Rankin & Campbell, 1955). Rankin and Campbell (1955) studied a persons GSR in connection

to his or her implicit bias, and found the following:

There are a number of characteristics of the GSR which recommended it as a potential

measure of attitudes. For one thing, the GSR is highly sensitive, although this sensitivity

also becomes a source of difficulty in providing experimental control. A second

advantage is the general inability of the subject to inhibit the response voluntarily. Third,

the GSR has repeatedly shown itself related to affect or to favorable and unfavorable

evaluations of stimuli (p. 30).


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Their studies found an increase in GSR activity when individuals participated in the test but also

found the limitation that the preference towards or against a stimulus could not be measured

(Rankin & Campbell, 1955). In other words, there was a response to the stimuli, but it could

only be measured as arousal, and not as positive or negative bias.

Phelps, et al. (2000) conducted another physiological test, using functional magnetic

resonance imaging (fMRI) while participants looked at pictures of individuals of different races.

In their first experiment, Phelps, et al. (2000) showed White subjects images of unfamiliar Black

and White individuals, while they measured their fMRI. Then, they compared these results with

the subjects results to other implicit association tests and found that the strength of amygdala

activation to Black-versus-White faces was correlated with two indirect (unconscious) measures

of race evaluation (Implicit Association Test [IAT] and potentiated startle), but not with the direct

(conscious) expressions of race attitudes (Phelps, et al., 2000, p. 729). However, this was not

the case when participants were shown pictures of individuals whom they knew, regardless of

their race, in the second experiment. Consequently, from their two experiments Phelps, et al.

(2000) concluded that amygdala and behavioral responses to Black-versus-White faces in White

subjects reflect cultural evaluations of social groups modified by individual experience (p. 729).

Vanman, Saltz, Nathan, and Warren (2004) developed a third physiological test in an

attempt to identify a persons unconscious attitudes. They used a facial electromyography

(EMG) in order to measure the muscle movements of the faces of the participants in their study.

Their findings indicate that facial EMG can be used as an implicit measure of prejudice related

to discrimination (Vanman, et al., 2004, p. 711). To reach this conclusion, they asked students

to evaluate several applicants for an open position. Vanman, et al. (2004) used an EMG to
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measure students responses toward White or Black applicants, revealing that bias in cheek

EMG activity was related to the race of the chosen applicant (Vanman, et al., 2004, p. 711).

In addition to physiological measures, computerized tests that measure individuals

implicit racial bias have been developed. There are two kinds of computerized tests: sequential

priming procedures and response competition procedures. Sequential priming is one of the most

widely used methods for measuring implicit social cognition (Cameron, C. D., Brown-Iannuzzi,

J. L., Payne, B. K., 2012, p. 1). Cameron, et al. (2012) explained that priming involves

presenting some stimulus with the aim of activating a particular idea, category, or feeling and

then measuring the effects of the prime on performance in some other task (p.1). Fazio,

Sanbonmatsu, Powell and Kardes (1986) first used sequential priming procedures to measure

unconscious attitudes. They found that a persons implicit attitudes are automatically activated

once he or she comes in contact with the object being evaluated (Fazio, et al., 1986). Then, the

conclusions reached by Fazio, et al. (1986) were utilized by Payne, Cheng, Govorum, and

Stewart (2005) to study the application of sequential priming methods to implicit racial bias. For

this, Payne, et al. (2005) created the affect misattribution procedure (AMP). In the test,

participants were shown pictures of Black, White and Asian individuals sequentially. The Asian

individuals were included as a neutral race to test the participants bias. Each participant was

asked to make a statement about the physical appearance of the Asian person after they had seen

Black and White individuals. Payne, et al. (2005) found that people with White bias were more

likely to make a positive statement about an Asian after they saw a picture of a White person.

Contrarily, participants were prone to make negative statements about the Asian in the picture

after they had seen a picture of a Black person.


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Response competition procedures are the second type of computerized measure available.

Harrison (1968) asserts that response competition examines the hypothesis that novel stimuli

elicit antagonistic response tendencies, producing a tension state (p. 363). When individuals are

presented with a stimulus, their interaction with it will generate an automatic response because

it will bear some resemblance to many stimuli encountered in the past (Harrison, 1968, p. 363).

Two main tests belong to this category: the Implicit Association Test and the Implicit Relational

Assessment Procedure. The Implicit Association Test was developed when the research

available at the time indicated that the methods available at the time were not accurate in

predicting a persons unconscious attitudes (Banaji & Greenwald, 2013). The creators of the test,

Greenwald, McGhee and Schwartz (1998), projected that the implicit association method may

reveal attitudes and other automatic associations even for subjects who prefer not to express

those attitudes (p. 1465). This test measures the latency with which a person can connect two

categories (for racial testing these categories are Black and White) with words that are

commonly described as positive or negative (for example, flower is positive, and insect is

negative) (Greenwald, et al., 1998). The test is structured as follows:

Half the stimuli are photos of either Black or White faces and the other half are words

that are either positive or negative in character. For half of the trials (the compatible

task), the individual presses one key if the face is White or the word is positive and a

different key if the face is Black or the word is negative. For the other half of the trials

(the incompatible task), the individual presses one key if the face is White or the word

is negative and a different key if the face is Black or the word is positive (Blanton,

Jaccard, Strauts, Mitchell, & Tetlock, 2015, p. 1469).


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Greenwald, et al. (1998) explain that the latency, or time it takes for individuals to perform these

tasks, is measured throughout the test. Positive or negative scores are calculated depending on

the amount of time individuals take to complete the tasks. When individuals can relate White

faces to positive words faster, they possess a positive score. When they take a shorter time to

connect Black faces to positive words, their scores are negative (Greenwald, et al., 1998).

Blanton, et al. (2015) explained the way the test is scored:

On the IAT metric, positive scores are interpreted as revealing an implicit preference for

Whites over Blacks, negative scores are interpreted as revealing an implicit preference

for Blacks over Whites, and scores near zero are interpreted as revealing little or no

implicit bias (Blanton, et al., 2015, p. 1469).

Even though the IAT was an enormous advance in the possibility of measuring implicit

bias, Blanton, et al. (2015), and OShea, Watson and Brown (2016) discovered that it also has

several limitations. First, Blanton, et al. (2015) found evidence that the IAT metric is right

biased, such that individuals who are behaviorally neutral tend to have positive IAT scores (p.

1468). In doing more research, they found that because implicit attitudes cannot be fully known,

the measure is arbitrary. Blanton, et al. (2015) concluded that observed scores are thought to be

some function of the underlying true scores, but the exact function form typically is not known

(p. 1469). Furthermore, the IAT is limited because it can only measure relative attitudes

(OShea, et al., 2016, p. 159). OShea, et al. (2016) indicated that the IAT inherently compares

two stimuli groups with positive and negative words. These groups can be Black and White,

Men and Women, Young and Old, Gay and Straight, among others. For this reason, the way the

test was created, a persons implicit bias for one group (e.g. Whites) is measured only in relation

to another group (e.g. Blacks), and; therefore, the results are not absolute (OShea, et al., 2016).
20

Then, another limitation of the IAT arises because some categories do not have an obvious

comparison group (OShea, et al., 2016, p. 159).

The Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure (IRAP) was created to overcome some of

the limitations of the IAT. The IRAP is one of the reaction time (RT) tools that attempt to

measure absolute attitudes and do not require a relative comparison to another group (OShea,

et al., 2016, p. 159). Since the IRAP does not compare a set of stimuli in relation to another, but

in relation to the self, it claims to measure absolute, not just relative, implicit attitudes

(OShea, et al., 2015, p. 158). OShea, et al. (2016) found the following:

The IRAP is based on latencies of participants accurate and speeded responses to stimuli.

However, rather than categorizing items with the appropriate key press (as in the IAT),

participants instead have to press keys that correspond with true or false displayed on the

computer screen. (p. 159)

In the IRAP, participants are given facts related to the category of stimuli being studied, and they

are asked to press true or false as quickly and accurately as possible. Nonetheless, this test is

also imperfect. OShea, et al. (2016) found that the use of positive or negative language affects

the way people respond, which alters the results, and magnifies or minimizes the bias that people

present.

Finally, in addition to computerized measures, there are paper and pencil measures.

Many of these measures are adaptations of computerized methods such as the Implicit

Association Test. Additionally, Gilbert and Hixon (1991) created the word fragment completion

task, which Son Hing, Li, and Zanna (2001) adapted to find a persons racial bias. In the

experiment by Son Hing, et al., participants interacted with a Chinese person for a few minutes

before completing the task. Once started, participants were shown words without a letter.
21

Participants had to choose a letter to complete the word. For instance, participants were

presented with the word POLI_E. They could potentially choose the letter C or the letter T to

create the words police or polite. Depending on which word was chosen, participants were

determined to have a positive or negative bias toward Asians (Son Hing, et al., 2001).

These measures are all flawed individually, but together, they have proven to be helpful

in the advancement of research to determine peoples implicit bias.


22

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