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Social Forces
Abstract
In a sample of southern Californians, three questions were investigated: (1) Are there
race/ethnic differences in beliefs about the causes of poverty? (2) Do two social
psychological variables, namely internal and external self-explanations, signi.ficantly
affect beliefs about poverty net of respondents' background characteristics? and (3) Do
the determinants of beliefs about poverty differfor blacks, Latinos, and whites? Results
indicate that in each case the answer is yes. First, blacks and Latinos are more likely
than whites to view both individualistic and structuralist explanations for poverty as
important. Second, respondents' self-explanations have significant effects on poverty
beliefs. Lastly, the patterns of effects of several variables that predict beliefs about poverty
differ across race/ethnic groups. Results con.firm, contradict, and extend current
knowledge of beliefs about poverty.
Interest in the causes and consequences of beliefs about social inequality can be
traced to Marx's ([1859] 1970; Marx & Engels [1845] 1970) discussions of class
and consciousness. Building on this foundation, scholars have continued the
research tradition by investigating the determinants and consequences of
"beliefs about inequality," often noting the roles of ideology and consciousness
in the maintenance, stability, and reproduction of social stratification (Feagin
1975; Huber & Form 1973; Kluegel & Smith 1986; Robinson & Bell 1978). While
there is an extensive literature on the determinants and consequences of class
* A version of this article was the recipient of the American Sociological Association Social
Psychology Section's 1995 Graduate Student Paper Award and the Southern Sociological
Society's 1995 Howard W. Odum Award for outstanding graduate student paper. In addition,
it was presented at the 1994 American Sociological Association meetings in Los Angeles. The
research was supported by NIMH Grant PHS-T32 MH14588-18. The author wishes to thank
Sheldon Stryker and Richard Serpe for the opportunity to participate in the survey inves-
tigation producing the data used in this study. Thanks are also due to Sheldon Stryker, Robert
V. Robinson, John Pease, and Janet Hunt for their helpftul comments on earlier drafts of this
article. I am particularly indebted to Larry Hunt and Brian Powellfor their helpfiul suggestions
and careful assistance during several revisions of this article. Direct all correspondence to
Matthew Hunt, Department of Sociology, 744 Ballantine Hall, Indiana University,
Bloomington, IN 47405. E-mail: mohunt@indiana.edu.
i The University of North Carolina Press Social Forces, September 1996, 75(1):293-322
Theoretical Background
Feagin (1975) noted that beliefs about poverty are of three types: (1) individual-
istic - in which characteristics of persons are used to explain poverty,
(2) structuralist - in which the larger socioeconomic system is seen as the cause
of poverty, and (3) fatalistic - in which supra-individual, but non-social-
structural forces (e.g., luck, chance) are pointed to as the source of poverty. Past
studies document the greater popularity of individualistic views of poverty
among Americans (Feagin 1975; Huber & Form 1973; Kluegel & Smith 1986).
Public beliefs about the sources of poverty center on the lack of a proper work
ethic, the lack of ability, and other character defects of the poor themselves. In
short, the picture painted by these studies is one of perceived personal deficien-
cies of those who are poor - an image consistent with Ryan's (1971) claim that
Americans "blame the victim" when thinking about poverty.
Research into the antecedents of beliefs about poverty has generally found
that persons of higher status (e.g., those with higher incomes, whites, and older
people) favor individualistic explanations. Lower status has been found to
increase use of structuralist explanations, "but not necessarily with greatly
diminished support for individualism" (Kluegel & Smith 1986:93). The adher-
ence to individualism among lower status people is explained as evidence of the
strength of the dominant ideology, which is thought to be a general cultural
trait, having broad, universalistic effects on all Americans. In contrast to the
stable effects of individualism, structuralist beliefs are more variable, more
perception of the general condition of his or her group rather than his or her
own SES. Schuman, Steeh, and Bobo (1985) find support for this argument in
strong black support for social welfare initiatives when controlling for SES,
suggesting that such support is better explained by racial collective experience
than individual socioeconomic standing. In interpreting the relationship between
race and SES on beliefs about poverty, if race/ethnic differences in attitudes are
reduced significantly when controlling for SES, the self-interest perspective will gain
support. In contrast, if race/ethnic differences persist following the introduction of SES
controls, the group identification explanation will be supported.5
Much social psychological research makes the implicit assumption that the
determinants of attitudes and beliefs are the same across large-scale social
categories such as race and ethnicity. In short, it is generally assumed that the
determinants of a belief among the race/ethnic subgroups that make up a
sample are the same as among the total sample. As a consequence of this
assumption of similarity, the hypothesis that the beliefs and attitudes of
understudied (i.e., nonwhite) race/ethnic groups might be influenced in
different ways by various structural and social psychological factors has gone
largely untested.9 I test this hypothesis, guided by the assumption that groups
with widely different experiences and conditions of existence may differ in how
particular variables affect ideological beliefs. The historical oppression and
continued segregation (Massey & Denton 1992) of blacks is an obvious source
of group distinction. At a more social-psychological level, Steele (1994) argues
that even successful blacks, who are on a par with middle-class whites from the
standpoint of socioeconomic status, stili must cope with knowledge of the
historical reality of race-based discrimination, as weli as the continuing
perception of racism as a force influencing self and feliow group members, in
forming an ideological orientation toward American society.-l The relatively
recent migration of many Latinos to southern California from Central and South
America (Donato 1994) may differentiate them from most blacks and non-Latino
whites in the region. These factors alone make it clear that blacks and Latinos
have distinct experiences and histories that may have implications for how
members of these groups perceive themselves, other groups, and American
society.
A final factor contributing to the origin and perpetuation of the assumption
of race/ethnic similarity has been the insufficient numbers of minority respon-
dents in past surveys for the type of statistical analyses needed to compare the
determinants of dependent variables such as beliefs about poverty. In contrast
to past research, the data base used in this study contains sizable subsamples of
blacks and Latinos, aliowing for statistical subgroup comparisons that directly
examine the validity of the assumption of similarity.
DATA
The data for this study derive from a computer-assisted telephone sample
survey of five counties (Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, San Bernardino, and
San Diego) in southern California, conducted between January and March 1993.
The survey used the Waksberg (1978) method of random-digit dialing and
covered all working exchanges in the five counties under examination. The
response rate was just above 70% and 2,854 interviews were completed. The
race breakdown was 1,245 whites, 737 Latinos, 646 blacks, 148 Asians, and 62
"others" (16 people refused to answer the race self-identification question).
Given the extreme cultural heterogeneity of the Asian category (which includes
Japanese, Chinese, Koreans, Vietnamese, and others), I elected to exclude Asians
from the study in order to focus on a comparison of the three major race/ethnic
groups (N - 2,628). The survey purposely oversampled blacks, resulting in a
sample in which whites represent 47.4% of respondents, blacks represent 24.6%
of respondents, and Latinos represent 28% of respondents."1 A weighting
correction adjusts the sample to mirror existing race/ethnicity and gender
population proportions according to 1990 census information. This procedure
changes the race/ethnic percentages to whites = 60.2%, blacks = 8.7%, and
Latinos = 31.1%. I use the weighted sample for the calculation of the frequen-
cies, variable means, and standard deviations, which appear in Tables 1 and 2.
Interviews were conducted in English or Spanish according to the language the
respondent preferred. A complex translation, back-translation technique was
used to ensure the linguistic equivalence of the survey instrument in English
and Spanish.12
Belief Measures
STRATIMCATION BELIEFS
enough good jobs." Respondents were asked whether they thought that each
reason was "very important" (coded 4), "somewhat important" (3), "not very
important" (2), or "not at all important" (1), as a reason for poverty.
SELF-EXPLANATIONS
Findings
Lack of effort by
the poor themselves 57 34 9 53 39 8
Personal irresponsibility,
lack of discipline among
those who are poortt 50 32 18 44 30 27
Failure of society
to provide good schools
for many Americans 38 26 36 46 29 26
Failure of private
industry to provide
enough good jobs 29 38 33 35 39 28
Prejudice and
discriminationtt 34 39 27 31 44 25
Just bad luck 8 28 63 12 32 56
TABLE 1: Reasons for Poverty: Marginals in 1969, 1980, and 1993a (Continued)
Lack of effort by
the poor themselves 40 (8) 42 18 -.01 .78
Personal irresponsibility,
lack of discipline among
those who are poortt 45 (6) 38 17 -.04 .78
Failure of society
to provide good schools
for many Americans 62 (1) 26 14 .70 -.00
Failure of private
industry to provide
enough good jobs 48 (4) 37 15 .69 .14
Prejudice and
discrimination4t 49 (2) 36 14 .70 .03
Just bad luck 12 (10) 32 56 .26 .22
This dual consciousness pattern resonates with the arguments of Bobo (1991)
and Mann (1970) as well as with Kluegel and Smith's (1986) assertion that
blacks demonstrate the strongest group consciousness in their support for
structural challenges to the dominant ideology but "stop short of denying the
justice of economic inequality in principle and of dismissing the ideas that the
rich and poor as individuals are deserving of their fate" (290). While past
research has found blacks to be slightly less than or just as individualistic as
Dependent Variables
Independent variables
whites, the current findings show that blacks (and Latinos) may surpass the
individualism of whites, even while exhibiting the greater levels of structural
thinking about inequality.
Finally, the effects of several of the sociodemographic variables included in
model 3, and used in past research on beliefs about poverty, warrant brief com-
ment. Consistent with an underdog perspective (Robinson & Bell 1978), which
predicts that relatively disadvantaged groups (e.g., those with low incomes,
women) will favor beliefs that challenge the dominant ideology: women are
more likely than men to see structuralist reasons for poverty as important, and
a lower household income increases the likelihood that structuralist beliefs will
be invoked. Having more education reduces the likelihood of seeing either type
of poverty belief as important. The negative impact of education on
individualism supports an enlightenment perspective, while the negative effect
on structuralism supports perspectives (e.g., the underdog viewpoint) that
emphasize the role of education as a component of socioeconomic status. Finally,
consistent with past research, older respondents in model 3 are more likely to
be individualistic on the subject of poverty.
In sum, the models composing Table 3 demonstrate that there are significant
race/ethnic differences in beliefs about poverty.
Table 4 recreates all regressions from Table 3 and adds the internal and external
self-explanation variables in an effort to incorporate the self-concept into our
understanding of how beliefs about poverty are shaped. Across the six
equations in Table 4, the race/ethnicity and sociodemographic findings are
largely consistent with those reported previously. (Exceptions are that, in model
6, the age variable does not show the previously observed significant effect on
individualism and the education variable does not show the previously
observed significant effect on structuralism.)18 The self-explanation effect
consistent across all three models. Contrary to prediction, respondents in the
complete sample do not generalize neatly from self-explanations to beliefs about
poverty: internal self-explanations do not lead solely to individualistic thinking
about poverty, nor do external self-explanations lead solely to the invocation of
only structuralist reasons for poverty. While these patterns seem to show that
both internal and external self-explanations significantly increase both individu-
alistic and structuralist thinking about poverty, further analyses reveal that the
effect results from two distinct patterns, corresponding with whites and
nonwhites, that are superimposed in Table 4.
Nonetheless, Table 4 provides an affirmative answer to the second main
question of this study: social-psychological variables do have significant effects
on beliefs about poverty net of respondents' background characteristics. In an
effort to further deconstruct the findings reported in Table 4, I reran models
within race/ethnic subgroups to explore how blacks, Latinos, and whites may
contribute differently to the patterns reported for the whole sample.
Table 5 represents the final set of analyses, which directly test the assumption
of similarity concerning the determinants of poverty beliefs for the three
race/ethnic groups. To address this third main question of the study, the
equations with only sociodemographic variables (model 2) and equations with
both sociodemographic and the self-explanation variables (model 5) were run
again within the three separate race/ethnic subsamples. These analyses further
specify links between race, the self, and ideological beliefs, or in Mills's (1959)
language, some ideological consequences of the intersections of social structure
and biography. The significance of race/ethnic group differences in the
regression coefficients for each independent variable (from the equations run
separately within each subgroup) is assessed using a difference-of-slope test.
This test is comparable to testing the significance of the interaction term of the
independent variable with race/ethnicity (Kmenta 1971).
Independent variables
Whites
Model 2 Model 5
Independent variables
a~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
Blacks
Model 2 Model 5
Independent variables
Latinos
Model 2 Model 5
general structural position, which provides two basic reference groups: one that
highlights their relative success and the importance of beliefs in internal,
individual sources of advancement, and a second that highlights minorities'
relative disadvantage and the continuing significance of external, environmental
barriers to equality with whites. From a symbolic interactionist perspective these
self-explanations can be understood to represent two distinct components of
identity, or "vocabularies of motive" (rather than different poles of a single
continuum as the locus-of-control concept assumes), which may have a different
salience for different respondents (from different experiences of the world), as
well as different levels of salience within the selves of particular respondents.
For minorities, the salience of internal self-explanations leads to the
increased adoption of structuralist beliefs as a response to personal struggles in
a caste-conditioned system. Internal self-explanations are made salient from a
sense of having worked hard and having made sacrifices to achieve personal
success and the status that gainful employment brings. However, unlike whites,
who operate with a view of the stratification system that causes them to
generalize (in universalistic fashion) from personal experiences to the poor,
employed minorities' beliefs are more complex and are shaped by the compet-
ing pull of the castelike reality of race/ethnic status. Thus, even when the
dominant ideology internal terms are salient in explaining one's own biography,
minorities also contend with a sense of having had to overcome structural
barriers to achieve their success, while acknowledging that similar barriers exist
for other members of one's group. The internal self-orientation does not
dominate consciousness but remains one component of a dual consciousness
characteristic of minority groups. In short, the intemal attribution of responsibil-
ity is fully compatible with more structural modes of thinking that place some
responsibility outside the individual realm. This finding is consistent with
Steelman and Powell's (1993) finding that among African Americans, support
for government funding of higher education (interpreted as a form of social
welfare) is fully consistent with a sense of personal responsibility among parents
for funding their children's education. For blacks and Latinos, assuming
personal responsibility, or saying "I made it because of me," does not preclude
- indeed it can increase - the acknowledgment that structural barriers exist in
society.
The pattern of external self-explanations leading to individualistic beliefs
about poverty among minorities is understood with a similar dual-consciousness
logic, supplemented by theories of cognitive attribution biases (Nisbett & Ross
1980; Ross 1977). Studies of ego-defensive or self-serving attribution biases
suggest that external self-explanations are commonly adopted by vulnerable
persons to deflect responsibility for personal outcomes away from the self and
toward the larger environment23 Studies also suggest that working Americans'
views of the poor are shaped by such ego-defensive tendencies. Lewis (1978)
argues that the projection of personal responsibility for failure onto the poor
allows certain vulnerable strata to feel better about their own limited successes.
Lane (1962) makes a similar point in arguing that many working Americans
exhibit a fear of equality, since living close to poverty (in the sense of limited
income, limited resources, the threat of falling into poverty) produces a need for
that include nonwhites. Further, such research should consider the implications
that minorities' distinct structural positions and experiences have on the content
and organization of the self, as well as how various patterns of self-organization
(e.g., the relative salience of internal and external self-explanations) affect
ideological beliefs about inequality and other social and political issues.
Future research should also investigate race/ethnic differences in how
persons' self-perceptions of their relative success or failure shape ideological
thinking. While I lack direct measures of perceived success or failure, it is
reasonable to suggest in light of our knowledge of attribution biases that
internal self-explanations are indicative of perceived relative success, while
external self-explanations are adopted in an ego-defensive manner to deflect
responsibility from the self when relative failure is perceived. Given this logic,
one can speculate about the distinctive effects of self-explanation in minority
groups. Specifically, the internal orientation is likely indicative of a kind of ego
security that enables respondents to adopt a more compassionate view of the
poor. As the poor represent no threat to the self when internal self-explanations
are salient, structural barriers can be invoked to explain others' poverty in a
"while I've made it because of me, the system keeps others down" fashion. For
minorities, personal biography is explained in particularistic fashion - in this
case, as an exception to the general rule that validates the moral claims of the
underdog. In contrast, external self-explanations likely flow from a kind of ego
vulnerability that is not conducive to the development of a structuralist
consciousness. Rather, extemal self-explanations among minorities appear to
cause actors to interpret others' lack of success in individualistic terms in a
"while I've been limited by outside forces, the poor only have themselves to
blame" fashion. Again, minority personal biography is understood in particular-
istic terms, in this case relative to ideological beliefs about the poor that deny
the moral claims of the underdog in the service of maintaining personal
exceptionalism and a favorable self-identity.
The growing inequality between a gainfully employed class and a growing
urban underclass within minority communities should motivate future
ethnographic and survey studies of ideological beliefs to examine the applicabil-
ity of theories of "middle" Americans' beliefs about the poor that were
originally developed among white populations (e.g., Lane 1962; Lewis 1978).
Further, future research should address in greater detail the ideological
implications of various manifestations of the self-concept in an effort to move
beyond those aspects of this study that have been necessarily speculative.
Speculation aside, however, this study has produced answers to the three main
questions posed at the outset: First, race/ethnic differences do exist in beliefs
about poverty. This study documents the unexpected pattem of blacks and
Latinos showing greater support for both structural and individualistic thinking
in comparison with whites. Second, the social-psychological variables do have
significant mediating effects on poverty beliefs net of respondents' background
characteristics. Finally, this study shows that the effects of several of the
independent variables on poverty beliefs do differ by race group, which calls
into question the implicit idea that these basic social-psychological processes
operate similarly for persons of all groupstand social locations.
Notes
2. Such reasoning can be traced to thinkers such as Levi-Strauss (1966) who hold that such
bipolar dichotomies are the result of oppositional human thought processes rooted in the
structure of the mind. This imagery survives in theories that assume that all beliefs can be
scaled along a single dimension (e.g., liberal-conservative), as well as in cognitive consistency
theories (Abelson et al. 1968), which hold that inconsistency is an unpleasant state that creates
a motivational drive toward resolution and consistency in beliefs (Kluegel & Smith 1986:15).
3. Kluegel and Smith (1986) state that "individual and structural explanations are not
alternatives" (17). Much research (Huber & Form 1973; Lane 1962; Mann 1970) supports the
"principle of cognitive efficiency," which holds that persons can hold both types of beliefs
simultaneously, rather than viewing them as alternatives in the quest for consistency (Kluegel
& Smith 1986).
4. Given Gurin, Miller, and Gurin's (1980) finding of strongest group identification among
blacks, along with the relative weakness of any class consciousness or class awareness in
American history, it is argued that racial minorities are more likely to respond to race
cleavages in forming a group identification.
5. See Sears and Funk (1991) for a thorough review of the concept of self-interest and its use in
studies of social and political attitudes. Sears and Funk are critical of the use of demographic
measures of self-interest and document the consistently greater explanatory power of symbolic
politics measures in predicting attitudes. While I am conceptualizing personal self-interest in
socioeconomic status terms, my comparison is with race/ethnicity (rather than symbolic politics
measures) in understanding beliefs about poverty.
6. Rather than assuming a single internal-external personality continuum (i.e., locus of control)
as conceptualized by Rotter (1966) and other psychological social psychologists, I take a
symbolic interactionist approach to analyzing the effects of two separate variables representing
vocabularies that individuals draw upon in varying degrees to explain their circumstances.
7. I am not arguing that these are identical, parallel attribution tendencies with one simply
referring to the self, and the other to the issue of poverty. I do, however, believe that it is
reasonable to assume a general similarity between the tendency to refer to internal/individual-
level properties of the self and to internal/individual-level properties of other people in
explaining why they are poor. Similarly, there is a basic similarity between the tendency to
refer to nonindividual/noninternal forces affecting the self and to nonindividual/noninternal
forces causing poverty. Kluegel and Smith (1986) use a similar interpretive strategy in referring
to ability and effort attributions as representing the person level, while referring to luck and
"being helped or held back by other people" (81) as external attributions. The empirical
implications of including and excluding luck in the measurement of the dependent variables
is explored in note 24.
8. While questions of causality between attitudes about self and other objects remain, I argue
- in light of past research, and the importance accorded to the self-concept in symbolic
interactionism - that it is reasonable to ask whether the way that people think about their
own societal positions affects how they think about other people's positions in society (e.g., the
poor). As a safeguard, models were run each way (i.e., with self-explanations as independent
variables and poverty beliefs as dependent variables, and vice versa) to ensure that the patterns
of effects are similar both ways. Results demonstrate that the patterns of effects are the same.
9. Several studies examining the beliefs and attitudes of nonwhite race/ethnic groups have
appeared in recent years (e.g., Guarnaccia, Angel & Worobey 1991; Smith 1990; Welch &
Sigelman 1988), most of which focus on race/ethnic group differences in adherence to
particular beliefs and attitudes (e.g., Banks & Juni 1991; Booth-Kewley, Rosenfeld & Edwards
1992). Despite these developments, studies that compare race/ethnic groups on the determinants
of beliefs and attitudes are still a rarity. It is the dearth of studies examining group differences
SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES
Gender Female - 1
Male - 0
Household Income
STRATLFICATION BELIEFS
Interviewer statement: The following statements refer to possible reasons for poverty in
America. For each of the reasons, please tell me whether you think it is
(4) very important
(3) somewhat important
(2) not very important
(1) not at all important
as a reason for poverty.
SELF-EXPLANATIONS
Respondents were asked how important "abilities," "opportunities," "effort," and "luck" were
in determining their success in the domains of education and work.
Interviewer Statement for Education: "Now we would like you to think about your education.
Think about the highest degree you have eamed. Please indicate how important the following
were in determining your educational success:"
How important would you say your abilities, things like talents, intelligence, and skills were in
determining your educational success?
How important would you say your opportunities, things like your family background and
other life circumstances, were in determining your educational success?
How important would you say your effort, things like desire, dedication, and motivation was
in determining your educational success?
How important was luck, that is fate or chance in determining your educational success?
Interviewer Statement for Work: "Now we would like you to think about the work you do.
How important are the following in determining your success in the kind of work or job you
currently hold?"
How important would you say your abilities, things like talents, intelligence, and skills are in
determining the kind of work or job you currently hold?
How important would you say your opportunities, things like your family background and
other life circumstances, are in deternining the kind of work or job you currently hold?
How important would you say your effort, things like desire, dedication, and motivation is in
determining the kind of work or job you currently hold?
How important is luck, that is fate or chance in determining the kind of work or job you
currently hold?
in the determinants of (rather than adherence to) beliefs and attitudes that underlies the
assumption of similarity.
10. See Kluegel and Smith (1986) for a discussion of blacks' lower levels of support for the
belief in the availability of equal opportunity in American society.
11. The survey was conducted by the Social Science Research Center at the California State
University at Fullerton. Response rate represents the ratio of completed interviews to the total
of all completed interviews, never completed call-backs, respondent refusals, working numbers
at which an answering machine was reached, and working numbers that were never answered.
Oversampling was achieved by oversampling telephone exchanges in 1990 census tracts where
the black population was greater than 30%. Comparisons with census data confirms the
representativeness of the current sample in basic sociodemographic characteristics.
12. The survey questionnaire was split into three parts, with one-third of it given to each of
three translators. Following the initial translation from English to Spanish, the three thirds of
the Spanish version were distributed round-robin style to another translator to be translated
back to English. Then, this process was repeated with another translation back to Spanish.
Finally, the existing Spanish version was given to a proficient native speaker of Spanish for
translation back to English. Following these procedures, all translators and the principal
investigator met as a group to discuss changes which would ensure maximum equivalence
between the two versions of the survey.
13. I focus on individualistic and structuralist beliefs for two reasons. First, virtually all past
research on beliefs about poverty utilizing Feagin's (or similar) survey items examines
individualistic and structuralist beliefs. Second, factor analysis of the Feagin items reveals these
two underlying dimensions. Since relatively few items referring to luck/fatalism are typically
incorporated into surveys - making it unlikely that a distinct luck/fatalism factor will appear
- these survey items may underestimate the role of luck/fatalism issues in people's thinking
about poverty. Future studies should address this possibility.
14. The question wordings differed slightly from Feagin's and Kluegel and Smith's in two
cases. The "prejudice and discrimination" item included "against blacks" in Kluegel and Smith
and "against Negroes" in Feagin's design. In addition, in the current data, "personal
irresponsibility, lack of discipline among those who are poor" was substituted for the item
used by the two previous studies that read "loose morals and drunkenness." As one reviewer
pointed out, the new personal irresponsibility" language is likely more palatable to Americans
than the "loose morals" language, making the relatively low individualism scores found in this
study all the more noteworthy.
15. These patterns suggest that the significant positive correlation observed for the whole
sample is, in part, a function of the relatively large proportion of Latino respondents in the
current data base in comparison with samples used in previous studies. Thus, the conclusion
that these beliefs may be combined is made clearer when considering the belief patterns of
previously understudied race/ethnic minority populations.
16. All reported regressions involve listwise deletion of cases. Models in Table 3 contain all
respondents with full information on all variables included in the equations (run separately for
each dependent variable) comprising model 3. Models in Tables 4 and 5 contain all respon-
dents with full information on all variables in models 6 and 5 respectively. Models were also
run using pairwise and mean-substitution case-selection criteria and produced nearly identical
results.
17. To explore the possibility that the race/ethnic effects might be due to acquiescence bias (i.e.,
the tendency of some respondents to agree with, or systematically endorse, survey items
despite "true" item content), two approaches were taken. First, I ran all models in which
individualism was the dependent variable with structuralism as an independent variable, and
vice versa. The two poverty beliefs had significant positive effects on one another, but their
inclusion in the models did not significantly alter the coefficients of the race/ethnicity dummy
variables. Second, I created a new variable that directly measured the tendency to agree despite
item content. This variable was created with eight items from the Rosenberg (1965) self-esteem
and Pearlin and Schooler (1978) mastery scales, which include items coded in different
directions. This new variable assigned a score to respondents based on the sum of the
difference between the group mean for an item and any "strongly agree" response by a
particular respondent. Thus, if a respondent strongly agreed with multiple items, despite their
substantive meaning regarding self-esteem and mastery, they received a higher score on the
new variable. Entering this variable into the models reported here did not alter any data
patterns or levels of statistical significance. Results of these analyses are available upon request.
While other method effects could have influenced the results of this study, the above
approaches discount the most likely possible source of bias. Nevertheless, future work should
consider the possibility of other sources of bias that may affect the results of statistical research
on survey data that compares blacks, Latinos, and whites.
18. The fact that models in Table 4 are restricted to employed respondents raises the following
question: Would restriction to the employed-only sample (rather than the total sample) result
in different findings for Table 3? The answer is no. When the models were run on the
employed-only subsample, all basic patterns were the same. I elected not to use the employed-
only sample throughout the entire article since the findings I report on southern Californians'
beliefs about poverty represent a stronger contribution to the literature when taken from the
most representative sample possible. I elected to use the subsample of employed respondents
at this point in the study for two reasons. First, all attempts to construct the self-explanation
variables using only education information, or using the maximum amount of information
available for any given respondent (i.e., including work information if the respondent was
employed), resulted in scales with unsatisfactory reliability levels. Second, the self-explanation
variables are theoretically richer when referring to work and education - especially given that
the ideological issue at hand is poverty.
19. With two exceptions: in model 5 among Latinos, women are significantly more likely than
are men to see structuralist reasons as important, and, among whites in model 5, income loses
its significant negative effect on structuralism.
20. Universalistic norms are consistent with a class-based view of the social system (Parsons
1951) which is perceived to treat people sinmlarly according to achieved criteria. Whether or not
mobility is perceived to be readily available (i.e., an open system), the important point is that
universalistic norms lead one to believe that self's and others' experiences of the world are
similar. In contrast, particularistic norms are consistent with a caste-based view of the social
system. From a caste standpoint, the system is perceived to treat people differently according
to ascribed statuses. Given such a view of the system, people are more likely to explain their
biographies in particularistic terms - i.e., as exceptions to the rules by which other peoples'
lives are determined.
21. Blacks and Latinos are significantly different from whites with two exceptions. First, among
Latinos, as with whites, the effect of external self-explanations on structuralism is significant.
However, a difference-of-slope test demonstrates that the white coefficient for this relationship
is significantly larger than among Latinos, reinforcing the stability of the differences between
whites and minorities that I am emphasizing. The other exception is that the difference
between whites and blacks in the effect of internal self-explanations on individualism is not
significant. These patterns should not deflect attention away from the larger number of ways
in which both blacks and Latinos are significantly different from whites.
22. This theme can be traced back to W.E.B. DuBois's ([1903] 1993) discussion of double
consciousness. DuBois argued that African American consciousness reflects a basic dualism due
to the necessity of balancing a native black soul, or sense of self, with an imposed American
self.
23. See Gurin, Gurin, and Morrison (1978) for a discussion of the sources of an external control
ideology among blacks, which is interpreted as a realistic perception of the circumstances of
discrimination and historic oppression rather than a pathological personality attribute. Table
2 confirms that blacks and Latinos are more likely than whites to use extemal self-explanations.
Further, correlations with Pearlin's "mastery" or "personal efficacy" scale suggest that extemal
self-explanations are consistent with a lower sense of personal control or efficacy than are
internal self-explanations.
24. Does including luck/fatalism issues in the measurement of the dependent variables change
the basic findings of this article? No. I performed the following additional lines of analysis,
incorporating luck/fatalism issues into the measurement of the dependent variables, to
demonstrate that consistently dealing with luck (i.e., including it in the self-explanations and
dependent variables) does not change the fundamental findings of this article. First, I reran the
factor analysis on the ten Feagin items (in Table 1) to see how information on luck might be
included. Reanalysis reveals that there is a potential third factor that comes close to making the
usual eigenvalue cut point of 1. This factor registers an eigenvalue of .979. Since the decision
rule of an eigenvalue of 1 is not written in stone, and is legitimately violated if there is a
theoretical basis to do so, I reran the factor analysis forcing a three-factor solution. These three
variables contain effects for each of the ten items analyzed, thus building information on each
item into the measurement of each poverty dimension. This procedure yields a new measure-
ment of the two factors usually studied (individualism and structuralism), as well as a third
factor I call luck/fatalism that is independent of the factor-score individualism and structural-
ism variables. The factor-score variables for the first two factors correlate extremely highly with
individualism and structuralism (in the .9 range) as I originally constructed them and as I
employ them in the article (i.e., standardized-summed scales). Rerunning analyses with these
three new dependent variables allows me to demonstrate that (1) the same race/ethnic
differences (in beliefs about poverty and in the impact of the self-explanations on beliefs about
poverty) found using standardized summed scales that exclude luck/fatalism information (i.e.,
the luck and health items) are found using the factor-score variables for these dimensions that
include data on all ten items, and (2) all three race/ethnic groups are the same with regard to
the determinants of luck/fatalism: specifically, it is the extemal self-explanation that is
significant for each race/ethnic group. The fact that this different measurement strategy
reaffirms my basic findings on race/ethnic differences in the impact of the self-explanations,
as well as the fact that all three groups exhibit the same patterns on luck/fatalism, points to the
conclusion that the self-explanation findings for minorities represent something specific to
kinds of minority experience (which are not a function of an inconsistency in dealing with
luck). The analyses discussed in this note are available upon request.
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