Professional Documents
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COMMUNICATION
CHANNELS
MODEM
CONTROLLER
1. Alarm Functions:
To sound alarm/annunciation regarding dangerous, uncommon events such as abnormal
values of process parameters, fire, illegal entry in premises, over temperatures, low voltage
of auxiliary supply, unusual happening etc. Alarms are obtained from data logger and are for
alerting the operator in the control room.
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Control of two position devices such as circuit breakers, isolators, earthing switchers,
starters. Indication of on/ off state of the devices on control board / mimic diagrams
Control of position of device shaving positions (closed, middle, open) eg: values, input
setting, indication of position on control panels
Control positions of multi-position device eg: tap changer, indication of position on
control panels
Indication without control
Control without indication eg: raise or control of
4. Sequential operation of devices with predetermined time and conditions for operation of
various devices eg:
a. Auto-reclosing of circuit breakers operation
b. Operation of circuit breaker, isolator and earthing switch in a particular sequence during
opening of circuit and another sequence during closing of circuit.
By means of SCADA system, the operator in control center can cause operations in a remote sub
station. The possible remote operations include:
Some of the remote operations are made automatic by one-line computer based system without
human intervention Eg: network islanding, back up protection. The automatic control functions are
segregated into:
1. Interconnection functions
2. Transmission line automatic function as shown in the table
Protective Functions
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Auto-Closing Transformer Protection
Bus-Protection Reactor Protection
Fault distance reporting Synchronizing
Back up protection
Protective Functions
Introduction: Utility departments are learning that a good radio telemetry system (The technology
of automatic radio transmissions of data from a remote source to a receiving station for recording
and analysis.) can provide the backbone for remotely monitoring and controlling their freshwater,
wastewater, and collection systems.
Because utility systems are typically spread throughout a municipality, city or county, radio
telemetry is the most reliable and cost effective means to tie each of the remote locations back to the
plant or administrative office. By using a common radio channel, a computer at the water plant or
other central site can query each of the remote locations for the status of the pumps, valves,
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pressures, etc. The computer can also control the operation of each of those components through the
same radio channel
The Central Computer at the plant or office, and the units at each of the remote locations share the
radio channel. One at a time, the computer at the water plant polls for information from each of the
remote locations. To do this, each remote location has a unique radio address so it knows when the
central computer is talking to it. The total poll loop takes from 15 seconds to 2.5 minutes,
depending on the number of remote sites in the system.
Major advantage of telemetry is eliminating the need for driving across town to check on, or
change, the status of equipment operating at remote locations. Telemetry also allows the utility
to discover alarm conditions before they become critical events. The utility can monitor high-
well conditions and power outages occurring at remote sites in "real time."
Another advantage of telemetry is in preventive maintenance. By utilizing the reports
provided by TAC II Software, the utility can diagnose pump problems long before they
become failures. These reports allow the user to compare run times of pumps from day to day.
These run times normally are very constant, so a variation in run times can indicate a problem.
By monitoring pump performance, many customers have virtually eliminated overtime pump
repairs.
Another valuable use of radio telemetry is being able to relay system status across town to
initiate automatic control functions. The system can transmit status such as "pump run," "tank
level," or "water pressure" from one remote location to another to activate control functions
such as turning on chlorine injectors, or turning off well field pumps.
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A typical Radio telemetry system starts with the Central Site located at a plant or main office. The
Central Site includes a radio unit, an antenna tower with antenna, and the Central Site
Computer. Remote Terminal Units (RTU) are located at the wells, pumping stations, tanks,
treatment plants, metering stations, and other remote sites scattered throughout the utility's
district. The heart of the central computer is the TAC II software that monitors the
communications between the Central Site and each of the remote sites.
The TAC II (Telemetry And Control, Second Generation) was designed expressly for use by water
and wastewater utilities. Utilities should not have to become experts in telemetry and
systems integration on order to have an effective, reliable system.
The main goal was to build a total solution package designed specifically for the average utility to
operate and maintain. All the features and functions are the result of specific needs and
recommendations received from Water Industry personnel.
The Central Site includes the central computer and a radio unit with antenna to provide
communications between the central computer and the Remote Terminal Units. The
Central Site Computer is a Pentium based computer running TAC II software. It is a
standard, desktop PC that does not require any special operating environment apart from
connection to an Uninterruptible Power Supply (UPS). The system has been designed so
the addition of more RAM memory, mass storage, or input/output devices is possible and
easy. The computer runs under a multitasking/multi-user operating system such as UNIX.
Connected to the central computer is a fiber optic modem used to communicate with the central site
radio. Also connected are printers, LAN networks, backup storage, remote terminals, and
any other computer equipment and software required to support the utility's SCADA
requirements. The central computer system can be partitioned so the fresh water,
wastewater, and/or collections departments can simulate having their own system. This, in
effect, allows the utility to operate separate systems on the same frequency using the same
central site equipment.
No Computer required
Inputs at one site become outputs at the other site (Copycat Feature)
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No Calibration required
Quick start-up
No programming
2. EZSCADA:
All signals are bi-directional, using a license free 2.4 GHz radio band, so that data may be read
from the remote station and sent to it. The license-free, spread-spectrum radio technology allows
small systems to be set up with very little effort and low cost.
The three major misconceptions that are faced by SCADA System Security which are commonly
held by utility managers. The experiences of network security professionals point to the
misconceptions, listed below are the major obstacles to the implementation of the best possible
information security strategies.
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1 The SCADA system resides on a physically separate, stand-alone network.
Most SCADA systems were originally built before and often separate from other corporate
networks. As a result, IT managers typically operate on the assumption that these systems cannot be
accessed through corporate networks or from remote access points. Unfortunately, this belief is
usually fallacious. In reality, SCADA networks and corporate IT systems are often bridged as a
result of information management practices. First, the demand for remote access computing has
encouraged many utilities to establish connections to the SCADA system that enable SCADA
engineers to monitor and control the system from points on the corporate network. Second, many
utilities have added connections between corporate networks and SCADA networks in order to
allow corporate decision makers to obtain instant access to critical data about the status of their
operational systems. Often, these connections are implemented without a full understanding of the
corresponding security risks. In fact, the security strategy for utility corporate network
infrastructures rarely accounts for the fact that access to these systems might allow unauthorized
access and control of SCADA systems.
2 Connections between SCADA systems and other corporate networks are protected by strong
access controls.
Many of the interconnections between corporate networks and SCADA systems require the
integration of systems with different communications standards. The result is often an infrastructure
that is engineered to move data successfully between two unique systems. Due to the complexity of
integrating disparate systems, network engineers often fail to address the added burden of
accounting for security risks. As a result, access controls designed to protect SCADA systems from
unauthorized access through corporate networks are usually minimal, which is largely attributable
to the fact that network managers often overlook key access points connecting these networks.
Although the strategic use of internal firewalls and intrusion detection systems (IDS), coupled with
strong password policies, is highly recommended, few utilities protect all entry points to the
SCADA system in this manner.
#3 SCADA systems require specialized knowledge, making them difficult for network intruders
to access and control.
The above misconception assumes that all attackers of a SCADA system lack the ability to access
information about their design and implementation. These assumptions are inappropriate given the
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changing nature of utility system vulnerabilities in an interconnected environment. Due to the fact
that utility companies represent a key component of one of the nations critical.
Conclusion:
SCADA systems are used not only in industrial processes: e.g. steel making, power generation
(conventional and nuclear) and distribution, chemistry, but also in some experimental facilities such
as nuclear fusion. The size of such plants range from a few 1000 to several 10 thousands
input/output (I/O) channels. However, SCADA systems evolve rapidly and are now penetrating the
market of plants with a number of I/O channels of several 100 K: we know of two cases of near to 1
M I/O channels currently under development.
Reference:
1. A.Daneels, W.Salter, "Technology Survey Summary of Study Report", IT-CO/98-
08-09, CERN, Geneva 26th Aug 1998.
2. G.Baribaud et al., "Recommendations for the Use of Fieldbuses at CERN in the
LHC Era", Proceedings of the 1997 International Conference on Accelerator and Large
Experimental Physics Control Systems, Beijing, 1997, p.285.