VANCIL VS BELMES

Posted by kaye lee on 3:00 AM

G.R. No. 132223, June 19 2001 [Guardianship]

FACTS: The RTC appointed Bonifacia Vancil, an American citizen,

as legal and judicial guardian over the persons and estate of
Valerie and Vincent, the children of her deceased son Reeder.
Helen Belmes, the natural mother of the minor children,
instituted a motion for removal of Guardianship and Appointment
of Vancil, asserting that she is the natural mother in custody of
and exercising parental authority over the subject minors. Trial
court rejected Belmes'petition. The CA reversed the RTC order.
Since Valerie had reached the age of majority at the time the
case reached the SC, the Court resolves to determine who
between the mother and grandmother of minor Vincent should be
his guardian.

ISSUE: Whether Helen Belmes is the sole guardian of the minor

Vincent.

RULING:
Belmes, being the natural mother of Vincent, has the preferential
right to be his guardian. Art. 211 of the FC states: "The father and
the mother shall jointly exercise parental authority over the
persons of their common children. In case of disagreement, the
fathers decision shall prevail, unless there is a judicial order to
the contrary. xxx."

Vancil, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute

parental authority only in case of death, absence or unsuitability
of Belmes. Considering that Belmes is still alive and has exercised
continuously parental authority over Vincent, Vancil has to prove
Belmes'unsuitability. Assuming that Belmes is unfit as a guardian
of Vincent, still Vancil cannot qualify as a substitute guardian. She
admitted in her petition that an expatriate like her will find
difficulty of discharging the duties of a guardian. As the Court
held in Guerrero vs Teran, the courts should not appoint persons
as guardians who are not within the jurisdiction of the courts as
they will find it difficult to protect the wards.
FACTS: Petitioner, Bonifacia Vancil, is the mother of Reeder C. Vancil, a
Navy serviceman of the United States of America who died in the said
country on December 22, 1986. During his lifetime, Reeder had two (2)
children named Valerie and Vincent by his common-law wife, Helen G.
Belmes.
Sometime in May of 1987, Bonifacia Vancil commenced before the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City a guardianship proceedings over the
persons and properties of minors Valerie and Vincent docketed as
Special Proceedings No. 1618-CEB. At the time, Valerie was only 6
years old while Vincent was a 2-year old child. It is claimed in the
petition that the minors are residents of Cebu City, Philippines and
have an estate consisting of proceeds from their fathers death pension
benefits with a probable value of P100,000.00.
Finding sufficiency in form and in substance, the case was set for
hearing after a 3-consecutive-weekly publications with the Sunstar
Daily.
On July 15, 1987, petitioner, Bonifacia Vancil was appointed legal and
judicial guardian over the persons and estate of Valerie Vancil and
Vincent Vancil Jr.
On August 13, 1987, the natural mother of the minors, Helen Belmes,
submitted an opposition to the subject guardianship proceedings
asseverating that she had already filed a similar petition for
guardianship under Special Proceedings No. 2819 before the Regional
Trial Court of Pagadian City.
Thereafter, on June 27, 1988, Helen Belmes followed her opposition
with a motion for the Removal of Guardian and Appointment of a New
One, asserting that she is the natural mother in actual custody of and
exercising parental authority over the subject minors at Maralag,
Dumingag, Zamboanga del Sur where they are permanently residing;
that the petition was filed under an improper venue; and that at the
time the petition was filed Bonifacia Vancil was a resident of 140
Hurliman Court, Canon City, Colorado, U.S.A. being a naturalized
American citizen.
On October 12, 1988, after due proceedings, the trial court rejected
and denied Belmes motion to remove and/or to disqualify Bonifacia as
guardian of Valerie and Vincent Jr. and instead ordered petitioner
Bonifacia Vancil to enter the office and perform her duties as such
guardian upon the posting of a bond of P50,000.00. The subsequent
attempt for a reconsideration was likewise dismissed in an Order dated
November 24, 1988.
ISSUE:
Who between the mother and grandmother of minor Vincent should be
his guardian.
HELD: YES, the natural mother of the minor, has the preferential right
over that of petitioner to be hisguardian.
Article 211 of the Family Code provides:
Art. 211. The father and the mother shall jointly exercise parental
authority over the persons of their common children. In case of
disagreement, the fathers decision shall prevail, unless there is a
judicialorder to the contrary.
Being the natural mother of the minor Vincent, she has the
corresponding natural and legal right to be in her custody. Petitioners
claim to bethe guardian of said minor can only be realized by way
of substitute parental authority pursuant to Article 214 of the Family
Code, thus:
Art. 214. In case of death, absence or unsuitability of the parents,
substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving
grandparent.
Petitioner, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute
parental authority only incase of death, absence or unsuitability of
respondent. Considering that respondent is verymuch alive and has
exercised continuously parental authority over Vincent, petitioner has
to prove, in asserting her right to be the minors guardian,
respondents unsuitability.
Petitioner asserts this based on the allegation that Valerie was raped
several times by the a live in partner. However this case pertains to
Vincent and is thus not directly attestable to that fact. Moreover the
status as U.S.resident, her old age and her conviction of libel in the
country deem her unlikely to be able to execute the duties of a
guardian (has not been in RP since 87). Moreover courts should not
appoint persons as guardians who are not within the jurisdiction of our
courts for they will find it difficult to protect the wards.

Parco v. CA
Digest
Parco v. Court of Appeals 111 SCRA 262
G.R. No. L-33152 January 30,1982
Ponente: De Castro, J.:

Facts:
1. This case stems from a previous Special
proceedings for the guardianship of incompetent
Soriaya Rodriguez. The guardianship proceeding
originally pertained to Branch 1, CFI of Quezon.
Subsequently, it was transferred to Branch IV-Calauag,
CFI of Quezon, where respondent judge Kayanan took
cognizance of the case.

2. The private respondent, Francisco Rodriguez Jr. was

the appointed guardian. Respondent judge approved
the conveyance of three (3) parcels of land belonging to
the ward to the petitioners, the spouses Parco.

3. Almost two years after the guardianship court's

approval of the 'sale', the private respondent filed an
urgent petition for the examination of the subject
conveyance of the lots to the petitioners, by virtue of
the transfer of title to third parties. He argued that the
conveyance was actually a loan agreement with a right
to recover while the spouses alleged that there was an
absolute sale of the lands in dispute.

Issue: Whether or not a guardianship court has

jurisdiction to order the reconveyance of the
properties to the ward

RULING: No, unlike in previous court decision, the facts

of this case is not in all fours as there is a cloud over
the titles of the properties in question. A reconveyance
would require the determination of the ownership or
title of the subject three parcels of land, which is
beyond the jurisdiction of the guardianship court, and
thus must be threshed out in a separate and ordinary
civil action.

In previous decisions, the court approved the

reconveyance to the ward of properties embezzled,
concealed or conveyed when there is not question as to
the ward's title and ownership to the property. Herein, it
is premature to say based only on the pleadings that
the ward has clear and undisputable title to the
properties.
Rule 96

1. PARCO V. CA

FACTS: The Judge of CFI Quezon, Branch IV, Calauag authorized and
approved, upon motion of Francisco Rodriguez Jr, guardian of Soledad
Rodriguez, the sale to spouses Luis Parco and Virginia Bautista 3
parcels of land to answer for the medical expenses of the ward
Rodriguez.

Almost a year and five months later, the guardian of Rodriguez

filed a petition in the CFI invoking Sec. 6 Rule 96, praying that an order
be issued requiring the couple Parco and Bautista to appear before the
court so that they can be examined as regards to the 3 lots which are
allegedly in danger of being lost, squandered, concealed, and
embezzled and upon failure to do so or to comply with any order that
may be issued in relation therewith. The guardian alleges that the
transaction was in fact a loan to be paid in 3 months but upon the
expiration of the period thereof, the couple refused to sell back such
property of the ward.

CFI judge, exercising limited and special jurisdiction as a

guardianship court under Sec 6 Rule 96 ruled in favor of the of the
guardian and ordered the reconveyance and delivery of the property to
the ward.
ISSUE: W/N the CFI judge, exercising limited and special
jurisdiction as a guardianship court had jurisdiction to adjudicate the
issue of ownership and order the reconveyance and delivery of the
property to the ward?

RULING: No. Generally, the guardianship court exercising special and

limited jurisdiction cannot actually order the delivery of the property of
the ward found to be embezzled, concealed or conveyed. In categorical
language of this Court, only in extreme cases, where property clearly
belongs to the ward or where his title thereto has been already
judicially decided, may the court direct its delivery to the guardian. In
effect, there can only be delivery or return of embezzled, concealed or
conveyed property of the ward, where the right or title of said ward is
clear and undisputable. However, where title to any property said to be
embezzled, concealed or conveyed is in dispute, as in this case, the
determination of said title or right whether in favour of the person said
to have embezzled, concealed or conveyed the property must be
determined in a separate ordinary action and not in guardianship
proceedings.

Apparently, there is a cloud of doubt as to who has a better right

or title to the disputed properties. This, the Court believes, requires the
determination of title or ownership of the three parcels of land in
dispute which is beyond the jurisdiction of the guardianship court and
should be threshed out in a separate ordinary action not in a
guardianship proceeding.

2. CUI V PICCIO

Facts: Don Mariano Cui sold three of his lots to three of his children in
equal shares. However, one was not able to pay, so Mariano shared
ownership with his two other children, Antonio and Mercedes. The two
children borrowed money from Rehabilitation Finance Corporation,
subject to mortgage of the land. Mariano allowed the mortgage, with
the condition that all the rentals will go to him. He did not participate
with the payment of the loan. Nearly a year later, his other children
filed a guardianship proceeding, which the court granted. The other
children tried to nullify the sale to Antonio and Mercedes, which was
still pending. When they asked the court to deliver the rental payments
to them, Judge Piccio granted it.
Issue: Whether Piccio acted in grave abuse of discretion in allowing
such delivery of rental payments to the ward

Ruling: Yes. Under Sec 6 of Rule 97, the ward may ask the guardian
court to deliver an actual or prospective interest which was owned by
the ward, and was embezzled, concealed, or conveyed by another. In
the case at hand, Sec 6 of Rule 97 does not apply, since the rental
payments Is still a subject of controversy, as to who really owns such
payments. This must be litigated in a ordinary civil action, to which a
guardian court does not have jurisdiction.

PABLO-GUALBERTO VS. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. Nos. 154994 and 156254 June 28, 2005

Facts: Crisanto Rafaelito G. Gualberto V filed before the RTC a petition for
declaration of nullity of his marriage to Joycelyn w/ an ancillary prayer for
custody pendente lite of their almost 4 year old son, Rafaello, whom her
wife took away w/ her from their conjugal home and his school when she
left him.
The RTC granted the ancillary prayer for custody pendente lite, since the
wife failed to appear despite notice. A house helper of the spouses testified
that the mother does not care for the child as she very often goes out of the
house and even saw her slapping the child. Another witness testified that
after surveillance he found out that the wife is having lesbian relations.
The judge issued the assailed order reversing her previous order, and this
time awarded the custody of the child to the mother. Finding that the
reason stated by Crisanto not to be a compelling reason as provided in Art
213 of the Family Code.

Issue: Whether or not the custody of the minor child should be awarded to
the mother.

Held: Article 213 of the Family Code provided: Art 213. In case of
separation of parents parental authority shall be exercised by the parent
des granted by the court. The court shall take into account all relevant
consideration, especially the choice of the child over seven years of age,
unless the parent chosen is unfit.
No child under seven yrs of age shall be separated from the mother unless
the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise,
This Court has held that when the parents separated, legally or otherwise,
the foregoing provision governs the custody of their child. Article 213 takes
its bearing from Article 363 of the Civil Code, w/c reads:
Art 363. In all question on the care, custody, education and property pf
children, the latter welfare shall be paramount. No mother shall be
separated from her child under seven years of age, unless the court finds
compelling reason for such measure.
The Incompetent Carmen Caniza v. Court of Appeals, Pedro and
Leonora Estrada

G.R. No. 110427; February 24, 1997

Facts:

Carmen Caniza (94), a spinster, a retired pharmacist, and former

professor of the College of Chemistry and Pharmacy of the University
of the Philippines, was declared incompetent by judgment of the QC
RTC in a guardianship proceeding instituted by her niece, Amparo A.
Evangelista. She was so adjudged because of her advanced age and
physical infirmities which included cataracts in both eyes and senile
dementia. Amparo A. Evangelista was appointed legal guardian of her
person and estate.

Caiza was the owner of a house and lot. Her guardian Amparo
commenced a suit to eject the spouses Estrada from the said premises
in the MTC of Quezon City. Complaint pertinently alleged that plaintiff
Caiza was the absolute owner of the property in question, covered by
TCT No. 27147; that out of kindness, she had allowed the Estrada
Spouses, their children, grandchildren and sons-in-law to temporarily
reside in her house, rent-free; that Caiza already had urgent need of
the house on account of her advanced age and failing health, "so funds
could be raised to meet her expenses for support, maintenance and
medical treatment;" that through her guardian, Caiza had asked the
Estradas verbally and in writing to vacate the house but they had
refused to do so; and that "by the defendants' act of unlawfully
depriving plaintiff of the possession of the house in question, they **
(were) enriching themselves at the expense of the incompetent,
because, while they ** (were) saving money by not paying any rent for
the house, the incompetent ** (was) losing much money as her house
could not be rented by others." Also alleged was that the complaint
was "filed within one (1) year from the date of first letter of demand
dated February 3, 1990."

In their Answer, the defendants declared that they had been living in
Caiza's house since the 1960's; that in consideration of their faithful
service they had been considered by Caiza as her own family, and the
latter had in fact executed a holographic will by which she
"bequeathed".

Judgement was rendered by the MetroTC in favor of Caiza but it was

reversed on appeal by the Quezon City RTC.

Caiza sought to have the Court of Appeals reverse the decision but
failed in that attempt.

It ruled that (a) the proper remedy for Caiza was indeed an accion
publiciana in the RTC, not an accion interdictal in the MetroTC, since
the "defendants have not been in the subject premises as mere
tenants or occupants by tolerance, they have been there as a sort of
adopted family of Carmen Caiza," as evidenced by what purports to
be the holographic will of the plaintiff; and (b) while "said will, unless
and until it has passed probate by the proper court, could not be the
basis of defendants' claim to the property, ** it is indicative of intent
and desire on the part of Carmen Caiza that defendants are to remain
and are to continue in their occupancy and possession, so much so
that Caiza's supervening incompetency cannot be said to have vested
in her guardian the right or authority to drive the defendants out. They
conclude, on those postulates, that it is beyond the power of Caiza's
legal guardian to oust them from the disputed premises.

Carmen Caiza died, and her heirs -- the aforementioned guardian,

Amparo Evangelista, and Ramon C. Nevado, her niece and nephew,
respectively -- were by this Court's leave, substituted for her.

Issue:

1. Whether or not Evangelista, as Caiza's legal guardian had

authority to bring said action; and

2. Whether or not Evangelista may continue to represent Caiza after

the latter's death.

Ruling:

1. The Estradas insist that the devise of the house to them by Caiza
clearly denotes her intention that they remain in possession thereof,
and legally incapacitated her judicial guardian, Amparo Evangelista,
from evicting them therefrom, since their ouster would be
inconsistent with the ward's will.
A will is essentially ambulatory; at any time prior to the testator's
death, it may be changed or revoked; and until admitted to probate, it
has no effect whatever and no right can be claimed thereunder, the
law being quite explicit: "No will shall pass either real or personal
property unless it is proved and allowed in accordance with the Rules
of Court" (ART. 838,id.).

An owner's intention to confer title in the future to persons possessing

property by his tolerance, is not inconsistent with the former's taking
back possession in the meantime for any reason deemed sufficient.
And that in this case there was sufficient cause for the owner's
resumption of possession is apparent: she needed to generate income
from the house on account of the physical infirmities afflicting her,
arising from her extreme age.
Amparo Evangelista was appointed by a competent court the general
guardian of both the person and the estate of her aunt, Carmen
Caiza. Her Letters of Guardianship clearly installed her as the
"guardian over the person and properties of the incompetent CARMEN
CANIZA with full authority to take possession of the property of said
incompetent in any province or provinces in which it may be situated
and to perform all other acts necessary for the management of her
properties.".

By that appointment, it became Evangelista's duty to care for her

aunt's person, to attend to her physical and spiritual needs, to assure
her well-being, with right to custody of her person in preference to
relatives and friends. It also became her right and duty to get
possession of, and exercise control over, Caiza's property, both real
and personal, it being recognized principle that the ward has no
right to possession or control of his property during her incompetency.
That right to manage the ward's estate carries with it the right to take
possession thereof and recover it from anyone who retains it, and bring
and defend such actions as may be needful for this purpose.

2. As already stated, Carmen Caiza passed away during the

pendency of this appeal. The Estradas thereupon moved to dismiss
the petition, arguing that Caiza's death automatically terminated
the guardianship, Amaparo Evangelista lost all authority as her
judicial guardian, and ceased to have legal personality to represent
her in the present appeal. The motion is without merit.

While it is indeed well-established rule that the relationship of guardian

and ward is necessarily terminated by the death of either the guardian
or the ward, the rule affords no advantage to the Estradas. Amparo
Evangelista, as niece of Carmen Caiza, is one of the latter's only two
(2) surviving heirs, the other being Caiza's nephew, Ramon C.
Nevado. On their motion and by Resolution of this Court, they were in
fact substituted as parties in the appeal at bar in place of the
deceased.

"SEC. 18. Death of a party. After a party dies and the claim is not
thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the
legal representative of the deceased to appear and be substituted for
the deceased within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as
may be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said
time, the court may order the opposing party to procure the
appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a time to
be specified by the court, and the representative shall immediately
appear for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased. The court
charges involved in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the
opposing party, may be recovered as costs. The heirs of the deceased
may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring
the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may
appoint guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.