CASE 1

BONIFACIA P. VANCIL, petitioner, 
vs.
HELEN G. BELMES, respondent.
G.R. No. 132223
June 19, 2001

DOCTRINE: Section 7 of Rule 93 of the Revised Rules of Court confirms the designation
of the parents as ipso facto guardian of their minor children without need of a court
appointment and only for good reason may another person be named.

FACTS:
Petitioner, Bonifacia Vancil, is the mother of Reeder C. Vancil, a Navy serviceman of the
USA who died in the said country on December 22, 1986. Reeder had two (2) children
named Valerie and Vincent by his common-law wife, Helen G. Belmes.

In May of 1987, Bonifacia Vancil commenced before the RTC-Cebu City a guardianship
proceedings over the persons and properties of minors Valerie and Vincent. At the time,
Valerie was only 6 years old while Vincent was a 2-year old child. It is claimed in the petition
that the minors are residents of Cebu City, Philippines and have an estate consisting of
proceeds from their father’s death pension benefits with a probable value of P100,000.00.

The case was set for hearing after a 3-consecutive-weekly publications with the Sunstar Daily.
On July 15, 1987, petitioner, Bonifacia Vancil was appointed legal and judicial guardian
over the persons and estate of Valerie Vancil and Vincent Vancil Jr.

On August 13, 1987, the natural mother of the minors, Helen Belmes, submitted an
opposition to the subject guardianship proceedings asseverating that she had already
filed a similar petition for guardianship under S.P. No. 2819 before RTC-Pagadian City.

Helen Belmes followed her opposition with a motion for the Removal of Guardian and
Appointment of a New One, asserting that she is the natural mother in actual custody of and
exercising parental authority over the subject minors at Maralag, Dumingag, Zamboanga del
Sur where they are permanently residing; that the petition was filed under an improper venue;
and that at the time the petition was filed Bonifacia Vancil was a resident of 140 Hurliman Court,
Canon City, Colorado, U.S.A. being a naturalized American citizen.

The trial court rejected and denied Belmes’ motion to remove and/or to disqualify
Bonifacia as guardian of Valerie and Vincent Jr. and instead ordered petitioner Bonifacia
Vancil to enter the office and perform her duties as such guardian upon the posting of a bond of
P50,000.00. The Court of Appeals rendered its assailed Decision reversing the RTC.

ISSUE:
Who between the mother and grandmother of minor Vincent should be his guardian?

HELD:
The mother, not the grandmother, should be the guardian.

Stress should likewise be made that our Civil Code considers parents, the father, or in the
absence, the mother, as natural guardian of her minor children. The law on parental
authority under the Civil Code or P.D. 603 and now the New Family Code, (Article 225 of the
Family Code) ascribe to the same legal pronouncements. Section 7 of Rule 93 of the Revised
Rules of Court confirms the designation of the parents as ipso facto guardian of their
minor children without need of a court appointment and only for good reason may
another person be named. Ironically, for the petitioner, there is nothing on record of any
reason at all why Helen Belmes, the biological mother, should be deprived of her legal rights as
natural guardian of her minor children. To give away such privilege from Helen would be an
abdication and grave violation of the very basic fundamental tenets in civil law and the
constitution on family solidarity.

Indeed, being the natural mother of minor Vincent, respondent has the corresponding
natural and legal right to his custody. In Sagala-Eslao vs. Court of Appeals, this Court held:

"Of considerable importance is the rule long accepted by the courts that ‘the right of
parents to the custody of their minor children is one of the natural rights incident
to parenthood,’ a right supported by law and sound public policy. The right is an
inherent one, which is not created by the state or decisions of the courts, but
derives from the nature of the parental relationship."

Petitioner, as the surviving grandparent, can exercise substitute parental authority ONLY
in case of death, absence or unsuitability of respondent. Considering that respondent is
very much alive and has exercised continuously parental authority over Vincent, petitioner has
to prove, in asserting her right to be the minor’s guardian, respondent’s unsuitability. Petitioner,
however, has not proffered convincing evidence showing that respondent is not suited to be the
guardian of Vincent. Petitioner merely insists that respondent is morally unfit as guardian of
Valerie considering that her (respondent’s) live-in partner raped Valerie several times. But
Valerie, being now of major age, is no longer a subject of this guardianship proceeding.

Even assuming that respondent is unfit as guardian of minor Vincent, still petitioner cannot
qualify as a substitute guardian. It bears stressing that she is an American citizen and a
resident of Colorado. Obviously, she will not be able to perform the responsibilities and
obligations required of a guardian. In fact, in her petition, she admitted the difficulty of
discharging the duties of a guardian by an expatriate, like her. To be sure, she will merely
delegate those duties to someone else who may not also qualify as a guardian.

Significantly, this Court has held that courts should not appoint persons as guardians who
are not within the jurisdiction of our courts for they will find it difficult to protect the
wards. In Guerrero vs. Teran, this Court held:

"Doña Maria Muñoz y Gomez was, as above indicated, removed upon the theory that
her appointment was void because she did not reside in the Philippine Islands. There is
nothing in the law which requires the courts to appoint residents only as
administrators or guardians. However, notwithstanding the fact that there are no
statutory requirements upon this question, the courts, charged with the
responsibilities of protecting the estates of deceased persons, wards of the
estate, etc., will find much difficulty in complying with this duty by appointing
administrators and guardians who are not personally subject to their jurisdiction.
Notwithstanding that there is no statutory requirement, the courts should not consent to
the appointment of persons as administrators and guardians who are not personally
subject to the jurisdiction of our courts here."
 CASE 2
GUARDIANSHIP OF THE INCOMPETENT LEONORA NAVARRO AND THE MINORS
ADOLFO YUSON AND OTHERS, ELDEGARDES YUSON DE PUA, Judicial Guardian-
Appellant,
vs.
JUSTINIANO SAN AGUSTIN, Movant-Appellee.
G.R. No. L-27402
July 25, 1981

DOCTRINE: We hold that court had no jurisdiction to authorize the sale of any property
belonging to an heir who is under guardianship without first requiring the guardian to
secure the corresponding authority from the guardianship court. Worse, much less
could the probate court have any power to effectively approve a sale of an heir-ward
which had, as in this case, been actually disapproved by the guardianship court.

FACTS:
Appeal from the order dated November 12, 1966 approving the "Motion for Confirmation of
Deed Of Transfer of Right on Lots Nos. 632 and 633, Cadastre No. 102 in favor of Justiniano
San Agustin" of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch I, Hon. Vicente N. Cusi, Jr.
presiding, in Special Proceedings Case No. 282, entitled "Guardianship of the Incompetent
Leonora Navarro and the Minors Adolfo Yuson and Others."

The records disclose the following antecedents of this appeal:

The spouses Enrique Navarro and Maximina Bonleon died intestate in 1945 — on March
18 and February 15, 1945, respectively — leaving as heirs the following:

a) Benita Navarro, legitimate daughter, of legal age, and residing at Lasang, Davao City.
b) Leonora Navarro, legitimate daughter, of legal age, and residing in Lasang, Davao
City, under the judicial guardianship of Eldegardes Yuson de Pua — Davao City.
c) Ramon Navarro and Delia Navarro, legitimate grandchildren (children of
predeceased child Antonio Navarro), eight and seven years of age respectively,
represented by their mother Filipinas Catalan.

In the course of the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouses (SP No. 64-R),
entitled "Intestate Estate of the Deceased Spouses Enrique Navarro and Maximina Bonleon", a
Project of Partition dated June 11, 1956, executed by all the above-named heirs with the
assistance of their respective guardian and counsel, was presented to the court for approval,
which the court approved in its order dated August 31, 1956. Among the properties awarded
to Leonora Navarro in said Project of Partition were:
xxx
"b) The parcel of land situated at Lasang, Davao City, designated as Lot 634-A, with an
area of 89,430 square meters, more or less;
"c) All rights and interests under the portion of Lot No. (632 and 633) situated at Panabo,
Davao with an area of 1.5 hectares, more or less adjacent to the parcel of land
described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-1297."
On October 13, 1958, Eldegardes Yuson de Pua, eldest legitimate daughter and judicial
guardian of the incompetent Leonora Navarro Yuson, filed a verified petition with the
court below, praying for authority to sell Lot No. 634-A. On October 25, 1958, the court
issued an order granting the judicial guardian authority to sell Lot No. 634-A on the
ground that "the sale of the aforesaid property will be beneficial to the ward and her minor
children because the proceeds thereof could be expended for their maintenance." Accordingly,
Lot No. 634-A was sold to herein appellee, Justiniano San Agustin, for P13,750.00 as
evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale dated January 19, 1959. This sale was approved by the
court on January 23, 1959.

On January 20, 1959, the same guardian Mrs. de Pua filed a second petition in the court a
quo, praying for authority to sell Lots Nos. 632 and 633 on the ground that the standing
account of the estate of the insane, Leonora Yuson and the expenses for maintenance of her
children, the herein petitioner deems it wise that the above-mentioned property, which the
estate cannot maintain or improve, be sold.

However, the true area of the two lots — i.e., eleven (11) instead of only one and one-half
(1-1/2) hectares — was disclosed in this petition.

On the same day that this second petition was filed, Mrs. de Pua also filed a "Motion to
Approve Sale of Property" because Lots Nos. 632 and 633 had in the meantime been
already sold by her to Dr. Justiniano San Agustin the day before, i.e., on January 19,
1959, as evidenced by an instrument titled "Transfer of Rights", that is to say, simultaneously
with the other deed which was duly authorized and approved by the court.

Acting on this second motion, on February 7, 1959, the Court denied the petition to sell Lots
Nos. 632 and 633, thus:
"Inasmuch as the judicial guardian sold just recently Lot No. 634-A, TCT No. 1296,
belonging to the ward, in the amount of P13,750.00, the sale of the property
mentioned in her petition filed on January 20, 1959, is not necessary or would not
be beneficial to the ward; hence, the petition to sell is hereby denied.”

Meanwhile, because the co-heirs of the ward, Leonora Navarro — namely, Benita
Navarro, Delia Navarro and Ramon Navarro, in aforementioned Special Case No. 64-R
learned thru the sale by appellant guardian Mrs. de Pua to Dr. San Agustin that Lots Nos.
632 and 633 consisted not merely of 1.5 hectares but 11, steps were taken towards the
return of the said properties and they were correspondingly returned to the estate for proper
disposition, and as a result, a Supplemental Project of Partition dated June 9, 1960 was arrived
at, submitted to the court but subsequently amended on July 29, 1960. The amended
Supplemental Project of Partition was also approved by the court in Case No. 64-R on
August 29, 1960. Under the terms of the Supplemental Project of Partition and the amendment
thereto, the heirs agreed that:

"The Estate shall recognize and confirm the conveyance of the rights over said Lots Nos.
632-633, Cad. 102, with an area of 11 hectares, in favor of JUSTINIANO SAN
AGUSTIN, for the stipulated price of P8,250.00; and

"The heirs Benita Navarro and the minors Ramon and Delia Navarro, hereby cede and
assign in favor of the heir Leonora Navarro, all of their rights, interests in the aforecited
lots nos. 632-633, Cad. No. 102 and all its improvements under the consideration that
said Leonora Navarro shall pay to the aforenamed co-heirs, namely, Benita Navarro and
the minors Ramon and Delia, all surnamed Navarro, the sum of P1,200.00. xxx”
On August 21, 1962, Mrs. de Pua filed an "Ex-Parte Motion" manifesting her desire to
return to Dr. San Agustin the amount of P7,375.00 advanced by him, so that the
possession of Lots Nos. 632 and 633 may be returned to the guardianship. This motion
was granted in an order dated September 1, 1962.

According to appellant on page 11 of her brief, it was only after she filed a civil action, docketed
as Civil Case No. 5160, seeking the reconveyance of the said lots that appellee began to
move by filing on September 28, 1966 a "Motion for Confirmation of Deed of Transfer of
Rights Over Lots 632 and 633, Cad. 102" in his favor. He prayed that "in the interest of
justice and equity, the Transfer of Rights over Lots 632 and 633 in favor of Justiniano San
Agustin be approved and confirmed by the Honorable Court." He based his alleged right over
the two lots on the "Supplemental Project of Partition" of June 9, 1960 and the "Amendment to
the Supplemental Project of Partition" of July 29, 1960, which were executed by the Judicial
Administrator and by the heirs, respectively, and approved by the probate court in the intestate
proceeding, to modify, as already stated earlier, the original Project of Partition because of the
discovery of the true area of Lots Nos. 632 and 633, which is eleven (11) hectares and not one
and one-half (1.5) hectares only, and that all the heirs agreed in said "Supplemental Project of
Partition" and the amendment thereto, among other things, to recognize and confirm the sale of
Lots Nos. 632 and 633 in his favor, instead of partitioning the same in some other manner.

On November 12, 1966, Mrs. de Pua filed an Opposition to the Motion for Confirmation.
Over said opposition, the court issued an order granting Dr. San Agustin's motion for
confirmation.

Appellant Mrs. de Pua argues through counsel that the transfer of rights is void ab initio
and cannot be approved nor confirmed, because under Rule 95, Sec. 1 of the Rules of
Court, property under guardianship can be sold only by prior authority granted by the
guardianship court; that in the instant case "not only was the transfer of rights executed by the
judicial guardian without any authority, but the petition seeking authority to sell, which was filed
a day after the actual execution of the transfer of rights, was expressly denied by the lower
court"; and, therefore, the transfer of rights is void because "a sale of the ward's realty by the
guardian without authority from the court is void," citing Inton vs. Quintana. Furthermore, she
adds that the transfer of rights is not necessary nor beneficial to the ward. In fact, there
is no allegation at all to such effect in appellee's motion for confirmation.

ISSUE:
W/N the lower court acted correctly in issuing the order of November 12, 1966, approving
the Motion for Confirmation of Sale of Lots 632 and 633 filed by the appellee Dr. San
Agustin and setting aside its previous order of February 7, 1959, which earlier
disapproved the sale of the same lots.

HELD:
NO. To start with, it must be emphasized that what appellee asked the court to confirm
was a sale in 1959, or seven years before the filing of said motion, and what is more, it
was a sale which the court refused to authorize in its order of February 7, 1959, for the
simple reason that in its opinion, considering that a previous sale of Lot 634-A for
P13,750.00 had just been approved, it could not see why it would again be "necessary,"
after just a few days, "or beneficial to the ward" that the two lots, Lots 632 and 633
should still be sold.
Reiteratedly, this Court has ruled that under Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 96 (now Rule 95) that the
properties of Leonora, the ward of appellant Mrs. de Pua could be sold only under
authority of the guardianship court in Special Proceedings No. 282. Without such
authority, any sale would necessarily be illegal. Indeed, even on the assumption posited by
appellee that the lack of authority from the guardianship court resulted only in a voidable sale
which could be ratified, there is no showing in the record that there was any such ratification.
We cannot go along with the proposition that the approval by the probate court in Case No. 64-
R of the amended "Supplemental Project of Partition" may be deemed in law as tantamount to
the required ratification.

It is quite true that appellant-guardian Mrs. de Pua, did sign, assisted by her lawyer, Atty. Pedro
S. Castillo, the motion to approve said "Supplemental Project of Partition" of July 29, 1960, and
that said motion was approved by the probate court on August 29, 1960. It is further true that in
the first "Supplemental Project of Partition" it was specifically stipulated in paragraph 7(a) "that
this Estate shall recognize and confirm the conveyance of the rights over said Lots Nos. 632
and 633, Cad. 102, with an area of 11 hectares, in favor of Justiniano San Agustin, for the
stipulated price of P8,250.00." But legally speaking, the approval by the probate court of
such project of partition (the stipulation just quoted was specifically reiterated in the
amended project dated July 29, 1960), did not in any degree confer upon Mrs. de Pua the
power to dispose of the lots in question without prior permission of the guardianship
court. Indeed, the motion to approve referred to was signed only by Flor A. Unson, the Judicial
Administrator in the probate court in Case No. 64-R. We hold that court had no jurisdiction to
authorize the sale of any property belonging to an heir who is under guardianship
without first requiring the guardian to secure the corresponding authority from the
guardianship court. Worse, much less could the probate court have any power to
effectively approve a sale of an heir-ward which had, as in this case, been actually
disapproved by the guardianship court. 
In arriving at this conclusion, We are not overlooking the fact that the same judge, the
Honorable Vicente N. Cusi, Jr. who had issued the order denying authority to sell Lots 632 and
633 was the very one who in his order of November 12, 1966, here being assailed, approved
the motion for confirmation on the lame excuse, as We see it, that his previous order of
February 7, 1959 was "based on erroneous facts." What "erroneous facts " he did not state,
which circumstance readily places the order in question subject to the omission to comply with
the constitutional requirement that final orders or decisions of courts of record should state the
facts on which it is based, which means, of course, that at least the main elemental facts must
be stated in a manner such as to enable the parties to comprehend intelligently what they are. 
Another equally important consideration lies in the way to Our giving Our sanction to the
questioned order. In the order of February 7, 1959, Judge Cusi held the sale was neither
necessary nor beneficial to the ward. The motion for confirmation of appellee of September 28,
1966 had no allegation at all that could induce anyone to alter the conclusion in the February 7,
1959 order. If indeed there was already need on the part of the ward Leonora for additional
funds in 1966, the court could not just assume that such was the case, absent any allegation,
much less any proof to such effect before it. We cannot but wonder how Lot 634-A with an area
of a little less than 9 hectares was sold for P13,750.00 and yet two lots, numbered 632 and 633,
indicating that they must be either contiguous to Lot 634-A or within its immediate vicinity could
be sold on the same day for only P8,250.00. A guardianship court is designed purposely to
see to it that the interests of wards under its jurisdiction are taken care of by the court's
appointed guardian with the diligence and prudence of a bonus pater familiae. We are not
convinced that such standard of care was observed in the impugned order of November
12, 1966.
We hold that appellant had every right to require the reconveyance by deed of said lots, without
prejudice to her returning to appellee the P7,375.00 he appears to have paid, but not before
appellee San Agustin has accounted for the fruits of the lots in question which have remained in
his possession since 1959 and a proper set-off of the amount of any possible additional
payment has been determined.
CASE 3
EDUARDO T. ABAD, Petitioner, 
vs.
LEONARDO BIASON and GABRIEL A. MAGNO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 191993
December 5, 2012

DOCTRINE: It is a well-established rule that the relationship of guardian and ward is

necessarily terminated by the death of either the guardian or the ward.

FACTS:
On March 19, 2007, petitioner Eduardo Abad (Abad) filed a petition for guardianship over
the person and properties of Maura B. Abad (Maura) with RTC-Dagupan City. In support
thereof, Abad alleged that he maintains residence at No. 14 B St. Paul Street, Horseshoe
Village, Quezon City and that he is Maura’s nephew. He averred that Maura, who is single,
more than ninety (90) years old and a resident of Rizal Street, Poblacion, Mangaldan,
Pangasinan, is in dire need of a guardian who will look after her and her business affairs.
Due to her advanced age, Maura is already sickly and can no longer manage to take care
of herself and her properties unassisted thus becoming an easy prey of deceit and
exploitation.

The RTC gave due course to the same and scheduled it for hearing. When the petition was
called for hearing on April 27, 2007, nobody entered an opposition and Abad was allowed
to present evidence ex parte. After Abad formally offered his evidence and the case was
submitted for decision, Atty. Gabriel Magno filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene, together with
an Opposition-in- Intervention. Subsequently, on June 14, 2007, Leonardo Biason (Biason)
filed a Motion for Leave to File Opposition to the Petition and attached therewith his
Opposition to the Appointment of Eduardo Abad as Guardian of the Person and Properties of
Maura B. Abad. Specifically, Biason alleged that he is also a nephew of Maura and that he
was not notified of the pendency of the petition for the appointment of the latter’s
guardian. He vehemently opposed the appointment of Abad as Maura’s guardian as he
cannot possibly perform his duties as such since he resides in Quezon City while Maura
maintains her abode in Mangaldan, Pangasinan. Biason prayed that he be appointed as
Maura’s guardian since he was previously granted by the latter with a power of attorney to
manage her properties.

The RTC rendered a Decision, denying Abad’s petition and appointing Biason as Maura’s
guardian. The CA affirmed RTC’s decision.

On June 7, 2010, Abad filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court.
Subsequently, Maura filed a Motion for Leave to Intervene, together with a Petition-in-
Intervention.

Abad contends that that CA erred in affirming the RTC’s decision despite the fact that it did not
hold any hearing to determine whether Biason possessed all the qualifications for a guardian as
provided by law. Further, he was not given the opportunity to submit evidence to controvert
Biason’s appointment.

Abad also bewails his disqualification as guardian on the sole basis of his residence. He
emphasizes that it is not a requirement for a guardian to be a resident of the same locality as
the ward, or to be living with the latter under the same roof in order to qualify for the
appointment. The more significant considerations are that the person to be appointed must be
of good moral character and must have the capability and sound judgment in order that he may
be able to take care of the ward and prudently manage his assets.

Unfortunately, pending the resolution of the instant petition, Biason died. On May 11,
2012, Maura filed a Manifestation and Motion, informing this Court that Biason passed away on
April 3, 2012 at SDS Medical Center, Marikina City due to multiple organ failure, septic shock,
community acquired pneumonia high risk, prostate CA with metastasis, and attached a copy of
his Death Certificate. Maura averred that Biason’s death rendered moot and academic the
issues raised in the petition. She thus prayed that the petition be dismissed and the
guardianship be terminated.

On June 20, 2012, this Court issued a Resolution, requiring Abad to comment on the
manifestation filed by Maura. Pursuant to the Resolution, Abad filed his Comment on August
9, 2012 and expressed his acquiescence to Maura’s motion to dismiss the petition. He
asseverated that the issues raised in the petition pertain to the irregularity in the appointment of
Biason as guardian which he believed had been rendered moot and academic by the latter’s
death. He also supported Maura’s prayer for the termination of the guardianship by asseverating
that her act of filing of a petition-in-intervention is indicative of the fact that she is of sound mind
and that she can competently manage her business affairs.

ISSUE:
W/N the petition should be dismissed as the death of Biason rendered moot and
academic the issue on guardianship.

HELD:
YES. An issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a
justiciable controversy, so that a determination of the issue would be without practical
use and value. In such cases, there is no actual substantial relief to which the petitioner
would be entitled and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition.

In his petition, Abad prayed for the nullification of the CA Decision dated August 28, 2009 and
Resolution dated April 19, 2010, which dismissed his appeal from the Decision dated
September 26, 2007 of the RTC and denied his motion for reconsideration, respectively.
Basically, he was challenging Biason’s qualifications and the procedure by which the RTC
appointed him as guardian for Maura. However, with Biason’s demise, it has become
impractical and futile to proceed with resolving the merits of the petition. It is a well-
established rule that the relationship of guardian and ward is necessarily terminated by
the death of either the guardian or the ward. The supervening event of death rendered it
pointless to delve into the propriety of Biason’s appointment since the juridical tie
between him and Maura has already been dissolved. The petition, regardless of its
disposition, will not afford Abad, or anyone else for that matter, any substantial relief.

Moreover, Abad, in his Comment, shared Maura’s belief that the petition has lost its
purpose and even consented to Maura’s prayer for the dismissal of the petition.
 CASE 4
NILO OROPESA, Petitioner, 
vs.
CIRILO OROPESA, Respondent.
G.R. No. 184528
April 25, 2012

DOCTRINE: A finding that a person is incompetent should be anchored on clear, positive

and definite evidence.

FACTS:
On January 23, 2004, the (petitioner) filed with the RTC-Parañaque City, a petition for him
and a certain Ms. Louie Ginez to be appointed as guardians over the property of his
father, the (respondent) Cirilo Oropesa.

In the said petition, it is alleged among others that the (respondent) has been afflicted
with several maladies and has been sickly for over ten (10) years already having suffered
a stroke on April 1, 2003 and June 1, 2003, that his judgment and memory [were]
impaired and such has been evident after his hospitalization; that even before his stroke,
the (respondent) was observed to have had lapses in memory and judgment, showing signs of
failure to manage his property properly; that due to his age and medical condition, he
cannot, without outside aid, manage his property wisely, and has become an easy prey
for deceit and exploitation by people around him, particularly Ms. Ma. Luisa Agamata, his
girlfriend.

On July 6, 2004, the (respondent) filed his Opposition to the petition for guardianship.

Thereafter, the (petitioner) presented his evidence which consists of his testimony, and that of
his sister Gianina Oropesa Bennett, and the (respondent’s) former nurse, Ms. Alma Altaya. After
presenting evidence, the (petitioner) filed a manifestation dated May 29, 2006 resting his case.
The (petitioner) failed to file his written formal offer of evidence.

Thus, the (respondent) filed his "Omnibus Motion to Declare the petitioner to have waived the
presentation of his Offer of Exhibits and the presentation of his Evidence Closed since they
were not formally offered; (2) To Expunge the Documents of the Petitioner from the Record; and
(3) To Grant leave to the Oppositor to File Demurrer to Evidence.

The court a quo granted the (respondent’s) Omnibus Motion. Thereafter, the (respondent) then
filed his Demurrer to Evidence dated July 23, 2006. The trial court granted respondent’s
demurrer to evidence in an Order dated September 27, 2006. The dispositive portion of which
reads:

WHEREFORE, considering that the petitioner has failed to provide sufficient

evidence to establish that Gen. Cirilo O. Oropesa is incompetent to run his
 personal affairs and to administer his properties, Oppositor’s Demurrer to
Evidence is GRANTED, and the case is DISMISSED.

ISSUE:
W/N respondent is considered an “incompetent” person as defined under Sec. 2, Rule 92
of the Rules of Court who should be placed under guardianship.

HELD:
NO. A guardianship is a trust relation of the most sacred character, in which one person, called
a "guardian" acts for another called the "ward" whom the law regards as incapable of managing
his own affairs. A guardianship is designed to further the ward’s well-being, not that of the
guardian.

The full text of Section 2, Rule 92 reads:

Sec. 2. Meaning of the word "incompetent." – Under this rule, the word "incompetent"
includes persons suffering the penalty of civil interdiction or who are hospitalized
lepers, prodigals, deaf and dumb who are unable to read and write, those who are
of unsound mind, even though they have lucid intervals, and persons not being of
unsound mind, but by reason of age, disease, weak mind, and other similar
causes, cannot, without outside aid, take care of themselves and manage their
property, becoming thereby an easy prey for deceit and exploitation.

We have held in the past that a "finding that a person is incompetent should be anchored
on clear, positive and definite evidence." We consider that evidentiary standard
unchanged and, thus, must be applied in the case at bar.

Respondent denied the allegations made by petitioner and cited petitioner’s lack of material
evidence to support his claims. According to respondent, petitioner did not present any relevant
documentary or testimonial evidence that would attest to the veracity of his assertion that
respondent is incompetent largely due to his alleged deteriorating medical and mental condition.
In fact, respondent points out that the only medical document presented by petitioner
proves that he is indeed competent to run his personal affairs and administer his
properties. Portions of the said document, entitled "Report of Neuropsychological
Screening," were quoted by respondent in his Memorandum to illustrate that said report in fact
favored respondent’s claim of competence, to wit:

General Oropesa spoke fluently in English and Filipino, he enjoyed and participated
meaningfully in conversations and could be quite elaborate in his responses on many of
the test items. He spoke in a clear voice and his articulation was generally
comprehensible. x x x. General Oropesa performed in the average range on most of
the domains that were tested. He was able to correctly perform mental calculations
and keep track of number sequences on a task of attention. He did BEST in visuo-
constructional tasks where he had to copy geometrical designs using tiles. Likewise, he
was able to render and read the correct time on the Clock Drawing Test. x x x
Reasoning abilities were generally intact as he was able to suggest effective
solutions to problem situations. x x x.

With the failure of petitioner to formally offer his documentary evidence, his proof of his father’s
incompetence consisted purely of testimonies given by himself and his sister (who were
claiming interest in their father’s real and personal properties) and their father’s former caregiver
(who admitted to be acting under their direction). These testimonies, which did not include
any expert medical testimony, were insufficient to convince the trial court of petitioner’s
cause of action and instead lead it to grant the demurrer to evidence that was filed by
respondent.

It is the observation of the Court that oppositor is still sharp, alert and able. It is
axiomatic that, as a general rule, "only questions of law may be raised in a petition for
review on certiorari because the Court is not a trier of facts." It is also long settled that
"factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, will not be disturbed by
this Court.