G.R. No.

104139 December 22, 1992

LYDIA M. PROFETA, petitioner,

vs.
HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON, in his capacity as Executive Secretary, Office of the President of the
Philippines, respondent.

PADILLA, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari assailing a portion of the decision of the Office of the President, dated 23 October 1991,
declaring petitioner as compulsorily retired as of 15 October 1991 and the resolution dated 31 January 1992 denying petitioner's
motion for reconsideration of said decision.

The antecedents are the following:

Petitioner, Dr. Lydia M. Profeta, served as Executive Dean of the Rizal Technological Colleges from 24 October 1974 to 15 October
1978. From 16 October 1978 to 30 April 1979, petitioner was the appointed Acting President of said College until her promotion to
President of the same college on 1 May 1979.

After the 1986 EDSA revolution or on 5 March 1986, petitioner filed her courtesy resignation as President of the Rizal Technological
Colleges and the same was accepted on 21 March 1986. A day before the acceptance of her courtesy resignation, petitioner applied
for sick leave.

On 4 November 1988, petitioner was appointed Acting President of Eulogio "Amang" Rodriguez Institute of Science and Technology
(hereinafter referred to as EARIST) and was thereafter appointed its President on 29 March 1989.

After reaching the age of sixty-five (65) years on 16 June 1989, petitioner inquired from the Government Service Insurance System
(GSIS) as to whether she may be allowed to extend her services with the government as President of EARIST beyond the age of sixty-
five (65) years, to enable her to avail of the old-age pension retirement benefits under PD 1146 (Revised Government Service
Insurance Act of 1977). In answer to her query, petitioner was advised by the GSIS to return to the service until she shall have fulfilled
the fifteen (15) years service requirement pursuant of Section 11 of PD 1146, to qualify for the old-age pension retirement plan. The
GSIS declared that petitioner was not yet eligible to retire under PD 1146, as she had not rendered the sufficient number of years of
service on the date of her supposed retirement on 16 June 1989 and that her creditable service was only twelve (12) years and two
(2) months. As things stood, she could only claim one hundred percent (100%) of her average monthly compensation for every year
of creditable service or to a refund of her premium contributions with the GSIS. 1

On 6 October 1989, as recommended by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) Secretary and the Board of Trustees
of EARIST, President Aquino, through Deputy Executive Secretary Magdangal B. Elma, extended the term of petitioner as President of
EARIST until she shall have completed the required fifteen (15) years of service after reaching the age of sixty five (65) years on the
date of her normal retirement on 16 June 1989 or for an additional period of two (2) years, seven (7) months and twelve (12) days. 2

In March 1990, the EARIST Faculty and Employees Union filed an administrative complaint against petitioner before the Office of the
President, for her alleged irregular appointment and for graft and corrupt practices. In a memorandum, dated 16 August 1990, the
Office of the President furnished petitioner a copy of the complaint with a directive to file an answer thereto with the DECS Secretary,
who was duly authorized to conduct a formal investigation of the charges against petitioner. Pending investigation of the complaint,
petitioner was placed under preventive suspension for a period of ninety (90) days. 3 After serving the period of suspension, petitioner
re-assumed her duties and functions as President of EARIST.

4
In a letter dated 20 July 1990, DECS Secretary Cario recommended the compulsory retirement of petitioner.

For the purpose of investigating the administrative charges against petitioner, 5 an Ad-Hoc Committee was created by President
Aquino on 12 February 1991. The parties filed their respective pleadings and hearings in the case were conducted by the committee.

Pending resolution of the administrative charges against her, petitioner was detailed with the DECS Central Office pursuant to a
memorandum dated 13 February 1991 signed by Deputy Executive Secretary Sarmiento III. Petitioner filed a petition
for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 40, seeking her reinstatement as EARIST
President. After trial, said petition was dismissed. On appeal, the Court of Appeals denied the petition for certiorari on 2 April 1991. 6

Petitioner likewise assailed her reassignment with the DECS Central Office, before the Civil Service Commission (CSC). On 30 July
1991, the CSC denied petitioner's complaint. She moved for reconsideration of said resolution but the same was denied on 3
December 1991, which prompted petitioner to file a petition for certiorari before this Court docketed as G.R. No. 103271. On 3 March
1992, this Court dismissed said petition.

After evaluating the evidence presented before the Ad-Hoc Committee, in a decision 7 dated 23 October 1991, the Office of the
President dismissed the administrative complaint against petitioner for lack of substantial evidence. In the same decision, the Office
of the President also declared petitioner as compulsory retired from government service as of 15 October 1991, holding that:

... (I)f the aforesaid sick leave of 62 working days (approximately 3 months) were to be added to the respondent's
creditable service, together with the period of two (2) weeks which the respondent's counsel admits in his
Memorandum the respondent had served as Professorial Lecturer, the respondent should be considered as
compulsorily retired as of Oct. 15, 1991, having completed the required 15 years in the service on or about the said
date after reaching the age of 65.

Accordingly, the administrative charges against Dr. Lydia M. Profeta for her alleged "irregular appointment and graft
and corrupt practices" are hereby dismissed. However, Dr. Profeta is hereby considered as now compulsorily retired
from the service as of October 15, 1991, in accordance with the provisions of Section 11 (b) of Presidential Decree
No. 1146, having completed fifteen (15) years in the government service on or about he said date after reaching
the age of sixty-five (65) on June 16, 1989. 8

In a letter dated 23 October 1991, petitioner requested the GSIS to determine the exact date of her retirement. On 5 November 1991,
petitioner was advised by the GSIS that the exact date of her retirement falls on 14 August 1992. 9

A motion for reconsideration was then filed by petitioner with the Office of the President, assailing the portion of its decision declaring
her as compulsorily retired from the service as of 15 October 1991, alleging that the said office has no jurisdiction over the issue of
her compulsory retirement from the government service.

In a resolution 10 dated 31 January 1992, petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied by the Office of the President. In the same
resolution, the Office of the President clarified that there was an over extension of petitioner's period of service with the government
by failure to reckon with the sixty-two (62) working days during which petitioner went on sick leave (from 20 March to 17 June 1986)
and the period of two (2) weeks during which petitioner served as Professorial Lecturer. In considering petitioner as compulsory
retired as of 15 October 1991, the Office of the President held that it merely resolved motu proprio to shorten by three-and-a-half (3-
1/2) months the extension granted to petitioner to complete the required fifteen (15) years of service for purposes of retirement. It
further declared that it is for the President to determine whether or not petitioner could still continue as EARIST President despite her
exoneration from the administrative charges filed against her.

Under Presidential Decree No. 1146 (Revised Government Insurance Act of 1977), one of the benefits provided for qualified members
of the GSIS is the old-age pension benefit. A member who has rendered at least fifteen (15) years of service and is at least sixty (60)
years old when separated from the service, is entitled to a basic monthly pension for life but for not less than five (5) years. On the
other hand, a member who has rendered less than fifteen (15) years of service but with at least three (3) years of service and is sixty
(60) years of age when separated from the service is entitled to a cash payment equivalent to one hundred percent (100%) of the
average monthly compensation for every year of service.

However, retirement is compulsory for a member who has reached the age of sixty-five (65) years with at least fifteen (15) years of
service. If he has less than fifteen (15) years of service, he shall be allowed to continue in the service to complete the fifteen (15)
years, 11 to avail of the old-age pension benefit.

To a public servant, a pension is not a gratuity but rather a form of deferred compensation for services performed and his right to it
commences to vest upon his entry into the retirement system and becomes an enforceable obligation in court upon fulfillment of all
conditions under which it is to be paid. Similarly, retirement benefits receivable by public employees are valuable parts of the
consideration for entrance into and continuation in public office or employment. They serve a public purpose and a primary objective
in establishing them is to induce competent persons to enter and remain in public employment and render faithful and efficient
service while so employed. 12 Retirement laws are liberally interpreted in favor of the retiree because their intention is to provide for
his sustenance and hopefully even comfort, when he no longer has the stamina to continue earning his livelihood. 13 The liberal
approach aims to achieve the humanitarian purposes of the law in order that the efficiency, security and well-being of government
employees maybe enhanced. 14

In the case at bar, at the time petitioner reached the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five (65) years, she had rendered less than
the required fifteen (15) years of service under Section 11 of P.D. 1146. Thus, to enable her to avail of the old-age pension benefit,
she was allowed to continue in the service and her term as President of EARIST was extended until she shall have completed the
fifteen (15) years service requirement, or for an additional two (2) years, seven (7) months, and twelve (12) days, as determined by
the Office of the President.
This period of extended service granted to petitioner was amended by the Office of the President. In resolving the administrative
complaint against petitioner, the Office of the President, ruled not only on the issues of alleged irregular appointment of petitioner
and of graft and corrupt practices, but went further by, in effect, reducing the period of extension of service granted to petitioner on
the ground that the latter had already completed the fifteen (15) years service requirement under P.D. 1146, and declared petitioner
as compulsorily retired as of 15 October 1991.

In other words, the extension of service of petitioner was until January 1992. However, the Office of the President made a new
computation of petitioner's period of service with the government, the Office of the President included as part of her service the sixty-
two (62) days sick leave applied for by petitioner covering the period between 20 March to 17 June 1988 and her service as a lecturer
of approximately two (2) weeks, or a total of three-and-a-half (3 1/2) months. As a result of this new computation, petitioner's
extension of service which was supposed to end in January 1992 was reduced by the Office of the President by three-and-a-half (3
1/2) months or until 15 October 1991.

On the other hand, the computation made by the GSIS as to the exact date of retirement of petitioner fell on 14 August 1992. 15 Thus,
the extension of service granted to petitioner by the Office of the President for two (2) years, seven (7) months and twelve (12) days
which brought her services only up to January 1992, would not enable herein petitioner to complete the fifteen (15) years service
requirement for purposes of retirement. To allow the Office of the President to shorten the extension of service of petitioner by three-
and-a-half (3 1/2) months which consist of petitioner's sick leave and service as lecturer, would further reduce petitioner's service
with the government. Such reduction from petitioner's service would deprive her of the opportunity of availing of the old-age pension
plan, based on the computation of the GSIS.

We hold that it is the GSIS which has the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether a member is qualified or not to avail
of the old-age pension benefit under P.D. 1146, based on its computation of a member's years of service with the government. 16 The
computation of a member's service includes not only full time but also part time and other services with compensation as may be
included under the rules and regulations prescribed by the System. 17

The sixty-two (62) days leave of absence of petitioner between 20 March to 17 June 1986 and her part-time service as a lecturer f
approximately two (2) weeks, or a total of three-and-a-half (3 1/2) months is not reflected in her service record. Said period should be
considered as part of her service with the government and it is only but proper that her service record be amended to reflect said
period of service.

We have observed that the computation made by the GSIS of petitioner's date of retirement failed to take into account the three-and-
a-half (3 1/2) months service of petitioner which was not reflected in her service record. If we deduct this unrecorded three-and-a-half
(3 1/2) months service of petitioner from 14 August 1992, petitioner is to be considered retired on 30 April 1992.

The order of the Office of the President declaring petitioner as compulsorily retired as of 15 October 1991 defeats the purpose for
allowing petitioner to remain in the service until she has completed the fifteen (15) years service requirement. Between the period of
16 October 1991 to 30 April 1992, petitioner should have been allowed to continue in the service to be able to complete the fifteen
(15) years service requirement; she was prepared to render services for said period but was not allowed to do so; she should,
therefore, the entitled to all her salaries, benefits and other emoluments during said period (16 October 1991 - 30 April 1992).
However, petitioner's claim for reinstatement to her former position to enable her to complete the fifteen (15) year service
requirement for retirement purposes is no longer possible, considering that she is deemed to have completed the said service
requirement as of 30 April 1992.

WHEREFORE, the portion of the decision of the Office of the President dated 23 October 1991 declaring petitioner as compulsorily
retired as of 15 October 1991 is SET ASIDE. Petitioner is hereby declared to have been in the service as President of EARIST from 16
October 1991 until 30 April 1992 and therefore entitled to all salaries, benefits and other emoluments of said office from 16 October
1991 to 30 April 1992. In addition, she is declared as entitled to her old-age pension benefits for having reached age 65 years while in
the service with 15 years of service to her credit, subject to her compliance with all applicable regulations and requirements of the
GSIS.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-21723 November 26, 1970

HILARION BERONILLA, petitioner,

vs.
GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, its BOARD OF TRUSTEES, ET AL., respondents.

BARREDO, J.:

A special civil action for prohibition seeking to declare Resolution No. 1497 of the Board of Trustees of the respondent Government
Service Insurance System of August 9, 1963 to the effect that petitioner "Mr. (Hilarion) Beronilla be considered compulsorily retired
from the service (as Auditor of the Philippine National Bank) effective January 14, 1963" as null and void for having been issued, in
the words of the petition, "in excess of the powers granted to it by law, a wanton abuse of discretion, violation of contracts, removal
or forced retirement without due process of law and to declare all acts heretofore taken in implementation thereof also void, and to
prohibit said respondent and its representatives from carrying out or implementing the aforesaid resolution." Acting on petitioner's
prayer for preliminary injunction, on August 26, 1963, this Court issued the writ prayed for upon petitioner's filing an injunction bond
in the amount of P1,000.00.

At the time of the filing of the present petition on August 23, 1963, petitioner was acting as and performing the duties of Auditor of
the Philippine National Bank. Before that, he had occupied many other positions in the government and had been a member of the
GSIS during all times required by law.

In his application for employment, his applications for life and retirement insurance as well as his application to be allowed to take
civil service examinations, ten times from 1917 to 1925, petitioner uniformly indicated that his date of birth is January 14, 1898. He
also indicated the same date of birth in his Member's Service Record which he submitted to the GSIS on October 29, 1954 pursuant to
the provisions of Section 13-A, Republic Act No. 660.

On September 29, 1959, he requested the Commissioner of Civil Service, thru the Auditor General, that his date of birth indicated in
the records be changed to January 14, 1900. According to the petition, it was only in 1955, before the demise of his mother that
petitioner discovered that his true date of birth is January 14, 1900; that his mother told him that in 1916, his uncle, Alvaro Beronilla,
purchased a cedula for him showing in the same that he was already 18 years old for the reason that his uncle wanted to take
advantage of his being able to vote for him in La Paz, Abra in 1919, when he would be already twenty-one years of age and the uncle
a candidate for vice-president of the municipality; that since then he had been looking for people who could attest to his true date of
birth and it was only in September, 1959 that he came upon two old persons of their town, Felix Alberne and Ricardo Lalin who could
do so; that the former had been a member of the provincial board and the latter is a retired justice of the peace; and that his letter to
the Civil Service Commissioner was supported by the affidavits of these two persons. This letter was endorsed by the Commission to
the GSIS for action "without the intervention of the Civil Service Commission."

In the GSIS, petitioner's letter-request was referred to the Legal Counsel who, on October 22, 1959, denied the same since "all official
records point to January 14, 1898 as the birthday of Mr. Hilarion Beronilla." Upon learning of this denial, petitioner submitted
additional evidence to support his request. This evidence consisted of photostat copies of the yearbooks of the Philippine Institute of
Accountants in 1954 and 1958 wherein his date of birth is shown as January 14, 1900. This additional evidence notwithstanding, on
March 21, 1960 the Legal Counsel reiterated his former denial. Whereupon, on May 21, 1960 petitioner appealed to the General
Manager of the System who at that time was Mr. Rodolfo Andal. Upon favorable recommendation of the 2nd Assistant General
Manager, Mr. F. G. Araa in a memorandum dated May 30, 1960, on June 2, 1960, Mr. Andal placed "OK." at the foot thereof over his
initials, thus indicating approval of the requested change.

Based on this action of the General Manager, notes of the adjustment of the date of birth of petitioner to January 14, 1900 were sent
to the Auditor General and the Commissioner of Civil Service and the proceeds of petitioner's policy was re-computed. The Legal
Counsel whose title and rank had been meanwhile changed to Assistant General Manager for Legal Affairs later communicated the
aforesaid decision of the General manager to the Philippine National Bank on November 2, 1962 and the Deputy Auditor General on
November 12, 1962, by letter and indorsement, respectively. As emphasized by petitioner, in the letter to the Philippine National
Bank, it is stated that "his date of birth has been adjusted by this office, after careful study and deliberation." On the other hand, in
the 2nd indorsement to the Deputy Auditor General, it was made clear that relative to petitioner's life insurance policy No. N-2065
which had matured on November 30, 1957, corresponding adjustment or recomputation of the maturity value had been effected on
the basis of his changed date of birth. In the meantime, upon application of petitioner, on October 1, 1960, he was issued a new life
policy No. 335778 indicating his date of birth as January 14, 1900. Regarding his above-mentioned policy No. N-2065, on July 7, 1960,
demand was made upon petitioner to pay the System additionally the sum of P131.09, due to the adjustment of his date of birth,
which demand, petitioner promptly complied with.

Almost three years after Mr. Andal approved the change of petitioner's date of birth, more specifically, on May 6, 1963, Mr. Ismael
Mathay, then Auditor of the Central Bank detailed to the Philippine National Bank, wrote the Board of Trustees of the GSIS about the
service of petitioner and stated that "in the course of the audit of the transactions of the Philippine National Bank, it was found that
Mr. Hilarion Beronilla has been continuously paid since January 15, 1963, his salary allowances and other fringe benefits as Auditor of
said Bank notwithstanding the fact that Mr. Beronilla has attained his sixty-fifth (65th) birthday last January 14, 1963, the date of his
automatic and compulsory retirement from the government service as fixed under Republic Act No. 3096 approved June 16, 1961."
Acting on this letter, the Board referred the same to Assistant General Manager and Actuary, Dr. Manuel Hizon, then in charge of the
Claims Department. The latter submitted a memorandum on August 6, 1963 stating the facts and evidence in the GSIS records
concerning the determination of the date of birth of petitioner, including the actions aforementioned taken thereon by Mr. Andal and
the Legal Counsel. On August 9, 1963, the Board adopted the disputed resolution without even notifying petitioner of Mr. Mathay's
letter and without giving him any opportunity to be heard regarding the same.

Upon these facts, it is the theory of petitioner that the approval by General Manager Andal of his request for the change of the date of
his birth in the official records of the GSIS from January 14, 1898 to January 14, 1900, after the same had been previously denied by
the Legal Counsel, could not be legally altered or modified by the Board of Trustees, not only because the power to decide such
matter finally is legally lodged in the General Manager and not in the Legal Counsel, nor in the Board, but also because even if the
Board were assumed to have authority to review the acts of the General Manager, it was either guilty of laches or estopped from
revising the same; and, furthermore, in approving the resolution in dispute, the Board of Trustees had denied due process to
petitioner and impaired the obligations of the contract between petitioner and the GSIS regarding his retirement. In other words, the
main issue before Us in this case is one of power and does not call for Our determination of whether petitioner's real date of birth is
January 14, 1898 or January 14, 1900. Accordingly, all We have to decide is whether or not the GSIS Board of Trustees acted within its
powers when it reversed the approval by General Manager Andal of petitioner's request for the change of his date of birth, taking all
circumstances into account including petitioner's allegations of res adjudicata, laches, estoppel, denial of due process and
unconstitutional impairment of contractual obligations. After carefully going over the facts on record and considering all pertinent
legal principles and statutory provisions, particularly Commonwealth Act 186, the Charter of the GSIS, as amended, together with the
relevant resolutions of the Board of Trustees, We have decided to uphold the superior authority of the Board over the General
Manager and to dismiss this petition.

We do not deem it necessary to pass upon petitioner's initial proposition, pressed vigorously, to be sure, to the effect that as between
the previous denial by the Legal Counsel and the subsequent approval by General Manager Andal of his request for the change of his
date of birth in the records, the latter, which was precisely the action on his appeal from the Legal Counsel's denial, should prevail.
Even granting it to be true that, pursuant to what is generally the practice and the rule, applications for retirement annuities in the
GSIS are subject to final approval by the General Manager after its being approved by one of the Assistant General Managers and/or
one or two Department Managers, 1 it is clear to Us that under the GSIS charter, the General Manager's approval is not beyond review
and reprobation by the Board of Trustees. It must be borne in mind that under Section 16 of said charter, the System "shall be
managed by the Board of Trustees ... " and Section 17 adds that the Board "shall have the following powers and authority: (a) to
adopt by-laws, rules and regulations for the administration of the System and the transaction of its business." On the other hand, the
extent of the functions and powers of the General Manager are defined in Section 18 as follows:

SEC. 18. Personnel. The Board shall have the power to appoint a general manager, who shall be a person of
recognized experience and capacity in the subject of life and social insurance, and who shall be the chief executive
officer of the System, one or more assistant general managers, one or more managers, a medical director, and an
actuary, and fix their compensation. The general manager shall, subject to the approval of the Board, appoint
additional personnel whenever and wherever they may be necessary to the effective execution of the provisions of
this Act, fix their compensation, remove, suspend, or otherwise discipline them, for cause. He shall have the power
to prescribe their duties, grant leave, prescribe certain qualifications to the end that only competent persons may
be employed, and appoint committees: Provided, however, That said additional personnel shall be subject to
existing Civil Service laws, rules and regulations.

xxx xxx xxx

It is thus obvious that by express statutory authority, the Board of Trustees directly manages the System and the General Manager is
only the chief executive officer of the Board. In the exercise of its power to adopt rules and regulations for the administration of the
System and the transaction of its business, the Board may lodge in the General Manager the authority to act on any matter the Board
may deem proper, but in no wise can such conferment of authority be considered as a full and complete delegation resulting in the
diminution, much less exhaustion, of the Board's own statutorily-based prerogative and responsibility to manage the affairs of the
System and, accordingly, to decide with finality any matter affecting its transactions or business. In other words, even if the Board
may entrust to the General Manager the power to give final approval to applications for retirement annuities, the finality of such
approval cannot be understood to divest the Board, in appropriate cases and upon its attention being called to a flaw, mistake or
irregularity in the General Manager's action, of the authority to exercise its power of supervision and control which flows naturally
from the ultimate and final responsibility for the proper management of the System imposed upon it by the charter. Incidentally, it
may be added that the force of this principle is even more true insofar as the GSIS is concerned, for the fiduciary character of the
management of the System is rendered more strict by the fact that the funds under its administration are partly contributed by the
thousands upon thousands of employees and workers in all the branches and instrumentalities of the government. It is indeed well to
remember at all times that the System and, particularly, its funds do not belong to the government, much less to any administration
which may happen to be temporarily on the saddle, and that the interests of the mass of its members can only be duly safeguarded if
the administrators of the System act with utmost fidelity and care. Not for nothing is its controlling and managing board called the
Board of Trustees. It results, therefore, that the first contention of petitioner cannot be sustained and We hold that any authority
conferred upon the General Manager by the Board of Trustees notwithstanding, the said Board may in appropriate cases and in the
exercise of its own sound discretion review the actions and decisions of the General Manager. The mere fact that the resolution
granting the authority expressly gives the character of finality to the General Manager's acts does not constitute such a
representation to third persons dealing with the System that such finality is definite even vis-a-vis the Board as to create any
estoppel, for the simple reason that it is not legally possible for the Board to divest itself of an authority which the charter of the
System places under its direct responsibility. From another point of view, since the law clearly vests the management in the Board
and makes the General Manager only its chief executive officer, all parties dealing with the System must be deemed to be on guard
regarding the ultimate authority of the Board to modify or reverse any action of the General Manager and they cannot complain
should the Board exercise its powers in the premises.

Petitioner posits, however, that even assuming that the Board may have the power to reverse or modify any action of the General
Manager in the exercise of his authority, because of the failure of the Board to act from June 2, 1960, when General Manager Andal
acted favorably on his request to August 9, 1963, when the Board approved the herein impugned Resolution No. 1497, or for more
than three years, during which time corresponding adjustments were made in his GSIS records, payment and life insurance policies
and due notices were served by the GSIS itself on all parties concerned on the basis of his changed date of birth, respondent should
be considered as guilty of laches or held in estoppel to change or alter the action of Mr. Andal. While petitioner's posture is not
entirely without logic, it falls short of the requirements for the successful invocation of the pleas of laches and estoppel. We have
carefully considered the lengthy and rather impressive discussion by petitioner of these points in his petition, memorandum and reply
to respondent's memorandum as well as the equally detailed and authority-supported contrary arguments in the answer and
memorandum of the respondent, and We have arrived at the conclusion that petitioner's position cannot be sustained.

It may be stated at the outset that petitioner's twin points of laches and estoppel actually boil down in this particular case to nothing
more than estoppel by silence. With this clarification, it is meet to recall that "mere innocent silence will not work estoppel. There
must also be some element of turpitude or negligence connected with the silence by which another is misled to his injury" (Civil Code
of the Philippines by Tolentino, Vol. IV, p. 600) and that "the doctrine of estoppel having its origin in equity and therefore being based
on moral and natural justice, its applicability to any particular case depends, to a very large extent, upon the special circumstances of
the case." (Mirasol v. Municipality of Tabaco, 43 Phil. 610, 614.) Important also it is not to overlook that as regards the actuations of
government officials, the general rule is that their mistakes and omissions do not create estoppel. (Republic vs. Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Co., L-18841, January 27, 1969, citing Pineda vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas, 52 Phil. 803, 807; and
Benguet Consolidated Mining Co. vs. Pineda, 98 Phil. 711, 724. See also: Republic vs. Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines, Inc., L-26862, March
30, 1970, and the cases therein cited.)

Moreover, in computing the period of alleged silence or inaction of the Board, what is relevant is not the actual or, what petitioner
calls, imputable knowledge of said Board of the favorable action of Mr. Andal. Even if such knowledge had come earlier than May 6,
1963, the date of Mr. Mathay's letter, what is decisive is that it was only thru Mr. Mathay's letter that the Board got notice of the error
in Mr. Andal's action. Precisely because it was not incumbent upon the Board, as petitioner himself alleges, to spontaneously or in the
ordinary course review the action of the General Manager, any knowledge thereof by the Board, whether actual or imputable, could
not, in logic and conscience, have placed the Board on notice of any error or irregularity therein. Consequently, the immediate steps
taken by the Board to have the facts alleged in Mr. Mathay's letter verified are inconsistent with the charge of unreasonable delay,
much more of laches.

The compulsory retirement of government officials and employees upon their reaching the age of 65 years is founded on public policy
which aims by it to maintain efficiency in the government service and at the same time give to the retiring public servants the
opportunity to enjoy during the remainder of their lives the recompense, inadequate perhaps for their long service and devotion to.
the government, in the form of a comparatively easier life, freed from the rigors of civil service discipline and the exacting demands
that the nature of their work and their relations with their superiors as well as the public would impose upon them. Needless to say,
therefore, the officials charged with the duty of implementing this policy cannot be too careful in insuring and safeguarding the
correctness and integrity of the records they prepare and keep. In this case, all that the Board has done is to set aside what it found
to be an erroneous decision of the General Manager in approving the change of date of petitioner's birth, because from the evidence
before it, the Board was convinced that the originally recorded date of birth should not be disturbed. We cannot see where the
charged inequity of such action of the Board could lie.

Above all, it is a must consideration whenever principles of equity are invoked that for such invocation to succeed, it must appear
that if the plea is not heeded the party making the plea will suffer, in truth and in fact, inequity and injury, whether pecuniary or
moral or, at least, in a juridical sense. Such is not the case with petitioner. Examining the circumstances of this case, We see nothing
inequitous to petitioner in the questioned resolution of the Board of Trustees. For decades back, repeatedly and uniformly, petitioner
made it appear in all material government and public records and in all his representations to respondent System that his date of
birth is January 14, 1898. His rather belated request for a change of said date to January 14, 1900 which would unquestionably favor
his interests, pecuniarily or otherwise, and correspondingly adversely affect those of the System and, of course, its members, was
duly investigated and found not to be sufficiently grounded to merit favorable action by the Legal Counsel in whom is lodged the
authority to evaluate such request. True this negative action was reversed by the General Manager, albeit by virtue of a procedure
not strictly in accordance with the established one as outlined in footnote 1 of this opinion, but on the other hand, the favorable
action of the General Manager was in turn reversed by the Board of Trustees, the final legal authority in the System, upon its being
informed of the error thereof. It is to be noted that, after all, it was always the petitioner who made representations to the respondent
System as to his date of birth, and not the other way around. All that the System did was to take his representations for what they
were worth. He was not believed by the Legal Counsel, but the General Manager did; on the other hand, the authority higher than the
General Manager found the action of the General Manager erroneous. Under these circumstances, how could the System be in
estoppel where the conflicting representations are of the petitioner rather than of the System?

Anent petitioner's contention that he was denied due process when the Board of Trustees acted on the letter of Mr. Mathay, without
notifying him thereof or hearing him thereon, suffice it to say that since there is no showing that under the procedure established in
the GSIS, such notice and hearing are required, considering that the System operates as a business corporation and generally notice
and hearing are not indispensable for due process in corporations, and in any event, inasmuch as what was considered by the Board
was nothing more than petitioner's own conflicting representations, and if petitioner really believed he should have been heard, he
could have filed a motion for reconsideration or reopening, it cannot be said that indeed he had not had due opportunity to present
his side.
Finally, as regards petitioner's argument that the Board's resolution in question constitutes an impairment of the obligations of his
contract of insurance, it is obvious that the constitutional injunction that is evidently the basis of such argument refers to the
legislature and not to resolutions even of government corporations. Besides, petitioner's life insurance policy, apart from not having
any real relevance in this case, what is involved being his retirement, contains specific provisions contemplating the correction of any
error or mistake in the date of birth of the insured. On the other hand, the retirement of government employees is imposed by law
and is not the result of any contractual stipulation.

WHEREFORE, the petition in this case is dismissed, with costs against petitioner, and the writ of preliminary injunction issued herein is
hereby dissolved.

G.R. No. 97419 July 3, 1992

GAUDENCIO T. CENA, petitioner,

vs.
THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, and THE HON. PATRICIA A. STO. TOMAS, in her capacity as Chairman of the Civil
Service Commission, respondents.

MEDIALDEA, J.:

May a government employee who has reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years, but who has rendered 11 years, 9 months
and 6 days of government service, be allowed to continue in the service to complete the
15-year service requirement to enable him to retire with the benefits of an
old-age pension under Section 11 par. (b) of the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977? This is the issue raised before
this Court by petitioner Gaudencio T. Cena, a Registrar of the Register of Deeds of Malabon, Metro Manila.

The facts are not disputed.

Petitioner Gaudencio T. Cena entered the government service on November 16, 1978 as Legal Officer II of the Law Department of
Caloocan City where he stayed for seven (7) years until his transfer on November 16, 1986 to the Office of the Congressman of the
First District of Caloocan City where he worked for only three (3) months, or until February 15, 1987, as Supervising Staff Officer.

On July 16, 1987, he was appointed as Registrar of the Register of Deeds of Malabon, Metro Manila, the position he held at the time
he reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years on January 22, 1991. By then, he would have rendered a total government
service of 11 years, 9 months and 6 days. Before reaching his 65th birthday, he requested the Secretary of Justice, through
Administrator Teodoro G. Bonifacio of the Land Registration Authority (LRA), that he be allowed to extend his service to complete the
15-year service requirement to enable him to retire with full benefits of old-age pension under Section 11, par. (b) of P.D. 1146.

The LRA Administrator, for his part, sought a ruling from the Civil Service Commission whether or not to allow the extension of service
of petitioner Cena as he is covered by Civil Service Memorandum No. 27, series 1990. In his 2nd Indorsement dated August 6, 1990,
the LRA Administrator observed that if petitioner's service as of January 22, 1991 of 10 years, 6 months and 6 days (should be 11
years, 9 months and 6 days) would be extended to 15 years, he would have to retire on April 15, 1994 at the age of 68 years.

On July 31, 1990, the Civil Service Commission denied petitioner Cena's request for extension of service in its CSC Resolution No. 90-
681, declaring therein, that Mr. Cena shall be considered retired from the service on January 22, 1991, the date when he shall reach
the compulsory retirement age of
sixty-five (65) years, unless his retention for another year is sought by the head of office under Civil Service Memorandum Circular
No. 27, s. 1990.

Petitioner Cena filed a motion for reconsideration. On October 17, 1990, the Civil Service Commission set aside its CSC Resolution No.
90-681 and allowed Gaudencio Cena a one-year extension of his service from January 22, 1991 to January 22, 1992, citing CSC
Memorandum Circular No. 27, series of 1990, the pertinent of which reads:

1. Any request for the extension of service of compulsory retirees to complete the fifteen (15) years service
requirement for retirement shall be allowed only to permanent appointees in the career service who are regular
members of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), and shall be granted for a period not exceeding one
(1) year.

On January 22, 1991, petitioner's second motion for reconsideration was denied in its CSC Resolution No. 91-101.

Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari alleging that the Civil Service Commission committed a grave abuse of discretion
when it granted the extension of petitioner's service as Registrar of Deeds of Malabon, Metro Manila, for a period of only one (1) year
pursuant to CSC Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990, instead of three (3) years and three (3) months to complete the 15-
year service requirement for his retirement with full benefits as provided under Section 11, par. (b) of Presidential Degree No. 1146,
otherwise known as the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977.

Petitioner contends that reliance of the Commission on par. (1) of Memorandum Circular No. 27 allowing an extension of service of a
compulsory retiree for a period not exceeding one (1) year is both erroneous and contrary to the "benevolent and munificent
intentions" of Section 11 of P.D. 1146. Petitioner points out that par. (b), Section 11 of P.D. No. 1146 does not limit nor specify the
maximum number of years the retiree may avail of to complete the 15 years of service.

The Solicitor-General agrees with petitioner Cena. He argues that the questioned provision being generally worded, Section 11 par.
(b), P.D. 1146 has general application, thus respondent CSC has no authority to limit through CSC Memorandum Circular No. 27 the
privilege under said section to government employees who lack just one year to complete the 15-year service requirement.

The Civil Service Commission, however, contends that since public respondent CSC is the central personnel agency of the
government, it is vested with the power and authority, among others, to grant or allow extension of service beyond retirement age
pursuant to Section 14 par. (14), Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of Executive Order No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987). In
interpreting Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146, public respondent CSC contends that the phrase "Provided, That if he has less than
fifteen years of service, he shall be allowed to continue in the service to complete the fifteen years", is qualified by the clause:
"Unless the service is extended by appropriate authorities," which means that the extension of service must be first authorized by the
Commission, as the appropriate authority referred to in Section 11, par. (b), P.D. 1146, before the service of a compulsory retiree (one
who has already reached age of 65 years with at least 15 years of service) can be extended.

We grant the petition.

Section 12, par. (14), Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (November 24, 1987) cannot be
interpreted to authorize the Civil Service Commission to limit to only one (1) year the extension of service of an employee who has
reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 without having completed 15 years of service, when said limitation his no relation to or
connection with the provision of the law supposed to be carried into effect.

Section 12, par. (14), Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 provides thus:

Sec. 12. Powers and Functions. The Commission shall have the following powers and functions:

xxx xxx xxx

(14) Take appropriate action on all appointments and other personnel matters in the Civil Service including
extension of service beyond retirement age;

As a law of general application, the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot authorize the modification of an express provision of a special
law (Revised Government Service Insurance of 1977). Otherwise, the intent and purpose of the provisions on retirement and pension
of the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977 (P.D. 1146) would be rendered nugatory and meaningless.

Section 11 paragraph (b) of the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977 expressly provides, thus:

Sec. 11. Conditions for Old-Age Pension. (a) Old-age pension shall be paid to a member who:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Unless the service is extended by appropriate authorities, retirement shall be compulsory for an employee of
sixty-five years of age with at least fifteen years of service: Provided, That if he has less than fifteen years of
service, he shall be allowed to continue in the service to complete the fifteen years. (Emphasis supplied)

Being remedial in character, a statute creating a pension or establishing retirement plan should be liberally construed and
administered in favor of the persons intended to be benefited thereby. The liberal approach aims to achieve the humanitarian
purposes of the law in order that the efficiency, security and well-being of government employees may be enhanced (Bautista vs.
Auditor General, 104 Phil 428; Ortiz vs. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. L-78957, June 28, 1988, 162 SCRA 812).

The Court stated in Abad Santos vs. Auditor General, 79 Phil. 176, that a pension partakes of the nature of "retained wages" of the
retiree for a double purpose: (1) to entice competent men and women to enter the government service, and (2) permit them to retire
from the service with relative security, not only for those who have retained their vigor, but more so for those who have been
incapacitated by illness or accident.
We have applied the liberal approach in interpreting statutes creating pension or establishing retirement plans in cases involving
officials of the Judiciary who lacked the age and service requirement for retirement. We see no cogent reason to rule otherwise in the
case of ordinary employees of the Executive Branch, as in the case of petitioner Cena, who has reached 65 but opted to avail of the
statutory privilege under Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146 to continue in the service to complete the 15-year service requirement in
order to avail of old-age pension.

In Re: Application for Gratuity Benefits of Associate Justice Efren I. Plana, Adm. Matter No. 5460, En Banc Resolution, March 24, 1988,
the Court, applying the liberal approach, ruled that Justice Plana, who at the time of his courtesy resignation on March 25, 1986
lacked a few months to meet the age requirement for retirement under the law, is entitled to full retirement benefits under R.A. 910
because his accrued leave credits would have entitled him to go on leave until beyond the age requirement for retirement.

The above ruling of the Court was reiterated in Re: Application for Retirement under Rep. Act No. 910 of Associate Justice Ramon B.
Britanico of the Intermediate Appellate Court, Adm. Matter No. 6484 Ret., May 15, 1989. By liberally interpreting Section 3 of R.A.
910, as amended, in favor of the persons intended to be benefited by them, the Court also allowed the conversion of the application
for disability retirement of Justice Ruperto Martin under said Section 3 of R.A. 910, as amended (10-year lump sum without the
lifetime annuity) into an application for voluntary retirement under Section 1
(5-year lump sum with lifetime annuity) eleven years after his disability retirement was approved on January 10, 1978 (In Re:
Application for Life Pension under Rep. Act 910. Ruperto G. Martin, applicant, 187 SCRA 477). The ten-year lump sum which he had
received was considered by the Court as payment under Section 1 of the five-year lump sum, to which he was entitled, and of his
monthly pensions for the next five years.

However, the Court pointed out in Re: Gregorio G. Pineda, Adm. Matter No. 2076-RET., July 13, 1990, and its six (6) companion cases,
187 SCRA 469, that when the Court allows seeming exceptions to fixed rules for certain retired Judges or Justices, there are ample
reasons behind each grant of an exception. The crediting of accumulated leaves to make up for lack of required age or length of
service is not done indiscriminately. It is always on case to case basis.

There is thus no justifiable reason in not allowing ordinary employees in the Executive Branch on a case to case basis, to continue in
the service to complete the 15-year service requirement to avail of the old-age pension under Section 11 of P.D. 1146. By limiting the
extension of service to only one (1) year would defeat the beneficial intendment of the retirement provisions of P.D. 1146.

In resolving the question whether or not to allow a compulsory retiree to continue in the service to complete the 15-year service,
there must be present an essential factor before an application under Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146 may be granted by the
employer or government office concerned. In the case of officials of the Judiciary, the Court allows a making up or compensating for
lack of required age or service only if satisfied that the career of the retiree was marked by competence, integrity, and dedication to
the public service (Re: Gregorio Pineda, supra). It must be so in the instant case.

It is interesting to note that the phrase "he shall be allowed to continue in the service to complete the fifteen years" found in Section
11 (b) of P.D. 1146 is a reproduction of the phrase in the original text found in Section 12 (e) of Commonwealth Act 186, as amended,
otherwise known as the "Government Service Insurance Act" approved on November 14, 1936. There is nothing in the original text as
well as in the revised version which would serve as the basis for providing the allowable extension period to only one (1) year. There
is likewise no indication that Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146 contemplates a borderline situation where a compulsory retiree on his
65th birthday has completed more than 14, but less than 15 years of government service., i.e. only a few months short of the 15-year
requirement which would enable him to collect an old-age pension.

While it is true that the Administrative Code of 1987 has given the Civil Service Commission the authority "to take appropriate action
on all appointments and other personnel matters in the Civil Service including extension of service beyond retirement age", the said
provision cannot be extended to embrace matters not covered by the Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977 (Sto. Tomas
vs. Board of Tax Appeals, 93 Phil. 376, 382, "citing 12 C.J. 845-46). The authority referred to therein is limited only to carrying into
effect what the special law, Revised Government Insurance Act of 1977, or any other retirement law being invoked provides. It cannot
go beyond the terms and provisions of the basic law.

The Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 27 being in the nature of an administrative regulation, must be governed by
the principle that administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with
the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions (People vs. Maceren, G.R.
No. L-32166, October 18, 1977, 79 SCRA 450; Teoxon v. Members of the Board of Administrators, L-25619, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA
585; Manuel v. General Auditing Office, L-28952, December 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 660; Deluao v. Casteel, L-21906, August 29, 1969, 29
SCRA 350).

The pronouncement of the Court in the case of Augusta Toledo vs. Civil Service Commission, et al., G.R. No. 92646-47, October 4,
1991, squarely applies in the instant case. We declared in the case of Toledo that the rule prohibiting 57-year old persons from
employment, reinstatement, or
re-employment in the government service provided under Section 22, Rule III of the Civil Service Rules on Personnel Actions and
Policies (CSRPAP) cannot be accorded validity, because it is entirely a creation of the Civil Service Commission, having no basis in the
law itself which it was meant to implement and it cannot be related to or connected with any specific provision of the law which it is
meant to carry into effect. The Court, speaking thru Justice Edgardo L. Paras, stated, thus:

The power vested in the Civil Service Commission was to implement the law or put it into effect, not to add to it; to
carry the law into effect or execution, not to supply perceived omissions in it. "By its administrative regulations, of
course, the law itself can not be extended; said regulations cannot amend an act of Congress." (Teoxon v. Members
of the Board of Administrators, Philippine Veterans Administration, 33 SCRA 585, 589 [1970], citing Santos v.
Estenzo, 109 Phil. 419 [1960]; see also, Animos v. Philippine Veterans Affairs Office, 174 SCRA 214, 223-224 [1989]
in turn citing Teoxon).

The considerations just expounded also conduce to the conclusion of the invalidity of Section 22, Rule III of the
CSRPAP. The enactment of said section, relative to 57-year old persons, was also an act of supererogation on the
part of the Civil Service Commission since the rule has no relation to or connection with any provision of the law
supposed to be carried into effect. The section was an addition to or extension of the law, not merely a mode of
carrying it into effect. (Emphasis supplied)

The governing retirement law in the instant case is P.D. 1146 otherwise known as the "Revised Government Service Insurance Act of
1977." The rule on limiting to only one (1) year the extension of service of an employee who has reached the compulsory retirement
age of 65 years, but has less than 15 years of service under Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27 s. 1990, cannot likewise be
accorded validity because it has no relation to or connection with any provision of P.D. 1146 supposed to be carried into effect. The
rule was an addition to or extension of the law, not merely a mode of carrying it into effect. The Civil Service Commission has no
power to supply perceived omissions in P.D. 1146.

As a matter of fact, We have liberally applied Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146 in two (2) recent cases where We allowed two
employees in the Judiciary who have reached the age of 65 to continue in the government service to complete the 15-year service
requirement to be entitled to the benefits under P.D. 1146.

In a resolution dated January 23, 1990 in A.M. No. 87-7-1329-MTC, We allowed Mrs. Florentina J. Bocade, Clerk of Court, Municipal Trial
Court, Dagami, Leyte, who at the time she reached the age of 65 years on October 16, 1987 had only 10 years of government
service, to continue her services until October 10, 1992. Thus, she was given a period of 5 years, to complete the
15-year service requirement to be entitled to the retirement benefits under Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146. The Court observed that
Mrs. Bocade is still performing her duties without any adverse complaints from her superior and that she is physically fit for work per
report of the Medical Clinic.

The Court, in a resolution dated April 18, 1991, in A.M. No. 91-3-003-SC.-Re: Request for the extension of service of Mrs. Crisanta T.
Tiangco, allowed Mrs. Crisanta T. Tiangco, Budget Officer V, Budget Division, Fiscal Management and Budget Office of the Supreme
Court to continue her services until February 10, 1995. She was granted a period of 3 years, 10 months and 13 days because she has
to her credit only 11 years, 1 month and 17 days of government service at the time she reached the age of 65 years on March 29,
1991 in order that she be entitled to the retirement benefits under P.D. No. 1146.

It is erroneous to apply to petitioner Cena who has rendered 11 years, 9 months and 6 days of government service, Section 12, par.
(b) of P.D. 1146 which provides that "a member who has rendered at least three (3) years but less than 15 years of service at the time
of separation shall, . . . upon separation after age sixty, receive a cash equivalent to 100% of his average monthly compensation for
every year of service."

The applicable law should be Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146 which allows him to extend his 11 years, 9 months and 6 days to
complete the 15-year of service consistent with the beneficial intendment of P.D. 1146 and which right is subject to the discretion of
the government office concerned.

Section 12 par. (b) of P.D. 1146 does not apply to the case of herein Cena, because he opted to continue in the service to complete
the 15-year service requirement pursuant to Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146. The completion of the 15-year service requirement
under Section 11 par. (b) partakes the nature of a privilege given to an employee who has reached the compulsory retirement age of
65 years, but has less than 15 years of service. If said employee opted to avail of said privilege, he is entitled to the benefits of the
old-age pension. On the other hand, if the said employee opted to retire upon reaching the compulsory retirement age of 65 years
although he has less than 15 years of service, he is entitled to the benefits provided for under Section 12 of P.D. 1146 i.e. a cash
equivalent to 100% of his average monthly compensation for every year of service.

The right under Section 11, par. (b) is open to all employees similarly situated, so it does not offend the constitutional guarantee of
equal protection of the law. There is nothing absurd or inequitable in rewarding an employee for completion of the 15-year service
beyond the retirement age. If he would be better off than the one who has served for 14 years but who is separated from the service
at the age of 64, it would be only just and proper as he would have worked for the whole period of 15 years as required by law for
entitlement of the old-age pension. Indeed, a longer service should merit a greater reward. Besides, his entitlement to the old-age
pension is conditioned upon such completion. Thus, if the service is not completed due to death or incapacity, he would be entitled to
the benefit under Section 12, par. (b), i.e. cash equivalent to 100% of his average monthly compensation for every year of service.
Finally, in view of the aforesaid right accorded under Section 11, par. (b) of P.D. 1146, petitioner Cena should not be covered by
Memorandum Circular No. 65 issued by then Executive Secretary Catalino Macaraig on June 14, 1988. Memorandum Circular No. 65
allowing retention of service for only six (6) months for "extremely meritorious reasons" should apply only to employees or officials
who have reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years but who, at the same time, have completed the 15-year service
requirement for retirement purposes. It should not apply to employees or officials who have reached the compulsory retirement age
of 65 years, but who opted to avail of the old-age pension under par. (b), Section 11 of P.D. 1146, in which case, they are allowed, at
the discretion of the agency concerned, to complete the 15-year service requirement.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted. The Land Registration Authority (LRA) of the Department of Justice has the discretion to allow
petitioner Gaudencio Cena to extend his 11 years, 9 months and 6 days of government service to complete the 15-year service so
that he may retire with full benefits under Section 11 par. (b) of P.D. 1146.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 111812 May 31, 1995

DIONISIO M. RABOR, petitioner,

vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, respondent.

FELICIANO, J.:

Petitioner Dionisio M. Rabor is a Utility Worker in the Office of the Mayor, Davao City. He entered the government service as a Utility
worker on 10 April 1978 at the age of 55 years.

Sometime in May 1991, 1 Alma, D. Pagatpatan, an official in the Office of the Mayor of Davao City, advised Dionisio M. Rabor to apply
for retirement, considering that he had already reached the age of sixty-eight (68) years and seven (7) months, with thirteen (13)
years and one (1) month of government service. Rabor responded to this advice by exhibiting a "Certificate of Membership" 2 issued
by the Government Service Insurance System ("GSIS") and dated 12 May 1988. At the bottom of this "Certificate of Membership" is a
typewritten statement of the following tenor: "Service extended to comply 15 years service reqts." This statement is followed by a
non-legible initial with the following date "2/28/91."

Thereupon, the Davao City Government, through Ms. Pagatpatan, wrote to the Regional Director of the Civil Service Commission,
Region XI, Davao City ("CSRO-XI"), informing the latter of the foregoing and requesting advice "as to what action [should] be taken on
this matter."

In a letter dated 26 July 1991, Director Filemon B. Cawad of CSRO-XI advised Davao City Mayor Rodrigo R. Duterte as follows:

Please be informed that the extension of services of Mr. Rabor is contrary to M.C. No. 65 of the Office of the
President, the relevant portion of which is hereunder quoted:

Officials and employees who have reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years shall not be
retained the service, except for extremely meritorious reasons in which case the retention shall
not exceed six (6) months.

IN VIEW WHEREFORE, please be advised that the services of Mr. Dominador [M.] Rabor as Utility Worker in that
office, is already non-extend[i]ble. 3

Accordingly, on 8 August l991, Mayor Duterte furnished a copy of the 26 July 1991 letter of Director Cawad to Rabor and advised him
"to stop reporting for work effective August 16, 1991." 4

Petitioner Rabor then sent to the Regional Director, CSRO-XI, a letter dated 14 August 1991, asking for extension of his services in the
City Government until he "shall have completed the fifteen (15) years service [requirement] in the Government so that [he] could also
avail of the benefits of the retirement laws given to employees of the Government." The extension he was asking for was about two
(2) years. Asserting that he was "still in good health and very able to perform the duties and functions of [his] position as Utility
Worker," Rabor sought "extension of [his] service as an exception to Memorandum Circular No. 65 of the Office of the
President." 5 This request was denied by Director Cawad on 15 August 1991.
Petitioner Rabor next wrote to the Office of the President on 29 January 1992 seeking reconsideration of the decision of Director
Cawad, CSRO-XI. The Office of the President referred Mr. Rabor's letter to the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission on 5 March
1992.

In its Resolution No. 92-594, dated 28 April 1992, the Civil Service Commission dismissed the appeal of Mr. Rabor and affirmed the
action of Director Cawad embodied in the latter's letter of 26 July 1991. This Resolution stated in part:

In his appeal, Rabor requested that he be allowed to continue rendering services as Utility Worker in order to
complete the fifteen (15) year service requirement under P.D. 1146.

CSC Memorandum Circular No. 27, s. 1990 provides, in part:

1. Any request for extension of service of compulsory retirees to complete the fifteen years
service requirement for retirement shall be allowed only to permanent appointees in the career
service who are regular members of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and shall
be granted for a period of not exceeding one (1) year.

Considering that as early as October 18, 1988, Rabor was already due for retirement, his request for further
extension of service cannot be given due course. 6 (Emphasis in the original)

On 28 October 1992, Mr. Rabor sought reconsideration of Resolution No. 92-594 of the Civil Service Commission this time invoking the
Decision of this Court in Cena v. Civil Service Commission. 7 Petitioner also asked for reinstatement with back salaries and benefits,
having been separated from the government service effective 16 August 1991. Rabor's motion for reconsideration was denied by the
Commission.

Petitioner Rabor sent another letter dated 16 April 1993 to the Office of the Mayor, Davao City, again requesting that he be allowed to
continue rendering service to the Davao City Government as Utility Worker in order to complete the fifteen (15) years service
requirement under P.D. No. 1146. This request was once more denied by Mayor Duterte in a letter to petitioner dated 19 May 1993. In
this letter, Mayor Duterte pointed out that, under Cena grant of the extension of service was discretionary on the part of the City
Mayor, but that he could not grant the extension requested. Mayor Duterte's letter, in relevant part, read:

The matter was referred to the City Legal Office and the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, in the advent of
the decision of the Supreme Court in the Cena vs. CSC, et al. (G.R. No. 97419 dated July 3, 1992), for legal opinion.
Both the City Legal Officer and the Chairman of the Civil Service Commission are one in these opinion
that extending you an appointment in order that you may be able to complete the fifteen-year service requirement
is discretionary [on the part of] the City Mayor.

Much as we desire to extend you an appointment but circumstances are that we can no longer do so. As you are
already nearing your 70th birthday may no longer be able to perform the duties attached to your position.
Moreover, the position you had vacated was already filled up.

We therefore regret to inform you that we cannot act favorably on your request. 8 (Emphases supplied)

At this point, Mr. Rabor decided to come to this Court. He filed a Letter/Petition dated 6 July 1993 appealing from Civil Service
Resolution No. 92-594 and from Mayor Duterte's letter of 10 May 1993.

The Court required petitioner Rabor to comply with the formal requirements for instituting a special civil action of certiorari to review
the assailed Resolution of the Civil Service Commission. In turn, the Commission was required to comment on petitioner's
Letter/Petition. 9 The Court subsequently noted petitioner's Letter of 13 September 1993 relating to compliance with the mentioned
formal requirements and directed the Clerk of Court to advise petitioner to engage the services of counsel or to ask for legal
assistance from the Public Attorney's Office (PAO). 10

The Civil Service Commission, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed its comment on 16 November 1993. The Court then
resolved to give due course to the Petition and required the parties to file memoranda. Both the Commission and Mr. Rabor (the latter
through PAO counsel) did so.

In this proceeding, petitioner Rabor contends that his claim falls squarely within the ruling of this Court in Cena v. Civil Service
Commission. 11

Upon the other hand, the Commission seeks to distinguish this case from Cena. The Commission, through the Solicitor General,
stressed that in Cena, this Court had ruled that the employer agency, the Land Registration Authority of the Department of Justice,
was vested with discretion to grant to Cena the extension requested by him. The Land Registration Authority had chosen not to
exercise its discretion to grant or deny such extension. In contrast, in the instant case, the Davao City Government did exercise its
discretion on the matter and decided to deny the extension sought by petitioner Rabor for legitimate reasons.

While the Cena decision is barely three (3) years old, the Court considers that it must reexamine the doctrine of Cena and the
theoretical and policy underpinnings thereof. 12

We start by recalling the factual setting of Cena.

Gaudencio Cena was appointed Registrar of the Register of Deeds of Malabon, Metropolitan Manila, on 16 July 1987. He reached the
compulsory retirement age of sixty-five (65) years on 22 January 1991. By the latter date, his government service would have
reached a total of eleven (11) years, nine (9) months and six (6) days. Before reaching his 65th birthday, Cena requested the
Secretary of Justice, through the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority ("LRA") that he be allowed to extend his service to
complete the fifteen-year service requirement to enable him to retire with the full benefit of an Old-Age Pension under Section 11 (b)
of P.D. No. 1146. If Cena's request were granted, he would complete fifteen (15) years of government service on 15 April 1994, at the
age of sixty-eight (68) years.

The LRA Administrator sought a ruling from the Civil Service Commission on whether or not Cena's request could be granted
considering that Cena was covered by Civil Service Memorandum No. 27, Series of 1990. On 17 October 1990, the Commission
allowed Cena a one (1) year extension of his service from 22 January 1991 to 22 January 1992 under its Memorandum Circular No. 27.
Dissatisfied, Cena moved for reconsideration, without success. He then came to this Court, claiming that he was entitled to an
extension of three (3) years, three (3) months and twenty-four (24) days to complete the fifteen-year service requirement for
retirement with full benefits under Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146.

This Court granted Cena' s petition in its Decision of 3 July 1992. Speaking through Mr. Justice Medialdea, the Court held that a
government employee who has reached the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five (65) years, but at the same time has not yet
completed fifteen (15) years of government service required under Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146 to qualify for the Old-Age Pension
Benefit, may be granted an extension of his government service for such period of time as may be necessary to "fill up" or comply
with the fifteen (15)-year service requirement. The Court also held that the authority to grant the extension was a discretionary one
vested in the head of the agency concerned. Thus the Court concluded:

Accordingly, the Petition is GRANTED. The Land Registration Authority (LRA) and Department of Justice has the
discretion to allow petitioner Gaudencio Cena to extend his 11 years, 9 months and 6 days of government to
complete the fifteen-year service so that he may retire with full benefits under Section 11, paragraph (b) of P.D.
1146. 13 (Emphases supplied)

The Court reached the above conclusion primarily on the basis of the "plain and ordinary meaning" of Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146.
Section 11 may be quoted in its entirety:

Sec. 11 Conditions for Old-Age Pension. (a) Old-Age Pension shall be paid to a member who

(1) has at least fifteen (15) years of service;

(2) is at least sixty (60) years of age; and

(3) is separated from the service.

(b) unless the service is extended by appropriate authorities, retirement shall be compulsory for an employee at
sixty-five-(65) years of age with at least fifteen (15) years of service; Provided, that if he has less than fifteen (15)
years of service, he shall he allowed to continue in the service to completed the fifteen (15) years. (Emphases
supplied)

The Court went on to rely upon the canon of liberal construction which has often been invoked in respect of retirement statutes:

Being remedial in character, a statute granting a pension or establishing [a] retirement plan should be liberally
construed and administered in favor of persons intended to be benefitted thereby. The liberal approach aims to
achieve the humanitarian purposes of the law in order that efficiency, security and well-being of government
employees may be enhanced. 14 (Citations omitted)

While Section 11 (b) appeared cast in verbally unqualified terms, there were (and still are) two (2) administrative issuances which
prescribe limitations on the extension of service that may be granted to an employee who has reached sixty-five (65) years of age.

The first administrative issuance is Civil Service Commission Circular No. 27, Series of 1990, which should be quoted in its entirety:
 TO : ALL HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS, BUREAUS AND AGENCIES OF THE NATIONAL/LOCAL GOVERNMENTS INCLUDING
GOVERNMENT- OWNED AND/OR CONTROLLED CORPORATIONS WITH ORIGINAL CHARTERS.

SUBJECT : Extension of Service of Compulsory Retiree to Complete the Fifteen Years Service Requirement for
Retirement Purposes.

Pursuant to CSC Resolution No. 90-454 dated May 21, 1990, the Civil Service Commission hereby adopts and
promulgates the following policies and guidelines in the extension of services of compulsory retirees to complete
the fifteen years service requirement for retirement purposes:

1. Any request for the extension of service of compulsory retirees to complete the fifteen (15)
years service requirement for retirement shall be allowed only to permanent appointees in the
career service who are regular members of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS),
and shall be granted for a period not exceeding one (1) year.

2. Any request for the extension of service of compulsory retiree to complete the fifteen (15)
years service requirement for retirement who entered the government service at 57 years of age
or over upon prior grant of authority to appoint him or her, shall no longer be granted.

3. Any request for the extension of service to complete the fifteen (15) years service requirement
of retirement shall be filled not later than three (3) years prior to the date of compulsory
retirement.

4. Any request for the extension of service of a compulsory retiree who meets the minimum
number of years of service for retirement purposes may be granted for six (6) months only with
no further extension.

This Memorandum Circular shall take effect immediately. (Emphases supplied)

The second administrative issuance Memorandum Circular No. 65 of the Office of the President, dated 14 June 1988 provides:

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREAS, this Office has been. receiving requests for reinstatement and/or retention in the service of employees
who have reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years, despite the strict conditions provided for in
Memorandum Circular No. 163, dated March 5, 1968, as amended.

WHEREAS, the President has recently adopted a policy to adhere more strictly to the law providing for compulsory
retirement age of 65 years and, in extremely meritorious cases, to limit the service beyond the age of 65 years to
six (6) months only.

WHEREFORE, the pertinent provision of Memorandum Circular No. 163 or on the retention in the service of officials
or employees who have reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years, is hereby amended to read as follows:

Officials or employees who have reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years shall not be
retained in the service, except for extremely meritorious reasons in which case the retention shall
not exceed six (6) months.

All heads of departments, bureaus, offices and instrumentalities of the government including government-owned or
controlled corporations, are hereby enjoined to require their respective offices to strictly comply with this circular.

This Circular shall take effect immediately.

By authority of the
President

(Sgd.)

CATALINO MACARAIG, JR.

Executive Secretary
 Manila, June 14, 1988. 15 (Emphasis supplied)

Medialdea, J. resolved the challenges posed by the above two (2) administrative regulations by, firstly, considering as invalid Civil
Service Memorandum No. 27 and, secondly, by interpreting the Office of the President's Memorandum Circular No. 65
as inapplicable to the case of Gaudencio T. Cena.

We turn first to the Civil Service Commission's Memorandum Circular No. 27. Medialdea, J. wrote:

The Civil Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 27 being in the nature of an administrative regulation,
must be governed by the principle that administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a
particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of
carrying into effect its general provisions (People v. Maceren, G.R. No. L-32166, October 18, 1977, 79 SCRA 450;
Teoxon v. Members of the Board of Administrators, L-25619, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 585; Manuel v. General
Auditing Office, L-28952, December 29, 1971, 42 SCRA 660; Deluao v. Casteel, L-21906, August 29, 1969, 29 SCRA
350). . . . . The rule on limiting to one the year the extension of service of an employee who has reached the
compulsory retirement age of sixty-five (65) years, but has less than fifteen (15) years of service under Civil Service
Memorandum Circular No. 27, S. 1990, cannot likewise be accorded validity because it has no relationship or
connection with any provision of P.D. 1146 supposed to be carried into effect. The rule was an addition to or
extension of the law, not merely a mode of carrying it into effect . The Civil Service Commission has no power to
supply perceived omissions in P.D. 1146. 16 (Emphasis supplied)

It will be seen that Cena, in striking down Civil Service Commission Memorandum No. 27, took a very narrow view on the question of
what subordinate rule-making by an administrative agency is permissible and valid. That restrictive view must be contrasted with this
Court's earlier ruling in People v. Exconde, 17 where Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes said:

It is well established in this jurisdiction that, while the making of laws is a non-delegable activity that corresponds
exclusively to Congress, nevertheless, the latter may constitutionally delegate authority and promulgate rules and
regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies, for the reason that the legislature often
finds it impracticable (if not impossible) to anticipate and provide for the multifarious and complex situations that
may be met in carrying the law into effect. All that is required is that the regulation should be germane to the
objects and purposes of the law; that the regulation be not in contradiction with it, but conform to standards that
the law prescribes. 18(Emphasis supplied)

In Tablarin v. Gutierrez, 19 the Court, in sustaining the validity of a MECS Order which established passing a uniform admission test
called the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) as a prerequisite for eligibility for admission into medical schools in the Philippines,
said:

The standards set for subordinate legislation in the exercise of rule making authority by an administrative
agency like the Board of Medical Education are necessarily broad and highly abstract. As explained by then Mr.
Justice Fernando in Edu v. Ericta (35 SCRA 481 [1970])

The standards may be either expressed or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is
easily met. The Standard though does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied
from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly the
legislative objective is public safety. What is sought to be attained in Calalang v. William is "safe
transit upon the roads."

We believe and so hold that the necessary standards are set forth in Section 1 of the 1959 Medical Act: "the
standardization and regulation of medical education" and in Section 5 (a) and 7 of the same Act, the body of the
statute itself, and that these considered together are sufficient compliance with the requirements of the non-
delegation principle. 20 (Citations omitted; emphasis partly in the original and partly supplied)

In Edu v. Ericta, 21 then Mr. Justice Fernando stressed the abstract and very general nature of the standards which our Court has in
prior case law upheld as sufficient for purposes of compliance with the requirements for validity of subordinate or administrative rule-
making:

This Court has considered as sufficient standards, "public welfare," (Municipality of Cardona v. Municipality of
Binangonan, 36 Phil. 547 [1917]); "necessary in the interest of law and order," (Rubi v. Provincial Board, 39 Phil. 660
[1919]); "public interest," (People v. Rosenthal, 68 Phil. 328 [1939]); and "justice and equity and substantial merits
of the case," (International Hardwood v. Pangil Federation of Labor, 17 Phil. 602 [1940]). 22 (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, therefore, Cena when it required a considerably higher degree of detail in the statute to be implemented, went against
prevailing doctrine. It seems clear that if the governing or enabling statute is quite detailed and specific to begin with, there would be
very little need (or occasion) for implementing administrative regulations. It is, however, precisely the inability of legislative bodies to
anticipate all (or many) possible detailed situations in respect of any relatively complex subject matter, that makes subordinate,
delegated rule-making by administrative agencies so important and unavoidable. All that may be reasonably; demanded is a showing
that the delegated legislation consisting of administrative regulations are germane to the general purposes projected by the
governing or enabling statute. This is the test that is appropriately applied in respect of Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27,
Series of 1990, and to this test we now turn.

We consider that the enabling statute that should appropriately be examined is the present Civil Service law found in Book V, Title
I, Subtitle A, of Executive Order No. 292 dated 25 July 1987, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987 and not
alone P.D. No. 1146, otherwise known as the "Revised Government Service Insurance Act of 1977." For the matter of extension of
service of retirees who have reached sixty-five (65) years of age is an area that is covered by both statutes and not alone by Section
11 (b) of P.D. 1146. This is crystal clear from examination of many provisions of the present civil service law.

Section 12 of the present Civil Service law set out in the 1987 Administrative Code provides, in relevant part, as follows:

Sec. 12 Powers and Functions. The [Civil Service] Commission shall have the following powers and functions:

xxx xxx xxx

(2) Prescribe, amend and enforce rules and regulations for carrying into effect the provisions of the Civil Service
Law and other pertinent laws;

(3) Promulgate policies, standards and guidelines for the Civil Service and adopt plans and programs to
promote economical, efficient and effective personnel administration in the government;

xxx xxx xxx

(10) Formulate, administer and evaluate programs relative to the development and retention of a qualified and
competent work force in the public service;

xxx xxx xxx

(14) Take appropriate action on all appointments and other personnel matters in the Civil Service including
extension of service beyond retirement age;

xxx xxx xxx

(17) Administer the retirement program for government officials and employees, and accredit government services
and evaluate qualifications for retirement;

xxx xxx xxx

(19) Perform all functions properly belonging to a central personnel agency and such other functions as may be
provided by law. (Emphasis supplied)

It was on the bases of the above quoted provisions of the 1987 Administrative Code that the Civil Service Commission promulgated
its Memorandum Circular No. 27. In doing so, the Commission was acting as "the central personnel agency of the government
empowered to promulgate policies, standards and guidelines for efficient, responsive and effective personnel administration in the
government." 23 It was also discharging its function of "administering the retirement program for government officials and employees"
and of "evaluat[ing] qualifications for retirement."

In addition, the Civil Service Commission is charged by the 1987 Administrative Code with providing leadership and assistance "in
the development and retention of qualified and efficient work force in the Civil Service" (Section 16 [10]) and with the "enforcement
of the constitutional and statutory provisions, relative to retirement and the regulation for the effective implementation of the
retirement of government officials and employees" (Section 16 [14]).

We find it very difficult to suppose that the limitation of permissible extensions of service after an employee has reached sixty-five
(65) years of age has no reasonable relationship or is not germane to the foregoing provisions of the present Civil Service Law. The
physiological and psychological processes associated with ageing in human beings are in fact related to the efficiency and quality of
the service that may be expected from individual persons. The policy considerations which guided the Civil Service Commission in
limiting the maximum extension of service allowable for compulsory retirees, were summarized by Grio-Aquino, J. in her dissenting
opinion in Cena:

Worth pondering also are the points raised by the Civil Service Commission that extending the service of
compulsory retirees for longer than one (1) year would: (1) give a premium to late-comers in the government
service and in effect discriminate against those who enter the service at a younger age; (2) delay the promotion of
the latter and of next-in-rank employees; and (3) prejudice the chances for employment of qualified young civil
service applicants who have already passed the various government examination but must wait for jobs to be
vacated by "extendees" who have long passed the mandatory retirement age but are enjoying extension of their
government service to complete 15 years so they may qualify for old-age pension. 24 (Emphasis supplied).

Cena laid heavy stress on the interest of retirees or would be retirees, something that is, in itself, quite appropriate. At the same time,
however, we are bound to note that there should be countervailing stress on the interests of the employer agency and of other
government employees as a whole. The results flowing from the striking down of the limitation established in Civil Service
Memorandum Circular No. 27 may well be "absurd and inequitable," as suggested by Mme. Justice Grio-Aquino in her dissenting
opinion. An employee who has rendered only three (3) years of government service at age sixty-five (65) can have his service
extended for twelve (12) years and finally retire at the age of seventy-seven (77). This reduces the significance of the general
principle of compulsory retirement at age sixty-five (65) very close to the vanishing point.

The very real difficulties posed by the Cena doctrine for rational personnel administration and management in the Civil Service, are
aggravated when Cena is considered together with the case of Toledo v. Civil Service Commission. 25 Toledo involved the provisions of
Rule III, Section 22, of the Civil Service Rules on Personnel Action and Policies (CSRPAP) which prohibited the appointment of persons
fifty-seven (57) years old or above in government service without prior approval of the Civil Service Commission. Civil Service
Memorandum Circular No. 5, Series of 1983 provided that a person fifty-seven (57) years of age may be appointed to the Civil Service
provided that the exigencies of the government service so required and provided that the appointee possesses special qualifications
not possessed by other officers or employees in the Civil Service and that the vacancy cannot be filled by promotion of qualified
officers or employees of the Civil Service. Petitioner Toledo was appointed Manager of the Education and Information Division of the
Commission on Elections when he was almost fifty-nine (59) years old. No authority for such appointment had been obtained either
from the President of the Philippines or from the Civil Service Commission and the Commission found that the other conditions laid
down in Section 22 of Rule III, CSRPAP, did not exist. The Court nevertheless struck down Section 22, Rule III on the same exceedingly
restrictive view of permissible administrative legislation that Cena relied on. 26

When one combines the doctrine of Toledo with the ruling in Cena, very strange results follow. Under these combined doctrines, a
person sixty-four (64) years of age may be appointed to the government service and one (1) year later may demand extension of his
service for the next fourteen (14) years; he would retire at age seventy-nine (79). The net effect is thus that the general statutory
policy of compulsory retirement at sixty-five (65) years is heavily eroded and effectively becomes unenforceable. That general
statutory policy may be seen to embody the notion that there should be a certain minimum turn-over in the government service and
that opportunities for government service should be distributed as broadly as possible, specially to younger people, considering that
the bulk of our population is below thirty (30) years of age. That same general policy also reflects the life expectancy of our people
which is still significantly lower than the life expectancy of, e.g., people in Northern and Western Europe, North America and Japan.

Our conclusion is that the doctrine of Cena should be and is hereby modified to this extent: that Civil Service Memorandum Circular
No. 27, Series of 1990, more specifically paragraph (1) thereof, is hereby declared valid and effective. Section 11 (b) of P.D. No. 1146
must, accordingly, be read together with Memorandum Circular No. 27. We reiterate, however, the holding in Cena that the head of
the government agency concerned is vested with discretionary authority to allow or disallow extension of the service of an official or
employee who has reached sixty-five (65) years of age without completing fifteen (15) years of government service; this discretion is,
nevertheless, to be exercised conformably with the provisions of Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of 1990.

We do not believe it necessary to deal specifically with Memorandum Circular No. 65 of the Office of the President dated 14 June
1988. It will be noted from the text quoted supra (pp. 11-12) that the text itself of Memorandum Circular No. 65 (and for that matter,
that of Memorandum Circular No. 163, also of the Office of the President, dated 5 March 1968) 27 does not purport to apply only to
officers or employees who have reached the age of sixty-five (65) years and who have at least fifteen (l5) years of government
service. We noted earlier that Cena interpreted Memorandum Circular No. 65 as referring only to officers and employees who have
both reached the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five (65) and completed the fifteen (15) years of government service. Cena so
interpreted this Memorandum Circular precisely because Cena had reached the conclusion that employees who have reached sixty-
five (65) years of age, but who have less than fifteen (15) years of government service, may be allowed such extension of service as
may be needed to complete fifteen (15) years of service. In other words, Cena read Memorandum Circular No. 65 in such a way as to
comfort with Cena's own conclusion reached without regard to that Memorandum Circular. In view of the conclusion that we today
reached in the instant case, this last ruling of Cena is properly regarded as merely orbiter.

We also do not believe it necessary to determine whether Civil Service Memorandum Circular No. 27 is fully compatible with Office of
the President's Memorandum Circular No. 65; this question must be reserved for detailed analysis in some future justiciable case.
Applying now the results of our reexamination of Cena to the instant case, we believe and so hold that Civil Service Resolution No. 92-
594 dated 28 April 1992 dismissing the appeal of petitioner Rabor and affirming the action of CSRO-XI Director Cawad dated 26 July
1991, must be upheld and affirmed.

ACCORDINGLY, for all the foregoing, the Petition for Certiorari is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 92284 July 12, 1991

TEODORO J. SANTIAGO, petitioner,

vs.
THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT, and the GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM, respondents.

The basic issue presented in this case is the correct interpretation of Executive Order No. 966, Section 9, providing as follows:

Sec. 9. Highest Basic Salary Rate. The compensation of salary or pay which may be used in computing the
retirement benefits shall be limited to the highest salary rate actually received by an official/employee as fixed by
law and/or indicated in his duly approved appointment. This shall include salary adjustments duly authorized and
implemented by the presidential issuance(s) and budget circular(s), additional basic compensation or salary
indicated in an appointment duly approved as an exception to the prohibition on additional or double compensation,
merit increases, and compensation for substitutionary services or in an acting capacity. For this purpose, all other
compensation and/or fringe benefits such as per diems, allowances, bonuses, overtime pay, honoraria hazard pay,
flying time fees, consultancy or contractual fees, or fees in correcting and/or releasing examination papers shall not
be considered in the computation of the retirement benefits of an official/employee.

The question was raised by the petitioner in connection with the computation of his retirement benefits which he claims was not
made in conformity to the above-quoted requirement.

The petitioner was employed in the Commission on Audit as State Auditor IV with a monthly salary of P7,219.00. In 1988, he was
assigned to the COA Auditing Unit at the Department of Transportation and Communications and detailed to the Manila International
Airport Authority. On July 1, 1988, the board of directors of the MIAA passed the following resolution: 1

RESOLUTION NO. 88-70

RESOLVED, that, as recommended by Management, the designation of Mr. Teodoro J. Santiago, Jr., as Assistant
General Manager for Finance and Administration, effective 15 August 1988, be approved, as it is hereby approved,
subject to the following conditions:

1. He will retain his plantilla position in COA;

2. His compensation from MIAA, shall be the difference between the salary of AGM for Finance and Administration
(MIAA) and that of State Auditor IV (COA); and

3. His retirement benefits shall be chargeable against COA.

This resolution was duly communicated to the COA on July 11, 1988, with a request for the petitioner's indefinite detail to the MIAA. In
reply, Chairman Eufemio C. Domingo wrote MIAA on July 14, 1988, as follows: 2

. . . please be informed that we are authorizing such detail through appropriate office order up to February 15,
1989. The order includes authority to collect representation and transportation allowances (RATA) of P1,200.00 each
month and other allowances attendant to the position chargeable against the funds of the NAIAA.

As regards your proposal that Mr. Santiago be allowed to collect the difference in salary of his position in the COA as
State Auditor IV and his designated position as Assistant General Manager thereat, likewise chargeable against the
funds of that office, this Commission interposes no objection to the proposal to pay him the difference between his
present monthly salary of P7,219.00 and that of Assistant General Manager which reportedly amounts to
P13,068.00 a month or a monthly difference of P5,849.00, provided that he is formally designated (not appointed)
Assistant General Manager by the Board of Directors, NAIAA, and that payment of his salary differential is approved
by the same office.
 xxx xxx xxx

On August 10, 1988, Secretary Reinerio O. Reyes, concurrently chairman of the MIAA board of directors, issued an office order
formally designating the petitioner as Acting Assistant General Manager for Finance and Administration, effective August 16, 1988. 3

The petitioner served in this capacity and collected the differential salary of P5,849.00 plus his salary of P7,219.00 for a total
compensation of P13,068.00. He received this compensation until December 5, 1988, when he was transferred to the Presidential
Management Staff under COA Office Order No. 8811448 dated December 6, 1988.

On March 1, 1989, the petitioner retired after working in the government for 44 years.

In computing his retirement benefits, the Government Service Insurance System used as basis the amount of P13,068.00, considering
this the highest basic salary rate received by the petitioner in the course of his employment. 4 The COA disagreed, however, and paid
his retirement benefits on the basis of only his monthly salary of P7,219.00 as State Auditor IV. 5

The petitioner requested recomputation based on what he claimed as his highest basic salary rate of P13,068.00. This was denied on
December 8, 1989, and he was so notified on February 5, 1990. On March 7, 1990, he came to this Court to seek reversal of the
decision of the COA on the ground of grave abuse of discretion.

We note at the outset that there is no dispute regarding the legality of the petitioner's occupying the second position in the MIAA and
receiving additional compensation for his services therein. As the Solicitor General observed. "What the petitioner was receiving from
the MIAA was the additional compensation allowed under Section 17 of Act No. 4187 which, in turn, is allowed under Section 8,
Paragraph B, Article IX of the Constitution." 6

In Quimzon v. Ozaeta, 7 this Court held that double appointments are not prohibited as long as the positions involved are not
incompatible, except that the officer or employee appointed cannot receive additional or double compensation unless specifically
authorized by law. The additional compensation received by the petitioner is not an issue in the case at bar because of its express
approval by the COA and the admission of the Solicitor General that it is allowed under the cited provision.

More specifically, Section 17 of Act No. 4187 provides:

Any existing act, rule or order to the contrary notwithstanding, no full time officer or employee of the government
shall hereafter receive directly or indirectly any kind of additional or extra compensation or salary including per
diems and bonuses from any fund of the government, its dependencies, and semi-government entities or boards
created by law except:

(1) Officers serving as chairman or members of entities and enterprise organized, operated,
owned or controlled by the government, who may be paid per them for each meeting actually
attended or when an official travel;

(2) Auditors and accountants;

(3) Provincial and municipal treasurers and their employees;

(4) Employees serving as observers of the Weather Bureau; and

(5) Those authorized to receive extra or additional compensation by virtue of the provision of this
Act. (Emphasis supplied)

The Solicitor General argues, albeit not too strongly, that the additional compensation received by the petitioner was merely an
honorarium and not a salary. As a mere honorarium, it would not fall under the provision of Section 9 and so should not be added to
his salary in computing his retirement benefits.

We cannot accept this contention. An honorarium is defined as something given not as a matter of obligation but in appreciation for
services rendered, a voluntary donation in consideration of services which admit of no compensation in money. 8 The additional
compensation given to the petitioner was in the nature of a salary because it was receive by him as a matter of right in recompense
for services rendered by him as Acting Assistant General Manager for Finance and Administration. In fact, even Chairman Domingo
referred to it in his letter dated July 14, 1988, as the petitioner's "salary differential."

The Solicitor General's main argument is that the petitioner cannot invoke Section 9 because he was not appointed to the second
position in the MIAA but only designated thereto. It is stressed that under the said provision, "the compensation of salary or pay which
may be used in computing the retirement benefits shall be received by an official employee as fixed by law and/or indicated in his
duly approved appointment." The petitioner's additional salary was fixed not in a duly approved appointment but only in a
designation.

Belittling this argument, the petitioner maintains that there is no substantial distinction between appointment and designation. He
cites Mechem, who defines appointment as "the act of designation by the executive officer, board or body, to whom that power has
been delegated, of the individual, who is to exercise the functions of a given office." 9 He also invokes Borromeo v. Mariano, 10 where
this Court said that "the term "appoint," whether regarded in its legal or in its ordinary acceptation, is applied to the nomination or
designation of an individual."

Strictly speaking, there is an accepted legal distinction between appointment and designation. While appointment is the selection by
the proper authority of an individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office, designation, on the other hand, connotes
merely the imposition of additional duties, usually by law, upon a person already in the public service by virtue of an earlier
appointment (or election). 11 Thus, the appointed Secretary of Trade and Industry is, by statutory designation, a member of the
National Economic and Development Authority. 12 A person may also be designated in an acting capacity, as when he is called upon
to fill a vacancy pending the selection of a permanent appointee thereto or, more usually, the return of the regular incumbent. In the
absence of the permanent Secretary for example, an undersecretary is designated acting head of the department. 13

14
As the Court said in Binamira v. Garrucho:

Appointment may be defined as the selection, by the authority vested with the power, of an individual who is to
exercise the functions of a given office. When completed, usually with its confirmation, the appointment results in
security of tenure for the person chosen unless he is replaceable at pleasure because of the nature of his office.
Designation, on the other hand, connotes merely the imposition by law of additional duties on an incumbent official,
as where, in the case before us, the Secretary of Tourism is designated Chairman of the Board of Directors of the
Philippine Tourism Authority, or where, under the Constitution, three Justices of the Supreme Court are designated
by the Chief Justice to sit in the Electoral Tribunal of the Senate or the House of Representatives. It is said that
appointment is essentially executive while designation is legislative in nature.

Nevertheless, we agree with the petitioner that in the law in question, the term "appointment" was used in a general sense to include
the term "designation." In other words, no distinction was intended between the two terms in Section 9 of Executive Order No. 966.
We think this to be the more reasonable interpretation, especially considering that the provision includes in the highest salary rate
"compensation for substitutionary services or in an acting capacity." This need not always be conferred by a permanent appointment.
A contrary reading would, in our view, militate against the letter of the law, not to mention its spirit as we perceive it. That spirit
seeks to extend the maximum benefits to the retiree as an additional if belated recognition of his many years of loyal and efficient
service in the government.

As thus interpreted, Section 9 clearly covers the petitioner, who was designated Acting Assistant General Manager for Finance and
Administration in the office order issued by Secretary Reyes on August 10, 1988. The position was then vacant and could be filled
either by permanent appointment or by temporary designation. It cannot be said that the second position was only an extension of
the petitioner's office as State Auditor IV in the Commission on Audit as otherwise there would have been no need for his designation
thereto. The second office was distinct and separate from his position in the Commission on Audit. For the additional services he
rendered for the MIAA, he was entitled to additional compensation which, following the letter and spirit of Section 9, should be
included in his highest basic salary rate.

It is noteworthy that the petitioner occupied the second office not only for a few days or weeks but for more than three months. His
designation as Acting Assistant General Manager for Finance and Administration was not a mere accommodation by the MIAA. On the
contrary, in his letter to Chairman Domingo requesting the petitioner's services. MIAA General Manager Evergisto C. Macatulad said,
"Considering his qualifications and work experience, we believe that a finance man of his stature and caliber can be of great help in
the efficient and effective performance of the Airport's functions."

Retirement laws should be interpreted liberally in favor of the retiree because their intention is to provide for his sustenance, and
hopefully even comfort, when he no longer has the stamina to continue earning his livelihood. After devoting the best years of his life
to the public service, he deserves the appreciation of a grateful government as best concretely expressed in a generous retirement
gratuity commensurate with the value and length of his services. That generosity is the least he should expect now that his work is
done and his youth is gone. Even as he feels the weariness in his bones and glimpses the approach of the lengthening shadows, he
should be able to luxuriate in the thought that he did his task well, and was rewarded for it.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The challenged resolution is SET ASIDE and judgment is hereby rendered DIRECTING the
computation of the petitioner's retirement benefits on the basis of his Highest Basic Salary Rate of P13,068.00, It is so ordered.