CHANAKYA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY

A PROJECT OF
CONTRACT-I
ON
COERCION IN INDIA & DURESS IN ENGLAND

SUBMITTED TO: SUBMITTED BY:

Mrs Sushmita Singh Shreya Sinha
Faculty of Contracts 1 Roll No. - 1648
Semester 1st
B.BA LL.B
Session 2016-2021
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 DECLARATION BY THE CANDIDATE

I hereby declare that the work reported in the BB.A. LL.B (Hons.) Project Report entitled
COERCION IN INDIA AND DURESS IN ENGLAND submitted at Chanakya National
Law University, Patna is an authentic record of my work carried out under the supervision
of Mrs. Sushmita Singh. I have not submitted this work elsewhere for any other degree or
diploma. I am fully responsible for the contents of my Project Report.

(Signature of the Candidate)

SHREYA SINHA
Chanakya National Law University, Patna
20/04/2017

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 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

IF YOU WANT TO WALK FAST GO ALONE

IF YOU WANT TO WALK FAR GO TOGETHER

A project is a joint endeavor which is to be accomplished with utmost compassion, diligence

and with support of all. Gratitude is a noble response of ones soul to kindness or help
generously rendered by another and its acknowledgement is the duty and joyance. I am
overwhelmed in all humbleness and gratefulness to acknowledge from the bottom of my
heart to all those who have helped me to put these ideas, well above the level of simplicity
and into something concrete effectively and moreover on time.
This project would not have been completed without combined effort of my revered
Contract-I teacher Mrs SUSHMITA SINGH whose support and guidance was the driving
force to successfully complete this project. I express my heartfelt gratitude to her. Thanks are
also due to my parents, family, siblings, my dear friends and all those who helped me in this
project in any way. Last but not the least; I would like to express my sincere gratitude to our
Contract-I teacher for providing us with such a golden opportunity to showcase our talents.
Also this project was instrumental in making me know more about the term wrongful act and
how it is a major constituent of a tort claim. This project played an important role in making
me understand more about the difference between coercion in India and Duress in England. It
was truly an endeavour which enabled me to embark on a journey which redefined my
intelligentsia, induced my mind to discover the intricacies involved in laws related to
coercion and duress.

Moreover, thanks to all those who helped me in any way be it words, presence,
Encouragement or blessings...

- Shreya Sinha
- 1st Semester
- B.BA LL.B

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 CONTENTS
Acknowledgement..3

Table of Contents...4

List of Cases...5

Research Questions...6

Aims and Objectives..6

Hypothesis..6

Research Methodology..6

Limitations.7

Review of Literature...7-8

1. Introduction...9-10

2. Coercion..11-15

3. Duress.16-21

4. Comparison between Coercion and Duress22-23

5. Law Commission Recommendations with respect to coercion..24-25

6. Conclusion26

Bibliography27

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 LIST OF CASES

1. Ranganayakamma v. Alwar Setti

2. Chikkan Ammiraju v. Chikkam Seshama

3. Bansraj Das v. Secretary of State

4. Krishan Lal Kalra v. N.D.M.C

5. Karuppayee Ammal V. Karuppiah Pillai

6. Kesarmal v. Valliappa Chettiar

7. Cumming v. Ince

8. North Ocean Shipping Co Ltd. V. Hyundai Construction Co Ltd.

9. Pao On v. Lau Yiu

10. Lynch v. DPP, Northern Ireland

11. Universe Tankships of Monrovia v. ITWF

12. Dai-Ichi Karkaria Pvt. Ltd. V. ONGC

13. Barton v Armstrong

14. Antonio v Antonio

15. Morgan v. Palmer

16. Skeate v. Beale

17. B. & S. Contracts and Design Ltd. V. Victor Green Publications Ltd.

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 RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. What is coercion?
2. What is duress?
3. What are the similarities between coercion and duress?
4. What are the differences between coercion and duress?
5. Comparative analysis of coercion under Indian law and duress under English law.

AIMS AND OBJECTIVES

Aims and Objectives of this project are:
1. To study about coercion in India.
2. To study about duress in England.
3. To study the similarities and differences between coercion and duress.

HYPOTHESIS
The definition of coercion under Indian law covers a wider area as compared to that of duress
under English law. Under English law, duress consist actual or threatened violence, or
imprisonment of the contracting party, or anybody directly or closely associated to the
contracting party by the other party to the contract or anyone acting with his knowledge and
for his advantage. Whereas, in India, it includes the unlawful detention of person and
property by any person; directed against, not necessarily the contracting party only. It may be
directed against any person, even if he is a stranger to the party. Threat to person as a
vitiating factor has been termed as duress in England and threat to person and threat to
property has been collectively termed as coercion in India which is a major problem in
dealing with when covering Duress and Coercion apart from the other problem in hand that
Coercion covers a wider area by significantly pointing out the minute intricacies like the
capacity of a stranger to sue / to be sued in a contract.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

The researcher has used the doctrinal method of research in the completion of this project on
Analysis of the term Wrongful Act as a constituent of tort claim. The sources are
mentioned in the review of literature.

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 LIMITATIONS
The presented research is confined to a time limit of one month and this research contains
only doctrinal works which are limited to library sources.

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 INTRODUCTION
According to section 10 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, free consent is an essential
requirement of a contract. Section 14 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 defines free consent.
According to section 14, of the Indian Contract Act, Consent is said to be free when it is not
caused by:
1. Coercion (Section 15) Consent is said to be caused by coercion when it is obtained
by pressure exerted by either committing or threatening to commit an act forbidden by
the Indian Penal Code or unlawfully detaining or threatening to detain any property.
2. Undue influence (Section16) A contract is said to be induced by undue influence
where the relation subsisting between the parties are such that one of the parties is in a
position to dominate the will of the other and uses that position to obtain an unfair
advantage over the other.
3. Fraud (Section17) Means and includes the following acts done with the intention to
deceive or to induce a person to enter into a contract. (a) the suggestion that a fact is
true when it is not true and the person making the suggestion does not believe it to be
true (b) active concealment of a fact by a person who has knowledge or belief of the
fact, (c) promise made without the intention of performing it.
4. Misrepresentation (Section 18) When a person positively asserts that a fact is true
when his information does not warrant it to be so, though he believes it to be true, it is
misrepresentation. A breach of duty which brings an advantage to the person
committing it by misleading the other to his prejudice is also a misrepresentation.
5. Mistake (Section 20, 21, 22) Where both parties to an agreement are under a
mistake as to a matter of fact essential to the agreement, the agreement is void. An
erroneous opinion as the value of the thing, which forms the subject matter of the
agreement, is not deemed as mistake as to a matter of fact. Unilateral mistake, i.e. the
mistake in the mind of only one party does not affect the validity of the contract.

The above five are the vitiating factors to free consent. If the contract made by any of the
above four reason, the contract is voidable at the option of the aggrieved party. If the
agreement induced by mutual mistake, the agreement would stand void or cancelled. An
agreement can be treated as a valid contract only when the consent of the parties are free and
not under any undue influence, fear, pressure etc. The consent of the parties must be genuine
and free.

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Where consent to an agreement is caused by coercion, undue influence, fraud, or,
misrepresentation the contract is said to be voidable at the option of the party whose consent
was so caused. And, where consent is caused by mistake, the agreement is void and a void
agreement is not enforceable at the option of either party.
Coercion
According to the Section 15, of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, Coercion is the committing,
or, threatening to commit any act forbidden by the Indian Penal Code (XLV of 1860), or the
unlawful detaining, or threatening to detain, any property, to the prejudice of any person
whatever, with the intention of causing any person to enter into an agreement.
Explanation: It is immaterial whether the Indian Penal Code (XLV of 1860), is or is not in
force in the place where coercion is employed.
Coercion is said to be there where the consent of a person has been caused either by:
(i) Committing, or threatening to commit any act forbidden by the Indian Penal Code,
or by
(ii) Unlawful detaining or threatening to detain any property.

Such an act should be to the prejudice of any person whatever.

Duress
Under Common law duress consists in actual violence or threat of violence to a person. It
only includes fear of loss to life or bodily harm including imprisonment, but not a threat of
damage to goods. The threat must be to do something illegal, i.e. to commit a tort or a crime.
There is nothing wrong in threat to prosecute a person for an offence, or to sue him for a tort
committed by him, although threatening illegal detention would be duress. Moreover, duress
must be directed against a party to the contract, or his wife, child, parent or other near
relative, and also caused by a party to the contract, or within his knowledge. It has been noted
that the Common Law recognizes only a threat to mans person and not to his goods to
constitute duress.

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 COERCION
Coercion is the practice of compelling a person or manipulating them to behave in an
involuntary way (whether through action or inaction) by use of threats, intimidation or some
other form of pressure or force. Coercion may involve the actual infliction of physical or
psychological harm in order to enhance the credibility of a threat. The threat of further harm
may then lead to the cooperation or obedience of the person being coerced. The term is often
associated with circumstances which involve the unethical use of threats or harm to achieve
some objective. Coercion may also refer to more subtle means of influence such as sweet
talking, begging, charming, and seduction. Coercion invalidating a contract need not proceed
from a party to the contract, or be immediately directed against a person whom it is intended
to cause to enter into the contract. The act or the threat to commit the act should have caused
the party to enter into the contract. The term cause is not a term of art but one of science.
Nothing can be said to be the cause of a particular effect, unless it is the proximate and
immediate cause of that effect. When a particular effect is said to be caused by a particular
factor, it must be clearly and cogently established that the effect is the direct outcome of the
particular cause. Thus, in order for coercion to invalidate a contract, it has to be instrumental
in making the party agree to the contract. Any persons set of feasible choices is obtained
from the combination of two elements: the initial endowment (the perceived initial state of
the world, which the chosen actions are going to affect) and the transformation rules (which
state how any chosen action will change the initial endowment, according to the persons
perception). It follows that coercion could in principle take place by purposely manipulating
either the transformation rules or the initial endowment (or both). In practice, however, the
detailed choice reaction of a victim to a change in initial endowment is generally
unpredictable. Hence effective coercion can only be carried out through manipulation of the
transformation rules. This is done by the credible threat of some injury, conditional on the
victims choice. Often, it involves the actual inflicting of injury in order to make the threat
credible, but it is the threat of (further) injury which brings about the change in
transformation rules. Coercion does not remove entirely the victims ability to choose, nor
does it necessarily affect his or her ranking of potential alternatives. As Roman jurists used to
say, Coactus volui, tamen volui (I willed under coercion, but still I willed). In the
terminology of rational choice theory, coercion does not remove a persons objective
function, but only affects the constraints under which such function is maximised. Yet, the
purpose of coercion is to substitute ones aims to those of the victim. For this reason, many

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social philosophers have considered coercion as the polar opposite to freedom. Various forms
of coercion are distinguished: first on the basis of the kind of injury threatened, second
according to its aims and scope, and finally according to its effects, from which its legal,
social, and ethical implications mostly depend.
Coercion is said to be there where the consent of a person has been caused either by:
(i) Committing, or threatening to commit any act forbidden by the Indian Penal Code, or
by
(ii) Unlawful detaining or threatening to detain any property.
Such an act should be to the prejudice of any person whatever.

(i) Act forbidden by the Indian Penal Code

It has been noted that if a person commits or threatens to commit an act forbidden by the
Indian Penal Code with a view to obtaining the consent of the other person to an agreement,
the consent in such a case is deemed to have been obtained by coercion. For instance, A
threatens to shoot B if he does not agree to sell his property to A at the stated price, Bs
consent in this case has been obtained by coercion.
For coercion, it is not necessary that the Indian Penal Code should be applicable at the place
where the consent has been so caused. Explanation to section 15 makes it clear that to
constitute coercion, it is immaterial whether the Indian Penal Code is or is not in force in the
place where coercion is employed. The following illustration explains this point:
A, on board an English ship on the high seas, causes B to enter into an agreement by the act
amounting to criminal intimidation under the Indian Penal Code. A afterwards sues B for the
breach of contract at Calcutta. A has employed coercion, although his act is not an offence by
the law of England, and although Section 506 of the Indian Penal Code was not in force at the
time when, or at the place where the act was done.
In the case of Ranganayakamma v. Alwar Setti1, a 13 year old Hindu widow consented to
adopt a boy, when the relatives of the adopted boy obstructed the removal of her husband
until she gave her consent to the adoption. The court held that this constituted an offense
under Section 297 of the Indian Penal Code which enacts that whosoever with the intention
of wounding the feelings of any person, or with the knowledge that the feelings of a person
are likely to be wounded, offers an indignity to any human corpse, or causes disturbance of

1
I.L.R. (1889) 13 Mad. 214.

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any person assembled for the performance of funeral ceremonies, is liable to imprisonment of
fine or both. Thus, it was held that the consent was obtained by coercion within the meaning
of Section 15 of the Indian Contract Act. Mere threat of bringing a criminal charge does not
amount to coercion, as it is not forbidden by the Indian Penal Code. But threat of bringing a
false charge with the object of making another enter into a contract is coercion.
In the case of Chikkan Ammiraju v. Chikkam Seshama2 the question arose whether if a
person held out a threat of committing suicide to his wife and son if they refused to execute a
release in his favor, and the wife and son in consequences of that threat executed the release,
the release could be said to have obtained by coercion within the meaning of this section.
Wallis, C.J., and Seshagiri Aiyar, J., answered the question in the affirmative, holding in
effect that though a threat to commit suicide was not punishable under the Indian Penal Code,
it must be deemed to be forbidden, as an attempt to commit suicide was punishable under the
Code (S. 309). Oldfield, J., answered the question in the negative on the ground that the
present section should be construed strictly, and that an act was not punishable under the
Penal Code could not be said to be forbidden by that Code3. That view seemed to be correct.
The penal code forbids only what it declares punishable. A demand by workers under the
Industrial Dispute Act backed by a threat of Strike being not illegal, the threat of strike would
not amount to coercion.4
Under the language of the section as it stands, a threat to commit an offence under any law
other than the Indian Penal Code 1860, may not amount to coercion. Recognizing this, the
Law Commission of India had recommended a wider expression to include penal laws other
than the Indian Penal Code, 1860 in its thirteenth report.
Need for amendment of Section 15
It may be noted that committing or threatening to commit any act forbidden by IPC
constitutes coercion. Acts forbidden by other penal laws are not included in this definition.
The law commission of India in its report on the Indian Contract Act has recommended 5
amendment of section 15 and inclusion in the definition other penal laws also.

2
I.L.R. (1918) 41 Mad. 33.
3
(1890) ILR 13 Mad 2142 Amiraju v. Seshama, (1917) 41 Mad 33
4
Workmen of Appin Tea Estate v. Presiding officer, Industrial Officer, Assam, AIR 1966 Gau 115: (1967) II LLJ
371.
5 th
13 Report (1958), p. 21

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 (ii) Unlawful detaining of property

Consent can also be said to be caused by coercion, if it is caused as a result of unlawful

detaining of property or a threat to do so. In the case of Bansraj Das v. Secretary of State6,
for the purpose of realising a fine due from a son, the government attached the property
belonging to both him and his father. The payment made by the father in order to save the
property from being sold was held to have been made under coercion. A refusal on the part of
mortgagee to convey the equity of redemption except on certain terms is not an unlawful
detaining or threatening to detain any property within the meaning of this section. However,
refusal by the outgoing agent, whose term expired, to hand over the account books to the new
incoming agent until, the principal gave him a complete release would amount to coercion.5
In another illustrative case, where an agent, whose services were terminated, detained
accounts to obtain his release, the court held that the release was said to have been induced by
coercion7. If the detention of property is not lawful, there is no coercion. Thus, if a mortgagee
refuses to convey the equity of redemption except on the terms dictated by him, there is
nothing unlawful in it and therefore, no coercion is caused in this case.8

Prejudice of a person
The term prejudice used in this section does not imply merely the emotion of prejudice.
Some form of legal injury must follow in order that a person is said to be prejudiced. When
the threat to commit suicide by a husband caused a wife to release the property, the court held
that the wife was prejudiced.9 Section 15 requires that there should be committing or
threatening to commit, any act forbidden by Indian Penal Code, or the unlawful detaining, or
threatening to detain, any property, to the prejudice of any person whatever, with the
intention of causing any person into an agreement.
It means that the act of coercion should not necessarily be directed against the contracting
party, it is enough that the act is to the prejudice of any person whatever, and with the
intention of causing any person to enter into an agreement. If, for example, A unlawfully
detains Bs son, C, in order to coerce B to enter into the agreement, the case would be

6
Bansraj Das v. Secretary of State AIR 1939 All 373
7
Muthiah Chettiar v. Karupan Cheti, I.L.R. (1927) Mad. 786 : A.I.R. 1927 Mad. 852 : 105 I.C.5.
8
Bengal Stone Co. Ltd. v. Joseph Hyam, (1918) Cal. L.J. 78.
9
Amiraju v. Seshama, (1917) 41 Mad 33

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covered within the section. Apart from that, it is also not necessary that the wrongful act
causing coercion should proceed from the party to the contract. Thus, if in order to coerce a
widow to adopt a child, the relatives of the adopted boy do not allow the dead body of the
widows husband to be taken out of the home until the adoption is made, this is coercion.10
If a person is dispossessed of his property under illegal threat that unless he parts with the
possession, he would be detained under MISA (Maintenance of Internal Security Act),
parting with the property under such threat amounts to coercion under section 15 of the
Indian Contract Act, 1872.
In the case of Krishan Lal Kalra v. N.D.M.C11 the plaintiff was given license by N.D.M.C
(New Delhi Municipal Corporation) to run an open air restaurant in the Connaught Circus,
New Delhi. The lease was to expire on 31st May, 1978. The plaintiff, who started running the
Restaurant under the name and style Rumble Open Air Restaurant, was allegedly thrown
out of the premises after taking forcible possession thereof without due process of law by the
defendant, who sent demolition squad with police force on 7th August, 1976. There was also a
threat that the plaintiff would be detained under MISA, if he did not handover the possession
of the property.
The plaintiff alleged that there was coercion and he filed the present suit claiming damages of
Rs. 10 lacs.
It was held that a person is not bound by any act done under duress or coercion. In this case
the threat that the plaintiff would be detained under MISA amounted to coercion. The
plaintiffs suit was decreed for a sum of Rs. 9,11,525.12 with cost as well as interest @ 12%
w.e.f. 7th August, 1979 , i.e., the date of filing the suit till the date of payment of the decreed
amount.

10
Ranganayakamma v. Alwar Setti, I.L.R. (1889) 13 Mad. 214; Chuni Lal v. Maula Baksh, 161 I.C. 347.
11
A.I.R 2011 Delhi 402.

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 Duress
The following comparison has been attempted by the madras high court.
Karuppayee Ammal V. Karuppiah Pillai12
What the Indian law calls, coercion is called in English law duress or menace. Duress is
said to consist in actual or threatened violence or imprisonment of the contracting party or his
wife, parent or child, by the other party or by anyone in s.15 is much wider and includes the
unlawful detention of property also. Further, coercion may be committed by any person, not
necessarily a party, or his party, or his parent, wife or child. It may be directed against any
person, even immediate violence and also unnerve a person of ordinary firmness of mind,
these requests are not necessary in Indian law.
Under the English law, actual or threatened violence to the victims person has long been
recognized to amount to duress,13 but duress may consist of actual or threatened
imprisonment,14 and now also includes wrongful threats to property or threat to seize goods,15
and wrongful or illegitimate threats to economic interests, where the victim has no alternative
but to submit.16 The effect of duress is not to make the act of the victim non-voluntarily, nor
does it deprive him with a choice between evils.17 The classic case of duress is, not the lack
of will to submit but the victims intentional submission arising from the realization that
there is no practical choice open to him.18
There has developed tremendous jurisprudence around the concept of duress, especially
economic duress. Devising a test for this concept involves a delicate balancing act for, in a
sense, all contracts are made under pressure- each party threatens the other that unless his
terms are accepted, the other party will not get the reciprocal benefits under the contract. The
test in English law has been to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate pressures, and
only the latter is said to amount to duress. Threats to commit an otherwise lawful act are
ordinary not duress. Thus, a threat to breach the contracts in order to reach an agreement as to
its variation has been generally regarded as a legitimate commercial pressure, especially
where this is the result of an unanticipated difficulty or based on a bona fide and reasonable

12
(1987)1 Mad Lj 138
13
Kesarmal v. Valliappa Chettiar, [1954] 1 WLR 380 (PC).
14
Cumming v. Ince, [1847] 11 QB 112 (woman forcibly taken to lunatic asylum); but see Biffin v. Bignell, (1862)
7 H & N 877 (distinction between a threat and a mere warning).
15
North Ocean Shipping Co Ltd. V. Hyundai Construction Co Ltd., [1978] 3 All ER 1170.
16
Pao On v. Lau Yiu, [1979] 3 All ER 65.
17
Lynch v. DPP, Northern Ireland, [1975] AC 653,690.
18
Universe Tankships of Monrovia v. ITWF, [1983] 1 AC 366, 400 : [1982] 2 All ER 67 (HL)

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belief that unless the demand is met, the party would unable to perform. If however the threat
is immoral or unconscionable, this might be held to constitute duress.
Thus, an unlawful threat by a trade union to continue the boycott of a ship;19 a threat to
break an existing contract coupled with unreasonable and overwhelming commercial
pressure; refusal to rescue a vessel in distress or those on board save on extortionate terms;
have all been held to be cases involving duress.
The doctrine of economic duress has also been accepted by the Bombay High Court to be part
of Indian law.20 However to the extent this decision is seen as an authority importing the
doctrine of duress in Indian Law; its correctness is not free from doubt.

Evolution of Doctrine of Duress

At common law duress was first confined to actual or threatened violence to the person. For
the next seven centuries the common law required a wrongful or an unlawful act before it
could provide redress for duress, but the presence of fear in the victim would be relatively
less important.
Common law duress of the person was often assimilated to crime or tort; indeed these
categories often overlapped, and for that reason perhaps it failed to develop much beyond the
narrow scope of threatened personal violence. Victims of more subtle forms of pressure had
to seek equitable redress in Chancery which acted generally to protect mentally and
physically handicapped persons who had been impoverished by the exercise of undue
influence. Equity was concerned with promises which had been extracted by the unethical or
immoral use of a superior bargaining position, such as was found in confidential or fiduciary
relationships, which inhibited the victims free exercise of his will. The inequity in the
equitable doctrine of pressure was that the victim had been compelled to do what he did not
want to do.
Historically, there was one exception to the common law rule that duress would create a
voidable contract when it was induced by threatened personal violence, that is, duress of
goods. This single, early incursion into the area of economic duress began in the eighteenth
century in simple cases of wrongful seizure or detention of personal property. There were no
parallel developments in England. Instead, English courts devoted their energies to the
development of an illogical distinction between payments of money at the time of the duress

19
Universe Tankships of Monrovia v. ITWF, [1983] 1 AC 366, 400 : [1982] 2 All ER 67 (HL)
20
Dai-Ichi Karkaria Pvt. Ltd. V. ONGC, AIR 1992 Bom 309 (buyer threatened non-performance to make
seller agree to renegotiated terms)

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and a promise to pay money in the future. In the former case the victim was given restitution
of his money, whereas in the latter case he was ordered to pay the money to his coercer.
In summary, common law distress was a crude, ill-defined and obscure notion, little used and
of little use except in cases of overt threats. Equally, while invoked by the courts more often,
undue influence or pressure have lacked sufficient definition to be effective controls when
economic coercion in the marketplace was at issue.

Elements of Duress
It is a fact that people enter into contracts on a daily basis as a result of pressure of one kind
or another. As Lord Wilberforce and Lord Simon remarked in Barton v Armstrong21, in
life including the life of commerce and finance, many acts are done under pressure so that
one can say that the actor had no choice but to act. Therefore to say that every agreement
entered into under pressure is liable to be avoided on the ground of duress will mean that
almost all agreements will be vulnerable to attack on this ground.
The law has to determine the pressure which is unacceptable and so amount to duress and
pressure which is acceptable and therefore should not constitute duress. This has been done
by laying done two requirements which must be satisfied for relief to be available on the
grounds of duress. There must be pressure which amounts to compulsion of will of the
complainant and the pressure must be one that the law does not regard as legitimate. As Lord
Scarman explained in Universe Tankships Inc of Monrovia v. ITF22, there are two
elements in the wrong of duress (1) pressure amounting to compulsion of will of the victim,
and (2) the illegitimacy of the pressure exerted.
The first element concerns the coercive effect of pressure on the complainant. It inquires
whether the complainants consent was truly given. However, the complainants defective
consent alone is not sufficient to constitute duress. The second element is necessary. The
pressure that impairs the complainants free exercise of judgment must be illegitimate. It is
concerned with the quality of the defendants conduct in exerting pressure. The defendant
must have behaved in a way which makes the pressure affecting the complainants consent to
be regarded as illegitimate.

21
[1976] A.C. 104.
22
[1983] 1 A.C. 366.

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Forms of Duress
Originally, the parameters of the doctrine were very narrow in that an agreement could be
avoided for duress only where the duress was in the form of a threat to the person.
Subsequently, it was accepted that duress of goods can also vitiate consent to an agreement,
and recent developments in respect of economic duress show that the categories of duress
should not be regarded as closed.

Duress of Person
Duress of the person may consist in violence to the person, or threats of violence, or in
imprisonment, whether actual or threatened. The threat of violence need not be directed at the
claimant: a threat of violence against the claimants spouse or near relations and a threat
against the claimants employees have been held to constitute duress. It is suggested that even
a threat against a stranger should be enough if the complainant genuinely that the submission
was the only way to prevent the stranger from being injures or worse.
The complainant only needs to prove that the pressure was the reason why he entered into the
contract and the court will conclude that illegitimate pressure induced the contract unless
there is evidence that the illegitimate pressure in face contributed nothing to the decision to
enter the contract. It is not necessary for the claimant in case of threat to person to
demonstrate that he had no practical alternative but to enter into the challenged contract.
In the case of Antonio v Antonio23 where a wife succumbed to a long campaign of threats of
violence and intimidation by her husband and transferred him half the shares in her company
and enter into a shareholders agreement with him, the court found that the transfer and the
agreement were both induced by duress. The court did not even enquire into whether she had
any practical alternative such as seeking legal remedy.

Duress colore officii

In cases where the illegitimate pressure is in the form of an unlawful demand for payment by
a public official, a distinction is to be drawn between cases where the complainant paid the
money in order to obtain a service from the public official (such as granting of a license or
permit) and cases where the complainant paid the money by way of tax or similar impost. In
the first category, the court readily infers that the claimant had no practical alternative but to
submit to the demand of the public official since, as Littledale J. put in the Morgan v.

23
[2008] EWHC 1199 (QB)

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Palmer24, the complainant could not otherwise obtain the services he required. But in cases
where the payment is by way of tax, there is a practical alternative open to the claimant in the
form of legal proceedings to challenge the legality of the public officials demand for tax.

Duress of goods
It has been noted that the Common Law recognizes only a threat to mans person and not to
his goods to constitute duress. This is different from Indian Law where Section 15 of the
Indian Contract Act recognizes unlawful detention, or a threat to detain property as coercion.
The position under English Law may be explained by referring to the case of Skeate v.
Beale25. In this case, a landlord threatened to sell his tenants goods, having a distress of 19-
10 sh. against the tenant for rent. The landlord withdrew this distress in exchange of the
tenant paying 3-7 sh.-6d. immediately and promising to pay the remaining 16-2 sh.-6d.
from the tenant, the tenant pleaded that this promise had been obtained under duress by
threatening the sale of his property in so far as the distress was wrongful. The tenants plea
was rejected and he was made to pay the amount in accordance with the promise because
threat regarding goods cannot constitute duress.
In India, in case of coercion not only the contract is voidable under section 19, but if some
money has been paid or goods delivered by a party to the contract under coercion, the same is
recoverable under Section 72. The Section reads as under:
A person to whom money has been paid, or anything delivered, by mistake or under
coercion, must repay or return it.
Economic duress
Certain threats or forms of pressure, not associated to the person, nor limited to the seizure or
withholding of goods, may give grounds for relief to a party who enters into a contract as a
result of threat or pressure. In cases of economic duress the main question is whether the
claimant had practical or adequate alternative or not. The alternative must be practical or
reasonable in the sense that it was adequate for the claimants purpose in the circumstances.
In the case of a threat to breach a contract, for example if the circumstances are such that the
claimant can easily obtain the required goods or services from an alternative source at a
reasonable prize then the court is likely to regard this as a reasonable alternative and therefore
may regard this as a strong evidence that the claimants decision to enter into the agreement
was not induced by illegitimate pressure; but it is different where the circumstances are such

24
(1824) 2 B. & C. 729 at 739.
25
(1840) 11 A. & E. 983

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that it would be difficult or impossible to find the substitute for the contracted goods or
services within the time available at a reasonable cost.
In North Ocean Shipping Company Limited v. Hyundai Construction Co. Ltd.26, the
builders building a ship under a contract for the plaintiffs, threatened, without any legal
justification, to terminate the contract unless the plaintiffs agreed to increase the price by
10%. It was held that this amounted to a case of economic duress and that the plaintiff would
be entitled, on that ground, to refuse payment of the additional 10%.
In B. & S. Contracts and Design Ltd. V. Victor Green Publications Ltd.27, the plaintiffs
had contracted to erect an exhibition stand for the defendants at Olympia, but their workmen
went on strike. To get the work done, the defendants agreed to contribute 4500 to pay off
the workmens claims. It was held by the court of appeal that this promise was made under
duress as the defendants had no realistic alternative but the promise to pay, given the serious
threat to their economic interests.

26
(1979) QB 705.
27
(1984) I.C.R. 419.

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 COMPARISON BETWEEN COERCION AND DURESS

Coercion in India means committing or threatening to commit an act forbidden by the Indian
Penal Code. Duress, under Common Law, consists in actual violence or threat of violence, to
a person. It includes doing of an illegal act against a person, whether it be a crime or a tort.
Thus, unlike coercion, duress is not confined to unlawful acts forbidden by any specific penal
law, like the Indian Penal Code in India.
In India, coercion can also be there by detaining or threatening to detain any property. In
other words, in coercion, an act may be directed against a person or his property. In England,
duress is constituted by acts or threats against the person of a man and not against his
property.
In India, coercion may proceed from a person who is not a party to the contract, and it may
also be directed against a person who, again, may be a stranger to the contract. In England,
duress should proceed from a party to the contract and is also directed against the party to the
contract himself, or his wife, parent, child, or other near relative.
Coercion under this Act is much wider than what was duress in English Law. It includes
unlawful detention of property, may be committed by any person not necessarily party to the
contract, and may be committed by any person, even a stranger and unlike duress ,causing of
immediate violence or unnerving a person of ordinary firmness of mind are not necessarily
under the Indian Law.
As per the law and cases studied in India and England the basic difference between
COERCION and DURESS is briefly stated below
a) Coercion in India means committing or threatening to commit an act forbidden by the
Indian Amni Code. Duress, under Common Law, consists in actual violence or threat of
violence, to a person. It includes Going of an illegal act against a person, whether it be a
crime or a tort. Thus, unlike coercion, duress is not confined to unlawful acts forbidden by
any specific penal law, like the Indian Penal Code in India.
b) In India, coercion can also be there by detaining or threatening to detain any property.
In other words, in coercion, an act may be directed against a person or his property. In
England, duress is constituted by acts or threats against the person of a man and not against
his property:
c) In India, coercion may proceed from a person who is not a party to the contract, and it
may also be directed against a person who, again, may be a stranger to the contract. In

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England, duress should proceed from a party to the contract and is also directed against the
party to the contract himself, or his wife, parent, child, or other near relative.
Thus, we conclude the third chapter of our topic by giving the essence of the basic difference
between coercion under Indian Law and Duress under English Law.

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 LAW COMMISSION RECOMMENDATIONS
WITH RESPECT TO COERCION

The 13th report of the Law Commission of India which was chaired by Shri M C Setalvad
contained a segment on Section 15 that is the definition of coercion. The definition of
coercion given in the Indian Contract Act is not exhaustive. It cannot apply to situations in
modern times where coercion can be induced by very many ways. Coercion, as already seen,
is defined in the Indian Contract Act, as the committing or threatening to commit, any act
forbidden by the Indian Penal Code or the unlawful detaining or threatening to detain, any
property, to the prejudice of any person whatever, with the intention of causing any person to
enter into an agreement. The phrase any act forbidden by the Indian Penal Code is what
was critically examined by the Law Commission. The purpose of the Indian Penal Code is to
create offences and not merely forbid them. The Indian Penal Code forbids only that which it
deems punishable. There are laws other than the Indian Penal Code performing the same
function. It has been up to the courts so far to interpret the meaning of the phrase in question
and differentiate between forbidden by the Indian Penal Code and punishable by the
Indian Penal Code. One such case where this differentiation was made was in the case
Ammiraju v. Seshamma , an intriguing question arose as to whether a release signed by a
wife and son in consequence of a threat of committing suicide had been obtained by coercion
within the meaning of Section 15. The issue here was whether suicide is an act forbidden by
the Indian Penal Code. The court held that the word forbidden is wider than the term
punishable. As an attempt to commit suicide is punishable under the Indian Penal Code, the
threat to commit suicide would also come under the ambit of acts forbidden by the Indian
Penal Code. The dissenting judge was of the opinion that the section should be construed
strictly and that an act which was not punishable by the Indian Penal Code cannot be
forbidden by it as a penal code forbids only what it punishes. This kind of interpretation can
vary from court to court. Though it was held in the above case that threat to commit suicide
does constitute coercion within the meaning of Section 15 of the Indian Contract Act, the
section itself has to amended to include a more comprehensive meaning to the offences, the
commission or the threatening of which, would constitute coercion. The report suggested the
words should be deleted and in place a wider expression of the offences forbidden by law in
India be included in the Section.

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In the draft proposal of the amendment submitted by the Law Commission, they stated that
the definition of coercion be changed as follows:
Coercion is the committing or threatening to commit any act, when the committing, or
threatening to commit such act is punishable by any law for the time being in force, or the
unlawful detaining, or threatening to detain, any property, to the prejudice of any person
whatever, with the intention to causing any person to enter into a contract.

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 CONCLUSION

In this assignment work I have tried to throw light on the concept of coercion in the context
of the Indian Contract Act. Simultaneously I have also compared it with the position in
England. The concept of Coercion seems fairly simple. In most legal systems, the use of
physical specific coercion by private individuals is a criminal offence in all cases not
involving self-defence or similar situations. Specific coercion may be used as a legal defence
in criminal cases for acts committed under threat of injury. Similarly, one may claim the legal
nullity of a contract signed under duress. The picture is less simple for psychological specific
coercion, owing to the general difficulty in finding clear evidence for it.
While analysing whether the Law Commission Report should be implemented or not, we
should remember that the Indian Contract Act in its first form was enacted in 1872. Though it
was enacted in the 19th century, it has managed to serve its purpose of defining the general
principles of contracts to this day. The definition of coercion as given in the Indian Contract
Act of 1872 is out-dated for modern use. It includes within its ambit only offences which are
forbidden by the Indian Penal Code. In the first place, the Indian Penal Code only declares
offences punishable and not forbidden. Secondly, in the present context, the Indian Penal
Code is not the only law that defines and punished offences in India. Thus, it is my opinion
that the definition of coercion should be updated and the law commission recommendation
should be implements forthwith. Also the concept of Economic Coercion needs to be
properly defined and laid down as the more and more cases of Economic Coercion is
cropping up but still the position in our country over this topic is still not very clear.

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 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Statutes
Indian Contract Act, 1872

Books
1. Dr. R.K. Bangia, Contract-I (Allahabad Law Agency)
2. Avtar Singh, Contract & Specific Relief (Eastern Book Company), Twelfth Edition
3. J. Beatson, Ansons Law of Contract (Oxford University Press), 28th Edition

Websites
1. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Duress_in_English_law
2. https://www.lawctopus.com/academike/doctrine-duress/
3. https://www.slideshare.net/Aaditya05/indian-and-english-laws-on-coercion
4. https://indiankanoon.org/search/?formInput=duress
5. https://indiankanoon.org/doc/894399/
6. https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Contracts_Under_Coercion_CFinkelstein_093010
.pdf
7. http://hanumant.com/CoerUndueFraudMisrep.html
8. https://www.slideshare.net/Aaditya05/indian-and-english-laws-on-coercion

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