TOPIC: ADMINISTRATIVE CODE

Are the government-owned or controlled corporations within the scope

and meaning of the "Government of the Philippines"?

Suggested Answer:
Section 2 of the Introductory Provisions of the Administrative Code
of 1987 defines the government of the Philippines as the corporate
governmental entity through which the functions of government are
exercised throughout the Philippines, including, save as the contrary
appears from the context, the various arms through which political
authority is made effective in the Philippines, whether pertaining to
the autonomous regions, the provincial, city, municipal or barangay
subdivisions or other forms of local government.
Government-owned or controlled corporations are within the scope and
meaning of the Government of the Philippines if they are performing
governmental or political functions.

The Maritime Industry Authority (MARINA) issued new rules and

regulations governing pilotage services and fees and the conduct of
pilots in Philippine ports. This it did without notice, hearing nor
consultation with harbor pilots or their associations whose rights
and activities are to be substantially affected. The harbor pilots
then filed suit to have the new MARINA rules and regulations declared
unconstitutional for having been issued without due process.

Suggested Answer:

The issuance of the new rules and regulations violated due process.
Under Section 9, Chapter II, Book VII of the Administrative Code of
1987, as far as practicable, before adopting proposed rules, an
administrative agency should publish or circulate notices of the
proposed rules and afford interested parties the opportunity to
submit their views; and in the fixing of rates, no rule shall be
valid unless the proposed rates shall have been published in a
newspaper of general circulation at least two weeks before the first
hearing on them. In accordance with this provision, in Commissioner
of Internal Revenue vs. Court of Appeals, 261 SCRA 236 (1996), it was
held that when an administrative rule substantially increases the
burden of those directly affected, they should be accorded the chance
to be heard before its issuance.

PEOPLE vs. MACEREN

Facts:

Buenaventura, Reyes, Aquino and del Rosario were charged by a Constabulary investigator in the
municipal court of Sta. Cruz, Laguna with having violated Fisheries AO.
Accused in resorted to electro fishing in the waters of Barrio San Pablo Norte, Sta. Cruz by using their
own motor banca, equipped with motor; with a generator with attached dynamo; and electrocuting
device locally known as sensored with a somewhat webbed copper wire on the tip or other end of a
bamboo pole with electric wire attachment which was attached to the dynamo direct and with the use
of these devices or equipments catches fish thru electric current, which destroy any aquatic animals
within its cuffed reach, to the detriment and prejudice of the populace.

Upon motion of the accused, the municipal court quashed the complaint. The prosecution appealed.
The Court of First Instance of Laguna affirmed the order of dismissal. The case is now before this
Court on appeal by the prosecution under Republic Act No. 5440.

The lower court held that electro fishing cannot be penalize because electric current is not an
obnoxious or poisonous substance it is not a substance at all but a form of energy conducted or
transmitted by substances. The lower court held that the law does not clearly prohibit electro fishing,
the executive and judicial departments cannot consider it unlawful.

Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, upon the recommendation of the Fisheries
Commission, issued Fisheries Administrative Order by restricting the ban against electro fishing to
fresh water fisheries.

Issue:

(1) W/N Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1 were not issued under section 11 of the Fisheries Law
which punishes fishing by means of an obnoxious or poisonous substance? NO.

Held:

The penal provision of Administrative Order No. 84 implies that electro fishing is penalized as a form of
fishing by means of an obnoxious or poisonous substance under section 11.

The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their
authority in issuing Fisheries

Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1 and that those orders are not warranted under the Fisheries
Commission, Republic Act No. 3512. The reason is that the Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit
electro fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. Had the lawmaking
body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect could have been easily
embodied in the old Fisheries Law. The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the
power to declare what acts should constitute an offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations
and the imposition of the penalty provided for in the law itself.

However, at present, there is no more doubt that electro fishing is punishable under the Fisheries Law
and that it cannot be penalized merely by executive revolution because Presidential Decree No. 704,
which is a revision and consolidation of all laws and decrees affecting fishing and fisheries expressly
punishes electro fishing in fresh water and salt water areas. The inclusion in that decree of provisions
defining and penalizing electro fishing is a clear recognition of the deficiency or silence on that point of
the old Fisheries Law. It is an admission that a mere executive regulation is not legally adequate to
penalize electro fishing.

An examination of the rule-making power of executive officials and administrative agencies and, in
particular, of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural under the Fisheries Law sustains the view that
he ex his authority in penalizing electro fishing by means of an administrative order.
Administrative agent are clothed with rule-making powers because the lawmaking body finds it
impracticable, if not impossible, to anticipate and provide for the multifarious and complex situations
that may be encountered in enforcing the law. All that is required is that the regulation should be
germane to the defects and purposes of the law and that it should conform to the standards that the
law prescribes.

The lawmaking body cannot possibly provide for all the details in the enforcement of a particular
statute. The grant of the rule-making power to administrative agencies is a relaxation of the principle
of separation of powers and is an exception to the nondeleption of legislative, powers. Administrative
regulations or "subordinate legislation calculated to promote the public interest are necessary because
of "the growing complexity of modem life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental
regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the law". The rule-making power must be
confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it his been
enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to
embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned.
Where the legislature has delegated to executive or administrative officers and boards authority to
promulgate rules to carry out an express legislative purpose, the rules of administrative officers and
boards, which have the effect of extending, or which conflict with the authority granting statute, do
not represent a valid precise of the rule-making power but constitute an attempt by an administrative
body to.

Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in

harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its
general provisions. By such regulations, of course, the law itself cannot be extended. An
administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress.

PHILIPPINE CONSUMERS FOUNDATION, INC. vs. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION,

CULTURE AND SPORTS

Facts:

On February 21, 1987, the Task Force on Private Higher Education created by DECS
submitted a report entitled "Report and Recommendations on a Policy for Tuition
and Other School Fees." The report favorably recommended to the DECS the
following courses of action with respect to the Government's policy on increases in
school fees for the SY 1987 to 1988. DECS took note of the report and issued an
Order authorizing the 15% to 20% increase in school fees as recommended by the
Task Force. Petitioner sought for reconsideration on the ground that increases were
too high. Thereafter, the Order was modified reducing the increases to a lower
ceiling of 10% to 15%. Petitioner still opposed the increases.

Petitioner, allegedly on the basis of the public interest, went to this Court and filed
the instant Petition for prohibition, seeking that judgment be rendered declaring the
questioned Department Order unconstitutional. The thrust of the Petition is that the
said Department Order was issued without any legal basis. The petitioner also
maintains that the questioned Department Order was issued in violation of the due
process clause of the Constitution in as much as the petitioner was not given due
notice and hearing before the said Department Order was issued.

In support of the first argument, the petitioner argues that while the DECS is
authorized by law to regulate school fees in educational institutions, the power to
regulate does not always include the power to increase school fees.

Regarding the second argument, the petitioner maintains that students and parents
are interested parties that should be afforded an opportunity for a hearing before
school fees are increased. In sum, the petitioner stresses that the questioned Order
constitutes a denial of substantive and procedural due process of law.

Issue: Whether or not DECS has the power to prescribe school fees?

Held: Yes. In the absence of a statute stating otherwise, this power includes the
power to prescribe school fees. No other government agency has been vested with
the authority to fix school fees and as such, the power should be considered lodged
with the DECS if it is to properly and effectively discharge its functions and duties
under the law.

The function of prescribing rates by an administrative agency may be either a

legislative or an adjudicative function. If it were a legislative function, the grant of
prior notice and hearing to the affected parties is not a requirement of due process.
As regards rates prescribed by an administrative agency in the exercise of its quasi-
judicial function, prior notice and hearing are essential to the validity of such rates.
When the rules and/or rates laid down by an administrative agency are meant to
apply to all enterprises of a given kind throughout the country, they may partake of
a legislative character. Where the rules and the rates imposed apply exclusively to a
particular party, based upon a finding of fact, then its function is quasi-judicial in
character.

Is Department Order No. 37 issued by the DECS in the exercise of its legislative
function? We believe so. The assailed Department Order prescribes the maximum
school fees that may be charged by all private schools in the country for schoolyear
1987 to 1988. This being so, prior notice and hearing are not essential to the
validity of its issuance.

EUGENIO vs. CSC et al

G.R. No. 115863

March 31, 1995

FACTS: . Eugenio is the Deputy Director of the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute.
She applied for a Career Executive Service (CES) Eligibility and a CESO rank,. She
was given a CES eligibility and was recommended to the President for a CESO rank
by the Career Executive Service Board.

Then respondent Civil Service Commission passed a Resolution which abolished the
CESB, relying on the provisions of Section 17, Title I, Subtitle A. Book V of the
Administrative Code of 1987 allegedly conferring on the Commission the power and
authority to effect changes in its organization as the need arises.
Saidresolution states:

Pursuant thereto, the Career Executive Service Board, shall now be known as the
Office for Career Executive Service of the Civil Service Commission. Accordingly, the
existing personnel, budget, properties and equipment of the Career Executive
Service Board shall now form part of the Office for Career Executive Service.

Finding herself bereft of further administrative relief as the Career Executive Service
Board which recommended her CESO Rank IV has been abolished, petitioner filed
the petition at bench to annul, among others, said resolution.

ISSUE: WON CSC given the authority to abolish the office of the CESB

HELD: the petition is granted and Resolution of the respondent Commission is

hereby annulled and set aside

NO

1. The controlling fact is that the CESB was created in PD No. 1 on September 1,
1974. It cannot be disputed, therefore, that as the CESB was created by law, it can
only be abolished by the legislature. This follows an unbroken stream of rulings that
the creation and abolition of public offices is primarily a legislative function

In the petition at bench, the legislature has not enacted any law authorizing the
abolition of the CESB. On the contrary, in all the General Appropriations Acts from
1975 to 1993, the legislature has set aside funds for the operation of CESB.

Respondent Commission, however, invokes Section 17, Chapter 3, Subtitle A. Title I,

Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 as the source of its power to abolish the
CESB.

But as well pointed out by petitioner and the Solicitor General, Section 17 must be
read together with Section 16 of the said Code which enumerates the offices under
the respondent Commission.

As read together, the inescapable conclusion is that respondent Commissions

power to reorganize is limited to offices under its control as enumerated in Section
16..

2. . From its inception, the CESB was intended to be an autonomous entity, albeit
administratively attached to respondent Commission. As conceptualized by the
Reorganization Committee the CESB shall be autonomous. It is expected to view
the problem of building up executive manpower in the government with a broad and
positive outlook.

The essential autonomous character of the CESB is not negated by its attachment
to respondent Commission. By said attachment, CESB was not made to fall within
the control of respondent Commission. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, the
purpose of attaching one functionally inter-related government agency to another is
to attain policy and program coordination. This is clearly etched out in Section
38(3), Chapter 7, Book IV of the aforecited Code, to wit:

(3) Attachment. (a) This refers to the lateral relationship between the department
or its equivalent and attached agency or corporation for purposes of policy and
program coordination. The coordination may be accomplished by having the
department represented in the governing board of the attached agency or
corporation, either as chairman or as a member, with or without voting rights, if this
is permitted by the charter; having the attached corporation or agency comply with
a system of periodic reporting which shall reflect the progress of programs and
projects; and having the department or its equivalent provide general policies
through its representative in the board, which shall serve as the framework for the
internal policies of the attached corporation or agency.

NOTES:

Section 17, Chapter 3, Subtitle A. Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987
as the source of its power to abolish the CESB. Section 17 provides:

Sec. 17. Organizational Structure. Each office of the Commission shall be headed
by a Director with at least one Assistant Director, and may have such divisions as
are necessary independent constitutional body, the Commission may effect changes
in the organization as the need arises.

Sec. 16. Offices in the Commission. The Commission shall have the following
offices:

(1) The Office of the Executive

(2) The Merit System Protection Board composed of a Chairman and two (2)
members

(3) The Office of Legal Affairs

(4) The Office of Planning and Management

(5) The Central Administrative Office.

(6) The Office of Central Personnel Records

(7) The Office of Position Classification and Compensation

(8) The Office of Recruitment, Examination and Placement

(9) The Office of Career Systems and Standards

(10) The Office of Human Resource Development

(11) The Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit.

(12) The Office of Personnel Relations

(13) The Office of Corporate Affairs

(14) The Office of Retirement

(15) The Regional and Field Offices.