THE COLLAPSE OF I-35W HIGHWAY BRIDGE IN MINNEAPOLIS
Hazwal, Saidatina Aishah, Khairul Hafizi
Faculty of Electrical Engineering
University Teknikal Malaysia Melaka (UTeM)
Durian Tunggal, Melaka
hazwal_ngadeni@yahoo.com.my, saida.aishah_007@yahoo.com, khairul_hafizi91@yahoo.com
Abstract This paper present the case study
on the Collapse of I-35W Highway Bridge in
Minneapolis. 1st of August 2007, the eight-lane,
1,907 foot long I-35W Highway Bridge over the
Mississippi River in Minneapolis, Minnesota had
collapsed and resulting in 13 people died and 145
people were injured. On the day of the collapse,
the bridge was under construction and all the
equipment and construction aggregates were
delivered on the road and increase the weight of
the bridge itself. It is investigated that one of the
reasons was due to the faulty gusset plate due to
the error in the original design. Corrosion damage
in gusset plates, fracture of a floor truss,
preexisting cracking, temperature effects, and pier
movement were also identified. This accident is
considered as engineered accident that caused by
flaws of the design. In this report, Code of
Conduct was discussed in order to make other
engineers aware about the safety of the public as it
is an important thing to look at during designing.
Besides, line drawing and flow chart are used in
order to identify the cause and problems occur in
the bridge. In line drawing, the positive and
negative paradigm are listed and flow chart shows
the process of constructing the bridge and
supposedly, there should not be any design flaws
in constructing the I-35W Highway Bridge if the
original design is reviewed and checked
thoroughly by the party in charged. Last but not
least, the main cause of this accident is due to
design flaws of Sverdrup & Parcels quality
control procedures to ensure that the appropriate
main truss gusset plate calculations were
performed for the I-35W Highway Bridge and the
inadequate design review by Federal and State
transportation officials.
Index Terms Bridge tragedy, type of
accident, ethical theories, flaws of design, code of
conduct.
I. INTRODUCTION
About 6:05 p.m. central daylight time on
Wednesday, 1st of August 2007, the eight-lane, 1,907
foot long I-35W Highway Bridge over the
Mississippi River in Minneapolis, Minnesota,
experienced a catastrophic failure in the main span of
the deck truss.[1,2] As a result, 1,000 feet of the deck
truss collapsed, with about 456 feet of the main span
falling 108 feet into the 15 foot deep river. A total of
111 vehicles were on the portion of the bridge that
collapsed. Of these, 17 were recovered from the
water. As a result of the bridge collapse, 13 people
died and 145 people were injured. [1] On the day of the
collapse, roadway work was underway on the I-35W
Highway Bridge and four of the eight travel lanes,
two outside lanes northbound and two inside lanes
southbound, were closed to traffic. In the early
afternoon, construction equipment and construction
aggregates were delivered and positioned in the two
closed inside southbound lanes. The equipment and
aggregates, which were being staged for a concrete
pour of the southbound lanes that was to begin about
7:00 p.m., were positioned toward the south end of
the center section of the deck truss portion of the
bridge and were in place by about 2:30 p.m. [1] About
6:05 p.m., a motion-activated surveillance video
camera just west of the I-35W Highway Bridge,
recorded a portion of the collapse sequence. This
tragedy instantly captured national attention. Since
the safety of bridges and other public infrastructure is
taken for granted, catastrophic failures like this
directly threaten the credibility of the government,
and can easily turn into widespread panic and public
outrage.
II. DESCRIPTION OF THE LITERATURE
Engineering consulting firm of Sverdrup &
Parcel and Associates, Inc., of St. Louis, Missouri, a
predecessor company of Sverdrup Corporation
designed the I-35W Highway Bridge which was
acquired in 1999 by Jacobs Engineering Group, Inc.
The bridge design was developed over several years,
with plans for the foundation approved in 1964 and
final design plans certified by the Sverdrup & Parcel
project manager cum Professional Engineer on 4th of
March 1965. The bridge design plans were approved
by Minnesota Department of Transportation
(Mn/DOT) on 18th of June 18, 1965.
A. Causes of Tragedy
One of the probable reasons was due to the
faulty gusset plate (48 metal plate used to connect
and secure multiple beams). This plate was half as
thick as it should have been, the result of an error in
the original design by Sverdrup & Parcel and
Associates in 1961 that somehow made its way
through the quality control process within the firm,
and the many rounds of design reviews by federal
and state transportation officials. Due to the
construction activity that was ongoing on that time,
concentrated construction weight were placed
directly on the weakest link of the bridge. Meaning
that it is directly on the point where the faulty gusset
plate located.
Other than gusset plate, the Safety Board also
considered a number of potential explanations that
lead to this accident. The following factors were
considered, but not totally taken into considerations
as it was only a minor reasons as being causal to the
collapse; corrosion damage in gusset plates, fracture
of a floor truss, preexisting cracking, temperature
effects, and pier movement were also identified
during the investigations.
Figure 1: Chronology of Incident
III. ETHICAL ISSUES
A. Type of Accident
There are many ways to categorized accidents.
One of the methods is to group accidents into three
types; which are procedural, engineered, and
systemic. Procedural accidents are the result of
someone making a bad choice or not following
established procedures. Engineered accidents are
caused by flaws of the design. Supposedly,
engineered failures should be corrected during
testing. As for systemic accidents, it is harder to
control and harder to understand. The perfect
example of systemic accident is the airline industry.
The collapse of the I-35W Bridge in
Minneapolis is considered as engineered accident.
From the investigation, it is noted that these are the
failures of materials, devices that do not perform well
under all conditions encountered or devices that do
not perform as expected. From this accident, the main
factor is related to gusset plates that used to connect
the steel beams in the truss. The investigators
determined that the original design for these gusset
plates was insufficient and unsatisfactory. It is been
found that the gusset plates installed on the bridge
were only half the thickness that should have been to
support the structure. [3] 16 of these gusset plates had
fractured when the bridge collapsed. [4] Besides, the
design of the bridge was also found to be fracture-
critical, meaning that there were no redundant load-
bearing paths designed into the structure, thus a
failure of any one of several critical structural
elements would lead to a collapse of the entire
structure. By referring to the definition of engineered
accidents, the engineered failures should be
anticipated in the design stage and should be caught
and corrected during testing. However, the original
design firm did not detect the design error when the
plans were originally created and approved. Even
though there were numerous subsequent
recalculations for maintenance, load rating, or
inspections, these calculations are not necessarily
expected to uncover original mistakes in the gusset
plate designs or calculations.
Last but not least, a serious design error that
leads to undersized gusset plates and structure that
was too weak to safely support the bridge led to this
accident.
B. Ethical Theory
 The codes of ethics of the professional The I-35W Bridge was designed by the
engineering societies make it clear that safety is of
paramount importance to the engineer. Engineers engineering consulting firm of Sverdrup & Parcel and
have the responsibility to society to produce
products, structures, and process that are safe. Associates, Inc., of St. Louis, Missouri. The design
Clearly, nothing can be 100% safe, but engineers are
required to make their designs as safe as possible. was based on the 1961 American Association of State

National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) Highway Officials (AASHO) Standard Specifications
received sets of design documents from both the
Minnesota Department of Transportation (Mn/DOT) for Highway Bridges and 1961 and 1962 Interim
and Jacobs Engineering Group, Inc. (Jacobs) after the
bridge collapse. In addition to the design drawings, Specifications, and on the 1964 Minnesota Highway
both entities provided the same collections of several
hundred pages of consecutively indexed and Department Standard Specifications for Highway
numbered compilations of checked computation
sheets showing calculations performed for the final Construction. The bridge design was developed over
design of the bridge. [3,4] The computation sheets for
the deck truss superstructure contained design numerous years. In 1964, plans for the foundation
calculations for the welded gusset plates used in the
floor trusses, but none of the records from Mn/DOT were approved and construction of some piers began
or Jacobs Engineering showed any calculations for
the gusset plates on the main trusses. during that time. The final design plans for the bridge

were certified by the Sverdrup & Parcel project

manager (a registered professional engineer) on

March 4, 1965. The bridge design plans were

approved by the Minnesota Highway Department on

June 18, 1965. [4]

Project manager of Sverdrup & Parcel (a registered

professional engineer) that certified the final design
plans for the bridge should check carefully about the
calculations and design of the bridge. None of the
records from Mn/DOT or Jacobs Engineering showed
any calculations for the gusset plates on the main
trusses. The project manager should realize this
design error before he certified it as safety design.
This is the first aspect to be taken into consideration
as a registered engineer.

Besides that, he can be regard as irresponsible

person for the actions taken as a project manager.
Although he allowed the project to be carried out and
give convenience to the public, the action actually
threatens the safety of people where the main fault is
placed on the design structure. From this accident,
the action of the project manager can be categorized
in virtue ethics. In engineering career, virtue ethics
concern about the action of the engineer itself.
Whether their action is honest, responsible and loyal
to the community and employer or not. In general
view, it can be seen that the bridge has flaws in the
design and might cause danger to the people.
However, the project manager still certified the final
design plans without knowingly the purpose of his
action.
C. Code of Conduct
It is believe that engineers hold a great moral
responsibility when it comes to the safety of the
countrys bridges. The Board of Engineers lists in its
fundamental codes that engineers should hold
paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the
public. Moreover, large numbers of the bridges have
been deemed unsafe or structurally deficient. This
problem has been resulted from poor bridge design
and maintenance. One of the United States greatest
disasters was the collapse of the I-35W Highway
Bridge back in 2007. An investigation was launched
to determine the cause of the accident. The
investigations found that I-35W Bridge lacked
sufficient quality control of the gusset plates design
by the engineers.[4] The original design of gusset
plates was insufficient and the gusset plates installed
were only half the thickness that they should installed
to support the structure. However, the investigators
also were unable to verify when and by whom this
mistake were made.
If one person dies as a result of engineering
failure, not only does it negatively reflect the
profession, but also it is certainly a tragedy. All
engineering disciplines have a broad code of ethics
that must be followed by all engineers. For instance,
section 1.1 of the 1st rule of practice in the code of
professional conduct states that, A Professional
Engineers shall approve and sign only those
engineering documents that he has prepared or are
prepared under his direct supervision. The
documents that accompany a bridge inspection
should only be approved if the inspection applies
sufficient applicable methods. I-35W Bridge passed
inspection to the extent that it was safe to drive on.
The engineers performing the inspection most
certainly applied applicable standards to the process.
Nonetheless, the standards were not enough applied
as the guidance in identifying the weak areas and
preventing the collapse.[3] The engineers remain
ethical in this context. However, advanced
technological inspection procedures would lead to
higher standards. In turn, society would obtain a
greater degree of sustainability.
When inspecting bridges, all the aspects of
the codes apply for engineers. Furthermore, some
things may be overlooked despite very through
inspections. Thus in order to maintain sustainability
as well as ensure the lives, safety, health and welfare
of the general public, engineers must accompany
traditional methods of bridge inspections with
advanced procedures utilizing technology that
includes the use of sensors, infrared and radar
equipment. One mistake in engineering causes
people to die. These advanced technological methods
will allow engineers to prevent disaster, as well as
follow ethical codes within their profession.[3]
The codes of professional conduct also
states that, A Registered Engineer shall at all-time
hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the
public goes directly with the technology. This
technology will prevent disaster if being used with
correct. For example, the engineers are trying to
install sensors on the bridges for the safety of the
public, so there is no chance for incidents in the
Minneapolis of I-35W Bridge. Thirteen people died
and many were injured and with these sensors, these
things can be prevented.
Furthermore, A Registered Engineer shall
conduct himself honorably, responsibly, ethically, and
lawfully so as to enhance the honor, reputation, and
usefulness of the profession. By letting the public
know that they can build these sensors and use them
in bridges, the public will go along with it because of
the safety reasons. The engineers reputation will rise
in the eyes of the public due to the giving this type of
information to them. Besides that, another code of
professional conduct states that A Registered
Engineer shall undertake assignments only if he is
qualified by education and experience in the specific
technical fields in which he is involved. This code
explain that engineers should have knowledge of
developments in the area of professional engineering
relevant to any services that are undertaken and being
competence in the performance. The design of the I-
35W Bridge structure should be develop by the
knowledgeable engineers.
The maintenance and improvement of
technical competence should be done by seek, accept,
and offer honest criticism of technical work, correct
errors, and to credit properly the contributions of
others. Moreover, all persons regardless of such
factors as race, religion, gender, disability, age, or
national origin must to treat fairly. The maintenance
and improvement must avoid injuring others and
raise the reputation. The engineers should be
maintain to assist others engineers and co-workers in
their professional development and to support them
in following this code of ethics.
 The engineers must accept responsibility in
making engineering decisions consistent with the
safety, health and welfare of the public, and to
disclose promptly factors that might endanger the
public or the environment. The first one is to avoid
real or perceived conflicts of interest whenever
possible. Besides that, the engineers should be honest
and realistic in stating claims or estimates based on Figure 2: Line Drawing Analysis
available data, reject bribery in all its forms, and
improve the understanding of technology, its According to the line drawing analysis, the approach
appropriate application, and potential consequences. taken by the authority in this case wasnt the best
ethical choice.
Lastly, the code A Registered Engineer
shall act for each employer or clients as faithful agent B. Flowchart
or trustee is the code that all engineers must fulfill it.
The engineers shall have a fairness and loyalty to One possible flow chart that should been gone on
associates, clients, and employer. They also should constructing this bridge is illustrated in Figure 3.
have fidelity to public needs and have devotion to
high ideals of personal honor and professional
integrity.

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Line Drawing

Problem: Authority want to build a bridge located in

Minnesota that connecting the Minneapolis
neighborhoods of Downtown East and Marcy-
Holmes. The bridge was build in 1967 and in 2007,
the bridge was collapsed. The investigation team
found out that there are flaws in the original design
by Sverdrup & Parcel and Associates. The gusset
plate used is half as thick as it should have been. The
flaws only detected after the bridge collapsed because
of poor maintenance and inspection.
Positive Paradigm: Bridge Safe
Negative Paradigm: Bridge Collapse
Hypothetical examples for consideration:
1. Replace the old gusset with new gusset according
to correct specification
2. Combine the existing gusset with another gusset
that has the same size
3. Construct additional structure to support the bridge
tension
4. Limit the allowable weight to pass the bridge
One view of the line is as shown in Figure 2.
Figure 3: Flowchart Analysis
According to the above flow chart, the
original design of the bridge should have gone
through several inspection processes before it is
permitted to construct. However, the design
somehow made its way through the quality
check process within the firm and authority
although there is error in the original design.
V. CONCLUSION
The National Transportation Safety Board
determines that the probable cause of the collapse of
the I-35W bridge in Minneapolis, Minnesota, was the
inadequate load capacity, due to a design error by
Sverdrup & Parcel and Associates, Inc., of the gusset
plates at the U10 nodes, which failed under a
combination of substantial increases in the weight of
the bridge, which resulted from previous bridge
modifications and the traffic and concentrated
construction loads on the bridge on the day of the
collapse. Contributing to the design error was the
failure of Sverdrup & Parcels quality control
procedures to ensure that the appropriate main truss
gusset plate calculations were performed for the I-
35W Highway Bridge and the inadequate design
review by Federal and State transportation officials.
Contributing to the accident was the generally
accepted practice among Federal and State
transportation officials of giving inadequate attention
to gusset plates during inspections for conditions of
distortion, such as bowing, and of excluding gusset
plates in load rating analyses.
VI. REFERENCE
[1] Extracted from Highway Accident Report
Collapse of I-35W Highway Bridge Minneapolis,
Minnesota.
Available:http://www.ntsb.gov/doclib/reports/2008/H
AR0803.pdf
[2] Brewer, John. "I-35W Bridge collapses over
Mississippi River; 7 dead." St. Paul Pioneer Press 01
Aug 2007.
[3] http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/bridge-
collapse-anniversary-safe-drivers
[4] http://www.studymode.com/essays/i-35W-
Ethical-Problem-618113.html
[5] (2007). I-35 Bridge Collapse, Minneapolis,
MN. U.S. Department of Transportation Federal
Highway Association. [Online article].
Available:http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/pressroom/fsi35.h
tm
[6] Chang, Kenneth, Wald, Matthew L. (2007,
Aug. 3). Minneapolis Bridge Had Passed
Inspections. The New York Times. [Online article]
Available:http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/03/us/03
safety.html
[7] J. Walker. (2011, Oct. 4). Improving and
Restoring The Urban Infrastructures Of Pittsburgh:
Ethics And Education. University of Pittsburgh,
Swanson School of Engineering. [Online article]
Available:www.pitt.edu/~jhw27/Writing
%20Assignment%203.docx