G.R. No. 104768.

July 21, 2003

Republic of the Philippines, petitioner, vs. Sandiganbayan, Major General Josephus Q. Ramas
and Elizabeth Dimaano, respondents

The Case

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the Resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan (First Division)[1] dated 18 November 1991 and 25 March 1992 in Civil Case No. 0037. The
first Resolution dismissed petitioners Amended Complaint and ordered the return of the confiscated items
to respondent Elizabeth Dimaano, while the second Resolution denied petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration. Petitioner prays for the grant of the reliefs sought in its Amended Complaint, or in the
alternative, for the remand of this case to the Sandiganbayan (First Division) for further proceedings
allowing petitioner to complete the presentation of its evidence.

Antecedent Facts

Immediately upon her assumption to office following the successful EDSA Revolution, then President
Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order No. 1 (EO No. 1) creating the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG). EO No. 1 primarily tasked the PCGG to recover all ill-gotten wealth of former
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates. EO No. 1
vested the PCGG with the power (a) to conduct investigation as may be necessary in order to accomplish
and carry out the purposes of this order and the power (h) to promulgate such rules and regulations as
may be necessary to carry out the purpose of this order. Accordingly, the PCGG, through its then Chairman
Jovito R. Salonga, created an AFP Anti-Graft Board (AFP Board) tasked to investigate reports of unexplained
wealth and corrupt practices by AFP personnel, whether in the active service or retired. [2]

Based on its mandate, the AFP Board investigated various reports of alleged unexplained wealth of
respondent Major General Josephus Q. Ramas (Ramas). On 27 July 1987, the AFP Board issued a Resolution
on its findings and recommendation on the reported unexplained wealth of Ramas. The relevant part of the
Resolution reads:

III. FINDINGS and EVALUATION:

Evidence in the record showed that respondent is the owner of a house and lot located at 15-Yakan St., La
Vista, Quezon City. He is also the owner of a house and lot located in Cebu City. The lot has an area of
3,327 square meters.

The value of the property located in Quezon City may be estimated modestly at P700,000.00.

The equipment/items and communication facilities which were found in the premises of Elizabeth Dimaano
and were confiscated by elements of the PC Command of Batangas were all covered by invoice receipt in
the name of CAPT. EFREN SALIDO, RSO Command Coy, MSC, PA. These items could not have been in the
possession of Elizabeth Dimaano if not given for her use by respondent Commanding General of the
Philippine Army.

Aside from the military equipment/items and communications equipment, the raiding team was also able
to confiscate money in the amount of P2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars in the house of Elizabeth
Dimaano on 3 March 1986.
Affidavits of members of the Military Security Unit, Military Security Command, Philippine Army, stationed
at Camp Eldridge, Los Baos, Laguna, disclosed that Elizabeth Dimaano is the mistress of respondent. That
respondent usually goes and stays and sleeps in the alleged house of Elizabeth Dimaano in Barangay
Tengga, Itaas, Batangas City and when he arrives, Elizabeth Dimaano embraces and kisses
respondent. That on February 25, 1986, a person who rode in a car went to the residence of Elizabeth
Dimaano with four (4) attache cases filled with money and owned by MGen Ramas.

Sworn statement in the record disclosed also that Elizabeth Dimaano had no visible means of income and
is supported by respondent for she was formerly a mere secretary.

Taking in toto the evidence, Elizabeth Dimaano could not have used the military equipment/items seized in
her house on March 3, 1986 without the consent of respondent, he being the Commanding General of the
Philippine Army. It is also impossible for Elizabeth Dimaano to claim that she owns the P2,870,000.00 and
$50,000 US Dollars for she had no visible source of income.

This money was never declared in the Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent. There was an
intention to cover the existence of these money because these are all ill-gotten and unexplained
wealth.Were it not for the affidavits of the members of the Military Security Unit assigned at Camp
Eldridge, Los Baos, Laguna, the existence and ownership of these money would have never been known.

The Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent were also submitted for scrutiny and analysis by the
Boards consultant. Although the amount of P2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US Dollars were not included, still it
was disclosed that respondent has an unexplained wealth of P104,134. 60.

IV. CONCLUSION:

In view of the foregoing, the Board finds that a prima facie case exists against respondent for ill-gotten and
unexplained wealth in the amount of P2,974,134.00 and $50,000 US Dollars.

V. RECOMMENDATION:

Wherefore it is recommended that Maj. Gen. Josephus Q. Ramas (ret.) be prosecuted and tried for violation
of RA 3019, as amended, otherwise known as Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and RA 1379, as
amended, otherwise known as The Act for the Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Property. [3]

Thus, on 1 August 1987, the PCGG filed a petition for forfeiture under Republic Act No. 1379 (RA No.
1379) [4] against Ramas.

Before Ramas could answer the petition, then Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez filed an Amended
Complaint naming the Republic of the Philippines (petitioner), represented by the PCGG, as plaintiff and
Ramas as defendant. The Amended Complaint also impleaded Elizabeth Dimaano (Dimaano) as co-
defendant.

The Amended Complaint alleged that Ramas was the Commanding General of the Philippine Army
until 1986. On the other hand, Dimaano was a confidential agent of the Military Security Unit, Philippine
Army, assigned as a clerk-typist at the office of Ramas from 1 January 1978 to February 1979. The
Amended Complaint further alleged that Ramas acquired funds, assets and properties manifestly out of
proportion to his salary as an army officer and his other income from legitimately acquired property by
taking undue advantage of his public office and/or using his power, authority and influence as such officer
of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and as a subordinate and close associate of the deposed President
Ferdinand Marcos.[5]

The Amended Complaint also alleged that the AFP Board, after a previous inquiry, found reasonable
ground to believe that respondents have violated RA No. 1379. [6] The Amended Complaint prayed for,
among others, the forfeiture of respondents properties, funds and equipment in favor of the State.

Ramas filed an Answer with Special and/or Affirmative Defenses and Compulsory Counterclaim to the
Amended Complaint. In his Answer, Ramas contended that his property consisted only of a residential
house at La Vista Subdivision, Quezon City, valued at P700,000, which was not out of proportion to his
salary and other legitimate income. He denied ownership of any mansion in Cebu City and the cash,
communications equipment and other items confiscated from the house of Dimaano.

Dimaano filed her own Answer to the Amended Complaint. Admitting her employment as a clerk-typist
in the office of Ramas from January-November 1978 only, Dimaano claimed ownership of the monies,
communications equipment, jewelry and land titles taken from her house by the Philippine Constabulary
raiding team.

After termination of the pre-trial,[7] the court set the case for trial on the merits on 9-11 November
1988.

On 9 November 1988, petitioner asked for a deferment of the hearing due to its lack of preparation for
trial and the absence of witnesses and vital documents to support its case. The court reset the hearing to
17 and 18 April 1989.

On 13 April 1989, petitioner filed a motion for leave to amend the complaint in order to charge the
delinquent properties with being subject to forfeiture as having been unlawfully acquired by defendant
Dimaano alone x x x.[8]

Nevertheless, in an order dated 17 April 1989, the Sandiganbayan proceeded with petitioners
presentation of evidence on the ground that the motion for leave to amend complaint did not state when
petitioner would file the amended complaint. The Sandiganbayan further stated that the subject matter of
the amended complaint was on its face vague and not related to the existing complaint. The
Sandiganbayan also held that due to the time that the case had been pending in court, petitioner should
proceed to present its evidence.

After presenting only three witnesses, petitioner asked for a postponement of the trial.

On 28 September 1989, during the continuation of the trial, petitioner manifested its inability to
proceed to trial because of the absence of other witnesses or lack of further evidence to present. Instead,
petitioner reiterated its motion to amend the complaint to conform to the evidence already presented or to
change the averments to show that Dimaano alone unlawfully acquired the monies or properties subject of
the forfeiture.

The Sandiganbayan noted that petitioner had already delayed the case for over a year mainly because
of its many postponements. Moreover, petitioner would want the case to revert to its preliminary stage
when in fact the case had long been ready for trial. The Sandiganbayan ordered petitioner to prepare for
presentation of its additional evidence, if any.

During the trial on 23 March 1990, petitioner again admitted its inability to present further
evidence. Giving petitioner one more chance to present further evidence or to amend the complaint to
conform to its evidence, the Sandiganbayan reset the trial to 18 May 1990. The Sandiganbayan, however,
hinted that the re-setting was without prejudice to any action that private respondents might take under
the circumstances.

However, on 18 May 1990, petitioner again expressed its inability to proceed to trial because it had no
further evidence to present. Again, in the interest of justice, the Sandiganbayan granted petitioner 60 days
within which to file an appropriate pleading. The Sandiganbayan, however, warned petitioner that failure to
act would constrain the court to take drastic action.

Private respondents then filed their motions to dismiss based on Republic v. Migrino.[9] The Court
held in Migrino that the PCGG does not have jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute military officers by
reason of mere position held without a showing that they are subordinates of former President Marcos.

On 18 November 1991, the Sandiganbayan rendered a resolution, the dispositive portion of which
states:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the Amended Complaint, without pronouncement as
to costs. The counterclaims are likewise dismissed for lack of merit, but the confiscated sum of money,
communications equipment, jewelry and land titles are ordered returned to Elizabeth Dimaano.

The records of this case are hereby remanded and referred to the Hon. Ombudsman, who has primary
jurisdiction over the forfeiture cases under R.A. No. 1379, for such appropriate action as the evidence
warrants. This case is also referred to the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for a
determination of any tax liability of respondent Elizabeth Dimaano in connection herewith.

SO ORDERED.

On 4 December 1991, petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration.

In answer to the Motion for Reconsideration, private respondents filed a Joint Comment/Opposition to
which petitioner filed its Reply on 10 January 1992.

On 25 March 1992, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Resolution denying the Motion for Reconsideration.

Ruling of the Sandiganbayan

The Sandiganbayan dismissed the Amended Complaint on the following grounds:

(1.) The actions taken by the PCGG are not in accordance with the rulings of the Supreme Court
in Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan[10] and Republic v. Migrino[11] which involve the same issues.

(2.) No previous inquiry similar to preliminary investigations in criminal cases was conducted against
Ramas and Dimaano.

(3.) The evidence adduced against Ramas does not constitute a prima facie case against him.

(4.) There was an illegal search and seizure of the items confiscated.

The Issues

Petitioner raises the following issues:

A. RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT PETITIONERS EVIDENCE

CANNOT MAKE A CASE FOR FORFEITURE AND THAT THERE WAS NO SHOWING OF
 CONSPIRACY, COLLUSION OR RELATIONSHIP BY CONSANGUINITY OR AFFINITY BY
AND BETWEEN RESPONDENT RAMAS AND RESPONDENT DIMAANO
NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT SUCH CONCLUSIONS WERE CLEARLY
UNFOUNDED AND PREMATURE, HAVING BEEN RENDERED PRIOR TO THE
COMPLETION OF THE PRESENTATION OF THE EVIDENCE OF THE PETITIONER.

B. RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE
PETITIONER, INCLUDING THE FILING OF THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT AND THE
AMENDED COMPLAINT, SHOULD BE STRUCK OUT IN LINE WITH THE RULINGS OF
THE SUPREME COURT IN CRUZ, JR. v. SANDIGANBAYAN, 194 SCRA 474 AND
REPUBLIC v. MIGRINO, 189 SCRA 289, NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT:

1. The cases of Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, supra, and Republic v. Migrino, supra, are
clearly not applicable to this case;

2. Any procedural defect in the institution of the complaint in Civil Case No. 0037 was
cured and/or waived by respondents with the filing of their respective answers
with counterclaim; and

3. The separate motions to dismiss were evidently improper considering that they
were filed after commencement of the presentation of the evidence of the
petitioner and even before the latter was allowed to formally offer its evidence
and rest its case;

C. RESPONDENT COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE ARTICLES AND THINGS
SUCH AS SUMS OF MONEY, COMMUNICATIONS EQUIPMENT, JEWELRY AND LAND
TITLES CONFISCATED FROM THE HOUSE OF RESPONDENT DIMAANO WERE
ILLEGALLY SEIZED AND THEREFORE EXCLUDED AS EVIDENCE.[12]

The Courts Ruling

First Issue: PCGGs Jurisdiction to Investigate Private Respondents

This case involves a revisiting of an old issue already decided by this Court in Cruz, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan[13] and Republic v. Migrino.[14]

The primary issue for resolution is whether the PCGG has the jurisdiction to investigate and cause the
filing of a forfeiture petition against Ramas and Dimaano for unexplained wealth under RA No. 1379.

We hold that PCGG has no such jurisdiction.

The PCGG created the AFP Board to investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices of AFP
personnel, whether in the active service or retired. [15] The PCGG tasked the AFP Board to make the
necessary recommendations to appropriate government agencies on the action to be taken based on its
findings.[16] The PCGG gave this task to the AFP Board pursuant to the PCGGs power under Section 3 of EO
No. 1 to conduct investigation as may be necessary in order to accomplish and to carry out the purposes of
this order. EO No. 1 gave the PCGG specific responsibilities, to wit:

SEC. 2. The Commission shall be charged with the task of assisting the President in regard to the following
matters:

(a) The recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his
immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the
 Philippines or abroad, including the takeover and sequestration of all business enterprises
and entities owned or controlled by them, during his administration, directly or through
nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office and/ or using their powers,
authority, influence, connections or relationship.

(b) The investigation of such cases of graft and corruption as the President may assign to the
Commission from time to time.

x x x.

The PCGG, through the AFP Board, can only investigate the unexplained wealth and corrupt practices
of AFP personnel who fall under either of the two categories mentioned in Section 2 of EO No. 1. These are:
(1) AFP personnel who have accumulated ill-gotten wealth during the administration of former President
Marcos by being the latters immediate family, relative, subordinate or close associate, taking undue
advantage of their public office or using their powers, influence x x x; [17] or (2) AFP personnel involved in
other cases of graft and corruption provided the President assigns their cases to the PCGG. [18]

Petitioner, however, does not claim that the President assigned Ramas case to the PCGG. Therefore,
Ramas case should fall under the first category of AFP personnel before the PCGG could exercise its
jurisdiction over him. Petitioner argues that Ramas was undoubtedly a subordinate of former President
Marcos because of his position as the Commanding General of the Philippine Army. Petitioner claims that
Ramas position enabled him to receive orders directly from his commander-in-chief, undeniably making
him a subordinate of former President Marcos.

We hold that Ramas was not a subordinate of former President Marcos in the sense contemplated
under EO No. 1 and its amendments.

Mere position held by a military officer does not automatically make him a subordinate as this term is
used in EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A absent a showing that he enjoyed close association with former
President Marcos. Migrino discussed this issue in this wise:

A close reading of EO No. 1 and related executive orders will readily show what is contemplated within the
term subordinate. The Whereas Clauses of EO No. 1 express the urgent need to recover the ill-gotten
wealth amassed by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, and close
associates both here and abroad.

EO No. 2 freezes all assets and properties in the Philippines in which former President Marcos and/or his
wife, Mrs. Imelda Marcos, their close relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents, or
nominees have any interest or participation.

Applying the rule in statutory construction known as ejusdem generis that is-

[W]here general words follow an enumeration of persons or things by words of a particular and specific
meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying
only to persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned [Smith, Bell & Co, Ltd.
vs. Register of Deeds of Davao, 96 Phil. 53, 58, citing Black on Interpretation of Laws, 2 ndEd., 203].

[T]he term subordinate as used in EO Nos. 1 & 2 refers to one who enjoys a close association with former
President Marcos and/or his wife, similar to the immediate family member, relative, and close
associate in EO No. 1 and the close relative, business associate, dummy, agent, or nominee in
EO No. 2.

xxx
It does not suffice, as in this case, that the respondent is or was a government official or employee during
the administration of former President Marcos. There must be a prima facie showing that the
respondent unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of his close association or relation with
former Pres. Marcos and/or his wife. (Emphasis supplied)

Ramas position alone as Commanding General of the Philippine Army with the rank of Major
General[19] does not suffice to make him a subordinate of former President Marcos for purposes of EO No. 1
and its amendments. The PCGG has to provide a prima facie showing that Ramas was a close associate of
former President Marcos, in the same manner that business associates, dummies, agents or nominees of
former President Marcos were close to him. Such close association is manifested either by Ramas
complicity with former President Marcos in the accumulation of ill-gotten wealth by the deposed President
or by former President Marcos acquiescence in Ramas own accumulation of ill-gotten wealth if any.

This, the PCGG failed to do.

Petitioners attempt to differentiate the instant case from Migrino does not convince us. Petitioner
argues that unlike in Migrino, the AFP Board Resolution in the instant case states that the AFP Board
conducted the investigation pursuant to EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A in relation to RA No. 1379. Petitioner
asserts that there is a presumption that the PCGG was acting within its jurisdiction of investigating crony-
related cases of graft and corruption and that Ramas was truly a subordinate of the former
President. However, the same AFP Board Resolution belies this contention. Although the Resolution begins
with such statement, it ends with the following recommendation:

V. RECOMMENDATION:

Wherefore it is recommended that Maj. Gen. Josephus Q. Ramas (ret.) be prosecuted and tried for violation
of RA 3019, as amended, otherwise known as Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and RA 1379, as
amended, otherwise known as The Act for the Forfeiture of Unlawfully Acquired Property. [20]

Thus, although the PCGG sought to investigate and prosecute private respondents under EO Nos. 1, 2, 14
and 14-A, the result yielded a finding of violation of Republic Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379 without any relation
to EO Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. This absence of relation to EO No. 1 and its amendments proves fatal to
petitioners case. EO No. 1 created the PCGG for a specific and limited purpose, and necessarily its powers
must be construed to address such specific and limited purpose.

Moreover, the resolution of the AFP Board and even the Amended Complaint do not show that the
properties Ramas allegedly owned were accumulated by him in his capacity as a subordinate of his
commander-in-chief. Petitioner merely enumerated the properties Ramas allegedly owned and suggested
that these properties were disproportionate to his salary and other legitimate income without showing that
Ramas amassed them because of his close association with former President Marcos. Petitioner, in
fact, admits that the AFP Board resolution does not contain a finding that Ramas accumulated his wealth
because of his close association with former President Marcos, thus:

10. While it is true that the resolution of the Anti-Graft Board of the New Armed Forces of the
Philippines did not categorically find a prima facie evidence showing that respondent Ramas
unlawfully accumulated wealth by virtue of his close association or relation with former
President Marcos and/or his wife, it is submitted that such omission was not fatal. The
resolution of the Anti-Graft Board should be read in the context of the law creating the same and the
objective of the investigation which was, as stated in the above, pursuant to Republic Act Nos. 3019 and
1379 in relation to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-a; [21] (Emphasis supplied)

Such omission is fatal. Petitioner forgets that it is precisely a prima facie showing that the ill-gotten
wealth was accumulated by a subordinate of former President Marcos that vests jurisdiction on PCGG. EO
No. 1[22] clearly premises the creation of the PCGG on the urgent need to recover all ill-gotten wealth
amassed by former President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close
associates. Therefore, to say that such omission was not fatal is clearly contrary to the intent behind the
creation of the PCGG.

In Cruz, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan,[23] the Court outlined the cases that fall under the jurisdiction of the
PCGG pursuant to EO Nos. 1, 2,[24] 14,[25] 14-A:[26]

A careful reading of Sections 2(a) and 3 of Executive Order No. 1 in relation with Sections 1, 2 and 3 of
Executive Order No. 14, shows what the authority of the respondent PCGG to investigate and prosecute
covers:

(a) the investigation and prosecution of the civil action for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth under
Republic Act No. 1379, accumulated by former President Marcos, his immediate
family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the
Philippines or abroad, including the take-over or sequestration of all business enterprises
and entities owned or controlled by them, during his administration, directly or through his
nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office and/or using their
powers, authority and influence, connections or relationships; and

(b) the investigation and prosecution of such offenses committed in the acquisition of said ill-
gotten wealth as contemplated under Section 2(a) of Executive Order No. 1.

However, other violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act not otherwise falling
under the foregoing categories, require a previous authority of the President for the
respondent PCGG to investigate and prosecute in accordance with Section 2 (b) of Executive
Order No. 1. Otherwise, jurisdiction over such cases is vested in the Ombudsman and other
duly authorized investigating agencies such as the provincial and city prosecutors, their
assistants, the Chief State Prosecutor and his assistants and the state prosecutors. (Emphasis
supplied)

The proper government agencies, and not the PCGG, should investigate and prosecute forfeiture
petitions not falling under EO No. 1 and its amendments. The preliminary investigation of unexplained
wealth amassed on or before 25 February 1986 falls under the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman, while the
authority to file the corresponding forfeiture petition rests with the Solicitor General. [27] The Ombudsman
Act or Republic Act No. 6770 (RA No. 6770) vests in the Ombudsman the power to conduct preliminary
investigation and to file forfeiture proceedings involving unexplained wealth amassed after 25 February
1986.[28]

After the pronouncements of the Court in Cruz, the PCGG still pursued this case despite the absence
of a prima facie finding that Ramas was a subordinate of former President Marcos. The petition for
forfeiture filed with the Sandiganbayan should be dismissed for lack of authority by the PCGG to
investigate respondents since there is no prima facie showing that EO No. 1 and its amendments apply to
respondents. The AFP Board Resolution and even the Amended Complaint state that there are violations of
RA Nos. 3019 and 1379. Thus, the PCGG should have recommended Ramas case to the Ombudsman who
has jurisdiction to conduct the preliminary investigation of ordinary unexplained wealth and graft cases. As
stated in Migrino:

[But] in view of the patent lack of authority of the PCGG to investigate and cause the prosecution of
private respondent for violation of Rep. Acts Nos. 3019 and 1379, the PCGG must also be enjoined from
proceeding with the case, without prejudice to any action that may be taken by the proper prosecutory
agency. The rule of law mandates that an agency of government be allowed to exercise only the powers
granted to it.
 Petitioners argument that private respondents have waived any defect in the filing of the forfeiture
petition by submitting their respective Answers with counterclaim deserves no merit as well.

Petitioner has no jurisdiction over private respondents. Thus, there is no jurisdiction to waive in the
first place. The PCGG cannot exercise investigative or prosecutorial powers never granted to it. PCGGs
powers are specific and limited. Unless given additional assignment by the President, PCGGs sole task is
only to recover the ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses, their relatives and cronies. [29] Without these elements,
the PCGG cannot claim jurisdiction over a case.

Private respondents questioned the authority and jurisdiction of the PCGG to investigate and prosecute
their cases by filing their Motion to Dismiss as soon as they learned of the pronouncement of the Court
in Migrino. This case was decided on 30 August 1990, which explains why private respondents only filed
their Motion to Dismiss on 8 October 1990.Nevertheless, we have held that the parties may raise lack of
jurisdiction at any stage of the proceeding. [30] Thus, we hold that there was no waiver of jurisdiction in this
case. Jurisdiction is vested by law and not by the parties to an action. [31]

Consequently, the petition should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction by the PCGG to conduct the
preliminary investigation. The Ombudsman may still conduct the proper preliminary investigation for
violation of RA No. 1379, and if warranted, the Solicitor General may file the forfeiture petition with the
Sandiganbayan.[32] The right of the State to forfeit unexplained wealth under RA No. 1379 is not subject to
prescription, laches or estoppel.[33]

Second Issue: Propriety of Dismissal of Case

Before Completion of Presentation of Evidence

Petitioner also contends that the Sandiganbayan erred in dismissing the case before completion of the
presentation of petitioners evidence.

We disagree.

Based on the findings of the Sandiganbayan and the records of this case, we find that petitioner has
only itself to blame for non-completion of the presentation of its evidence. First, this case has been
pending for four years before the Sandiganbayan dismissed it. Petitioner filed its
Amended Complaint on 11 August 1987, and only began to present its evidence on 17 April
1989. Petitioner had almost two years to prepare its evidence. However, despite this sufficient time,
petitioner still delayed the presentation of the rest of its evidence by filing numerous motions for
postponements and extensions. Even before the date set for the presentation of its evidence, petitioner
filed, on 13 April 1989, a Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint. [34]The motion sought to charge the
delinquent properties (which comprise most of petitioners evidence) with being subject to forfeiture as
having been unlawfully acquired by defendant Dimaano alone x x x.

The Sandiganbayan, however, refused to defer the presentation of petitioners evidence since
petitioner did not state when it would file the amended complaint. On 18 April 1989, the Sandiganbayan
set the continuation of the presentation of evidence on 28-29 September and 9-11 October 1989, giving
petitioner ample time to prepare its evidence. Still, on 28 September 1989, petitioner manifested its
inability to proceed with the presentation of its evidence. The Sandiganbayan issued an Order expressing
its view on the matter, to wit:

The Court has gone through extended inquiry and a narration of the above events because this case has
been ready for trial for over a year and much of the delay hereon has been due to the inability of the
government to produce on scheduled dates for pre-trial and for trial documents and witnesses, allegedly
upon the failure of the military to supply them for the preparation of the presentation of evidence
thereon. Of equal interest is the fact that this Court has been held to task in public about its alleged failure
to move cases such as this one beyond the preliminary stage, when, in view of the developments such as
those of today, this Court is now faced with a situation where a case already in progress will revert back to
the preliminary stage, despite a five-month pause where appropriate action could have been undertaken
by the plaintiff Republic.[35]

On 9 October 1989, the PCGG manifested in court that it was conducting a preliminary investigation
on the unexplained wealth of private respondents as mandated by RA No. 1379. [36]The PCGG prayed for an
additional four months to conduct the preliminary investigation. The Sandiganbayan granted this request
and scheduled the presentation of evidence on 26-29 March 1990. However, on the scheduled date,
petitioner failed to inform the court of the result of the preliminary investigation the PCGG supposedly
conducted. Again, the Sandiganbayan gave petitioner until 18 May 1990 to continue with the presentation
of its evidence and to inform the court of what lies ahead insofar as the status of the case is concerned x x
x.[37] Still on the date set, petitioner failed to present its evidence. Finally, on 11 July 1990, petitioner filed
its Re-Amended Complaint.[38] The Sandiganbayan correctly observed that a case already pending for years
would revert to its preliminary stage if the court were to accept the Re-Amended Complaint.

Based on these circumstances, obviously petitioner has only itself to blame for failure to complete the
presentation of its evidence. The Sandiganbayan gave petitioner more than sufficient time to finish the
presentation of its evidence. The Sandiganbayan overlooked petitioners delays and yet petitioner ended
the long-string of delays with the filing of a Re-Amended Complaint, which would only prolong even more
the disposition of the case.

Moreover, the pronouncements of the Court in Migrino and Cruz prompted the Sandiganbayan to
dismiss the case since the PCGG has no jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute the case against private
respondents. This alone would have been sufficient legal basis for the Sandiganbayan to dismiss the
forfeiture case against private respondents.

Thus, we hold that the Sandiganbayan did not err in dismissing the case before completion of the
presentation of petitioners evidence.

Third Issue: Legality of the Search and Seizure

Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan erred in declaring the properties confiscated from Dimaanos
house as illegally seized and therefore inadmissible in evidence. This issue bears a significant effect on
petitioners case since these properties comprise most of petitioners evidence against private respondents.
Petitioner will not have much evidence to support its case against private respondents if these properties
are inadmissible in evidence.

On 3 March 1986, the Constabulary raiding team served at Dimaanos residence a search warrant
captioned Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunition. Dimaano was not present during the raid but
Dimaanos cousins witnessed the raid. The raiding team seized the items detailed in the seizure receipt
together with other items not included in the search warrant. The raiding team seized these items: one
baby armalite rifle with two magazines; 40 rounds of 5.56 ammunition; one pistol, caliber .45;
communications equipment, cash consisting of P2,870,000 and US$50,000, jewelry, and land titles.

Petitioner wants the Court to take judicial notice that the raiding team conducted the search and
seizure on March 3, 1986 or five days after the successful EDSA revolution. [39]Petitioner argues that a
revolutionary government was operative at that time by virtue of Proclamation No. 1 announcing that
President Aquino and Vice President Laurel were taking power in the name and by the will of the Filipino
people.[40] Petitioner asserts that the revolutionary government effectively withheld the operation of the
1973 Constitution which guaranteed private respondents exclusionary right.
 Moreover, petitioner argues that the exclusionary right arising from an illegal search applies only
beginning 2 February 1987, the date of ratification of the 1987 Constitution. Petitioner contends that all
rights under the Bill of Rights had already reverted to its embryonic stage at the time of the search.
Therefore, the government may confiscate the monies and items taken from Dimaano and use the same in
evidence against her since at the time of their seizure, private respondents did not enjoy any constitutional
right.

Petitioner is partly right in its arguments.

The EDSA Revolution took place on 23-25 February 1986. As succinctly stated in President Aquinos
Proclamation No. 3 dated 25 March 1986, the EDSA Revolution was done in defiance of the provisions
of the 1973 Constitution.[41] The resulting government was indisputably a revolutionary government
bound by no constitution or legal limitations except treaty obligations that the revolutionary government,
as the de jure government in the Philippines, assumed under international law.

The correct issues are: (1) whether the revolutionary government was bound by the Bill of Rights of
the 1973 Constitution during the interregnum, that is, after the actual and effective take-over of power
by the revolutionary government following the cessation of resistance by loyalist forces up to 24 March
1986 (immediately before the adoption of the Provisional Constitution); and (2) whether the protection
accorded to individuals under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Covenant) and the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Declaration) remained in effect during the interregnum.

We hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution was not operative during the
interregnum. However, we rule that the protection accorded to individuals under the Covenant and the
Declaration remained in effect during the interregnum.

During the interregnum, the directives and orders of the revolutionary government were the supreme
law because no constitution limited the extent and scope of such directives and orders. With the
abrogation of the 1973 Constitution by the successful revolution, there was no municipal law higher than
the directives and orders of the revolutionary government. Thus, during the interregnum, a person could
not invoke any exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because there was neither a constitution nor a Bill
of Rights during the interregnum. As the Court explained in Letter of Associate Justice Reynato S.
Puno:[42]

A revolution has been defined as the complete overthrow of the established government in any country or
state by those who were previously subject to it or as a sudden, radical and fundamental change in the
government or political system, usually effected with violence or at least some acts of violence. In Kelsen's
book, General Theory of Law and State, it is defined as that which occurs whenever the legal order of a
community is nullified and replaced by a new order . . . a way not prescribed by the first order itself.

It was through the February 1986 revolution, a relatively peaceful one, and more popularly known as the
people power revolution that the Filipino people tore themselves away from an existing regime. This
revolution also saw the unprecedented rise to power of the Aquino government.

From the natural law point of view, the right of revolution has been defined as an inherent right of a people
to cast out their rulers, change their policy or effect radical reforms in their system of government or
institutions by force or a general uprising when the legal and constitutional methods of making such
change have proved inadequate or are so obstructed as to be unavailable. It has been said that the locus
of positive law-making power lies with the people of the state and from there is derived the right of the
people to abolish, to reform and to alter any existing form of government without regard to the existing
constitution.

xxx
It is widely known that Mrs. Aquinos rise to the presidency was not due to constitutional
processes; in fact, it was achieved in violation of the provisions of the 1973 Constitution as a
Batasang Pambansa resolution had earlier declared Mr. Marcos as the winner in the 1986
presidential election. Thus it can be said that the organization of Mrs. Aquinos Government which was
met by little resistance and her control of the state evidenced by the appointment of the Cabinet and other
key officers of the administration, the departure of the Marcos Cabinet officials, revamp of the Judiciary
and the Military signaled the point where the legal system then in effect, had ceased to be obeyed
by the Filipino. (Emphasis supplied)

To hold that the Bill of Rights under the 1973 Constitution remained operative during the interregnum
would render void all sequestration orders issued by the Philippine Commission on Good Government
(PCGG) before the adoption of the Freedom Constitution. The sequestration orders, which direct the
freezing and even the take-over of private property by mere executive issuance without judicial action,
would violate the due process and search and seizure clauses of the Bill of Rights.

During the interregnum, the government in power was concededly a revolutionary government bound
by no constitution. No one could validly question the sequestration orders as violative of the Bill of Rights
because there was no Bill of Rights during the interregnum. However, upon the adoption of the Freedom
Constitution, the sequestered companies assailed the sequestration orders as contrary to the Bill of Rights
of the Freedom Constitution.

In Bataan Shipyard & Engineering Co. Inc. vs. Presidential Commission on Good
Government,[43] petitioner Baseco, while conceding there was no Bill of Rights during the interregnum,
questioned the continued validity of the sequestration orders upon adoption of the Freedom Constitution in
view of the due process clause in its Bill of Rights. The Court ruled that the Freedom Constitution, and later
the 1987 Constitution, expressly recognized the validity of sequestration orders, thus:

If any doubt should still persist in the face of the foregoing considerations as to the validity and propriety
of sequestration, freeze and takeover orders, it should be dispelled by the fact that these particular
remedies and the authority of the PCGG to issue them have received constitutional approbation and
sanction. As already mentioned, the Provisional or Freedom Constitution recognizes the power and duty of
the President to enact measures to achieve the mandate of the people to . . . (r)ecover ill-gotten properties
amassed by the leaders and supporters of the previous regime and protect the interest of the people
through orders of sequestration or freezing of assets or accounts. And as also already adverted to, Section
26, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution treats of, and ratifies the authority to issue sequestration or freeze
orders under Proclamation No. 3 dated March 25, 1986.

The framers of both the Freedom Constitution and the 1987 Constitution were fully aware that the
sequestration orders would clash with the Bill of Rights. Thus, the framers of both constitutions had to
include specific language recognizing the validity of the sequestration orders. The following discourse by
Commissioner Joaquin G. Bernas during the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission is instructive:

FR. BERNAS: Madam President, there is something schizophrenic about the arguments in defense of the
present amendment.

For instance, I have carefully studied Minister Salongas lecture in the Gregorio Araneta University
Foundation, of which all of us have been given a copy. On the one hand, he argues that everything
the Commission is doing is traditionally legal. This is repeated by Commissioner Romulo also.
Minister Salonga spends a major portion of his lecture developing that argument. On the other
hand, almost as an afterthought, he says that in the end what matters are the results and not the
legal niceties, thus suggesting that the PCGG should be allowed to make some legal shortcuts,
another word for niceties or exceptions.
Now, if everything the PCGG is doing is legal, why is it asking the CONCOM for special protection?
The answer is clear. What they are doing will not stand the test of ordinary due process,
hence they are asking for protection, for exceptions. Grandes malos, grandes remedios,
fine, as the saying stands, but let us not say grandes malos, grande y malos remedios. That is not
an allowable extrapolation. Hence, we should not give the exceptions asked for, and let me
elaborate and give three reasons:

First, the whole point of the February Revolution and of the work of the CONCOM is to hasten
constitutional normalization. Very much at the heart of the constitutional normalization is the full
effectivity of the Bill of Rights. We cannot, in one breath, ask for constitutional normalization and
at the same time ask for a temporary halt to the full functioning of what is at the heart of
constitutionalism. That would be hypocritical; that would be a repetition of Marcosian protestation
of due process and rule of law. The New Society word for that is backsliding. It is tragic when we
begin to backslide even before we get there.

Second, this is really a corollary of the first. Habits tend to become ingrained. The committee
report asks for extraordinary exceptions from the Bill of Rights for six months after the convening
of Congress, and Congress may even extend this longer.

Good deeds repeated ripen into virtue; bad deeds repeated become vice. What the committee
report is asking for is that we should allow the new government to acquire the vice of disregarding
the Bill of Rights.

Vices, once they become ingrained, become difficult to shed. The practitioners of the vice begin to
think that they have a vested right to its practice, and they will fight tooth and nail to keep the
franchise. That would be an unhealthy way of consolidating the gains of a democratic revolution.

Third, the argument that what matters are the results and not the legal niceties is an argument
that is very disturbing. When it comes from a staunch Christian like Commissioner Salonga, a
Minister, and repeated verbatim by another staunch Christian like Commissioner Tingson, it
becomes doubly disturbing and even discombobulating. The argument makes the PCGG an
auctioneer, placing the Bill of Rights on the auction block. If the price is right, the search and
seizure clause will be sold. Open your Swiss bank account to us and we will award you the search
and seizure clause. You can keep it in your private safe.

Alternatively, the argument looks on the present government as hostage to the hoarders of hidden
wealth. The hoarders will release the hidden health if the ransom price is paid and the ransom
price is the Bill of Rights, specifically the due process in the search and seizure clauses. So, there
is something positively revolving about either argument. The Bill of Rights is not for sale to the
highest bidder nor can it be used to ransom captive dollars. This nation will survive and grow
strong, only if it would become convinced of the values enshrined in the Constitution of a price
that is beyond monetary estimation.

For these reasons, the honorable course for the Constitutional Commission is to delete all of
Section 8 of the committee report and allow the new Constitution to take effect in full vigor. If
Section 8 is deleted, the PCGG has two options. First, it can pursue the Salonga and the Romulo
argument that what the PCGG has been doing has been completely within the pale of the law. If
sustained, the PCGG can go on and should be able to go on, even without the support of Section
8. If not sustained, however, the PCGG has only one honorable option, it must bow to the majesty
of the Bill of Rights.

The PCGG extrapolation of the law is defended by staunch Christians. Let me conclude with what
another Christian replied when asked to toy around with the law. From his prison cell, Thomas
 More said, "I'll give the devil benefit of law for my nations safety sake. I ask the Commission to
give the devil benefit of law for our nations sake. And we should delete Section 8.

Thank you, Madam President. (Emphasis supplied)

Despite the impassioned plea by Commissioner Bernas against the amendment

excepting sequestration orders from the Bill of Rights, the Constitutional Commission still adopted the
amendment as Section 26,[44] Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution. The framers of the Constitution were
fully aware that absent Section 26, sequestration orders would not stand the test of due process under the
Bill of Rights.

Thus, to rule that the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution remained in force during the interregnum,
absent a constitutional provision excepting sequestration orders from such Bill of Rights, would clearly
render all sequestration orders void during the interregnum. Nevertheless, even during the interregnum
the Filipino people continued to enjoy, under the Covenant and the Declaration, almost the same rights
found in the Bill of Rights of the 1973 Constitution.

The revolutionary government, after installing itself as the de jure government, assumed responsibility
for the States good faith compliance with the Covenant to which the Philippines is a signatory. Article 2(1)
of the Covenant requires each signatory State to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory
and subject to its jurisdiction the rights[45] recognized in the present Covenant. Under Article 17(1) of the
Covenant, the revolutionary government had the duty to insure that [n]o one shall be subjected to
arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence.

The Declaration, to which the Philippines is also a signatory, provides in its Article 17(2) that [n]o one
shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property. Although the signatories to the Declaration did not intend it as
a legally binding document, being only a declaration, the Court has interpreted the Declaration as part of
the generally accepted principles of international law and binding on the State. [46] Thus, the revolutionary
government was also obligated under international law to observe the rights [47] of individuals under the
Declaration.

The revolutionary government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration during the
interregnum. Whether the revolutionary government could have repudiated all its obligations under the
Covenant or the Declaration is another matter and is not the issue here. Suffice it to say that the Court
considers the Declaration as part of customary international law, and that Filipinos as human beings are
proper subjects of the rules of international law laid down in the Covenant. The fact is the revolutionary
government did not repudiate the Covenant or the Declaration in the same way it repudiated the 1973
Constitution. As the de jure government, the revolutionary government could not escape responsibility for
the States good faith compliance with its treaty obligations under international law.

It was only upon the adoption of the Provisional Constitution on 25 March 1986 that the directives and
orders of the revolutionary government became subject to a higher municipal law that, if contravened,
rendered such directives and orders void. The Provisional Constitution adopted verbatim the Bill of Rights
of the 1973 Constitution.[48] The Provisional Constitution served as a self-limitation by the revolutionary
government to avoid abuses of the absolute powers entrusted to it by the people.

During the interregnum when no constitution or Bill of Rights existed, directives and orders issued by
government officers were valid so long as these officers did not exceed the authority granted them by the
revolutionary government. The directives and orders should not have also violated the Covenant or the
Declaration. In this case, the revolutionary government presumptively sanctioned the warrant since the
revolutionary government did not repudiate it. The warrant, issued by a judge upon proper application,
specified the items to be searched and seized. The warrant is thus valid with respect to the items
specifically described in the warrant.
 However, the Constabulary raiding team seized items not included in the warrant. As admitted by
petitioners witnesses, the raiding team confiscated items not included in the warrant, thus:

Direct Examination of Capt. Rodolfo Sebastian

AJ AMORES

Q. According to the search warrant, you are supposed to seize only for weapons. What else,
aside from the weapons, were seized from the house of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?

A. The communications equipment, money in Philippine currency and US dollars, some

jewelries, land titles, sir.

Q. Now, the search warrant speaks only of weapons to be seized from the house of Elizabeth
Dimaano. Do you know the reason why your team also seized other properties not
mentioned in said search warrant?

A. During the conversation right after the conduct of said raid, I was informed that the reason
why they also brought the other items not included in the search warrant was because
the money and other jewelries were contained in attach cases and cartons with
markings Sony Trinitron, and I think three (3) vaults or steel safes. Believing that the
attach cases and the steel safes were containing firearms, they forced open these
containers only to find out that they contained money.

xxx

Q. You said you found money instead of weapons, do you know the reason why your team
seized this money instead of weapons?

A. I think the overall team leader and the other two officers assisting him decided to bring
along also the money because at that time it was already dark and they felt most
secured if they will bring that because they might be suspected also of taking money
out of those items, your Honor.[49]

Cross-examination

Atty. Banaag

Q. Were you present when the search warrant in connection with this case was applied before
the Municipal Trial Court of Batangas, Branch 1?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And the search warrant applied for by you was for the search and seizure of five (5) baby
armalite rifles M-16 and five (5) boxes of ammunition?

A. Yes, sir.

xxx

AJ AMORES
 Q. Before you applied for a search warrant, did you conduct surveillance in the house of Miss
Elizabeth Dimaano?

A. The Intelligence Operatives conducted surveillance together with the MSU elements, your
Honor.

Q. And this party believed there were weapons deposited in the house of Miss Elizabeth
Dimaano?

A. Yes, your Honor.

Q. And they so swore before the Municipal Trial Judge?

A. Yes, your Honor.

Q. But they did not mention to you, the applicant for the search warrant, any other properties
or contraband which could be found in the residence of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?

A. They just gave us still unconfirmed report about some hidden items, for instance, the
communications equipment and money. However, I did not include that in the
application for search warrant considering that we have not established concrete
evidence about that. So when

Q. So that when you applied for search warrant, you had reason to believe that only weapons
were in the house of Miss Elizabeth Dimaano?

A. Yes, your Honor.[50]

xxx

Q. You stated that a .45 caliber pistol was seized along with one armalite rifle M-16 and how
many ammunition?

A. Forty, sir.

Q. And this became the subject of your complaint with the issuing Court, with the fiscals
office who charged Elizabeth Dimaano for Illegal Possession of Firearms and
Ammunition?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Do you know what happened to that case?

A. I think it was dismissed, sir.

Q. In the fiscals office?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Because the armalite rifle you seized, as well as the .45 caliber pistol had a Memorandum
Receipt in the name of Felino Melegrito, is that not correct?

A. I think that was the reason, sir.

 Q. There were other articles seized which were not included in the search warrant, like for
instance, jewelries. Why did you seize the jewelries?

A. I think it was the decision of the overall team leader and his assistant to bring along also
the jewelries and other items, sir. I do not really know where it was taken but they
brought along also these articles. I do not really know their reason for bringing the
same, but I just learned that these were taken because they might get lost if they will
just leave this behind.

xxx

Q. How about the money seized by your raiding team, they were not also included in the
search warrant?

A. Yes sir, but I believe they were also taken considering that the money was discovered to be
contained in attach cases. These attach cases were suspected to be containing pistols
or other high powered firearms, but in the course of the search the contents turned out
to be money. So the team leader also decided to take this considering that they believed
that if they will just leave the money behind, it might get lost also.

Q. That holds true also with respect to the other articles that were seized by your raiding
team, like Transfer Certificates of Title of lands?

A. Yes, sir. I think they were contained in one of the vaults that were opened. [51]

It is obvious from the testimony of Captain Sebastian that the warrant did not include the monies,
communications equipment, jewelry and land titles that the raiding team confiscated.The search warrant
did not particularly describe these items and the raiding team confiscated them on its own authority. The
raiding team had no legal basis to seize these items without showing that these items could be the subject
of warrantless search and seizure. [52] Clearly, the raiding team exceeded its authority when it seized these
items.

The seizure of these items was therefore void, and unless these items are contraband per se,[53] and
they are not, they must be returned to the person from whom the raiding seized them. However, we do not
declare that such person is the lawful owner of these items, merely that the search and seizure warrant
could not be used as basis to seize and withhold these items from the possessor. We thus hold that these
items should be returned immediately to Dimaano.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The questioned Resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan dated 18 November 1991 and 25 March 1992 in Civil Case No. 0037, remanding the
records of this case to the Ombudsman for such appropriate action as the evidence may warrant, and
referring this case to the Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for a determination of any tax
liability of respondent Elizabeth Dimaano, are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 147607. January 22, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. BENHUR MAMARIL, appellant.
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen,
Pangasinan, Branch 39, in Criminal Case No. L-5963, finding appellant Benhur Mamaril guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Section 8[1] of Republic Act (RA) No. 6425, as amended by RA No. 7659.
The Information filed against appellant reads:
That on or about the 1st day of February, 1999 and sometime prior thereto, in the municipality of Lingayen,
province of Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, willfully, unlawfully and criminally [did] keep and possess crushed marijuana leaves contained in
seventy eight (78) sachets with a total weight of two hundred thirty six and eighty three hundredth
(236.83) grams and two (2) bricks of marijuana fruiting tops weighing one thousand six hundred grams,
each brick weighing eight hundred (800) grams, with a total weight of one thousand eight hundred thirty
six and eighty three hundredth (1,836.83) grams, a prohibited drug, without authority to possess the
same.
CONTRARY to Sec. 8 of R.A. 6425, as amended by R.A. 7659, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act
of 1972.[2]
When arraigned on October 8, 1999, appellant pleaded not guilty. [3] At the pre-trial conference held on
October 18, 1999, the parties admitted the following facts:
1. That the search was made in the house and premises of the parents of the accused where he (accused)
also lives, at Ramos St., Lingayen, Pangasinan, on February 1, 1999 at about 2:30 o clock in the afternoon;
2. That the search was conducted by the elements of the PNP particularly SPO4 Faustino Ferrer, SPO1
Alfredo Rico and others;
3. That the policemen brought along with them a camera;
4. That the accused was in the balcony of the house when it was searched;
5. The existence of the report of physical science report No. (DT-077-99) issued by the PNP Crime
Laboratory through Chemist Theresa Ann Bugayong Cid;
6. That accused was subjected to urine sample laboratory on February 2, 1999. [4]
Thereafter, trial ensued.
The Prosecutions Evidence
On January 25, 1999, the Intelligence Section PNCO of the Lingayen Police Station, represented by SPO2
Chito S. Esmenda, applied[5] before the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 39, for a
search warrant authorizing the search for marijuana, a prohibited drug, at the family residence of appellant
Benhur Mamaril, situated at Ramos Street, Poblacion, Lingayen, Pangasinan. On said date, then presiding
Executive Judge Eugenio G. Ramos (now retired) issued Search Warrant No. 99-51. [6]
On February 1, 1999, at about 2:30 p.m., the Chief of Police of the Lingayen Police Station, SPO3 Alfredo
Rico, SPO4 Faustino Ferrer, Jr. and other police officers went to the residence of appellant and implemented
Search Warrant No. 99-51. When they arrived at appellants house, they saw appellants mother under the
house. They asked her where appellant was, and she told them that appellant was in the house,
upstairs. When they went upstairs, they saw appellant coming out of the room. Upon seeing the
policemen, appellant turned back and tried to run towards the back door. SPO3 Rico told appellant to stop,
which appellant did. SPO3 Rico informed appellant that they had a search warrant to search the house
premises.They showed appellant and his mother the search warrant. Appellant looked at the search
warrant and did not say anything. Thereafter, the policemen searched the house. The search was
witnessed by two members of the barangay council in said area, namely, Barangay Kagawad Leonardo
Ramos and Barangay Tanod Valentino Quintos, whom the police brought with them. [7]
The searching team confiscated the following: (1) fifty-five (55) heat-sealed plastic sachets containing
suspected marijuana leaves, which were found in a buri bag (bayong) under appellants house; (2) three
heat-sealed plastic sachets containing suspected marijuana leaves and seeds contained in an eye-glass
case; (3) twenty-two (22) heat-sealed plastic sachets containing suspected marijuana leaves and seeds
taken under a pillow placed on a monobloc chair; and (4) two (2) bricks of suspected marijuana contained
inside a white and gray bag found inside the closet of appellants room. SPO3 Alfredo Rico took pictures [8] of
the confiscated items and prepared a receipt[9] of the property seized. SPO4 Faustino Ferrer, Jr. prepared a
certification[10] that the house was properly searched, which was signed by appellant and the barangay
officials who witnessed the search. After the search, the police officers brought appellant and the
confiscated articles to the Lingayen Police Station and turned them over to the desk officer. [11]
The next day, on February 2, 1999, police officers Alfredo Rico, Alberto Santiago and Rodolfo Madrid
brought the confiscated articles to the Crime Laboratory at Camp Florendo, San Fernando, La Union for
examination. Appellant was also brought there for a drug test.[12]
Police Superintendent Ma. Theresa Ann Bugayong Cid, forensic chemist and head of the PNP Crime
Laboratory, Regional Office I, Camp Florendo, Parian, San Fernando City, La Union, testified that on
February 2, 1999, she received from the Chief of Police of Lingayen, Pangasinan, a request [13] for a drug
test on the person of appellant Benhur Mamaril and a laboratory examination of the confiscated
specimens.[14] After weighing the specimens and testing the same, Police Superintendent Cid issued a
report[15] finding the specimens[16] to be POSITIVE to the test for the presence of marijuana x x x. [17]
Moreover, Police Superintendent Cid affirmed the findings in her report[18] that the examination conducted
on the urine sample of appellant was positive for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride known
as shabu.[19]
After the prosecution formally offered its testimonial and documentary exhibits on March 5, 2000,
appellant, through his counsel, filed a motion with memorandum[20] contending that: (1) the exhibits of the
prosecution are inadmissible in evidence under Section 2 and Section 3 (2) of Article III (Bill of Rights) of
the 1987 Constitution as the search warrant, by virtue of which said exhibits were seized, was illegally
issued, considering that the judges examination of the complainant and his two witnesses was not in
writing; and (2) said search warrant was illegally or improperly implemented. Appellant prayed that all the
exhibits of the prosecution be excluded as evidence or in the alternative, that the resolution of the
admissibility of the same be deferred until such time that he has completed the presentation of his
evidence in chief. On August 25, 2000, the prosecution opposed the motion, and the trial court denied
appellants motion.[21]
The Defenses Evidence
Appellant Benhur Mamaril, 31, single, laborer, denied that he was residing at his parents house at Ramos
Street, Lingayen, Pangasinan since he has been residing at a rented house at Barangay Matic-matic, Sta.
Barabara, Pangasinan since December 18, 1998. Appellant declared that on February 1, 1999, it was his
brother and the latters family who were residing with his mother at Ramos Street, but on said day, his
brother and family were not in the house since they were at the fishpond. [22]
Appellant testified that on February 1, 1999, he was at his parents house at Ramos Street, Lingayen,
Pangasinan, because he and his live-in partner visited his mother on said day and arrived there at 10:00
a.m. At about 2:00 p.m. of February 1, 1999, while appellant was at the back of his parents house, about
seven to nine policemen, in civilian clothes, arrived. The policemen asked appellant to go upstairs and they
immediately handcuffed him and brought him to the balcony of the house. He stayed at the balcony until
the search was finished after more than 30 minutes. Thereafter, he was brought to the clinic of one Dr.
Felix and a medical examination was conducted on him. Then he was brought to the municipal hall.[23]
Appellant testified that he saw the buri bag, the eye-glass case, and the gray and white bag containing
suspected marijuana for the first time on the day of the search when he was at the balcony of their house.
He also testified that he saw the Receipt of Property Seized for the first time while he was testifying in
court. He admitted that the signature on the certification that the house was properly searched was his.[24]
Moreover, appellant testified that in the early morning of February 2, 1999, he was brought to the PNP
Crime Laboratory in San Fernando, La Union where he gave his urine sample. Appellant insinuated that the
confiscated items were only planted because he had a misunderstanding with some policemen in
Lingayen. However, he admitted that the policemen who searched his parents house did not threaten or
harm him in any way and he had no misunderstanding with SPO3 Alfredo Rico. [25]
Atty. Enrico O. Castillo, Branch Clerk of Court, RTC-Branch 39, Lingayen, Pangasinan, was requested to
testify on the available records regarding Search Warrant No. 99-51 on file in the trial court and to identify
said documents. Atty. Castillo testified that he only had with him the application for search warrant, the
supporting affidavits of PO3 Alberto Santiago and Diosdado Fernandez and the return of the search
warrant.[26]
Atty. Enrico declared that before he assumed office as Branch Clerk of Court, the person supposed to be in
custody of any transcript of the searching questions and answers made by Executive Judge Eugenio G.
Ramos in connection with the application for Search Warrant No. 99-51 was Mrs. Liberata Ariston, who was
then a legal researcher and at the same time OIC-Branch Clerk of Court. However, during the trial of this
case, Mrs. Liberata Ariston was in the United States of America. Atty. Enrico averred that he asked Mrs.
Liberata Aristons daughter, Catherine Ramirez, who is a court stenographer, about said transcript, but it
has not been found. Atty. Enrico testified that based on the records, there is no stenographic notes. He
added that they tried their best to locate the subject transcript, but they could not find it. [27]
The Trial Courts Decision
On January 23, 2001, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution having established beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused of the
crime of possession of marijuana defined and penalized under Section 8 of RA 6425, as amended, this
Court in the absence of any modifying circumstances, hereby sentences said accused to suffer the penalty
of RECLUSION PERPETUA and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000), plus costs of this
suit.
The period of preventive imprisonment suffered by the accused shall be credited in full in service of his
sentence in accordance with Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
SO ORDERED.[28]
The Appeal
Appellant contends that the trial court made the following errors:
I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING AS INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE THE ARTICLES ALLEGEDLY
SEIZED FROM ACCUSED-APPELLANT CONSIDERING THAT SEARCH WARRANT NO. 99-51 WAS ILLEGALLY
ISSUED.
II
THE TRIAL COURT LIKEWISE ERRED IN NOT DECLARING AS TOTALLY INADMISSIBLE THE INVENTORIED
ARTICLES IN THE RECEIPT OF SEIZED PROPERTY AND THE CORRESPONDING CERTIFICATION ISSUED
THERETO (EXHS. J AND I) SINCE THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS NOT ASSISTED BY COUNSEL WHEN HE
SIGNED THE SAME.
III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE
FACT THAT HIS GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.[29]
Appellant prays for his acquittal on the ground that Search Warrant No. 99-51 was illegally issued
considering that there was no evidence showing that the required searching questions and answers were
made anent the application for said search warrant. Appellant pointed out that Branch Clerk of Court
Enrico O. Castillo testified that based on the records, there was no transcript of stenographic notes of the
proceedings in connection with the application for said search warrant. Appellant thus asserts that it
cannot be said that the judge made searching questions upon the alleged applicant and his witnesses,
which is in violation of Section 2, Article III of the Constitution and Section 5, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court.
Our Ruling
Appellants contention is meritorious.
The right against unreasonable searches and seizures is guaranteed under Article III, Section 2, of the
Constitution, thus:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by
the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.
Said Constitutional provision is implemented under Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, thus:
Sec. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant. A search warrant shall not issue except upon probable cause
in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the things to be seized which may be anywhere in the Philippines.
Sec. 5. Examination of complainant; record. -- The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally
examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath, the complainant and
the witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn
statements, together with the affidavits submitted.
Under the above provisions, the issuance of a search warrant is justified only upon a finding of probable
cause. Probable cause for a search has been defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a
reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects
sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. [30] In determining the
existence of probable cause, it is required that: (1) the judge must examine the complainant and his
witnesses personally; (2) the examination must be under oath; and (3) the examination must be reduced in
writing in the form of searching questions and answers.[31]
Atty. Enrico O. Castillo, Branch Clerk of Court, RTC-Branch 39 of Lingayen, Pangasinan, who was requested
to testify on the available records kept in their office regarding Search Warrant No. 99-51, presented before
the court only the application for search warrant [32] and the supporting affidavits[33] of PO3 Alberto Santiago
and Diosdado Fernandez. Atty. Castillo could not produce the sworn statements of the complainant and his
witnesses showing that the judge examined them in the form of searching questions and answers in
writing as required by law. Atty. Castillo testified, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Q Would you admit that from the records available there is no transcript of the proceedings of a searching
questions and answers made by the Executive Judge upon the complainant as well as the two (2)
witnesses not only in connection with application for Search Warrant 99-51 but in all of those application
covered by that record namely, 99-49, 99-50, 99-51, 99-52, 99-53 and 99-54?
A Sir, based on the records there is no transcript of [s]tenographic notes.
Q Did you not ask Catherine Ramirez, the daughter of then OIC-Mrs. Liberata Ariston about said transcript?
A I asked her for several times, sir, and in fact I asked her again yesterday and she told me that she will try
to find on (sic) the said transcript.
Q But until now there is no transcript yet?
A Yes, sir.
Q Because according to the rules the transcript must be attached to the records of this case together with
the application for search warrant as well as the supporting affidavit of the said application, but there is no
records available to have it with you and there is no proof with you?
A Because during the time I assumed the office, sir, the records in the store room which they placed is
topsy turvy and all the records are scattered. So, we are having a hard time in scanning the records, sir.
Q But did you not try your very best assisted by the Court personnel to locate said transcript, Mr. Witness?
A Sir, we tried our best but based on the transcript I can not just read the said transcript.
Q You mean to say you were able to [find] the stenographic notes?
A No, sir. There are stenographic notes but they are not yet transcribed, sir.
Q That is by a machine steno?
A Yes, sir.
Q Did you not ask the assistance of the co-stenographers in your sala who are using the machine steno to
identify what cases does that stenographic notes (sic)?
A Sir, I was assisted by some stenographers but we can (sic) not find the transcript of
stenographic notes concerning Search Warrant No. 99-49 to 99-54.[34] (Underscoring ours)
Based on the above testimony and the other evidence on record, the prosecution failed to prove that
Executive Judge Eugenio G. Ramos put into writing his examination of the applicant and his witnesses in
the form of searching questions and answers before issuance of the search warrant. The records only show
the existence of an application[35] for a search warrant and the affidavits[36] of the complainants witnesses.
In Mata v. Bayona,[37] we held:
Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not sufficient. The examining Judge has to
take depositions in writing of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and to attach them to
the record. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly determine
the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will
be found later that his declarations are false.
We, therefore, hold that the search warrant is tainted with illegality by the failure of the Judge to conform
with the essential requisites of taking the depositions in writing and attaching them to the record,
rendering the search warrant invalid.
We cannot give credit to the argument of the Solicitor General that the issuing judge examined under oath,
in the form of searching questions and answers, the applicant SPO2 Chito S. Esmenda and his witnesses on
January 25, 1999 as it is so stated in Search Warrant No. 99-51. Although it is possible that Judge Ramos
examined the complainant and his witnesses in the form of searching questions and answers, the fact
remains that there is no evidence that the examination was put into writing as required by law. Otherwise,
the depositions in writing of the complainant and his witnesses would have been attached to the record,
together with the affidavits that the witnesses submitted, as required by Section 5, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court. Consequently, we find untenable the assertion of the Solicitor General that the subject stenographic
notes could not be found at the time Branch Clerk of Court Enrico Castillo testified before the trial court
because of the confused state of the records in the latters branch when he assumed office.
The Solicitor General also argues that appellant is deemed to have waived his right to question the legality
of the search because he did not protest against it, and even admitted during his testimony that he was
neither threatened nor maltreated by the policemen who searched their residence.
We disagree. The cases[38] cited by the Solicitor General involved a warrantless search. In this case, the
police authorities presented a search warrant to appellant before his residence was searched. At that time,
appellant could not determine if the search warrant was issued in accordance with the law. It was only
during the trial of this case that appellant, through his counsel, had reason to believe that the search
warrant was illegally issued causing appellant to file a motion with memorandum objecting to the
admissibility of the evidence formally offered by the prosecution. In People v. Burgos,[39] we ruled:
Neither can it be presumed that there was a waiver, or that consent was given by the accused to be
searched simply because he failed to object. To constitute a waiver, it must appear first that the right
exists; secondly, that the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such a
right; and lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. (Pasion Vda. de Garcia v.
Locsin, 65 Phil. 689). The fact that the accused failed to object to the entry into his house does not amount
to a permission to make a search therein (Magoncia v. Palacio, 80 Phil. 770). As pointed out by Justice
Laurel in the case of Pasion Vda. de Garcia v. Locsin (supra):
xxxxxxxxx
x x x As the constitutional guaranty is not dependent upon any affirmative act of the citizen, the courts do
not place the citizen in the position of either contesting an officers authority by force, or waiving his
constitutional rights; but instead they hold that a peaceful submission to a search or seizure is not a
consent, or an invitation thereto, but is merely a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law. (56
C.J., pp.1180, 1181).
We apply the rule that: courts indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental
constitutional rights and that we do not presume acquiescence in the loss of fundamental rights. (Johnson
v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458).
In this case, we construe the silence of appellant at the time the policemen showed him the search warrant
as a demonstration of regard for the supremacy of the law. Moreover, appellant seasonably objected [40] on
constitutional grounds to the admissibility of the evidence seized pursuant to said warrant during the trial
of the case,[41] after the prosecution formally offered its evidence.[42] Under the circumstances, no intent to
waive his rights can reasonably be inferred from his conduct before or during the trial.
No matter how incriminating the articles taken from the appellant may be, their seizure cannot validate an
invalid warrant.[43] In Mata v. Bayona,[44] we ruled:
.[N]othing can justify the issuance of the search warrant but the fulfillment of the legal requisites. It might
be well to point out what has been said in Asian Surety & Insurance Co., Inc. vs. Herrera:
It has been said that of all the rights of a citizen, few are of greater importance or more essential to his
peace and happiness than the right of personal security, and that involves the exemption of his private
affairs, books and papers from inspection and scrutiny of others. While the power to search and seize is
necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the law enforced without transgressing the
constitutional rights of the citizens, for the enforcement of no statute is of sufficient importance to justify
indifference to the basic principles of government.
Thus, in issuing a search warrant the Judge must strictly comply with the requirements of the Constitution
and the statutory provisions. A liberal construction should be given in favor of the individual to prevent
stealthy encroachment upon, or gradual depreciation of the rights secured by the Constitution. No
presumption of regularity are to be invoked in aid of the process when an officer undertakes to justify it.
We, therefore, find that the requirement mandated by the law that the examination of the complainant and
his witnesses must be under oath and reduced to writing in the form of searching questions and answers
was not complied with, rendering the search warrant invalid. Consequently, the evidence seized pursuant
to said illegal search warrant cannot be used in evidence against appellant in accordance with Section 3
(2),[45] Article III of the Constitution.
It is unnecessary to discuss the other issues raised by appellant in seeking to exclude the evidence seized
pursuant to said illegal search warrant.
Without the aforesaid illegally obtained evidence, there is no sufficient basis to sustain the conviction of
appellant.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Lingayen, Pangasinan, Branch 39, in Criminal
Case No. L-5963, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Judgment is hereby rendered declaring Search Warrant No.
99-51 NULL and VOID and the search and seizure made at appellants residence illegal. For lack of evidence
to establish appellants guilt beyond reasonable doubt, appellant BENHUR MAMARIL is
hereby ACQUITTED and ordered RELEASED from confinement unless he is being held for some other legal
grounds.
The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ORDERED to IMPLEMENT without delay this Decision and
to INFORM this Court, within ten (10) days from receipt hereof, of the date appellant was actually released
from confinement.
The confiscated marijuana is ORDERED forfeited in favor of the State and the trial court is hereby directed
to deliver or cause its delivery to the Dangerous Drugs Board for proper disposition.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 199034 (Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo vs. Hon. Leila M. De Lima, in her capacity as Secretary of the
Department of Justice and Ricardo A. David, Jr., in his capacity as Commissioner of the Bureau of
Immigration) and G.R. No. 199046 (Jose Miguel T. Arroyo vs. Hon. Leila M. De Lima, in her capacity as
Secretary, Department of Justice, Ricardo V. Paras III, in his capacity as Chief State Counsel, Department of
Justice and Ricardo A. David, Jr., in his capacity as Commissioner, Bureau of Immigration)

This is in response to the Dissenting Opinions of Justices Antonio T. Carpio and Maria Lourdes P.A. Sereno in
relation to the Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) issued by the Court on November l5, 2011 pursuant to
its Resolution of even date. In its relevant part, the November 15, 2011 Resolution provided as follows:
x x x Acting on the Special Civil Actions for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction, and mindful of the underlying issues in
the cases the right to life (which is the highest right under the Constitution) and its supporting rights,
including the right to travel the Court Resolved to
(a) CONSOLIDATE the above-entitled cases;

(b) REQUIRE the respondents to COMMENT on the consolidated petitions NOT LATER THAN
NOVEMBER 18, 2011;

(c) ISSUE a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER in the consolidated petitions, enjoining the respondents
from enforcing or implementing DOJ Department Circular No. 41 and Watchlist Order Nos. ASM-11-237
dated August 9, 2011, 2011-422 dated September 6, 2011 and 2011-573 dated October 27, 2011, subject
to the following conditions:

(i) The petitioners shall post a cash bond of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00) payable to this
Court within five (5) days from notice hereof. Failure to post the bond within the aforesaid period will result
in the automatic lifting of the temporary restraining order;

(ii) The petitioners shall appoint a legal representative common to both of them who will receive
subpoena, orders and other legal processes on their behalf during their absence. The petitioners shall
submit the name of the legal representative, also within five (5) days from notice hereof; and

(iii) If there is a Philippine embassy or consulate in the place where they will be traveling, the
petitioners shall inform said embassy or consulate by personal appearance or by phone of their
whereabouts at all times; and

(d) SET the consolidated cases for ORAL ARGUMENTS on November 22, 2011 x x x.
The temporary restraining order shall be immediately executory. Justices Antonio T. Carpio and Bienvenido
L. Reyes have reserved the right to submit their dissenting opinions. Leonardo-De Castro, J., on official
business. Del Castillo, J., on official leave. (adv156 & 157)
The above Resolution was followed by the related November 18, 2011 and November 22, 2011
Resolutions, pertinently reading:

November 18, 2011 Resolution

On November 15, 2011, the Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining Secretary of Justice Leila
M. De Lima, her agents, representatives, or persons acting in her place or stead, from enforcing or
implementing DOJ Department Circular No. 41 and Watchlist Order Nos. ASM-11-237 dated August 9, 2011,
2011-422 dated September 6, 2011 and 2011-573 dated October 27, 2011. To date, it appears that
Secretary De Lima has effectively prevented petitioners Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and Jose Miguel T. Arroyo
from leaving the country.
Accordingly, on motion of the petitioners, the Court Resolved to require Secretary De Lima to (a) SHOW
CAUSE, within a NON-EXTENDIBLE period of ten (10) days from notice hereof, why she should not be
disciplinary dealt with or held in contempt for failure to comply with the temporary restraining order and
(b) IMMEDIATELY COMPLY with the said temporary restraining order by allowing petitioners to leave the
country.
November 22, 2011 Resolution
On November 18, 2011, the Court, by a vote of 7-6, found that there was no sufficient compliance with the
second condition of the Temporary Restraining Order issued on November 15, 2011. However, by a vote of
7-6, the Court ruled that the TRO was not suspended pending compliance with the second condition. Thus,
the Court resolved to CLARIFY that the TRO was not suspended even with the finding that there was no
full compliance with the conditions of the TRO.

The Court further Resolved to

(a) REQUIRE the petitioners to COMMENT, within ten (10) days from today, on the Urgent
Manifestation with Motion to Lift Temporary Restraining Order dated November 18, 2011 filed by the Office
of the Solicitor General (OSG) for public respondents [x x x];
(b) NOTE the Supplemental Compliance dated November 18, 2011 filed by Atty. Ferdinand S. Topacio,
submitting the Special Powers of Attorney from Mrs. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo and Mr. Jose Miguel Arroyo
pursuant to the resolution dated November l8, 20ll;
(c) NOTE the aforesaid Special Powers of Attorney authorizing him, among others, to receive
summons, subpoenas, orders and other legal processes, and to submit documentary evidence.
In its En Banc session of November 29, 2011, the Court revoted on the issue of whether or not the TRO was
suspended pending compliance by the petitioners of condition (ii) on the requirement to appoint their legal
representative. This issue was no longer reflected in the adverted November 22, 2011 Resolution.
Unpromulgated Dissenting Opinion of Justice Sereno filed late and in contravention of Section
2, Rule 10 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court (IRSC)
When, as earlier indicated, the En Banc Court conducted a revote on the question bearing on the
suspension of the TRO pending compliance with the appointment of petitioners legal representative, a
majority of 7 members categorically voted that the TRO was not suspended. The revote, to stress, was
held to clarify the correctness of the directives contained in the Courts November 22, 2011 Resolution on
the same issue.
After the vote, Justice Sereno, when asked when she would submit her dissenting opinion thereon,
committed to do so on December 1, 2011, a self-imposed deadline. As it turned out, her opinion was
belatedly filed only on December 2, 2011 (a Friday) at 4 p.m. She did not even circulated a letter asking for
an extension of time to submit her opinion. Her late submission effectively prevented me from responding
to her opinion since I was already booked to leave for Jakarta on December 4, 2011 to attend the ASEAN
Chief Justices Roundtable on Environment. Accordingly, I requested Atty. Enriqueta E. Vidal to hold in
abeyance the promulgation of Justice Serenos opinion so that the matter of the promulgation could be
discussed in the December 6, 2011 En Banc session. I could have had filed a separate opinion on her
dissent had she filed it on December 1, 2011. For then, I would have the rest of December 1 and the whole
day of December 2, 2011 to prepare and submit one.
There is yet another reason why I felt the dissent should not be promulgated until the validity thereof is
discussed by the En Banc. In my view, the disclosures made in Justice Serenos dissent may constitute a
breach of Sec. 2, Rule 10 of the IRSC which reads:
Sec. 2. Confidentiality of court sessions.Court sessions are executive in character, with only the Members
of the Court present. Court deliberations are confidential and shall not be disclosed to outside
parties, except as may be provided herein or as authorized by the Court.
The Chief Justice or the Division Chairperson shall record the action or actions taken in each case for
transmittal to the Clerk of Court or Division Clerk of Court after each session. The notes of the Chief Justice
and the Division Chairperson, which the Clerk of Court and the Division Clerks of Court must treat with
strict confidentiality, shall be the bases of the minutes of the sessions.
The following confidential matters, discussed during the November 18, 2011 session, are embodied in the
Dissenting Opinion of Justice Sereno promulgated on the same date, to wit:

1. At this mornings special session called exclusively to deliberate on the pending incidents in the above-
consolidated Petitions, the Court voted on several matters:
The first voting was on whether the Resolution dated 15 November 2011 granting the prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) by petitioners is to be reconsidered or not. The justices who voted on the 15
November 2011 Resolution maintained the same vote, 8-5.
The issue in the second voting, proposed by one of the members of the Court, was on whether the TRO
issued by the Clerk of Court should be recalled for failure to comply with one of the conditions, Condition
Number 2, imposed for the issuance of the TRO. Condition No. 2 reads:
(ii) The petitioners shall appoint a legal representative common to both of them who will receive
subpoena, orders, and other legal processes on their behalf during their absence. The
petitioners shall submit the name of the legal representative, also within five (5) days from notice hereof;
(Emphasis supplied.)
On this matter, the voting was 76[1] finding that there was no compliance with the second condition of the
TRO.
The third voting proceeded from the result of the second voting whether, considering that the Court found
that there was a failure to comply with a condition imposed by the earlier resolution, the Court should
explicitly state that the TRO was thereby suspended in the meantime pending compliance with Condition
Number 2. The Court, by a vote of 7-6, decided there was no need to explicitly state the legal effect on the
TRO of the noncompliance by petitioners with Condition Number 2 of the earlier Resolution.
The fourth vote that was taken was on whether the Court would direct public respondents to show cause
why they should not be held in contempt for failure to comply with the TRO and to comply therewith. The
vote was unanimous.
The fifth vote was on whether public respondent DOJ Secretary should be ordered to also show cause why
she should not be held in contempt for showing disrespect for the Court. The voting on this was 9-4.
The sixth voting was on whether to reset the schedule of the oral arguments. This was unanimously
denied.[2]

2. The Court, motu proprio, even without the motion from petitioners herein, is ordering public respondent
De Lima to show cause why she should not be held for indirect contempt by showing disrespect to the
Court. The majority has explained that this order is anyway, to just require an explanation from her, and is
thus not out of the ordinary.[3]
3. The majority, by a 7-6 voting, denied the minoritys proposition that a resolution be issued including a
phrase that the TRO is suspended pending compliance with the second condition of the 15 November 2011
Resolution. The majority argued that such a clarification is unnecessary, because it is clear that the TRO is
conditional, and cannot be made use of until compliance has been done. It was therefore the sense of the
majority that, as an offshoot of the winning vote that there was failure by petitioners to comply with
Condition Number 2, the TRO is implicitly deemed suspended until there is compliance with such condition.
Everyone believed that it would be clear to all that a conditional TRO is what it is, conditional. [4]
4. Contrary to this interpretation, as stated, it was the understanding of a majority that the TRO is
suspended pending compliance with our earlier Resolution. [5]

On the other hand, the unpromulgated dissenting opinion of Justice Sereno contained the following
confidential matters:
1. To recall, my Dissenting Opinion of 18 November 2011 consisted of two parts: (1) a narration of the
voting that took place in the morning; and (2) the reason why my Dissent to the Decision of the majority to
grant the temporary restraining order (TRO) in favor of petitioners continues. [6]

2. What took place in the En Banc morning sessions of the 15th, 18th, and 22nd of November 2011 has been
placed on record by Justice Antonio T. Carpio in a letter to Chief Justice Renato C. Corona and circulated to
all the members of the Court on the morning of 24 November 2011.
The letter reads:
24 November 2011
The CHIEF JUSTICE
Supreme Court
May I suggest that the issuance of the attached Resolution dated 22 November 2011, which is supposed to
clarify the Resolution dated 18 November 2011, be held in abeyance until the En Banc has a chance to
go over the same. Instead of clarifying the Resolution dated 18 November 2011, the attached Resolution
compounds the error in the Resolution dated 18 November 2011. (Underlining supplied)
You will recall that during the En Banc meeting last 18 November 2011,[7] the En Banc, after a long
discussion, voted on the following issues:
1. That petitioners did not comply with condition (ii) for the issuance of the TRO (voting was 7-6 with
Carpio, Abad, Villarama, Mendoza, Sereno, Reyes and Bernabe as the majority);

2. That there is no need to state in the Resolution that the TRO is suspended until petitioners comply
with condition (ii), that is, petitioners will simply be directed to comply with condition (ii) for the issuance of
the TRO (voting was 7-6, with Corona, Velasco, Brion, Peralta, Bersamin, Abad, and Perez as the majority).
This vote was taken after Justice Abad stated that since condition (ii) for the issuance of the TRO was not
complied with, there was no need to state that the TRO is suspended since it is common sense that the
TRO cannot take effect unless all the conditions are satisfied. I had earlier proposed that the Court recall
the TRO for non-compliance of condition (ii) but Justice Abads response was that it need not be recalled
because its effectivity is deemed suspended pending compliance with condition (ii). After all, Justice Abad
said, it will take only 10 minutes for the amended Special Power of Attorney to be submitted by Atty.
Topacio.
However, the Resolution dated 18 November 2011 did not reflect at all item 1. The Resolution merely
stated that petitioners are directed to comply with condition (ii) for the issuance of the TRO, which
correctly reflects item 2. Thus, in the En Banc meeting last 22 November 2011, I suggested that the En
Banc clarify the Resolution dated 15 November 2011 to reflect item 1 above. The En Banc agreed, and no
one objected. Justice Velasco was designated to draft the clarificatory Resolution.
Justice Carpios confidential letter aforementioned became part of the discussion during the En
Banc session on November 29, 2011 which ought not to be divulged to the public.

3. The letter of Justice Carpio was taken up on the morning of 29 November 2011. While Justice Roberto A.
Abad had argued on 18 November 2011 that the suspensive effect of non-compliance with condition (ii)
need no longer be stated, as it is common sense, this time he voted unequivocably that despite non-
compliance with condition (ii), the TRO is nevertheless not suspended. [9]

4. The voting taken on 29 November 2011 was of the same composition as that of the 18 November 2011
voting. Justices Carpio, Abad, Martin S. Villarama, Jr., Jose C. Mendoza, Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno,
Bienvenido L. Reyes and Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe as the first majority group maintain that there was no
compliance with condition (ii). Then the majority grouping shifted when Justice Abad as he did on 18
November joined Chief Justice Corona and Justices Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., Arturo D. Brion, Diosdado M.
Peralta, Lucas P. Bersamin, and Jose P. Perez to comprise the majority. This time, however, the majority
categorically voted to declare the non-suspension of the TRO despite non-compliance with condition
(ii). There was therefore, in every sense of the word, a revision of the second majority groups vote, which
now has the effect of reversing their earlier ruling. This is not strange, as any clarification of an earlier vote
can result in a very substantive revision of that earlier vote. I requested two (2) days to write my Dissent.
[10]

5. When the resolution came out, it was not, with all due respect, a fully accurate reflection of what took
place; thus, the sentences in my Dissent advising the acting chief of the PIO to desist from interpreting our
actions, the letter of Justice Carpio, and the need for a re-voting by the En Banc on 29 November 2011.
This incident demonstrates an existing gap between the actual discussion and the voting results that take
place in an En Banc session and their reflection in written form via an unsigned resolution. [11]
Justice Serenos unpromulgated dissenting opinion appears to me as a clear breach of Sec. 2, Rule 10 of the
IRSC, which pronounces, in an unequivocal manner, that Court deliberations are confidential and shall not
be disclosed to outside parties, except as may be provided herein (IRSC) or as authorized by the Court. The
aforesaid excerpts from the promulgated November 18, 2011 Dissenting Opinion and the unpromulgated
Dissenting Opinion of Justice Sereno are confidential matters taken up during the November 18, 2011 and
November 29, 2011 En Banc sessions. They cannot be incorporated in an opinion of a member of the
Court as this will be tantamount to a proscribed disclosure to outside parties even if contained in an
opinion. Justice Sereno has not shown that such disclosure is allowed by any rule of the IRSC or authorized
by the Court.
More importantly, it is the Chief Justices task under Sec. 2, Rule 10 of the IRSC to record the action or
actions taken in each case. The notes of the Chief Justice shall be the bases of the minutes of the session
which, in turn, resolutions shall be predicated upon. Nowhere in the Rules does it say that a member can
incorporate the deliberations in his/her opinion. This caveat is to obviate the possibility of conflicting
statements of facts that will likely arise especially if the member takes a contrary position to that of the
majority.Justice Sereno, by stating what are allegedly the result of the deliberations of the En Banc and the
votation on cases or incidents, appears to encroach into the functions of the Chief Justice. This should not
be countenanced as once a vote is taken on an issue, the majority view then becomes that of the Court. To
say that such was not the case, as is the position of J. Sereno, would sow doubt and suspicion on the
veracity of the resolutions of the en banc as authenticated by the Clerk of Court. Else the stability of
judicial decisions and resolutions is compromised.
Accordingly, I recommend that the portions of the unpromulgated Dissenting Opinion of Justice Sereno
delving on what under the Rules are considered confidential be expunged for being violative of Sec. 2, Rule
10 of the IRSC. In the same token, confidential matters contained in this separate opinion should likewise
be expunged in the event the Court decides to adopt the recommendation herein made. It should be made
clear, however, that what impelled me to include matters in this opinion that only members of the Court
ought to know is to show that, should the dissenting opinion of Justice Sereno be promulgated in its
present form, it in itself is a departure from the IRSC.
The TRO authorized by the November l5, 20ll Resolution is immediately executory upon
compliance with the posting of the P2M bond.
The November 15, 2011 Resolution is clearThe temporary restraining order shall be immediately executory.
(Last paragraph, p. 3) This directive is qualified by item (c) of the said Resolution which prescribed three
(3) conditions:
i. the posting of the P2M bond within 5 days from notice otherwise the TRO will be automatically
lifted;
ii. the appointment of a legal representative who will receive subpoena, orders and other legal
processes during petitioners absence also within 5 days from notice; and
iii. the petitioners shall inform said embassy of their whereabouts at all times.
It is my view that petitioners are required only to post the bond of P2M to pave the way for the issuance of
the TRO. This is clear from the 2nd sentence of condition (i) that the failure to post the bond within 5 days
will result in the automatic lifting of the TRO.
While The Court ruled later in its November 22, 2011 Resolution that the special power of attorney
submitted by Atty. Topacio on November 15, 2011 was insufficient, the TRO however remained effective by
virtue of the submission of the requisite P2M bond. It should be made abundantly clear that the
qualification respecting the automatic lifting of the TRO obtaining in condition (i) was not made to apply to
condition (ii), implying that non-compliance with the requirement on the appointment of the legal
representative will not result in the lifting of the TRO. The matter of whether or not condition (ii) constitutes
a condition precedent or a subsequent condition, is now really of little moment. The important
consideration is that non-compliance with condition (ii) would not, under the very terms of the enabling
Resolution or the TRO itself, result in the automatic lifting of the restraining order thus granted.
At any rate, on November 15, 2011, petitioners complied with conditions (i) and (ii) and, as a result, the
Office of the Clerk of Court issued the TRO pursuant to the November 15, 2011 Resolution. The
presumptive validity of the TRO must be recognized, albeit the original special power of attorney accorded
Atty. Topacio was determined later to be non-compliant.
Respondent De Lima chose to ignore the TRO and so, on November 18, 2011, the Court issued a Resolution
requiring her to show cause why she should not be cited for contempt for her failure to comply with the
TRO and further require her to immediately comply thereto. Justice Carpio questioned the accuracy and
completeness of this Resolution. Thus, the Resolution in question was discussed during the November 22,
2011 session. By a vote of 7-6, the Court found that there was no sufficient compliance with the required
appointment of the legal representative of petitioners. Thereafter, there was a long discussion on whether
or not the TRO was suspended pending compliance with the second condition. I distinctly remember
moving that a vote be made on the issue of the suspension or non-suspension of the TRO pending
satisfaction of the second condition. Thus, the majority vote of 7 held that the TRO was not suspended
pending compliance with the appointment of the legal representative of petitioners. As a matter of fact, on
November 18, 2011, petitioners already submitted a special power of attorney appointing Atty. Topacio as
their legal representative to receive summons, subpoenas, orders and other legal processes. Thus, by
November 18, 2011, the issue of whether or not the TRO was suspended pending compliance with such
requirement has already become moot and academic and there is actually no necessity to clarify said
issue. However, to set the record straight, I certify that the draft directive on the non-suspension of the
TRO is correct and accurate.
On November 29, 2011, the Court En Banc voted anew on the same issue of the non-suspension of the
TRO pending compliance with the second condition and again, by a vote of 7 against 6, the Court held that
the TRO was not suspended. The majority sustained the correctness and validity of the November 22, 2011
Resolution. This should put the issue to rest.

[G.R. No. 147387. December 10, 2003]

RODOLFO C. FARIAS, MANUEL M. GARCIA, FRANCIS G. ESCUDERO, and AGAPITO A. AQUINO, AS
MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND ALSO AS TAXPAYERS, IN THEIR OWN
BEHALF AND IN REPRESENTATION OF THE MEMBERS OF THE MINORITY IN THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, petitioners, vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
HON. FELICIANO R. BELMONTE, JR., SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT,
SECRETARY OF THE SENATE, AND SECRETARY GENERAL OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, respondents.
[G.R. No. 152161. December 10, 2003]
CONG. GERRY A. SALAPUDDIN, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before the Court are two Petitions under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as amended, seeking to declare as
unconstitutional Section 14 of Republic Act No. 9006 (The Fair Election Act), insofar as it expressly repeals
Section 67 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 (The Omnibus Election Code) which provides:
SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. Any elective official, whether national or local, running for any
office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for President and Vice-
President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy.
The petition for certiorari and prohibition in G.R. No. 147387 was filed by Rodolfo C. Farias, Manuel M.
Garcia, Francis G. Escudero and Agapito A. Aquino. At the time of filing of the petition, the petitioners were
members of the minority bloc in the House of Representatives. Impleaded as respondents are: the
Executive Secretary, then Speaker of the House of Representatives Feliciano R. Belmonte, Jr., the
Commission on Elections, the Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG),
the Secretary of the Senate and the Secretary General of the House of Representatives.
The petition for prohibition in G.R. No. 152161 was filed by Gerry A. Salapuddin, then also a member of the
House of Representatives. Impleaded as respondent is the COMELEC.
Legislative History of Republic Act No. 9006
Rep. Act No. 9006, entitled An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and Credible
Elections through Fair Election Practices, is a consolidation of the following bills originating from the House
of Representatives and the Senate, respectively:
House Bill (HB) No. 9000 entitled AN ACT ALLOWING THE USE OF MASS MEDIA FOR ELECTION
PROPAGANDA, AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 881, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE
OMNIBUS ELECTION CODE, AS AMENDED, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES; [1]
Senate Bill (SB) No. 1742 entitled AN ACT TO ENHANCE THE HOLDING OF FREE, ORDERLY, HONEST,
PEACEFUL, AND CREDIBLE ELECTIONS THROUGH FAIR ELECTION PRACTICES. [2]
A Bicameral Conference Committee, composed of eight members of the Senate [3] and sixteen (16)
members of the House of Representatives,[4] was formed to reconcile the conflicting provisions of the
House and Senate versions of the bill.
On November 29, 2000, the Bicameral Conference Committee submitted its Report, [5] signed by its
members, recommending the approval of the bill as reconciled and approved by the conferees.
During the plenary session of the House of Representatives on February 5, 2001, Rep. Jacinto V. Paras
proposed an amendment to the Bicameral Conference Committee Report. Rep. Didagen P. Dilangalen
raised a point of order commenting that the House could no longer submit an amendment thereto. Rep.
Sergio A.F. Apostol thereupon moved that the House return the report to the Bicameral Conference
Committee in view of the proposed amendment thereto. Rep. Dilangalen expressed his objection to the
proposal. However, upon viva voce voting, the majority of the House approved the return of the report to
the Bicameral Conference Committee for proper action. [6]
In view of the proposed amendment, the House of Representatives elected anew its conferees [7] to the
Bicameral Conference Committee.[8] Then again, for unclear reasons, upon the motion of Rep. Ignacio R.
Bunye, the House elected another set of conferees[9] to the Bicameral Conference Committee.[10]
On February 7, 2001, during the plenary session of the House of Representatives, Rep. Bunye moved that
the House consider the Bicameral Conference Committee Report on the contrasting provisions of HB No.
9000 and SB No. 1742. Rep. Dilangalen observed that the report had been recommitted to the Bicameral
Conference Committee. The Chair responded that the Bicameral Conference Report was a new one, and
was a result of the reconvening of a new Bicameral Conference Committee. Rep. Dilangalen then asked
that he be given time to examine the new report. Upon motion of Rep. Apostol, the House deferred the
approval of the report until the other members were given a copy thereof. [11]
After taking up other pending matters, the House proceeded to vote on the Bicameral Conference
Committee Report on the disagreeing provisions of HB No. 9000 and SB No. 1742.The House approved the
report with 125 affirmative votes, 3 negative votes and no abstention. In explaining their negative votes,
Reps. Farias and Garcia expressed their belief that Section 14 thereof was a rider. Even Rep. Escudero, who
voted in the affirmative, expressed his doubts on the constitutionality of Section 14. Prior to casting his
vote, Rep. Dilangalen observed that no senator signed the Bicameral Conference Committee Report and
asked if this procedure was regular.[12]
On the same day, the Senate likewise approved the Bicameral Conference Committee Report on the
contrasting provisions of SB No. 1742 and HB No. 9000.
Thereafter, Rep. Act No. 9006 was duly signed by then Senate President Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. and then
Speaker of the House of Representatives Feliciano R. Belmonte, Jr. and was duly certified by the Secretary
of the Senate Lutgardo B. Barbo and the Secretary General of the House of Representatives Robert P.
Nazareno as the consolidation of House Bill No. 9000 and Senate Bill No. 1742, and finally passed by both
Houses on February 7, 2001.
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed Rep. Act No. 9006 into law on February 12, 2001.
The Petitioners Case
The petitioners now come to the Court alleging in the main that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, insofar as
it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, is unconstitutional for being in violation of Section
26(1), Article VI of the Constitution, requiring every law to have only one subject which should be
expressed in its title.
According to the petitioners, the inclusion of Section 14 repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code
in Rep. Act No. 9006 constitutes a proscribed rider. They point out the dissimilarity in the subject matter of
Rep. Act No. 9006, on the one hand, and Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, on the other. Rep. Act
No. 9006 primarily deals with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda and the
elimination of unfair election practices, while Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code imposes a limitation
on elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding in a permanent capacity by
considering them as ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing of the certificate of candidacy. The repeal of
Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is thus not embraced in the title, nor germane to the subject
matter of Rep. Act No. 9006.
The petitioners also assert that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution because it repeals Section 67 only of the Omnibus Election Code, leaving intact Section 66
thereof which imposes a similar limitation to appointive officials, thus:
SEC. 66. Candidates holding appointive office or position. Any person holding a public appointive office or
position, including active members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, and officers and employees in
government-owned or controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon
the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
They contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006 discriminates against appointive officials. By the repeal
of Section 67, an elective official who runs for office other than the one which he is holding is no longer
considered ipso facto resigned therefrom upon filing his certificate of candidacy. Elective officials continue
in public office even as they campaign for reelection or election for another elective position. On the other
hand, Section 66 has been retained; thus, the limitation on appointive officials remains - they are still
considered ipso facto resigned from their offices upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy.
The petitioners assert that Rep. Act No. 9006 is null and void in its entirety as irregularities attended its
enactment into law. The law, not only Section 14 thereof, should be declared null and void. Even Section
16 of the law which provides that [t]his Act shall take effect upon its approval is a violation of the due
process clause of the Constitution, as well as jurisprudence, which require publication of the law before it
becomes effective.
Finally, the petitioners maintain that Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is a good law; hence, should
not have been repealed. The petitioners cited the ruling of the Court in Dimaporo v. Mitra, Jr.,[13] that
Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code is based on the constitutional mandate on the Accountability of
Public Officers:[14]
Sec. 1. Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the
people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with patriotism and
justice, and lead modest lives.
Consequently, the respondents Speaker and Secretary General of the House of Representatives acted with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction for not considering those members of
the House who ran for a seat in the Senate during the May 14, 2001 elections as ipso facto resigned
therefrom, upon the filing of their respective certificates of candidacy.
The Respondents Arguments
For their part, the respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General, urge this Court to dismiss the
petitions contending, preliminarily, that the petitioners have no legal standing to institute the present
suit. Except for the fact that their negative votes were overruled by the majority of the members of the
House of Representatives, the petitioners have not shown that they have suffered harm as a result of the
passage of Rep. Act No. 9006. Neither do petitioners have any interest as taxpayers since the assailed
statute does not involve the exercise by Congress of its taxing or spending power.
Invoking the enrolled bill doctrine, the respondents refute the petitioners allegations that irregularities
attended the enactment of Rep. Act No. 9006. The signatures of the Senate President and the Speaker of
the House, appearing on the bill and the certification signed by the respective Secretaries of both houses
of Congress, constitute proof beyond cavil that the bill was duly enacted into law.
The respondents contend that Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, as it repeals Section 67 of the Omnibus
Election Code, is not a proscribed rider nor does it violate Section 26(1) of Article VI of the
Constitution. The title of Rep. Act No. 9006, An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest,
Peaceful and Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices, is so broad that it encompasses all the
processes involved in an election exercise, including the filing of certificates of candidacy by elective
officials.
They argue that the repeal of Section 67 is germane to the general subject of Rep. Act No. 9006 as
expressed in its title as it eliminates the effect of prematurely terminating the term of an elective official
by his filing of a certificate of candidacy for an office other than the one which he is permanently holding,
such that he is no longer considered ipso facto resigned therefrom. The legislature, by including the repeal
of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code in Rep. Act No. 9006, has deemed it fit to remove the
unfairness of considering an elective official ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his
certificate of candidacy for another elective office. With the repeal of Section 67, all elective officials are
now placed on equal footing as they are allowed to finish their respective terms even if they run for any
office, whether the presidency, vice-presidency or other elective positions, other than the one they are
holding in a permanent capacity.
The respondents assert that the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code need not be expressly
stated in the title of Rep. Act No. 9006 as the legislature is not required to make the title of the act a
complete index of its contents. It must be deemed sufficient that the title be comprehensive enough
reasonably to include the general subject which the statute seeks to effect without expressing each and
every means necessary for its accomplishment. Section 26(1) of Article VI of the Constitution merely calls
for all the parts of an act relating to its subject to find expression in its title. Mere details need not be set
forth.
According to the respondents, Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, insofar as it repeals Section 67, leaving
Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code intact and effective, does not violate the equal protection clause
of the Constitution. Section 67 pertains to elective officials while Section 66 pertains to appointive
officials. A substantial distinction exists between these two sets of officials; elective officials occupy their
office by virtue of their mandate based upon the popular will, while the appointive officials are not elected
by popular will. The latter cannot, therefore, be similarly treated as the former. Equal protection simply
requires that all persons or things similarly situated are treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed.
Further, Section 16, or the Effectivity clause, of Rep. Act No. 9006 does not run afoul of the due process
clause of the Constitution as it does not entail any arbitrary deprivation of life, liberty and
property. Specifically, the section providing for penalties in cases of violations thereof presume that the
formalities of the law would be observed, i.e., charges would first be filed, and the accused would be
entitled to a hearing before judgment is rendered by a court having jurisdiction. In any case, the issue
about lack of due process is premature as no one has, as yet, been charged with violation of Rep. Act No.
9006.
Finally, the respondents submit that the respondents Speaker and Secretary General of the House of
Representatives did not commit grave abuse of discretion in not excluding from the Rolls those members
thereof who ran for the Senate during the May 14, 2001 elections. These respondents merely complied
with Rep. Act No. 9006, which enjoys the presumption of validity until declared otherwise by the Court.
The Courts Ruling
Before resolving the petitions on their merits, the Court shall first rule on the procedural issue raised by the
respondents, i.e., whether the petitioners have the legal standing or locus standi to file the petitions at bar.
The petitions were filed by the petitioners in their capacities as members of the House of Representatives,
and as taxpayers and registered voters.
Generally, a party who impugns the validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in
the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement. [15] The
rationale for requiring a party who challenges the constitutionality of a statute to allege such a personal
stake in the outcome of the controversy is to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions.[16]
However, being merely a matter of procedure, this Court, in several cases involving issues of overarching
significance to our society,[17] had adopted a liberal stance on standing. Thus, in Tatad v. Secretary of the
Department of Energy,[18] this Court brushed aside the procedural requirement of standing, took
cognizance of, and subsequently granted, the petitions separately filed by then Senator Francisco Tatad
and several members of the House of Representatives assailing the constitutionality of Rep. Act No. 8180
(An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes).
The Court likewise took cognizance of the petition filed by then members of the House of Representatives
which impugned as unconstitutional the validity of a provision of Rep. Act No. 6734 (Organic Act for the
Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao) in Chiongbian v. Orbos.[19] Similarly, the Court took cognizance of
the petition filed by then members of the Senate, joined by other petitioners, which challenged the validity
of Rep. Act No. 7716 (Expanded Value Added Tax Law) in Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance.[20]
Members of Congress, such as the petitioners, were likewise allowed by this Court to challenge the validity
of acts, decisions, rulings, or orders of various government agencies or instrumentalities in Del Mar v.
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation,[21] Kilosbayan, Inc. v. Guingona, Jr.,[22] Philippine
Constitution Association v. Enriquez,[23] Albano v. Reyes,[24]and Bagatsing v. Committee on Privatization.[25]
Certainly, the principal issue posed by the petitions, i.e., whether Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code,
which this Court had declared in Dimaporo[26] as deriving its existence from the constitutional provision on
accountability of public officers, has been validly repealed by Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, is one of
overarching significance that justifies this Courts adoption of a liberal stance vis--vis the procedural matter
on standing. Moreover, with the national elections barely seven months away, it behooves the Court to
confront the issue now and resolve the same forthrightly. The following pronouncement of the Court is
quite apropos:
... All await the decision of this Court on the constitutional question. Considering, therefore, the importance
which the instant case has assumed and to prevent multiplicity of suits, strong reasons of public policy
demand that [its] constitutionality . . . be now resolved. It may likewise be added that the exceptional
character of the situation that confronts us, the paramount public interest, and the undeniable necessity
for a ruling, the national elections beings barely six months away, reinforce our stand. [27]
Every statute is presumed valid.[28] The presumption is that the legislature intended to enact a valid,
sensible and just law and one which operates no further than may be necessary to effectuate the specific
purpose of the law.[29]
It is equally well-established, however, that the courts, as guardians of the Constitution, have the inherent
authority to determine whether a statute enacted by the legislature transcends the limit imposed by the
fundamental law.[30] And where the acts of the other branches of government run afoul of the Constitution,
it is the judiciarys solemn and sacred duty to nullify the same. [31]
Proceeding from these guideposts, the Court shall now resolve the substantial issues raised by the
petitions.
Section 14 of Rep. Act
No. 9006 Is Not a Rider[32]
At the core of the controversy is Section 14, the repealing clause of Rep. Act No. 9006, which provides:
Sec. 14. Sections 67 and 85 of the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Blg. 881) and Sections 10 and
11 of Republic Act No. 6646 are hereby repealed. As a consequence, the first proviso in the third paragraph
of Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8436 is rendered ineffective. All laws, presidential decrees, executive
orders, rules and regulations, or any part thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby
repealed or modified or amended accordingly.
The repealed provision, Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, quoted earlier, reads:
SEC. 67. Candidates holding elective office. Any elective official, whether national or local, running for any
office other than the one which he is holding in a permanent capacity, except for President and Vice-
President, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of his certificate of
candidacy.
Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 26 (1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in
the title thereof.
The proscription is aimed against the evils of the so-called omnibus bills and log-rolling legislation as well
as surreptitious and/or unconsidered encroaches. The provision merely calls for all parts of an act relating
to its subject finding expression in its title.[33]
To determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional requirement that the subject of an
act shall be expressed in its title, the Court laid down the rule that
Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly
construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. The requirement that the subject of an act shall
be expressed in its title should receive a reasonable and not a technical construction. It is sufficient if the
title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which a statute seeks to effect,
without expressing each and every end and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of that
object. Mere details need not be set forth. The title need not be an abstract or index of the Act.[34]
The title of Rep. Act No. 9006 reads: An Act to Enhance the Holding of Free, Orderly, Honest, Peaceful and
Credible Elections through Fair Election Practices. Section 2 of the law provides not only the declaration of
principles but also the objectives thereof:
Sec. 2. Declaration of Principles. The State shall, during the election period, supervise or regulate the
enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of media of communication or
information to guarantee or ensure equal opportunity for public service, including access to media time
and space, and the equitable right to reply, for public information campaigns and fora among candidates
and assure free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections.
The State shall ensure that bona fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of
harassment and discrimination.[35]
The Court is convinced that the title and the objectives of Rep. Act No. 9006 are comprehensive enough to
include the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code within its contemplation. To require that the
said repeal of Section 67 of the Code be expressed in the title is to insist that the title be a complete index
of its content.[36]
The purported dissimilarity of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code, which imposes a limitation on
elective officials who run for an office other than the one they are holding, to the other provisions of Rep.
Act No. 9006, which deal with the lifting of the ban on the use of media for election propaganda, does not
violate the one subject-one title rule. This Court has held that an act having a single general subject,
indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long
as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be considered in furtherance of
such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the general subject. [37]
The deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee on the particular matter are particularly
instructive:
SEN. LEGARDA-LEVISTE:
Yes, Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to clarify.
So all were looking for now is an appropriate title to make it broader so that it would cover this provision
[referring to the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code], is that correct? Thats all. Because I
believe ...
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. SYJUCO):
We are looking for an appropriate coverage which will result in the nomenclature or title.
SEN. LEGARDA-LEVISTE:
Because I really do not believe that it is out of place. I think that even with the term fair election practice, it
really covers it, because as expressed by Senator Roco, those conditions inserted earlier seemed unfair
and it is an election practice and, therefore, I think, Im very comfortable with the title Fair Election Practice
so that we can get over with these things so that we dont come back again until we find the title. I mean,
its one provision which I think is fair for everybody. It may seem like a limitation but this limitation actually
provides for fairness in election practices as the title implies.
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. SYJUCO):
Yes.
SEN. LEGARDA-LEVISTE:
So I would want to beg the House contingent, lets get it over with. To me, ha, its not a very touchy
issue. For me, its even a very correct provision. I feel very comfortable with it and it was voted in the
Senate, at least, so I would like to appeal to the ... para matapos na, then we come back as a Bicam just
for the title Is that what youre ...?
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. SYJUCO):
Its not the title per se, its the coverage. So if you will just kindly bear with us. Im happy that there is
already one comfortable senator there among ... several of us were also comfortable with it. But it would
be well that when we rise from this Bicam that were all comfortable with it.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
Yes. Anyway, lets listen to Congressman Marcos.
REP. MARCOS:
Mr. Chairman, may I just make the observation that although it is true that the bulk of provisions deals with
the area of propaganda and political advertising, the complete title is actually one that indulge full
coverage. It says An Act to enhance the holding of free, orderly, honest ... elections through fair election
practices. But as you said, we will put that aside to discuss later one.
Secondly, I think the Declaration of Principles contained in Section 2, paragraph 2 is perfectly adequate in
that it says that it shall ensure candidates for public office that may be free from any form of harassment
and discrimination.
Surely this provision in Section 67 of the old Election Code of the existing Omnibus Election Code is a form
of harassment or discrimination. And so I think that in the effort at leveling the playing field, we can cover
this and it should not be considered a rider.
SEN. LEGARDA-LEVISTE:
I agree, Mr. Chairman. I think the Congresswoman from Ilocos had very clearly put it, that it is covered in
the Declaration of Principles and in the objective of this bill. And therefore, I hope that the House
contingent would agree to this so that we can finish it now. And it expressly provides for fair election
practices because ...
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
Yeah, I think what is on the table is that we are not disputing this, but we are looking for a title that is more
generic so that then we have less of an objection on constitutionality. I think thats the theory. So, there is
acceptance of this.
Maybe we should not call it na limitation on elected officials. Maybe we should say the special provision on
elected officials. So how is that? Alam mo ito ...
REP. MARCOS:
I think we just change the Section 1, the short title.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
Also, Then we say - - on the short title of the Act, we say ...
REP. MARCOS:
What if we say fair election practices? Maybe that should be changed...
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
O, sige, fine, fine. Lets a brainstorm. Equal...
REP. PADILLA:
Mr. Chairman, why dont we use An Act rationalizing the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and
credible elections, amending for the purpose Batasang Pambansa known as the Omnibus Election Code?
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
Why dont we remove fair and then this shall be cited as Election Practices Act?
REP. PICHAY:
Thats not an election practice. Thats a limitation.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
Ah - - - ayaw mo iyong practice. O, give me another noun.
REP. MARCOS:
The Fair Election.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
O, Fair Election Act.
REP. MACARAMBON:
Nagbi-brainstorm tayo dito, eh. How about if we change the title to enhance the holding of free, orderly,
honest, peaceful and ensure equal opportunity for public service through fair election practices?
REP. PICHAY:
Fair election practices?
REP. MACARAMBON:
Yeah. To ensure equal opportunity for public service through fair ...
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
Wala nang practices nga.
REP. PICHAY:
Wala nang practices.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
It shall be cited as Fair Election Act.
(Informal discussions)
REP. PICHAY:
Approve na iyan.
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
Done. So, okay na iyon. The title will be Fair Election Act.
The rest wala nang problema ano?
VOICES:
Wala na.
REP. MACARAMBON:
Wala na iyong practices?
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
Wala na, wala na. Mahina tayo sa practice, eh.
O, wala na? We will clean up.
REP. MARCOS:
Title?
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
The short title, This Act ...
THE CHAIRMAN (REP. SYJUCO):
Youre back to your No. 21 already.
REP. MARCOS:
The full title, the same?
THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. ROCO):
Iyon na nga. The full title is An Act to enhance the holding ... Thats the House version, eh, dahil pareho,
hindi ba? Then the short title This Act shall be known as the Fair Election Act. [38]
The legislators considered Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as a form of harassment or
discrimination that had to be done away with and repealed. The executive department found cause with
Congress when the President of the Philippines signed the measure into law. For sure, some sectors of
society and in government may believe that the repeal of Section 67 is bad policy as it would encourage
political adventurism. But policy matters are not the concern of the Court. Government policy is within the
exclusive dominion of the political branches of the government. [39] It is not for this Court to look into the
wisdom or propriety of legislative determination. Indeed, whether an enactment is wise or unwise, whether
it is based on sound economic theory, whether it is the best means to achieve the desired results, whether,
in short, the legislative discretion within its prescribed limits should be exercised in a particular manner are
matters for the judgment of the legislature, and the serious conflict of opinions does not suffice to bring
them within the range of judicial cognizance.[40] Congress is not precluded from repealing Section 67 by the
ruling of the Court in Dimaporo v. Mitra[41] upholding the validity of the provision and by its pronouncement
in the same case that the provision has a laudable purpose. Over time, Congress may find it imperative to
repeal the law on its belief that the election process is thereby enhanced and the paramount objective of
election laws the fair, honest and orderly election of truly deserving members of Congress is achieved.
Moreover, the avowed purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be embraced
in its title is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its provisions, and prevent
the enactment into law of matters which have not received the notice, action and study of the legislators
and the public.[42] In this case, it cannot be claimed that the legislators were not apprised of the repeal of
Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code as the same was amply and comprehensively deliberated upon
by the members of the House. In fact, the petitioners, as members of the House of Representatives,
expressed their reservations regarding its validity prior to casting their votes. Undoubtedly, the legislators
were aware of the existence of the provision repealing Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code.
Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006
Is Not Violative of the Equal
Protection Clause of the Constitution[43]
The petitioners contention, that the repeal of Section 67 of the Omnibus Election Code pertaining to
elective officials gives undue benefit to such officials as against the appointive ones and violates the equal
protection clause of the constitution, is tenuous.
The equal protection of the law clause in the Constitution is not absolute, but is subject to reasonable
classification. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one
class may be treated and regulated differently from the other. [44] The Court has explained the nature of the
equal protection guarantee in this manner:
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as
hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is
limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It does not
demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under
like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal
protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a
specified class, if it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making
a distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not. [45]
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy
their office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and
may be removed therefrom only upon stringent conditions.[46] On the other hand, appointive officials hold
their office by virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold
their office in a permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure [47] while others serve at the
pleasure of the appointing authority.[48]
Another substantial distinction between the two sets of officials is that under Section 55, Chapter 8, Title I,
Subsection A. Civil Service Commission, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No.
292), appointive officials, as officers and employees in the civil service, are strictly prohibited from
engaging in any partisan political activity or take part in any election except to vote. Under the same
provision, elective officials, or officers or employees holding political offices, are obviously expressly
allowed to take part in political and electoral activities. [49]
By repealing Section 67 but retaining Section 66 of the Omnibus Election Code, the legislators deemed it
proper to treat these two classes of officials differently with respect to the effect on their tenure in the
office of the filing of the certificates of candidacy for any position other than those occupied by
them. Again, it is not within the power of the Court to pass upon or look into the wisdom of this
classification.
Since the classification justifying Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, i.e., elected officials vis-a-vis appointive
officials, is anchored upon material and significant distinctions and all the persons belonging under the
same classification are similarly treated, the equal protection clause of the Constitution is, thus, not
infringed.
The Enrolled Bill Doctrine
Is Applicable In this Case
Not content with their plea for the nullification of Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 9006, the petitioners insist that
the entire law should be nullified. They contend that irregularities attended the passage of the said law
particularly in the House of Representatives catalogued thus:
a. Creation of two (2) sets of BCC (Bicameral Conference Committee) members by the House during its
session on February 5, 2001;
b. No communication from the Senate for a conference on the compromise bill submitted by the BCC
on November 29, 2000;
c. The new Report submitted by the 2nd/3rd BCC was presented for approval on the floor without copies
thereof being furnished the members;
d. The 2nd/3rd BCC has no record of its proceedings, and the Report submitted by it was not signed by the
Chairman (Sen. Roco) thereof as well as its senator-members at the time it was presented to and rammed
for approval by the House;
e. There was no meeting actually conducted by the 2nd/3rd BCC and that its alleged Report was instantly
made and passed around for the signature of the BCC members;
f. The Senate has no record of the creation of a 2nd BCC but only of the first one that convened
on November 23, 2000;
g. The Effectivity clauses of SB No. 1741 and HB No. 9000, as well as that of the compromise bill submitted
by the BCC that convened on November 20, 2000, were couched in terms that comply with the publication
required by the Civil Code and jurisprudence, to wit:
...
However, it was surreptitiously replaced in its final form as it appears in 16, R.A. No. 9006, with the
provision that This Act shall take effect immediately upon its approval;
h. The copy of the compromise bill submitted by the 2nd/3rd BCC that was furnished the members during its
consideration on February 7, 2001, did not have the same 16 as it now appears in RA No. 9006, but 16 of
the compromise bill, HB 9000 and SB 1742, reasons for which no objection thereto was made;
i. The alleged BCC Report presented to the House on February 7, 2001, did not contain a detailed,
sufficiently explicit statement of the changes in or amendments to the subject measure; and
j. The disappearance of the Cayetano amendment, which is Section 12 of the compromise bill submitted by
the BCC. In fact, this was the subject of the purported proposed amendment to the compromise bill of
Member Paras as stated in paragraph 7 hereof. The said provision states, thusly:
Sec. 12. Limitation on Elected Officials. Any elected official who runs for president and vice-president shall
be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon the filing of the certificate of candidacy. [50]
The petitioners, thus, urge the Court to go behind the enrolled copy of the bill. The Court is not
persuaded. Under the enrolled bill doctrine, the signing of a bill by the Speaker of the House and the
Senate President and the certification of the Secretaries of both Houses of Congress that it was passed are
conclusive of its due enactment. A review of cases[51] reveals the Courts consistent adherence to the
rule. The Court finds no reason to deviate from the salutary rule in this case where the irregularities
alleged by the petitioners mostly involved the internal rules of Congress, e.g., creation of the 2nd or
3rd Bicameral Conference Committee by the House. This Court is not the proper forum for the enforcement
of these internal rules of Congress, whether House or Senate. Parliamentary rules are merely procedural
and with their observance the courts have no concern.[52] Whatever doubts there may be as to the formal
validity of Rep. Act No. 9006 must be resolved in its favor. The Court reiterates its ruling in Arroyo v.
De Venecia,[53] viz.:
But the cases, both here and abroad, in varying forms of expression, all deny to the courts the power to
inquire into allegations that, in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply with its own rules, in
the absence of showing that there was a violation of a constitutional provision or the rights of private
individuals. In Osmea v. Pendatun, it was held: At any rate, courts have declared that the rules adopted by
deliberative bodies are subject to revocation, modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting
them. And it has been said that Parliamentary rules are merely procedural, and with their observance, the
courts have no concern. They may be waived or disregarded by the legislative body. Consequently, mere
failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate the action (taken by a deliberative body) when
the requisite number of members have agreed to a particular measure.
The Effectivity Clause
Is Defective
Finally, the Effectivity clause (Section 16) of Rep. Act No. 9006 which provides that it shall take effect
immediately upon its approval, is defective. However, the same does not render the entire law
invalid. In Taada v. Tuvera,[54] this Court laid down the rule:
... the clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislator may
make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date without its previous publication.
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual
fifteen-period shall be shortened or extended.[55]
Following Article 2 of the Civil Code[56] and the doctrine enunciated in Taada, Rep. Act No. 9006,
notwithstanding its express statement, took effect fifteen days after its publication in the Official Gazette
or a newspaper of general circulation.
In conclusion, it bears reiterating that one of the firmly entrenched principles in constitutional law is that
the courts do not involve themselves with nor delve into the policy or wisdom of a statute. That is the
exclusive concern of the legislative branch of the government. When the validity of a statute is challenged
on constitutional grounds, the sole function of the court is to determine whether it transcends
constitutional limitations or the limits of legislative power. [57] No such transgression has been shown in this
case.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.