Introduction

The entire second half of the twentieth century largely passed under the sign of the outcome

and consequences of World War II. Many aspects of its history are not only purely cognitive, but

also directly associated with the current problems of interest to the general public. In this case,

without due regard to personal and psychological aspects of the behavior, originality of style and

methods of the leaders of great powers a comprehensive study of events of from 1939-1945 are

impossible. Personalities of politicians such a scale, as Churchill and Roosevelt, always imposes

a deep imprint on policies they headed States. The logic of events, they became a real military

leaders of Great Britain and the United States that took power, opportunity and ability to

concentrate the resources of their countries for the successful conduct of hostilities and achieving

the goals of the war, determined on the basis of their understanding of British and American

national interests and taking into account the prevailing public sentiment. Therefore, the analysis

of ideas and decisions of the president and the prime minister is a key element in the process of

learning the depth and direction of strategic thinking, planning and implementation of military

operations of the armed forces of U.S. and UK. Without the influence of Churchill and Roosevelt

on the development of coalition strategy and policy is impossible to understand the development

of relations within the "Big Three" both in terms of creating an Anglo-American alliance, and in

relations between Western powers and the Soviet Union and the establishment of the foundations

of post-war world order.

The role of Winston Churchill and Fr. Roosevelt

The role of Winston Churchill and Fr. Roosevelt in the evolution of strategic thinking and

planning of armed struggle in the UK and U.S. 1939-1945, allows the following conclusions.

Ideas and solutions to the prime minister and president have been crucial in the process of

developing national strategies and coalition warfare. Their development was conditioned by both
the development of armed struggle between the aggressor countries and anti-fascist coalition,

and the change in the balance of forces within the "Big Three". (Alexander, 1962)

Churchill's military thinking was based primarily on British imperial policy and

developed in the interwar period, in line with the ruling in the British military and political elite

aspirations critically rethink the experience of World War II by returning to a more modern basis

for the traditions of "maritime strategy". He saw in the new global armed conflict has a way to

restore and enhance the old world order which had been a stronghold of world position the

British Empire. Patriotism, and imperial patriotism, has always been the dominant of the British

prime minister. He served in England as it should be every politician - giving all their strength

and skill, with quivering passion for the nation's history and traditions. This meant that the

interests of other states, personal or collective opinions, the public mood, if they were, in his

opinion, to the detriment of the British Empire to be overcome or ignored. (Cadogan, 1971)

Franklin Delano Roosevelt in 1939-1941. Sought to establish adequate to the changing

geopolitical realities of U.S. defense policy, but did not want to go into open conflict with the

isolationist sentiments. He hoped that war would help to overcome the indifference of American

society to the outside world, destabilize the existing balance of forces in Europe and the

Far East and help build a new world order in which America will take its rightful place of its

potential. The President, with his keen historical sense and willingness accept new things for the

analysis of current reality saw much further than many of his contemporaries, including his

American counterpart. Already during the New Deal, he showed the desire to look at it in terms

of actions and results, not some abstract. This enabled Roosevelt to actively and effectively

respond to the needs of his time, believing in common sense, not in worship of any ideological

dogmas. And devoted his work as a military leader for the nations global problem thus the

security, then spread U.S. influence in the geopolitical vacuum, which arose as a result of the

war. Unlike Churchill, enveloped in their ideas and decisions of the ancient traditions of the

British imperial era, Roosevelt was the son of the nation, gradually aware of the desire and
ability to take a decisive step towards world hegemony.

Despite the difference of military and political experience, a certain contradiction in the vision of

the purposes of the war begins, and methods of armed struggle, by September 1939. Both leaders

understand the vital interests of Britain and the United States in the suppression of their main

enemies - Germany and Japan. This became the basis for establishing relations between

Churchill and Roosevelt. (Patton, 1974)

And the prime minister and the president have always had a clearly defined marinistsky

nature of strategic thinking that helps them find common ground in developing a coalition

strategy. It was natural for the leaders, one of which is entirely dependent on oceanic

communications, and the second could have an impact on the world situation only through the

transoceanic transfer of its military and economic resources.

In ensuring the implementation of policy ideas with strategic planning, fighting was the main

objective of Churchill and Roosevelt as the military leaders of their countries. Therefore, the

politico-strategic views of the two leaders had a decisive influence on key strategic issues.

Roosevelt's position relative to the prioritization of various theaters, primarily Western European,

Mediterranean and Pacific, largely determined the distribution of resources, timing and extent of

the main operations of the Western powers, and eventually the post-war balance of power in the

world. Rapidly growing U.S. power allows the president to be less dependent in their decisions,

including from the point of view of London, and consequently to respond flexibly to changes in

the politico-strategic environment. In particular, maintaining a coalition strategy focus military

efforts of Great Britain and the U.S. operation "on the periphery," says only that the point of

view of Winston Churchill fit until mid-1943 in the broader context of the views of Fr. Roosevelt

on issues of strategic planning. After the president by autumn 1943 came to the conclusion of the

impossibility of further delay in deciding on the landing in France next year without jeopardizing

the postwar U.S. positions in Western Europe, he quickly reached an agreement with Stalin on

the coordination of a decisive blow to Germany and refused to support a "peripheral strategy".
Point of view, Roosevelt became the defining and developing a strategy of war against Japan.

President, experiencing serious pressures supporters of Pacific Alternative, insisted on the

principle of "Europe-first" as the basis for planning, but with 1943 and the actions of U.S. armed

forces. (Alexander, 1962)

Churchill failed to affect that position, and Roosevelt was forced to accept it as the basis

of coalition strategy. Formulated London in autumn 1940, principles of "peripheral strategy",

largely stemming from the vision of the Prime Minister most adequate to the existing realities

program of action remained the basis of the British position throughout the war. But it is

Churchill during the 1942-1944, had to increasingly take into account the requirements agreed

with the allies of plans of operations, often contradicted the true intentions of Prime Minister.

This proves not only the conservatism of Churchill's strategic thinking, but also largely generated

by its limited resources to maintain London's global offensive strategy.

After expanding the war strategic view of Roosevelt evolved from a narrow understanding of the

forms and extent of U.S. involvement in the conflict to the conduct of global politics and

strategy. Churchill, according to the capabilities of the country, eventually was forced to make

significant adjustments in their vision of the British action and review the contribution of

London to the defeat the aggressor, and then the role of Britain in the postwar world.

As a result, the military-strategic thoughts and decisions of the British leader often lagged behind

the performance of the world struggle, too closely been associated with a purely European and

imperial interests of London. At the same time, the military-strategic thinking of the president

was generally adequate general logic of the world struggle, the relation of forces of two opposing

coalitions, and the real role of each of the major theaters of war in general during World War II.

It is obvious that the relationship between the leaders of major Western powers the most

seamlessly evolved before 1943, when the British contribution to the war gave Churchill the

opportunity to communicate on an equal footing with Roosevelt. In what follows the logic of the

evolution of partnership between the two allies, and the overall progress of the war inevitably led
to the assertion of presidential leadership. However, often disagreed with the actions of each

other, serious disagreements on policy and strategy smoothed the interdependence of the military

effort of the two powers, and only prove the need for close personal contacts of the president and

prime minister. (Bryant, 1957)

Attitude of Western leaders and Stalin illustrate this complementarily of their actions.

Churchill in 1942 assumed the role of consistent opponent of the Second Front and inflexible

advocate of "the southern version of" offensive in Europe. On the one hand, this role with some

stretch corresponded to reality and allow the prime minister to insist on its strategic concept of

waging war, but on the other - allows the president to act as a sort of arbitrator in disputes

between him and Stalin, and have thus considerable advantages for upholding its vision of

coalition strategy. Moreover, it enabled the U.S. to establish itself as a world leader, getting

always the most advantageous position as a leading force on the decisions that determine the fate

of the fundamental trade-off agreements. (Patton, 1974)

Such a role of the President is determined primarily by the balance of forces within the "Big

Three". The increasingly apparent dependence of Britain and the desire of the USSR to "normal

relations" with the U.S. after the war predetermined acquiescence in her Churchill and Stalin.

There have also been important features of character, personal likes and dislikes among the

leaders. Roosevelt and Stalin had always stressed to respect each other as in correspondence and

in person, their mutual disposition was not a secret to others. This stems not only due to

diplomatic considerations, but also a certain similarity of thinking between the two leaders: they

have both 'manifest an obvious penchant for secrecy, a highly developed sense of intuition,

commitment to pragmatism in current solutions. And very importantly was the relationship

between the president and the Soviet dictator ever to have been burdened with the legacy of the

past. In contrast, in Churchill, Stalin always saw the "main organizer campaign of the Entente,

staunch anti-communist head of state, apply and a claim to the hegemony of Europe and as such

will inevitably focus its policies on the confrontation with the spread of Soviet influence. In
addition, the difference between the character of Churchill and Stalin added problems in their

relationship. (Arnold, 1949)

Roosevelt to end the war could achieve if not entirely sincere, but in any case had the

essential agreement in Moscow with his plans for the postwar settlement, which largely

contradict the position of prime minister. Based on the outcome of the war, which resulted in the

U.S. has become hegemonic West, we can certainly talk about whether the majority of the

President's decision. But for Churchill's victory, which gave the main sense of his political life,

leaving behind a taste of defeat - the century of the British Empire came to an end. Although

many predictions of the Prime Minister on the development situation in the world after the war

proved to be prophetic, his position could not seriously affect the course of events.

What I would had done if I were in place of Churchill

It is necessary to note, that a political situation, that both of the leader were strongly

differed and consequently will have influence on the performances. Major factors should be

taken into consideration for precise distinctions between wars. Churchill had collided from world

war, that inevitably had to occur, and 8 months before his taking responsibility as Prime Minister.

People should struggle to protect the country from invasion, therefore introductions into

war was not a personal choice that Churchill had made. It is a prominent aspect which should be

considered at studying his speech.

Churchill did not have to convince people, that for fair war, it was to convince the

countries to continue struggle and remain positive and also save nation from invasion. In his

position I would have acted the same in interests of our nation as Churchill did.

Conclusion

Wisdom and farsightness of Winston Churchill and Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1939 - 1945 was
largely driven by their views on the issues of fight against the aggressor countries that emerged

by the beginning of the war. The Prime Minister Churchills philosophy was based on the

traditions of British imperial policy and the "Maritime Strategy" and developed in the interwar

period, in an endeavor to critically rethink the experience of World War II. The President

Roosevelt, despite his reluctance to enter into open conflict with isolationist tendencies, as a

politician - globalist could not help but hope that a new world war would help build a new world

order in which America will take its rightful place of its potential. (Bryant, 1957)

Features of thought and character of Winston Churchill and Franklin Roosevelt most seriously

affected all aspects of strategic planning and management of military organizations of the

Western powers.

In particular, they are largely determined by the peculiarity of systems of military and civilian

leadership of Great Britain, based on the specific intervention of the Prime Minister in all

matters, and the U.S., where the president has provided much greater autonomy to its advisers

and subordinates. In this case, both leaders adhere to the principles of a democratic discussion of

emerging issues.

The evolution of strategic thinking of the president and prime minister had a crucial role in

the development of national strategies and coalition warfare. It was conditioned by both the

development of armed struggle between the two countries - the aggressors and the anti-fascist

coalition, and the change in the balance of forces within the "Big Three".

As a result of expansion of the war, joining in her Soviet-American Churchill was forced to make

significant adjustments in their vision of British strategy and review the role of Britain in world

affairs. Roosevelt's strategic views have evolved from a narrow understanding of the forms of

U.S. involvement in the conflict to the conduct of global politics and strategy.

In ensuring the implementation of policy ideas with strategic planning, fighting was the main

task of the Prime Minister and the President as the military leaders of their countries.

Therefore, the politico-strategic view of Roosevelt had a decisive influence on the prioritization
of various theaters, which was a key issue for the military strategy of the West in 1942 - 1943

years. Rapidly growing U.S. power allows the president to be less dependent in their decisions,

including from the point of view of London, and consequently to respond flexibly to changes in

the politico-strategic environment.

This proves not only the conservatism of Churchill's strategic thinking, but also largely

generated by its limited resources to maintain London's global offensive strategy.

As a result, the military-strategic thoughts and decisions of the British leader often lagged behind

the performance of the world struggle, too closely been associated with a purely European and

imperial interests of London. At the same time, the military-strategic thinking of the president

Roosevelt was generally adequate general logic of the world struggle, the relation of forces of

two opposing coalitions, and the real role of each of the major theaters of war in general during

the war.

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