1.

REYES VS CA 216 S 25

[G.R. No. 96492. November 26, 1992.]

ROMEO REYES, ANGEL PARAYAO, and EMILIO MANANGHAYA, petitioners, vs.

THE COURT OF APPEALS, EUFROCINA DELA CRUZ and VIOLETA DELOS
REYES, respondents.

FACTS:

Petitioners Romeo, Angel and Emilio question the respondent Court's decision
promulgated on November 22, 1990, which affirmed with modification the agrarian
court's decision promulgated January 10, 1990, which ordered them and the other
defendants therein to, among others, restore possession of the disputed landholding to
private respondent, Eufrocina Vda. dela Cruz.

Said respondent court's decision is now final and executory as to Olympio and
Severino, the other defendants in the agrarian court and, also, the other petitioners in
the respondent court, since they did not appeal the same.

The petitioners are asking the Court to re-examine all the evidence already presented
and evaluated by the trial court and re-evaluated again by the respondent appellate
court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Rules of Court is applicable in agrarian cases.

RULING:

NO.

DISCUSSION:

EVIDENCE IN AGRARIAN CASES

The trial court did not err when it favorably considered the affidavits of Eufrocina and
Efren Tecson although the affiants were not presented and subjected to cross-
examination.

Section 16 of P.D. No. 946 provides that:

"Rules of Court shall not be applicable in agrarian cases even in a suppletory

character."

The same provision states that

 "In the hearing, investigation and determination of any question or controversy,
affidavits and counter-affidavits may be allowed and are admissible in evidence."

SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE

Moreover, in agrarian cases, the quantum of evidence required is no more than

substantial evidence. This substantial evidence rule was incorporated in Section 18,
P.D. No. 946 which took effect on June 17, 1976 (Castro vs. CA, G.R. No. 34613,
January 26, 1989).

In Bagsican vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 226, the Supreme Court defined what
substantial evidence is:

"Substantial evidence does not necessarily import preponderant evidence, as is

required in an ordinary civil case. It has been defined to be such relevant
evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion and its absence is not shown by stressing that there is contrary
evidence on record, direct or circumstantial, for the appellate court cannot
substitute its own judgment or criteria for that of the trial court in determining
wherein lies the weight of evidence or what evidence is entitled to belief."
2. PP VS TURCO 337 S 714

[G.R. No. 137757. August 14, 2000.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. RODEGELIO TURCO,

JR., a.k.a "TOTONG", accused-appellant.

FACTS:

Appellant appealed from his conviction of the crime of rape of his 13-year-old cousin,
Escelea.

Escelea was about to sleep when she heard a voice calling her name. She asked who it
was he answered it was Turco. She knew it was him as they had known each other for
four years already. Immediately upon opening the door, the perpetrator hastily covered
her face with a towel. He ordered her to walk and, as they reached the pig pen, he layed
her down and raped her.

It was after 10 days that she told her brother-in-law of the incident, who, in turn,
informed her father.

Her father immediately asked her to see a doctor for medical examination and
eventually filed a complaint against the perpetrator.

The trail court found Turco guilty.

He appealed stating that there was no proof that the rape happened nor was there any
medico-legal officer despite the presence of a medical certificate.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the lower court erred in finding the appellant guilty of rape.

RULING:

NO.

DISCUSSION:

DECLARATIONS OF YOUNG AND IMMATURE RAPE VICTIMS DESERVE FULL

CREDENCE

At the outset, it should be remembered that the declarations on the witness stand of
rape victims who are young and immature deserve full credence.

Succinctly, when the offended parties are young and immature girls from the ages of
twelve to sixteen, courts are inclined to lend credence to their version of what
transpired, considering not only their relative vulnerability but also the shame and
embarrassment to which they would be exposed by court trial if the matter about which
they testified were not true.

MINOR LAPSES IN RAPE VICTIM'S TESTIMONY DO NOT DETRACT FROM HER

POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF THE MALEFACTOR

Minor lapses in a witness' testimony should be expected when a person recounts details
of an experience so humiliating and so painful to recall as rape.

Rape, as a harrowing experience, is usually not remembered in detail. For, such an

offense is not something which enhances one's life experience as to be worth recalling
or reliving but, rather, something which causes deep psychological wounds and casts a
stigma upon the victim for the rest of her life, which her conscious or subconscious mind
would prefer to forget. These lapses do not detract from the overwhelming testimony of
a prosecution witness positively identifying the malefactor.

Further, the testimony of a witness must be considered and calibrated in its entirety and
not by truncated portions thereof or isolated passages therein.

TESTIMONY OF RAPE VICTIM DESERVES CREDENCE WHERE THERE IS NO

MOTIVE TO FALSELY TESTIFY AGAINST ACCUSED

The Court finds that the victim had no motive to falsely testify against accused-
appellant. Her testimony deserves the credence accorded thereto by the trial court.
Pertinently, no woman, especially one of tender age, would concoct a story of
defloration, allow an examination of her private parts, and thereafter pervert herself by
being subjected to a public trial if she was not motivated solely by the desire to have the
culprit apprehended and punished.

PROSECUTION OF A RELATIVE OF THE VICTIM REINFORCED CONCLUSION

THAT RAPE REALLY HAPPENED

We reiterate the trial court's observation thereon the mother of accused-appellant

being a first degree cousin of the victim's father, that makes the victim and accused-
appellant second degree cousins or sixth civil degree relatives.

Filipino culture, particularly in the provinces, looks at the extended family as closely-knit
and recognizes the obligation of an older relative to protect and take care of a younger
one.

On the contrary, in the instant case, the victim initiated the prosecution of her cousin. If
the charge were not true, it is indeed difficult to understand why the victim would charge
her own cousin as the malefactor. Too, she having no compelling motive to file said
case against accused-appellant, the conclusion that the rape really happened is
logically reinforced.

DELAY IN REPORTING RAPE INCIDENT IS NOT UNCOMMON

As regards the initial delay of the victim in reporting the rape incident, suffice it to state
that the delay and initial reluctance of a rape victim to make public the assault on her
virtue is not uncommon.

In the case at bar, the victim's fear of her father who had moral ascendancy over her,
was explicit. She testified that she did not disclose the incident to her father because of
fear both of her father as well as of accused-appellant. Such reaction is typical of a
twelve-year-old girl and only strengthens her credibility.

NECESSITY OF INDEPENDENT PROOF IN SUPPORT OF "SWEETHEART THEORY"

In People vs. Venerable (290 SCRA 15 [1998]), the Court held that the sweetheart
theory of the accused was unavailing and self-serving where he failed to introduce love
letters, gifts, and the like to attest to his alleged amorous affair with the victim.

Hence, the defense cannot just present testimonial evidence in support of the theory
that he and the victim were sweethearts. Independent proof is necessary, such as
tokens, mementos, and photographs. It is likewise remarkable, a confession possibly of
the bankruptcy of this theory that accused-appellant has not insisted on this defense in
his brief, seemingly abandoning this line.

The Court, therefore, conclude that whatever familiarity and supposed closeness there
was between accused-appellant and the victim, is explained not by an intimate
relationship but by their blood relationship.

MEDICAL EXAMINATION IS NOT INDISPENSABLE IN THE PROSECUTION OF

RAPE

It is well-settled that a medical examination is not indispensable in the prosecution of

rape. The absence of medical findings by a medico-legal officer does not disprove the
occurrence of rape. It is enough that the evidence on hand convinces the court that
conviction is proper. In the instant case, the victim's testimony alone is credible and
sufficient to convict.
3. BAUTISTA VS APRECE, 1995

[G.R. No. L-38624. July 25, 1975.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CONRADO BAUTISTA

and GERARDO ABUHIN, defendants-appellants.

FACTS:

This is a mandatory review of the death penalty imposed by the Circuit Criminal Court of
Pasig, Rizal in its decision in case "CC-VII-847-Rizal" for Murder, entitled "People vs.
Conrado Bautista and Gerardo Abuhin"

Accused, who were serving sentence by virtue of final judgment in the New Bilibid
Prison, were charged with murder for inflicting multiple stab wounds upon and killing
another convicted prisoner while the latter was in the process of serving the accused
breakfast.

After trial, accused were found guilty as charged and were each sentenced to suffer the
penalty of death, to indemnify the heirs of the offended party of moral damages and
exemplary damages.

Accused set up the defense of alibi and claimed that their written statements admitting
the crime were extracted from them by force and intimidation.

Accused Bautista's alibi was that on the morning of December 13, 1970, when the crime
was committed he was sleeping in his cell.

Witness Antonio Juaningco, another prisoner, tried to substantiate Bautista's alibi by

testifying that on the morning of December 13, 1970, accused Bautista was with him
sleeping in cell no. 9 and went out because they were awakened by a commotion and
then saw the victim Beltran already dead.

Accused Abuhin when recalled to the witness stand did a complete somersault on his
previous testimony implicating Bautista when he stated that on that occasion he did not
see Bautista.

A testimony of another witness Ricardo Felix, another prisoner, that on the morning of
December 13, 1970, immediately after the killing of victim Beltran, he saw prisoner
Daeng, Boy Coro and Rolando Castillo "poking a knife to Bautista" and threatening said
Bautista to admit the crime.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the alibi can prevail the positive identification of the accused.
RULING:

NO.

DISCUSSION:

ALIBI CANNOT PREVAIL OVER POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF ACCUSED

The trial court did not commit any mistake in giving credit to the alibi of accused, for
aside from its inherent weakness as a defense, unsupported as it is by credible
evidence, alibi cannot stand the positive identification made by the prison guard and the
very damaging sworn statements of the co-accused who, by their plea of guilty, had
been previously sentenced for the same crime with which accused were charged.
4. GAANAN VS IAC 145 S 112

[G.R. No. L-69809. October 16, 1986.]

EDGARDO A. GAANAN, petitioner, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

FACTS:

This petition for certiorari asks for an interpretation of Republic Act (RA) No. 4200,
otherwise known as the Anti-Wiretapping Act, on the issue of whether or not an
extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in Section 1 of the Act, such that
its use to overhear a private conversation would constitute unlawful interception of
communications between the two parties using a telephone line.

Laconico telephoned appellant to come to his office and advise him on the settlement of
the direct assault case because his regular lawyer went on a business trip. Appellant
went to the office of Laconico where he was briefed about the problem.

Complainant Atty. Pintor and his client Manuel were discussing the terms for the
withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault which they filed with the Office of the City
Fiscal against Laconico. After they had decided on the proposed conditions,
complainant made a telephone call to Laconico.

Laconico requested appellant to secretly listen to the telephone conversation through a

telephone extension so as to hear personally the proposed conditions for the
settlement. Appellant heard complainant enumerate (extort) the conditions for
withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault.

Laconico agreed.

Laconico alerted his friend Colonel Zulueta of the Criminal Investigation Service of the
Philippine Constabulary.

He insisted that complainant himself should receive the money, when the complainant
said that his wife will receive the money. When he received the money, complainant was
arrested by agents of the Philippine Constabulary.

Appellant executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he heard complainant
demand P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Since appellant
listened to the telephone conversation without complainant's consent, complainant
charged appellant and Laconico with violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act.
ISSUE:

Whether or not the device includes the telephone extension.

RULING:

NO.

DISCUSSION:

DEVICE IN RA 4200 NOT INCLUDE TELEPHONE EXTENSION

An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone,

dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use
thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of a telephone line.

The phrase "device or arrangement" in Section 1 of RA No. 4200, although not

exclusive to that enumerated therein, should be construed to comprehend instruments
of the same or similar nature, that is, instruments the use of which would be tantamount
to tapping the main line of a telephone.

It refers to instruments whose installation or presence cannot be presumed by the party

or parties being overheard because, by their very nature, they are not of common usage
and their purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting or recording a telephone
conversation.

An extension telephone is an instrument which is very common especially now when

the extended unit does not have to be connected by wire to the main telephone but can
be moved from place to place within a radius of a kilometer or more. A person should
safely presume that the party he is calling at the other end of the line probably has an
extension telephone and he runs the risk of a third party listening as in the case of a
party line or a telephone unit which shares its line with another.

It can be readily seen that our lawmakers intended to discourage, through punishment,
persons such as government authorities or representatives of organized groups from
installing devices in order to gather evidence for use in court or to intimidate, blackmail
or gain some unwarranted advantage over the telephone users. Consequently, the mere
act of listening, in order to be punishable must strictly be with the use of the enumerated
devices in RA No. 4200 or others of similar nature. We are of the view that an extension
telephone is not among such devices or arrangements.
5. ORTANEZ VS CA 235 S 111

[G.R. No. 110662. August 4, 1994.]

TERESITA SALCEDO-ORTANEZ, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.

ROMEO F. ZAMORA, Presiding Judge, Br. 94, Regional Trial Court of Quezon city
and RAFAEL S. ORTANEZ, respondents.

FACTS:

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which seeks to reverse
the decision * of respondent Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 28545 entitle
"Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez versus Hon. Romeo F. Zamora, Presiding Judge, Br. 94,
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City and Rafael S. Ortanez".

On 2 May 1990, private respondent Rafael S. Ortanez filed with the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City a complaint for annulment of marriage with damages against petitioner
Teresita Salcedo-Ortanez, on grounds of lack of marriage license and/or psychological
incapacity of the petitioner.

Among the exhibits offered by private respondent were three (3) cassette tapes of
alleged telephone conversations between petitioner and unidentified persons.

Petitioner submitted her Objection/Comment to private respondent's oral offer of

evidence on the same day.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the cassette tapes are admissible.

RULING:

NO.

DISCUSSION:

In the present case, the trial court issued the assailed order admitting all of the evidence
offered by private respondent, including tape recordings of telephone conversations of
petitioner with unidentified persons. These tape recordings were made and obtained
when private respondent allowed his friends from the military to wire tap his home
telephone.

Rep. Act No. 4200 entitled "An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other
Related Violations of the Privacy of Communication, and for other purposes" expressly
makes such tape recordings inadmissible in evidence. The relevant provisions of Rep.
Act No. 4200 are as follows:
"Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties
to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any
other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or
dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or however otherwise
described. . . ."

"Section 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents,

substance, purport, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or any information
therein contained, obtained or secured by any person in violation of the preceding
sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial,
legislative or administrative hearing or investigation."

Clearly, respondents trial court and Court of Appeals failed to consider the afore-quoted
provisions of the law in admitting in evidence the cassette tapes in question. Absent a
clear showing that both parties to the telephone conversations allowed to recording of
the same, the inadmissibility of the subject tapes is mandatory under Rep. Act No. 4200.
6. RAMIREZ VS CA 248 S 590

[G.R. No. 93833. September 28, 1995.]

SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, petitioner, vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and

ESTER S. GARCIA, respondent.

FACTS:

A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Ramirez alleging that the private
respondent, Garcia, in a confrontation in the latters office, allegedly vexed, insulted and
humiliated her in a hostile and furious mood and in a manner offensive to petitioners
dignity and personality, contrary to morals, good customs and public policy.

In support of the claim, the petitioner produced a verbatim transcript, which was from
the tape recording, of the event and sought damages.

Private respondent filed a case against the petitioner in violation of RA 4200.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the respondent is liable of RA 4200.

RULING:

YES.

DISCUSSION:

NO DISTINCTION AS TO WHETHER THE PARTY SOUGHT TO BE PENALIZED

OUGHT TO BE A PARTY OTHER THAN OR DIFFERENT FROM THOSE INVOLVED
IN THE PRIVATE COMMUNICATION

Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, "An Act to Prohibit and Penalize Wire Tapping and Other
Related Violations of Private Communication and Other Purposes," clearly and
unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any
private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape
recorder.

The law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the
statute ought to be a party other than or different from those involved in the private
communication.

The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is
underscored by the use of the qualifier "any."
Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, "even a (person)
privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another without the
knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator" under this provision of R.A. 4200.

NATURE OF CONVERSATION, IMMATERIAL TO A VIOLATION THEREOF

The nature of the conversation is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance
of the same need not be specifically alleged in the information.

What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording
private communications by means of the devices enumerated therein. The mere
allegation that an individual made a secret recording of a private communication by
means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A.
4200.

As the Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court:
"Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before one can be regarded as a violator,
the nature of the conversation, as well as its communication to a third person should be
professed."

SCOPE "PRIVATE COMMUNICATION"

Petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in Section 1 of R.A.

4200 does not include "private conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the word
"communication" to a point of absurdity.

The word communicate comes from the Latin word communicare, meaning "to share or
to impart." In its ordinary signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or
imparting, as in a conversation, or signifies the "process by which meaning or thoughts
are shared between individuals through a common system of symbols (as language
signs or gestures)."

These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or

expressive communications of "meanings or thoughts" which are likely to include the
emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and private
respondent, in the privacy of the latter's office.

Any doubts about the legislative body's meaning of the phrase "private communication"
are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms "conversation" and
"communication" were interchangeably used by Senator Taada in his Explanatory Note
to the bill, quoted below:
"It has been said that innocent people have nothing to fear from their
conversations being overheard. But this statement ignores the usual nature of
conversations as well as the undeniable fact that most, if not all, civilized people
have some aspects of their lives they do not wish to expose. Free conversations
are often characterized by exaggerations, obscenity, agreeable falsehoods, and
the expression of anti-social desires of views not intended to be taken seriously.
The right to the privacy of communication, among others, has expressly been
assured by our Constitution. Needless to state here, the framers of our
Constitution must have recognized the nature of conversations between
individuals and the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his
intellect. They must have known that part of the pleasures and satisfactions of life
are to be found in the unaudited, and free exchange of communication between
individuals free from every unjustifiable intrusion by whatever means."
7. CITY OF MANILA VS GARCIA 19 S 413

[G.R. No. L-26053. February 21, 1967.]

CITY OF MANILA, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GERARDO GARCIA Carmencita

Villanueva, MODESTA PARAYNO Narciso Parayno, JUAN ASPERAS, MARIA
TABIA Simion Diliman, AQUILINO BARRIOS Leonora Ruiz, LAUREANO
DlZO, BERNABE AYUDA Leogarda de los Santos, ISABELO OBAOB Andrea
Riparip, JOSE BARRIENTOS, URBANO RAMOS, 1 ELENA RAMOS, ESTEFANIA
NEPACINA, MODESTA SANCHEZ; MARCIAL LAZARO, MARCIANA ALANO,
HONORIO BERIO Sedora Orayle, GLORIA VELASCO, WILARICO RICAMATA;
BENEDICTO DIAZ, ANA DEQUIZ (Mrs.) Alunan, LORENZO CARANDANG, JUAN
PECAYO, FELICIDAD MIRANDA Emigdio Egipto, defendants-appellants.

FACTS:

Plaintiff City of Manila is owner of parcels of land, forming one compact area, bordering
Kansas, Vermont and Singalong streets in Malate, Manila, and covered by Torrens titles
Nos. 49763, 37082 and 37558. Shortly after liberation, from 1945 to 1947, defendants
entered upon these premises without plaintiff's knowledge and consent. They built
houses of second class materials, again without plaintiff's knowledge and consent, and
without the necessary building permits from the city. There they lived thru the years to
the present.

In November, 1947, the presence of defendants having previously been discovered,

defendants Felicidad Miranda (Emigdio Egipto), Modesta C. Parayno, Benedicto Diaz,
Laureano Dizo, Jose Barrientos, Elena Ramos, Estefania, Nepacina, Modesta Sanchez,
Honorio Berio, Gloria Velasco, Ana Dequis Alunan and Benedicto Ofiaza (predecessor
of defendant Carandang) were given by Mayor Valeriano E. Fugoso written permits
each labeled "lease contract" to occupy specific areas in the property upon
conditions therein set forth. Defendants Isabelo Obaob and Gerardo Garcia (in the
name of Marta A. Villanueva) received their permits from Mayor Manuel de la Fuente on
January 29 and March 18, respectively, both of 1948. The rest of the 23 defendants
exhibited none.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the lease contract was valid.

RULING:

NO.

DISCUSSION:
MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES

Courts in the City of Manila should take judicial knowledge of all municipal ordinances
passed by the City for the Charter of Manila requires all courts sitting therein to take
judicial notice of all ordinances passed by the municipal board of Manila.

ERECTION OF HOUSES ON LAND OWNED BY ANOTHER

Where defendants entered the land, built houses of second class materials thereon
without the knowledge and consent of the City, without city permits their
constructions are illegal, and in familiar language they are known as squatters.
Squatting is unlawful and no amount of acquiescence on the part of the city officials will
elevate it into a lawful act. Official approval of squatting should not, therefore, be
permitted to obtain in this country where there is an orderly form of government.
8. YAO-KEE VS SY-GONZALES 167 S 736

[G.R. No. 55960. November 24, 1988.]

YAO KEE, SZE SOOK WAH, SZE LAI CHO, and SY CHUN YEN, petitioners, vs.
AIDA SY-GONZALES, MANUEL SY, TERESITA SY-BERNABE, RODOLFO SY, and
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

FACTS:

Sy Kiat, a Chinese national, died on January 17, 1977 in Caloocan City where he was
then residing, leaving behind real and personal properties here in the Philippines.

Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy filed a
petition for the grant of letters of administration. In said petition they alleged among
others that

(a) they are the children of the deceased with Asuncion Gillego;

(b) to their knowledge Sy Kiat died intestate;

(c) they do not recognize Sy Kiat's marriage to Yao Kee nor the filiation of her children
to him; and,

(d) they nominate Aida Sy-Gonzales for appointment as administratrix of the intestate
estate of the deceased.

The petition was opposed by Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sy Yun Chen
who alleged that:

(a) Yao Kee is the lawful wife of Sy Kiat whom he married on January 19, 1931 in China;

(b) the other oppositors are the legitimate children of the deceased with Yao Kee; and,

(c) Sze Sook Wah is the eldest among them and is competent, willing and desirous to
become the administratrix of the estate of Sy Kiat.

Yao Kee testified that she was married to Sy Kiat through the customs in China.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the marriage with Yao Kee is recognized here in the Philippines.

RULING:

NO.

DISCUSSION:
CUSTOM

Custom is defined as "a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed
(practiced) as a social rule, legally binding and obligatory"

MUST BE PROVED ACCORDING TO THE RULES ON EVIDENCE

The law requires that "a custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of
evidence" [Article 12, Civil Code.] On this score the Court had occasion to state that "a
local custom as a source of right can not be considered by a court of justice unless such
custom is properly established by competent evidence like any other fact" [Patriarca v.
Orate, 7 Phil. 390, 395 (1907).] The same evidence, if not one of a higher degree,
should be required of a foreign custom.

HOW PROVED

To establish a valid foreign marriage two things must be proven, namely: (1) the
existence of the foreign law as a question of fact; and (2) the alleged foreign marriage
by convincing evidence [Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43, 49 (1922)].

PROOF OF WRITTEN FOREIGN LAW

In proving a foreign law the procedure is provided in the Rules of Court. Proof of a
written foreign law, on the other hand, is provided for under Rule 132 Section 25. The
Court has interpreted section 25 to include competent evidence like the testimony of a
witness to prove the existence of a written foreign law [Collector of Internal Revenue v.
Fisher 110 Phil. 686, 700-701 (1961) citing Willamette Iron and Steel Works v. Muzzal,
61 Phil. 471 (1935).]

MARRIAGE CONTRACTED PURSUANT TO A FOREIGN LAW MUST BE PROVED TO

BE RECOGNIZED

Accordingly, in the absence of proof of the Chinese law on marriage, it should be

presumed that it is the same as ours . . . [Wong Woo Yiu v. Vivo, G.R. No. L-21076,
March 31, 1965, 13 SCRA 552, 555.] Since Yao Kee admitted in her testimony that
there was no solemnizing officer as is known here in the Philippines [See Article 56,
Civil Code] when her alleged marriage to Sy Kiat was celebrated it therefore follows that
her marriage to Sy Kiat, even if true, cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction [Wong
Woo Yiu v. Vivo, supra., pp. 555-556.]
9. TABUENA VS CA 196 S 650

[G.R. No. 85423. May 6, 1991.]

JOSE TABUENA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and EMILIANO

TABERNILLA, JR., respondents.

FACTS:

The petitioner faults the decision of the trial court, as affirmed by the respondent court,
for lack of basis. It is argued that the lower courts should not have taken into account
evidence not submitted by the private respondent in accordance with the Rules of
Court.

The subject of the dispute is a parcel of residential land consisting of about 440 square
meters and situated in Poblacion, Makato, Aklan. In 1973, an action for recovery of
ownership thereof was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Aklan by the estate of Alfredo
Tabernilla against Jose Tabuena, the herein petitioner. After trial, judgment was
rendered in favor of the plaintiff and the defendant was required to vacate the disputed
lot.

Tabuena appealed to the respondent court, complaining that, in arriving at its factual
findings, the trial court motu proprio took cognizance of Exhibits "A", "B" and "C", which
had been marked by the plaintiff but never formally submitted in evidence. The trial
court also erred when, to resolve the ownership of the subject lot, it considered the
proceedings in another case involving the same parties but a different parcel of land.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court erred in taking cognizance of Exhibits "A", "B" and "C",
which had been marked by the plaintiff but never formally submitted in evidence.

RULING:

YES.

DISCUSSION:

EVIDENCE NOT FORMALLY OFFERED CANNOT BE CONSIDERED NOR GIVEN

ANY EVIDENTIARY VALUE

The mere fact that a particular document is marked as an exhibit does not mean it has
thereby already been offered as part of the evidence of a party. They were not by such
marking formally offered as exhibits. As we said in Interpacific Transit, Inc. v. Aviles, "At
the trial on the merits, the party may decide to formally offer (the exhibits) if it believes
they will advance its cause, and then again it may decide not to do so at all. In the latter
event, such documents cannot be considered evidence, nor can they be given any
evidentiary value."

RATIONALE

The offer is necessary because it is the duty of a judge to rest his findings of facts and
his judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial.

WHEN CONSIDERED ADMISSIBLE AGAINST THE ADVERSE PARTY

We did say in People v. Napat-a that even if there be no formal offer of an exhibit, it may
still be admitted against the adverse party if, first, it has been duly identified by
testimony duly recorded and, second, it has itself been incorporated in the records of
the case. But we do not fine that these requirements have been satisfied in the case
before us.

WHEN CONSIDERED READ INTO THE RECORD OF A CASE PENDING BEFORE A

COURT

It is clear, though, that this exception is applicable only when, "in the absence of
objection," "with the knowledge of the opposing party," or "at the request or with the
consent of the parties," the case is clearly referred to or "the original or part of the
records of the case are actually withdrawn from the archives" and "admitted as part of
the record of the case then pending." These conditions have not been established here.
On the contrary, the petitioner was completely unaware that his testimony in Civil Case
No. 1327 was being considered by the trial court in the case then pending before it. As
the petitioner puts it, the matter was never taken up at the trial and was "unfairly sprung"
upon him, leaving him no opportunity to counteract.

FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE INFERIOR COURTS HELD NOT CONFORMABLE TO

THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD

It is the policy of this Court to accord proper deference to the factual findings of the
courts below and even to regard them as conclusive where there is now showing that
they have been reached arbitrarily. The exception is where such findings do not conform
to the evidence on record and appear indeed to have no valid basis to sustain their
correctness.
10. PP VS GODOY 250 S 676

[G.R. Nos. 115908-09. December 6, 1995.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. DANNY GODOY, * accused-

appellant.

FACTS:

Godoy is a teacher of Palawan National School. He was accused before the Regional
Trial Court and was subsequently convicted for the separate crimes of Rape and
Kidnapping wit Serious Illegal Detention.

During the time that Godoy was detained, the mother of Danny went to Mia and her
parents to settle the case.

Danny was without knowledge of such settlement.

The case persisted and Godoy was meted out the penalty of death.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Godoy was absolved and was acquitted due to the settlement.

RULING:

YES.

DISCUSSION:

BURDEN OF PROOF

By the very nature of the crime of rape, conviction or acquittal depends almost entirely
on the credibility of the complainant's testimony because of the fact that usually only the
participants can testify as to its occurrence. This notwithstanding, the basic rule remains
that in all criminal prosecutions without regard to the nature of the defense which the
accused may raise, the burden of proof remains at all times upon the prosecution to
establish his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. If the accused raises a sufficient doubt as
to any material element, and the prosecution is then unable to overcome this evidence,
the prosecution has failed to carry its burden of proof of the guilt of the accused beyond
a reasonable doubt and the accused must be acquitted.
RATIONALE

The rationale for the rule is that, confronted by the full panoply of State authority, the
accused is accorded the presumption of innocence to lighten and even reverse the
heavy odds against him.

WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY, MUST BE STRONG ENOUGH TO ESTABLISH GUILT

BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT

Mere accusation is not enough to convict him, and neither is the weakness of his
defense. The evidence for the prosecution must be strong per se, strong enough to
establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. In other words, the accused
may be convicted on the basis of the lone uncorroborated testimony of the offended
woman, provided such testimony is clear, positive, convincing and otherwise consistent
with human nature and the normal course of things.

GUIDING PRINCIPLES IN REVIEWING EVIDENCE FOR RAPE

There are three well-known principles that guide an appellate court in reviewing the
evidence presented in a prosecution for the crime of rape. These are:

(1) while rape is a most detestable crime, and ought to be severely and impartially
punished, it must be borne in mind that it is an accusation easy to be made, hard to be
proved, but harder to be defended by the party accused, though innocent;

(2) that in view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two persons are
usually involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme
caution; and

(3) that the evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot
be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.

WHERE INCULPATORY FACTS ARE CAPABLE OF TWO OR MORE EXPLANATIONS,

ONE CONSISTENT WITH INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED AND THE OTHER WITH
HIS GUILT, EVIDENCE IS NOT SUFFICIENT TO CONVICT

Doctrinally, where the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more
explanations one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other
consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty and
is not sufficient to support a conviction.
ALLEGATION OF COMPLAINANT THAT APPELLANT OPENLY ACCOMPANIED HER
ALL THE WAY TO THE GATE OF THE HOUSE AFTER THE ALLEGED RAPE IS NOT
CREDIBLE

It was further alleged by complainant that after her alleged ravishment, she put on her
panty and then appellant openly accompanied her all the way to the gate of the house
where they eventually parted ways. This is inconceivable. It is not the natural tendency
of a man to remain for long by the side of the woman he had raped, and in public in a
highly populated area at that. Given the stealth that accompanies it and the anxiety to
end further exposure at the scene, the logical post-incident impulse of the felon is to
distance himself from his victim as far and as soon as practicable, to avoid discovery
and apprehension. It is to be expected that one who is guilty of a crime would want to
dissociate himself from the person of his victim, the scene of the crime, and from all
other things and circumstances related to the offense which could possibly implicate
him or give rise to even the slightest suspicion as to his guilt. Verily, the guilty flee where
no man pursueth.

IT IS NOT IN ACCORD WITH HUMAN EXPERIENCE FOR APPELLANT TO HAVE LET

HIMSELF BE SEEN WITH COMPLAINANT IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE ALLEGED
RAPE

It is of common knowledge that facts which prove or tend to prove that the accused was
at the scene of the crime are admissible as relevant, on the theory that such presence
can be appreciated as a circumstance tending to identify the appellant. Consequently, it
is not in accord with human experience for appellant to have let himself be seen with the
complainant immediately after he had allegedly raped her. It thus behooves this Court to
reject the notion that appellant would be so foolhardy as to accompany complainant up
to the gate of the house, considering its strategic location vis-a-vis complainant's
boarding house which is just across the street, and the PNS school building which is
only around thirty meters away.

ADVERSELY AFFECTED BY THE NONCHALANT AND UNCONCERNED ATTITUDE

OF VICTIM AFTER THE ALLEGED RAPE

Complainant's enigmatic behavior after her alleged ravishment can only be described as
paradoxical: it was so strangely normal as to be abnormal. It seems odd, if not
incredible, that upon seeing the person who had allegedly raped her only the day
before, she did not accuse, revile or denounce him, or show rage, revulsion, and
disgust. Instead, she meekly went with appellant despite the presence of her parents
and the proximity of neighbors which, if only for such facts, would naturally have
deterred appellant from pursuing any evil design. From her deportment, it does not
appear that the alleged threat made by appellant had instilled any fear in the mind of
complainant. Such a nonchalant, unconcerned attitude is totally at odds with the
demeanor that would naturally be expected of a person who had just suffered the
ultimate invasion of her womanhood.

FINDINGS OF FACTS OF TRIAL COURT, GENERALLY UPHELD ON APPEAL

The rule, therefore, that this Court generally desists from disturbing the conclusions of
the trial court on the credibility of witnesses will not apply where the evidence of record
fails to support or substantiate the lower court's findings of fact and conclusions; or
where the lower court overlooked certain facts of substance and value that, if
considered, would affect the outcome of the case; or where the disputed decision is
based on a misapprehension of facts.

WEIGHT AND SUFFICIENCY; CORRECT MEANING OF TESTIMONY ASCERTAINED

ONLY UPON PERUSAL OF ENTIRE TESTIMONY.

The technique in deciphering testimony is not to solely concentrate on isolated parts of

that testimony. The correct meaning of the testimony can often be ascertained only
upon a perusal of the entire testimony. Everything stated by the witness has to be
considered in relation to what else has been stated.

OFFER OF COMPROMISE, NOT ALWAYS CONSIDERED AN ADMISSION OF GUILT

The prosecution insists that the offer of compromise made by appellant is deemed to be
an admission of guilt. This inference does not arise in the instant case. In criminal
cases, an offer of compromise is generally admissible as evidence against the party
making it. It is a legal maxim, which assuredly constitutes one of the bases of the right
to penalize, that in the matter of public crimes which directly affect the public interest, no
compromise whatever may be entered into as regards the penal action. It has long been
held, however, that in such cases the accused is permitted to show that the offer was
not made under a consciousness of guilt, but merely to avoid the inconvenience of
imprisonment or for some other reason which would justify a claim by the accused that
the offer to compromise was not in truth an admission of his guilt or an attempt to avoid
the legal consequences which would ordinarily ensue therefrom.

OFFER MADE WITHOUT PRESENCE OF ACCUSED, NOT AN IMPLIED ADMISSION

It has been held that where the accused was not present at the time the offer for
monetary consideration was made, such offer of compromise would not save the day for
the prosecution. In another case, this Court ruled that no implied admission can be
drawn from the efforts to arrive at a settlement outside the court, where the accused did
not take part in any of the negotiations and the effort to settle the case was in
accordance with the established tribal customs, that is, Muslim practices and traditions,
in an effort to prevent further deterioration of the relations between the parties.

PRESUMPTION INDICATING GUILT OF ACCUSED DOES NOT IN ITSELF DESTROY

PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE

It frequently happens that in a particular case two or more presumptions are involved.
Sometimes the presumptions conflict, one tending to demonstrate the guilt of the
accused and the other his innocence. In such case, it is necessary to examine the basis
for each presumption and determine what logical or social basis exists for each
presumption, and then determine which should be regarded as the more important and
entitled to prevail over the other. It must, however, be remembered that the existence of
a presumption indicating guilt does not in itself destroy the presumption against
innocence unless the inculpating presumption, together with all of the evidence, or the
lack of any evidence or explanation, is sufficient to overcome the presumption of
innocence by proving the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Until the
defendant's guilt is shown in this manner, the presumption of innocence continues.
11. BPI SAVINGS VS CTA 330 S 507

[G.R. No. 122480. April 12, 2000.]

BPI-FAMILY SAVINGS BANK, Inc., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, COURT OF

TAX APPEALS and the COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.

FACTS:

This is a petition for review assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed
the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals denying petitioner's claim for tax refund.
Allegedly, petitioner declared that it would apply the excess withholding tax as tax credit
for taxable year 1990 and it was presumed to have done so as petitioner failed to
present its 1990 Tax Return which would have shown that the amount in dispute was
not applied as a tax credit.

Although petitioner failed to present its 1990 Tax Return, petitioner presented other
evidence to prove its claim that it did not apply and could not have applied the amount
in dispute as tax credit. These evidence were never refuted by the BIR. Undisputed is
the fact that petitioner suffered a net loss in 1990, thus, it incurred no tax liability to
which the tax credit could be applied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the BIR and the Court can withhold the tax refund which rightfully
belongs to the petitioner.

RULING:

NO

DISCUSSION:

FACTUAL FINDINGS OF APPELLATE COURT, GENERALLY RESPECTED

As a rule, the factual findings of the appellate court are binding on this Court. This rule,
however, does not apply where, inter alia, the judgment is premised on a
misapprehension of facts, or when the appellate court failed to notice certain relevant
facts which if considered would justify a different conclusion. This case is one such
exception.
RULES OF PROCEEDINGS COURT OF TAX APPEALS NOT STRICTLY
CONSTRUED

Strict procedural rules generally frown upon the submission of the Return after the trial.
The law creating the Court of Tax Appeals, however, specifically provides that
proceedings before it "shall not be governed strictly by the technical rules of evidence."
The paramount consideration remains the ascertainment of truth. Verily, the quest for
orderly presentation of issues is not an absolute. It should not bar courts from
considering undisputed facts to arrive at a just determination of a controversy. It should
be stressed that the rationale of the rules of procedure is to secure a just determination
of every action. They are tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. But there
can be no just determination of the present action if we ignore, on grounds of strict
technicality, the Return submitted before the CTA and even before this Court.

JUDICIAL NOTICE

As a rule, "courts are not authorized to take judicial notice of the contents of the records
of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same
court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been heard or are actually
pending before the same judge." Be that as it may, Section 2, Rule 129 provides that
courts may take judicial notice of matters ought to be known to judges because of their
judicial functions.