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ASEAN Counterterrorism Cooperation Since 9/11
Author(s): Jonathan T. Chow

Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 45, No. 2 (March/April 2005), pp. 302-321
Published by: University of California Press
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ASEAN COUNTERTERRORISM
COOPERATION SINCE 9/11
Jonathan T. Chow
Abstract
This article examines ASEANs intramural counterterrorism cooperation from
9/11 through the Bali bombing of October 2002 and its effects on ASEANs
cohesion and the norm of non-intervention in members domestic affairs.
While the Bali bombing appeared to unify threat perceptions, domestic imper-
atives have significantly hindered substantive multilateral counterterrorism
efforts.
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

occupies a central position in the war on terrorism in Southeast Asia. Cooper-
ation among the member states of this multilateral consortium carries the
promise of a region-wide coordinated effort to combat terrorism. Such cooper-
ation, however, has proved elusive. Of particular note is the significant intra-
mural disagreement over threat perceptions and how far ASEAN members
should go in discussing domestic aspects of terrorisms origins and impacts, a
topic that brings up the potential for conflict over the organizations cherished
norm of non-interference in its members domestic affairs. In the immediate
aftermath of 9/11, the ASEAN states acted independently, implementing poli-
cies with obvious disregard for norms of decision making by consensus. Even
after the bombing of the Sari Club in Bali in October 2002, there was little
substantial counterterrorism cooperation among the ASEAN states, which in-
stead acted unilaterally or bilaterally with extra-regional actors, primarily the
United States. Despite these initial shortcomings, however, the ASEAN states
have since begun to display greater regional cohesion, resulting in progress
Jonathan T. Chow is a Ph.D. student in the Department of Political Sci-

ence at the University of California, Berkeley. The author would like to thank George T. Crane,
Marc Lynch, James McAllister, William J. Hurst, Joseph T. Gallagher, Ardimas Sasdi, and an
anonymous reader for their constructive comments and suggestions. Email: !jchow@berkeley.edu".
Asian Survey, Vol. 45, Issue 2, pp. 302321, ISSN 0004-4687, electronic ISSN 1533-838X.
2005 by The Regents of the University of California. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests
for permission to photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of California
Presss Rights and Permissions website, at http://www.ucpress.edu/journals/rights.htm.
302
JONATHAN T. CHOW 303
visible in the arrests of key terrorists and also in tangible steps toward greater
consultation and cooperation, such as intelligence sharing, joint training of law
enforcement, and efforts to standardize legal definitions of terrorism.
This article seeks to plot the trajectory of ASEAN counterterrorism cooper-
ation from before 9/11 to after the Bali bombing and to identify and explicate
the factors that have shaped this process. We begin by laying out ASEANs basic
norms of cooperation and examining how the association dealt with terrorism
prior to 9/11, showing that the problem was treated primarily as a domestic issue.
We explore certain individual member states diverse experiences with terror-
ism, showing that variation in domestic political stability strongly influenced
individual states stances toward regional counterterrorism cooperation, at times
creating friction among members with different priorities. Specifically, we fo-
cus on Indonesia, the Philippines, and Malaysia, because these states became
the focal points for American and ASEAN attention. Next, we examine the dy-
namics of intramural counterterrorism cooperation before and after the Octo-
ber 2002 bombing in Bali, arguing that the incident forced ASEAN members
to reevaluate their threat perceptions and helped move the states toward deeper
regional collaboration. Finally, we discuss how the ASEAN states have sought
to implement various counterterrorism initiatives while simultaneously adher-
ing strictly to the organizations norm of non-interference in domestic affairs,
even at the expense of other norms.
The chief argument here is twofold. First, multilateral counterterrorism co-
operation in ASEAN is based on common threat perceptions. The ASEAN states
varying domestic political situations and relations both with outside powers (es-
pecially the United States) and each other created divergent perceptions of friend
and foe, making regional cooperation difficult to achieve. Second, the prospect
of a regionalas opposed to domesticapproach to combating terrorism in
Southeast Asia created concerns within ASEAN that member states could vio-
late each others sovereignty and consequently foster domestic instability. These
concerns have been exacerbated in part by deeper American involvement in the
region, leading some states to resist intensive multilateral cooperation.
Norms of ASEAN Security Cooperation

and Early Counterterrorism Efforts
One of ASEANs goals has been the formation of a regional identity through
the establishment of certain norms of interaction. At the core of ASEANs phi-
losophy are the concepts of musjawarah (consultation) and mufukat (consen-
sus), codified in the key 1976 Declaration of the ASEAN Concord and Treaty
of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia. In ASEAN discussions, each
party articulates its viewpoints before a final decision is made. Decisions are
rendered on the basis of mutual consent rather than votes and a solution must
304 ASIAN SURVEY, VOL. XLV, NO. 2, MARCH/APRIL 2005
be agreeable to all parties before it is adopted. In the event of a deadlock,

ASEAN generally drops the issue and resorts to bilateral negotiations. More-
over, ASEAN professes a doctrine of strict non-interference in the domestic
affairs of its member states by other members, as codified in the 1972 Zone
of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) Declaration. The original goal of
these norms, collectively known as the ASEAN Way, was to prevent intramural
conflict from destroying ASEAN unity and rendering member states vulnerable
to communist subversion.1
Because of these norms, substantive security cooperation within ASEAN
historically has been difficult to achieve. Member states vigilantly guard their
sovereignty and are wary of potential encroachments on their domestic poli-
cies. It has not been uncommon for national interests to derail regional initia-
tives. ASEANs track record in security cooperation reveals tentative efforts
limited by divergent threat perceptions. Attempts by members to revise the
non-intervention norm have been hampered by fears that external pressure
could cause governments to lose legitimacy within their borders.2
Prior to 9/11, ASEAN did not single out terrorism as a topic of special im-
portance. Indeed, there is no specific mention of terrorism either in the joint
communiqus of the ASEAN Ministerial Meetings before 9/11 or in the chair-
mans statements of the ASEAN Regional Forums (ARF) prior to July 2001.
Instead, ASEAN subsumed terrorism under the rubric of transnational crime,
along with narcotics trafficking, arms smuggling, money laundering, and pi-
racy. On December 15, 1997, ASEAN promulgated ASEAN Vision 2020,
which laid out the organizations long-range goals. The major priorities of this
document included better regional economic integration, peaceful interaction
and dispute resolution among members, and enhanced cooperation to confront
transnational problems, including trafficking in drugs and humans.3 There was
no mention of terrorism either in this document or the 1998 Hanoi Plan of
Action, which detailed steps to be taken to implement ASEAN Vision 2020.
Because many (though not all) Southeast Asian terrorist groups are domes-
tic rather than transnational and often represent separatist movements with
1. For an excellent treatment of the subject of norms and identity formation in ASEAN, see
Amitav Acharya, Constructing a Security Community in Southeast Asia: ASEAN and the Problem
of Regional Order, Politics in Asia Series (London: Routledge, 2001), pp. 4779. The Declaration
of ASEAN Concord, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, and the ZOPFAN Declaration can be
found on the ASEAN website, !http://www.aseansec.org/90.htm".
2. Several past examples of divergent threat perceptions influencing individual member states
behaviors can be found in the case of Vietnams invasion of Cambodia in 1978. See, for instance,
Acharya, Constructing a Security Community, pp. 8485. See also Jurgen Haacke, ASEANs Dip-
lomatic and Security Culture: Origins, Development, and Prospects (London: RoutledgeCurzon,
2003), pp. 10104.
3. ASEAN, ASEAN Vision 2020, December 15, 1997, !http://www.aseansec.org/1814.htm".
primarily domestic goals, counterterrorism efforts typically were limited to in-

trastate operations with little or no cooperation among neighboring states.
This fit well with the ASEAN norm of non-intervention. During the 1990s,
however, a growing regional consensus emerged on the need to address trans-
national organized crime. Terrorism was included in this category, although
trafficking in drugs, arms, and humans received greater attention. The first
ASEAN Conference on Transnational Crime convened in Manila in December
1997. The conference produced the ASEAN Declaration on Transnational
Crime, which instituted a series of regular ministerial-level meetingsthe
ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational Crime (AMMTC)to facili-
tate coordination among various ASEAN bodies. The declaration also laid out
possibilities for information sharing and policy coordination, such as the
placement of police attachs in all ASEAN national capitals and the establish-
ment of an ASEAN Center for Combating Transnational Crime, which would
serve as a research center and regional clearinghouse for criminal information
among national police departments.
9/11 and After: Changing

Threat Perceptions
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, led to a qualitative change in the
way ASEAN approached terrorism. At the Third AMMTC on October 11, 2001,
in Singapore, ministers stated in their joint communiqu that efforts to fight
transnational crime should have a particular focus on terrorism. In May
2002, ASEAN produced the Work Program to Implement the Plan of Action to
Combat Transnational Crime, which laid out a comprehensive set of strategies
for addressing transnational crime at a regional level, including terrorism.4
There was indeed much work to be done. The organizational sophistication of
terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah (Islamic Organization,
JI) and their ability to shift smoothly across borders contrasted starkly with
major inconsistencies in the domestic legal systems, law enforcement mecha-
nisms, and security priorities of the ASEAN states. Legal measures against
terrorism varied widely (and continue to vary) within ASEAN. At one end,
Malaysia and Singapore possess internal security laws that provide for indefi-
nite detention without trial of any suspected terrorist; at the other, Indonesia
4. ASEAN, Joint Communiqu of the Third ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational

Crime, October 11, 2001, !http://www.aseansec.org/5621.htm"; ASEAN, Work Program to Im-
plement the ASEAN Plan of Action to Combat Transnational Crime, May 17, 2002, !http://www.
aseansec.org/5616.htm". Among the salient points of the Work Program were enhanced informa-
tion sharing, by compiling national terrorism laws into a central repository, exchanging information
on the detection of weapons of mass destruction, and moving member states toward ratification of
international terrorism conventions.
has a police force beset by corruption and an antiquated legal framework that
until March 2003 did not formally list terrorism as a crime or provide harsh
punishments for it.5 In short, to deal with terrorism as a regional issue required
that the ASEAN states carry out considerable standardization of political and
social mechanisms.
Such a concerted effort presupposes the existence of a shared perception of
terrorism as a threat. Because individual member states had encountered ter-
rorism within their borders across a wide spectrum of experience, they dif-
fered in their perceptions of the degree of threat and how to combat it. This, in
turn, influenced their positions on regional counterterrorism cooperation. An
overview of terrorist groups and the domestic political climate in several
ASEAN states will illustrate the origins of these divergent threat perceptions
and counterterrorism strategies.
In the Philippines, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Abu
Sayyaf Group both seek to establish an independent Islamic state in the primar-
ily Muslim southern province of Mindanao. Because of the large-scale nature
of the insurgency in the country, the government has adopted a strongly mili-
tary approach in combating it. During the 1990s, the MILF launched a series
of attacks throughout the southern Philippines, resulting in reprisals from the
army. As of this writing, formal negotiations between the government and
the MILF were scheduled to resume in February 2005, after an uneasy ceasefire
that has lasted since July 2003.
In Indonesia, the worlds most populous Islamic country, terrorism has been
linked to separatist movements in the provinces of East Timor, Irian Jaya, and
Aceh. Under former President Suharto, the Indonesian government employed
force to suppress political violence and dissent, as illustrated by numerous mil-
itary operations in those troubled provinces and elsewhere. The internal political
turbulence that followed Suhartos fall in 1998 created a more fertile environ-
ment for separatism and Islamic extremism. Domestic and international pres-
sure led to the 1999 referendum on independence in East Timor, resulting in
widespread violence by pro-Indonesian militias and a number of army units.
In May 2003, peace talks between the government and the separatist Gerakan
Aceh Merdeka (Free Aceh Movement, GAM) in the heavily Muslim province
of Aceh broke down, and Jakarta launched a major military crackdown there.
However, significant developments emerged in the wake of the December 26,
2004, tsunami, which devastated the region and killed as many as 150,000
people in Aceh alone.6 In early January 2005, GAM proposed a unilateral and
unconditional ceasefire, an action that the government in Jakarta welcomed.
5. Indonesia Needs Laws to Fight Terror, Straits Times (Singapore), January 31, 2002; Jusuf
Wanandi, Indonesia: A Failed State? Washington Quarterly 25:3 (Summer 2002), pp. 13546.
6. UN Predicts Aceh Toll of 150,000, Courier Mail (Queensland, Australia), January 20, 2005.
Although GAM forces and Indonesian troops engaged in some skirmishes

after the ceasefire was declared, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono offered
Aceh autonomy (a step short of GAMs goal of complete independence) and
amnesty, in exchange for a formal ceasefire agreement. Peace talks commenced
in Helsinki, Finland, at the end of January and ended with the possibility of a
referendum on Acehnese independence to be held within five to 10 years.
The 9/11 attacks prompted the United States to respond with major military
operations against the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. These actions raised
concerns among ASEAN members, particularly Malaysia and Indonesia, that
the war on terrorism was turning into a war on Islam. Unlike Indonesia and the
Philippines, whose relative political instability has made the military the chief
instrument of counterinsurgency, Malaysia faces a lower level of threat and thus
historically has been inclined to advocate a softer approach. Then-Malaysian
Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad argued in 2002 that ASEAN should adopt
a middle way in the war on terrorism by condemning not only terrorist attacks
but also the American operation in Afghanistan and seeking peaceful ways to
address the societal factors that had bred terrorism. Speaking at the Asia Soci-
ety, Mahathir argued that we should fight [terrorists] not just by direct action
but more by winning the hearts and minds of the people so as to reduce sup-
port for acts of terrorism and to reduce the attraction of acts of terror for those
who see no means of redress for their own sufferings.7
The bombing raids in Afghanistan initially drew no statement from then-
Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri. Having inherited a state that had
suffered economic and political turmoil since the 1997 Asian economic crisis,
Megawati saw her primary goal upon taking office in 2001 as restoring stabil-
ity, which required her to maintain a precarious balance among numerous fac-
tions including the military, Islamic fundamentalists, business interests, and
others. Indeed, various Islamic groups in Indonesia decried the American cam-
paign. The radical Front Pembala Islam (Islamic Defenders Front, FPI) de-
manded that Megawati sever relations with the United States and threatened to
force out Westerners living in Indonesia if she did not. The moderate Islamic
scholars group Nahdlatul Ulama (Revival of Scholars), representing orthodox
Sunni Islam, also denounced the war in Afghanistan, charging that it might in-
cite radical Islamic groups.8 Under such circumstances, it is understandable
that Indonesia appeared hesitant to join in multilateral counterterrorism coop-
eration and sought instead to treat terrorism as an essentially domestic problem.
On the other side of the issue, most other ASEAN states (excluding the
newly admitted states of Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and Vietnam) supported
7. Brute Force Not the Way to Fight Terrorism: Dr M, Business Times (Kuala Lumpur), Feb-
ruary 6, 2002.
8. Nations Lay Their Cards on the Table, Herald Sun (Melbourne), October 9, 2001, p. 10.
the anti-terrorism campaign as long-time friends and allies of the United

States.9 Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines all voiced official support for
the Afghanistan campaign. Thailand considered allowing the United States to
launch strikes into Afghanistan from the U-Tapao air base in the Gulf of Thai-
land, and Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra brushed off suggestions that his
countrys support of the United States might alienate Thai Muslims, saying that
the matter was not about race or religion but rather about combating interna-
tional terrorism.10 However, the Central Islamic Committee of Thailand, an Is-
lamic political party, was less enthusiastic and advocated that Thailand remain
neutral, refraining from lending military or political support to Washington.11
Philippine President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, facing a major separatist in-
surgency in the south, enthusiastically supported the United States and was the
first leader of an Asian country to proffer combat troops in support of Opera-
tion Enduring Freedom. Singapore also voiced support for the war against ter-
rorism but cautioned that the United States should build a broad consensus for
its policies. Ambassador-at-large Tommy Koh called on Washington to pur-
sue its just cause by just means, and to act wisely, so as not to lose its moral
high ground and the sympathy and support of the world.12
Regionalizing Terrorism: Tiptoeing Toward

a Unified Threat Perception
Alexander Wendt argues that a unifying factor in generating a collective iden-
tity among states is the designation of a common other, which can be a con-
crete threat, such as a particular country, or an abstract threat, such as nuclear
war. To this end, states generate processes of interdependence based on com-
mon interests and aversions created by the presence of the other.13 When
states assert their common identity not only in a political vacuum but also in
relation to other states, they can strengthen this identity by generating aver-
sions to alternative identities. Conversely, disagreements over the nature of
the other can weaken common identityand thus cooperationby creating
divergent priorities.
ASEAN took initial steps to create a unified threat perception of terrorism
on November 5, 2001, when its member states signed the ASEAN Declaration
on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism. The issuance of this statement despite
9. ASEAN admitted Vietnam as a member in 1995, Laos and Myanmar in 1997, and Cambodia
in 1999.
10. Thailand Gives Support to War on Terrorism, Bangkok Post, September 17, 2001.
11. Islamic Committee Urges Neutral Stance, ibid., October 3, 2001.
12. Terrorism: Spore Will Do Its Part, Straits Times, September 20, 2001.
13. Alexander Wendt, Collective Identity Formation and the International State, American
Political Science Review 88:2 (June 1994), p. 389.
sharp disagreements among members is less surprising than it might seem, be-
cause the document took a decidedly uncontroversial stance on the broad issue
of terrorism. The main points of the declaration were as follows:
Declaring that terrorism posed a formidable challenge to regional and interna-
tional peace and stability as well as to economic development;
Condemning the 9/11 attacks and [considering] such acts as . . . an assault on all of us;
Rejecting any attempt to link terrorism with any religion or race;
Review[ing] and strengthen[ing] . . . national mechanisms to combat terrorism;
Calling for enhanced information and intelligence sharing and regional cooperation
on law enforcement;
Calling for ASEAN members to sign, ratify, or accede to all relevant anti-terrorist
conventions including the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financ-
ing of Terrorism;
Declaring that the United Nations should play a major role in combating terror-
ism at the international level;
Declaring ASEANs intent to discuss and explore practical ideas and initiatives
to increase ASEANs role in and involvement with the international community . . . to
make the fight against terrorism a truly regional and global endeavour.14
The declaration did not address the primary sources of division within the
ASEAN organization, namely, the methods for combating terrorism through
multilateral cooperation and more directly, the extent to which such regional
cooperation would involve the United States. Nevertheless, the declaration was
significant as a statement of intent and an acknowledgement that terrorism
was a serious long-term issue that had to be faced.
Despite the issuance of the declaration, there emerged significant public dis-
agreement within ASEAN over how to combat regional terrorism. In February
2002, Singapore Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew charged that Indonesia was
unwilling to hunt down a nest of terrorists within its own borders, pointing
out that alleged JI leaders Abu Bakar Baasyir and Ridduan Isamuddin (also
known as Hambali) were still living freely there.15 Indonesia responded an-
grily; Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda suggested that the divergent approaches
to combating terrorism derived from the two countries political systems, one
based on democratic pluralism and the other on authoritarianism.16 Hundreds
of demonstrators surrounded the Singaporean Embassy in Jakarta to protest
Lees statement. An Indonesian newspaper, the Koran Tempo, demanded in an
editorial that Singapore provide clear proof that a terrorist network existed in
14. ASEAN, 2001 ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism, November 5,
2001, !http://www.aseansec.org/5620.htm".
15. Indonesia, Singapore at Odds on Terror, The Australian (Sydney), February 22, 2002.
16. Jakarta: Spore Is Too Authoritarian to Understand Us; Indonesias Foreign Minister Gets
in Jab at the Republic, Saying That in a Democratic System, Terrorism Must Be Dealt with Differ-
ently, Straits Times, February 25, 2002.
Indonesia, noting that under the authoritarian Suharto regime, evidence could
easily be fabricated as a means to arrest people and suggesting that Singapore
was doing similarly to innocent Indonesians and infringing upon Indonesias
sovereignty.17 President Megawati appealed for calm, but her stance upset con-
servative Muslim groups, which demanded an apology from Lee and a reeval-
uation of diplomatic relations with Singapore. Although the row eventually
died down, it illustrated the tensions within ASEAN and the challenges that
counterterrorism cooperation posed to non-intervention norms.
Two issues are worth noting here: the first is Indonesias consciousness of
its precarious position in the region. The 1997 Asian economic crisis caused a
precipitous decline in the Indonesian rupiah, created social unrest, and severely
damaged Indonesias credibility with foreign investors, ultimately resulting in
a bailout by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). That credibility was fur-
ther tarnished by President Suharto, who was widely perceived during the cri-
sis as acting in the narrow interests of his relatives and close associates.18 As
such, after the 1997 crisis and Suhartos resignation, Indonesia became re-
garded by the international community as something of a pariah and was thus
extremely sensitive to criticism from without that might hinder its ability to
recover both economically and politically.
Second, nationalism had become a major factor within the equation of re-
gional cooperation, in some cases overriding regional identity.19 The autonomy
laws of 1999 gave some 400 districts across Indonesia a degree of self-governance
after decades of repression under the Suharto regime.20 This also opened the
floodgates to expressions of public opinion on foreign policy, making it harder
for political elites to implement unpopular policies such as crackdowns on rad-
ical Islamic militants or cooperation with the United States and ASEAN in the
war on terrorism. In short, domestic factors were proving to be a significant
hurdle to substantive regional cooperation.
Wendt argues that creation of a common identity among states can be hin-
dered in part by domestic pressures, competing identities, or an insecure sense
17. Singapore Perpetrating State Terrorism on Indonesia, Says Paper, ibid., February 27,
2002.
18. For a more thorough discussion of the effects of the Asian economic crisis on Indonesias
international credibility, see Judith Bird, Indonesia in 1998: The Pot Boils Over, Asian Survey
39:1 (January/February 1999), pp. 2737.
19. The primary reason for this was Suhartos removal from power in 1998 and subsequent po-
litical reforms under his successor, B. J. Habibie, which allowed a free press, political parties, and
free elections. For an examination of ethnic nationalism and separatism since 1998, see Edward
Aspinall and Mark T. Berger, The Break-up of Indonesia? Nationalisms After Decolonisation and
the Limits of the Nation-State in Post-Cold War Southeast Asia, Third World Quarterly 22:6 (De-
cember 2001), pp. 100324.
20. Wanandi, Indonesia: A Failed State? p. 136.
of sovereignty. Domestic interests or competing identities within a state may

override the interests of the collective and cause the state to shun interdepen-
dent relationships. Wendt also contends that the sovereign entity, i.e., the state,
can significantly hinder collective identity formation if it needs to define itself
in contradistinction to other states, particularly for security matters. On the
other hand, sovereignty can also promote the formation of a collective identity
by helping ensure that a state does not become completely submerged beneath
the collective. Wendt posits that in this way, sovereignty may make it psy-
chologically possible for states to develop collective attachments.21 The cor-
ollary is that states with a weak sense of sovereignty may be more insecure
and reluctant to adopt a collective identity than states with greater sovereign
stability. Indonesias dilemma in balancing deeper regional cooperation with
government legitimacy appears to reflect this dynamic.
Assistance from the United States, which, post-9/11, was eager to enlist the
aid of Southeast Asian countries in combating terrorism on the second front,
also proved to be divisive for ASEAN and a hindrance to substantive cooperation.
The first American response to Southeast Asian terrorism took the form of aid
to the Philippines. In November 2001, President Arroyo accepted a $100 million
package of military training and equipment. By February 2002, the number of
American troops deployed to the Philippines to combat the Abu Sayyaf Group
had risen to 660.22 Although the Philippine Constitution forbids the use of for-
eign troops in combat on Philippine soil, Manila and Washington circumvented
the provision by labeling the operation a training exercise despite the fact that
American forces would be armed, entering hostile territory, and authorized to
return fire if attacked. The Philippine governments close cooperation with the
United States sparked a wave of popular opposition, with some members of
Parliament claiming that Arroyo had violated the Constitution and others ex-
pressing fears that the growing American presence mimicked the escalation of
the Vietnam War or heralded the beginning of American neo-colonialism.23 Con-
cerns also arose that American counterterrorism efforts would become enmeshed
with counterinsurgency efforts to combat the MILF, generally seen as enjoy-
ing wide popularity in largely Muslim Mindanao, thereby creating a larger
conflict. By the beginning of 2005, U.S. troops were still assisting Philippine
forces with counterterrorism operations, including on Mindanao. Washington
was also considering providing aid to the MILF for development in the prov-
ince, contingent upon the conclusion of a successful peace agreement.24
21. Wendt, Collective Identity Formation, pp. 38788.

22. Troop Presence in the Philippines Signals Phase Two of War on Terror, Irish Times
(Dublin), February 8, 2002.
23. Manila Debates Use of US Troops, The Australian, January 18, 2002.
24. Envoy: US Aid to MILF Hinges on Peace Deal, Manila Standard, January 17, 2005.
On the Indonesian front, the United States moved quickly after 9/11 to se-
cure President Megawatis assurances of cooperation in counterterrorism efforts.
During a meeting with President George Bush in early October 2001, Mega-
wati was promised an attractive quid pro quo for cooperation in the war on ter-
ror: restoration of bilateral military ties severed after the 1999 East Timor crisis
and an aid package totaling some $657.4 million. This consisted of $10 mil-
lion to train Indonesian police, $17 million to assist refugees and rebuild infra-
structure, $130 million to finance legal and judicial reform, $100 million in
trade concessions through granting duty-free status to 11 Indonesian products,
and $400 million to promote trade and investment in the oil and gas sector.25
Like Arroyo, Megawati came under intense domestic pressure for promising
cooperation, particularly when American planes began bombing the Taliban in
Afghanistan. Mass protests against what many perceived to be American ter-
rorism ensued, and the Muslim Ulamas Council, Indonesias top Islamic au-
thority, called for a jihad against the United States in response to any attack on
Afghanistan.26
The November 2001 signing of the ASEAN Declaration on Joint Action to
Counter Terrorism prompted the United States to ensure its own involvement.
Alluding to the declaration, Admiral Dennis Blair, commander of U.S. forces
in the Pacific, was quoted as saying that there is also a very important re-
gional component here in Southeast Asia that the U.S. doesnt have a role in
and thats the ASEAN regional initiative.27 The United States hosted a one-
day dialogue with ASEAN in Washington that included talks on regional
counterterrorism strategies. ASEAN ministers left with the impression that the
United States was taking them far more seriously than in the past. Assistant
Secretary of State James Kelly indicated in his opening address that some
ASEAN countries could assist in the war on terrorism not only through finan-
cial, technical, and political support but also by serving as a model for a mod-
erate Islamic society.28
The prospect of direct involvement by the United States in the war against
terrorism in Southeast Asia created new cleavages within ASEAN, making uni-
fied threat perception more difficult. For some states, the prospect of linking
regional and domestic counterterrorism efforts with direct American involvement
posed a dilemma. While aid was welcome, collaboration in a war popularly
perceived to be anti-Islamic was not. Malaysia was particularly sensitive to such
25. U.S. Showers Indonesia with Promises, Jakarta Post, September 21, 2001.
26. Indonesias President Backs US. Does Her Country? Christian Science Monitor, Sep-
tember 28, 2001; Indonesian Moslem Clerics Call for Jihad Against U.S. and Allies, Deutsche
Presse Agentur, September 25, 2001.
27. U.S. Seeks Role in ASEANs Anti-Terror Drive, The Hindu (Chennai, India), November
18, 2001.
28. US Friendlier to ASEAN Now, Straits Times, December 1, 2001.
cooperation and criticized the Philippines for allowing the United States to
conduct joint military exercises aimed at eradicating the Abu Sayyaf Group.
Malaysian Foreign Minister Hamid Albar was quoted as saying, We have
always thought that the best way of handling internal or regional problems is
between regional countries.29
In spite of the difficulties encountered in forging substantive multilateral
cooperation, signs also appeared that ASEAN countries were improving com-
munication among themselves. In May 2002, the Philippines, Indonesia, and
Malaysia signed the Agreement on Exchange and Establishment of Communi-
cation Procedures, to which Thailand and Cambodia later acceded. The agree-
ment committed the signatories to share airline passenger lists, blacklists, and
computerized fingerprint databases, as well as engage in joint training exer-
cises and strengthen border controls by designating common entry and exit
points. The same month, the ASEAN states promulgated the work program
against transnational crime detailed above.
On August 1, 2002, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell signed the ASEAN-
United States Joint Declaration for Cooperation to Combat International Ter-
rorism. The declaration was little more than a general, non-binding exhortation
to greater counterterrorism cooperation, along with several suggestions on how
to achieve it. Nevertheless, senior ASEAN officials claimed that the declara-
tion set the stage for further (and presumably more substantive) bilateral and
multilateral pacts.30 However, some of the ASEAN states, especially Vietnam
and Indonesia, acceded only reluctantly, fearing that the declaration would
grant the United States a blank check to carry out military operations in the re-
gion. The original wording of the document stated that the United States
would act in accordance with the principles of sovereign equality, territorial
integrity and . . . non-intervention in the domestic affairs of other states,
while the final wording declared that it would merely recognize those prin-
ciples.31 Powells visit to Southeast Asia, which included the signing of the
declaration, was more notable for his bilateral talks with Indonesia, which re-
sulted in a pledge of $50 million in counterterrorism aid over three years. Most
of the money was destined for Indonesian police forces, thus allowing the
United States to circumvent restrictions against funding the armed forces.32
29. ASEAN Split on Anti-Terror Tactics, International Herald Tribune, February 4, 2002.
30. ASEAN Countries Benefit from Anti-Terror Pact, Straits Times, August 3, 2002.
31. US Wins Licence to Open Second Front in Terror War, The Times (London), July 30,
2002.
32. Indonesias Help with War on Terror Could Restore US Aid, Christian Science Monitor,
July 1, 2002; Military Aid to Indonesia Revived in War on Terror, Los Angeles Times, August 3,
2002; Powell Sees Progress in Restoring Military Ties with Indonesia, Associated Press, August
3, 2002.
Some concrete multilateral action by ASEAN did follow the signing of the
declaration. Member countries agreed in late August to establish an ASEAN
Network Security Coordination Council to develop an information security
center and national Computer Emergency Response Teams to serve as early
warning systems against cyber-terrorism. On September 16, Singaporean au-
thorities announced the arrest of 21 men alleged to be members of JI who pur-
portedly had conducted reconnaissance and surveys of selected targets,
including the American embassy in Jakarta.33
To sum up, the post-9/11 period was marked by ASEANs attempts to change
its approach to terrorism from a primarily domestic to a more regional orienta-
tion. Two major internal cleavages influenced this effort. First, the ASEAN states
disagreed over the extent to which they should fight terrorism collectively, be-
cause of varying degrees of domestic political stability and fears of outside
meddling. Second, the states differed over how deeply the United States should
be involved in regional counterterrorism cooperation: for example, Singapore
and the Philippines supported American involvement, while Malaysia advo-
cated a more indigenous response to terrorism.
The Bali Bombing: A Slow Reveille

The bombing of the Sari Club in Bali on October 12, 2002, should have been a
warning to ASEAN that its regional counterterrorism efforts were still inade-
quate. Unlike previous terrorist attacks that mainly killed local people, the deaths
of numerous foreigners in the Bali bombing thrust Indonesia into the interna-
tional spotlight. Almost immediately, accusations flew that Jakarta had failed
to act on intelligence that terrorist groups were plotting attacks. Several days
before the bombing, United States Ambassador Ralph Boyce had actually
threatened to withdraw his diplomatic staff unless the Indonesian government
moved against suspected terrorists.34 Pressures mounted on ASEAN to take
concrete action. The Business Times of Singapore opined:
The Bali bombing is a wake-up call. All illusions about Southeast Asia being free of
terrorism will disappear. Countries of the region no longer have the luxury of
sweeping the issue under the rug and getting away with it. . . . So what should they
do? Whats needed is more than just another declaration on terrorism from ASEAN.
One has already been issued and has gone largely unnoticed. Instead, we need a
clear acknowledgement of the seriousness of the problem and a concrete, coopera-
tive, credible and well-publicized strategy to tackle it.35
The bombing appeared to catch ASEAN off guard just before the 8th ASEAN
Summit in November in Phnom Penh, when the group issued a declaration
33. Threats and Responses: Detainees, New York Times, September 17, 2002.
34. US Warned Indonesia of Terror Threat, Sunday Times (London), October 13, 2002.
35. Time to Take the Gloves Off, Business Times, October 14, 2002.
that mostly reiterated the Joint Declaration to Counter Terrorism of a year

earlier. The new Declaration on Terrorism by the 8th ASEAN Summit said the
organization was
Condemning the heinous terrorist attacks in Bali;
Denounc[ing] once again the use of terror . . . for whatever cause;
Deplor[ing] the tendency in some quarters to identify terrorism with particular
religions or ethnic groups;
Commend[ing] our law-enforcement authorities for the cooperative work that has
resulted in the arrest of persons plotting to commit acts of terrorism;
Resolving to carry out and build on the specific measures outlined in the ASEAN
Declaration on Joint Action to Counter Terrorism, and to intensify our efforts,
collectively and individually, to prevent, counter and suppress the activities of ter-
rorist groups in the region.36
On an unabashedly self-interested note, ASEAN warned foreign countries
against advising their citizens to avoid travel to Southeast Asia: We call on
the international community to avoid indiscriminately advising their citizens
to refrain from visiting or otherwise dealing with our countries, in the absence
of established evidence to substantiate rumors of possible terrorist attacks, as
such measures could help achieve the objectives of the terrorists (emphasis
added).37 This statement illustrates the fence-sitting approach of the ASEAN
states. On the one hand, they were under enormous pressure to do something
about regional terrorism; on the other, they remained reluctant even to acknowl-
edge the fact that terrorist networks posed a real threat to regional security.
This dilemma manifested itself in individual states counterterrorism actions.
Soon after the Bali bombing, the Indonesian government granted Megawati
broad emergency powers, pending the passage of a permanent anti-terror law.
Indonesia also established a central counterterrorism agency with the ability to
detain suspects without trial and suspend privacy laws in investigations. Lastly,
Megawati made death the maximum penalty for terrorism.38 In a move applauded
by Western governments, Indonesian authorities attempted to detain alleged JI
leader Abu Bakar Baasyir in late October. However, efforts to serve Baasyir
formally with an arrest warrant were embarrassingly hindered by a human wall
of hundreds of his supporters, who surrounded the hospital where he was re-
cuperating from exhaustion. In the end, Indonesian law enforcement allowed
Baasyir to remain in the hospital until November 2, whereupon officers trans-
36. ASEAN, Declaration on Terrorism by the 8th ASEAN Summit, November 3, 2002, !http://
www.ASEANsec.org/13154.htm".
37. Ibid.
38. Tim Dodd, Emergency Powers for Megawati, Australian Financial Review, October 19,
2002.
ferred him to a police hospital.39 Clearly, despite holding legal justification to

arrest Baasyir under the new emergency decrees, officials were hampered by
popular support for him and fears that a draconian approach to this sensitive
matter would lead to a breakdown of civil order.40
Despite Indonesias internal response to Bali, multilateral cooperation
within ASEAN remained elusive, largely because of the fractious issue of co-
operation with the United States and its allies. In one notable example, Austra-
lia, which lost 88 of its nationals in the bombing, lobbied ASEAN for a seat at
the annual ASEAN summit as a permanent dialogue partner, joining China,
Japan, and South Korea. Cambodia, Brunei, and Singapore strongly supported
the proposal, while Thailand and Indonesia remained ambivalent. At the 8th
summit, Mahathir shot down the proposal, saying it was too soon to discuss
expanding the summit process and calling for a detailed study of the implica-
tions of expanding membership to non-Asian nations.41 Simultaneously, the
ASEAN ministers unanimously approved the resolution condemning travel
warnings, mentioned above.
At the end of the summit, Mahathir made a statement criticizing the use of
travel warnings to single out countries, claiming rather ironically that Austra-
lia was particularly unsafe for Muslims because they are likely to have their
houses raided [by security forces], and that if you have a travel warning, you
have a travel warning for everybody.42 Obviously, Mahathir was concerned about
the economic and political impact that such warnings would have on the region
and on Malaysia in particular. Also, since Australia is a close ally of the United
States, Mahathir may have been suspicious of Australian involvement in re-
gional security policy and the possible concomitant that Canberras presence
could give the United States a foothold for regional control. In an interview with
the Weekend Australian, Mahathir said that Australia has to choose whether its
39. Supporters Block Police from Arresting Bashir, Straits Times, October 21, 2002; Indon
Police Formally Arrests Abu Bakar, Says Spokesman, Malaysia General News (Kuala Lumpur),
November 4, 2002.
40. On September 2, 2003, an Indonesian court convicted Abu Bakar Baasyir of incitement to
overthrow the government but acquitted him of the charge of leading a terrorist organization, citing
insufficient evidence. Baasyir was sentenced to four years in prison but through a series of appeals
received two sentence reductions enabling him to walk free on April 30, 2004. Upon his release,
however, police immediately re-arrested him on terrorism charges, claiming that they possessed
sufficient evidence to link him to Jemaah Islamiyah. In January 2005, Baasyir was standing trial
in Jakarta on terrorism charges. On March 3, an Indonesian court convicted him on a charge of con-
spiracy related to the Bali bombing of 2002, dropping the more serious charges of terrorism.
Baasyir was sentenced to 30 months in prison with credit for 10 months time served. See Radical
Cleric in Indonesia Is Acquitted of Terrorism, New York Times, March 4, 2005, sec. A, col. 7, p. 12.
41. ASEANs Cold Shoulder a Stark Signal of Frosty Conditions, The Age (Melbourne), No-
vember 9, 2002.
42. Australia Not a Safe Place, Particularly for Muslims, Says Dr M, New Straits Times
(Kuala Lumpur), November 6, 2002.
an Asian country or a Western country. If you take the position of being a sheriff,
or deputy sheriff, to America, you cannot very well be accepted by the coun-
tries of this region. The prime minister went on to charge that Australia is
more belligerent than many European countries. You have never criticized any
of the acts of the Americans. Even to the point where the Americans want to
go off on their own and attack Iraq, Australia seems to be with the Americans.43
Despite these setbacks, there was some progress in multilateral counterter-
rorism, although it took the form of discussions rather than coordinated poli-
cymaking. In January 2003, ASEAN convened a two-day workshop in Jakarta
to discuss ways of thwarting money-laundering and funding for terrorist groups.
Member states established a regional counterterrorism task force to enhance
communication and agreed to work toward making terrorism an extraditable
offense. It is worth noting that Australia, which was collaborating with Indo-
nesian police in the Bali investigation, was invited to join the task force.
Cooperation Since Bali: Toward

Deeper Multilateralism?
If the ASEAN states initial reaction to the bombing in Bali was defensive, the
next 12 months showed what appeared to be a dramatic change in attitude to-
ward multilateral counterterrorism cooperation. Efforts to break up the JI net-
work suggest the emergence of a new sense of regional coordination both
operationally and in terms of intelligence sharing. In February 2003, Indone-
sian police, acting on a tip from Singaporean police, arrested Mas Selamat
Kastari, a Singaporean national alleged to be the head of the JI network in Sin-
gapore. In April, Indonesian police arrested Abu Rusdin, the alleged successor
to the groups spiritual leader Abu Bakar Baasyir, along with 17 other sus-
pected members in a raid that seized a cache of guns and explosives. Arrests
throughout the region continued during the year. In August, Thai authorities
apprehended Hambali, JIs alleged operations chief and mastermind of the
Bali bombing, who reportedly told interrogators he had planned to bomb em-
bassies in Bangkok.44 Another step forward was Malaysias establishment of
the Southeast Asian Counterterrorism Center in Putrajaya in July. The center
is intended to serve as a clearinghouse for information on regional terrorism,
including a research unit to monitor and disseminate intelligence. It will also
convene regular seminars to share information and help train professionals on
border security and counterterrorism.45
43. Its US and Them, to Malaysias Mahathir, Weekend Australian (Sydney), November 23,
2002, p. 17.
44. Hambali Talks Under GrillingSlaughter of Innocents, The Australian, August 21, 2003.
45. Malaysian Southeast Asian Counterterrorism Center to Bolster Regional Cooperation
Ople, Department of Foreign Affairs, Philippines, press release no. 32603, July 3, 2003, !http://
www.dfa.gov.ph/news/pr/pr2003/jul/pr326.htm".
The amount and quality of discussion in ASEAN about terrorism also ap-
peared to improve. In March 2003, the ARF convened the first annual Interses-
sional Meeting on Counterterrorism and Transnational Crime (ISM CT-TC) in
Malaysia. This move was significant because it brought together not only ASEAN
countries but also extra-regional dialogue partners in an effort to share in-
formation and develop counterterrorist solutions. Participants include the EU,
the United States, Japan, China, Australia, and Russia. The meeting, while rel-
atively brief, nevertheless displayed ASEANs willingness to seek aid outside
its membership, albeit in a safe environment where member states could re-
main secure about their respective sovereignty. Among the topics discussed
were concrete methods for improving border controlssuch as standardized
travel documentation and the use of machine-readable passports and biometrics
and how developed countries could help less-developed countries implement
such technologies. Participants also identified the lack of timely and central-
ized information as an obstacle to effective counterterrorism and, as a start,
proposed compiling a roster of key counterterrorism officials worldwide to fos-
ter an international dialogue among those on the front line.46 The ASEAN
states appeared at least to have agreed that terrorism was indeed a real threat to
the region andrather than debating the nature of the threatwere now ex-
amining concrete ways to address it. While this was encouraging, it was only
the first step toward deeper, more substantive cooperation. ASEAN has begun
working to open up lines of communication with international powers, as indi-
cated by the annual ISM CT-TC joint declarations to combat terrorism with
the EU (January 2003), India (October 2003), Russia (June 2004), Australia
(July 2004), and an expanded ministerial meeting on transnational crime that
included China, Japan, and the Republic of Korea (AMMTC#3) for the first
time, in January 2004.
What caused ASEANs apparent volte-face? First, the arrest in several South-
east Asian countries of suspects linked to the Bali bombing underscored the
transnational nature of terrorism and helped to unify threat perceptions. No
longer could ASEAN members sit on the sidelines, believing that terrorism in
another member state did not affect them. The arrest of JI members through-
out Southeast Asia and the revelation of plans to bomb targets in relatively un-
scathed areas, such as Bangkok, helped to intensify the sense of direct threat
and galvanize states into action.
Second, the steps that ASEAN adopted to combat terrorism required rela-
tively minimal changes in domestic practices. If we examine the policies for
multilateral counterterrorism cooperation that emerged during the period from
2001 to 2004, it becomes evident the policies eschew controversial actions and
46. ASEAN Regional Forum, Report of the ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Counter-Terrorism
and Transnational Crime, March 2122, 2003, !http://www.aseansec.org/15133.htm".
assiduously avoid dictating how individual states should deal with terrorism
within their own borders. A good example is the Treaty on Mutual Legal As-
sistance in Criminal Matters, signed by eight ASEAN countries on November
28, 2004.47 The treaty allows states to seek assistance from one another in crim-
inal investigations pertaining to 190 different serious offenses, including money
laundering, hijacking, and murder. Such assistance includes the sharing of ev-
idence, service of legal documents, and recovery of criminal proceeds, but makes
no provision for extradition.48 Crucially, domestic laws take precedence over
implementation of the treatys provisions. This provides for some variation in
the degree of cooperation allowed among different dyads but also acts as a
safeguard against interference in domestic affairs, maintaining adherence to
ASEANs paramount norm of respect for sovereignty. The treaty will not take
effect until it has been ratified by the national governments of the signatories;
as of this writing in January 2005, no time frame had been set for ratification.
To a large extent, ASEANs post-Bali counterterrorism policies and actions
appear to cling more tightly to the norms of consensus and non-interference
than in the period immediately following 9/11. Although there has been an
increase in training workshops, information sharing agreements, and law en-
forcement cooperation, none of these multilateral arrangements have required
any of the member states to alter their domestic laws in ways that might court
controversy at home. While such flexibility is important to those ASEAN
states that risk antagonizing domestic constituencies through extensive coun-
terterrorism cooperation (e.g., Indonesia and the Philippines), it also slows the
pace of regional standardization of laws and enforcement practices.
Conclusion
There are several reasons why ASEANs initial efforts to combat regional ter-
rorism resulted in only minimal multilateral cooperation. As noted above, the
determinants of cooperation are a shared threat perception and the resolution
of dynamic tension between domestic and regional interests. In the period im-
mediately following 9/11, the ASEAN states were unable to agree on whether
terrorism was a major threat or a form of post-9/11 hysteria. This was evi-
denced by the sometimes radically different assessments proffered by state
leaders, as in the case of Megawati and Mahathir. The lukewarm Declaration
on Terrorism of the 8th ASEAN Summit in 2002 stands as strong evidence of
intramural indecision and an unwillingness to acknowledge fully the existence
of a regional threat. Such indecision reflected the difficulties that certain states,
such as Indonesia and the Philippines, encountered in trying to reconcile
47. The remaining two ASEAN countries, Thailand and Myanmar, were still considering add-
ing their signatures as well, as of this writing in January 2005.
48. Spore Signs Regional Legal Assistance Pact, Straits Times, November 30, 2004.
regional counterterrorism cooperation with domestic constituencies that per-

ceived such cooperation to be complicity in an illegitimate war. For Jakarta
and Manila, it was feared that implementing unpopular counterterrorism strat-
egies could weaken civil order. Thus, within the grouping, there was great in-
centive to be cautious and view the problem of terrorism in terms of domestic,
not region-wide, implications. Similarly, because of intra-ASEAN differences
in threat perception and an uneven concept of collective identity, the United
States was unable to significantly influence most member states: ASEAN was
unable to come to a unified assessment of American intentions. While the Phil-
ippines enthusiastically accepted U.S. aid (though not without significant op-
position), other statesMalaysia in particularresented what they perceived
to be an encroachment upon their sovereignty. Still others such as Indonesia
were extremely reluctant to accept American aid for fear of appearing to coop-
erate with a country seen by significant domestic constituencies as an enemy.
The war on terrorism provides a good example of what seems to be a prima
facie case of conflicting norms within ASEAN, but that could, instead, be re-
garded as the prioritization of certain norms over others. As illustrated in this
case, regulatory norms of cooperation, consensus, and non-interference in other
members affairs crumbled under pressure. Singapore and Indonesias acrimo-
nious exchange over domestic security politics in 2002 showed how regulatory
norms can break down; another example was the strong intramural disagreement
over American and Australian assistance.
Nonetheless, the constitutive norm of defending sovereignty above all else
has been vigorously upheld. This assertion is strengthened when we return to
Wendts argument that domestic interests and a weak sense of sovereignty can
override collective requirements if those perceptions lead a state to think it will
be more insecure if it adopts a collective identity. It is important to remember
that ASEANs norms were crafted in the context of its original raison dtre
to enable member states to resist communist insurgency by strengthening na-
tional governments and economies. Although the threat of communism is no
longer present, the state-oriented normsnon-intervention in domestic affairs,
consensual decision-making, and slow and weak integrationhave persisted.
In this sense, the norm of preserving sovereignty may be regarded as not only
regulatory but also constitutiveit is a fundamental part of what it means to
belong to ASEAN. Examining ASEAN norm adherence in this context, it is pos-
sible to conclude that even though individual states ignored regulatory norms
of consensus, they ultimately subordinated these to the higher constitutive norm
of preserving sovereignty whenever an action threatened to undermine it.
This does not necessarily mean that ASEANs adherence to this overarching
norm indicates the existence of a strong regional identity. Alexander Wendt ar-
gues that collective identity formation in the international system will lead to
an empathetic rather than instrumental or situational interdependence between
self and other, leading to states seeing each other as extensions of themselves.49
If there was truly a strong collective identity, we would have expected to see
substantive multilateral cooperation and, more importantly, a willingness to
embrace such cooperation at the domestic level, because states would view
other ASEAN members as extensions of themselves. As this article has shown,
though, the ASEAN states are far from identifying with each other in the war
on terrorism, as evidenced through their divergent threat perceptions, rhetori-
cal volleys, and sometimes fierce resistance to substantial interdependent efforts
at counterterrorism.
What about the cooperation displayed in the aftermath of the Bali bombing?
Increased intelligence sharing and operational cooperation certainly represent
a notable improvement, as does the new focus on counterterrorism strategies in
the ARF and the new Intersessional Meeting on Counterterrorism and Trans-
national Crime. Yet, it remains to be seen just how far cooperation will go. The
real test of ASEANs capacity for cooperation lies in the ability of its diverse
member states to agree on substantive policy implementation and common stan-
dards, as well as on sharing responsibilities and costs. Since the costs of im-
plementation can be expected to vary drastically from state to state, it is likely
that such issues may create new rifts within ASEAN, or simply be ignored for
the sake of organizational unity. Even after cooperative processes have been
established, it may be difficult to maintain them as they encounter and perhaps
conflict with domestic and nationalistic motives. For instance, in August 2003,
after the arrests of several Malaysians suspected of being JI militants, then-
Deputy Prime Minister Abdullah Ahmad Badawi (now prime minister) angrily
dismissed suggestions that his country might be serving as a base for al-
Qaeda. Instead, he stated, the militants activities were very much inspired by
Indonesians who were here on permanent stay visits. They are the ones who
started all this.50 Unless such fractures can be mended or held in check, they
will continue to stand as obstacles to transparency, trust, and cooperation.
49. Wendt, Collective Identity Formation, p. 386.

50. Were No al-Qaeda Base, Says a Bristling Malaysia, Straits Times, August 22, 2003.

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ASEAN Counterterrorism Cooperation Since 9/11

Author(s): Jonathan T. Chow

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)

Jonathan T. Chow is a Ph.D. student in the Department of Political Sci-

Norms of ASEAN Security Cooperation

be agreeable to all parties before it is adopted. In the event of a deadlock,

primarily domestic goals, counterterrorism efforts typically were limited to in-

9/11 and After: Changing

4. ASEAN, Joint Communiqu of the Third ASEAN Ministerial Meeting on Transnational

Although GAM forces and Indonesian troops engaged in some skirmishes

the anti-terrorism campaign as long-time friends and allies of the United

Regionalizing Terrorism: Tiptoeing Toward

of sovereignty. Domestic interests or competing identities within a state may

21. Wendt, Collective Identity Formation, pp. 38788.

The Bali Bombing: A Slow Reveille

that mostly reiterated the Joint Declaration to Counter Terrorism of a year

ferred him to a police hospital.39 Clearly, despite holding legal justification to

Cooperation Since Bali: Toward

regional counterterrorism cooperation with domestic constituencies that per-

49. Wendt, Collective Identity Formation, p. 386.

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