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Immigration Policy in a Time of War:

The United States, 193919451

ROGER DANIELS

THE ARGUMENT OF THIS ESSAY is that the World War II years

were crucial in setting the direction for American immigration policy for
the rest of the twentieth century, even though during the war immigration
from outside the hemisphere fell to the lowest levels ever recorded.2 I will
discuss these changes topically in four categories: 1) internment, registra-
tion, and incarceration; 2) naturalization; 3) refugees; 4) non-immigrants.

INTERNMENT, REGISTRATION, AND INCARCERATION

Internment, which had first been used by the United States during the
War of 1812, was applied during fall 1939 to German seamen picked up
on the high seas or on German vessels interned in American ports. Be-
fore Pearl Harbor hundreds of German, and later Italian, seamen and some
Italian employees of the Italian Pavilion at the New York Worlds Fair of
193940, were interned, first at Ellis Island and later at facilities run by the
INS in New Mexico and Montana.3 With the fall of France in June 1940,
nativists and others feared that Nazi agents, the largely mythical fifth
columnists, would be hidden among immigrants or pose as refugees.4 That
month a presidential directive transferred the INS from the Department
of Labor to the Department of Justice, pleasing nativists and conservatives
who felt that Secretary of Labor Frances Perkinss policies were too soft.5
Amidst a flurry of bills aimed at making deportation easierone of
which had been vetoed by the president in April 19406Congress passed
and Roosevelt signed the harsh Alien Registration Act of 1940 at the end
of June. Also known as the Smith Act, it was a complex measure of forty-
one sections organized into three largely unrelated titles. Title I was a peace-
time sedition act that later provided the statutory basis for the conviction
of a few Trotskyites during the war and in the postwar years was used to
jail many of the leaders of the American Communist Party. Title II expanded
the grounds, most of them involving subversive activities, under which
aliens could be deported. Title III required all aliens fourteen years of age
and older to register and be fingerprinted, usually at a post office, to advise
the INS in writing of any change of address, and to confirm their address, in
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108 Journal of American Ethnic History / Winter/Spring 2006

writing, every three months.7 Allowed to fall into desuetude by the govern-
ment but never repealed, the change-of-address provisions were enforced,
selectively, by John Ashcrofts regime in the Department of Justice in the af-
termath of 9/11 as a means of deporting large numbers of otherwise law-
abiding resident aliens of Middle Eastern and South Asian origin.
More than a million resident aliens encountered serious restrictions as
soon as the United States actually went to war. In December 1941, a series
of proclamations based on existing statute law declared non-citizen Japan-
ese, Germans, and Italians, being of the age of fourteen years and up-
ward alien enemies and liable to be apprehended, restrained, secured,
and removed as alien enemies.8 In mid-January 1942, all alien enemies
were required to re-register and receive new identification certificates and
carry them at all times.9 This covered more than a million persons in the
United States and in hemispheric territorieschiefly 600,000 Italians,
300,000 Germans, and 90,000 Japanesebut the Department of Justice
had relatively modest intentions. During the course of the war it arrested
fewer than 2 percentabout 16,000 personsand interned less than half
of those in INS camps: 7,459 individuals, 4,092 Japanese, 2,384 Germans,
794 Italians, and 199 others.10 These numbers do not include 6,610 cit-
izens and residents of Peru and fourteen other Latin American nations:
4,058 Germans, 2,264 Japanese, and 287 Italians. These men, women, and
children were deported from their homes at the behest of the United States
(whose agents helped to select them) and brought into the United States,
without statutory authority and in violation of American law, and interned
in INS camps.11
What is usually called, improperly, the internment of the Japanese
Americans will only be noted here. It was an incarceration, not based
on statute law, which deprived more than 110,000 persons of Japanese
birth and ancestry living on the Pacific Coast of their liberty. It made no
distinctions for either citizenship or age.12

NATURALIZATION

The most significant changes in naturalization law broadened the largely

arbitrary racial categories of those eligible for naturalization but nar-
rowed the ideological boundaries. The Nationality Act of 1940 did both.
On the one hand, it clarified the status of Mexicans and others of Amer-
indian heritage. All Indians born in the United States had been made citi-
zens in 1924; the 1940 statute expanded the rights of naturalization from
white persons and persons of African descent to include descendants of
races indigenous to the Western Hemisphere. On the other hand, echo-
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Daniels 109

ing the anti-subversive provisions of the Smith Act, it greatly expanded the
existing anti-radical provisions barring the naturalization of persons op-
posed to government or law.13
A further and little understood change was the ending of Chinese Ex-
clusion in 1943. The repeal statute, supported by a special message from
Franklin Roosevelt, was presented as a kind of good-behavior prize for
wartime allies. The campaign for it largely ignored Chinese Americans. The
repeal statute was a relatively simple three-part measure. Part one repealed
some or all of fifteen statutes enacted between 1882 and 1913 that had en-
forced Chinese exclusion. Part two gave a quota to persons of the Chinese
race, set at 105 annually, with a preference of up to 75 percent given to per-
sons born and resident in China. This meant that a Chinese born anywhere
in the worldsay, Canadahad to be charged to the tiny Chinese quota, a
stipulation that applied to no other group. Part three amended the national-
ity acts so that Chinese persons or persons of Chinese descent were eli-
gible for naturalization on the same terms as other eligible aliens.14
Critics, then and now, have stressed the obvious racist limitations of
the reform by focusing on the tiny quota. Gilbert Woo, a liberal San Fran-
cisco Chinatown journalist, denounced it as a token gesture and an insult to
Chinese Americans. But as scholars K. Scott Wong and Xiaojian Zhao sep-
arately have pointed out, the naturalization provisions, coupled with so-
called War Brides Acts, enabled thousands of Chinese American men not
only to become citizens but also to bring both brides and wives of long-
standing into the United States. The legal immigration of nearly 10,000
Chinese women changed significantly the demographic structure of the
Chinese American community, no longer a bachelor society.15 In addition,
although promoted as a special wartime case, the repeal of Chinese Ex-
clusion was a clear sign that the days of racial exclusion in naturalization
and immigration were numbered and can be seen as the hinge on which
American immigration policy turned. As FDR himself noted prophetically
in his message, passing the bill would be an earnest of our purpose to ap-
ply the policy of the Good Neighbor to our relations with other peoples.
Less than three years later separate bills extended the right of naturalization
to Filipinos and natives of India; and in 1952, in the generally reactionary
McCarran-Walter Act, naturalization was made colorblind.16

REFUGEES

As is notorious, Franklin Roosevelt long refused to take political risks on

behalf of European refugees who were predominantly Jewish. For example,
the New Deals most prolific legislator, Senator Robert F. Wagner of
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110 Journal of American Ethnic History / Winter/Spring 2006

New York, co-sponsored a bill in 1939 to admit 20,000 German children

outside of the quota. It had important bi-partisan supportincluding ex-
president Herbert C. Hooverbut the White House, uncharacteristically,
kept hands off. FDR was willing to allow some administration officials
Frances Perkins and Childrens Bureau head Katherine Lenrootto tes-
tify in favor of it. He even told his wife, in February 1939, that it is all right
for you to support the child refugee bill, but it is best for me to say nothing
[now]. Now became never. In June 1939, as the bill was dying without ever
having emerged from committee, the president annotated a memo asking
for his support File No Action, FDR. In addition, some of his personal
and official family viciously opposed the bill: one of his favorite cousins,
Laura Delano, wife of Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization
James Houghteling, told people at cocktail parties that the 20,000 charm-
ing children would all too soon grow up into 20,000 ugly adults.17
Frances defeat triggered the first of several small refugee rescue ac-
tions by the United States. Roosevelt asked his Advisory Committee on
Refugees to make lists of eminent refugees and then instructed the State
Department to issue temporary visas in the names of those individuals.
The State Department, whose reports on refugees are not always reliable,
said that it issued 3,268 such visas but only about a third of them were
used. A veritable galaxy of cultural superstars including Lion Feucht-
wanger, Heinrich Mann, Franz Werfel, Anna Mahler Werfel, Marc Chagall,
Jacques Lipchitz, Marcel Duchamp, and Wanda Landowska were brought
to the United States, many of them by that most improbable secret agent,
Varian Fry, who operated in Vichy Marseilles from August 1940 until Sep-
tember 1941.18
Late in 1940, two administrative measures eased the position of some
refugees who had already escaped from Germany and German-occupied
Europe. First, American consuls outside of Germany were allowed to
issue visas to refugees who had gotten to places like Portugal, French
Africa, and China and charge them to the German quota established in
the 1924 immigration act, little used after the war broke out. In fiscal year
1941, only 4,028 spaces were used and in fiscal 1942 about half that num-
ber. Had this kind of administrative ingenuity been used earlier, many
more refugees could have been admitted. Then, in January 1941, an agree-
ment with Canada set up a system whereby a refugee in the United States
on a temporary visa would be allowed to enter Canada briefly, apply for
a quota number from there, and re-enter the United States as a regular
immigrant. At that time, American law forbade a visitor from changing
status without leaving the United States.19
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Daniels 111

Only after Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthaus staff prepared

its Report to the Secretary on the Acquiescence of this Government in
the Murder of the Jews and he brought it to Rooseveltunder the less jar-
ring title of Personal Report to the Presidenton January 16, 1944, was
further action taken to bring refugees to the United States. From its blunt
first sentenceOne of the greatest crimes in history, the slaughter of
the Jewish people in Europe, is continuing unabatedto the end, it was
a damning indictment of American policy in general and of the State
Department in particular. The report not only attacked the Departments
visa policy, which, under the cloak of national security, had kept immi-
gration well below quota levels but also argued that some of its officials
Breckinridge Long in particularhad deliberately failed to rescue Jews.
Prodded by the report, Roosevelt undertook additional actions on behalf
of Jewish and other refugees but was reluctant to believe that Long, an old
friend, was the deliberate saboteur of rescue plans.20
FDR issued an executive order creating the War Refugee Board, whose
bills were paid by a combination of the Presidents discretionary funds and
money donated by Jewish organizations. Although the language of the
executive order stated that it is the policy of this Government to take all
measures within its power to rescue the victims of enemy oppression who
are in imminent danger of death and otherwise to afford such victims all
possible relief and assistance consistent with the successful prosecution of
the war,21 the truth of the situation had been, was then, and continued to
be at variance with that inflated claim. In fact, the War Refugee Board was
not authorized to bring even one refugee to the United States. It initially
placed the people it rescued in camps in North and West Africa, the Middle
East, Switzerland, and Sweden.22
A further step was taken in June 1944. FDR cabled Ambassador Robert
Murphy in Algiers on June 9 that:

I have decided that approximately 1,000 refugees should be im-

mediately brought from Italy to this country, to be placed in an
Emergency Refugee Shelter to be established at Fort Ontario near
Oswego, New York, where under appropriate security restrictions
they will remain for the duration of the war. These refugees will
be brought into the country outside of the regular immigration
procedure just as civilian internees from Latin American countries
and prisoners of war have been brought here. . . . It is contem-
plated that at the end of the war they will be returned to their
homelands.23
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112 Journal of American Ethnic History / Winter/Spring 2006

Three days later Roosevelt informed Congress of the program.24 He

claimed that notwithstanding this Governments unremitting efforts,
which are continuing, the numbers actually rescued from the jaws of death
have been small compared with the numbers still facing extinction in
German territory.
Sharon R. Lowenstein, the historian of this episode, has rightly called the
program a token shipment. It brought 987 refugees, mostly Jewish, from
camps in Italy to the United States. All but sixty-nine would remain in
America when the camp was emptied in February 1946, President Truman
having issued a directive allowing them to adjust their status. Although the
few brought to Oswego were truly a token insofar as the surviving victims
of the Holocaust were concerned, the precedent of presidential parole au-
thority would become an important part of American refugee policy during
the Cold War and beyond.25

NON-IMMIGRANTS

Finally, there is the phenomenon of what immigration officials now call

nonimmigrants, defining that curious term as aliens admitted to the
United States for a specified purpose and temporary period but not for per-
manent residence.26 It currently embraces such traditional categories of
arrivals as visitors for pleasure and students, but also a bewildering
array of individuals who come to work or do business and enter with a
complex series of visas differentiated by letters and numbers such as H-
1B. In 2003 more than 2.6 million such persons were admitted as non-
immigrants in categories that are potentially adjustable to immigrant
status. This is almost four times as large as the number of immigrants who
were admitted in 2003. Those 705,827 immigrants were almost equally
divided between new arrivals and those who had entered in some pre-
vious year and adjusted to immigrant status in 2003.27
There was no such category during World War Two, but a variety of
persons did come to America in those years whose presence is not reflected
in the INS reports. In addition to the Latin American civilians brought for
internment and more than 400,000 Axis prisoners of war,28 there was the
Bracero Program (from the Spanish bracer [arm]). Begun by an execu-
tive agreement between the United States and Mexico in July 1942 and
revised in April 1943, it was legalized by Congress in 1943 and extended to
cover West Indian and Bahamian workers who toiled largely in eastern
agriculture, as did some Canadians and Newfoundlanders. Government
data report just over 225,000 agricultural workers imported during the war
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Daniels 113

years, nearly three-quarters of them from Mexico.29 A separate wartime

bracero program provided about 50,000 maintenance workers for western
railroads.30 And, to be sure, there was considerable informal border cross-
ing, especially in Texas, which the Mexican government had excluded from
the formal program.
In addition, the government also made it possible for educated Chinese
to study in the United States. Beginning in 1942 the Cultural Division of
the State Department provided grants to enable many Chinese to study at
American universities; in 1949, when Chinese Communists led by Mao
Zedong (Tse-tung) drove the Chinese nationalists off the mainland to
Taiwan and began the Peoples Republic of China, there were some 5,000
Chinese, many of them students, in the United States on non-immigrant
visas. Many, perhaps most, of these stranded Chinese received immi-
grant visas and eventually became U.S. citizens.31
The foregoing demonstrates that the wartime experience was predictive
of the path that American immigration policy pursued from World War II
until the end of the century. The renaissance of mass immigration in the
second half of the twentieth century, encompassing nearly twenty-seven
million legal immigrants as opposed to just over twenty million in its first
half, was not solely the result of the 1965 immigration act. Journalists
and scholars who so describe it seriously misinform their readers. That
experience also seems to have a predictive quality for some post-9/11
events, but until many currently closed files are opened it will be impos-
sible to spell those matters out in any detail.32

NOTES

1. An earlier version of this material appeared in Roger Daniels, Guarding the Golden
Door: American Immigration Policy and Immigrants since 1882 (New York: Hill and
Wang, 2004), 8197.
2. In 1943, 1944, and 1945 immigration from the Eastern Hemisphere totaled 5,513,
5,467, and 8,473 respectively. The lowest previous figures were for 1822, 1823, and 1824
when 6,911, 6,354, and 7,912 immigrants were enumerated, almost all of them Europeans.
3. For 1812, see for example Charles Lockington, petitioner, The case of alien ene-
mies, considered and decided upon a writ of habeas corpus, allowed on the petition of
Charles Lockington, an alien enemy, by the Hon. William Tilghman, chief justice of the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, the 22d day of November, 1813. Reported by Richard
Bache, esq. (Philadelphia, 1813). Early American imprints. Second series; no. 28085, Mi-
crofiche 1242, Readex Microprint Corporation. For early World War II, see John J. Cul-
ley, A Troublesome Presence: World War II Internment of German Sailors in New Mex-
ico, Prologue 28 (Winter 1996): 27995; and Louis Fiset, Return to Sender: U.S.
Censorship of Enemy Alien Mail in World War II, Prologue 33 (Spring 2001): 2135.
4. See, for example, the State Department-inspired article by Samuel Lubell, War
by Refugee, Saturday Evening Post (Mar. 29, 1941).
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114 Journal of American Ethnic History / Winter/Spring 2006

5. Reorganization Plan No. V, 5 Federal Register 2223; George W. Martin, Madam

Secretary, Frances Perkins (Boston, 1976), 442.
6. The veto message is in Congressional Record, 86: 4157.
7. 54 Stat. 670.
8. Presidential proclamations 2525, 2526, 2526, and 2563 of Dec. 7, Dec. 8, 1941, and
July 17, 1942. Later, Hungarians, Bulgarians, and Rumanians were added to this category.
Austrian and Korean resident aliens, who had German and Japanese nationality respec-
tively, were not declared enemy aliens.
9. Presidential proclamation 2527, Jan. 14, 1942.
10. These numbers are very iffy and come from two FBI documents and the
Department of Justices annual report for 1943.
11. Max Paul Freidman, Nazis and Good Neighbors: The United States Campaign
against the Germans of Latin America in World War II (New York, 2003) is a superb
account of the process. For the Japanese see C. Harvey Gardiner. Pawns in a Triangle
of Hate: The Peruvian Japanese and the United States (Seattle, 1981); Seiichi Higashide,
Adios to Tears: The Memoirs of a Japanese Peruvian Internee in U. S. Concentration
Camps, 2d ed. (Seattle, 2000) is a memoir by a Peruvian Japanese, while Karen L. Riley,
Schools Behind Barbed Wire: The Untold Story of Wartime Internment and the Chil-
dren of Arrested Enemy Aliens (Lanham, MD, 2002) is an account of the INS family
camp at Crystal City, Texas, in which many of the Latin Americans were held. John K.
Emmerson, The Japanese Thread: A Life in the U.S. Foreign Service (New York, 1978)
is a memoir by an official involved in the deportation of the Peruvian Japanese. There has
been little scholarly analysis of the Latin American Italians involved. Friedman has pro-
vided the following table, not in his book, showing where the internees from Latin Amer-
ica came from.

LATIN AMERICAN INTERNEES, BY COUNTRY, WW II

Country Germans Italians Japanese
Bolivia 221 27 57
Br. Honduras 12 0 0
Chile 5 0 0
Colombia 646 23 12
Costa Rica 379 13 27
Cuba 13 5 5
Dominican Republic 68 7 1
Ecuador 463 24 11
El Salvador 96 29 6
Guatemala 479 10 0
Haiti 77 4 0
Honduras 144 4 1
Mexico 266 8 84
Nicaragua 177 16 6
Panama 247 52 247
Canal Zone* 4 0 0
Paraguay 17 0 0
Peru 702 49 1799
Venezuela 42 16 8
Total 4058 287 2264
* Does not include seamen interned in 193940.
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Daniels 115

12. For details see Roger Daniels, Prisoners Without Trial: Japanese Americans in
World War II. 2d ed. (New York, 2004); and Roger Daniels, Words Do Matter: A Note
on Inappropriate Terminology and the Incarceration of the Japanese Americans, in Gail
Nomura and Louis Fiset, eds., Nikkei in the Pacific Northwest: Japanese Americans and
Japanese Canadians in the Twentieth Century (Seattle, 2005), 183207.
13. 54 Stat. 1137.
14. The campaign for exclusion is the subject of Fred W. Riggs, Pressures on Con-
gress: A Study of the Repeal of Chinese Exclusion (New York, 1950). For Congressional
discussion, see U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Immigration and Naturalization,
Repeal of the Chinese Exclusion Acts, Hearings. . . . (Washington, DC, 1943). FDRs
message is in Samuel I. Rosenman, comp., The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin
D. Roosevelt (New York, 1950), 42930 (in the volume for 1943). The law, technically
an amendment to the Alien Registration Act of 1940, is 57 Stat. 600.
15. Gilbert Woo, One-Hundred-and-Seven Chinese, appears in a trail-blazing
anthology called Chinese American Voices: From the Gold Rush to the Present, ed. Judy
Yung, Gordon Chang, and Him Mark Lai (Berkeley, CA, 2006). K. Scott Wong, War
Comes to Chinatown: Social Transformation and the Chinese of California, in R. Lotchin,
ed., The Way We Really Were: The Golden State in the Second Great War (Urbana, IL,
2000), 16486; Xiaojian Zhao, Remaking Chinese America: Immigration, Family, and
Community, 19401965 (Philadelphia, 2002).
16. 66 Stat. 163.
17. For the Wagner-Rogers bill see Barbara McDonald Stewart, United States Gov-
ernment Policy on Refugees from Nazism, 19331940 (New York, 1982), ch. 12. The
Laura Delano quotation is from the manuscript diary of State Department official Jay P.
Moffat, May 25, 1939, as cited by Stewart, 532. This, and all other references to Jewish
refugee matters, were omitted from the published version of the diary. Nancy H. Hooker,
ed., The Moffat Papers: Selections from the Diplomatic Journals of Jay Pierrepont Moffat,
19191943 (Cambridge, MA, 1956).
18. Robert A. Divine. American Immigration Policy (New Haven, CT, 1957), 1023;
Cynthia Jaffee McCabe, Wanted by the Gestapo: Saved by AmericaVarian Fry and
the Emergency Rescue Committee, 7991, in Jarrell C. Jackman and Carla M. Borden,
eds., The Muses Flee Hitler: Cultural Transfer and Adaptation, 19301945 (Washing-
ton, DC, 1983); Varian Fry, Surrender on Demand (1945; Boulder, CO, 1997, also avail-
able as an e-book).
19. Divine, American Immigration Policy, 103.
20. John Morton Blum, ed., From the Morgenthau Diaries: Years of War, 19411945
(Boston, 1967), 2207; and Blum, Morgenthau and Roosevelt (Boston, 1970), 53133.
21. Rosenman, FDR Public Papers (1944 volume), 4853.
22. There is no monographic study of the War Refugee Board. Volume 11 of David
S. Wyman, ed., America and the Holocaust (New York, 198991) is devoted to War
Refugee Board Weekly Reports. Verne Newton, ed., FDR and the Holocaust. (New
York, 1996) contains essays by scholars representing a broad spectrum of opinion.
23. Rosenman. FDR Public Papers (1944 volume), 1635.
24. Rosenman. FDR Public Papers (1944 volume), 16872.
25. Sharon R. Lowenstein, Token Refuge: The Story of the Jewish Refugee Shelter at
Oswego, 19441946 (Bloomington, IN, 1986). See also the memoir by Ruth Gruber,
Haven: The Untold Story of 1,000 World War II Refugees (New York, 1983). She was a
special assistant to Interior Secretary Harold L. Ickes. Lowenstein seems not to have seen
FDRs cable to Murphy.
26. U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 1996 Statistical Yearbook of the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (Washington, DC, 1997), 104.
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116 Journal of American Ethnic History / Winter/Spring 2006

27. U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2003 Yearbook of Immigration Statistics

(Washington, DC: GPO, 2004), Tables 25 and 5. There were almost 28 million non-
immigrants in 2003, most of them temporary visitors not normally eligible for adjustment
of status: more than 20 million were tourists and more than 4 million temporary visitors
for business. Counting entrants is not precision work. For example, in 2003 the DHS
admitted 117,583 nonimmigrants whose particulars are unknown, and for years it
has been unable to differentiate between entrants from tiny Dominica and the Dominican
Republic, one of the major sources in recent years.
28. George C. Lewis and John Mewha, History of Prisoner of War Utilization by the
United States Army17761945 (Washington, DC, 1955), 91.
29. The World War II Bracero Program was initially ratified by 57 Stat. 70. The liter-
ature is very large. A place to begin is Wayne D. Rasmussen, A History of the Emergency
Farm Labor Supply Program, 19431947 (Washington, DC, 1951.) A table showing an-
nual numbers and nationalities is printed in Congressional Research Service, U.S. Immi-
gration Law and Policy (Washington, DC, 1979), Table 3, p. 40.
30. Barbara A. Driscoll, The Tracks North: The Railroad Bracero Program of World
War II (Austin, TX, 1999).
31. For State Department programs see Wilma Fairbank, Americas Cultural Experi-
ment in China, 19421949 (Washington, 1976). For the stranded Chinese see Daniels,
Guarding the Golden Door, 15254.
32. I have made some tentative speculations about post 9/11 policy in Daniels Pris-
oners Without Trial, 2d ed., 11921.