5 ~ 1 1 n~ m1 n

STATE 0 F ISRAEL
MINISTRY OF DEFENCE

PUBLIC RELATIONS OFFICE

Tel-Aviv, June 3, 1991

Mr. Steve Arroyo

15401 Beach Blvd. # 123
Wes tmi ns t e r , CA 92683
USA

Dear Si r ,
We have been asked t o acknowledge
the receipt of your l e t t e r addressed t o the Minister
of Defence.
W i t h best regards,

Yours sincerely,

In Charge of Information
 Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies at
DESBIC

DESCRIPTIVE ENCODE IN STAR BASED

INTERNAL COMMAND
Modernization Of Strategic Nuclear Weapons In Russia:
The Emerging New Posture

THE DESBIC Institute for International Studies

AGENCY FACT FINDING FILES

The Context: In Search of a Predictive
HTU

Paradigm UTH

The analysis of the nuclear debate presented above has inherent

limitations. First, the proposed classification, albeit sufficiently accurate
for the purposes of this paper, overlooks many potentially significant
differences between various experts and organizations that have to be
lumped together to achieve a semblance of descriptive order. As noted
above, the structure of the debate is not reducible to a simple dichotomy of
"good" and "bad," "hawks" and "doves," the proponents and the opponents
of START II. Second, the simple classification does not provide an
adequate picture of the dynamic of the debate. One needs "objective"40 TUHP UTHP

criteria to understand the preceding evolution and predict its future

development: a simple extrapolation of the last five-seven years might be
wrong if the process is not linear.

Two variables stand out in the previous section: the perceived utility of
nuclear weapons and the perceived level of threat. The first refers to the
extent that nuclear weapons are expected to achieve "positive" goals: if
nuclear weapons can only threaten "punishment" (i.e. a reactive mission),
their utility is assumed to be low, but if they can help solve local conflicts
or dissuade the United States from interfering in the Caspian Sea basin,
utility is coded as high. The level of threat is more self-explanatory and its
coding generally follows the lines in the previous sections (from the West
as a friend and ally to the West as an implacable foe bent on eliminating
Russia). Graphically, the current debate could be represented as a function
of these two variables in the following way:
 Picture 1

Of course, this diagram is only an approximation intended to convey the

general idea and the author's estimate of the situation; an accurate diagram
would require a survey (or, rather, a series of surveys) of the Russian
political establishment. Still, it does provide an idea of how the views are
distributed across the spectrum. The location of the views represented by
the 1993 military doctrine (and, as is now clear, the 1998 doctrine) serves
as a point of reference for the rest of the field. The area in the lower-left
comer represents the "minimalists," while the upper-right comer is the
"maxima lists." Of course, the blank spaces are not necessarily empty:
there are just too few people whose positions fall there. There are areas of
overlap, where positions of individuals and institutions are difficult to
distinguish in terms of the two proposed variables, but prescriptions could
still differ as a result of affiliation, sources of funding, personal
predispositions, etc.

Arrows show the trends of change in the distribution of views over the last
seven-ten years. An analysis of publications and interviews suggests that
in the late 1980s--early 1990s the distribution was even less even than
today. There were three poles located approximately on one line from the
lower-left to the upper-right comer. One proceeded from very low utility
of nuclear weapons and very low external threat; this position boiled down
to existential deterrence, the assumption that even a few nuclear weapons
could prevent an all-out war. The other pole united what could be termed
unreformed Cold War warriors, who stressed unilateralism and reliance on
almost unrestricted nuclear arms buildup. The third, in the middle, were
the "classic" Soviet moderate proponents of arms control, who were
behind the INF and START I Treaties. They preferred reductions as a way
to optimize the nuclear arsenal, regulate arms modernization and
deployment, but still remained on the side of rather large stockpiles of
weapons.

Since then, the number of proponents of absolutely minimal, existential

deterrence has significantly dwindled. Apparently, the biggest change was
caused not by a greater belief in the utility of nuclear weapons but rather
by disenchantment with the United States, which is often expressed by a
popular phrase, "the end of the honeymoon." Probably, the perceived
utility of nuclear weapons has increased as well, at least among some
erstwhile liberals, primarily as a result of a perceived need for a more
credible and robust second strike capability.

The differences between the early 1990s "idealists" and today's

"minimalists" boil down to the following: (a) larger estimated minimally
sufficient arsenal, (b) lower propensity to make concessions at arms
control negotiations, and (c) greater propensity to hedge against possible
unpleasant surprises. The first two points simply represent formal
attributes of nuclear balance, first and foremost the maintenance of a
credible second-strike capability: the current views demand high
probability of delivering a significant number of warheads in response to
an attack, more or less along McNamara's criteria. The third component is
primarily political: even rather liberal experts and politicians are no longer
optimistic about relations with the United States.

The evolution of the Cold War warriors depicted in the diagram is not
intended to suggest that they have necessarily moderated their views,
although some might have. Rather, over time their views have become
more diverse and now occupy a larger area. One only has to compare
intense, focused criticism of START II in 1992-93 with the proposals
advanced today. The limited moderation was a consequence of a clearer
understanding of the economic constraints on Russia's ability to modernize
and build up its nuclear weapons, and recognition that the dissolution of
the Soviet Union is permanent.

The evolution of the former centrists, which have now become largely
extinct, is particularly interesting. It is well known but rarely recognized
that a very large part of the Soviet political-military establishment in the
mid-1980s favored reduction of nuclear weapons. For a variety of reasons
(personal convictions, institutional interests political expediency) their
positions were far from radical. The actual process of arms reductions split
this group apart. Some continued the evolution and joined the ranks of a
more liberal "minimalist" group. The growing disenchantment of others in
the arms reduction process in the late 1980s led them to more hard-line
positions.

To a large extent, the evolution of the centrists was caused by the loss of
conventional superiority or at least parity with NATO. It was easy to
consider deep reduction of nuclear weapons while the Soviet Union
possessed sufficient conventional armed forces to support a broad variety
of missions. Today, the choice of military instruments is so limited that
some centrists no longer consider nuclear arms reduction feasible.
Subsequent evolution of the debate is likely to depend on the changing
perception of threat. It is formed by many different developments, not
necessarily limited to military power. Almost anything can affect the
perception of threat: economic sanctions, further enlargement of NATO,
Caspian oil pipelines, a new crisis around Iraq, etc. Such events are also
subject to interpretation: some will treat them as evidence of growing
threat, while others will tend to discount their significance.

In the meantime, the perception of the utility of nuclear weapons is likely

to change more slowly since there are fewer reasons to reevaluate the
currently held views. After all, people will be dealing with the same
amount of information and the same tools for interpreting it. As a result, in
the near future polarization is likely to stay and perhaps even increase. The
existing groups will consolidate around two different assessments of the
level of threat; each group will stretch vertically.

Picture 2
From this line of reasoning it follows that for some time a rather
contradictory combination of views might become possible: either
perception of immediate threat coupled with perception of low utility of
nuclear weapons or, alternatively, perception of low threat coupled with
high utility of nuclear weapons. Without doubt, such mixed views will be
internally contradictory and will not remain stable for long, making further
evolution likely.

By definition, long-term evolution is difficult to predict. Several options

seem possible. First, the Russian elite might develop some sort of
consensus on their perception of US policy. Recent trends indicate that a
mainstream, "hard-headed" position is already emerging, approximately
around the views espoused by the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy.
In addition, the growing marginalization of military and political aspects
of US-Russian relations could stimulate the emergence of a centrist
position as well: the increasingly influential business groups tend to judge
these relations by the degree to which they are conducive to business, not
by geopolitical schemes. If business is reasonably successful, then
geopolitics and ideology will be more or less suppressed. In both cases the
groups depicted in the diagram will tend to concentrate around one pole.

Second, if military reform is successful, Russia will come to rely

somewhat less on nuclear weapons; accordingly their perceived utility will
decrease. This will be a necessarily lengthy process since it involves
restructuring, reductions, replacement and education of personnel,
modernization of weapons, etc. All of this has to be done under severe
financial constraints. Furthermore, in all likelihood the military reform,
regardless of its success will not affect policyrnaking until there is some
sort of a "small successful war" (like the US operation in Grenada) to
visibly demonstrate that conventional forces could be relied upon for a
certain category of contingencies. The second option will help consolidate
the elite. If the perception of threat remains constant, there will be two
poles gravitating toward the lower left and the upper right corners. If
consensus on US-Russian relations emerges, then one pole will emerge.
Under any scenario, successful military reform is likely to benefit the
"minimalists" more.

Yet another option is continued uncertainty: the distribution of views

could remain frozen for a long time and experience only slow
consolidation. The most likely result is still the emergence of two opposite
poles in the lower left and upper right comers.

Much in the evolution of the debate will depend on economic and political
stabilization in Russia. If optimistic forecasts come true, Russia will
become more self-confident and its global positions will improve, in
particular in such sensitive areas as relations with other new independent
states of the former Soviet Union and with Europe. After all, many
problems are caused by inadequate competitiveness in international
markets, the inability to offer credits (as a rule, export of high-tech
products often depends on the ability of the exporting country to offer
cheap credits to finance purchases), and the low attraction of Russia's
domestic market. An improvement of these three parameters will reduce
the sense of dependency and help reduce the perceived external threat.

The United States could do much to shape the development of the debate
on nuclear weapons in Russia, even without sacrificing any major policy
goals. For example, the US Government could make it clear that the views
of Zbignew Brzezinski do not represent official policy. More active
pursuit of integration within the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council
could also yield significant results. More cautious policy in the Caspian
Sea region would help as well, especially if it is "packaged" in terms
friendly to Russia and sensitive to Russian concerns (e.g., it would be
advisable to avoid proclaiming the region an area of vital US interests,
since such declarations are invariably interpreted as hostile). These are
only illustrations, of course, since a detailed analysis of possible steps is
beyond the scope of this paper.

The Views of the Military Leadership

HTU UTH

The current debate has two unique characteristics. One is a curious

detachment of the government (meaning first of all the Administration of
the President, including the Security Council and the recently deceased
Defense Council) and the military leadership from the public debate. Little
is said on the matters, which are heatedly discussed by the elite; the
process of modernization, reduction and reshaping the arsenal proceeds on
its own.

The second characteristic is that the uniformed military is actually playing

the "doves:" they support START II and oppose plans for large-scale
MIRVing of ICBMs. Only rarely does one see sudden outbursts of
emotion, such as Vladimir Dvorkin's recent response to an article by
Podberezkin and Surikov.41 The military have not turned into proponents
HPTU UTHP

of total and complete nuclear disarmament, but they certainly do not seem
to support extreme proposals for a nuclear arms race.

The result is rather unusual. While the political elite appears to move to
the right and increasingly embrace the idea of a large, MIRVed nuclear
arsenal (funding, of course, is not available, but the attitudes are almost
ripe for that), the military's ambitions are more modest. They are more or
less comfortable with START II and are very serious about START III,
which is certain to confirm a ban on MIRVed ICBMs and will further
reduce the Russian force.
Since the government's policy on nuclear weapons is relatively
independent from the broader political context, it requires a separate,
independent inquiry. This section will attempt to reconstruct the rationales
for this policy; a review of the actual modernization programs in the next
section will serve as an additional test for the hypotheses about the "real"
Russian nuclear doctrine. The detachment, however, is clearly temporary
and cannot hold forever. The big question is whether the military would
eventually embrace the increasingly popular conservative views or
whether the political elite will reconcile itself with the more moderate
views of the military. But at the moment the public debate and the official
views have to be analyzed separately, even while both are important
ingredients of a study that attempts to predict the evolution of the Russian
strategic arsenal and doctrine.

It would be easy to explain away the military's moderate position as

simply an honest recognition of economic constraints. After ten years of
ever-deepening economic crisis, Russia can ill afford the nuclear arsenal it
inherited from the Soviet Union. Indeed, one of the key arguments in favor
of the START II Treaty is that deep reductions are the only way to keep
the imbalance with the United States within tolerable limits. With or
without START II it will have to reduce its nuclear arsenal to 2,000
warheads at best (START II counting rules). If START II is ratified, then
the US will be at the 3,500 level, if not--at 7,000-8,000.42
HPTU UTHP

For that reason, Russia kept insisting that the United States agrees to
negotiate and preferably sign START III even before START II is ratified,
so that the Russian parliament could consider both treaties simultaneously
or at least had a clearer picture of the future balance. In the spring of 1997,
at the Helsinki summit, the United States made a partial concession by
agreeing to establish the overall limit of warheads for START III at the
level preferred by Russia. Consultations on the new treaty have begun, and
since September 1997 have been very active, but are unlikely to result in a
treaty or even assume formal character until START II is ratified.

It remains uncertain, however, whether the United States will actually

pursue START III if START II is ratified, or if it will just mark time and
put Russia into an awkward position by codifying its inferiority.
Theoretically, the talks could continue forever, keeping the United States
at the START II level of 3,500, while Russia stays at a much lower level
(below 2,000 warheads) in anticipation of a new treaty. To some extent,
this uncertainly clouds the START II ratification process.

Economic constraints are hardly the only variable to affect the position of
the military. There is a widespread certainty that the United States will
significantly reduce its strategic weapons regardless of whether START II
is ratified; if this logic is correct, then Russia could MIRV its ICBMs, but
the imbalance might still remain within tolerable limits. After all, if there
is no START III, then Russia will have 1,500 to 2,000 warheads compared
to 3,500 on the US side; if there is no START II, then Russia can have
3,000 to 3,500 warheads (calculation is approximate) to something like
3,500 to 4,500 warheads on the US side. But in the latter case Russia
would have MIRVed ICBMs, which are considered a better response to an
NMD system.

This means that support of START II is a conscious decision of the

military and their policy reflects long-term planning and certain doctrinal
innovations. Apparently, this policy is connected first and foremost with
the former commander-in-chief of the SRF Igor Sergeev, who was
appointed the minister of defense in 1997.

Since his appointment as the SRF commander-in-chief in 1992, Sergeev

has become a veritable "nuclear czar," who determines not only the
policies of the SRF, but to a large extent the relevant aspects of the
policies of the Navy and the Air Force. His close ally is the director of the
4th Research Institute of the Ministry of Defense (the SRF institute)
P P

Vladimir Dvorkin.

In what was a unique experience for Russia, Sergeev became the SRF
commander as a result of genuine competition, after a special commission
interviewed several candidates for the position. Reportedly, the
commission was swayed by his response to the question about the impact
of a US strategic defense system. Other candidates proposed large-scale
MIRVing of ICBMs and abandonment of START II and even START I
(in 1992, to some this still seemed feasible), but Sergeev advocated a
"qualitative" response, in particular based on enhanced ability of single-
warhead ICBMs to penetrate the defense. Sergeev also advocated a faster
transition toward a pure second-strike posture to replace the "vstrechno-
otvetnyi udar" (launch under attack) strategy.

Subsequent modernization and reduction activities followed Sergeev's

initial statement without deviation. It is significant that he has not even
once proposed a different course of action (e.g., reject START III,
consider MIRVing, etc.), which leads one to conclude that fiscal
constraints are not the only motivation behind his behavior. Only recently,
as mentioned above, the new SRF commander-in-chief suggested that
MIRVing Topol-M was possible, but even then he did not declare it a top
priority option.

From the point of view of the military, nuclear weapons will remain the
core element in Russia's security. There exists an obvious relationship
between the role of nuclear weapons, on the one hand, and Russia's
economic potential and its (insufficient) involvement in international
security regimes, on the other. Economic weakness means, among other
things, weak conventional forces and fewer instruments of influencing
international politics. Underdeveloped security regimes mean that Russia
lacks effective means of presenting and defending its interests through
international institutions, economic and political vulnerability, and
reliance on raw power to a greater extent than would have been otherwise
necessary.

For the government, nuclear weapons are apparently even more valuable,
in a sense. Their impact on Russian domestic and foreign policy has been
counterintuitive. They have played a positive role and are likely to
continue playing it in the foreseeable future. Their presence has helped to
alleviate concerns about the security environment during the difficult
transition period. Nuclear weapons probably played a critical role in the
(so far) successful transition toward democracy and a market economy:
without them, the (perceived) reduction of security could have provoked
an arms buildup, requiring concentration of resources and political power,
i.e. restoration of an authoritarian regime. But proponents of reforms could
always invoke nuclear weapons and claim that security was assured, that
armed forces could be reduced and the defense budget cut down--even
below the reasonable level. In a sense, the ongoing modernization of
nuclear weapons is an inevitable "price" for reforms. Apparently, one can
hardly exist without the other.

Taken together, Russian strategic weapons modernization programs fall

rather neatly into a certain well-structured and logical framework. The
force will be smaller, but will consist of relatively invulnerable weapons
systems. The posture is likely to be oriented toward the second-strike
strategy meaning that it will be able to "ride out" the first strike of any
nuclear power, including the United States, and still be able to inflict
unacceptable damage in retaliation.

A particularly advantageous feature of the Russian arsenal will be

congruence between the low overall level and low concentration of
warheads on delivery vehicles, which will help to increase survivability.
As a result, the arsenal will be almost perfect for low levels of nuclear
weapons and will fit any probable arms control scheme, whether bilateral
with the United States or multilateral, with participation of other nuclear-
weapons states.

Funding is the only element missing today from the overall picture. After
economic growth resumes (and a period of protracted economic growth
might begin as early as this year), the current modernization effort will
reacquire common sense: the economically developing Russia will
ultimately cease to be the Upper Volta with nuclear weapons, to quote
Margaret Thatcher, and then nuclear weapons will look "natural."
Modernization also fits the strategy developed by the former first deputy
minister of defense Andrei Kokoshin (who has been promoted since to the
secretary of the Security Council). According to Kokoshin, the period of
scarcity should be devoted to research and development, with acquisition
postponed until approximately 2005. The number of types of weapons
(including nuclear) should be reduced. Until 2005, weapons producing
plants should be allocated the absolute minimum of contracts, just enough
to enable them to survive; plants that are no longer needed to support the
reduced armed forces and the relatively fewer types of equipment should
be closed or converted.43
HPTU UTHP

In hindsight, it is an ultimate irony that economic and political hardships

have probably rendered Russian strategic weapons a service, after all.
Russia skipped one or two stages in the modernization plans originally
projected by the Soviet Union and, under reasonably favorable economic
conditions, by the year 2010 it will have a rather small, fully optimized
arsenal, which will consist almost exclusively of the most modern
weapons (the word modern applies to delivery vehicles only; the CTBT
will limit modernization of warheads).

Modernization programs display a decisive turn toward putting quality of

delivery vehicles above quantity and survivable second-strike potential
above war-fighting capability. The new weapons will have the following
characteristics:

low concentration of warheads on delivery vehicles: ICBMs are

single-warhead and new submarines are likely to carry only 48
warheads each (more on that in the next section);
mobility or other means to ensure survivability: a significant share
of ICBMs will be mobile, the rest will be based in hardened silos;
submarines on patrol are highly invulnerable by definition;
improved accuracy, which includes air-launched cruise missiles;
and
increased ability to penetrate defense systems.

All these characteristics, with the exception of improved accuracy, meet

the traditional requirements of a second strike posture. Accuracy is usually
considered a property of war fighting, since the so-called countervalue
strike (the threat of punishment through elimination of cities) does not
require high accuracy. Improved accuracy is likely to be a by-product of
general improvement of all characteristics of delivery vehicles, however,
and apparently cannot be construed to mean that Russia is preparing for
more than a pure second strike: this would have required greater numbers
and/or heavily MIRVed ICBMs.44 HPTU UTHP
Close attention to qualitative characteristics suggests that the military
leadership is not content with simple "existential deterrence," which could
be achieved by relatively low quantities of any weapons systems and
would have required maintenance of the existing types instead of creation
of new ones. The goal is, rather, to maintain a robust reliable second-strike
arsenal capable of delivering a rather large number of warheads under the
worst (or realistically bad) circumstances. The realistically bad
circumstances probably include a first US strike and the ability to "ride it
out." In any event, this interpretation comfortably explains the absolute
majority of data on modernization programs.

In one of the very few public statements on the subject, the first deputy
minister of defense Nikolai Mikhailov (he replaced Kokoshin after the
latter moved to the Defense and then the Security Council) stated that
deterrence should be ensured not by the quantity of warheads but by
guaranteed delivery of warheads to the territory of the aggressor: At the
forefront here are the qualitative factors, rather than quantitative ones.
The goal of the defense ministry, according to Mikhailov, is to retain a
reliable deterrent while simultaneously reducing the number of both
delivery vehicles and warheads. This would require, among other things, a
new technological level of delivery vehicles and warheads, as well as of
information, command and control systems.45 Dvorkin, in the above-
HPTU UTHP

mentioned letter, confirmed that the military leadership46 did not consider
HPTU UTHP

it wise to retain old-type MIRVed ICBMs (as Podberezkin and Surikov

proposed) simply because their 1970s technology was hopelessly
outdated.

The attention to the qualitative parameters has a number of positive

implications for the strategic balance and arms control. First of all, the
requirements of numerical parity could be further relaxed. Exact parity has
never been achievable, nor vital. It was, to a large extent, a political
requirement, while in strictly military terms it was, as one analyst put it,
the roughest indicator of the strategic balance.47 The stability of the
HPTU UTHP

balance always depended on qualitative characteristics of weapons

systems. The purposeful creation of a reliable second-strike capability,
which stresses survivability, makes parity even less relevant. Russia will
be truly able to abandon it (of course, if the domestic political scene
permits it) and feel reasonably comfortable under a quite significant
disparity. Of course, numbers will continue to matter--no one suggests
they will not--but less than ever before.

Second, a combination of survivability and penetrability eases the impact

of national missile defense. Survivability means that more delivery
vehicles will survive the first strike to be used in retaliation, and
penetrability means that more of those will be able to deliver warheads. As
a result, the pressure to counter NMD deployment with additional
deployment of offensive weapons and MIRVing would decrease. As in the
previous case, the NMD problem will not disappear completely: at a
certain level of offensive arms and certain effectiveness of defense it will
reemerge, but the elasticity of the balance will increase, and the ABM
Treaty, including the issue of ABM demarcation, will not be as serious an
impediment to nuclear arms reduction as in the past.

Still, major uncertainties and unsolved problems will exist even when the
transition to the new posture has been completed. First, it is unclear if the
second strike capability will continue to exist under the combined impact
of numerical imbalance and an NMD system. The positive implications
described above treated the two separately; taken together, they might
substantially affect the calculations. It is likely that this uncertainty was
behind the statement of the current SRF commander-in-chief Yakovlev
about the possibility of MIRVing Topol-M.

Second, even a very reliable second strike capability might not be enough
to ensure security. At least, under the NSC-68 criteria further elaborated in
the subsequent decades (and still to a large extent guiding the thinking on
nuclear weapons), reliable nuclear deterrence requires the maintenance of
strong conventional deterrence in parallel. Thus, the current approach of
the Russian military, i.e. reliance on nuclear weapons as the main provider
of security, is a rather big gamble. After all, nuclear weapons are a means
of last resort, and if confronted with a choice between a relatively limited
concession and the use of nuclear weapons, Russia might choose the first.

Tactical nuclear weapons are supposed to compensate for that problem,

but they are still nuclear weapons and carry with them all the associated
limitations. The self-imposed restrictions on who could be targeted with
nuclear weapons (the negative guarantees, which were confirmed in the
military doctrine) exacerbate the problem further: since Russia cannot
threaten certain categories of states with nuclear weapons, nuclear
deterrence works only weakly against the rest.

Let us consider, as an example, the so-called Southern Flank, the states to

the south of Russia. Only Turkey in that region falls under the first use
provision, since it is formally allied with a nuclear power, the United
States. All others are formally non-nuclear, and the use of nuclear
weapons cannot be convincingly invoked. Even Pakistan, which is widely
assumed to have nuclear weapons and is viewed as generally unfriendly to
Russia (primarily because of its role in Afghanistan and the support of the
Taliban movement) presents problems because threatening the use of
nuclear weapons against Pakistan would amount to recognition of its
nuclear status. Without doubt, the specter of the use of nuclear weapons is
still present regardless of anything, but its credibility and thus the utility of
threat should be judged as low.
The same problems apply to Europe, the region which seems to have
become the focal point of worries for Russian strategic planners. Armed
conflicts there seem infeasible today, but if they emerge (e.g., as a result
of an attempt to challenge the existing borders), Russia would still face a
choice between the use of nuclear weapons over a relatively small issue
and surrendering its position. Again, the credibility of the threat should be
judged as low.

Of course, it is possible that vagueness is intentional and should help to

contain any, no matter how limited, military clash or provocation. After
all, if there exists even a miniscule chance of escalation to the nuclear
level, no NATO country would think about challenging Russia; at least
this follows from a Schelling-like analysis which is popular in Russia.
Still, these calculations are rather shaky, and the probability of benefits
and harm appears equal.48TUHP UTHP

These problems point at an important conclusion: the current degree of

reliance on nuclear weapons is temporary. They cannot fully substitute for
modernization of conventional armed forces. This area lies outside the
purview of this paper, and it is sufficient to note that the same logic is
likely to be applied to strategic weapons. This means putting quality above
quantity: the troops will be better suited for the types of conflicts that are
anticipated as most likely, conventional weapons will be "smarter," etc. In
other words, a return to the Soviet-type army is hardly possible.49HPTU UTHP

Comprehensive military reform will take a long time. So far, one can
guess only the broad contours. The outline of the future strategic posture
is, in contrast, more or less clear. The modernization programs, taken
together with the reduction of weapons and the position at arms control
negotiations, suggest that the goal is close to what in the 1980s was often
called "defensive defense"--a posture defined by a fine balance between
the ability to defend and inability to attack. At the same time, the likely
direction of further development is hardly toward "existential deterrence:"
the current plans stress reliable second-strike capability measured in
probably two or three hundred warheads. Still, even that arsenal will not
be suitable for a first strike, and in this sense will conform to "defensive
defense." It will also provide significant (but not unlimited) flexibility in
terms of numerical imbalance and resistance to the impact of a large-scale
defense system.

Whether these plans will be implemented remains to be seen. As noted

above, there are major uncertainties directly related to the planned posture
and the level of credibility of nuclear retaliation. There are also significant
domestic constraints, which might affect the preferences of the military.
Finally, there is a larger international context to keep in mind, in particular
the perception of external threat, which could emerge from economic and
political conflicts rather than from the more traditional military challenges.

In spite of major conceptual uncertainties, Russia is definitely bent on

keeping its nuclear weapons and even modernizing them. This is natural:
historically, nuclear weapons appeared first and only then the conceptual
basis for them was invented to suit the already existing systems.50 The
HPTU UTHP

practical impact of these conceptual uncertainties is that in the absence of

a clearly defined role, the benchmark for nuclear planning remains the US-
Russian nuclear balance. The fact that these two countries have the largest
arsenals appears to be only a superfluous reason, a convenient habitual
way to rationalize certain established methods of planning. Deep under it
hides what is probably the real rationale--the absence of a widely accepted
hypothesis about the missions of nuclear weapons in a post-Cold War
world.

References
HTU UTH

40. For the purposes of this paper, "objective" means exogenous criteria,
i.e. not derived from the phenomenon under inquiry. It would be pointless
to take position on START II or MIRVing as such criteria, since these
issues are an integral part of the debate and could change over time: if
START II is ratified, the debate would not stop nor would it stop if Russia
returns to MIRVed ICBMs. In either case new issues would come to the
fore. In this sense START II and MIRVing are the endogenous criteria and
cannot serve as a basis for a predictive framework. An example of
endogenous criteria is Jack Snyder's treatment of interest groups' impact
on foreign policy (Jack Snyder, Myths of Empire (Ithaca: Cornell Univ.
Press, 1992)). In each country case, Snyder found groups, which
influenced foreign policy, but each time the type of groups was different:
economy-based, ideology-based, social stratum-based, etc. Apparently, he
needed criteria not directly related to the cases under consideration, for
example, derived from the social structure of any society (economy-based
interest groups) or of a particular type of societies (totalitarian,
democratic, etc.). This would make a comparison across cases more
rigorous.

41. Vladimir Dvorkin, "O Polze Diskussii po Povodu Dogovora SNV-2"

(On the Benefits of Debates over the START II Treaty), Nezavisimaya
Gazeta, March 27, 1998, p. 7.

H
 Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies at
DESBIC

DESCRIPTIVE ENCODE IN STAR BASED

INTERNAL COMMAND
Program on Approaches to Russian Security

Modernization Of Strategic
Nuclear Weapons In Russia:
The Emerging New Posture

DESBIC INTELLIGENCE FACT

FINDINGS AND

INFORMATION GATHERING FOR START

II, III, IV

Contents
Why Study Strategic Modernization?
HTU UTH

The "Minimalists:" Back to the Classic Age of Deterrence | The

HTU UTH HTU

"Maximalists:" Back to a War-Fighting Capability UTH

The Nuclear Debate

HTU UTH

HTU The Context: In Search of a Predictive Paradigm UTH

The Views of the Military Leadership

HTU UTH

Modernization of the Russian Nuclear Triad

HTU UTH
 (I) Land-Based Strategic Missiles | (II) Sea-Based Strategic
HTU UTH HTU

Weapons | (III) Air-Based Strategic Weapons

UTH HTU UTH

Conclusion
HTU UTH

Why Study Strategic Modernization?

HTU UTH

Modernization of strategic weapons belongs to what some call the

"traditional agenda" of security studies, an area of research whose
popularity has plummeted with the passing of the Cold War. The treaties
signed by the Soviet Union/Russia and the United States (INF, START 1,
START II,1 and lesser ones) as well as other steps, including the 1991
HPTU UTHP

initiatives of Bush and Gorbachev,2 were broadly viewed as putting an end

HPTU UTHP

to the nuclear arms race. Accordingly, mastery of arcane nuclear war-

fighting theories and the intricacies of arms control negotiations seems
increasingly irrelevant. More salient issues, such as economic and political
integration, ethnic conflicts, and WMD proliferation occupy the attention
of policymakers and academics.

But old problems do not go away quietly. The place and the role of
nuclear weapons has changed, as has the nature of interest in them, but in
some way they continue to be relevant. During the Cold War, the threat of
nuclear war seemed so great that any progress in arms control was
welcome; common interest in preventing war was like a locomotive,
which could pull superpower relations out of crises. Today, this is no
longer the case. Arms control plays a visible role in great power politics
(and rightly so), progress on new treaties is no longer a necessary
condition for progress on other issues. To the contrary, the lack of
progress or, even worse, a setback can easily disrupt broader cooperation.
Arms control and the politics of nuclear balance have become a disruptive
force, to an extent, as exemplified by the deadlock over START II
ratification in Russia.

There are two alternative ways the politics of nuclear balance could affect
relations between Russia and the United States: one is negative. Some
Russian modernization options could undermine the stability of the
nuclear balance and stimulate a launch-on-warning posture; this could be
perceived in the United States as a threat, in the same fashion as the Soviet
arsenal was perceived as a threat in the 1970s and the 1980s. It should be
noted that the Soviet Union never actually had a first-strike capability; the
key here is the reaction of the United States and the modernization
programs it adopted in response.

The same option could also result from the deployment of a national
missile defense (NMD) system by the United States. Russia will see it as
destabilizing and is likely to respond by modernization and/or buildup of
its offensive forces, which, in its turn, would cause negative reaction in the
United States. Given the nature of the issue, the impact on the domestic
political situation in both countries is likely to be highly disruptive.

The other alternative is positive. Russian strategic modernization could

proceed in a stabilizing manner and facilitate eventual transition toward a
pure second strike posture. The real significance of this development,
however, will not be in its impact upon the nuclear balance: nuclear war is
clearly not in the cards. Rather, stable nuclear balance will enable the sides
to "forget' 'about those weapons; the arsenals will become useless not only
for combat, but also as a political instrument. Since complete nuclear
disarmament is hardly possible in the foreseeable future, putting weapons
"aside," relegating them to irrelevance is as close to their elimination as
realistically possible. Thus, the purpose of studying strategic
modernization is not to learn more about possible scenarios of a nuclear
exchange, but rather to understand an important aspect of domestic
politics in Russia and the United States and, through it, the dynamic of the
future relationship between them.

The potentially disruptive impact of the politics of nuclear balance is

demonstrated by the continuing saga of START 11 ratification in Russia.
The shortcomings of START II have already provided fertile ground for
conservative/nationalist opposition and helped mobilize voters around
their platform. Whether these shortcomings are militarily significant or not
seems irrelevant: what counts is how the potential imbalance is used in the
political games. Although the government is likely to push START II
through the parliament,3 it might have to make concessions in other areas
TUHP UTHP

of the domestic political process.

The materials presented in this paper suggest that the current

modernization programs in Russia lean toward the second, positive
alternative. Its future nuclear arsenal is likely to be small, conducive for
strategic stability, and non-provocative. It might even be unnecessary for
Russia to engage in a significant buildup effort in response to a US NMD
system, if one is deployed.

The positive outcome depends on two conditions. One is the minimum

level of funding. Without it, the strategic triad could quickly disintegrate.
This would be a potentially dangerous development, since it might
provoke a massive buildup once the economic situation improves and/or
might increase the likelihood of an authoritarian regime that would
mobilize resources to support such a buildup. Second, the transition
toward the new posture is politically difficult: its proponents will remain
vulnerable for at least the next five-seven years, until the new posture
finally takes shape and Russia's international situation stabilizes.
In this regard the US policy toward Russia will have a lasting influence on
the ongoing transition. Since Russia lacks financial and political resources
today, the full impact of current US policy will be delayed until the next
decade: no matter what the United States does, Russia will have to
ultimately accept it, but this acceptance could be short-lived, depending on
what is at stake. This means that today's reaction of the Russian
government to US policy is not necessarily a reliable indicator of long-
term relations; the "shadow of the future" should never be absent from
policy planning in either country.

This paper begins with an analysis of the ongoing debate over the strategic
modernization in Russia, reviews the policy of the government and the
military leadership, and then proceeds to the available data on actual
modernization programs. The last part will draw conclusions regarding the
possible evolution of these views under various scenarios.

The Nuclear Debate

HTU UTH

The well-known thesis that nuclear weapons are valued in Russia because
they are the last vestige of its great-power status is generally correct but
hardly sufficient to explain the attention to the nuclear arsenal. Nor is it
sufficient to say that nuclear weapons are a key security guarantee. These
statements yield little value in terms of predicting the size and the shape of
the arsenal since they do not contain criteria by which one could judge
whether the existing arsenal is sufficient, or have to be increased, or
modernized, etc. Without such criteria, decision-making is virtually
impossible: any decision would be arbitrary and subject to intense
challenge from the opposition, both within and outside the government.

Apparently, the benefits and losses resulting from the START II Treaty
are not at the center of the debate, either. The impact of START II is
rather easy to calculate, and a decision would have been made earlier. Nor
is the matter of funding necessarily at stake: everyone knows that Russia
cannot afford to reject STARTIII, but this does not dissuade its opponents.
Some suggest that START II simply should not be ratified in order to keep
more options open for the future, when the economic situation improves;
others prefer to ratify START II because it does not contradict what they
consider the optimal future strategic posture. Rather, the debate is about
the criteria by which the Russian nuclear arsenal should be judged. An
agreement on the criteria will determine its eventual size, structure,
missions, and capabilities.

This frame of reference has several important implications. The most

important among them is that the approval or the rejection of START II
will not end the debate: the decision of the Duma will affect the
probabilities of various outcomes, but will not completely foreclose any of
those. If the treaty is ratified, the option of MIRVing ICBMs will not be
removed completely: Russia could still return to them, for example, if the
United States deploys an NMD. On the other hand, the rejection of
START II does not automatically mean that Russia will MIRV its ICBMs:
it might still stick to that key provision. At this writing, the ratification
resolution, which will be sent to the floor of the Duma, is likely to espouse
the first option: START II would be subject to a review in the case the
United States deploys an NMD to determine whether MIRVing is
advisable. At the same time, the resolution will insist on even deeper
reductions, a START III treaty.

Another characteristic of the debate could be detected in frank discussions

with many Russian experts: the lines between various positions are not
necessarily drawn according to political, ideological, or institutional
boundaries. Rather, they often run within individuals: quite a few experts
cannot decide on their own preferences. It would be a mistake to picture
the situation in simple black and white colors, as a standoff between
"liberals" and "conservatives" or between "hawks" and "doves." In this
sense, the disagreements described below are relative: in some cases, they
refer to whole groups, but in others they describe the uncertainty that
exists in the minds of experts and politicians.

All sides in the debate share a number of positions, first and foremost that
Russia needs nuclear weapons and that their role has increased since the
end of the Cold War. At a minimum, they are supposed to prevent large-
scale aggression and guarantee Russia's sovereignty and survival. A study
of the Russian Institute of Strategic Studies (RISI) underscored that
"humankind has not created a substitute to nuclear weapons in terms of
their deterrent effect in the situations of escalating large-scale armed
conflicts. This means that in the foreseeable future nuclear weapons will
remain an important element of global politics despite all the
'inconveniences' related to their maintenance and the continuing debate
over the actual role of nuclear weapons in preventing world wars during
the last fifty years.4 In other words, the special role of nuclear weapons is
HPTU UTHP

determined by their real or perceived "absolute" character.

From here, it follows that nuclear weapons can compensate for Russia's
inferiority in conventional armed forces relative to NATO and China. The
new military doctrine, which is expected to be adopted sometime in 1998,
will provide for the use of nuclear weapons "in the case of an immediate
threat to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Russia that has
emerged as a result of an external aggression.5 This will be a
HPTU UTHP

reaffirmation of the provision of the 1993 doctrine, which, in its turn,

repudiated the 1982 Soviet policy of no-first-use. The 1993 first-use plank
was also confirmed in the 1997 national security concept.6 HPTU UTHP
Having introduced the first-use plank, however, the 1993 doctrine retained
certain restrictions on the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear
states in line with the negative guarantees provided by the Soviet Union
(as well as all other "legitimate" nuclear states) in connection with the
Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Only nuclear-
weapons states and their allies can be threatened with nuclear weapons.
The new, 1998 doctrine will keep these limitations together with the first-
use provision: Anatoli Klimenko and Aleksandr Koltukov underlined that
the 1993 document enjoyed the support of the Foreign Ministry (meaning,
it did not contradict international obligations) and thus it was decided to
keep it. They also noted that while the doctrine was still under
development unnamed experts attempted to broaden the first-use plank.7 HPTU UTHP

A broader, less official approach to the use of nuclear weapons includes,

for example, deterrence against "a belt of unstable, and sometimes
unfriendly, states and countries, which covertly seek weapons of mass
destruction.8 This definition embraces the majority of states to the south
TUHP UTHP

of Russia; it is interesting to note, however, that the recent shifts in

Russia's relations with Iran and Iraq have probably weakened the
perceived necessity to rely on nuclear weapons. Still, some states could be
viewed as "candidates" for deterrence by nuclear weapons, e.g. Pakistan,
whose policy in Afghanistan and Central Asia is assessed in Russia as
unfriendly.

The disagreements within the Russian elite regarding nuclear weapons

rather closely mirror the debates in the United States in the end of 1960s--
early 1970s and in the 1980s between the proponents of mutual assured
destruction (MAD), war-fighting, and war-winning approaches9 with just
TUHP UTHP

one important exception: almost no one in Russia advocates a transition to

defense programs similar to SDI. A comparison of the current debate in
Russia to the 30-year old debate in the United States sheds additional light
on its substance and the views expressed by different sides. It could also
provide a better grasp on how various doctrines emerge. Some are likely
to relate to the nature of nuclear weapons, others to the conventional
balance, still others to specific weapons systems that provide new
capabilities.

To a large extent, the perceptions and the prescriptions regarding nuclear

weapons appear to be determined by two related variables. One is the
relationship with the United States and NATO, another is the prospect that
the United States might deploy an NMD system and yield the Russian
deterrent potential useless. These variables are related to the extent that the
latter could be viewed as part of a "devious plan" to dominate and
subjugate Russia. They differ to the extent that the NMD could be
conceptualized as an independent phenomenon: the United States does not
harbor hostile plans toward Russia, but, regardless of intentions, the
deployment of an NMD could undermine the hedge against future threats
that might unexpectedly emerge, for example, as a result of elections ten
or twenty years from now.

The "Minimalists:" Back to the Classic Age of Deterrence

HTU UTH

Broadly speaking, there are two loose, ill-defined groups. One could be
called the "minimalists"--those who perceive a limited role for nuclear
weapons and favor a relatively small arsenal. Another is the
"maximalists"--those who tend to assign a broad range of missions to
nuclear weapons and insist that Russia needs a large arsenal.

On the question of relations with the West, very few members of the
Russian political establishment continue to adhere to the 1992-style
positive view of these relations. But the end of the "honeymoon" conceals
two rather distinct interpretations of the events, past and future. Most
"minimalists" say that there are no fundamental differences between
Russia and the United States, but cooperation is difficult and sometimes
impossible because the United States simply does not want it. In their
view, the United States often substitutes cooperation with complete
acceptance of its position by Russia and tends to label any disagreement as
a return to the Soviet/imperial policy. Examples abound, from the early
disagreements on Bosnia to the continuing conflicts around NATO
enlargement and Iraq.

More specifically, there is growing dissatisfaction with the failure of the

United States to accommodate Russian complaints about START I
implementation.10 According to the Russian view, these problems could be
HPTU UTHP

solved, but the United States does not wish to; a narrower focus is on the
US Navy, which, some say, refuses to budge even where it is possible and
necessary. A more traditional area of concern is the ABM Treaty: the
American arguments in favor of a national missile defense are simply not
taken seriously by Russian experts. The agreements on demarcation of
tactical and strategic defenses signed in New York in the fall of 1997 were
met with wide-spread dissatisfaction as well: they are viewed as
insufficient since the United States can still interpret them to allow
development of TMD systems, which, in Russian eyes, have strategic
potential.11 Some Russian experts believe that a more restrictive
TUHP UTHP

agreement was possible, but the United States refused to accept it (of
course, many US experts will not agree, but it is significant that this
perception is widely spread in Russia).

Still, the situation is far from critical, and patience and diplomacy are seen
as the main policy tools. This line has been evident in the acceptance of
the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council "in exchange" for NATO
enlargement and in the maneuvers around Iraq in the fall of 1997 and in
the early 1998. Within this paradigm, nuclear weapons are important, but
are expected to back up policy rather than play an independent role. In
addition to a fundamental role as a security guarantee, they also guard
against uncertainties in the future: a real large-scale conflict with NATO
and/or deployment of a national missile defense by the United States.

These views produce the perception of a rather limited role for nuclear
weapons. In many respects, it is close to what Bernard Brodie wrote in
1946: The first and most vital step in any American security program for
the age of atomic bombs is to take measures to guarantee to ourselves in
case of attack the possibility of retaliation in kind.12 The "minimalist"
HPTU UTHP

view of nuclear weapons is also in line with the views postulated in the
first Soviet official recognition of possession of nuclear weapons, in 1951:
the TASS statement declared that the purpose of Soviet nuclear weapons
was deterrence of nuclear war.13 The core of this view is the ability to
TUHP UTHP

retaliate in case of an attack--a nuclear attack in the "classic" formulation

or a large-scale conventional attack under a more recent policy.

A more liberal version of the "minimalist" view was expressed by Sergei

Kortunov: "The optimal version of Russia's nuclear strategy today is a
variant of non-aggressive, non-offensive and non-provocative (one could
even say 'friendly'), but also credible deterrence, which should be aimed
not only at the USA, but 'at all azimuths'--a Russian version of the classic
French, de Gaulle's doctrine of 'dissuasion' as opposed to the American
doctrine of 'deterrence' through the threat of annihilation.14 Although this HPTU UTHP

view enjoys some popularity, it is yet hardly feasible politically or even

bureaucratically: the military and politicians would still search for
"objective" criteria to determine "how much is enough," and these criteria
will inescapably be relative to the US nuclear arsenal, which is the largest
in the world. Still, this might represent the future of Russian thinking on
nuclear weapons if external and domestic conditions are right.

The dominant view of "minimalists" today does not boil down to simple
existential deterrence, in which the very presence of nuclear weapons
deters the other side. Rather, the core principle is that of assured second
strike capability, in line with McNamara's doctrinal innovations of the
1960s.15 Following McNamara, Russian experts and military planners
TUHP UTHP

attach considerable value to the ability to "ride out" the first strike and still
retain a second-strike capability. In this, they are closer to the views
expounded by Paul Nitze who said that even in the early days of the
nuclear era he and his associates believed that the quality of deterrence
depends upon one's ability to deal with the potential failure of deterrence.
The vital factor is that one's ability to deal with the contingency of
deterrence failing be understood by the other side.16 HPTU UTHP
The requirements outlined by Nitze are considerable. First, the number
and/or the survivability of nuclear weapons must be sufficient to ride out a
first strike by the other side. Second, the number and the quality of nuclear
weapons that survive the first strike of the other side must be sufficient for
it to believe that second-strike capability exists. Third, the surviving
weapons must match reasonably liberal estimates of unacceptable damage.
This calls for a rather large arsenal of deployed nuclear weapons, which,
in turn, presents the risk of a classic security dilemma: in pursuit of
second-strike capability "my" nuclear arsenal becomes so large that the
other side begins to worry about its second-strike capability.

Nitze, like many others, solved this dilemma by simply assuming that the
United States would never attack, so the Soviet Union did not have to
worry about the survivability of its deterrent force, it was only the US
headache. But, of course, the security dilemma would still emerge, and an
arms race would (and did) follow. Another solution is launch-on-warning,
whereby weapons do not have to ride out the first strike of the other side
because they are launched before the incoming warheads reach targets.

A way to avoid the security dilemma was proposed by the Scowcroft

commission in 1983: reduction of vulnerability of weapons, specifically
through the deployment of single-warhead mobile ICBMs--the route
which the Soviet Union was already taking and the United States planned
to take. In this way one can, theoretically, retain a second-strike capability
without inadvertently creating a first-strike capability. Apparently, this is
the favorite option of the Russian"minimalists."

Yet another solution is an NMD, but Russian experts and politicians

almost uniformly reject it on the grounds that a response in offensive
weapons would be cheaper and easier; thus mutual deterrence would be
reproduced at a higher level of arsenals. There is not consensus among the
"minimalists," however, on the proper response to a US NMD.

Even one of the experts of a conservative think tank, Spiritual Heritage

Foundation,17 concluded that under the most unfavorable circumstances
HPTU UTHP

(US first strike with 70-80 percent of Russian warheads lost and 50
percent effectiveness of the US ABM system) between 350 and 500
warheads would still reach US territory. The author also claimed that a 50
percent effective system would not be available until 2010-2015.

The official position stresses negotiations as the way to regulate and limit
the impact of defense systems. Recently, indications appeared that the
option of MIRVing of Topol-M with up to three warheads is kept open as
well. Vladimir Yakovlev, the SRF commander-in-chief, has openly
declared that Topol-M could be MIRVed if necessary as a hedge against a
US NMD.18 MIRVed ICBMs are considered the best means of
HPTU UTHP
overcoming defense because they can overwhelm it with warheads and
decoys. A simultaneous launch of a handful of MIRVed ICBMs is
obviously easier to coordinate than a simultaneous launch of several
hundred single-warhead ICBMs.19 Still, this is a far cry from the more
TUHP UTHP

conservative proposals discussed below.

The prescriptions of Russian "minimalists" do not necessarily match all

postulates of the "classic" deterrence theory, in particular the NSC-68
requirement of a sizable conventional force to supplement nuclear
deterrence, nor do they appear to fully account for the complex problems
of misperception, credibility, etc.20 A detailed discussion of these belongs
HPTU UTHP

elsewhere. It is sufficient to note that the threat of an East-West military

conflict is seen as low, and this helps to decrease many concerns that
otherwise could have emerged.

To summarize, the "minimalists" see nuclear weapons as an insurance

against a possible future threat, which will not necessarily materialize;
thus the insurance can be minimal. This insurance is not immediately
usable, like any insurance, and the size should be a reasonable
compromise between the need to guard against uncertainty and the risk of
buying an excessively expensive policy.

The "Maximalists:" Back to a War-Fighting Capability

HTU UTH

A considerable part of the Russian elite suspects, however, that more than
just the unwillingness to cooperate or high-handed American behavior is
at stake. Many think that the goals of the United States are outright anti-
Russian and that the threat to the country's survival is much more
imminent and requires a more robust military response.

The "maximalists" tend to conceptualize US policy toward Russia in terms

of Zbignew Brzezinski's writings.21 His idea is essentially about dividing
HPTU UTHP

Russia into several parts, of which the Western third should be integrated
into the "Atlanticist Europe," the Eastern third fall into China's sphere of
influence, while the middle would remain a "political black hole." This
proposal, predictably, infuriated the Russian political establishment, and
some suspect that Brzezinski simply made public the real goals of the
United States.22 If one adds to this the perception of threats from other
TUHP UTHP

"azimuths" such as China, Islamic countries, etc.,23 then the prescription HPTU UTHP

would be obvious: Russia needs a large nuclear force capable of

performing various missions, both strategic and theater-wide, to deter and
if necessary defeat almost any country or group of countries. Nuclear
weapons are supposed to have immediate value as a foreign policy tool
and be useful in a wide variety of global and local conflicts (after all,
within this world-view every local conflict is only part of a larger, global
US strategy aimed at eliminating Russia).
Same as with the "minimalists," the recommendations of this group
largely mirror relevant American theories. Consider, for example, the
warning Richard Perle gave after the collapse of the Berlin Wall but
before the collapse of the Soviet Union: it would be dangerous, he wrote,
to "disarm the West after the Cold War [and] ... run the risk that we might
yet again make Europe safe for the exertion of Soviet military power."24 TUHP UTHP

One only needs to replace the Soviet Union with the United States in that
quote and adjust for the geostrategic situation to arrive at a statement by
Sergei Glaziev, a prominent nationalist politician: [We need to] rethink
our foreign policy and defense doctrine, as well as the national security
doctrine. The thesis about the absence of enemies to Russia is obviously
wrong. ...[We need to] create necessary conditions for preservation and
development of strategic nuclear forces as a necessary and the most
important element of national security. ...[W]e should abstain from
ratification, implementation, and signing of treaties, which could reduce
the effectiveness of Russia's strategic nuclear forces, and particularly those
[treaties] that provide for unilateral concessions.25 HPTU UTHP

Much as some US theorists during the Cold War expected a first

disarming Soviet nuclear strike,26 these experts believe that the United
HPTU UTHP

States could strike first, or at least achieve a position where a successful

first strike would be possible. This concern is similar to that of the
American proponents of the infamous "bomber gap" and the "missile gap"
in the late 1950s27 -- that the United States would use its theoretical ability
HPTU UTHP

to defeat Russia in a nuclear war to chip away at its interests and

geopolitical positions. Nuclear inferiority would weaken Russia's ability to
resist because it would not be able to up the ante in an (inevitable?)
brinkmanship game. To avoid this gloomy scenario, they insist that
Russia's nuclear arsenal should be rather large (probably the same as or
larger than the START II limit of 3,500 warheads, and include a
significant number of MIRVed ICBMs).

MIRVed ICBMs are supposed to perform two functions. One is making a

US NMD incapable of defending against a Russian response--this mission
generally follows the logic of deterrence with the exceptions noted below.
The second function is to return to the situation of the 1980s, which made
possible greater versatility of scenarios of employment of nuclear weapons
beyond the straightforward second-strike option. This is essentially about
the ability to fight a nuclear war rather than simply threaten to "punish"
the aggressor. Or, as Brodie wrote in 1959 in a departure from his 1946
views, if deterrence fails we shall want enough forces to fight a total war
effectively.28
HPTU UTHP

The key difference between the "minimalists" and the "maximalists"

regarding the value of MIRVed ICBMs boils down to the following. The
former propose MIRVing only in response to a US NMD (and not all of
them think it necessary), the proposed scale of MIRVing is limited. The
latter consider MIRVing essential irrespective of the NMD, and when
(rather than if) it is deployed, the number of MIRVed ICBMs should be
increased even further. The scale of MIRVing is massive with or without
NMD and "heavy"--up to ten warheads per missile rather than up to three
for the "minimalists."

Two of the leading opponents of START II a deputy head of the

International Affairs Committee of the Duma Alexei Podberezkin and his
advisor Anton Surikov asserted: "Specialists think that in the case of
ratification of START II and especially if in five-six years Washington
would decide to annul the 1972 ABM Treaty, then in ten years Russia
would lose the ability to inflict guaranteed unacceptable damage to the
United States in a response strike.29 They argue that Russia should HPTU UTHP

transfer to its territory the production of heavy SS18 ICBMs (R-36M2 in

Soviet designation) and deploy 154 of those in the existing silos; in the
case the United States deploys an NMD, Russia should additionally
deploy 180 heavy ICBMs.30 In an earlier publication Anton SurikovHPTU UTHP

suggested that deploying up to seven warheads on Topol-M was possible

and advisable.31 HPTU UTHP

A crucial element in this system of views are tactical nuclear weapons,

which are expected to compensate for NATO's superiority in conventional
armed forces--superiority that will increase after the enlargement of
NATO. Tactical weapons should enable Russia to feel more self-assured
in local/regional conflicts and either help prevent or terminate them at
favorable conditions.32 During his tenure as a minister of defense, Igor
HPTU UTHP

Rodionov declared that in the view of NATO enlargement Russia "might

objectively face the task of increasing tactical nuclear weapons at [its]
borders.33 One of the most vocal proponents of greater reliance on TNF,
HPTU UTHP

Gen. Vladimir Belous (Ret.) proclaimed that "in contrast to strategic

weapons, whose central mission is 'deterrence' and, in the case it did not
succeed, 'punishment,' tactical weapons, even as they perform the function
of deterrence, could fulfill the mission of 'repulsing' aggression.34 In line HPTU UTHP

with NATO's Cold War-period rationalization, the "maximalists" suggest

that without tactical nuclear weapons Russia might have to choose
between defeat and an all-out war. The ability to prevail at the tactical
level is supposed to take care of this grim choice.

Overall, the perception of an imminent threat has created a host of (still

rather poorly developed) theories analogous to American doctrines of
limited nuclear strike, flexible response, limited war, escalation
dominance, etc.35 The purpose is to enable nuclear weapons to achieve a
HPTU UTHP

broad variety of missions when less than survival of the country is at

stake. To support these missions the strategic force should be capable of a
limited exchange, or a "demonstration" strike (similar to what Alexander
Haig proposed in the 1980s), or of deadlocking the strategic situation in
order to improve the chances of success at the substrategic level. Broad
missions also require a substantial tactical nuclear potential capable of
deterring NATO's conventional forces and dealing with other
contingencies (such as conflicts to the south of Russia).

The advocates of a more limited approach to nuclear weapons, the

"minimalists," display a rather ambiguous attitude toward tactical nuclear
weapons. They seem to avoid public statements on this subject and rarely
offer ideas on how exactly these weapons could be used. A mainstream
think tank, the Institute of Geopolitical and Military Forecasts (part of
IMEMO) cautiously suggested that "Russia needs a certain tactical nuclear
weapons potential as one of [the] guarantees of national security in the
case of possible radical changes in the European or Asian strategic scenes.
TNF could also be [a] somewhat useful36 addition in the case the balance
TUHP UTHP

in conventional armed forces is disrupted; they could be used primarily as

a political tool to prevent war."37 But they also said that the existing TNF
TUHP UTHP

arsenals were excessive and could be significantly reduced. Caution is

easy to explain by the domestic political situation in Russia, as well as its
uncertain international situation: the enlargement of NATO has
significantly increased the value of tactical nuclear weapons.

In a recent publication, Alexei Arbatov pointed at a fundamental

contradiction related to tactical nuclear weapons. On one hand, there is
widespread consensus that Russia needs them to balance NATO's
conventional superiority; on the other, the United States could destroy up
to 70 percent of Russian strategic weapons using only its tactical nuclear
and conventional weapons. A first strike using a combination of strategic
and tactical weapons, he said, would be 1.5-2 times more effective than
the one with only strategic weapons. Thus, Russia would do best if only it
had tactical nuclear weapons, but this is hardly possible.38HPTU UTHP

The brief description of the views espoused by the two groups, the
"minimalists" and the "maximalists," reveals that differences between
them relate to fundamental concepts of nuclear weapons and their role in
the international system. Regardless, there are certain trends common
both. They are situation-specific and are caused by shared concerns over
possible unfavorable developments in the international environment:
doubts still linger about US policy, particularly the prospect of
deployment of an NMD. Of course, the proposed responses radically
differ, but it seems significant that at least some concerns are shared and
the groups are apparently moving closer. It is not inconceivable that the
above-mentioned ambiguity in the minds of some experts and politicians
stems from this--for example, when the "minimalist" view of nuclear
weapons contradicts the "maximalist" assessment of the international
situation. The perceived weakness of the current Administration and the
influence of Congressional Republicans who advocate an NMD increases
the propensity to seek a hedge against unpleasant surprises.39 Unless the
HPTU UTHP

United States takes these concerns and uncertainties seriously, the still
slow drift of the Russian political establishment toward negative
expectations could become widespread.

In terms of START II, it is worth repeating that the treaty itself is of

relatively marginal concern and few actually like it. For the "minimalists,"
START II is consistent with their image of the future Russian nuclear
arsenal and, in addition, it helps somewhat constrain the US arsenal.
Though critical of many provisions of START II, they are willing to go
along with it. The "maximalists" oppose START II not simply because
they are concerned about its deficiencies, but primarily because it is
inconsistent with their preference for the future Russian arsenal.
Regardless, the "minimalists" might still abandon START II if they come
to the conclusion that a future US NMD system would deprive Russia of
its retaliatory capability.

References
HTU UTH

1. INF-Intermediate Nuclear Forces, i.e. the 1987 Treaty, which

eliminated land-based missiles with the range from 500 to 5,500 Ian;
START I-Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, the 1991 Treaty, which
reduced the strategic weapons of the Soviet Union and the United States to
6,000 accountable warheads (due to special accounting rules, the actual
number of warheads was higher for both sides); START II-the 1993
Treaty, which reduced the strategic weapons of Russia and the United
States to 3,500 warheads (the number of accountable and real warheads is
equal under the rules of that treaty). The INF Treaty has been
implemented, START I is being implemented now, START II has not
been ratified by Russia.

2. In the late September-early October, 1991 Presidents Bush and

Gorbachev made unilateral, more or less parallel statements with regard to
both strategic and tactical nuclear weapons. Both sides canceled one
ICBM program each, the Soviet Union promised to unilaterally reduce its
strategic forces under START I to 5,000 warheads, and-the most
significant part-both sides promised to significantly reduce their tactical
nuclear weapons by removing to central storage facilities or eliminating
warheads for all land- and sea-based tactical delivery systems and a
significant portion of warheads for air-based non-strategic delivery
systems. These statements also included other important steps.
3. For a comprehensive analysis of the prospects of START II ratification
see "Problemy Ratifikatsii Dogovora SNV-2 Na Vesennei Sessii 1998
goda v Gosudarstvennoi Dume" (The Problems of Ratification of the
START II Treaty during the Spring 1998 Session of the State Duma) in
Voprosy Bezopasnosti, Vol. 23, No. 3
FACT FINDING FILE START III

Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies at DESBIC

DESCRIPTIVE ENCODE IN STAR BASED

INTERNAL COMMAND
Modernization Of Strategic Nuclear Weapons In Russia:
The Emerging New Posture

THE DESBIC Institute for International Studies

IC. FACT FINDING FILES

51
Modernization of the Russian Nuclear Triad

The statements and hypotheses in the preceding sections need further testing against
the programs of modernization pursued by Russia. After all, it is the weapons
themselves that provide the most incontrovertible evidence. They also take the
longest to change, so that even if plans or policies evolve, the existing weapons
systems will continue to constrain the choices and preferences of politicians. There
are several features which are common for all modernization programs in all three
legs of the triad, One is that modernization effort spans all three legs --ICBMs,
SLBMs, and heavy bombers (the evidence on the latter is sketchy and unreliable),
which should seem surprising: under the financial constraints and the decreasing
overall limits of warheads the choice of a dyad (ICBMs + SLBMs) would have been
logical. The possible reasons for that decision will be explored below.

Secondly, modernization is limited by Soviet standards. Only one new type of

ICBMs is being developed (in the 1980s alone the Soviet Union deployed two new
types, SS-24 and SS-25, and was considering modernization of three existing types
and addition to one new type). Only one type of SSBNs is planned for deployment
(in the 1980s--two types of SSBNs, Typhoon and Delta IV), one existing type of
SLBMs (in the 1980s, the Soviet Union fielded two types of SLBMs, SS-N-20 and
SS-N-23). One new type of heavy bombers is under development (in the 1980s-also
only one new type, Tu-160).

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/Steve%20Ar...ocuments/FACT%20FINDING%20FILE%20START%20III.htm (1 of 20)4/30/2005 7:43:47 PM

FACT FINDING FILE START III

Modernization is also proceeding slower than usual. Although the SS-25M (Topol-
M) was adopted for deployment rather quickly, it was done at the expense of
drastically cutting down on the number of flight tests. The new-generation SSBN is
at least partially funded from the Moscow city budget (sic!), but the Severomorsk
shipyard continues to suffer from insufficient allocations.

Additionally, modernization does not affect all three legs of the triad
simultaneously, in contrast to Soviet practices. Instead, modernization of ICBMs is
now in full swing, modernization of the sea-based leg is only beginning, and heavy
bombers are clearly left for the future. This is quite unusual, as most of the existing
types of weapons will have to be discarded around the year 2005-2010. This only
serves to reinforce the hypothesis above that the properties of the US-Russian
nuclear balance are not viewed as "real," but rather as a benchmark for planning:
otherwise, a crash program could have followed, with associated changes in the
resource mobilization mechanism.

Even more interesting is that the stages of modernization do not seem to be directly
related to the state of technology of the existing weapons. Had it been the case,
heavy bombers would have been probably the first in line since the bulk of that leg
consists of Tu-95MS, which were produced in the 1980s, but are based on 1950s
technology. The ICBM force, in contrast, is by all standards rather modern, but was
nonetheless accorded the highest priority.

Instead, service life appears to be the criterion behind the choice of one or another
leg of the triad for modernization. The service life of Topols is the shortest (10- 15
years) and will expire in 2005-20 10; the service life of SSBNs is up to 25-30 years,
although this would require periodic medium-level maintenance, which is not being
performed on time and on all submarines, with the effect of shortening the service
life for some of those (the service life of heavy bombers is up to 30 years and they
are expected to remain operational longer than any other existing class of delivery
52
vehicles). Economic woes are common knowledge. Still, there is little doubt that
the Russian government would have found the money for strategic modernization
programs had the situation been assessed as dangerous. Evidently, this is not the
case: the government considers external conditions sufficiently stable for years
ahead to tolerate a fairly slow pace of modernization.

Modernization programs comply with START II. No MIRVed ICBMs are under
development, which is consistent with the prohibition on these missiles. Under no
conceivable circumstances can Russia exceed the START II limit of 3,500
warheads; to the contrary, it is likely to stay well below that limit. Furthermore, a

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/Steve%20Ar...ocuments/FACT%20FINDING%20FILE%20START%20III.htm (2 of 20)4/30/2005 7:43:47 PM

FACT FINDING FILE START III

significant increase in the concentration of warheads on delivery vehicles (in case

Russia decides to develop and deploy MIRVed ICBMs and 10-warhead SLBMs)
would make the force less stabilizing, which would run counter to the dominant
views of the military. It should not be forgotten that the military began the shift
toward putting the premium on survivability of the triad well before the dissolution
of the Soviet Union and while still under conditions of practically unlimited
funding. The deployment of mobile ICBMs in the 1980s was the first step in that
direction. The reduction of the number of warheads on existing SLBMs (for
example, from seven to four on SS-N- 18) reflected the same trend, same as the fact
that SS-N-23, the most modern of the existing SLBMs, has only four warheads. The
1990 Joint Statement on Future Negotiations proclaimed the intention to reduce
concentration of warheads on delivery vehicles, which was more than a concession
to the United States: the projected ICBM and SLBM programs featured no more
53
than five warheads per missile.

This means that survivability achieved through mobility and low concentration of
warheads on delivery vehicles is not a Russian innovation, but rather a continuation
of an earlier trend. In a sense, START II represents what the Soviet military would
have expected in the form of START IV or V. The collapse of the Soviet Union and
the economic crisis only helped to accelerate that evolution.

Since the "jump" over stages has already been made, Russia is likely to continue its
adherence to the current trends in modernization and will refrain from MIRVing
ICBMs. This line could be altered if the United States deploys a national missile
defense (NMD) system. In this case domestic pressure to deploy MIRVed ICBMs as
the means of penetrating the defense might tip the existing balance within the
Russian government and elite and strengthen the position of the (still numerous)
proponents of MIRVing. But such a change in the modernization plans is by no
means assured: even some conservatives recognize that an effective second-strike
capability could be retained without MIRVing.

But prospective systems are expected to have robust defense penetration

capabilities, and this is one more common feature of modernization. The new ICBM
is reportedly able to carry a very large load of decoys and defense penetration aids;
the new SSBN will be able to carry SLCMs, and, finally, the development of heavy
bombers is dictated, to a large extent, by the perceived need in ALCMs.

(I) Land-Based Strategic Missiles

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/Steve%20Ar...ocuments/FACT%20FINDING%20FILE%20START%20III.htm (3 of 20)4/30/2005 7:43:47 PM

FACT FINDING FILE START III

ICBMs have been accorded the highest priority among other legs of the triad. Their
modernization was halted only briefly after the breakup of the Soviet Union and
resumed as early as 1993. This could be explained by several reasons. First, ICBMs
have always been and are likely to remain the core of the Soviet strategic potential.
With the large landmass, relatively restricted access to oceans, and no forward bases
to deploy heavy bombers, ICBMs are the most convenient choice from the strategic-
military point of view. The SRF has also created a strong bureaucratic position and
is able to influence decisionmaking; in the minds of many politicians nuclear
weapons have come to be associated with land-based missiles. The appointment of
Igor Sergeev as the minister of defense only reinforces this trend.

The breakup of the Soviet Union has had a strong impact as well: two of three
modem types of ICBMs (SS-18, a.k.a. R-36 and its modifications, and SS-24, a.k.a.
RT-23) were produced in Ukraine; parts of the production base for the single-
warhead SS-25 (a.k.a. Topol, a.k.a. RT-2PM) also remained outside Russia. As a
result, Russia found it difficult and expensive to maintain even the existing
weapons, much less transfer production from Ukraine. The almost desperate need
for US support in the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from former republics to
Russia, especially from Ukraine, coupled with rather unfriendly relations with the
latter, led Russia to agree to complete elimination of MIRVed ICBMs.

Yet another reason to give priority to ICBMs could be understood if one pictures the
situation in 1992-93. Ratification of START II seemed imminent; it had to be
implemented by 2003 or, if the United States would have provided necessary
assistance, by the year 2000. This meant that by 2000 Russia would have been left
practically without silo-based ICBMs, except for 105 very old SS-19s (UR-
100UTTKh) downloaded to one warhead. Development of a new silo-based ICBM
seemed urgent; even road-mobile Topol-Ms could wait.

It is truly amazing, though, how much START II, which the Russian parliament
refuses to ratify, has already benefited Russia. Despite its many shortcomings, it
helped to limit modernization of ICBMs to just one type of single-warhead ICBMs.
Without START II, political pressure in favor of research and development on a
new MIRVed ICBM completely made in Russia might have been too strong. The
lack of resources might have strengthened the hand of those who advocated a return
to an authoritarian system. As things stand now, the defense of MIRVing remains
the prerogative of a minority (except for in the scenario of US deployment of an
NMD).

54
The mainstay ICBM is Topol-M. The testing phase is over, and the first regiment

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/Steve%20Ar...ocuments/FACT%20FINDING%20FILE%20START%20III.htm (4 of 20)4/30/2005 7:43:47 PM

FACT FINDING FILE START III

was deployed in late December 1997. On December 27, 1997 Boris Yeltsin
officially congratulated Igor Sergeev with the introduction of the first Topol-Ms into
55
combat duty. However, because of insufficient funding the regiment consists of
only two deployed missiles instead of the usual ten; the deployment itself is
56
classified as "evaluative," rather than a full-scale combat one.

Topol-M was designed at the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology (MIT), a

firm that specializes in solid-fuel missiles. From the very beginning (in the late
1960s) it was assigned the task of designing a solid-fuel mobile ICBM. The first
prototype, called Temp-2S, was dropped (some say, because it was too heavy to be
57
practical). The next, successful ICBM, Topol, appeared only by the 1980s, after a
successful intermediate-range missile Pioneer (SS-20). Some say, however, that the
adoption of Topol for deployment was partially due to the fact that Dmitri Ustinov,
who prior to becoming the minister of defense held top positions in the defense
industry, had a "soft spot" for both the MIT and the Ministry of Defense Industry,
which supervised it. (Previously, strategic missiles had been designed only within
the confines of the Ministry of General Machine-Building). As a result, the military
adopted a missile which, some say, was not ready for deployment. Today, one might
say it was sheer luck that through bureaucratic competition the MIT was given the
assignment: as a result, Russia inherited an active design bureau after the dissolution
of the Soviet Union (other design bureaus in the Russian territory had switched to
civilian space launch vehicles years earlier).

Research on Topol-M began in the late 1980s and by the early 1990s the missile
was ready for testing. The final decision to begin work on Topol-M was made by
Boris Yeltsin in February 1993: this decision confirmed and probably amended
earlier Soviet decisions on this missile (the amendments were necessary, obviously,
58
to account for the need to transfer production of some components to Russia).
From the very beginning, Topol-M was intended as a dual-based ICBM, to be
deployed in silos and on road-mobile launchers. Only the silo-based version exists
today; the road-mobile version has yet to be tested. This will involve primarily
modification of the first stage, and the process will be relatively simple.

Compared to Topol, the new missile is slightly shorter--the length of the assembled
missile without front section is 17.9 meters (Topol, 18.5 meters) and wider--the
diameter is 1.86 meters (Topol, 1.8 meters). Its front section is slightly longer: 3.3
59
meters (Topol, 2.3 meters). This solid-fuel missile is deployed and maintained in
launch canister, as the absolute majority of Soviet missiles (only the SS-13 was
deployed and maintained by stages), continuing the traditional difference between

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/Steve%20Ar...ocuments/FACT%20FINDING%20FILE%20START%20III.htm (5 of 20)4/30/2005 7:43:47 PM

FACT FINDING FILE START III

the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia in terms of approaches to missile-
building.

The pace of Topol-M's development was high: the first test was conducted in
December 1994 and the last one in July 1997. Compared to Topol, however, this
should not seem excessive: the first test of the latter was conducted in February
60
1983 and in 1985 the missile was adopted for deployment. The unusual aspect
was that only four tests of Topol-M took place in three years, whereas in the Soviet
61
Union the usual number of tests for a new type was 15-20.

Thus, testing of Topol-M seems more than a little bit hasty. The START I Treaty
permits up to 20 tests before the side has to either completely abandon the new
missile or accept it for deployment; the first official information on a new missile
62
(its throw-weight) has to be provided only after seven tests. This means that in the
late 1980s the prospect of such a short test series did not occur to anyone in the
Soviet Union or the United States. In fact, a well-known conservative general,
member of the Communist Party faction in the Duma, Albert Makashov claimed
that Topol-M had not undergone the required number of tests and was not ready for
63
deployment at all.

The unusually small number of tests could partially be explained by the fact that the
missile was a derivative from the existing Topol and thus used some existing
technology, but also by the possibility that tests were more thoroughly prepared than
64
used to be the case in the Soviet Union. There are reports that the ground checks
were considerably more thorough and that they were performed at the test range
65
rather than at the plant as had been the case during the Soviet period.

Insufficient funding evidently played an important role as well. In fact, originally a

series of six tests was scheduled, and after the first test some reports indicated that
more might be necessary. Even after the third test the situation remained uncertain,
since the missile reportedly had flaws in the cooling system. Evidently, the fourth
test went smoothly, and the missile was adopted for deployment. Still, only one
successful test is hardly sufficient, and the military might be not completely
66
satisfied with the quality of the new missile.

Topol-Ms service life without major maintenance is up to 15-20 years, longer than
67
that of Topol. Most of the Topols that exist today will have to be replaced rather

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/Steve%20Ar...ocuments/FACT%20FINDING%20FILE%20START%20III.htm (6 of 20)4/30/2005 7:43:48 PM

FACT FINDING FILE START III

soon, which means that quite a large quantity of new missiles will have to be
produced. Reportedly, the production capacity of the Votkinsk plant is up to 80
missiles per year; production is cost-effective at 30 missiles per year, and the
absolute minimum necessary to sustain the cooperation network of about 200 plants
68
is 12-15. The deployment rate was at 20 missiles per year in 1996, enough to
69
sustain production cooperation, but insufficient to make it cost-effective.

The planned rate of production is 30-40 annually with the goal of deploying 400-
500 Topol-Ms by 2010, although the level of funding is only 55 percent of the
required, which means that if the financial situation does not improve, only about
70
300 missiles will be deployed by 2010. However, if economic conditions improve
rapidly, as the Russian government now predicts, it would not be impossible to
71
return to the Soviet-era deployment rate of 48 per year.

Topol-M follows the Soviet tradition of large throw-weight: reportedly, 1.2 tons (for
comparison, Topol is 1 ton and a three-warhead Minuteman III is 1.15 tons). This is
the source of consistent speculation that Russia might MIRV Topol-M, especially
since the predecessor of both, the intermediate-range missile Pioneer (SS-20)
carried three warheads. Recently, Yakovlev did mention this possibility. But
throwweight in itself is not necessarily a reliable indicator. Topol-M is consistent in
this respect with other Soviet missiles: the six-warhead SS-19 is 4.35 tons and the
modern 10-warhead SS-24 is 4.05 tons; a comparison to Minuteman III is not
necessarily an indication of anything. In any event, MIRVing Topol-M would
require extensive redesigning and retesting of the missile, so no breakout from
START II limits would be possible, at least compared to the breakout potential of
Minuteman III and D-5 (Trident II). The conditions under which MIRVing Topol-M
could become feasible were noted in preceding sections.

Large throw-weight could be attributed to greater weight of the warhead, guidance

and other systems, and defense penetration aids. Topol-M is considered fairly well
equipped for penetration of defense systems. According to some estimates, this
single-warhead ICBM carries more decoys and penetration aids than a 10-warhead
72
Peacekeeper (MX). Reportedly, only a direct hit by an anti-missile could stop its
73
warhead on the descending trajectory. US sources suggest that Topol-M has a
74
maneuvering warhead, which has not been tested yet; Russian sources are silent
on that matter. If these reports are correct, then Topol-M, indeed, has an impressive
defense penetration capability.

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/Steve%20Ar...ocuments/FACT%20FINDING%20FILE%20START%20III.htm (7 of 20)4/30/2005 7:43:48 PM

FACT FINDING FILE START III

The first stage of Topol-M is reported to be more powerful than that of Topol, which
gives it an added capability to avoid a space-based defense system of the type that
was widely touted in the United States in the 1980s under the "Star Wars"
nickname. According to the commander-in-chief of the SRF Vladimir Yakovlev, the
greater power of Topol-M's booster was used to reduce the duration and the altitude
of the active (boost) phase of the trajectory. This was done specifically for the
purpose of avoiding the impact of "various types" of anti-missile defense systems,
such as ultra-high-frequency emissions, lasers, etc.-a clear reference to the "exotic"
75
space-based systems foreseen under the "START Wars." Dvorkin disclosed that
the altitude of Topol-M's boost phase is 4.5 times lower than that of older MIRVed
ICBMs, and only the new ICBM makes any sense under the conditions of a
76
prospective US NMD.

The distinguishing feature of the new ICBM is the premium put on survivability.
The silo-based version is reported to have enhanced resistance to a nuclear
explosion: some say that it can withstand a direct hit by a nuclear warhead. The
77
missile itself is completely resistant to an electromagnetic impulse.

The road mobile version possesses vastly more effective navigational equipment.
According to Yakovlev, it could be launched from any level spot within the division
deployment area, whereas Topol could be launched only from a limited number of
78
predetermined spots. Topol-M is projected to have significantly enhanced
concealment capabilities, being able to avoid all types of space and airborne
79
intelligence systems. Solomonov argues that the missile launchers might remain
unconcealed during normal combat duty, but will "disappear" if combat alert is
80
introduced. This might prove to be especially valuable in terms of the ability to
avoid B-1B and B-2 heavy bombers, which are commonly conceptualized in Russia
as "hunters" after mobile ICBMs.

The impact of concealment measures on verifiability--an obvious issue that is likely

to be raised at arms control talks--is likely to be minimal. The number of deployed
mobile ICBMs is checked through on-site inspections, when all mobile launchers
have to return to their garrison. The risk that some deployed launchers might not
return is hardly greater than with respect to Topols: the latter could theoretically
remain hidden as well. Other verification instruments provided by START I were
designed to remove that residual risk. The overall number of missiles for mobile
launchers is checked through the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system
installed at the production facility, which gives the most reliable figure on the

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/Steve%20Ar...ocuments/FACT%20FINDING%20FILE%20START%20III.htm (8 of 20)4/30/2005 7:43:48 PM

FACT FINDING FILE START III

number of produced missiles; the aggregate number of non-deployed (spare)

missiles could be verified through on-site inspections; the difference between the
two numbers (produced and non-deployed) gives the aggregate number of deployed
missiles.

What future awaits Topol-M? Clearly, the missile will remain the mainstay of the
SRF for a long time. The road-mobile version will gradually replace Topols, and
ultimately the whole force will consists exclusively of Topol-Ms. But the system is
apparently not perfect. In 1992, during the first stage of public debate over the yet-
unsigned START II, a number of drawbacks were disclosed by none other than the
81
Communist Pravda. The missile was considered rather large and heavy, which
limited its maneuverability and speed and constrained its ability to escape from a
nuclear strike fast enough and would be too vulnerable to the blast wave of an
explosion. The critics declared that Topols were acceptable only as part of a much
larger ICBM force, but not as the only type. Judging by the size of the missile,
82
Topol-M probably inherited the same drawbacks, according to some experts.

Of course, these problems are mitigated by the presence of silo-based ICBMs and
the projected overall size of the force (eventually about 700-800 missiles).
Apparently, Topol-M even in its mobile mode is more survivable than Topol. Still,
as arsenals are reduced, a new, lighter and smaller missile might be required to
increase survivability not just of the force as a whole, but also of each missile. There
are no indications of such plans so far, for understandable reasons. Russia can
barely support the work on Topol-M, that is, without affecting the overall economic
and social policy, and is unlikely to embark upon a new program until the economic
situation seriously improves. In the future a new ICBM seems likely, if current
trends in global nuclear relationships continue. There is an isolated and not very
reliable mention, however, of a modification of Topol-M, a Topol-M2, but its
83
characteristics remain unknown.

Topol-M was not the only single-warhead ICBM under development in the Soviet
Union, however. In an October 5, 1991 statement, Mikhail Gorbachev mentioned
that the Soviet Union was terminating the program of creating a small mobile
84
ICBM. The word "small" meant that this missile was smaller than Topol-M.
According to Solomonov, the missile's designation was Courier, and it was an
analogue to the US small ICBM Midgetman. It featured new materials, new fuel,
new guidance systems, and other elements, and the R&D program had reached the
stage of flight-tests by mid-1991. But, he complained, the United States learned
about the new missile (probably from the tests of its components) and did not

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/Steve%20Ar...ocuments/FACT%20FINDING%20FILE%20START%20III.htm (9 of 20)4/30/2005 7:43:48 PM

FACT FINDING FILE START III

85
permit [the Soviet Union] to conduct flight tests. A more feasible explanation,
however, is that facing the choice between two programs, one of which had become
excessive for financial reasons and because of arms reductions, the Soviet Union
chose the one that was closer to the existing type. This permitted savings on R&D,
testing, and deployment: unlike Topol-M, Courier would have required a
completely new launcher, infrastructure, etc. It is also possible that the other missile
was not intended for dual basing.

Russia might conceivably return to this idea in the sense that the next missile will be
smaller than Topol-M, more mobile and hardened. At least, this would fall into the
broad trend toward greater survivability of the retaliatory forces.

A different option was disclosed by the first deputy defense minister Nikolai
Mikhailov. According to him, Russia has started R&D on a single missile for land
86
and sea basing. This will permit, of course, major savings through the maximum
possible reduction in the number of types. Whether the project will be
technologically optimal and how the legal aspects will be taken care of (ICBMs will
have to be single-warhead, while SLBMs are more cost-effective if they carry
several warheads) remains to be seen.

(II) Sea-Based Strategic Weapons

The information on SLBM modernization is rather sketchy and contradictory, unlike

that on ICBMs. This is hardly surprising as it began in earnest only in late 1996 with
the laying of the keel of a new submarine. As with all new programs, the initial
87
stage allows plenty of space for conjecture and speculation; in the absence of hard
data, one can only attempt to untangle the contradictory information offered by
various sources.

The sea leg is the second priority after ICBMs. Its modernization could not be
postponed for too long. Navy requires especially long lead time for modernization,
since construction of new submarines is a lengthy process. The existing submarines
88
are growing old, and the new class had to be started in the mid-1990s. After 2003,
the SSBN force was expected to consist of 24 of the most modern SSBNs (Delta III,
Delta IV and Typhoon), but after 2006--only 17 submarines: even relatively new
89
submarines will begin to die out.

90
Construction of the first submarine of the new, fourth generation officially began

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/Steve%20Ar...ocuments/FACT%20FINDING%20FILE%20START%20III.htm (10 of 20)4/30/2005 7:43:48 PM

FACT FINDING FILE START III

91
on November 2, 1996. Its name was selected with a special purpose in mind: Yuri
Dolgoruki, after a 12th century great prince who founded Moscow. The mayor of
Moscow, Yuri Luzhkov, was present at the ceremony and committed funds from the
city budget to support its construction. The new submarine is being built at the
Severodvinsk shipyard after an almost 10-year pause in SSBN construction.
92
Construction is expected to last for four years, although consistent funding
93
shortages might delay it.

According to official US estimates, the new Borey class SSBN will be equipped
94 95
with solid-fuel SS-NX-28 SLBMs (a.k.a. R-39UTTKh, a.k.a. D-31). The new
96
missile is reportedly more accurate and has longer range. Based on the missile
type, Project 955 is assumed to be a continuation of Project 941 (a.k.a. Typhoon, a.k.
a. Akula), the largest SSBN in the world. Still, no source explicitly establishes the
97
connection. Project 941, of which six submarines are now in service, is equipped
98
with R-39 SLBM (a.k.a. SS-N-20, a.k.a. D-19, a.k.a. RSM-52), each carrying ten
warheads.

This logical picture hides numerous inconsistencies, however. Project 955 is not
necessarily a continuation of Project 941. Steven Zaloga, an authority on Soviet and
Russian strategic weapons, hypothesized that it was a derivative of the fourth-
generation attack submarine (SSN), Project 885 (a.k.a. Severodvinsk). Construction
99
of the first submarine of this class, Tomsk, began in the summer of 1996.

Russian specialists, however, define Borey as Delta V, establishing a direct link

between the existing Project 667 modifications (667A, 667B, 667BD, 667BDR, and
667BDRM), which are considered the "workhorse" of the Soviet/Russian SSBN
100
fleet, and the new SSBN.

101
Project 955 is smaller than Project 941 (reportedly 170 x 10 meters) and its
silhouette is similar to Project 667BDRM (a.k.a. Delta IV, a.k.a. Delphin). Like on
Project 667BDRM, Project 955's missile tubes are located behind the sail; Project
941 has a unique configuration: its missile tubes are in front of the sail. Borey will
carry 12 SLBMs (Project 667BDRM: 16, Project 941: 20). Project 955's abovewater
displacement is somewhere between Project 667BDRM (11,740 tons) and Project
102 103
941 (23,200 tons); US sources estimate it between 18,000 and 20,000 tons. Its
underwater displacement is actually smaller than even that of Project 667BDRM:

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/Steve%20Ar...ocuments/FACT%20FINDING%20FILE%20START%20III.htm (11 of 20)4/30/2005 7:43:48 PM

FACT FINDING FILE START III

104
17, 100 tons (667BDRM: 18,200 tons, 941: 48,000 tons).

But if the new SSBN does not represent a development of Project 941 SSBNs, then
one would have good grounds to doubt that it will be equipped with the R-
39UTTKh SLBM. Indeed, the development of R-39UTTKh began in 1985 and
105
already in 1989 the missile was adopted for deployment, when no new class of
SSBN was yet in existence. Russian experts report that the R-39UTTKh (D-
19UTTKh) was intended as a replacement for R-39 (D-19U) missile as part of
106
modernization of the Typhoon submarines.

In 1991 or 1992 the first Project 941 SSBN was put in dock for modernization and,
Zaloga suggested, was supposed to be refitted with the R-39UTTKh SLBMs in the
place of R-39. He notes, however, with his usual caution, that under the strained
economic conditions the project (with replacement of all R-39 by the modernized
version) might never be completed. In fact, he says, R-39UTTKh has never been
produced in quantity, since its first stage was developed and probably produced at
Pavlograd, in Ukraine, and the breakup of the Soviet Union created a dilemma:
whether all production should be moved to Russia or a new arrangement with
107
Ukraine should be found. It is worth noting that the Russian military has never
108
felt comfortable with importing components of strategic weapons. A different
version, however, suggests that the first stage of R-39 was produced in Penn and
109
then shipped to Pavlograd.

The logical question, then, is: if the R-39UTTKh is not the SLBM intended for
Project 955, which missile will be deployed with that new class? Surprisingly,
almost every Western expert, at least to this author's knowledge, has missed another
new type of SLBMs. One should recognize, though, that almost nothing is known
about it. According to B. Makeev, the Miass design bureau was working on two
new SLBMs: one he called SS-NX-27 (a follow-on to RSM-52, a.k.a. R-39) which
in the West is designated as SS-NS-28, and another SS-NX-26, a follow-on to RSM-
54 (a.k.a. R-29RM, a.k.a. D-9RM, a.k.a. SS-N-23), which is deployed with Project
110
667BDRM. He did not provide further data on the second missile (and his
NATO-style designations are questionable), but the fact that the Miass bureau was
working on a new missile to replace R-29RM is significant. The information about
research conducted on a follow-on to R-29RM is confirmed by Zuev, Kuznetsov,
111
and Tsvetkov. Jane's also mentions a follow-on liquid-fuel SLBM, which it
112
designates SS-NX-27.

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/Steve%20Ar...ocuments/FACT%20FINDING%20FILE%20START%20III.htm (12 of 20)4/30/2005 7:43:48 PM

FACT FINDING FILE START III

The military and the defense industry have been rather closed-mouthed about the
development of new SLBMs: when a test-flight in November 1997 went astray, the
official information did not include an indication of the type and characteristics of
113 114
that new missile. Apparently, this was the R-39UTTKh; US sources indicate
115
that all tests of that missile have so far been unsuccessful.

R-29RM is a liquid-fuel missile which carries four warheads; it has two standard
116
configurations, though --with ten and with four warheads. It seems likely that a
follow-on to Project 667BDRM would carry a follow-on to R-29RM, which should
mean that the new missile will remain liquid-fuel and have about four warheads (3
117
to 5). Thus, each Project 955 submarine will carry from 36 to 60 warheads,
which is consistent with the trend toward achieving greater survivability through
118
low concentration of warheads on delivery vehicles.

How did official US sources come up with the proposition that Project 955 will
carry SS-NX-28 (R-39UTTKh)? The expectation is logical, because work on the
119
second missile, a follow-on to R-29RM, is apparently behind schedule. Testing
has not begun yet, although the submarine is already under construction.

Of course, Russia will not be able to deploy many Project 955 submarines for
obvious financial reasons (Komsomolskaya Pravda reports that seven Borey SSBNs
120
will be ultimately built ). The force will consist of a mixture of Projects
667BDRM, 941, and 955. But even a relatively small addition of the Borey class
submarines would make the force more survivable. In any event, it would not be
logical to deploy the new submarine with 10-warhead missiles as it would reduce
the overall number of submarines permitted under START II and even further
within the START III limits. The original plan for START II was apparently around
121
18 submarines (some say 25 ); the mere thought that because of insufficient
122 123
funding it would dwindle to around 12 is viewed as a near-tragedy.
Obviously, the more submarines in the force, the more submarines are on patrol at
any given time. But it is a known fact that the Soviet Union could keep a smaller
percentage of its submarines on patrol than the United States, which dictates a larger
124
overall force just to keep a similar number of submarines at sea.

(III) Air-Based Strategic Weapons

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/Steve%20Ar...ocuments/FACT%20FINDING%20FILE%20START%20III.htm (13 of 20)4/30/2005 7:43:48 PM

FACT FINDING FILE START III

There is even less known about modernization of heavy bombers than about sea-
based strategic weapons. Until recently, it even seemed possible that Russia would
allow the remaining small force of its heavy bombers to "die out" and make a
transition toward a dyad. Of course, this would have taken a long time: the current
force consists of Tu-95MS heavy bombers, which represent a very old technology
(the original Tu-95s were designed in the 1950s), but were modernized in the 1980s
to accommodate air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs). The service life of these
bombers is about 30 years, so they are expected to survive for a reasonably long
time. Russia also has a handful of modern Tu-160s, but the majority of those
remained in Ukraine, and after five years of fruitless negotiations Russia decided
not to buy them.

Although Tu-160 could remain operational for a rather long time, production of
additional aircraft is expensive. As an apparent response to the failure of attempts to
acquire Tu-160s from Ukraine, it was decided to complete production of the six half-
125
ready Tu-160s, which still sit at a plant in Kazan, but there are apparently no new
contracts. When the economic situation improves, the Tu-160 will already represent
outdated technology and probably will not be worth producing. Possible further
reductions, beyond the 2,500 level of START III, might create a tension between the
Air Force and the modernizing ICBM and SLBM force, forcing them into a
competition for the share of warheads. Thus, while the existing force will survive
until the START II reductions are completed and even into the START III phase,
the ultimate choice in favor of a dyad would be logical.

The transition toward a dyad was hinted at in the unilateral moratorium on the
production of heavy bombers announced by Mikhail Gorbachev. Although it is
possible to resume production (there are no legal limits on a reversal of the
unilateral step), today it remains unlikely, except for the above-mentioned decision
to complete the six bombers, which were left "frozen" by Gorbachev. The variants
of the structure of the nuclear triad developed by the SRF assume a stable air-based
component of about 80 heavy bombers with about 600 START I accountable
warheads; this number could vary only to the extent that Tu-95MS could be
126
downloaded to six ALCMs or uploaded to 16. The apparent halt of R&D on new
nuclear ALCMs and concentration on conventional ALCMs seemed to reinforce this
trend (ALCM modernization is discussed further below).

Apparently, these projections do not represent the last word in strategic planning.
The modernization of the air leg of the triad is probably beginning. Recently Petr
Deynekin (then commander-in-chief of the Air Force) announced that work on new

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/Steve%20Ar...ocuments/FACT%20FINDING%20FILE%20START%20III.htm (14 of 20)4/30/2005 7:43:48 PM

FACT FINDING FILE START III

127
models was underway. His vague statement was detailed by the director-general
of the Tupolev design bureau, Igor Shevchuk. He said that the bureau was working
128
on a follow-on to both the medium Tu-22 bomber and the heavy Tu- 160 bomber.

Finally, there is an unconfirmed report that Russia already has a Tu-180 heavy
bomber--a "stealth" one, most probably very similar to the B-2, at least judging
129
from the photograph. Development of a "stealth" heavy bomber would have been
consistent with the propensity of the Soviet military and defense-industrial leaders
to match US modernization; it is much less clear if this would be a preferred choice
for Russia. For that reason one would have solid ground to question the information.

A combination of strategic considerations and bureaucratic maneuvering probably

was behind the decision to begin research on a new heavy bomber. The prospect of
the United States deploying an NMD naturally creates a stimulus for Russia to
retain ALCMs, demanding in turn an effort to retain and modernize their delivery
vehicles. With the ABM Treaty firmly in place, Russia might choose a dyad. Also,
the commander-in-chief of the Air Force, Petr Deynekin, is a former commander of
the long-range (strategic) aviation, and so his preferences went to the preservation
and modernization of the heavy bomber force. He also was a close ally of the new
minister of defense, Igor Sergeev. With the departure of Deynekin, the bureaucratic
momentum behind heavy bomber modernization might be lost.

A recent interview with the commander-in-chief of the SRF, Vladimir Yakovlev,

reflects the support, which the "missile-men," uncharacteristically, are prepared to
render to the Air Force. He declared that the strategic forces of Russia need to keep
the three-component structure in the future and that a heavy bomber force is and
will remain absolutely essential for the effectiveness of the strategic arsenal. He
130
particularly stressed the ability of heavy bombers to carry ALCMs.

In the absence of hard data on modernization of heavy bombers, one is left to

speculate about what exactly might come out of it. The new aircraft, if it emerges,
will be designed exclusively for ALCMs, since no other weapon would make much
sense. It is also likely to carry only nuclear ALCMs, although one should not rule
out the possibility that conventional ALCMs will be deployed on it as well. The
decisions will be largely determined by the provisions of START I and II, which
were developed primarily to fit the then current US position. According to the
START I Treaty (this provision was inherited by START II), nuclear ALCMs could
be deployed only on heavy bombers; if a nuclear ALCM is deployed on any other
aircraft, it automatically begins to classify as a heavy bomber. Thus, the only way

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/Steve%20Ar...ocuments/FACT%20FINDING%20FILE%20START%20III.htm (15 of 20)4/30/2005 7:43:48 PM

FACT FINDING FILE START III

Russia could preserve nuclear ALCMs in its arsenal is to have heavy bombers.

Conventional ALCMs, to the contrary, could be deployed on a variety of aircraft.

START I established a special limit on the number of conventionally-equipped
heavy bombers (up to 75), and START II added the right to "redesignate" up to 100
nuclear-equipped heavy bombers for conventional missions (Russia, however, is
against this provision and tries to eliminate it either through an amendment to
START II or within the context of the future START III treaty). Thus, Russia could
theoretically deploy up to 175 heavy bombers with conventional weapons. This
seems unlikely, however, for two reasons. One is financial: Russia can hardly afford
modernization and production of even the heavy bombers to replace the existing
ones; a large-scale program for conventionally armed heavy bombers appears out of
question for a long time. Second, most of the "conventional" missions for which the
United States would need heavy bombers are within the reach of medium bombers
(such as Tu-22M3) for Russia. Heavy bombers could be only moderately attractive
for these missions because of their larger payload (up to 16 for Tu-95MS).

A logical decision for the years to come would be to retain heavy bombers with
nuclear ALCMs and medium bombers with conventional ones. If the United States
is able to retain its START I and START II position in favor of the virtual absence
of the so-called "functionally related" distinctions between heavy bombers with
131
different equipment, Russia might choose the option of dual equipment.
Essentially this would mean that Russia will be able to retain a relatively small fleet
of heavy bombers and use them for nuclear or conventional missions as needed. In
terms of arms control negotiations, this might mean that Russia will attempt to
return to its earlier position (the Soviet position of the mid- 1980s) in favor of
counting all heavy bombers as nuclear-capable.

The characteristics of the future new heavy bomber are a matter of speculation and
conjecture. As the information above about Tu-180 suggests, the new heavy bomber
might use the "stealth" technology, that is, reduced probability of being detected by
radar. It is known that the Soviet Union was working on that technology, and one
should not exclude that it will be used for the new aircraft.

Conversely, it is also possible that the new heavy bomber will represent a simpler
version of Tu-160. Indeed, a carrier of ALCMs does not need too many "fancy"
132
features, much less "stealth" technology. ALCMs could be launched from a long
distance. A simpler heavy bomber will also be cheaper, which is important under
the existing and projected economic conditions (even after economic growth begins,

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/Steve%20Ar...ocuments/FACT%20FINDING%20FILE%20START%20III.htm (16 of 20)4/30/2005 7:43:48 PM

FACT FINDING FILE START III

money could be spent for other purposes).

The new heavy bomber is likely to carry 12 ALCMs on board, in its internal bays,
same as Tu-160. The reasons are simple: first, it is unlikely that the future heavy
bomber will have more than two internal bays. Second, the standard rotary launcher
for ALCMs on Tu-160 holds six ALCMs, and it would be logical and cheaper to use
the existing system.

In the 1990s, R&D efforts clearly concentrated on modernization of ALCMs,

especially the ones with conventional warheads. By 1992, the nuclear ALCMKh-55
was redesigned for non-nuclear warheads (Kh-65), but its range dropped to only 600
km compared to 2,400 and 3,000 for two versions of Kh-55 (apparently this version
served as the basis for an even shorter-range conventional ALCM, Kh-SD, with the
133
range of only 300 km). A whole new line of short-range weapons might mean
that Kh-65 was not necessarily a continuation of Kh-55, though, but rather an
134
independent design that used various elements of the strategic ALCM. This
hypothesis is supported by the parallel R&D on a new long-range supersonic
ALCM.

By the end of the 1980s, the Soviet Union reported that work was underway on a
supersonic (M2.5 to 3) long-range (up to 4,000 km) ALCM designated Kh-90.
Several flight tests were conducted in 1990 and 1991, but in 1992 the program was
135
reportedly terminated for undisclosed reasons. But in October 1995 reports about
a new, next-generation conventional long-range supersonic ALCM appeared; its
designation is assumed to be Kh-101. Reportedly, the new ALCM has accuracy of
136
about 12-20 meters, which is a key criterion for strategic conventional weapons.
It is not inconceivable that the previous Kh-90 program was terminated primarily
because an ALCM based on a more traditional design of Kh-55 could not achieve
the required accuracy, which would have made it rather useless in the conventional
form.

The apparent interest in conventional ALCMs creates ground for many interesting
hypotheses. Apparently, Russia is trying to reduce its reliance on nuclear weapons.
It is not yet clear whether conventional weapons will play a significant role in the
strategic balance: this cannot be ruled out, but the final answer will depend on the
ability to sustain and modernize the heavy bomber force over a long time. The shift
toward conventional weapons is almost certain at the regional level, especially given
the large existing force of Tu-22M3 medium bombers and the decision to modernize
them. Conceivably, conventional ALCMs might take the place of tactical nuclear

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/Steve%20Ar...ocuments/FACT%20FINDING%20FILE%20START%20III.htm (17 of 20)4/30/2005 7:43:48 PM

FACT FINDING FILE START III

weapons in regional balances: they would be less deadly, but much more effective
as a means of deterrence (especially given the strong international norm against the
use and even the threat of nuclear weapons).

Still, it is worth repeating that the above represents only informed speculation based
on the known history of Soviet heavy bombers and the fact that some research on a
new type is underway. Hard data is absent. Most likely, the modernization of heavy
bombers will take a long time. The land- and sea-based systems are being given
higher priority and, in the absence of sufficient funding, the Tupolev design bureau
will limit itself to the preliminary stage for the next few years at least. A group of
Russian experts estimated the earliest date when new heavy bombers could be
137
deployed as 2005. The significance of the existing information should not be
underestimated, however: it definitely shows that Russia has not yet decided to
make a transition toward a dyad and might continue to stick to a more conventional,
three-component structure for its strategic arsenal.

Conclusion

The analysis above suggests that modernization of Russian strategic forces is driven
by a combination of several factors:

The belief that nuclear weapons will continue to exist for a long time, and
Russia will need to keep them;
By the uncertainties about the future model of the international system, in
particular the unclear relations with NATO and especially the United States.
Nuclear weapons are supposed to guard against possible unpleasant surprises;
The new role of nuclear weapons as the primary guarantee of security.
Although Russia will have to modernize its conventional armed forces, they
are destined to remain relatively small (at least compared to the Soviet
period) and will hardly be able to deter a large-scale conflict (and the
probability of such a conflict remains uncomfortably high because the future
development of the international system remains uncertain);
Technological imperatives: since nuclear weapons will continue to exist and
have to be replaced, the replacement is necessarily more technologically
advanced than existing weapons;
The bureaucratic arrangements: the military continues to play a significant,
even if often only symbolic role. The government cannot ignore demands for
modernization, and the modernization of nuclear weapons is sufficiently
affordable and visible to satisfy both popular and institutional demands. Plus,

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/Steve%20Ar...ocuments/FACT%20FINDING%20FILE%20START%20III.htm (18 of 20)4/30/2005 7:43:48 PM

FACT FINDING FILE START III

Igor Sergeev, even when he was the commander-in-chief of the SRF, was a
reliable political ally for Boris Yeltsin;
The requirements of arms reduction treaties demand that Russia shift toward
single-warhead ICBMs and, in a more general sense, greater survivability of
both the overall force and individual systems; and
The possibility that the United States might deploy an NMD--without that,
some modernization plans could have been abandoned (especially ALCMs
and, associated with them, heavy bombers).

Modernization of strategic weapons follows the general rule developed by Andrei

Kokoshin when he was still the first deputy minister of defense: "design now--
purchase later." The pace is rather relaxed. Only modernization of ICBMs is
conducted at present, and even then the number of flight tests of the new missile
was limited and it might require additional work in the future. The new SSBN was
laid only in late 1996 and will take years to complete, even more to construct
several; the missile for this submarine has not been tested yet. New heavy bombers
are only on the drawing board.

The pace of modernization suggests that Russia, at least the government and the
military leadership, does not see immediate threats today or in the near future and
feels comfortable with the slow progress. This permits the government to spend
only the absolute politically acceptable minimum on these goals, while the bulk of
the budget goes to economic reform and social programs.

Still, modernization of strategic weapons is well ahead of that of the conventional

armed forces. This is partially caused by the greater lead-time required for
modernization of the former and by the fact that nuclear weapons are perceived to
be more important for the country's security. Among conventional weapons, only
tactical aircraft are being modernized at a comparable rate, but new planes are
intended for the foreign rather than domestic market: the Russian armed forces are
not buying aircraft today.

This might be another, no less valid explanation for the differences between the
strategic nuclear and conventional modernization. The firms that design and
produce conventional weapons could survive by producing weapons for sale abroad,
and this is an officially recognized policy. The designers and producers of strategic
weapons are limited to the domestic market. Designers could still survive, but
producers might disappear by the year 2005, and then, when Russia has the money
to purchase missiles and submarines, there will be no one to produce them. Thus,
modernization of strategic weapons should out of necessity precede that of

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/Steve%20Ar...ocuments/FACT%20FINDING%20FILE%20START%20III.htm (19 of 20)4/30/2005 7:43:48 PM

FACT FINDING FILE START III

conventional weapons.

The current modernization is oriented toward a START II- and III-compliant force.
It will be relatively small: 2,000 or less warheads, and will take into account all
relevant limitations and prohibitions, at least the ones that exist in START III. The
projected force will be also quite stable, by today's criteria, and thus will permit
transition toward a pure second-strike strategy. A serious factor of uncertainty is the
possible deployment of an NMD system by the United States, which might channel
both modernization and strategy into different directions, along the lines of strike-
on-warning and increased penetration capability.

All in all, it appears that the modernization of Russia's strategic nuclear forces is
proceeding in a positive direction, to the extent that the existence of nuclear
weapons is positive. In any event, the tense and dangerous nuclear stalemate of the
Cold War is not likely to be repeated, at least as far as Russian strategic weapons are
concerned.

References

51. Additional material concerning the existing strategic forces, the status of arms
control treaties and negotiations, as well as-and especially-the domestic political
processes in Russia that affect nuclear arms modernization can be found in Nikolai
Sokov, Russia's Approach to Deep Reductions of Nuclear Weapons, second edition
(Washington: The Henry Stimson Center).

SpyLOG

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/Steve%20Ar...ocuments/FACT%20FINDING%20FILE%20START%20III.htm (20 of 20)4/30/2005 7:43:48 PM

Breaking News

We Need a New, Comprehensive Arms Control

Treaty

DESBIC AGENDA AGENCY

Senior Staff Advisor

Col. Stanislav Lunev

Thursday April 21, 2,005

We finally have an administration that recognizes the threat

posed by ballistic missile programs in Iraq, Iran, North Korea
and other rogue states, as well as a threat posed by an
accidental launch of missiles by nations that are traditional
members of the so-called nuclear-missile club.

However, Washington's plans to build a National Missile

Defense (NMD) system has met strong resistance from some
Democrats on Capital Hill, as well as from Moscow and Beijing
both of whom strongly oppose such American initiatives.

The achievement of Washington's plans for the NMS system are

also seriously limited by 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty
and other arms control agreements which are considered by
some American policy makers and their friends in Moscow and
Beijing as a cornerstone of the world strategic stability.

There is no doubt that at the time when these arms control

treaties were signed they played an important role in the peace-
keeping process, but today their importance is questionable.

Last week in Moscow Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said

that Russia and the U.S. should reduce their vast nuclear
arsenals, but warned that new security ties would not come
quickly for both countries. During his talks with former KGB Lt.-
Colonel Putin, now Russia's president, and former KGB Lt.-
General Ivanov, now Russia's Defense Minister, Mr.Rumsfeld
said proposed nuclear reductions and expanded military,
political and economic cooperation could become pillars of a
strategic relationship between Moscow and Washington.

However, President Putin firmly rejected the Bush

administration's push to jointly withdraw from 1972 ABM treaty
but spoke hopefully of agreeing to mutual cuts in nuclear
weapons.

"You know our attitude toward the ABM treaty," Putin told
reporters in the Kremlin. "For us, it's unconditionally linked with
both the START-I and START-II treaties. I would like to
underline that."

We know that today's Russian leaders, as well as their Soviet

predecessors, have systematically violated and are still violating
their international obligations, including all these treaties.

Using the ABM treaty, signed by the U.S. with the no-longer
existing USSR, Moscow has been trying to prevent America
from building an NMD, which is vital for America's national
security.

Having its own territorial anti-missile defense in place today, the

Kremlin is also using the ABM treaty to extort money from
America on the basis a future "strategic relationship" which
would recognize Moscow's new international status, as well as
supply new credits, loans and other benefits.

As the 20 years that followed the signing of the ABM treaty

clearly demonstrated, the U.S. was, and is, the only party to this
treaty that followed its international obligations. At the same
time, Moscow continued to build up and modernize its own
missile defenses and the development of its nuclear and missile
arsenal.

In 1972, the U.S. had 5,700 nuclear weapons (which could be

delivered by the inter-continental ballistic missiles (ICBM), sea-
launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers, while the USSR
had 2,164 of the same weapons.
In 1991, the U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal exceeded 12,000,
reflecting a post-ABM treaty increase of 112 percent, and the
Soviet arsenal was nearly 11,000, having increased by more
than 400 percent. Do we need to say anything else?

Moscow also likes the START-I treaty, which was signed by

former USSR President Mikhail Gorbachev and U.S. President
George Bush during their Moscow summit in 1991. As the
Russian press has reported, according to this treaty's basic
provisions, Russia and the U.S. must have no more than 1,600
delivery vehicles (i.e. ICBMs, sea-launched ballistic missiles and
heavy bombers) and 6,000 nuclear strategic warheads by
December 2009 and thereafter.

Moscow likes this treaty because under START-I's provisions it

had a chance to dismantle old and extremely costly strategic
nuclear weapons and develop and deploy the new generation of
strategic ballistic missiles and nuclear warheads.

According to Russia's state-run press, the START-I treaty "is the

only document today that really works in the sphere of strategic
offensive arms reduction."

However, in 1993, President George Bush and his Russian

counterpart Boris Yeltsin signed the START-II treaty, which
could once more dramatically reduce the strategic nuclear-
missile arsenals of the both nations. In particular, it was
supposed to result in the early elimination of all of the former
Soviets' vast arsenal of SS-18s - heavy ballistic missiles
capable of pre-emptively attacking the U.S. with large numbers
of independently targetable multiple warheads. This was exactly
the treaty ratified by the U.S. Senate in January 1996.

Unfortunately, the Clinton-Gore administration agreed in

September 1997 to defer the dismantling of these and other
threatening Russian missiles until as late as 2007. And that was
the arrangement the Russian Duma (Lower House of
parliament) approved in April 2000. As a result, until now
START-II is not in effect because the U.S. Senate and Russian
Duma ratified different documents and the last version of the
treaty has yet to be approved by the U.S. Congress.

Putin's position on this question is well known and he

subsequently indicated that none of Russia's long-range
missiles would be retired until they reach the end of their useful
service life. He also has said Russia would pull out of other
arms control treaties and could equip existing single-warhead
missiles with multiple warheads if the U.S. goes ahead with its
plans for the NMD system.

At the same time Russia continues to develop and deploy a new

generation of its strategic nuclear-missile arsenal. According to
press reports, Russia conducted a test of a long-range SS-25
missile last month that may be designed to scuttle U.S. missile
defenses.

The missile's engine - a supersonic-combustion ramjet - is just

as powerful as it sounds, and can generate speeds five times
the speed of sound. The missile was fired into space from a
launch site in Central Russia, and its last stage dropped down
into the atmosphere, flying at supersonic speed to the
Kamchatka Peninsula, The missile has a range of more than
7,000 miles.

We know that currently the number of warheads in the U.S. and

Russian strategic arsenals is more than enough to destroy our
planet several times. There is no doubt that the old arms control
treaties, which were good at the time they were signed, are not
good for the present day. And it would be a really good idea for
the U.S. to find a way for forging a new and comprehensive
arms control treaty that could combine positive parts of old
agreements and limit offensive as well as defensive nuclear,
missile and other weapons.

But of course, any new and comprehensive treaty needs to work

for America and our friends and allies, as well as for
international peace and real stability.
START III AGENDA

TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

THE PEOPLES STATE OF ISRAEL THE UNITED NATIONS ASSEMBLYS
THE NUCLEAR POWERS AND ALL ENSIGNS TO THE STATES OF THE
INTERNATIONAL PROVISIONAL APPLICATION
ON FURTHER DISPOSAL REDUCTION AND LIMITATION
OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION

(Note: Certain dates and deadlines of the Treaty have been modified by the START II and III
Protocols, as ascribed for Signatory endorsements, and previously signed in New York on
September 26, 1997, whereas a Head of State may be excused from service assignment in view of
both the United States Senate, the Russian Duma, as so forth, The Republics to an Ensign and, or
States as said, found to be willfully or negligibly in disagreement or violation of Provisions , as
expressly agreed upon by a majority consensus herein afore in observance forgo. These changes
have been incorporated in the following text.)

The United States of America, The Peoples State of Israel, The United Nations Organization,
and all insignias to a Marquis, hereinafter referred to as The Nuclear Powers or the Parties,

Reaffirming their obligations under the Treaty Between the United States of America and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive
Arms of July 31, 1991, hereinafter referred to as the START and START II Treaties,

Stressing their firm commitment to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
of July 1, 1968, and their desire to contribute to its strengthening,

Taking into account the commitment by the Republic of Belarus, the Republic of Kazakhstan,
and Ukraine to accede to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1,
1968, as non-nuclear-weapon States Parties,

Mindful of their undertakings with respect to strategic offensive arms under Article VI of the
Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968, and under the Treaty
Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the
Limitation of the explosive grade dangers imposed by Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May
26, 1972, as well as the provisions of the Joint Understanding signed by the Presidents of the

file:///C|/Documents and Settings/Steve Arroyo/My Documents/START III AGENDA.htm (1 of 11)4/27/2005 8:44:39 AM

START III AGENDA

United States of America and the Russian Federation on June 17, 1992, and the vitality of the
Joint Statement on a Global Protection System signed by the Presidents of the United States
of America and the Russian Federation on June 17, 1992,

Desiring to enhance strategic stability and predictability, and, in doing so, to eliminate further
strategic offensive arms such as nuclear warheads for sale and nuclear biological, and
chemical formulations and said crude devices, in addition to the reductions and limitations
provided for in NPT and the START II, and other agreements reached, to this Treaty,

Considering that further progress toward that end will help lay a solid foundation for a world
order built on safe, fair and orderly values that would preclude the risk of outbreak of pre-
emptive secondary or independent terrorist attacks as a result of buy, sell, or trading weapons
of mass destruction that would lead to an inevitability perpetual to nuclear confrontation and
the consequential aftermath of sort after critical life support systems,

Recognizing their special responsibility as permanent members of the United Nations Security
Council for maintaining international peace and security,

Taking note of United Nations General Assembly Resolution 47/52K of December 9, 1992.
Conscious of the new realities that have transformed the political and strategic relations
between the Parties, and the relations of partnership that have been established between them,
in particulars the nuclear fuel enrichment aiding and abetment concerns hereafter

Have agreed as follows:

Article I

1. Each Party shall reduce, dispose and limit its intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs)
and ICBM launchers, submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and SLBM launchers,
heavy bombers, ICBM warheads, SLBM warheads, all nuclear warheads of any standard
displacement; and heavy bomber armaments considered a nuclear, biological, and chemical
attack platform or program. In and though, START III shall conjoin the obligations assumed
under START II commencing December 31, 2007. All Partys to a nuclear utility energy
complex shall be considered a Nuclear Power hereinafter. Except for the United States and
Russia, the aggregate numbers for each Party, as counted in accordance with Articles III and
IV of this Treaty, is not to exceed, 00, 66 nuclear nor biological formulation warheads. As the
conditions set forth in this Article. If for some reason the Partys to this confirmation
willfully, or negligibly violate and perpetuate the said limitable attributes, a citation and
penalty assessment conscript may be issued for the U N and ,or The Finance Ministry The
State of Israel. To assure the viability and effectiveness of this Convention an amount of 1
billion dollars on behalf of The International Court, and the Israeli Ministry of Justices; per
act or fact pertaining to deliberate concealment, or numerical discrepancies in the cause for
nuclear warheads available for purchase; suitcase bombs, crude radioactive devices as so it is

file:///C|/Documents and Settings/Steve Arroyo/My Documents/START III AGENDA.htm (2 of 11)4/27/2005 8:44:39 AM

START III AGENDA

to, the financial responsibility of that State on behalf of the convicted to repatriate U N
Ministers of an alliance here withal. Upon entry into force of START III the nuclear warheads
attributed to deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers, are
considered retro-effective as a condition of submergence from START II. In view of the
obligations assumed, for Russia and the United States, the two Partys agreed to reduce one
anothers strategic nuclear arsenals to somewhere in between 3800 and 4250 or fewer thereof..
Therefore within the framework of this Article, by December 31, 2,012 that their be ,666 or
less, for explosive high yielding or low yielding nuclear devices on each side, Russia and the
U S, as such as shall be considered the star based research and collaboration scheduled
reduction Agreements for the two Contracting Partys of the Powers therewith here at. Apart
from the obligations undertaken to the Conventions, .the decision of the supreme interest of
the U S Russian entire relative nuclear explosive detonating forces such as a warheads or
multiple warheads, including in particularly the cause of high frequency yield devices with
consume all an oxygen mask can never make properties shall be considered priority
deactivation silos sequences as sequences denied, so it was. The zone of application for the
purpose of this Treaty shall include the North and South hemispheres and the breadth of the
atmosphere here at. The Partys hereto establish France, Britain, China and all others believed
to be harboring fissile enzymes to a noxious disciple such as is reported as so, are required to
allow U N and U S, Israeli, and their assigned On Site Inspection Teams permanently
accessible means to verify the willingness to give up its substantial arsenal contingencies as
ordered to do so from star based research and design insignias to the Convention. Aside from
the START II follow through obligations, all other States or Partys to a weapons grade
explosive numerical identification shall be limited to disposals monitoring and numerous
sentry observation duty. The secondary Nuclear Powers France, Great Britain, China, are
required to reduce, dispose and de-limit said nuclear devices for sale and anger management
to the point of ,066 crude or secondary warheads with higher frequency yield forgo, devisable
at a 20% percent yearly agreed upon reduction ratio also by December 31, 2,012. and
discontinue upgrades in explosive charges with nuclear contraption engineering such as
mentioning will describe and nuclear warheads of any standard attribution, hydrogen bombs,
or warheads of any unit of bombardment, and any of the sort of mentioning, thermo, and
thermal fusion, nor propertys unidentifiable yet considered to be identifiably similar in
isotopic research as fissile frequency defoliant, as soon to cease and desist by 31 December
2,012, or face considerable fines instilled here at.
For the purpose of providing assurance of the objective stated, operational custody of devices
of the higher explosive yield shall be considered a higher priority interest in the strategic
destruction or dismantling and disposal procedures as provided for in this Provision in
accordance with the procedures governing the entry into force of this Treaty(s).

Section 2.

file:///C|/Documents and Settings/Steve Arroyo/My Documents/START III AGENDA.htm (3 of 11)4/27/2005 8:44:39 AM

START III AGENDA

2. Within the limitations provided for in paragraph 1 of this Article, the aggregate numbers for
The U S and Russia from START II to START III entry into force, shall not exceed:
(a) 2160, for warheads attributed to deployed SLBMs;
(b) 1200 for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs of types to which more than one
warhead is attributed; and
(c) 650, for warheads attributed to deployed heavy ICBMs. Memorandum of Attribution;
3. Upon fulfillment of the obligations provided for in paragraph 1 of this Article, The U S and
Russia shall further reduce and limit its ICBMs and ICBM launchers, SLBMs and SLBM
launchers, s, ICBM warheads, SLBM warheads, and heavy bomber armaments, so that no
later than [January 1, 2003] December 31, 2007, and thereafter, the aggregate number for each
Party, as counted in accordance with Articles III and IV of this Treaty, does not exceed, for
warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMS, and deployed heavy bombers, a
number between 3000 and 3500 or such lower number as each Party shall agree as such, but
in no case shall such number exceed 3500.
4. Within the limitations provided for in paragraph 3 of this Article, the aggregate numbers for
The U S and Russia, their sponsor States as well, shall not exceed:
(a) a number between 1700 and 1750, for warheads attributed to deployed SLBMS or such
lower number as all insignias intended victims to a Party shall have agreed so, but in no case
shall such number exceed 1750; [Memorandum of Attribution]Same as for all Partys;
(b) zero, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs of types to which more than one warhead
is attributed; and same as for all insignias to a Marquis with similar attribution;
(c) zero, for warheads attributed to deployed heavy ICBMs.; Memorandum of Attribution
5. The process of reductions provided for in paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article shall begin
upon entry into force of this Treaty, shall be sustained throughout the reductions period
provided for in paragraph 1 of this Article, and a 10% reduction to aspect ratio per year for all
The Nuclear Powers, shall be the cause for U N penalty assessments fines, and shall be
completed no later than [seven years after entry into force of the START Treaty] December
31, 2012. Upon completion of these reductions, the Parties shall begin further reductions
provided for in paragraphs 3 and 4 of this Article, which shall also be sustained throughout
the reductions period defined in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 6 of this Article.
6. [Provided that the Parties conclude, within one year after entry into force of this Treaty, an
agreement on a program of assistance to promote the fulfillment of the provisions of this
Article, the obligations provided for in paragraphs 3 and 4 of this Article and in Article II of
this Treaty shall be fulfilled by every Party no later than December 31, 2012.] The Parties
may conclude an agreement on a program of assistance for the purpose of facilitating
implementation of the provisions of this Article, including for the purpose of accelerating
such implementation.

Article II

file:///C|/Documents and Settings/Steve Arroyo/My Documents/START III AGENDA.htm (4 of 11)4/27/2005 8:44:39 AM

START III AGENDA

1. No later than December 31, 2007, in orders to facilitate the aspect to ratio progress is
foregoing and in order to insure the peoples propertys from radioactive debrit and said
accumulations, permits and termination orders shall be issue of the days we went deliberating
hostile quotations, even so, each Party undertakes to have eliminated or to have converted to
launchers of ICBMs to which one warhead is attributed all its deployed and non-deployed
launchers of ICBMs to which more than one warhead is attributed under Article III of this
Treaty (including test launchers and training launchers), without exception, inclusive to those
launchers of ICBMs other than heavy ICBMs at space launch facilities allowed under the
START Treaty, and disavowed hereby and not to have thereafter launchers of ICBMs to
which more than one warhead is attributed. ICBM launchers that have been converted to
launch an ICBM of a different type shall not have a capability of launching an ICBM of the
pre-existing or modernized attribution therefore. Each Party shall carry out such elimination
or conversion using the procedures provided for in the START Treaty, except as otherwise
provided for, in DESBIC AGENDAS multimode nuclear non-proliferation upgrades and
revisions, as such in paragraph 3 of this Article.
2. To insure implementation to the execution of the obligations provided for in paragraph 1 of
this Article each Party to an insignia decoration is bound by Israeli Firing squad tactics which
shall also apply to silo launchers of ICBMs on which the number of warheads has been
reduced to one pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article III and the Partys to this entry of this
Treaty.
3. Elimination of silo launchers of heavy ICBMs, including test launchers and training
launchers, shall be implemented by means of either:
(a) elimination in accordance with the procedures provided for in Section II of the Protocol on
Procedures Governing the Conversion or Elimination of the Items Subject to the START, II
and START III, IVs retroactive implementation to Treatys agendas as fulfill obligations
and; or [Memorandum of Attribution]
(b) conversion to silo launchers of ICBMs other than heavy ICBMs in accordance with the
procedures provided for in the Protocol on Procedures Governing Elimination of Heavy
ICBMs and on Procedures Governing Conversion of Silo Launchers of Heavy ICBMs, as so,
for all Partys to a nuclear weapons grade manufactures warning of time tables availability
as related for the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on
Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the
Elimination and Conversion Protocol. No more silo launchers of heavy ICBMs may be so
converted. Memorandum of Attribution]
4. Each Party undertakes not to emplace an ICBM, the launch canister of which has a
diameter greater than 2.5 meters, in any silo launcher of heavy ICBMs converted in
accordance with subparagraph 3(b) of this Article.
5. Elimination of launchers of heavy ICBMs at space launch facilities shall be phased out,
orders are to be carried out in accordance with subparagraph 3(a) of this Article.
6. No later than December 31, 2012, each Party undertakes to have eliminated all of its

file:///C|/Documents and Settings/Steve Arroyo/My Documents/START III AGENDA.htm (5 of 11)4/27/2005 8:44:39 AM

START III AGENDA

deployed and non-deployed heavy ICBMs and their launch canisters in accordance with the
procedures provided for in the Elimination and Conversion Protocol or by using such missiles
for delivering objects into the upper atmosphere or space, and not to have such missiles or
launch canisters unless authorized by The U N General Assembly quorum call as in the cause
for engineering modernization developers and space flight to the Moon or as such thereto.
7. Each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections in connection with the elimination of
heavy ICBMs and their launch canisters, as well as inspections in connection with the
conversion of silo launchers of heavy ICBMs. Except as otherwise provided for in the
Elimination and Conversion Protocol, such inspections shall be conducted subject to the
applicable provisions of the assessment of Israel of the threats imposed by neighboring ideals
and solutions indecisive of the objectives at launching coded reminders of a Saturday that was
once free so then.
8. Each Party undertakes not to transfer heavy ICBMs to any
recipient whatsoever, including any other Party to the START,II, III, NPT Treatys thereof.
9. Beginning on December 31, 2007, and thereafter, each Party undertakes not to produce,
acquire, flight-test (except for flight tests from space launch facilities conducted in accordance
with the provisions of the descriptive encodes entrys as formal Treatys; or deploy ICBMs to
which more than one warhead is attributed under Article III of this Treaty bearing in mind that
the two cut off dates implied are Governed by United Nations attributable fines annual
imposed in lieu of the 10% aspect to ratio disarmament dictates of martial law therefore.

Article III

1. For the purposes of attributing warheads to deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs under
this Treaty, the Parties shall use the provisions provided for in Article III of the START
Treaty, except as otherwise provided for in paragraph 2 of this Article.
2. Each Party shall have the right to reduce the number of warheads attributed to deployed
ICBMs or deployed SLBMs only of existing types, except for heavy ICBMs. Reduction in the
number of warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs of existing types
that are not heavy ICBMs shall be carried out in accordance with the provisions of paragraph
5 of Article III of the START Treaty, except that:
(a) the aggregate number by which warheads are reduced may not exceed the 1250 limit
provided for in paragraph 5 of Article III of the START Treaty
(b) the number by which warheads are reduced on ICBMs and SLBMS, other than the
Minuteman III ICBM for the United States of America and the SS-N-18 SLBM for the
Russian Federation, may at any one time not exceed the limit of 666 warheads for each Party
provided for herewith subparagraph 5(c)(i) of Article III of the START Treaty ;
each Party shall have no such right to reduce by more than four warheads, but not by more
than five warheads, the number of warheads attributed to each ICBM out of no more than 105
ICBMs of one existing type of ICBM. An ICBM to which the number of warheads attributed

file:///C|/Documents and Settings/Steve Arroyo/My Documents/START III AGENDA.htm (6 of 11)4/27/2005 8:44:39 AM

START III AGENDA

has been reduced, because all ICBMs and are to be disassembled and all nuclear war heads
are to be destroyed not later than 2,012, December 31 in accordance with this paragraph shall
never anymore be deployed in an ICBM launcher in which an ICBM of that type was
deployed as of the date of signature of the START Treaty; and
(d) the reentry vehicle platform for an ICBM or SLBM to which a reduced number of
warheads is attributed is required to be destroyed and a new reentry vehicle platform. is a
matter of 6 to 10% upgrades for the said limitations discussed in DESBIC ABENDA for
chemical low frequency yield property exceptions where the aggregate integers provided for
are U S, U N, Russia and Formers, and China 4,250 non-ICBM chemical low graded agreed
to frequency yield non-explosive devices and no biological weapons or devices of such to
orders and such as that chemical property not much more lethal than agent orange therefore
whatsoever therein.
3. Notwithstanding the number of warheads attributed to a type of ICBM or SLBM in
accordance with the purpose of a Treaty, each Party undertakes not to:
(a)produce, flight-test, or deploy an ICBM or SLBM with a number of reentry vehicles greater
than the number of warheads attributed to within the grounds of recognizing Israels rights to
existence, as it is to supply it under terms of this Treaty; nor
(b) increase the number of warheads attributed to an ICBM or SLBM that has had the number
of warheads attributed to it reduced in accordance with the provisions of this Article.
[ Memorandums and Attribution]

Article IV

1. For the purposes of this Treaty, the number of warheads attributed to each deployed heavy
bombers shall be equal to the number of nuclear weapons for which any heavy bomber of the
same type or variant of a type is actually equipped, with the exception of heavy bombers
reoriented to a conventional role as provided for in paragraph 7 of this Article. Each nuclear
weapon for which a heavy bomber is actually equipped shall count as one warhead toward the
limitations provided for in Article I of this Treaty. For the purpose of such counting, nuclear
weapons include long-range nuclear air-launched , nuclear warhead accounting with
numerous sentry detail assigned to guard your safety monitors average Intelligences aspect to
ratio consideration of the weapons grade crude device management teleprompter as such are
(ALCMs), nuclear air-to-surface missiles with a range of less than 600 kilometers, and
nuclear bombs.
2. For the purposes of this Treaty, the number of nuclear weapons for which a heavy bomber
is actually equipped shall be the number specified for heavy bombers of that type and variant
of a type in the Memorandum of Understanding on Warhead Attribution and Heavy Bomber
Data Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America, the Russian Federation
and all Jungle areas of incalculable measurements on Further Reduction and Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Memorandum on Attribution.

file:///C|/Documents and Settings/Steve Arroyo/My Documents/START III AGENDA.htm (7 of 11)4/27/2005 8:44:39 AM

START III AGENDA

3. Each Party undertakes not to equip any heavy bomber with a greater number of nuclear
weapons than the number specified for heavy bombers of that type or variant of a type in the
aforementioned descriptive and a Memorandum on Attribution. Therewith;
4. No later than 180 days after entry into force of this Treaty, each Party shall exhibit one
heavy bomber of each type and variant of a type specified in the Memorandum on Attribution.
The purpose of the exhibition shall be to demonstrate to the other Party the number of nuclear
weapons for which a heavy bomber of a given type or variant of a type is capable friendly a
payload bank can appear, as actually equipped.
5. If either Party intends to change the number of nuclear weapons specified in the
Memorandums of Combined efforts on Attribution, for which a heavy bomber of a type or
variant of a type is actually equipped, it shall provide a 90-day advance notification of such
intention to the other Party. Ninety days after providing such a notification or at a later date
agreed by the Parties, the Party changing the number of nuclear weapons for which a heavy
bomber is actually equipped shall exhibit one heavy bomber of each such type or variant of a
type. The purpose of the exhibition shall be to demonstrate to the other Party the revised
number of nuclear weapons for which heavy bombers of the specified type or variant of a type
are actually equipped. The number of nuclear weapons attributed to the specified type and
variant of a type of heavy bomber shall change on the ninetieth day after the notification of
such intent. On that day, the Party changing the number of nuclear weapons for which a heavy
bomber is actually equipped shall provide to the other Party a notification of each change in
data according to categories of data contained in the Memorandum on Attribution. However
the 90 day advance notice section denotes an intention to comply and is strongly advised that
we not seek to competitively supply industrial railcars of a passage whereat.
6. The exhibitions and inspections conducted pursuant to paragraphs 4 and 5 of this Article
shall be carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Protocol on
Exhibitions and Inspections of Heavy Bombers Relating to the Treaty Between the United
States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and Limitation of
Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Protocol on Exhibitions and
Inspections. However in accordance to the Final Recommendation the participating status quo
to an insignia agree to undertake the responsibilities as do the United States and Russia to
disassembly standards Protocol as specified to do so or willing to force an evacuation efforts
should be made to create a suitable environment to altercate in another manner hereof.
7. Each Party shall have the right to reorient to a conventional role heavy bomber equipped
for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMS. For the purposes of this Treaty,
heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role are those heavy bombers specified by a Party
from among its heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear
ALCMs that have never been accountable under the START Treaty as heavy bombers
equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMS. The reorienting Party shall provide to the other
Party a notification of its intent to reorient a heavy bomber to a conventional role no less than
90 days in advance of such reorientation; conversion procedures shall be required for such a

file:///C|/Documents and Settings/Steve Arroyo/My Documents/START III AGENDA.htm (8 of 11)4/27/2005 8:44:39 AM

START III AGENDA

heavy bomber to be specified as a heavy bomber reoriented to a conventional role.

8. Heavy bomber reoriented to a conventional role shall be subject to the following
requirements
(a) the number of such heavy bombers shall not exceed 100 between them at 50 apiece at any
one time for the U S and the Soviet Empire by reason of close military exercise and joint
supplications to the former Republics, as so the same for the United Nations contingencies,
so as to be stated perspective of an aspect to ratio disarmament Protocol objective herein;
(b) such heavy bombers shall be based separately from heavy bombers with nuclear roles; [
such heavy bombers shall be used only for non-nuclear missions. Such heavy bombers shall
not be used in exercises for nuclear missions, and their aircrews shall not train or exercise for
such missions; and
(d) heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role shall have differences from other heavy
bombers of that type or variant of a type that are observable by national technical means of
verification and visible during inspection.
9. Each Party shall have every right to return a nuclear role heavy bombers
that has been reoriented in accordance with paragraph 7 of this Article to a conventional role. The
Party carrying out such action shall provide to the other Party through diplomatic channels
notification of its intent to return a heavy bomber no less than 90 days in advance of taking such
action. Such a heavy bomber returned to a nuclear role would be considered counterpoint, and only
subsequently be reoriented to a conventional role. Heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role
shall have differences observable by national technical means of verification and visible during
inspection from other heavy bombers of that type and variant of a type that have not been reoriented
to a conventional role, as well as from heavy bombers of that type and variant of a type that are still
reoriented to a conventional role.
10. Each Party shall locate storage areas for heavy bomber nuclear armaments no less than
100 kilometers from any air base where heavy bombers reoriented to a conventional role are
based.
11. Except as otherwise provided for in this Treaty, heavy bombers reoriented to a
conventional role shall remain subject to the provisions of Treaty, including the inspection
provisions.
12. If not all heavy bombers of a given type or variant of a type are reoriented to a
conventional role, one heavy bomber of each type or variant of a type of heavy bomber
reoriented to a conventional role shall be exhibited in the open for the purpose of
demonstrating to the other Party the differences referred to in subparagraph 8(d) of this
Article. Such differences shall be subject to inspection by the other Partys.
13. If not all heavy bombers of a given type or variant of a type reoriented to a conventional
role are returned to a nuclear role, it will be considered a retractable citation subject to fines
and, or sanctions therefore one heavy bomber of each type and variant of a type of heavy
bomber shall not be returned to a nuclear role so be an exhibition in the open for the purpose
of demonstrating to the other Partys the differences referred to in paragraph 9 of this Article.
Such differences shall be subject to inspection by the On Site Inspection Agencys and other

file:///C|/Documents and Settings/Steve Arroyo/My Documents/START III AGENDA.htm (9 of 11)4/27/2005 8:44:39 AM

START III AGENDA

collective arrangements of the duly sworn approach to detonation powers here when;
14. The exhibitions and inspections provided for in paragraphs 12 and 13 of this Article shall
be carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in the START II Protocol on
Exhibitions and Inspections.

Article V

1. Except as provided for in this Treaty, the provisions of the NPT, and START, II, III, S-4,
and DESBIC AGENDA Treatys, including the verification provisions, shall be used for
implementation of this unconditional responsibility;
2. To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties
hereby establish the Multilateral Implementation Commission, (MIC). The MIC Commission
shall be an impartial unbiased conciliatory Israeli bonded branch of the United Nations
Organization for International accordance The Parties agree that, if either Party so requests,
they shall meet within the framework of the Multilateral Implementation Commission to:
(a) resolve questions relating to compliance with the obligations assumed; and
(b) agree upon such additional measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and
effectiveness of this Treaty.

Article VI

1. This Treaty, including its Memorandum on Attribution., Elimination and Conversion

Protocol, and Protocol on Exhibitions and Inspections, DESBIC AGENDA, START III, The
S-4 Treatys, INF, and its executions , all of which are integral parts thereof, shall be subject
to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. This Treaty shall
enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification, and subsequently
retro-effective and to the entry into force of the START II Treaty herein;
2. The provisions of paragraph 8 of Article II of this Treaty shall be applied provisionally by
the Parties from the date of its signature.
3. This Treaty shall remain in force and is of unlimited duration here withal we do.
4. Their shall any Party , in exercising its national sovereignty, have any excuses to withdraw
from this Treaty if it decides it cant be a matter of options on the disc Ill never received. All
Partys were bound to it so stipulated tonight. Therefore in and if extraordinary events related
to the subject matter of this Treaty have produced an enzyme of sparks; it will be deemed as
the choice of judgment and legal actions we misconceived, and troublesome and now. Any
notice of withdrawal or condemnation is the sign of the devil,; and how could we forgive all
the times we forgot, therefore to the Providence of all who betray the way to understand
survival as inscribed by Israel of a Faith wherein as entered to the face of value made known
to all these presents.

Article VII

Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into

file:///C|/Documents and Settings/Steve Arroyo/My Documents/START III AGENDA.htm (10 of 11)4/27/2005 8:44:39 AM
START III AGENDA

force in accordance with the procedures governing entry into force of this Treaty.

Article VIII

This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.
DONE at H B. U S A. on April 25, 2,005 in the English language; text being authentic.

O IN

WITNESS WHEREOF FOR THE UNITED NATIONS

file:///C|/Documents and Settings/Steve Arroyo/My Documents/START III AGENDA.htm (11 of 11)4/27/2005 8:44:39 AM
START III MEMORANDUM OF PROVISIONAL APPLICATION

START III TREATY MEMORANDUM *

OF PROVISIONAL APPLICATION
TREATY BETWEEN
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA THE PEOPLES STATE OF ISRAEL THE UNITED NATIONS ASSEMBLYS
THE NUCLEAR POWERS
AND ALL ENSIGNS TO THE STATES OF THE INTERNATIONAL PROVISIONAL APPLICATION ON FURTHER
DISPOSAL REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION

The United States of America, The Peoples State of Israel, The United Nations Organization, and All Insignias to a
Marquis, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Conscious that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all humanity, that it cannot be won and must never
be fought,
Convinced that the measures for the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms and the other
obligations set forth in this Treaty will help to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war and strengthen International
peace and security, Recognizing that the interests of
the Parties and the interests of international security require the strengthening of strategic stability,
Mindful of their undertakings with regard to strategic offensive arms in Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation
of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968; Article XI of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May
26, 1972; the dangers of nuclear detonation combust able matters, and the Washington Summit Joint Statement of June 1,
1990,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I
Each Party shall reduce and limit its strategic offensive arms in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, and shall
carry out the other obligations set forth in this Treaty and its Annexes, Protocols, and Memorandum of Understanding.

ARTICLE II
1. Each Party shall reduce and limit its ICBMs and ICBM launchers, SLBM s and SLBM launchers, heavy bombers,
ICBM warheads, SLBM warheads, heavy bomber armaments, and all nuclear and biological components such as
warheads of any standard displacement, so that seven years after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, the

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/Steve%20...ANDUM%20OF%20PROVISIONAL%20APPLICATION%202.htm (1 of 18)4/30/2005 5:45:41 PM

START III MEMORANDUM OF PROVISIONAL APPLICATION

aggregate numbers, as counted in accordance with Article III of this Treaty, do not exceed:
(a) 000, for deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers, deployed SLBM s and their associated launchers, and
deployed heavy bombers, including 000 for deployed heavy ICBMs and their associated launchers; [RF MOU, Section
II] [US MOU, Section II The United National Accounting, (U N] [Agreed State of Protocols as Referred to as the IDF
Treaty Series ]
(b) 0000, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBM s, and deployed heavy bombers, including:
[START III, Art. I,5]
(i) 0000, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBM s;
(ii) 0000, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs on mobile launchers of ICBMs;
(iii) 0000, for warheads attributed to deployed heavy ICBMs. [phased heavy reductions)
2. Each Party shall implement the reductions pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article in to multiple phases, so that its
strategic offensive arms do not exceed:
(a) by the end of the first phase, that is, no later than 31 December 2,007,after entry into force of this Treaty, and
thereafter, the following aggregate numbers:
(i) 0,666, for deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers, deployed SLBM s and their associated launchers, and
deployed heavy bombers;
(ii) 0,666, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBM s, and deployed heavy bombers;
(iii) 0.666, warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBM s;
(b) by the end of the second phase, that is, no later than 31 December 2,017 after entry into force of this Treaty, and
thereafter, the following aggregate numbers:
(i) 0,000, for deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers, deployed SLBM s and their associated launchers, and
deployed heavy bombers;
(ii) 0,000, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBM s, and deployed heavy bombers;
(iii) 0,000, warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBM s;
(c) by the end of the third phase, and with attributable fines sanctioned and impugned, that is, no later than 31 December
2,022 after entry into force of this Treaty: the aggregate numbers provided for in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be
reduced and disposed of properly to the points of aggregate uniform numerical contingencies of 0,000, including crude
radioactive contraptions thereupon
3. Each Party shall limit the aggregate throw-weight of its deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBM s so that seven years
after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter such aggregate throw-weight does not exceed 10% per annum
accumulative reduction aspect to ratio of metric tons. [Throw-weight Limits/Provisions Provided hereupon for Types of
ICBMs and SLBM s]

4. If under any circumstances a Party to the Provisions of this entry are not in standard conformity of
the per annum 10% aspect to ratio reduction phase of uniform disarmament Protocols; a Promissory
report must be received by the U N Supervisory Unit, The Chief of Staffs U S and Israeli Defense
quarters; and a determination will be made if any late charges or penalty fees are to be assessed
thereto

ARTICLE III

1. For the purposes of counting toward the maximum aggregate limits provided for in subparagraphs 1(a), 2(a)(i), and 2(b)

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/Steve%20...ANDUM%20OF%20PROVISIONAL%20APPLICATION%202.htm (2 of 18)4/30/2005 5:45:41 PM

START III MEMORANDUM OF PROVISIONAL APPLICATION

(i) of Article II of this Treaty:

(a) Each deployed ICBM and its associated launcher shall be counted as one unit; each deployed SLBM and its
associated launcher; shall be counted as one unit.
(b) Each deployed heavy bombers shall be counted as one unit.
2. For the purposes of counting deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers and deployed SLBM s and their
associated launchers
(a) Each deployed launcher of ICBMs and each deployed launcher of SLBM s shall be considered to contain one
deployed ICBM or one deployed SLBM, respectively.
(b) If a deployed ICBM has been removed from its launcher and another missile has not been installed in that launcher,
such an ICBM removed from its launcher and located at that ICBM base shall continue to be considered to be contained
in that launcher.
(c) If a deployed SLBM has been removed from its launcher and another missile has not been installed in that launcher,
such an SLBM removed from its launcher shall be considered to be contained in that launcher. Such an SLBM removed
from its launcher shall be located only at a facility at which non-deployed SLBM s may be located pursuant to
subparagraph 9(a) of Article IV of this Treaty or be in movement to such a facility.
3. For the purposes of this Treaty, including counting ICBMs and SLBM s:
(a) For ICBMs or SLBM s that are maintained, stored, and transported in stages, the first stage of an ICBM or SLBM of a
particular type shall be considered to be an ICBM or SLBM of that type.
(b) For ICBMs or SLBM s that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles without launch canisters, an
assembled missile of a particular type shall be considered to be an ICBM or SLBM of that type.
(c) For ICBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles in launch canisters, an assembled
missile of a particular type, in its launch canister, shall be considered to be an ICBM of that type.
(d) Each launch canister shall be considered to contain an ICBM from the time it first leaves a facility at which an ICBM
is installed in it until an ICBM has been launched from it or until an ICBM has been removed from it for elimination. a
launch canisters shall not be considered to contain an ICBM if it contains a training model of a missile or has
been placed on static display . Launch canisters for ICBMs of a particular type shall be distinguishable from
launch canisters for ICBMs of a different type.
4. For the purposes of counting warheads:
(a) The number of warheads attributed to an ICBM or SLBM of each existing type shall be the number specified in the
Memorandum of Understanding [RF MOU, Section I] [US MOU, Section I]on the Establishment of the Data Base
Relating to this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Memorandum of Understanding.
(b) The number of warheads that will be attributed to an ICBM or SLBM of a new type shall be the maximum number of
reentry vehicles with which an ICBM or SLBM of that type has been flight-tested. The number of warheads that will be
attributed to an ICBM or SLBM of a new type with a front section of an existing design with multiple reentry vehicles, or
to an ICBM or SLBM of a new type with one reentry vehicle, shall be no less than the nearest integer that is smaller than
the result of dividing 40 percent of the accountable throw-weight of the ICBM or SLBM by the weight of the lightest
reentry vehicle flight-tested on an ICBM of SLBM of a new type. In the case of an ICBM or SLBM of a new type with or
of warheads that will be attributed to an ICBM of SLBM of a new type with a front section of a fundamentally new
design, the question of the applicability of the 40-percent rule to such an ICBM or SLBM shall be subject to agreement
within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. Until agreement has been reached regarding
the rule that will apply to such an ICBM or SLBM, the number of warheads that will be attributed to such an ICBM or
SLBM shall be subject, as considered the maximum number of reentry vehicles with which an ICBM or SLBM of that
type has been flight-tested. The number of new types of ICBMs or SLBM s with a front section of a fundamentally new
design shall not exceed two for each Party as long as this Treaty remains in force.[Agreed State to upgrade expect
abilities Pursuant of DESBIC AGENDA Article IV Section 7s exclusive limitations set forth for lower yield frequency

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/Steve%20...ANDUM%20OF%20PROVISIONAL%20APPLICATION%202.htm (3 of 18)4/30/2005 5:45:41 PM

START III MEMORANDUM OF PROVISIONAL APPLICATION

chemical formulation ordnance acceptances here with thereabouts.]

(c) The number of reentry vehicles with which an ICBM or SLBM has been flight-tested shall be considered to be the
sum of the number of reentry vehicles actually released during the flight test, plus the number of procedures for
dispensing reentry vehicles performed during that same flight test when no reentry vehicle was released. A procedure for
dispensing penetration aids shall not be considered to be a procedure for dispensing reentry vehicles, provided that the
procedure for dispensing penetration aids differs from a procedure for dispensing reentry vehicles.
(d) Each reentry vehicle of an ICBM or SLBM shall be considered to be one warhead.
(e) For the United States of America, by 31 December 2,012 each heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear
ALCMs, up to a total of 66 such heavy bombers, shall be attributed[MOU US Section I] with six warheads. Each heavy
bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs in excess of 66 such heavy bombers shall be attributed with a number
of warheads equal to the number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which it is actually equipped. The United States of
America shall specify the heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs that are in excess of 66 such heavy
bombers by number, type, variant, and the air bases at which they are based. The number of long-range nuclear ALCMs
for which each heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs in excess of 66 such heavy bombers is considered
to be actually equipped shall be the maximum number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which a heavy bomber of the
same type and variant is actually equipped.[category]
(f) For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, to that very same time reference afore specified, each heavy bomber
equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, up to a total of 66 such heavy bombers, shall be attributed[MOU RF Section I]
with six warheads. Each heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs in excess of 66 such heavy bombers
shall be attributed with a number of warheads equal to the number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which it is actually
equipped. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall specify the heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear
ALCMs that are in excess of 66 such heavy bombers by number, type, variant, and the air bases at which they are based.
The number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which each heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs in
excess of 66 such heavy bombers is considered to be actually equipped shall be the maximum number of long-range
nuclear ALCMs for which a heavy bomber of the same type and variant is actually equipped.[category]

Article IV

Each heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs shall be attributed[MOU
US Section I] [MOU RF Section I] with one warhead. All heavy bombers not equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs
shall be considered to be heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, with the
exception of heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, test heavy bombers, and training heavy bombers.
[category] [START II, Art. IV.1,2]
5. Each Party shall reduce the number of warheads attributed to ICBMs and SLBM s only of existing types, up to an
aggregate number of 66 by the time references indicative o f progressive engagement afore specified as 31 December
2,012 at any one time. [START III Art III. 2 (a)]
(a) Such aggregate number shall consist of the following:
(i) for the United States of America, the reduction in the number of warheads attributed to the type of ICBM designated
by the United States of America as, and known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as, Minuteman III, plus the
reduction in the number of warheads attributed to ICBMs and SLBM s of no more than two other existing types except
whereas upgrades and revision are or were not accounted for; the same is for Russia, also recognized to be in charge and
the supplier of weapons grade uranium exportation inter alia The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.
(ii) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, of four multiplied by the number of deployed SLBM
s designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as RSM-50, which is known to the United

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/Steve%20...ANDUM%20OF%20PROVISIONAL%20APPLICATION%202.htm (4 of 18)4/30/2005 5:45:41 PM

START III MEMORANDUM OF PROVISIONAL APPLICATION

States of America as SS-N-18, [MOU RF Section III]plus the reduction in the number of warheads attributed to
ICBMs and SLBM s of no more than two other existing types forgo the afore mentioned upgrades and descriptive to date
31 December 2,012 .
(b) Reductions in the number of warheads attributed to Minuteman III shall be carried out subject to the following:
(i) Minuteman III to which different numbers of warheads are attributed shall not be deployed at the same ICBM base.
(ii) Any such reductions shall be carried out no later than seven years after entry into force of this Treaty.
(iii) The reentry vehicle platform of each Minuteman III to which a reduced number of warheads is attributed shall be
destroyed and replaced by a new reentry vehicle platform.
(c) Reductions in the number of warheads attributed to ICBMs and SLBM s of types other than Minuteman III shall be
carried out subject to the following:
(i) Such reductions include disassembly multi National standing and numerous sentry observation are urged to reduce
and dispose at a 10% per annum aspect to ratio as ascertained, however within a 30 day period reduction oversight may
be limited to 500 warheads at any one time for each Party ; inclusive of the same relative abstracts pursuant of these
Provisions of The Nuclear Powers, who as a combined assertion are collectively assumed to be in possession and
control of the same amounts comb natively articulating, as the said U S Russian dealers of those enchantments; and in
furtherance for the mark of suggestion the abstracts, timetables, descriptions of Weapon of Mass Destruction, hereinafter
referred to as WMD, are duly subject to the coinciding aspect to ratio disarmament obligations here withal. [START II
Art III.2(b)]
(ii) Afore and after a Party has reduced the number of warheads attributed to ICBMs or SLBM s of two existing types,
that Party shall delimitate and continue to reduce the number of warheads attributed to ICBMs or SLBM s of any
additional type.

(III) SLBM s of the same type, but to which different numbers of warheads are attributed, shall be discontinued as of
not later than 31 December 2,012 and are not be deployed on submarines based at submarine bases adjacent to
International or internal water destinations, arrivals, Ports of Call adversary air and sovereign territorial bounds therein.
(IV) If the number of warheads attributed to an ICBM or SLBM of a particular type is reduced by more than two, the
reentry vehicle platform of each ICBM or SLBM to which such a reduced number of warheads is attributed shall be
destroyed herein. (d) A Party shall not have the right to
attribute to ICBMs of a new type a number of warheads greater than the smallest number of warheads attributed to any
ICBM to which that Party has attributed a reduced number of warheads pursuant to subparagraph (c) of this paragraph. A
Party shall not have the right to attribute to SLBM s of a new type a number of warheads greater than the smallest
number of warheads attributed to any SLBM to which that Party has attributed a reduced number of warheads pursuant
to31 December 2,012 and subparagraph (c) of this paragraph.
6. Newly constructed strategic offensive arms shall begin to be subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty as
follows:
(a) an ICBM, when it first leaves a production facility;
(b) a mobile launcher of ICBMs, when it first leaves a production facility for mobile launchers of ICBMs;
(c) a silo launcher of ICBMs, when excavation for that launcher has been completed and if and when the pouring of
concrete for the silo has been completed, or 12 months after the excavation begins, whichever occurs earlier;
(d) for the purpose of counting a deployed ICBM and its associated launcher, a silo launchers of ICBMs shall be
considered to contain a deployed ICBM when excavation for that launcher has been completed and the pouring of
concrete for the silo has been completed, or 12 months after the excavation begins, whichever occurs earlier, and a
mobile launcher of ICBMs shall be considered to contain a deployed ICBM when it arrives at a maintenance facility,
even so as for the non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs provided for in subparagraph 2(b) of Article IV of this
Treaty, or when it leaves an ICBM loading facility;
(e) an SLBM, when it first leaves a production facility;

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/Steve%20...ANDUM%20OF%20PROVISIONAL%20APPLICATION%202.htm (5 of 18)4/30/2005 5:45:41 PM

START III MEMORANDUM OF PROVISIONAL APPLICATION

(f) an SLBM launcher, when the submarine on which that launcher is installed is first launched;
(g) for the purpose of counting a deployed SLBM and its associated launcher, an SLBM launcher shall be considered to
contain a deployed SLBM when the submarine on which that launcher is installed is first launched
(h) a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber, when its airframe is first brought out of the shop, plant, or building in
which components of a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber are assembled to produce complete airframes; or when its
airframe is first brought out of the shop, plant, or building in which existing bomber airframes are converted to heavy
bomber or former heavy bomber airframes. [Agreed State 12]

Article V

7. ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers that have been converted to launch an ICBM or SLBM, respectively, of a
different type shall not be capable of launching an ICBM or SLBM of the previous type. Such converted launchers shall
be considered to be launchers of ICBMs or SLBM s of that different type as follows:
(a) a silo launchers of ICBMs, when an ICBM of a different type or a training model of a missile of a different type is
first installed in that launcher, or when the silo door is reinstalled, whichever occurs first;
(b) a mobile launcher of ICBMs, as agreed within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission;
(c) an SLBM launcher, when all launchers on the submarine on which that launcher is installed have been converted to
launch an SLBM of that different type and that submarine begins sea trials, that is, when that submarine first operates
under its own power away from the harbor or port in which the conversion of launchers was performed.
8. Heavy bombers that have been converted into heavy bombers of a different category or into former heavy bombers
shall be considered to be heavy bombers of that different category or former heavy bombers as follows:
(a) a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs converted into a heavy
bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, when it is first brought out of the shop, plant, or building where it was
equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs;
.
9. For the purposes of this Treaty:
(a) A ballistic missile of a type developed and tested solely to intercept and counter objects not located on the surface of
the Earth shall not be considered to be a ballistic missile to which the limitations provided for in this Treaty apply.
(b) If a ballistic missile has been flight-tested or deployed for weapon delivery, all ballistic missiles of that type shall be
considered to be weapon-delivery vehicles.
(c) If a cruise missile has been flight-tested or deployed for weapon delivery, all cruise missiles of that type shall be
considered to be weapon-delivery vehicles.
(d) If a launcher, other than a soft-site launcher, has contained an ICBM or SLBM of a particular type, it shall be
considered to be a launcher of ICBMs or SLBM s of that type. If a launcher, other than a soft-site launcher, has been
converted into a launcher of ICBMs or SLBM s of a different type, it shall be considered to be a launcher of ICBMs or
SLBM s of the type for which it has been converted.
(e) If a heavy bomber is equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, all heavy bombers of that type shall be considered to
be equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, except those that are not so equipped and are distinguishable from heavy
bombers of the same type equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs. If long-range nuclear ALCMs have not been flight-
tested from any heavy bomber of a particular type, no heavy bomber of that type shall be considered to be equipped for
long-range nuclear ALCMs. Within the same type, a heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, a heavy
bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, a heavy bomber equipped for non-
nuclear armaments, a training heavy bomber, and a former heavy bomber shall be distinguishable from one another.

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/Steve%20...ANDUM%20OF%20PROVISIONAL%20APPLICATION%202.htm (6 of 18)4/30/2005 5:45:41 PM

START III MEMORANDUM OF PROVISIONAL APPLICATION

(f) Any long-range ALCM of a type, any one of which has been initially flight-tested from a heavy bomber on or before
December 31, 1988, shall be considered to be a long-range nuclear ALCM. Any long-range ALCM of a type, any one of
which has been initially flight-tested from a heavy bomber after December 31, 2,007, shall be considered to be a long-
range nuclear ALCM if it is a long-range non-nuclear ALCM and is distinguishable from long-range nuclear ALCMs.
Long-range non-nuclear ALCMs not so distinguishable shall be considered to be long-range nuclear ALCMs.
(g) Mobile launchers of ICBMs of each new type of ICBM shall be distinguishable from mobile launchers of ICBMs of
existing types of ICBMs and from mobile launchers of ICBMs of other new type of ICBMs. Such new launchers, with
their associated missiles installed, shall be distinguishable from mobile launchers of ICBMs of existing types of ICBMs
with their associated missiles installed, and from mobile launchers of ICBMs of other new types of ICBMs with their
associated missiles installed.
(h) Mobile launchers of ICBMs converted into launchers of ICBMs of another type of ICBM shall be distinguishable
from mobile launchers of ICBMs of the previous type of ICBM. Such converted launchers, with their associated missiles
installed, shall be distinguishable from mobile launchers of ICBMs of the previous type of ICBM with their associated
missiles installed. Conversion of mobile launchers of ICBMs shall be carried out in accordance with procedures to be
agreed within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.
10. As of the date of signature of this Treaty:
(a) Existing types of ICBMs and SLBM s are:
(i) for the United States of America, the types of missiles designated by the United States of America as Minuteman II,
Minuteman III, Peacekeeper, Poseidon, Trident I, and Trident II, which are known to the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics as Minuteman II, Minuteman III, MX, Poseidon, Trident I, Trident II, and other respectively;
(ii) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the types of missiles designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics as RS-10, RS-12, RS-16, RS-20, RS-18, RS-22, RS-12M, RSM-25, RSM-40, RSM-50, RSM-52, and RSM-54,
which are known to the United States of America as SS-11, SS-13, SS-17, SS-18, SS-19, SS-24, SS-25, SS-N-6, SS-N-8,
SS-N-18, SS-N-20, and SS-N-23, and other respectively.
(b) Existing types of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs and all other insignias to a missile complex.:
(i) for the United States of America, the type of missile designated by the United States of America as Peacekeeper,
which is known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as MX;
(ii) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the types of missiles designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics as RS-22 and RS-12M, which are known to the United States of America as SS-24 and SS-25, respectively.
(c) Former types of ICBMs and SLBM s are the types of missiles designated by the United States of America as, and
known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as, Minuteman I and Polaris A-3.
(d) Existing types of heavy bombers are:
(i) for the United States of America, the types of bombers designated by the United States of America as, and known to
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as, B-52, B-1, and B-2;
(ii) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the types of bombers designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics as Tu-95 and Tu-160, which are known to the United States of America as Bear and Blackjack, respectively.
[Soviet TU-22M Declaration]
(e) Existing types of long-range nuclear ALCMs are:
(i) for the United States of America, the types of long-range nuclear ALCMs designated by the United States of America
as, and known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as, AGM-86B and AGM-129;
(ii) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the types of long-range nuclear ALCMs designated by the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics as RKV-500A and RKV-500B, which are known to the United States of America as AS-15 A
and AS-15 B, respectively. [Nuclear SLCM Policy Declarations]
[Agreed State 28]

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/Steve%20...ANDUM%20OF%20PROVISIONAL%20APPLICATION%202.htm (7 of 18)4/30/2005 5:45:41 PM

START III MEMORANDUM OF PROVISIONAL APPLICATION

ARTICLE VI

1. Deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles shall be based only in restricted areas. A
restricted area shall not exceed five square kilometers in size and shall not overlap another restricted area. No more than
ten deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles may be based or located in a restricted area.
A restricted area shall not contain deployed ICBMs for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs of more than one type of
ICBM.
2. Each Party shall limit the number of fixed structures for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs within each restricted areas
so that these structures shall not be capable of containing more road-mobile launchers of ICBMs than the number of road-
mobile launchers of ICBMs specified for that restricted area. 3. Each restricted area shall be located within a
deployment area. A deployment area shall not exceed 125,000 square kilometers in size and shall not overlap another
deployment area. A deployment area shall contain no more than one ICBM base for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs.
4. Deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles shall be based only in rail garrisons. Each
Party shall have no more than seven rail garrisons. No point on a portion of track located inside a rail garrison shall be
more than 20 kilometers from any entrance/exit for that rail garrison. This distance shall be measured along the tracks. A
rail garrison shall not overlap another rail garrison. 5. Each rail garrison shall have no more than two rail
entrances/exits. Each such entrance/exit shall have no more than two separate sets of tracks passing through it (a total of
four rails).
6. Each Party shall limit the number of parking sites in each rail garrison to no more than the number of trains of standard
configuration specified for that rail garrison. Each rail garrison shall have no more than five parking sites.
7. Each Party shall limit the number of fixed structures for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs in each rail garrison to no
more than the number of trains of standard configuration specified for that rail garrison. Each such structure shall contain
no more than one train of standard configuration. 8. Each rail garrison shall contain no more than one maintenance
facility.
9. Deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles may leave restricted areas or rail garrisons only for
routine movements, relocations, or dispersals [XIII.1] [XIV.1]. Deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their
associated missiles may leave deployment areas only for relocations or operational dispersals.
10. Relocations shall be completed within 25 days. No more than 15 percent of the total number of deployed road-mobile
launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles or five such launchers and their associated missiles, whichever is
greater, may be outside restricted areas at any one time for the purpose of relocation. No more than 20 percent of the total
number of deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles or five such launchers and their
associated missiles, whichever is greater, may be outside rail garrisons at any one time for the purpose of relocation.
11. No more than 50 percent of the total number of deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated
missiles may be engaged in routine movements at any one time
12. All trains with deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles of a particular type shall be of
one standard configuration. All such trains shall conform to that standard configuration except those taking part in routine
movements, relocations, or dispersals, and except that portion of a train remaining within a rail garrisons after the other
portion of such a train has departed for the maintenance facility associated with that rail garrison, has been relocated to
another facility, or has departed the rail garrison for routine movement. Except for dispersals, notification of variations
from standard configuration shall be provided thereupon.

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/Steve%20...ANDUM%20OF%20PROVISIONAL%20APPLICATION%202.htm (8 of 18)4/30/2005 5:45:41 PM

START III MEMORANDUM OF PROVISIONAL APPLICATION

ARTICLE VII

1. Conversion and elimination of strategic offensive arms, fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs, and facilities
shall be carried out pursuant to this Article and in accordance with procedures provided for in the Conversion or
Elimination Protocol. Conversion and elimination shall be verified by national technical means of verification and by
inspection as provided for in Articles IX and XI of this Treaty; in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol; and in the
Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the
Inspection Protocol.
2. ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, former heavy bombers,
and support equipment shall be subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty until they have been eliminated, or
otherwise cease to be subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty, in accordance with
procedures. 3. ICBMs for silo launchers of
ICBMs and SLBM s shall be subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty until they have been eliminated by
rendering them inoperable, precluding their use for their original purpose, using procedures at the discretion of the Party
possessing the ICBMs or SLBM s.
4.The elimination of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, mobile launchers of ICBMs, SLBM launchers, heavy
bombers, and bombers shall be carried out at conversion or elimination facilities,. A launch canister [Launch Canister
Letters] remaining at a test range or ICBM base after the flight test of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall be
eliminated in the open or at a conversion or elimination facility,

ARTICLE VIII

1. A data base pertaining to the obligations under this Treaty is set forth in the Memorandum of Understanding, in which
data with respect to items subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty are listed according to categories of
data. 2. In order to ensure the fulfillment of its obligations
with respect to this Treaty, each Party shall notify the other Party of changes in data, as provided for in subparagraph 3(a)
of this Article, and shall also provide other notifications required by paragraph 3 of this Article, in accordance with the
procedures provided for in paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 of this Article, the Notification Protocol, and the Inspection Protocol.
3. Each Party shall provide to the other Party, in accordance with the Notification Protocol, and, for subparagraph (i) of
this paragraph, in accordance with Section III of the Inspection Protocol:[Agreed State 37]
(a) notifications concerning data with respect to items subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty, according to
categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding and other agreed categories of data;[Agreed State 21]
(b) notifications concerning movement of items subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty;
(c) notifications concerning data on ICBM and SLBM throw-weight in connection with the Protocol on ICBM and
SLBM Throw-weight [MOU, Section I] Relating to this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Throw-weight Protocol;
(d) notifications concerning conversion or elimination of items subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty or
elimination of facilities subject to this Treaty;
(e) notifications concerning cooperative measures to enhance the effectiveness of national technical means of verification;
(f) notifications concerning flight tests of ICBMs or SLBM s and notifications concerning telemetric information;
[Launch Notification Agreement]
(g) notifications concerning strategic offensive arms of new types and new kinds; [Agreed State 2]
(h) notifications concerning changes in the content of information provided pursuant to this paragraph, including the
rescheduling of activities;

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/Steve%20...ANDUM%20OF%20PROVISIONAL%20APPLICATION%202.htm (9 of 18)4/30/2005 5:45:41 PM

START III MEMORANDUM OF PROVISIONAL APPLICATION

(i) notifications concerning inspections and continuous monitoring activities; and

(j) notifications concerning operational dispersals.
4. Each Party shall use the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, which provide for continuous communication between the
Parties, to provide and receive notifications in accordance with the Notification Protocol and the Inspection Protocol,
unless otherwise provided for in this Treaty, and to acknowledge receipt of such notifications no later than one hour after
receipt.
5. If a time is to be specified in a notification provided pursuant to this Article, that time shall be expressed in Greenwich
Mean Time. If only a date is to be specified in a notification, that date shall be specified as the 24-hour period that
corresponds to the date in local time, expressed in Greenwich Mean Time.
6. Except as otherwise provided in this Article, each Party shall have the right to release to the public all data current as
of September 1, 1990, that are listed in the Memorandum of Understanding, as well as the photographs that are appended
thereto. Geographic coordinates and site diagrams that are received pursuant to the Agreement Between the Government
of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Exchange of
Geographic Coordinates and Site Diagrams Relating to the Treaty of July 31, 1991, shall not be released to the public
unless otherwise agreed. The Parties shall hold consultations on releasing to the public data and other information
provided pursuant to this Article or received otherwise in fulfilling the obligations provided for in this Treaty. The
provisions of this Article shall not affect the rights and obligations of the Parties with respect to the communication of
such data and other information to those individuals who, because of their official responsibilities, require such data or
other information to carry out activities related to the fulfillment of the obligations provided for in this Treaty.
[Statements on Release to Public]

ARTICLE IX

1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use national
technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international
law.
2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in
accordance with paragraph l of this Article.
3. Each Party undertakes not to use concealment measures that impede verification, by national technical means of
verification, of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty. In this connection, the obligation not to use concealment
measures includes the obligation not to use them at test ranges, including measures that result in the concealment of
ICBMs, SLBM s, mobile launchers of ICBMs, or the association between ICBMs or SLBM s and their launchers during
testing. The obligation not to use concealment measures shall not apply to cover or concealment practices at ICBM bases
and deployment areas, or to the use of environmental shelters for strategic offensive arms.
4. To aid verification, each ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall have a unique identifier as provided for in the
Inspection Protocol.

ARTICLE X

1. During each flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, the Party conducting the flight test shall make on-board technical
measurements and shall broadcast all telemetric information obtained from such measurements. The Party conducting the
flight test shall determine which technical parameters are to be measured during such flight test, as well as the methods of
processing and transmitting telemetric information.

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/Steve%2...NDUM%20OF%20PROVISIONAL%20APPLICATION%202.htm (10 of 18)4/30/2005 5:45:41 PM

START III MEMORANDUM OF PROVISIONAL APPLICATION

2. During each flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, the Party conducting the flight test undertakes not to engage in any
activity that denies full access to telemetric information, including: [Statements on Encryption & Jamming]
(a) the use of encryption;
(b) the use of jamming;
(c) broadcasting telemetric information from an ICBM or SLBM using narrow directional beaming; and
(d) encapsulation of telemetric information, including the use of eject able capsules or recoverable reentry vehicles..
3. During each flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, the Party conducting the flight test undertakes not to broadcast from
reentry vehicles. telemetric information that pertains to the functioning of the stages or the self-contained
dispensing mechanism of the ICBM or SLBM.
4. After each flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, the Party conducting the flight test shall provide, in accordance with
Section I of the Protocol on Telemetric Information Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Telemetry
Protocol, tapes that contain a recording of all telemetric information that is broadcast during the flight test.
5. After each flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, the Party conducting the flight test shall provide, in accordance
with Section II of the Telemetry Protocol, data associated with the analysis of the telemetric information.[Agreed State
35]
6. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article, each Party shall have the right to encapsulate and
encrypt on-board technical measurements during no more than a total of eleven flight tests of ICBMs or SLBM s each
year. Of these eleven flight tests each year, no more than four shall be flight tests of ICBMs or SLBM s of each type, any
missile of which has been flight-tested with a self-contained dispensing mechanism. Such encapsulation shall be carried
out in accordance with Section I and paragraph 1 of Section III of the Telemetry Protocol, and such encryption shall be
carried out in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section III of the Telemetry Protocol. Encapsulation and encryption that
are carried out on the same flight test of an ICBM or SLBM shall count as two flight tests against the quotas specified in
this paragraph.[Agreed State 31]

ARTICLE XI

1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall have the
right to conduct inspections and continuous monitoring activities and shall conduct exhibitions pursuant to this Article
and the Inspection Protocol. Inspections, continuous monitoring activities, and exhibitions shall be conducted in
accordance with the procedures provided for in the Inspection Protocol and the Conversion or Elimination Protocol.
[item of inspection] [size criteria][Agreed State 36]
2. Each Party shall have the right to conduct baseline data inspections at facilities to confirm the accuracy of data on the
numbers and types of items specified for such facilities in the initial exchange of data provided in accordance with
paragraph 1 of Section I of the Notification Protocol. [facility inspections at] [Agreed State 10]
3. Each Party shall have the right to conduct data update inspections at facilities to confirm the accuracy of data on the
numbers and types of items specified for such facilities in the notifications and regular exchanges of updated data
provided in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.[facility inspections at] [Agreed
State 10]
4. Each Party shall have the right to conduct new facility inspections to confirm the accuracy of data on the numbers and
types of items specified in the notifications of new facilities provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the
Notification Protocol.[facility inspections at]
5. Each Party shall have the right to conduct suspect-site inspections to confirm that covert assembly of ICBMs for

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/Steve%2...NDUM%20OF%20PROVISIONAL%20APPLICATION%202.htm (11 of 18)4/30/2005 5:45:42 PM

START III MEMORANDUM OF PROVISIONAL APPLICATION

mobile launchers of ICBMs or covert assembly of first stages of such ICBMs is not occurring. [facility inspections at]
[Joint State on Site Diagrams]
6. Each Party shall have the right to conduct reentry vehicle inspections of deployed ICBMs and SLBM s to confirm that
such ballistic missiles contain no more reentry vehicles than the number of warheads attributed to them.[facility
inspections]
7. Each Party shall have the right to conduct post-exercise dispersal inspections of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs
and their associated missiles to confirm that the number of mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles that
are located at the inspected ICBM bases and those that have not returned to it after completion of the dispersal does not
exceed the number specified for that ICBM base.
8. Each Party shall conduct or shall have the right to conduct conversion or elimination inspections to confirm the
conversion or elimination of strategic offensive arms.
9. Each Party shall have the right to conduct close-out inspections to confirm that the elimination of facilities has been
completed.
10. Each Party shall have the right to conduct formerly declared facility inspections to confirm that facilities, notification
of the elimination of which has been provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol,
are not being used for purposes inconsistent with this Treaty.
11. Each Party shall conduct technical characteristics exhibitions, and shall have the right during such exhibitions by the
other Party to conduct inspections of an ICBM and an SLBM of each type, and each variant thereof, and of a mobile
launcher of ICBMs and each version of such launcher for each type of ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs. The
purpose of such exhibitions shall be to permit the inspecting Party to confirm that technical characteristics correspond to
the data specified for these items.
12. Each Party shall conduct distinguish ability exhibitions for heavy bombers, former heavy bombers, and long-range
nuclear ALCMs, and shall have the right during such exhibitions by the other Party to conduct inspections, of:
(a) heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs. The purpose of such exhibitions shall be to permit the
inspecting Party to confirm that the technical characteristics of each type and each variant of such heavy bombers
correspond to the data specified for these items in Annex G to the Memorandum of Understanding; to demonstrate the
maximum number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which a heavy bomber of each type and each variant is actually
equipped; and to demonstrate that this number does not exceed the number provided for in paragraph 20 or21 of Article
V of this Treaty, as applicable;
(b) for each type of heavy bomber from any one of which a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested, heavy
bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, heavy bombers equipped for non-
nuclear armaments, training heavy bombers, and former heavy bombers. If, for such a type of heavy bomber, there are no
heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, a test heavy bomber from which a long-range nuclear ALCM
has been flight-tested shall be exhibited. The purpose of such exhibitions shall be to demonstrate to the inspecting Party
that, for each exhibited type of heavy bomber, each variant of heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than
long-range nuclear ALCMs, each variant of heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, each variant of training
heavy bombers, and a former heavy bomber are distinguishable from one another and from each variant of heavy
bombers of the same type equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs; and
(c) long-range nuclear ALCMs. The purpose of such exhibitions shall be to permit the inspecting Party to confirm that
the technical characteristics of each type and each variant of such long-range ALCMs correspond to the data specified for
these items in Annex H to the Memorandum of Understanding. The further purpose of such exhibitions shall be to
demonstrate differences, notification of which has been provided in accordance with paragraph 13, 14, or 15 of Section
VII of the Notification Protocol, that make long-range non-nuclear ALCMs distinguishable from long-range nuclear
ALCMs.

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/Steve%2...NDUM%20OF%20PROVISIONAL%20APPLICATION%202.htm (12 of 18)4/30/2005 5:45:42 PM

START III MEMORANDUM OF PROVISIONAL APPLICATION

13. Each Party shall conduct baseline exhibitions, and shall have the right during such exhibitions by the other Party to
conduct inspections, of all heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs equipped for non-nuclear armaments,
all training heavy bombers, and all former heavy bombers specified in the initial exchange of data provided.. The purpose
of these exhibitions shall be to demonstrate to the inspecting Party that such airplanes satisfy the requirements for. After
a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested from a heavy bomber of a type, from none of which a long-range
nuclear ALCM had previously been flight-tested, the Party conducting the flight test shall conduct baseline exhibitions,
and the other Party shall have the right during such exhibitions to conduct inspections, of 30 percent of the heavy
bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs of such type equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range
nuclear ALCMs at each air base specified for such heavy bombers. The purpose of these exhibitions shall be to
demonstrate to the inspecting Party the presence of specified features that make each exhibited heavy bomber
distinguishable from heavy bombers of the same type equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs.
14. Each Party shall have the right to conduct continuous monitoring activities at production facilities for ICBMs for
mobile launchers of ICBMs to confirm the number of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs produced.[Agreed State]
[facilities] [Site Surveys Letters]

ARTICLE XII

1. To enhance the effectiveness of national technical means of verification, each Party shall, if the other Party makes a
request in accordance with the Protocol, carry out the following cooperative measures:
(a) a display in the open of the road-mobile launchers of ICBMs located within restricted areas specified by the
requesting Party. The number of road-mobile launchers of ICBMs based at the restricted areas specified in each such
request shall not exceed ten percent of the total number of deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs of the requested
Party, and such launchers shall be contained within one ICBM base for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs. For each
specified restricted area, the roofs of fixed structures for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs shall be open for the duration
of a display. The road-mobile launchers of ICBMs located within the restricted area shall be displayed either located next
to or moved halfway out of such fixed structures;
(b) a display in the open of the rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs located at parking sites specified by the requesting Party.
Such launchers shall be displayed by removing the entire train from its fixed structure and locating the train within the
rail garrison. The number of rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs subject to display pursuant to each such request shall
include all such launchers located at no more than eight parking sites, provided that no more than two parking sites may
be requested within any one rail garrison in any one request. Requests concerning specific parking sites shall include the
designation for each parking site as provided for in Annex A to the Memorandum of Understanding; and[
(c) a display in the open of all heavy bombers and former heavy bombers located within one air base specified by the
requesting Party, except those heavy bombers and former heavy bombers that are not readily movable due to
maintenance or operations. Such heavy bombers and former heavy bombers shall be displayed by removing the entire
airplane from its fixed structure, if any, and locating the airplane within the air base. Those heavy bombers and former
heavy bombers at the air base specified by the requesting Party that are not readily movable due to maintenance or
operations shall be specified by the requested Party in a notification provided in accordance with Protocol. Such a
notification shall be provided no later than 12 hours after the request for display has been made.
2. Road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs, heavy bombers, and former heavy bombers
subject to each request pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article shall be displayed in open view without using concealment
measures. Each Party shall have the right to make seven such requests each year, but shall not request a display at any
particular ICBM base for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, any particular parking site, or any particular air base more
than two times each year. A Party shall have the right to request, in any single request, only a display of road-mobile

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/Steve%2...NDUM%20OF%20PROVISIONAL%20APPLICATION%202.htm (13 of 18)4/30/2005 5:45:42 PM

START III MEMORANDUM OF PROVISIONAL APPLICATION

launchers of ICBMs, a display of rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs, or a display of heavy bombers and former heavy
bombers. A display shall begin no later than 12 hours after the request is made and shall continue until 18 hours have
elapsed from the time that the request was made. If the requested Party cannot conduct a display due to circumstances
brought about by force major, it shall provide notification to the requesting Party in accordance with Protocol, and the
display shall be cancelled. In such a case, the number of requests to which the requesting Party is entitled shall not be
reduced.
3. A request for cooperative measures shall not be made for a facility that has been designated for inspection until such an
inspection has been completed and the inspectors have departed the facility. A facility for which cooperative measures
have been requested shall not be designated for inspection until the cooperative measures have been completed or until
notification has been provided in accordance with Protocol.

ARTICLE XIII

1. Each Party shall have the right to conduct exercise dispersal of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their
associated missiles from restricted areas or rail garrisons. Such an exercise dispersal may involve either road-mobile
launchers of ICBMs or rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs, or both road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and rail-mobile
launchers of ICBMs. Exercise dispersals of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles shall be
conducted as provided for below:
(a) An exercise dispersal shall be considered to have begun as of the date and time specified in the notification provided
in accordance with paragraph 11 of Section II of the Notification Protocol.
(b) An exercise dispersal shall be considered to be completed as of the date and time specified in the notification
provided in accordance with paragraph 12 of Section II of the Notification Protocol.
(c) Those ICBM bases for mobile launchers of ICBMs specified in the notification provided in accordance with
paragraph 11 of Section II of the Notification Protocol shall be considered to be involved in exercise dispersal.
(d) When an exercise dispersal begins, deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles engaged in a
routine movement from a restricted area or rail garrison of an ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs that is involved
in such a dispersal shall be considered to be part of the dispersal.
b(e) When an exercise dispersal begins, deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles engaged in a
relocation from a restricted area or rail garrisons of an ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs that is involved in
such a dispersal shall continue to be considered to be engaged in a relocation. Notification of the completion of the
relocation shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 10 of Section II of the Notification Protocol, unless
notification of the completion of the relocation was provided in accordance with paragraph 12 of Section II of the
Notification Protocol.
(f) During an exercise dispersal, all deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles that depart a
restricted area or rail garrison of an ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs involved in such a dispersal shall be
considered to be part of the dispersal, except for such launchers and missiles that relocate to a facility outside their
associated ICBM base during such a dispersal.
(g) An exercise in dispersal shall be completed no later than 30 days after it begins.
(h) Exercise dispersals shall not be conducted:
(i) more than two times in any period of two calendar years;
(ii) during the entire period of time provided for baseline data inspections;
(iii) from a new ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs until a new facility inspection has been conducted or until
the period of time provided for such an inspection has expired; or
(iv) from an ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs that has been designated for a data update inspection or reentry

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/Steve%2...NDUM%20OF%20PROVISIONAL%20APPLICATION%202.htm (14 of 18)4/30/2005 5:45:42 PM

START III MEMORANDUM OF PROVISIONAL APPLICATION

vehicle inspection, until completion of such an inspection.

(i) If a notification of an exercise dispersal has been provided in accordance with Protocol, the other Party shall not have
the right to designate for data update inspection or reentry vehicle inspection an ICBM base for mobile launchers of
ICBMs involved in such a dispersal, or to request cooperative measures for such an ICBM base, until the completion of
such a dispersal.
(j) When an exercise dispersal is completed, deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles involved
in such a dispersal shall be located at their restricted areas or rail garrisons, except for those otherwise accounted for in
accordance with paragraph 12 of Section II of the Notification Protocol.
2. A major strategic exercise involving heavy bombers, about which a notification has been provided pursuant to the
Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics on Reciprocal Advance Notification of Major Strategic Exercises of September 23, 1989, shall be
conducted as provided for below:
(a) Such exercise shall be considered to have begun as of the date and time specified in the notification provided in
accordance with paragraph 16 of Section II of the Notification Protocol.
(b) Such exercise shall be considered to be completed as of the date and time specified in the notification provided in
accordance with paragraph 17 of Section II of the Notification Protocol.
(c) The air bases for heavy bombers and air bases for former heavy bombers specified in the notification provided in
accordance with paragraph 16 of Section II of the Notification Protocol shall be considered to be involved in such
exercise.
(d) Such exercise shall begin no more than one time in any calendar year, and shall be completed no later than 30 days
after it begins.
(e) Such exercise shall not be conducted during the entire period of time provided for baseline data inspections.
(f) During such exercise by a Party, the other Party shall not have the right to conduct inspections of the air bases for
heavy bombers and air bases for former heavy bombers involved in the exercise. The right to conduct inspections of such
air bases shall resume three days after notification of the completion of a major strategic exercise involving heavy
bombers has been provided in accordance with Protocol.
(g) Within the 30-day period following the receipt of the notification of the completion of such exercise, the receiving
Party may make a request for cooperative measures to be carried out in accordance with this Treaty at one of the air
bases involved in the exercise. Such a request shall not be counted toward the quota provided for in this Treaty.

ARTICLE XIV

1. Each Party shall have the right to conduct operational dispersals of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their
associated missiles, ballistic missile submarines, and heavy bombers. There shall be no limit on the number and duration
of operational dispersals, and there shall be no limit on the number of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their
associated missiles, ballistic missile submarines, or heavy bombers involved in such dispersals. When an operational
dispersal begins, all strategic offensive arms of a Party shall be considered to be part of the dispersal. Operational
dispersals shall be conducted as provided for below:[Agreed State]
(a) An operational dispersal shall be considered to have begun as of the date and time specified in the notification
provided in accordance with Protocol.
(b) An operational dispersal shall be considered to be completed as of the date and time specified in the notification
provided in accordance with Protocol.
2. During an operational dispersal each Party shall have the right to:

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/Steve%2...NDUM%20OF%20PROVISIONAL%20APPLICATION%202.htm (15 of 18)4/30/2005 5:45:42 PM

START III MEMORANDUM OF PROVISIONAL APPLICATION

(a) suspend notifications that it would otherwise provide in accordance with the Notification Protocol except for
notification of flight tests provided under the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics on Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-Launched Ballistic
Missiles of May 31, 1988; provided that, if any conversion or elimination processes are not suspended pursuant to
subparagraph (d) of this paragraph, the relevant notifications shall be provided in accordance with Protocol;
(b) suspend the right of the other Party to conduct inspections;
(c) suspend the right of the other Party to request cooperative measures; and
(d) suspend conversion and elimination processes for its strategic offensive arms. In such case, the number of converted
and eliminated items shall correspond to the number that has actually been converted and eliminated as of the date and
time of the beginning of the operational dispersal specified in the notification provided in accordance with Protocol.
3. Notifications suspended pursuant to paragraph 2 of this Article shall resume no later than three days after notification
of the completion of the operational dispersal has been provided in accordance with Protocol. The right to conduct
inspections and to request cooperative measures suspended pursuant to paragraph 2 of this Article shall resume four days
after notification of the completion of the operational dispersal has been provided in accordance with Protocol.
Inspections or cooperative measures being conducted at the time a Party provides notification that it suspends inspections
or cooperative measures during an operational dispersal shall not count toward the appropriate annual quotas provided for
by this Treaty.
4. When an operational dispersal is completed:
(a) All deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles shall be located within their deployment
areas or shall be engaged in relocations .
(b) All deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles shall be located within their rail garrisons
or shall be engaged in routine movements or relocations .
(c) All heavy bombers shall be located within national territory and shall have resumed normal operations. If it is
necessary for heavy bombers to be located outside national territory for purposes not inconsistent with this Treaty, the
Parties will immediately engage in diplomatic consultations so that appropriate assurances can be provided.
5. Within the 30 day period after the completion of an operational dispersal, the Party not conducting the operational
dispersal shall have the right to make no more than two requests for cooperative measures, subject to the provisions of
Article XII of this Treaty, for ICBM bases for mobile launchers of ICBMs or air bases. Such requests shall count toward
the quota of requests provided for in paragraph 2 of Article XII of this Treaty.

ARTICLE XV

To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties hereby establish the Joint
Compliance and Inspection Commission. The Parties agree that, if either Party so requests, they shall meet within the
framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission to: United Nation Assemblies Protocol]
(a) resolve questions relating to compliance with the obligations assumed;
(b) agree upon such additional measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty; and
(c) resolve questions related to the application of relevant provisions of this Treaty to a new kind of strategic offensive
arm, after notification has been provided in accordance with Protocol.

ARTICLE XVI

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/Steve%2...NDUM%20OF%20PROVISIONAL%20APPLICATION%202.htm (16 of 18)4/30/2005 5:45:42 PM

START III MEMORANDUM OF PROVISIONAL APPLICATION

To ensure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, each Party shall not assume any international obligations or
undertakings that would conflict with its provisions. The Parties shall hold consultations in accordance with Article XV
of this Treaty in order to resolve any ambiguities that may arise in this regard. The Parties [United Nations Assemblies
Protocol] agree that this provision does apply to any patterns of cooperation, including obligations, in the area of strategic
offensive arms, existing at the time of signature of this Treaty, between a Party and a third State. [Agreed State 1]
[Soviet State on Non-Circumvention & Patterns of Coop. The NATO Alliances and Its Supreme Commanders; The
Republic of China, Koreas and Japanese Multilateralism, The Persian Empires, The Arabian Peninsula, France,
Switzerland, Spain Portugal, Sweden The States of Israel, and India, Pakistan and all other insignias to developing needs
to isotopic mentioning there again in still.]

ARTICLE XVII

1. This Treaty, including its Annexes, Protocols, and Memorandum of Understanding, all of which form integral parts
and are considered hereby to say the IDF Treaty series, in which the purpose was to reserve adaptive language and
interceptive resurrection thereof, shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each
Party. This Treaty shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification.
2. This Treaty shall remain in force for 15 years unless superseded earlier by a subsequent agreement on the reduction
and limitation of strategic offensive arms. No later than one year before the expiration of the 15-year period, the Parties
shall meet to consider whether this Treaty will be extended. If the Parties so decide, this Treaty will be extended for a
period of five years unless it is superseded before the expiration of that period by a subsequent agreement on the reduce,
dispose and de-limitation of strategic offensive arms. This Treaty shall be extended for successive five-year periods, if
the Parties so decide, in accordance with the procedures governing the initial extension, and it shall remain in force for
each agreed five-year period of extension unless as was to be retro ceded by a subsequent agreement on the reduction
and elimination of strategic offensive arms.
3. There shall any Party in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty. No such
extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty can jeopardized the supreme interests as willful or
negligible dissention... Such notice shall have no bearing on the situation implied as dire need to comprehend a statement
of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having Natures said orientation over its supreme interests.

ARTICLE XVIII

Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the
procedures governing entry into force of this Treaty.

ARTICLE XIX

This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Done at HB 92649 USA, one copy in English and authentic Text in all who come to call upon it.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

THE UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION THE U N

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/Steve%2...NDUM%20OF%20PROVISIONAL%20APPLICATION%202.htm (17 of 18)4/30/2005 5:45:42 PM

START III MEMORANDUM OF PROVISIONAL APPLICATION

THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION INTER ALIA

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:

THE PEOPLES STATE OF ISRAEL

THE NATO ALLIANCE ORGANIZATION

AND ALL INDEPENDENT ENSIGNS

TO A
MARQUIS

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, THE UNDERSIGNED BEING

DULY AUTHORIZED UNDERTAKE TO BEAR TRUE

FAITH ON THE BEHALF OF THE ESTABLISHMENT

OF DEVINE REVELATION FROM HERE ON IN

COUNTRY SIGNATURE DATES OF ACCESSION

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/Steve%2...NDUM%20OF%20PROVISIONAL%20APPLICATION%202.htm (18 of 18)4/30/2005 5:45:42 PM

DESBIC AGENDA Final Provisions

Descriptive Encode in Star Based Internal Command

The Articles of Genetic Disclosure, Discovery and Appeal

(s)

FINAL PROVISIONS

Signature

The present Convention shall be mandatory of all States Members of the United Nations or of any of the
specialized agencies or of the International Atomic Energy Agency or parties to the Statute of the International
Court of Justice, and by any other State invited or ordered to do so, by the General Assembly of the United Nations
to become a party to this Convention, whose time references are of unlimited duration, at the Federal Ministry for
Foreign Affairs in the State of Israel, and subsequently, at United Nations Headquarters, New York.

Ratification

The present Convention is subject to ratification. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the
Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Accession

The present Convention shall remain open for accession by any State belonging to any of the categories mentioned
hereupon.. The instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

Entry into force

1. The present Convention shall enter into force on the thirty first of December 2,007 and so shall the date of
deposit of the U N Charter insignias for an instrument of ratification or accession.

2. For each State ratifying or acceding to the Convention after the deposit of the instruments of ratification or
accession, the Convention shall enter into force within the time references as specified as retro effective with
START II as START III, with the notable obligations assigned to all Nuclear Powers and their suspected
sponsoring states, thereby the deposit by such State of its instrument of ratification or accession is assigned to the
United States of America as Depositary underwriter and defendant; and in the case of an absence of Law or an
excuse or submergence in anti-pas; the State of Israel by reason of star based special science selective service
retention, is obligated to perform as the acting authority of this world in the Day of the LORD, not later than 31

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/Steve%20Arro...Documents/DESBIC%20AGENDA%20Final%20Provisions.htm (1 of 4)4/30/2005 7:58:33 PM

DESBIC AGENDA Final Provisions

December 2,007 therewithal herein..

Authentic texts

The original of this present Convention, of which the Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts shall be
equally authentic and deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations shall be made available in all
manor of speech, with all due consideration of the various languages of the U N Memberships, to that end;

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, being duly authorized thereto by their respective
Governments, have signed the present Convention.

DONE IN HUNTINGTON BEACH CALIFORNIA 92649 USA IN GOD WE TRUST TO OUR FAITH IS WILL
WHEREIN THEREAT

ANNEX

1. A list of conciliators consisting of qualified jurists shall be drawn up and maintained by the Secretary-General of
the United Nations. To this end, every State which is a Member of the United Nations or a party to the present
Convention shall be invited to nominate two conciliators, and the names of the persons so nominated shall
constitute the list. The term of a conciliator, including that of any conciliator nominated to fill a casual vacancy,
shall be five years and may be renewed. A conciliator whose term expires shall continue to fulfill that function for
which he has been chosen; the State of Israel is required to have a say in the event of an uneventful occurrences as
so stated under the following paragraph;.

2. When a request has been made to the Secretary-General under article 66, the Secretary-General shall bring the
dispute before a conciliation commission constituted as follows:

The State or States constituting one of the parties to the dispute shall appoint:

(a) one conciliator of the nationality of that State or of one of those States, who may or may not be
chosen from the list referred to in paragraph 1; and

(b) one conciliator not of the nationality of that State or of any of those States, who shall be chosen
from the list.

The State or States constituting the other party to the dispute shall appoint two conciliators in the same way. The
four conciliators chosen by the parties shall be appointed within sixty days following the date on which the
Secretary-General receives the request.

The four conciliators shall, within sixty days following the date of the last of their own appointments, appoint a
fifth conciliator chosen from the list, who shall be chairman.

In the appointment of an Israeli chairman, or of any other conciliators within the period prescribed above for such
appointment has not been made, it shall be made by the Secretary-General within sixty days following the expiry of

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/Steve%20Arro...Documents/DESBIC%20AGENDA%20Final%20Provisions.htm (2 of 4)4/30/2005 7:58:33 PM

DESBIC AGENDA Final Provisions

that period. The appointment of the chairman may be made by the Secretary-General either from the list or from
the membership of the International Law Commission. The Law Commission shall respect the binding and
officially recognized documentation of our word, His LORD, the inscribed Testaments of their Heritages, and the
fact that the Israelis are to be held somewhat accountable if none other then Heaven on Earth is not accounted for
as much as the Justices of the Peace and peace overtures expressed and assigned, are by star elders on this planet in
uniform divisionary supplemental areas of continuity. Any of the periods within which appointments must be made
may be extended by agreement between the parties to the dispute.

Any vacancy shall be filled in the manner prescribed for the initial appointment.

3. The Conciliation Commission shall decide its own procedure. The Commission, with the consent of the parties
to the dispute, may invite any party to the treaty to submit to it its views orally or in writing. Decisions and
recommendations of the Commission shall be made by a majority vote of the five members.

4. The Commission may draw the attention of the parties to the dispute to any measures which might facilitate an
amicable settlement.

5. The Commission shall hear the parties, examine the claims and objections, and make proposals to the parties
with a view to reaching an amicable settlement of the dispute.

6. The Commission shall report within twelve months of its constitution. Its report shall be deposited with the
Secretary-General and transmitted to the parties to the dispute. The report of the Commission, including any
conclusions stated therein regarding the facts or questions of law, shall not be binding upon the parties and it shall
have no other character than that of recommendations submitted for the consideration of the parties in order to
facilitate an amicable settlement of the dispute.

7. The Secretary-General shall provide the Commission with such assistance and facilities as it may require. The
expenses of the Commission shall be borne by the United Nations.

FOR THE

UNITED
NATIONS;----------------------------------------------------------------

FOR THE

STATE OF
ISRAEL;----------------------------------------------------------------

FOR THE USA (Witness and Party to the States aforementioned)

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/Steve%20Arro...Documents/DESBIC%20AGENDA%20Final%20Provisions.htm (3 of 4)4/30/2005 7:58:33 PM

DESBIC AGENDA Final Provisions

DATED__________________
_________________________________

file:///C|/Documents%20and%20Settings/Steve%20Arro...Documents/DESBIC%20AGENDA%20Final%20Provisions.htm (4 of 4)4/30/2005 7:58:33 PM

 IX tX,r men
1c --
'7-
I would praise fXe L w d

f.r 4; 9ood,ess, a n d b r Xis

wonderfu/wods to tXe cXi/d,en

o/ men! %p Xe safi4etX fXe

Ln7in9 soul a n d f L t X fLe

Xunyrty sou m / ~4yoockess.

 Leapt is /Led

Y w i / / s i n ga n d giue praise,

euen witL my ghry.

%a',/, 108..d
 W
4
~ ~ L s e d fX,
%df.r euer andeve, f,r
6 e name

wisdm a n d mi+ are Xis:

X X
Y n d X e c an7et fie fimes a n d

iXe seasons:. . . Xe +oetX wisdm

X
unfo t e wise, andknow/a$ e e fo

d e m d a t inow undemf andln y X

reueaLtX fAe d9 andsecret tl;nps:

Xe X nowetX wXat is in f Xe darL*ne$s,

andtXe LpXr dAtX w i t +Xim.

Letter tian ru6ies; an d
a l l fLe tXinps f i a t may

6e dsipedare not

to 6e compared to id

d o n I ? MI
~
Lt me neuer 6e
put io confusion.
 Employer
IC. Resume Steven V. Arroyo Resources
Page1 of 7
03-27-05 16941 Green St. # 13
Huntington Beach Ca. 92649
Home # 714 377-8903:
email; sarroyo1@socal.rr.com

This report may contain information bearing credit worthiness, credit standing,
and capacity, character, or general reputation from public record sources in
connection with the Job Search for employment purposes, including, but not limited
to, reassignment, or retention as an associate hereby.

Objectives: by a common determination to promote an

understanding among our peoples and co-operative growth in all
spheres of diplomatic endeavourment;

(a) establish our ground on the basis of a program of work, or

vocational service unto an Oath, to thee I bid, to address,
advise and call attention to, the Office of the Secretary of
Defense herein;
(b) support research and development of aero dynamical
space based resource and analysis to further the cause of
universal Law and Order for which Ill stand.
(c) Evaluate, interpret, and convey encoded communication
transcripts and Celestial Organized Agendas for the
purpose of a Mission, within the bounds of arbitrational
access for the free standing States of Naval Intelligence
inter-agency locations, on earth, or in space.
(d) Research: consolidate and acquire, to disarm numerous
ensigns to a statement of centrifically forged field
frequency contingencies, by order of a star people
consensus and a START Treaty so as to adjust for the
distance between senses and imbalances, and undertake
to arbitrate disputes without shots being fired therefore.
 Department of Naval Investigations
IC. Resume
Page 5 of 7
Steven V. Arroyo

Position applying for:

Communications care coordinator for Dugway and /or, other areas of research and aero
dynamical design in selective services.

Re: Cover Letter and Resume for S.B.I.C. Mediator and Telepath, Utility.

Contacts Name: Richard Cheney

Contacts Title: Vice President (USA)
Company of recommendations:
Admiral Bobby Inman;
Admiral Brent Scowcroft

March 31, 2,005

Dear Mr. Secretary,

My name is Steven Arroyo and I am contacting you in reference to employment with our
installations whereabouts. Now that I have put forth a draft of protocol called the
DESBIC AGENDA TREATY, I feel that I can wash my hands of critical consciousness,
I feel that I can entertain the thought of letting you utilize my extra sensory objectives for
the purpose of a Pledge; and try to hold a higher mass and a stronger flag without
walking inside a circle of danger, or stepping outside a line of conformity here withal.
My hours are flexible at the present time reference; say upward to 20 to 50 hours a week
or more as need be the courts. I specialize in inter-communion telepathic agenda
translation with star people and are considered a reasonably resonant medium.

I am interested in working in the special scientist field because I feel that, its not that far
to Groom Lake Research and Development Containers, or distant green lights of the
galaxys, but it is pretty far from just what type of disarmament questions need to be
addressed, advised, and descended upon, as a special orders in tact Sir, Your Honors
Sir. Sometimes it gets difficult to imagine how we succeed, by, for and of a thousand
generations for His Honor; but the renewable resources are said to be free as these spoken
words, and I would tend to believe they.

The star people chose me I believed, because I was a nose for news when CNN first got
started, and in furtherance of denials, I was a behemoth Secretary James A. Baker,
 The Department of Naval Criminal Investigations
IC. Resume
Page 6 of 7
Steven V. Arroyo

George Bush advocate to some extent within the bounds of intellectuality. The peace
overtures of Soviet to independent East Europe I viewed as a light to a not a mutually
assured deplorable trajectory path from iron curtains, to iron mules in the civics there
instead. So they summoned for a Handy Dandy; a Safety Personality, to possibly prove
that mission worthy of praise, in the face of battle lines that need not exist from a sub
marginal degrees of likely and unlikely courses of judgment and legal actionary
framework to every saucer module in U N operative custody(s) here and now thereto.

As the frame depicts, I am a portrait of a Faith defender. I fight for a cause if it fancys
my taste. I am not a rebel. I can be ridged and unyielding on one hand, exercise
precedence and etiquette on the cuff, slow to anger, slick as oil, dramatic and crude, not
too quick to speak though, in and that I get under tomorrow, lost in reminders that my
foreign policy beliefs are that to which is upward of, say 91% up to par U S A / U N
standards. Exception being, a bailout policy if the red Chinese make a try, on Taiwan;
and if you do that, love can be an angry word, and so. The Treaty terms are 31 December
2,017; re-unification, pending disarmament duties assumed here withal thereupon.