Human Rights

"All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights.They are endowed with reason and conscience and should

act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood".

Article 1 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights

Human rights are one of the key principles of contemporary international relations and the cornerstone of the Polish legal

system. The Constitution of the Republic of Poland recognizes the inherent dignity of each human being and warrants a

variety of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights and freedoms.

The fundamental guarantees enunciated in the Constitution are safeguarded by a number of institutions, most notably the

Human Rights Defender (Rzecznik Praw Obywatelskich) along with independent courts of law and tribunals.

The Republic of Poland is a signatory to major international documents on human rights, including the European

Convention on Human Rights (formally the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms)

and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. After joining the EU, Poland is committed to pursuing the

European values, such as, in particular, human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law, and respect for human

rights, including minority rights.

In the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, foreign policy with regard to human rights is handled by the Department of United

Nations and Human Rights. In proceedings before international bodies upholding human rights, the Republic of Poland is

represented by the Plenipotentiary of the Minister of Foreign Affairs for Proceedings before the European Court of Human

Rights and supported by the Department of Proceedings before International Human Rights Protection Bodies.

Spy intelligence & espionage

Commonwealth[edit]
Though the first official Polish government service entrusted
with espionage, intelligence and counter-intelligence was not formed until 1918, Poland and later
the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth had developed networks of informants in neighboring
countries. Envoys and ambassadors had also gathered intelligence, often using bribery. Such
agents included the 17th-century Polish poet Jan Andrzej Morsztyn.
Polish kings and Polish-Lithuanian military commanders (hetmans) such as Stanisaw
Koniecpolski maintained intelligence networks. The hetmans were responsible for intelligence-
gathering in the Ottoman Empire, its vassal states and disputed territories such
as Wallachia, Moldavia and Transylvania. Intelligence networks also operated inMuscovy and
among the restless Cossacks.

In 1683, during the Battle of Vienna, the Polish merchant-spy Jerzy Franciszek Kulczycki secured a
promise of military assistance for Vienna, besieged by the Turkish forces ofKara Mustafa Pasha, and
thus facilitated the victory of a Christian European coalition led by Polish King Jan III Sobieski.
Kulczycki is reported to have received as reward for his services the Turks' supplies of coffee beans
and to have established Vienna's first coffee house.

Partitions[edit]
During the period when Poland had been partitioned (beginning in 1772, until 1918) by three
adjacent empires, intelligence played an important role in patriotic Poles' surveillance of their
occupiers and in their planning and conduct of successive Polish uprisings.

191418[edit]
In 1914 Jzef Pisudski created the Polish Military Organization, an intelligence and special-
operations organization which worked alongside the Polish Legions. As such, it was independent
of Austro-Hungary and loyal to Pisudski and to a future independent Poland.

191821[edit]
Immediately upon achieving independence in 1918, Poland established armed forces. Reflecting the
influence of the French Military Mission to Poland, the Polish General Staffwas divided into divisions
entrusted with specific tasks:

1. Oddzia I (Division I) Organization and mobilization;

2. Oddzia II (Division II) Intelligence and counterintelligence;
3. Oddziau III (Division III) Training and operations;
4. Oddzia IV (Division IV) Quartermaster.

Division II (colloquially, "Dwjka," "Two") was formed in October 1918, even before Poland had
declared her independence. Initially called the "General Staff Information Department," Division II
was divided into sections (sekcje):

Sekcja I Reconnaissance and close intelligence;

Sekcja II
 IIa (East) Offensive intelligence for Bolshevik Russia, Lithuania, the Belarusian People's
Republic, Ukraine and Galicia;
IIb (West) Offensive intelligence for Austria, Germany, France and the United Kingdom;
Sekcja III General intelligence and surveillance abroad (East and West);
Sekcja IV Preparation of a front-line bulletin;
Sekcja V Contacts with military and civilian authorities;
Sekcja VI Contacts with attachs in Berlin, Vienna, Budapest, Moscow and Kiev;
Sekcja VII Ciphers (i.e., cryptology).

An extensive network of domestic and foreign informants developed rapidly. This was due to
Poland's poor economic situation, itself the result of over a century of foreign occupation. In the 19th
and early 20th centuries, Poland's economic and political situation had forced hundreds of
thousands to emigrate. With the advent of Polish independence, many migrs offered their services
to Polish intelligence agencies. Others Poles who had been living in the former Russian Empire and
were now making their way home through war-torn Russia, provided priceless intelligence on
the logistics, order of battle and status of the parties in the Russian Civil War.

In Western Europe (especially in Germany, France and Belgium) the Polish diaspora often formed
the backbone of heavy industry; some one million people of Polish descent lived in the Ruhr
Valley alone. Many of these provided intelligence on industrial production and economic conditions.

After the outbreak of the Polish-Soviet War in early 1919, intelligence from the east proved vital to
Poland's survival against a far superior enemy. A separate organization was formed within Polish
Intelligence, taking over most intelligence duties for the duration of the war. This was a Biuro
Wywiadowcze (Intelligence Bureau) comprising seven departments:

1. Organisation;
2. Offensive Intelligence "A";
3. Offensive Intelligence "B";
4. Offensive Intelligence "C";
5. Defensive Intelligence;
6. Internal propaganda;
7. Counterintelligence.

The fourth department, Offensive Intelligence "C", became the most developed because it carried
out all the duties connected with "front-line" reconnaissance and intelligence, as well as "long-range"
intelligence and surveillance in countries surrounding Bolshevik Russia, including Siberia (still in the
hands of the White Russians), Turkey, Persia, China,Mongolia and Japan.

The third department, Offensive Intelligence "B," controlled an intelligence network in European
Russia.
Additional intelligence was obtained from Russian defectors and prisoners of war who crossed the
Polish lines in their thousands, especially after the 1920 Battle of Warsaw.

192139[edit]
See also: Prometheism

After the PolishSoviet War and the Treaty of Riga, Polish Intelligence had to restructure to cope
with new challenges. Though Poland had won most of her border conflicts (most notably the war
with Russia and the Greater Poland Uprising of 1918-19 against Germany), her international
situation was unenviable. By mid-1921, Section II had been restructured into three main
departments, each overseeing a number of offices:

Organization Department:

1. Organization;
2. Training;
3. Personnel;
4. Finances;
5. Polish ciphers and codes, communication, and foreign press.

Information Department:

1. East;
2. West;
3. North;
4. South;
5. Statistics office;
6. Nationalities and minorities;

Intelligence Department:

1. Intelligence technology;
2. Central agents' bureau;
3. Counterintelligence;
4. Foreign cryptography (Biuro Szyfrw);
5. Radio intelligence and wire-tapping.

Until the late 1930s the Soviet Union was seen as the most likely aggressor and
Poland's main adversary. Section II developed an extensive network of agents within
Poland's eastern neighbor and other adjoining countries. In the early 1920s Polish
intelligence began developing a network for "offensive intelligence." The Eastern Office
(Referat "Wschd") had several dozen bureaus, mostly attached to Polish consulates in
Moscow, Kiev, Leningrad, Kharkov and Tbilisi.

Short-range reconnaissance was carried out by the Border Defense Corps, created in
1924. On a number of occasions, soldiers crossed the border disguised as smugglers,
partisans or bandits. They gathered information on the disposition of Soviet troops and
the morale of the Soviet populace. At the same time, Soviet forces carried out
analogous missions on Polish soil. The situation finally stabilized in 1925; however, such
missions continued to occur occasionally.

Polish Intelligence produced fairly accurate pictures of the capabilities of Poland's main
potential adversariesGermany and the Soviet Union. Nonetheless, this information
was of little avail when war came in September 1939. Good intelligence could not offset
the overwhelming superiority of the German and Soviet armed forces. The conquest of
Poland took four weekstoo short a time for intelligence services to make a significant
contribution. With Poland conquered, her intelligence services had to evacuate their
headquarters to allied French and British territories.

193945[edit]
Main article: Polish contribution to World War II

Until 1939 Polish intelligence services did not, as a rule, collaborate with the intelligence
services of other countries. A partial exception was France, Poland's closest ally; even
then cooperation was lukewarm, with neither side sharing their most precious secrets.
An important exception was the long-term collaboration between France's Gustave
Bertrandand Poland's Cipher Bureau, headed by Gwido Langer. The situation only
began to change in 1939, when war appeared certain and Britain and France entered
into a formal military alliance with Poland. The most important result of the subsequent
information-sharing was the disclosure to France and Britain of Polish techniques and
equipment for breaking German Enigma machine ciphers.

The initial break into the Enigma ciphers had been made in late 1932 by
mathematician Marian Rejewski, working for the Polish General Staff's Cipher Bureau.
His work was facilitated, perhaps decisively, by intelligence provided by Bertrand. With
the help of fellow mathematicians Henryk Zygalski and Jerzy Rycki, Rejewski
developed techniques todecrypt German Enigma-enciphered messages on a regular
and timely basis.

Six-and-a-half years after the initial Polish decryption of Enigma ciphers, French and
British intelligence representatives were briefed on Polish achievements at a trilateral
conference held at Cipher Bureau facilities in the Kabaty Woods, just south of Warsaw,
on July 26, 1939, barely five weeks before the outbreak of World War II. This formed the
basis for early Enigma decryption by the British at Bletchley Park, northwest of London.
Without the head start provided by Poland, British reading of Enigma encryptions might
have been delayed several years, if it would have gotten off the ground at all.

Key Polish Cipher Bureau personnel escaped from Poland on September 17, 1939, on
the Soviet Union's entry into eastern Poland, and eventually reached France. There, at
"PC Bruno" outside Paris, they resumed cracking Enigma ciphers through the "Phony
War" (October 1939 May 1940). Following the fall of northern France to the
Germans, the Polish-French-Spanish cryptological organization, sponsored by French
Major Gustave Bertrand, continued its work at "Cadix" in the Vichy "Free Zone" until it
was occupied by German forces in November 1942.

After the 1939 invasion of Poland, practically all of the General Staff's Section II
(Intelligence) command apparatus managed to escape to Romania and soon reached
France and Britain. Reactivating agent networks throughout Europe, they immediately
began cooperating with French and British intelligence agencies. After the
subsequent fall of France, most of Section II ended up in Britain.

At that time Britain was in a difficult situation, badly in need of intelligence from occupied
Europe after rapid German advances had disrupted its networks and put German forces
into areas where Britain had few agents. Following the personal intervention
of Churchill and Sikorski in September 1940, cooperation between British and Polish
intelligence organizations entered a new phase.

The Poles placed their Section II at the disposal of the British, but as a quid pro
quo requested and obtained (at that time without any reservations) the right to use,
without British oversight, their own ciphers which they had developed in France. The
Poles were the only Allied country that was given this unique status, though as the war
progressed it was challenged by some agencies of the British government. Due to
support from members of the British Special Operations Executive, the Poles kept their
ciphers to the end of hostilities.[1]

In the first half of 1941 Polish agents in France supplied Britain with intelligence on U-
boat movements from French Atlantic ports. The Polish network in France grew to 1,500
members and, before and during Operation Overlord, supplied vital information about
the German military in France. Agents working in Poland in the spring of 1941 supplied
extensive intelligence about German preparations to invade the Soviet Union (Operation
Barbarossa).

Polish spies also documented German atrocities being perpetrated at Auschwitz (Witold
Pilecki's report) and elsewhere in Poland against Jewish and non-Jewish populations.
Polish intelligence gave the British crucial information on Germany's secret-weapons
projects, including the V-1 and V-2 rockets, enabling Britain to set back these German
programs by bombing the main development facility at Peenemnde in 1943. Poland's
networks supplied the western Allies with intelligence on nearly all aspects of the
German war effort. Of 45,770 reports received by British intelligence during the war,
nearly half (22,047) came from Polish agents.

On March 15, 1946, Section II was officially disbanded, and its archives were taken over
by Britain. At Section II's dissolution, it had 170 officers and 3,500 agents, excluding
headquarters staff. Very likely at least some of the Polish agents continued working
directly for Britain during the Cold War.

The Polish intelligence contribution to Britain's war effort was kept secret due to Cold
War exigencies. In later years, as official British histories were released, the Polish
intelligence role barely rated a mention. Only when British wartime decryption of Enigma
ciphers was made public in the 1970s, did a Polish contribution begin to become known;
even then, however, the early versions published in Britain (and some versions even to
the end of the 20th century) claimed that Polish intelligence had only been able
to steal a German Enigma machine. The truth, which had previously been disclosed
in Bertrand's book and would later be detailed in papers by Marian Rejewski (who had
survived the war and lived to 1980), made slow headway against British and American
obfuscations, mendacities and fabrications.[2] The Polish Enigma-breaking effort had
been much more sophisticated than those English-language accounts made out, and
had in fact relied largely on mathematical analysis.

Historians' efforts to gain access to documentation of other Polish intelligence

operations met with British stonewalling and with claims that the pertinent Polish
archives had been destroyed by the British.

More recently, the British and Polish governments have begun jointly producing an
accurate account of the Polish intelligence contribution to Britain's war effort. The
key Anglo-Polish Historical Committee Report on the subject was published in July
2005. It was written by leading historians and experts who had been granted
unprecedented access to British intelligence archives. The report concluded that 43
percent of all reports received by British secret services from continental Europe in
1939-45 had come from Polish sources[3]

See also: Home Army and V1 and V2

194589[edit]
Main articles: Gwny Zarzd Informacji Wojska Polskiego, Suba Bezpieczestwa,
and Ministerstwo Bezpieczestwa Publicznego
Civilian branches[edit]
On occupying Poland and installing a puppet government, the Soviet Union created new
Polish intelligence and internal-security agencies. The Soviet special services had
begun training Polish officers as early as 1943. That year, some 120 Poles had begun
training at an NKVD school in Kuybyshev (now Samara). At the same time, in NKVD-
NKGB schools all over the USSR, hundreds of
Germans, Romanians, Czechoslovaks and Bulgarians had also undergone the same
training in order to prepare them for work in future special services in their respective
countries.

In July 1944 in Moscow the temporary Polish puppet government was established by
the name of the Polish Committee of National Liberation (Polski Komitet Wyzwolenia
Narodowego), or PKWN. The PKWN was organized as thirteen departments (resorty).
One of them was the Department of Public Security (Resort Bezpieczestwa
Publicznego), or RBP, headed by long-time Polish communist Stanisaw Radkiewicz.
The largest and the most important department in the RBP, Department 1, was
responsible for counter-espionage and headed by Roman Romkowski. By September
1945 Department 1 had become so large that three additional departments were
created, as well as two separate sections. By the close of 1944, the Department of
Public Security totaled 3000 employees.

On December 31, 1944, the PKWN was joined by several members of the Polish
government in exile, among them Stanisaw Mikoajczyk. It was then transformed into
theProvisional Government of Republic of Poland (Rzd Tymczasowy Republiki
Polskiej, or RTRP), and the departments were renamed as ministries.

The Ministry of Public Security was responsible for both intelligence and counter-
espionage, as well as surveillance of citizens and suppression of dissent. They
generally did not employ former officers of the "Dwojka" or follow the traditions of pre-
war Polish intelligence services. Personnel were recruited for their "political reliability".
New formations were trained by Soviet NKVD experts. Additionally, and especially in the
early years (194549), Soviet officers in Polish uniforms overlooked their operations.
After Joseph Stalin's death in 1953 and the later defection of Col. Jzef wiato, the
Ministry of Public Security was canceled and replaced by two separate administrations -
the Committee for Public Security (Komitet do Spraw Bezpieczestwa Publicznego, or
Kds.BP) and the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Ministerstwo Spraw Wewntrznych or
MSW).

The Kds.BP was responsible for intelligence and government protection and. From
September 3, 1955 to 28 November 1956, the Main Directorate of Information of the
Polish Army (Gwny Zarzd Informacji Wojska Polskiego), which was responsible for
the military police and counter-espionage agency, was also controlled by the Kds.BP.
The MSW was responsible for the supervision of local governments, Militsiya,
correctional facilities, fire rescue and the border and internal guards.

The next big changes came in 1956. The Committee for Public Security was canceled
and the Ministry of Internal Affairs took over their responsibilities. The MSW assumed
control of the political police, under the Suba Bezpieczestwa.

From 1956 to the fall of communism in Poland the MSW was one of the biggest and
strongest administrations. During this period its responsibilities included intelligence,
counter-espionage, anti-state activity (SB), government protection, confidential
communications, supervision of the local governments, militsiya, correctional facilities,
and fire rescue. The Ministry of Internal Affairs was divided into departments. The most
important of these were the first second and third departments. The first dealt with
foreign operations and intelligence gathering, the second with spy activities both by
Poland and other countries and the third was responsible for anti-state activities and the
protection of the country's secrets.

With the exception of its own departments and sections, the MSW also had control over
the Militsiya (Komenda Gwna Milicji Obywatelskiej or KG/MO), fire rescue (Komenda
Gwna Stray Poarnych or KG/SP), territorial anti-aircraft defense, (Komenda Gwna
Terenowej Obrony Przeciwlotniczej KG/TOP), management of geodesy and
cartography, (Gwny Zarzd Geodezji i Kartografii) and health services (Centralny
Zarzd Suby Zdrowia). Ministry of Internal Affairs also had control over the command
of the Internal Security Corp. (Dowdztwo Korpusu Bezpieczestwa Wewntrznego or
KBW), command of the Border Guard (Dowdztwo Wojsk Ochrony Pogranicza or KOP),
and management of Information of Internal Troops (Zarzd Informacji Wojsk
Wewnetrznych). Through the 1980s the MSW had 24,390 staff in Security Services,
62,276 in the Citizen's Militsiya, 12,566 in Motorized Reserves of the Citizens Militia
(Zmotoryzowane Odwody Milicji Obywatelskiej, or ZOMO), 20,673 in Administratively-
Economic Units (Jednostki administracyjno-gospodarcze) and 4,594 in ministry schools,
not including students.
Military branches[edit]
The first military special services in Poland after World War II were created in 1943 as
part of the Polish military in the USSR. First organ that dealt with military
counterespionage was called Directorate of Information by the commander-in-chief of
the Polish Army (Zarzd Informacji Naczelnego Dowdcy Wojska Polskiego, or ZI
NDWP). On November 30, 1944, the commander-in-chief of the Polish
Army, general Micha Rola-ymierski, transformed the ZI NDWP into the Main
Directorate of Information of the Polish Army (Gwny Zarzd Informacji Wojska
Polskiego, or GZI WP) in his 95th order. From 30 November 1950, the GZI WP became
the Main Directorate of Information of the Ministry of Defense (Gwny Zarzd Informacji
Ministerstwa Obrony Narodowej, or GZI MON). In September 1955 GZI MON became
part of the Committee for Public Security (Komitet do spraw Bezpieczestwa
Publicznego), which was the successor of Ministerstwo Bezpieczestwa Publicznego,
more commonly known as the Urzd Bezpieczestwa or UB, and the name was
changed to the Main Directorate of Information of the Committee for Public Security, or
GZI KdsBP. In November 1956 the GZI Kds.BP separated from the Committee for
Public Security, and returned to its previous role, becoming again the Main Directorate
of Information of the Ministry of Defense. After the reform instituted by Wadysaw
Gomuka in 1956, and the role the GZI played in repressions and executions, the Main
Directorate of Information of Ministry of Defense was canceled in 1957 and replaced by
the Military Internal Service (Wojskowa Suba Wewntrzna, or WSW). The WSW
continuously operated as the main military police and counterespionage service until the
fall of communism in Poland.

The first Polish Military Intelligence after World War II was the Second Section of
General Staff of the Polish People's Army (Oddzia II Sztabu Generalnego Ludowego
Wojska Polskiego, or Odzia II Szt Gen LWP) and bore the same name as its precursor
from before the war. Odzia II Szt Gen WP was established on July 18, 1945, but its
origins can be traced to May 1943, when the first reconnaissance company was created
in Polish Army units in the USSR. Between July 1947 and June 5, 1950, the Second
Section of General Staff of the Polish People's Army operated within the structure of the
Ministry of Public Security together with the civilian intelligence branch as Department
VII. On June 5, 1950, it returned to the Ministry of Defense. The first head of Odzia II
Szt Gen WP was Colonel Gieorgij Domeradzki. In November 1945 this position was
occupied by General Wacaw Komar, and between October 1950 and March 1951 by
soviet officer Konstantin Kahnikov. The last commander of the Second Section of
General Staff of the Polish People's Army was Igor Suchacki.

On November 15, 1951, Polish Defence Minister Konstantin Rokossovsky (in his 88th
order) transformed the Second Section of General Staff of the Polish People's Army to
Second Directorate of General Staff of the Polish Army (Zarzd II Sztabu Generalnego
Wojska Polskiego). Internal organization was transformed from sections to directorates
and intelligence work among the United States, Great Britain, the Federal Republic of
Germany, France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Switzerland and Austria was expanded to
countries such as Norway, Spain, Portugal, Greece, Turkey and Israel. In 1990 the
Second Directorate of General Staff of the Polish Army was join with the Military Internal
Service (Wojskowa Suba Wewntrzna, or WSW), in order to have intelligence and
counter-intelligence working under one structure as the Second Directorate for
Intelligence and Counter-intelligence (Zarzd II Wywiadu i Kontrwywiadu). In 1991 the
Second Directorate for Intelligence and Counter-intelligence was transformed into
Military Information Services (Wojskowe Suby Informacyjne, or WSI), and continues to
function under this name.

1989present[edit]
After the changes of 1989 the Suba Bezpieczestwa was disbanded by the first free
government under the prime minister, Tadeusz Mazowiecki. A new agency, called the
State Protection Office (Urzd Ochrony Pastwa, or UOP) was formed and staffed
mainly by the former SB officers who successfully passed a verification procedure. Its
mission was primarily general espionage and intelligence gathering as well as counter-
espionage and fighting against high ranked organized crime. It was commanded by a
career intelligence officer but was directly supervised by a civilian government official,
Coordinator for the Special Services.

Most of the time the agency evaded public attention, although it was dragged into
political fighting over appointments of its chiefs, lustration and some perceived failures
with organized crime cases. In 2002 the new, post-communist left-wing government
reorganized the special services by dividing them into two agencies; the Internal
Security Agency (Agencja Bezpieczestwa Wewntrznego) and Intelligence Agency
(Agencja Wywiadu). The move was widely perceived as a way of cleansing the higher
ranks of the officers appointed by previous right-wing governments.

The military intelligence continued to function under a slightly altered name (Wojskowe
Suby Informacyjne- Military Information Services) and without much organizational
change; at least none that was visible to the general public. The new Polish
conservative government declared dissolution of the WSI and creating new services in
October 2005, since the agency skipped serious external reforms after the collapse of
communism in 1989. Throughout the transformation the WSI were allegedly involved in
dubious operations, arms sales to UN-sanctioned states and corruption scandals. In
2006 the WSI was split into Suba Kontrwywiadu Wojskowego and Suba Wywiadu
Wojskowego.
Notable operations[edit]

Operation Simoom, 1990

Notable personnel[edit]

Feliks Ankerstein
Edmund Charaszkiewicz.
Roman Czerniawski
 Jzef Englicht
Jan Kowalewski.
Jerzy Franciszek Kulczycki
Kazimierz Leski
Jan Leniak.
Stefan Mayer.
Wiktor Michaowski.
Tadeusz Peczyski
Tadeusz Puszczyski
Tadeusz Schaetzel
Zbigniew Siemitkowski
Mieczysaw Zygfryd Sowikowski.
Halina Szymaska

New emerging military weapons

Possible/future/ordered equipment[edit]

Vari
Model Image Origin Type Number Details
ant

PR-15 [1] Pol 9 mm x 19 PR- Probably new handgun to

Ragun and Parabellu 15 replace P-64, P-83 and
m Pistol Ragu future WIST-94.
n

Kbk wz. Pol 5.56mm wz. 8400+20 On order.[79]

1996 Mini- and NATOCar 1996 9[78]
Beryl bine C

Kbs wz. Pol 5.56mm wz. 17621+3 On order.[80]

1996 Beryl and NATOAss 1996 034
ault Rifle C
MSBS Pol 5.56mm More orders of various
Radon and NATOAss variants possible in the future.
ault Rifle

New 7.62mm 250 It is planned to buy in 2016

Designated NATO D around 250 examples of
Marksman MR DMR, to replace old SWD.[81]
Rifle

Bor Pol 7.62mm 60 60 on order.[82]

and NATO Sni
per Rifle

UKM-2000 Pol 7.62mm UKM 368 Modernized version of UKM-

and NATO GP - 2000P, 378 on order.[83]
MG 2000
P
zmod
.

Minigun Uni 7.62mm M- ~100 Miniguns will be mounted on

ted NATO Six 134D new helicopters[84]
States -Barreled
Machine
Gun

[85]
SBAO-40 Pol 40 mm GPB 296
and Grenade O-40
Launcher

RGP-40 Pol 40 mm ~200[86]

and Revolver
Grenade
Launcher
LM-60 Pol 60 mm LM- 108 108 on order.[87]
Pluton and Mortar 60D

PIORUN Pol 72 mm Pioru 400[26] Around 400 missiles of newer

and Man- n version, Piorun, deliveries
portable from 2014 to 2017.
surface-to-
air missile

Light [2] Ukr 107 mm Prototype testing scheduled

portable aine Anti-Tank for mid-2015. Serial
Anti-Tank Pol Guided production to begin in 2017-
missile and Missile 2018. The system will have
System. System three types of warheads
Program weighing about 2.5 kg each:
"Corsair" Cumulative, Thermobaric and
Explosive. System equipped a
thermal sight and guidance
module.
Cooperation between Bumar
Holding nd Ukrainian
"Luch".[88]

Light Pol Light tank The primary armament of

support and future light tank will be a 105
tank or 120 mm caliber gun fitted
Program within an unmanned turret.
Will be built to replace T-72.

New Infant Pol Developed to replace BWP-

ry fighting and 1 in land forces.
vehicle Pro
gram
New Pol Probably will be built
Amphibiou and by AMZ-Kutno. Replacement
s Armoured for BRDM-2
Scout Car
Program

KTO Finl Amphibio 307 To be delivered until 2019.[42]

Rosomak and us
Pol Wheeled
and Infantry
Fighting
Vehicle
and
Armoured
Personnel
Carrier

Modzierz Pol 120 mm SMG 0 96 more will be produced for

RAK and Self- SMK 64 Polish Army, 64 of them in
Propelled SMK 32 standard version, 32 in
Mortar WD command version.
SMG 120 - RAK mortar
mounted on tracked
chassis.(modernized Opal-I,
in future it would be chassis
of Polish IFV)
SMK 120 - RAK mortar
mounted on KTO
Rosomak chassis.
Built by Huta Stalowa Wola

AHS Kryl Pol 155mm 168 New self-propelled auto-

and self- loading gun for land forces,
propelled built by Huta Stalowa Wola,
auto- System uses a license
loading built ATMOS 2000 howitzer.
gun The vehicle platform is a
special version Jelcz heavy
truck. Prototype completion
scheduled for 2015. In future
the Kryl will replace 152mm
SpGH DANA.

Baobab-K [3] Pol Minelayer New minelayer system built

and by Huta Stalowa Wola.
 [89]
New Self- Pol Self- 20
Propelled and Propelled
Anti- Anti-
Aircraft Aircraft
Gun Gun
Program
"Note"

New low Pol New SAM 11 Cooperation between Polski

range and System batteries Holding Obronny, Warsaw
Surface-to- University of
air missile Technology and Military
Program, University of Technology in
"Narew" Warsaw
Missile is in advanced phase
of development.

New New SAM 6 Raytheon with Patriot PAC-3

medium- System batteries and MBDA with SAMP/T
long range land version participate in the
Surface-to- tender.[90]
air missile
Program
Wisla

New Pol Multiple Cooperation between Huta

Multiple and launch Stalowa Wola, ZM
Launch rocket Mesko and Lockheed Martin.
Rocket system
System.
Program
"Homar"

Soa Pol Self- ubr 8 8 Zubr MMSR/Sola radar

and propelled MMS station on order. System uses
surface-to- R N-26A/MMSR radar to
air missile support Poprad VSHORAD.[7
1][91]
system
Poprad Pol Self- ubr 79 79 POPRAD planned.[71]
and Propelled P 2 from
Surface- test[70]
to-Air
Missile
System

Jelcz Pol Truck 442.3 910

and 2 200
662.4
3

New Utility New 48 48 new utility helicopters to

helicopters utility replace Mi-8 in Polish Land
Program helicopter forces ( 70 for all types of
forces ) with deliveries
planned for 2016,[92] Agusta
Westland/PZL-
Swidnik with AW149, Airbus
Helicopters with EC725and Si
korsky/PZL Mielec with S-
70i are interested in the
tender.[93]

New New +30 to Around 30 or more are to be

Attack attack ~48 bought as replacement for Mi-
helicopters helicopter 24. 4 companies are interested
Program, in participation in the
"Kruk" tender: Bell
Helicopters with AH-
1Z, Boeing Defense, Space &
Security with AH-
64E, Agusta
Westland with AW-129
Mangusta and Airbus Helicop
ters with EC-665 Tiger.[94][95]

Light Light 118 The vehicles will be used by

armoured armoured Polish Armed Forces
long-range reconnaiss reconnaissance regiments
reconnaissa ance with capable to transport on
nce C130 Hercules. With a
vehicles vehicles maxium payload of 900g.
(LRRVS) Deliveries are expected to
commence in 2016-2022

The Armed Forces of the Polish Republic are still in the main using post-Soviet equipment
purchased from Warsaw Pact countries or built on license in Poland. Modern weapons procured
after 1989, and weapons that were built or modernized domestically are a small proportion of the
overall equipment park. The Polish Army (WP) has faced a difficult task of modernization. It still
maintains in service aging or obsolete small arms such as the AKM rifle which should only be used
to reserve or territorial units, not professional soldiers! Fortunately, this is not the worst of problems
and most of obsolete small arms will be withdrawn and replaced by new models. Competitions for
new weapons are under way. A number of small arms types, including the Beryl assault rifle and
UKM-2000 machine-gun, are modern and can remain in service for many years. They are to be
supplemented by the new MSBS rifle system which is expected to enter production in 2018.
Mortars such as the 120mm wz. 1943 and 2B11 Sani are obsolete and will be
replaced in coming years by M120K Rak self-propelled mortars whose
production is to begin shortly. Metys and Fagot ATGMs will have to be
withdrawn in coming years and replaced something else. Strela-2M SAMs are
also obsolete. The Polish-made Grom SAMs, on the other hand, are one of the
best weapons in their class and could remain for years after being upgraded to
the Piorun standard. When it comes to tanks, situation has improved slightly
in the last year. It was possible to decomission over 100 T-72s and replace
them with WPs most modern MBTs, Leopard 2A5s. It allowed the reform of
two neglected armored brigades. Leopard 2A4 and 2A5 are comparatively
modern designs which are suitable for the modern battlefield. They equip 4
tank battalions (232 tanks). They have, however, served between 20 and 30
years in the Bundeswehr. It means that the tanks are heavily used up and
many of their subsystems demand replacement, which means they ought to be
thoroughly overhauled and brought to a level equivalent to Leopard 2A7/A7.
The improvement program named Leopard 2PL is suffering considerable
delays. When it comes to the PT-91, they are an effective modernization of
Soviet T-72s. They equip 4 tank battalions (232 tanks). The oldest entered
service in 1995, the newest in 2002. Baseline T-72s, on the other hand, which
equip 3 tank battalions (169 tans) are badly obsolete and should be withdrawn
quickly. The opportunity to upgrade them was lost 15 years ago. Two years
ago, the Direct Support Vehicle (WWB) Gepard mock-up was demonstrated
for the first time, under the working name of PL-01 Concept. That vehicle
looked like it came straight off a sci-fi movie set. Of course, it was only a mock-
up on CV-90 chassis. We are supposed to see its fully operational prototype in
2016 and the vehicle is to enter production in 2018. But will that hurried
development influence the new design? We have to maintain faith in our
designers (which was badly shaken after the Krab self-propelled howitzer
problems) that the result will not be a fiasco but an ultra-modern tank.

The situation with the BWP-1 IFVs is also dire. They equip 19 battalions (16
mechanized, 2 motorized, and 1 mountain), which gives a total of 1,000
vehicles, the most widely used armored vehicle in the WP. Its weapons are
obsolete and ineffective against modern weapons, and its armor protection
does not ensure the crews and dismounts safety. Other European countries
modernized their fleets to resemble the Soviet BMP-1P with a more modern
Konkurs/Fagot launcher, while Romanians procured Israeli 25mm turrets for
their MLI-84M1. Polish BWP-1s were not modernized in any way in spite of
the BMP-1M Puma project. Therefore they are suitable only for
decommissioning. Work on a new IFV for the WP, the Borsuk, began in 2015.
The prototype is to be ready by the end of 2016, and the vehicle is to enter
production in 2019. The rapidity with which the project is being implemented
nevertheless carries considerable risks, as in the case of the Gepard. KTO
Rosomak is one of the most modern wheeled APCs in the world. The choice of
the vehicle was brilliant. It has served in the WP for 10 years, and some 570
vehicles have been produced, of which more than a dozen were lost in
Afghanistan. But it equips only 4 motorized battalions (with 232 vehicles).
About 150 vehicles were being used by the Afghanistan and Chad rotations,
and one can assume they will equip two more motorized battalions in
motorized brigades which still use BWP-1. That leaves 100 Rosomaks missing,
which are probably awaiting receipt by the military at the factories and lack
specialized equipment (Rak mortar, etc.). Rosomaks biggest weakness is that
it is not fitted to fire Spike ATGMs, which would give the vehicle ability to
destroy MBTs. Temporary fixes like the spike-bus Rosomak-S, which is used
to carry two Spike firing sections would likely not pass the test of fire. Some of
the additional 307 Rosomaks ordered as specialized vehicles will receive
ZSSW-30 remote turrets with Spile launchers. BRDM-2 armored cars have
served with the WP for 50 years and are obsolete. They still equip
reconnaissance companies of mechanized brigades and reconnaissance
regiments, in spite of being worn out, poorly armored, and equipped with
obsolete vision equipment. The modernized BRDM-2 named Zbik/Szakal is
comparably modern and could serve for at least a decade. BWA new
reconnaissance vehicle is to enter service in 2019.

Howitzer artillery units are armed with Soviet 2S1 and Czechoslovak Dana,
which are both aging. They were modernized by the addition of TOPAZ
automated fire direction system. They equip artillery battalions of mechanized
and armored brigades and artillery brigades. Both of these types are to be
completely replaced by new Polish Krab and Kryl howitzers. Rocket artillery
uses obsolete BM-21 Grad, Czechoslovak RM-70, and Polish WR-40 Langusta.
The first two types are to be replaced by the WR-300 Homar which is still
under development. The WR-40 is a Polish upgrade of the BM-21 and can
serve for many more years. The ZSU-23-4 is by now archaic, though the
upgraded ZSU-23-4MP Biala can remain in service for many more years.
Poprad air defense system is to enter service in 2016 and replace some of the
oldest short-range air defense weapons. 2K12 Kub is too outdated to
modernize, but some 9K33 Osa systems will be upgraded to Osa-P. Ultimately
they will be replaced by the winner of the Narew competition to acquire
medium-range air-defense weapons. When it comes to helicopters, the
majority of multi-purpose Mi-2 and Mi-8/-17 will be withdrawn in the next
few years and replaced by a new helicopter to be determined in the course of
ongoing competition. Even though the Airbus Helicopters Caracal was
reported as having won, the new Polish goverment annulled the results of the
tender and announced a new competition to be held. Mi-24 attack helos will
also be withdrawn and replaced by the Kruk competition winner, where
entries so far include the AH-64, AH-1Z, Eurocopter Tiger, AW-129 Mangusta,
Rooivalk, and even Turkeys T-129. The fighter-bomber aviation will be
reduced from 111 to 82 aircraft by withdrawing 14 unmodernized Su-22s and
15 MiG-29s. Upgraded Su-22s will remain in service for at least another 10
years before being withdrawn. The F-16C/D will remain in service for at least
another 20-25 years, and recently received a delivery of 40 JASSM missiles
from the United States. 8 Italian Aermacchi M-346 advanced jet trainers
procurement is ongoing. The situation is worst of all in the Navy. The most
modern ships in service are the Orkan missile boats which entered service 20
years ago. The corvette Kaszub has been in service for almost 30 years. Two
Oliver Hazard Perry frigates were transferred to Poland after 20 years of
intensive USN service, and then served another dozen years under the Polish
flag. The single Kilo submarine has been in service for 30 years. These ships
must be replaced by 2030 at the latest, even though they are the newest and
best Polish warships. Apart from that, the four Project 207 Kobben subs were
launched in the 60s and served almost 30 years in the Norwegian Navy before
their transfer to Poland, where they served another decade. The only reason
for satisfaction is the Coastal Missile Squadron [with Norwegian NSM missiles
capable of land-attack role] and the contract for another squadron.
Special Forces are in the best shape of all. Al of their equipment is modern and
battle tested. They are the pride and joy of the Polish Ministry of Defense
which is why they are maintained at such a high level.

To sum up: Polands armed forces are still using mostly obsolete equipment,
with only small proportion of it being truly modern. If the funding available
for modernization were used more effectively, Poland would have many new
weapons systems, and much of what is being used would have been consigned
to museums. The next 10 years will be crucial for the WP, because the service
life of most post-Soviet weapon systems will finally expire. They will have to be
withdrawn from service and replaced with new, modern ones in a fluid enough
fashion to ensure Polands tankers, pilots, and sailors were not deprived of
their ability to fight. One can only hope that the current programs will not be
delayed as in the past, and will be 100% successful. The only thing remaining
is to await the outcome of the 2013-2022 modernization plan.

J.Hawks Comment: Two key conclusions that can be drawn from this and
other similar recent materials are that, first, Poland no longer has the ability
to design modern weapon systems other than small arms, and second, it is
facing an avalanche of very costly and possibly over-ambitious procurement
programs in the next few years. They include upgrading the badly worn-out
Leopard 2 tank fleet, procuring 400 modern IFVs, 300 light tanks, over 100
artillery weapons, 30 attack helicopters, 80 general purpose helicopters, 3
submarines, 3 light frigates, medium- and long-range air defense
systems, not counting many other weapon systems, down to assault rifles,
which are also on the planning list. But there is no way by which all of these
plans can come to fruition. The planned equipment levels are comparable to
countries like France or Germany which, even though far wealthier, cannot
afford to maintain armored vehicle fleets any more, and have not pursued so
many modernization projects simultaneously. Poland is thus facing
structural disarmament due to its inability to replace its current equipment
park and is likely to lose come capabilities (like, for example, attack
helicopters) altogether.
One has to wonder what the political implications will be, especially since
they threaten to undermine the current Polish leaderships to transform the
country into the most powerful state in Central Europe. And yet at the
moment its technical capabilities are inferior to even Ukraines. Will that
force a reassessment of the policy of antagonizing the countrys both eastern
and western neighbors and expanding ones influence into former parts of
the pre-18th Century Polish Commonwealth (Ukraine, Belarus, Baltics), or is
the current leadership of the country hoping that the Anglo-Saxon powers
will view Polands belligerent policies as consistent with their aims and back
it militarily and politically? At the moment, all the indicators point at the
latter option, even though it threatens to plunge the country into an
untenable and even dangerous position.