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2. RANCE v. NLRC
Facts:
A CBA was wntered into on April 30, 1981 by and between
respondents Polybag Manufacturing Corpo and Polybag Workers
Union one of which is a stipulation that the former may dismiss any
employeeif they would join other organization aside from the
existing one.
Petitioners were among the 125 members of the respondent union
who were expelled by the latter for disloyalty in that they allegedly
joined the NAFLUa large federation. Because of the expulsion,
petitioners were dismissed by Respondent Corporation.
Petitioners contend that the requisites of due process were not
complied with in that, there was no impartial tribunal or union body
vested with authority to conduct the disciplinary proceeding under
the union constitution and by-laws, and, that complainants were not
furnished notice of the charge against them, nor timely notices of
the hearings on the same
Petitioners sued for reinstatement and backwages stating their
dismissal was without due process. Losing both in the decisions of
the NL Arbiter and NLRC, they elevated their cause to the SC
Issue:
w/o the dismissal was due to a just cause.
Held:
The court held that the dismissal was made in bad faith There was
indeed connivance between the corporation and the Union. The
facts show that even if the workers sought help from the union,
they were disregarded by the leaders, who were not dismissed.
Their plights were no heeded by the corporation. Therefore, the
main recourse is to seek help from NAFLU, but such act did not
authorize the federation (NAFLU) to represent them. Nor is it an act
of disloyalty based on the CBA.
The members did not even sign documents to prove the allegations.
In fact it is a mere act of preserving what they have; their jobs. The
state recognizes the right of the workers to security of tenure and
they may not be terminated without just cause, which in this case
was absent.
It is the policy of the state to assure the right of workers to
"security of tenure" (Article XIII, Sec. 3 of the New Constitution,
Section 9, Article II of the 1973 Constitution). The guarantee is an
act of social justice. When a person has no property, his job may
possibly be his only possession or means of livelihood. Therefore,
he should be protected against any arbitrary deprivation of his job.
Article 280 of the Labor Code has construed security of tenure
as meaning that "the employer shall not terminate the services of
an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by" the
code.
In the case at bar, the scandalous haste with which respondent
corporation dismissed 125 employees lends credence to the claim
that there was connivance between respondent corporation and
respondent Union. It is evident that private respondents were in
bad faith in dismissing petitioners. They, the private respondents,
are guilty of unfair labor practice.
RULING:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, (1) the decision of respondent National Labor
Relations Commission in NLRC-NCR-11-6881-82 dated April 26, 1984 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE; and (2) respondent corporation is ordered: (1)
to reinstate petitioners to their former positions without reduction in rank,
seniority and salary; (b) to pay petitioners three-year backwages, without
any reduction or qualification, jointly and solidarily with respondent Union;
and (c) to pay petitioners exemplary damages of P500.00 each. Where
reinstatement is no longer feasible, respondent corporation and respondent
union are solidarily ordered to pay, considering their length of service their
corresponding separation pay and other benefits to which they are entitled
under the law.
Issue:
1. w/o the termination of Bondocs employment was with just cause
2. The petitioner invokes the policy of the State to assure the right of
"workers" to security of tenure
Held:
1.
Under the peculiar or particular facts of this case the termination of
bondoc's employment was lawful and justified and that no grave
abuse of discretion was lawful and justified and that no grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction was committed by the
Presidential Executive Assistant in affirming the NLRC's decision
sustaining their termination of his employment.
Bondoc was not employed for a fixed period. He held his position of
department manager at the pleasure of the bank's board of
directors. He occupied a managerial position and his stay in therein
depended on his retention of the trust and confidence of the
management and whether there was any need for his services.
Although some vindictive motivation might have impelled the
aboliton of his position, yet, it is undeniable that the bank's board
of directors possessed the power to remove him and to determine
whether the interest of the bank justified the existence of his
department.
Under the old Termination Pay Law, it was held that in the absence
of a contract of employment for a specific period the employer has
the right to dismiss his employees at anytime with or without just
cause
It may be noted that under Policy Instructions No. 8 of the
Secretary of Labor "the employer is not required to obtain a
previous written clearnace to terminate managerial employees in
order to enable him to manage effectively".
2.
That guarantee is an act of social justice. When a person has no
property, his job may possibly be his only possession or means of
livelihood. Therefore, he should be protected against any arbitrary
and unjust deprivation of his job.
Article 280 of the Labor Code has construed security of tenure as
referring to regular employment and as meaning that "the employer
shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just
cause or when authorized by" the Code.
As already noted above, the facts of this case do not warrant the
conclusion that Bondoc's right to security of tenure was
oppressively abridged. He knew all along that his tenure as a
department manager rested in the discretion of the bank's board of
directors and that at anytime his services might be dispensed with
or his position might be abolished
Ruling:
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Presidential Executive Assistant is
affirmed with the modification that the Bank of the P.I. should pay to the
petitioner separation pay equivalent to his salary and allowances (if any) for
seven months.
Facts:
In October 1951, Premiere Productions, Inc. (PPI) filed a petition
with the Court of Industrial relations (CIR) seeking authority to lay-
off 44 workers on the ground of financial losses.
o on the ground that it was losing in the operation of its
business.
The union therein (Philippine Movie Pictures Workers Association)
opposed the petition as it averred that PPI is merely retaliating
against employees who joined a previous strike.
Judge Arsenio Roldan of the CIR then conducted an ocular
inspection. The inspection was attended by counsels for both
parties. The judge inspected some records and interrogated some
witnesses. The counsels for both parties were granted opportunities
to cross examine in said ocular inspection.
Thereafter, Judge Roldan granted PPI the authority to lay-off the 44
workers.
After shutting the studios, the company filed another petition with
the CIR for permission or authority to lease its equipments, studios,
and other facilities to Eddie Infante, Braulio Calma and others.
o The association objected to the proposed lease on the ground
that it was an attempt by the company to make use of its
properties through other persons which would mean
disturbance of the status quo while the dispute between the
association and the company was pending.
Then the company filed a motion to withdraw its petition saying
that it was convinced that the lease of its properties was a mere
exercise of its proprietary rights, and that court permission was
unnecessary.
o The motion was granted.
The company filed 3 petitions with the CIR for permission or
authority to lease its equipments, studios, and other facilities
o The association filed 3 urgent petitions with the CIR,
incidental case No. 98 V-8, for contempt and for injunction on
the ground that the company had no right to remove its
equipment from its studios to be leased
After the company had answered the three petitions for contempt
and injunction, by agreement of the parties, these three incidental
cases were heard jointly. During the hearing held before Presiding
Judge Roldan and in the presence of one Martin Dolorico, a
Commissioner of the CIR, the parties entered into a stipulation of
facts and stated therein their respective contention, after which,
both parties submitted the cases for decision without further
evidence. This was on October 7, 1952.
In the meantime, on April 18, 1953, the association filed a
"Supplemental petition to annul lease contracts and for contempt of
court and for injunction"
The association filed a "Motion for production of document" under
section 1, Rule 21, of the Rules of Court
o Thereafter, Commissioner Martin Dolorico filed his report,
which report was approved and completely adopted by Judge
Roldan
wherein he found that the leases of the equipment,
studios and other properties of the movie company to
third parties were not simulated but genuine
As to the supplemental petition to annul he lease contracts and for
contempt of court and for injunction filed on April 18, 1953 and the
motion filed on June 14th
o Judge Roldan held that they would be heard separately from
the incidental cases, for purposes of expediency. The decision
ended by denying the three petitions for injunction and for
contempt of court.
Upon motion for reconsideration by the association and over the
opposition of the company
o the CIR in banc by resolution dated November 13, 1953,
reconsidered the decision aforementioned and set it aside, as
premature, saying that before rendering a final decision, the
court should have awaited further presentation of evidence on
the supplemental petition of April 18, 1953, "so that all
ingredients for the proper disposal of the case would have
been complete."
ISSUE:
Whether or not an ocular inspection may be the basis, without
receiving full evidence, of determining the cause or motive of laying off
employees.
HELD: No. An ocular inspection does not satisfy the procedural
requirement. The petition for lay-off was predicated on the lack of work and
of the further fact that the company was incurring financial losses these
allegations cannot be proven simply by an ocular inspection. The parties,
especially the workers in this case, should not be deprived of their
opportunity to present evidence they may deem necessary to establish their
case in the main trial. Here, the main trial is absent because all that was
conducted was an ocular inspection such is tantamount to a deprivation of
their right to be heard. It is recognized that ones employment, profession,
or trade, or calling, is a property right and the wrongful interference
therewith is an actionable wrong. Therefore, the dismissal of the 44 workers
without opportunity to be heard is a violation of their property right.
The association has now filed these petitions for review by
certiorari, not only of the decision of Judge Roldan but also of the
resolution of the majority of the CIR, to set the same aside, and for
the rendition of another decision holding the leases entered into by
the movie company to be illegal and that the company and its
officers and agents be held to have committed contempt of court in
entering into those leases without authority of the CIR.
The majority of the Tribunal believe that it is unnecessary to go into
the merits of the present cases, because the resolution of the
majority of the CIR setting aside the decision of Judge Roldan, left
the cases without any decision to appeal from, and that said
resolution is in the nature of a mere interlocutory order, which is
not subject to appeal.
RULING:
In view of the foregoing, these petitions for certiorari are hereby
denied, and the cases are ordered remanded to the CIR for further
proceedings. No costs.
FACTS:
Rogelio is an employee of the Ibajay branch of MSDC, with Lim as
Branch Manager. In 1991, he availed himself of the SSS retirement benefits,
and in order to facilitate the grant of such benefits, he entered into an
internal arrangement with Chan and MSDC to the effect that MSDC would
issue a certification of his separation from employment notwithstanding that
he would continue working as a laborer in the Ibajay branch but it was only
on 1997 that Rogelio was paid his last salary but without retirement
benefits, he was 67 years old at that time.
Rogelio then filed the case for payment of his retirement benefits
before the Labor Arbiter. MSDC defense is that they were not engaged in
copra buying in Ibajay and they did not ever register in such business in any
government agency and that Lim is an independent copra buyer.
RATIO:
(1) In any controversy between a laborer and his master, doubts
reasonably arising from the evidence are resolved in favor of the laborer.
(2) The beneficent provisions of Article 287 of the Labor Code, is apart
from the retirement benefits that can be claimed by a qualified employee
under the social security law.
(3) The benefits was enacted as a labor protection measure and as a
curative statute to respond, in part at least, to the financial well-being of
workers during their twilight years soon following their life of labor, can be
extended not only from the date of its enactment but retroactively to the
time the employment contracts started."
APPLICABLE LAWS:
"ART. 287. Retirement. Any employee may be retired upon reaching
the retirement age established in the collective bargaining agreement or
other applicable employment contract.
"Unless the parties provide for broader inclusions, the term 'one-half
(1/2) month salary' shall mean fifteen (15) days plus one-twelfth (1/12) of
the 13th month pay and the cash equivalent of not more than five (5) days
of service incentive leaves. "Retail, service and agricultural establishments or
operations employing not more than ten (10) employees or workers are
exempted from the coverage of this provision.
HELD: YES
Article 94 of the Labor Code, as amended, affords a worker the
enjoyment of ten paid regular holidays (inclusive of
o 1. New Years Day January 1
o 2. Maundy Thursday Movable Date
o 3. Good Friday Movable Date
7. IBAA E U vs Inciong
Facts:
On June 20, 1975, the Union filed a complaint against the bank for
the payment of holiday pay before the then Department of Labor,
National Labor Relations Commission, Regional Office IV in Manila.
Conciliation having failed, and upon the request of both parties, the
case was certified for arbitration on 7 July 1975.
o The records disclosed that employees of respondent bank
were not paid their wages on unworked regular holidays as
mandated by the Code, particularly Article 208
Art. 208.Right to holiday pay.
(a) Every worker shall be paid his regular daily
wage during regular holidays, except in retail and
service establishments regularly employing less than 10
workers.
(b) The term "holiday" as used in this chapter,
shall include: New Year's Day, Maundy Thursday, Good
Friday, the ninth of April the first of May, the twelfth of
June, the fourth of July, the thirtieth of November, the
twenty-fifth and the thirtieth of December and the day
designated by law for holding a general election.
Issue:
Whether the Ministry of Labor is correct in determining that monthly
paid employees are excluded from the benefits of holiday pay.
Held:
RULING:
The Supreme Court granted the petition, set aside the order of the
Deputy Minister of Labor, and reinstated the 25 August 1975
decision of the Labor Arbiter Ricarte T. Soriano.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent, despite having executed a quitclaim, is entitled
to a grant of his additional monetary claims.
HELD: YES
The Petition has no merit.
Indeed, an employee cannot be dismissed except for cause, as
provided by law, and only after due notice and hearing. Employees
who are dismissed without cause have the right to be reinstated
without loss of seniority rights and other privileges; and to be paid
full back wages, inclusive of allowances and other benefits, plus
proven damages.
9. PNCC vs NLRC
Facts:
Private respondents Raul C. Abrico, Rodrigo Vasallo, Eduardo A.
Sibbaluca, and Benigno M. Manasis were deployed by herein
petitioner for overseas employment to Iraq as security guards
pursuant to individual appointment contracts dated April 15, 1985.
These were submitted to the POEA and were validated by the latter
on April 22, 1985. The contracts provided for a US$350.00/month
salary.
However, on May 12, 1985, a second overseas contract was
executed by the PNCC which was accepted by private respondents.
It modified the April 15, 1985 contract by providing for a monthly
salary of US$260.00 for the same position. The contract was for a
two-year period. When the period lapsed, private respondents were
repatriated and were extended local employment.
However, all of them filed their voluntary resignation effective
August 31, 1987 so that they could avail of more benefits under the
Retirement Program offered by the PNCC.
On August 17, 1987, private respondents filed a complaint before
the POEA for, among others,
o (a) non-payment of promotional pay increase for Raul C.
Abrico and Rodrigo J. Vasallo;
o (b) underpayment of salaries, overtime pay, bonuses, night
differential pay, sick leave, and vacation leave benefits;
o (c) assigning Friday overtime guarding duties to non-guards.
In disposing of the complaint, the POEA ruled as follows:
From the decision of the POEA, the PNCC appealed to the NLRC. It
alleged that the POEA erred in applying Article 34(i) of the Labor
Code; and in holding that the notice of employment, dated April 15,
1985, providing for a monthly salary of US$350.00 was the actual
overseas employment contract instead of the one dated May 12,
1985 which provided for a salary of US$260.00/month.
NLRC affirmed the decision of the POEA
The PNCC now finds fault in that decision by saying that the April
15, 1985 document was but a mere notice/offer of employment.
Petitioner alleges further that it was never signed and accepted by
private respondents.
o Consequently, it never became a binding contract between
the parties concerned. Petitioner further stated that the real
contract of employment was the one executed on May 12,
1985 which provided for a monthly salary of US$260.00 and
which was accepted by private respondents
Hence this petition
ISSUE:
Whether or not the monthly salary of herein complainants is
US$350.00 a month or US$260.00.
HELD:
As correctly invoked by complainants paragraph (1) of Article 34 of
the Labor Code prohibits the substitution or alteration of
employment contracts approved and verified by the Department of
Labor from the time (of) the actual signing thereof by the parties
up to and including the period of expiration of the same without the
approval of the Department of Labor.
While the allegations of the PNCC may cast doubt on the real nature
of the April 12, 1985 document, our Civil Code 7 states:
In case of doubt, all labor legislation and all labor contracts shall be
construed in favor of the safety and decent living for the laborers.
The mandate of the law for a liberal interpretation of labor contracts
in favor of the working man was applied in the case of Ditan vs.
POEA Administrator 8 where We made the following
pronouncement:
A strict interpretation of the cold facts before us might support the
position taken by the respondents. However, we are dealing here
not with an ordinary transaction but with a labor contract which
deserves special treatment and a liberal interpretation in favor of
the worker . . . the Constitution mandates the protection of labor
and the sympathetic concern of the State for the working class
conformably to the social justice
Under the policy of social justice, the law bends over backward to
accommodate the interests of the working class on the humane
justification that those with less privileges in life should have more
privileges in
RULING:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the questioned Resolution of
the NLRC is hereby AFFIRMED. Consequently, this petition is DISMISSED.
With costs.