http://www.inss.org.

il/publication/qatar-crisis-causes-implications-risks-need-compromise/

http://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/analytics/second-qatar-crisis-causes-and-possible-
solutions/

On 5 June 2017, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates and five
other states cut diplomatic ties with Qatar, accusing Doha of supporting terrorist
organisations and destabilising the situation in the Middle East.

senegal and Chad also recalled their ambassadors from Qatar. Saudi Arabia, the UAE and
Bahrain suspended flights to Qatar and shut their land borders with the country. To a large
extent, Qatars current conflict with Saudi Arabia and its allies is a recrudescence of old
controversies between these Gulf monarchies, dating back to the Arab Spring and
subsequent developments.

Cause of the Conflict

The primary long term cause of the crisis between the Saudi-led camp and the government of Qatar is
Dohas funding of and political support for politically active and sometimes violent Islamist groups,
often affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood. Qatars GCC allies feel threatened by the muslim
brotherhood Despite Saudi, Egyptian, and Emirati objections and the fact that it is the politically
and militarily weaker party, Qatar has continued to support its Islamist allies for several reasons
I.e. genuine ideological affinity; a sense, that political Islam was an ascendant force in the region
a drive to boost its global influence by being able to engage with these groups on behalf of the
international community; a desire to challenge the status quo

2 Qatars independent foreign policy and willingness to challenge Saudi leadership has consistently
weakened the notion of a Sunni Arab camp. In addition, Qatars use of the government-owned
media outlet al-Jazeera to magnify the Muslim Brotherhoods influence throughout the Arab world
and criticize leaders in Riyadh, Cairo, and Abu Dhabi has long been a serious thorn in regional
relations.
A second source of tension is Dohas accommodating stance toward Iran, which is seen by most of
the other Sunni-majority states in the Gulf as a growing threat to their security or even existence.
Over the last decade, the Qataris have taken steps such as voting against a UNSC resolution calling
on Iran to halt its nuclear enrichment program and signing a bilateral counterterrorism agreement
with Iran this approach is likely the result of both Qatars relative military weakness compared to
Iran as well as its economic interest in maintaining cooperation with the country with which it shares
the worlds largest gas field

Third, the Arab Spring which put the leadership and orientation of a number of regional states at
regional competition among most of the Sunni monarchies, Iran, and the Islamists
In some cases, such as Syria, Iran was the main beneficiary. Rather than consolidating efforts among
those opposed to both the Assad regime and ISIS and creating a cohesive moderate opposition force,
the competition between Saudi Arabia and Qatar drove them to support different and often
competing groups in Syria

or example, in the area surrounding Damascus, Riyadh funneled money and weapons to Jaysh al-
Islam while Qatar supported its rival Faylaq al-Rahman.

For example, in Egypt, the Saudis supported the traditional military-political establishment while the
Qataris supported the Muslim Brotherhood and its political organ, the Freedom and Justice Party

Fourth, President Trump's visit to Saudi Arabia, his first foreign visit to any country, was read in
Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and Cairo as a green light for them to punish Qatar for its support of Islamist
groups. Trump expressed an unqualified commitment to Riyadh and its allies in the region, with a
focus on containing Iran and fighting against radical Islam, signaling there would be no fallout from
the United States if they took steps to push Qatar back into line. Trump even took credit on Twitter
for bringing about the regional blockade of Qatar, and denounced Doha's leaders as "high-level
funders of terrorism," though his own Secretary of State had appealed for an easing of that
blockade. In this sense, the Saudi-led move was at once an opportunity for the GCC partners and
Egypt to punish their adversaries in Doha, please their allies in Washington, and remove attention
from their own shortcomings and challenges.

GCC-Qatar Crisis: Implications

Qatari citizens have been given two weeks to leave the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Bahrain. Diplomats were
given 48 hours. The three countries also banned their citizens from visiting Qatar.

Expatriates living in Qatar are no longer eligible for an Emirati visa on arrival.

Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt banned all forms of travel to and from Qatar. Saudi Arabia's
land border with Qatar was closed.

Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt have banned Qatari carriers from flying in their airspace.

Saudi Arabia and Bahrain have denied port access to all vessels flying the Qatari flag. The UAE's Abu
Dhabi Petroleum Ports Authority and Port of Fujairah expanded their ban to all vessels arriving from, or
destined to, Qatar regardless of their flag. LNG traffic has also experienced disruptions.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE have stopped exporting sugar to Qatar. There have been reports of people
stocking up on food supplies in the event of food shortages.

Saudi Arabia has shut down Al Jazeera TV operations in the kingdom. The UAE announced that people
expressing sympathy for Qatar on social media will be prosecuted with jail time and fines. Qatari news
websites have been banned in Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt.
Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain are limiting financial exposure to Qatar according to people familiar
with the matter.

Players Interests
Saudi Arabia and the UAE are probably considering a change of Qatars leadership,
possibly via military coup with the goal of placing someone fully loyal to the idea of Sunni
unity under Riyadhs control into power

Ankaras position might interfere with this scenario. With the Turkish leadership positioning
itself as Qatars closest ally since the Arab Spring, its credibility would suffer considerably if
it let another power shift happen in the country without interfering.

coup might negatively impact the United States image, since its military bases are primarily
considered as safeguards against external intervention. Moreover, since Qatar has Al
Udeid, one of the largest US bases in the Middle East, Washington will try to manage the
Qatari crisis with minimum damage to Doha.

cutting diplomatic ties and closing borders is over... it is not a way to resolve
crisis. These countries have no other option but to start regional dialog