Juan Luis Cabrera

80430312
PHIL 4351

Wittgenstein and the Private Language

The emergence and constitution of the philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein was one of
the most important cultural events in the last century, to such a degree that Wittgenstein could
well be considered the philosopher of the twentieth century. We cannot trace only the traces of
its influence in several generations of philosophers, but, moreover, its indelible imprint has been
projected into fields as dissimilar as psychology, linguistics, anthropology, sociology, and
literary criticism. Viewed from a more specific perspective, within the field of linguistics
(whether philosophical or not) his theses have been debated enormously about the need to refer
to a detailed analysis of the expressions of ordinary language as the way to solve problems
Theorists. It is in this sense that the Wittgensteinian doctrines in the field of structural and
generative linguistics have generally not been well received. It is enough to cite the works of
Jerrold J. Katz to show that Wittgenstein's approximations to language have not always been
well seen when compared with, to put a case, transformational generative grammar By Chomsky.
Indeed, in the face of this linguist - and in general compared with structural linguistics - the
interventions of the creator of Ordinary Language Philosophy have been considered by some
linguists as downright amateurs and to some extent superficial and accessory; Conclusions that
are, at least, debatable.

On the other hand, the importance of the manager of analytical philosophy should not
make us forget that in recent times his study is in sharp decline (mainly due to the endless
exegesis of the Wittgensteinian orthodoxy) and - as it seems the slope of the slope Of its interest
will continue to increase progressively. This is not surprising: Wittgenstein's influence is no
longer at its zenith after dominating for about five decades the colleges, institutes and centers of
philosophical research. Now philosophical fashions focus on the so-called postmodern thinking.

It is clear that his charismatic and particular way of facing the great problems of
philosophy has bewitched many and his followers have become a sort of secret sect whose
common goal is given by the interest of preserving the sacred scriptures and the true word of the
master. One would have to see how Wittgensteinians receive any criticism that violates their
mentor's opinions or how any challenge to the standards of interpretation is met with severe
homicidal fury. However, it should be noted that Wittgenstein's importance transcends the
uncritical and dogmatic attitudes of his unconditional followers and acolytes, so that
philosophers such as Richard Rorty, Wittgenstein's fluency for contemporary philosophy. From
our perspective, Wittgenstein is one of the thinkers who preludes what in the seventies of the
twentieth century begins to be called as postmodern thought, and precisely its importance lies in
the extent to which it anticipates some future discussions - for example, the Role of relativism -
in contemporary culture. Although for metaphysical thinkers - or even some educated in the rigor
of science - Wittgenstein is already overcome, his work continues to offer an analytical model, as
long as we set aside the blinkers of strict dogma, and let us not forget that Radical ideas always
have an immediate past; Thus, even the postmodern ones will have to recognize the debts
contracted with philosophers like Nietzsche and Heidegger, besides Wittgenstein.

Regardless of the unleashed passions [and without fully sharing the analytical paradigm
of our author, especially since once he abandons his first approximation to language (that is, to
the logical analysis of this one) he discards any possibility of logical study of that vehicle of
Human communication, an approach that has been tested in contemporary linguistics and which
has proven to be of enormous value, as well as verifying that a structural and logical study of
languages is possible without necessarily falling into the atrocious reductionism of
neopositivism]. Will focus on the revision of the primordial characteristics of the Wittgensteinian
view of language, particularly in the debate on the private language argument.

It is well known that Wittgenstein's philosophy operates as the deployment of a

systematic questioning of the discussions themselves. Fann has shown how, despite the imminent
evolution of his thinking, his conception of philosophy in Philosophical Investigations is
completely indebted to the one he held in the Tractatus logicophilosophicus, although it is true
that his last method is the frank denial of the first. The difference of the method in both works is
that while in the Tractatus the path that follows is the way of the logical analysis of language, in
the Investigations of what is at issue is to provide an opening to the thought - and this against Of
his earlier reductivism succeed in dissolving pseudo-classical problems of philosophy. 1 The
main objective of the Tractatus is to show why the problems of philosophy arise from a
fundamental misunderstanding of the logic of language, as well as to investigate the function and
structure of language. To achieve its objectives, Wittgenstein proposes to end philosophizing,
limiting the expression of thoughts, that is, language. And he ends up concluding that its
structure allows to be revealed by means of mathematical logic, and its function will be to
describe the world.

What are the defining characteristics of Wittgenstein's philosophical approach to

language? As Jacobo Muoz points out (1972: 23), the following are the basic corollaries of his
image of language: a) language is acquired through a specific learning process, b) it is impossible
to have a private language, c) There is a logic in the psychic processes concomitant with
language.

Language, in its immediate opacity and polysemy, has engendered many

misunderstandings. Superstitions about language are created on the basis of language itself. And
it is just of such superstitions as to be undone; for this reason, the philosophy will be to clarify
any terminological, semantic or syntactic mystification. For Wittgenstein, that language is not
diaphanous does not mean that there is a hidden, underlying support; in reality, there is nothing
hidden (similar to an essence) in language: it is only a question of seeing and describing its daily
functioning.

And since language works in its uses, one must ask questions directly about them. But language
is not unitary: it presents an innumerable variety of uses. These different types of language are
forms of life and, therefore, the primary thing in the language will not be the signification but the
use. The theoretical imperative simply expressed will be: you have to see how it works in its
common usage, and appreciate what its particular grammar. For this, a comparison of language
with games is illustrative. There are as many languages as language games. As we have warned,

1 Fann, 1975: 128-129

given that what is fundamental in language is how to use it, it is impossible to ensure that
language is a network of meanings independent of the lives of those who use it: on the contrary,
it is a framework integrated with the course of our lifetime. Language is complex of activities
governed by the rules of the game: it is a way of life. "The 'justification' or 'legitimation' of a
language game is based on its integration with vital activities and with reality. The unity of
language games is the family air: games form a family that is not reduced to a single meaning
"(Ferrater, 1966: 18).

Our relationship with reality is consumed in thinking because the doubling of self-world
reaches its maximum splendor in thinking. And since language is the means by which the self
and the world duplicate or refer to one another, we cannot but speak in terms of an inextricable
unit or functional set formed by the dual thinking-language. We know that it is impossible to
speak without thinking or thinking without speaking because from the very moment I think I
already speak inwardly. What then will be the difference between experience and thinking?
Primarily, experience is something that happens to us, is lived passively, as if the being of man
was a receptacle; The thinking we do, is a modifying praxis, constant action directed at objects,
an attempt to transgress what is purely experienced in a receptive way. If something can be
qualified as thought, that something must be expressed articulately by means of signs. Let us say
that thought has as an invaluable faculty the construction of an immediate and living bond with
reality. What is that bond? First, it will be given in the moment in which what I think is reality
itself; I point to her to show what I think. The proposition, the thought, lives in the linguistic
system; But this is not to say that we experience the system every time we use the proposition: in
the use of the expression is not the linguistic system present as such. That is why language is
neither a process, nor a state, nor something given: it is the system of an institutionalized,
socially agreed power. It is by virtue of this that for man it is feasible to express any meaning in
the system that is already there, to say something new. And this sense can be expressed without
knowing how we produce isolated systems.2 A language is a system and a proposition - being a
proposition of a language - is a part of the system. Hence, propositions are the members of a
language, of a system. And therefore, it is illusory to believe in the existence of unique,
intransmissible languages, because there is no single proposition. Tautologically expressed, any
proposition that makes sense says what it says, and nothing else: as a proposition, it does not
have to say what it does not say, but it could virtually say. We insist, language is a linguistic
praxis, an institutionalized power. Already the concept of language rests on the very concept of
understanding, on the concept of common form of life. In this way, the core of linguistic
communication will not be the transmission of information but the understanding within a
common act.3

2 Wittgenstein, 1984: 69

3 Wittgenstein, 1998: 277 y 278

 It is known that - prior to Wittgenstein's approach to the subject - no one had
systematically developed the thesis of the existence of a private language, that is, a private
foundation of language. Even so, such a topic has been of prime importance for contemporary
philosophy. In general terms we can argue that the problem about private languages is the
problem of how words mean. This is a problem very similar to the question of what a rule of
language is. Although the question of the existence of a private language had already been
approached by Wittgenstein in 1934-1936 in his Cambridge lecture notes (published in 1968)
(Wittgenstein 1979: 35-82), his first formulation " Public "problem appears in 1953 with the
edition of his philosophical Investigations. But what is the importance of such a problem? Let us
reply with Kenny's words:

... that such language is possible has a philosophical importance not so much as a question in its
own right, but because of its consequences for the epistemology and philosophy of mind ... many
traditional and influential philosophical theories held that a private language is possible;
Consequently, if private languages are impossible, such theories are false (Kenny, 1986: 179).

The problem of private language is the attempt to solve the following question: how to
transfer from individual subjective experience to objective (ie, intersubjective) experience? If we
agree that the latter is the basis of everyday life, science and the mediations of language in the
complex of social life, we can appreciate the extent of its scope.

On the other hand, let us remember that in this dispute against the practitioners of the
private language it is never specified who is the target of the attack. We assume that, in general,
Wittgenstein refers to a tacit assumption of modern philosophy as a whole. To understand this, it
will be necessary to remember that the perspective centered on the ego (Cartesian) has as its
main followers Descartes himself and to the classical and contemporary empiricism
(neopositivism or logical positivism) -and we might agree that these are the adversaries before
whom Wittgenstein throws his deadly darts. These latter doctrines seek to bridge the stumbling
blocks of skepticism inherent in such a conception of the solutions provided by a behavioral
version of language, knowledge and description of human behavior. His strategy is clear; both
logical resources appear as the limits of egocentrism: although they deny classical rationalism,
they keep intact their underlying fundamental assumptions. The general feature that distinguishes
it is that they manage to characterize all knowledge as a derivative that finds its foundation in the
private and immediate experiences of the subject. Each one - according to these epistemic
tendencies - learns, justifies and uses its concepts from private objects. If we want to trace the
genealogy of the problem, it is easy to identify Descartes as the philosopher who placed privacy
as the distinctive of the mental. As Villanueva points out, in the philosophy of Descartes:

... people appear as beings composed of soul and body ... [these] are two different substances and
as such have relations completely external and contingent. The soul or mind is a complete being
that can subsist on its own ... [and is characterized] as a spiritual or immaterial substance ... The
notion of privacy [implies that] ... if we postulate internal or private objects we will have
Something that the mind can occupy without having to resort to the material objects that are
unattainable, given the dualism ... To these private objects ... (Villanueva, 1979: 13 and 14).

Thus, the argument of the private language (ALP) serves to show that Cartesianism is
unintelligible, meaningless or fundamentally wrong. As already pointed out, deciding the
possibility of the existence of private language (LP) functions as a crucial experiment to
determine the validity of the philosophical theories that postulate it. Wittgenstein's first foray
into the path of critical criticism of the LP runs in the realm of rules. The same common sense-so
dear to this thinker-tells us that a rule is the clear symptom of the public (collective,
intersubjective) character of some activity. Certainly, following a rule is always a practice or
custom:4 presupposes a life form. That is why it is impossible to have private rules. All rules
have to be public so that they can be shared by several people.5

Language as a human activity is governed by rules and, as such, if it must be an effective

means of communication, there must be minimal agreement as to definitions and judgments. The
second incursion into the controversy against the exclusive, personal language is developed
within the scope of private newspapers.

A man can encourage himself, give orders, obey, censure, punish, ask a question and
answer. One could even imagine men who spoke only in monologue. They would accompany
their activities to themselves. An explorer who observed them and listened to their speeches
might be able to translate their language to ours (he would be in a position to correctly predict
the actions of these people, for he would also hear them form resolutions and decisions)
(Wittgenstein 1988: 219).

It is clear that the language of such imaginary human beings is not necessarily intelligible
language. By virtue of the limitations that are intrinsic to you, your privacy may only be verified
as a matter of fact. In such a way that the use of a private diary is only contingently private, since
the use of its expressions is parasitic of the use of prayers of our language. In fact, it is
impossible to communicate - with myself or with others - without a proper symbolic record, that
is, nothing can be said unless a language is known beforehand; And it is just the knowledge of a
language that is in question: from Wittgenstein's perspective it is impossible to know the
language privately. Certainly, I can have a secret code, but even such presupposes the previous
knowledge of another language that will serve as the basis and configuration framework (its
secret keys will be modeled around that one) (Rhees, 1979: 105). What, then, is a private
language? In paragraph 243 of the first part, Wittgenstein, in stating unequivocally the question
of the possibility of such a type of language, provides his definition of LP:

But would it also be conceivable a language in which one could write down or express his inner
experiences - his feelings, moods, etc. - for his own use? "Can not we do it in our ordinary
language?" "But that's not what I mean. The words of this language must refer to what can only be
known by the speaker, to his immediate, private sensations. Another cannot, therefore, understand
this language (Wittgenstein, 1988: 219).

Translated into the language of Kant: is it possible that judgments of perception are

4 Wittgenstein, 1988: 201

5 Ibid: 203
derived empirical judgments? In the language in question the speaker notes or verbalizes for his
own use internal type experiences. In fact, we all do this in ordinary language since we routinely
speak of sensations and give them certain names:

The elements involved in the specification of what he means by private language are the
following:

1) The words of that language must refer to what can only be known by the speaker.

2) The words of this language should refer to the immediate, private sensations of the speaker.

3) Another cannot understand this language.

Point 1 establishes the epistemic privacy of the objects referred to by the words of this
language; 2 establishes the ontic privacy of these objects; And 3 is presented as a consequence of
1 and 2 "(Garcia, 1979: 65 and 66).

From what can be seen, the very notion of private language rests on the interconnection
of two fundamental assumptions - and erroneous ones according to our thinker - about the nature
of both language and experience. The misunderstanding of experience is made clear by the fact
that experience is held to be private (and not socially constructed - through a learning mechanism
inscribed on the foundations of sociality - as Wittgenstein will show); The error with respect to
language is the belief - founded, as the Viennese philosopher will argue - that words acquire
meaning insofar as they are inextricably linked to an ostensive definition. So if, in a sedentary
LP, the connection between words and sensations were established through the natural
manifestations of sensations, then such language is not deprived by the simple fact that the others
can understand it - at least as a logical possibility -. In Wittgenstein, the categorically distinct
difference between the verbal-or intensive-definition and the ostensive definition is central to his
argument. For example, the author of a private diary would not be able to make the words used
by another,6 because it would be physically impossible to assign a verbal definition to him. The
impossibility of providing this is decisive because then the nexus between sign and sensation
should be designed based on an ostensible internal or private definition. Our author attacks the
idea of the primacy of the ostensive definition, since it rejects from the outset that the learning of
language is reduced to giving names to objects,7 that the act of naming - or attaching a sort of
label to a cosine - Use of the word. 8 What underlies such a conceptualization of ostensive
definition is the idea that the meaning of a word is the object of which the word is only a
representative: words are representative of objects, for they are in their place; therefore, to
understand the meaning of a word is to know the object it represents.9

6 Ibid: 225-227

7 Ibid: 43
8 Ibid.
9 Ibid: 57 y 59
 How do words relate to sensations? There does not seem to be any problem here; why do
not we talk about feelings every day and name them? But how is the connection of the name with
the named one established? The question is the same as this: how does a man learn the meaning
of the names of sensations? For example, the word "pain". Here is a possibility: the words are
connected with the primitive, natural expression of the feeling and put in its place. A child has
been hurt and shouts; then the adults talk to him and teach him exclamations and later prayers.
They teach the child a new behaviour of pain. "Do you say, then, that the word 'pain' really
means shouting? Unlike; The verbal expression of pain replaces it by shouting and does not
describe it "(Ibid .: 219).

In this section it is clearly seen that the flank of Wittgenstein's attack are ostensible
definitions: the model of the immediate and private assignment object / name that is rejected
revolves around the idea that a speaker understands a name by having apprehended his
sustenance the bearer. Here is criticizing the theory that someone can know what pain is only
from his own case, once he has experienced it. For this conception, pain, being a state, is
impossible to be transmitted.

The name I assign to a pain is just a label that I place for identification purposes. Thus,
the next time I suffer from pain, I will be able to search in my mind and verify if the experiences
- feelings - past and present exist; At that moment I would say: "Ah! It is the same sensation!
"Therefore, they mean the same thing. This formulation is derived from the assumption -
unfinished- that familiarity is precisely what involves meaning: it is only and exclusively the
own pain with which one is familiar, so it is from the perspective of the case itself that one
knows what is the pain. If this were all right, no one could teach another person the meaning of
the word pain: each speaker would name the feeling for himself by an ostensible and private
definition. In short, if by "name" one means "word whose meaning is learned by ostensive
definition," then "pain" is not the name of a sensation; but if by "name" one attributes the
meaning of what is ordinarily understood by that word, then of course "pain" is the name of a
sensation.

As we already see, Wittgenstein (1988: 225-227) legitimately raises the question of

whether humans could have a language for their sensations, even if they lack the natural
expressions of such sensations. The philosopher's answer is unequivocal: it is to ensure that when
we speak of giving a name to a sensation we are forgetting that if the mere act of naming is to
make sense, an enormous amount of scenery must be presupposed in the language, than to give
name to a Sensation must be presupposed its grammar, which shows the place in which the new
name is to be placed. Later he continues to argue with a fictitious situation:

"Let's imagine this case. I want to keep a diary about the repetition of a certain sensation.
To that end the association with the sign "S" and in a calendar I write this sign by day that I have
the sensation. In the first place I will observe that a definition of the sign can not be formulated.
But I can still give myself a kind of ostentatious definition! How? Can I point to the sensation?
Not in the ordinary sense. But I speak, or jot down the sign and at the same time concentrate my
attention on sensation-as if I were pointing it inwardly. But why this ceremony? Because only
something like that seems to be! A definition certainly serves to establish the meaning of a sign.
Well, this happens precisely by concentrating attention; therefore, by that means, I imprint the
connection of the sign with sensation. "I print it," however, can only mean: this process makes
me remember the future of the right connection. But in our case I have no criterion of correction.
I would like to say here: what is correct in any case seems correct. And this only means that we
can not speak of 'right' here (ibid .: 227).

It is clear that here the argumentative procedure will typically be a case of reduction to
the absurd. In the first place, Wittgenstein concedes that there is a speaker of a private language.
But here comes a whole problematic based on its nefarious epistemological consequences: the
first problem that arises to the hypothetical speaker of this paragraph is to be able to define to
itself what it is that can count as the same sensation. It is obvious that it will be impossible for
him to describe with the public language what would be the same thing in this case. It is subject
to the empire of its incommunicable language, it must rely on the pure ostensive definition.
When someone wants to say something with an ostensive definition, he is forced to show by his
gestures, body language, in short, by his practice and by what he has done and by what will be
done by rejecting or accepting certain objects in relation to Other uses of the name, that is, by
what he means. What makes ostension possible is a certain background of applications, which, in
the case of the hypothetical ostensible definition with the mind's eye, Wittgenstein believes
impossible. A type of performance is only regulated if there is a difference between its correct
and incorrect instances. If we strictly circumscribe it, in the mind there is - and can not be -
differences between being and appearance: how my feeling is determined by how it seems to me
to be. No definition in the mental environment could determine what it should count as
something similar to what occupies my consciousness now, because the definition of a term or
the description of a rule only fixes right and wrong through the practice of applying the rule Nor,
in the case of the mind, can the hypothetical practice of applying the rule also fix the difference
between right and wrong, because in the realm of the mental there is no difference between a
practice and its appearance. In the case of predicates such as pain the content is determined by
pre-linguistic expressions that fix the meaning of the predicate itself. And when there is no pre-
linguistic manifestation, the content of the manifestation must be fatally determined by the
independent meaning of the words used. In short, there is no private language, since language is
institutionalized power, since from the beginning it is the element of common vital praxis. A
private language presupposes the common and public language how would a (imaginary) private
language be? Three features should unfold: his words refer to what only the speaker knows, refer
to the private sensations of the speaker and, therefore, cannot understand another person. Thus
the examination of the question of the private diary reveals the inconsistency of an LP, and
consequently the very impossibility - both logical and empirical - of the existence of such a
language prevents traditional (philosophical) theories of The linguistic significance, the use of
language, verification, metaphysics, in short, of the model centered on the subject (egocentric)
fall by its own weight.

We have seen how Wittgenstein conceives the problem of private language. From our
perspective, the trait to be considered is the specific form in which Wittgenstein argues against
metaphysical elucidations such as that of the eminently personal language. We believe that it is
truly urgent - as in Wittgenstein's time - to avoid metaphysical misunderstandings, so that
philosophy ceases to be more than a kind of verbal ornament. Similarly, Wittgenstein's insistence
on the need to appreciate language games (which are by definition social, intersubjective, shared)
is of the utmost importance for understanding the transformations that have taken place in the
analysis of language, which is perfectly exemplified in The pragmatics, that linguistic discipline
that Wittgenstein would contribute to inaugurate.

Finally, we should emphasize that the importance of the problem of private language lies
in a specific theory of rationality (which in our author will always be socially constructed, which
places him within the dominant current of thought in sociology, anthropology and Psychology,
leaving aside the classic and sterile philosophical egology), and the discussion about the proper
features of reason and rationality in general remains open. In this Wittgensteinian polemic, the
positions they face are not simply referred to a belief concerning the existence or non-existence
of the private language. Moreover, what we appreciate is that they are competing models of
rationality. And it is necessary to recognize that in the contemporary world a type of private
grammar is admitted, that of the psychotic, and it is not surprising, since this type of subjects
lacks an adequate socialization (and, therefore, of immersion in the Symbolic code of the group).
Thus, we would appreciate that in the possibility of development of shared languages human
rationality, as opposed to the development of exclusive, personal, private grammars of the
mentally ill.

Thus, what Wittgenstein can clearly offer us are rudiments - albeit in a very unprocessed
and systematic way - of a theory of rationality. And this is why we would not agree with the
radical positions of some linguists who do not see our Viennese philosopher more than as a
distant antecedent that we must forget and refer to the attic of useless objects. Today, more than
ever, Wittgenstein can continue to be effective if we approach him from an anti-dogmatic,
critical and channeled perspective to the solution of specific problems, without believing (as with
his unconditional ones) that in his work we will find all relevant answers or points of view
Appropriate.
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