VICTORIA REGNER VS CYNTHIA LOGARTA order for the court to acquire jurisdiction over the respondents,
537 SCRA 277 Conflict of Laws Private International Law
Service of Summons Personal Action Real Action
Extraterritorial Service
FACTS:
Cynthia Logarta and Teresa Tormis were the daughters of Luis
Regner in his first marriage with Anicita Regner. Victoria
Regner is the second wife of Luis.
In 1999, Victoria alleged that Cynthia and Teresa with the help
of another sibling defrauded Luis, who was then very ill and
was unable to write, into placing his thumbmark into a Deed of
Donation. In said Deed, Luis purportedly donated a Proprietary
Ownership Certificate pertaining to membership shares in the
Cebu Country Club. Victoria alleged that said Deed is void
because the placing of thumbmark by Luis was done without
the latters free will and voluntariness considering his physical
state; that it was done without Luiss lawyer; that the ratification
made by Luis before he died is likewise void because of similar
circumstances.
In the same year, Victoria filed a complaint to annul said deed
with the RTC of Cebu. The sheriff could not deliver the
summonses against Cynthia and Teresa because apparently,
although they are Filipinos, they are not residing here; they are
residing in California. It was only in the year 2000 that one of
the summonses was served to one of the sisters, Teresa,
when she came back to the Philippines.
Teresa immediately filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
that Victoria failed to prosecute her case for an unreasonable
length of time. Naturally, Victoria opposed the MTD. Teresa, in
her rejoinder, alleged that the case should be dismissed
because Cynthia, who is an indispensable party, was not
issued any summons, hence, since an indispensable party is
not served with summons, without her who has such an
interest in the controversy or subject matter there can be no
proper determination of the case. The trial court ruled in favor
of Teresa; this was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: Whether or not the dismissal of Victorias complaint is
correct.
HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court agreed with the arguments
presented by Teresa. The Supreme Court also emphasized:
There are generally two types of actions: actions in rem and
actions in personam. An action in personam is an action
against a person on the basis of his personal liability, while an
action in rem is an action against the thing itself, instead of
against the person.
The certificate, subject of the donation, is a personal property.
The action filed by Victoria is therefore a personal action. So in
summons must be served upon them. Further, the certificate is
indivisible, Cynthias and Teresas interests thereto can only be
determined if both are summoned in court.
In personal actions, if the respondents are residents of the
Philippines, they may be served summons in the following
order:
1. Personal Service;
2. If (1) is not possible, Substituted Service;
3. If respondent cant be found because he is abroad but still
a resident of the Philippines, by publication with leave of
court.
In personal actions still, if the respondents are non-residents,
they may be served summons in the following manner:
1. Personal service through the Philippine embassy;
2. By publication in a newspaper of general circulation in
such places and for such time as the court may order, in
which case a copy of the summons and order of the court
should be sent by registered mail to the last known
address of the defendant; or
3. in any other manner which the court may deem sufficient.
The above must be with leave of court.
In the case at bar, Cynthia was never served any summons in
any of the manners authorized by the Rules of Court. The
summons served to Teresa cannot bind Cynthia. It is
incumbent upon Victoria to compel the court to authorize the
extraterritorial service of summons against Cynthia. Her failure
to do so for a long period of time constitutes a failure to
prosecute on her part.
***What if the petition is an action in rem? What are the
applicable rules?
If the action is in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant is not essential for giving the court
jurisdiction so long as the court acquires jurisdiction over the
res. If the defendant is a nonresident and he is not found in the
country, summons may be served extraterritorially in the
following instances:
1. when the action affects the personal status of the plaintiff;
2. when the action relates to, or the subject of which is
property within the Philippines, on which the defendant
claims a lien or an interest, actual or contingent;
3. when the relief demanded in such action consists, wholly
or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest in
property located in the Philippines; and
4. when the defendant non-residents property has been
attached within the Philippines.
In the above instances, summons may be effected by:
1. personal service out of the country, with leave of court;
2. publication, also with leave of court; or bar, Morada was already working in Manila when she was
3. any other manner the court may deem sufficien summoned by her superior to go to Saudi Arabia to meet with
a Saudia Airlines officer. She was not informed that she was

SAUDI ARABIAN AIRLINES VS COURT OF APPEALS
297 SCRA 469 CONFLICT OF LAWS PRIVATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW SITUS LOCUS ACTUS
FACTS:
Milagros Morada was working as a stewardess for Saudia
Arabian Airlines. In 1990, while she and some co-workers were
going to appear in a court trial. Clearly, she was defrauded into
appearing before a court trial which led to her wrongful
conviction. The act of defrauding, which is tortuous, was
committed in Manila and this led to her humiliation, misery, and
suffering. And applying the torts principle in a conflicts case,
the SC finds that the Philippines could be said as a situs of the
tort (the place where the alleged tortious conduct took place).
BANCO DO BRASIL VS COURT OF APPEALS

in a lay-over in Jakarta, Indonesia, an Arab co-worker tried to 333 SCRA 545 Conflict of Laws Private International Law

rape her in a hotel room. Fortunately, a roomboy heard her cry Service of Summons in In Personam Cases

for help and two of her Arab co-workers were arrested and FACTS:

detained in Indonesia. Later, Saudia Airlines re-assigned her to

In 1989, Cesar Urbino, Sr. sued Poro Point Shipping Services
work in their Manila office. While working in Manila, Saudia
for damages the former incurred when one of the latters ship
Airlines advised her to meet with a Saudia Airlines officer in
ran aground causing losses to Urbino. Urbino impleaded
Saudi. She did but to her surprise, she was brought to a Saudi
Banco Do Brasil (BDB), a foreign corporation not engaged in
court where she was interrogated and eventually sentenced to
business in the Philippines nor does it have any office here or
5 months imprisonment and 289 lashes; she allegedly violated
any agent. BDB was impleaded simply because it has a claim
Muslim customs by partying with males. The Prince of Makkah
over the sunken ship. BDB however failed to appear multiple
got wind of her conviction and the Prince determined that she
times. Eventually, a judgment was rendered and BDB was
was wrongfully convicted hence the Prince absolved her and
adjudged to pay $300,000.00 in damages in favor of Urbino for
sent her back to the Philippines. Saudia Airlines later on
BDB being a nuisance defendant.
dismissed Morada. Morada then sued Saudia Airlines for
damages under Article 19 and 21 of the Civil Code. Saudia
BDB assailed the said decision as it argued that there was no
Airlines filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the RTC
valid service of summons because the summons was issued to
has no jurisdiction over the case because the applicable law
the ambassador of Brazil. Further, the other summons which
should be the law of Saudi Arabia. Saudia Airlines also prayed
were made through publication is not applicable to BDB as it
for other reliefs under the premises.
alleged that the action against them is in personam.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court acquired jurisdiction over
ISSUE: Whether or not Saudia Airlines contention is correct.
Banco Do Brasil.

HELD:
HELD:
No. Firstly, the RTC has acquired jurisdiction over Saudia
No. Banco Do Brasil is correct. Although the suit is originally in
Airlines when the latter filed a motion to dismiss with petition
rem as it was BDBs claim on the sunken ship which was used
for other reliefs. The asking for other reliefs effectively asked
as the basis for it being impleaded, the action nevertheless
the court to make a determination of Saudia Airliness rights
became an in personam one when Urbino asked for damages
hence a submission to the courts jurisdiction.
in the said amount. As such, only a personal service of
Secondly, the RTC has acquired jurisdiction over the case
summons would have vested the court jurisdiction over BDB.
because as alleged in the complaint of Morada, she is bringing
Where the action is in personam, one brought against a person
the suit for damages under the provisions of our Civil Law and
on the basis of his personal liability, jurisdiction over the person
not of the Arabian Law. Morada then has the right to file it in
of the defendant is necessary for the court to validly try and
the QC RTC because under the Rules of Court, a plaintiff may
decide the case. When the defendant is a non-resident,
elect whether to file an action in personam (case at bar) in the
personal service of summons within the state is essential to the
place where she resides or where the defendant resides.
acquisition of jurisdiction over the person. This cannot be done,
Obviously, it is well within her right to file the case here
however, if the defendant is not physically present in the
because if shell file it in Saudi Arabia, it will be very
country, and thus, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over his
disadvantageous for her (and of course, again, Philippine Civil
person and therefore cannot validly try and decide the case
Law is the law invoked).
against him.

Thirdly, one important test factor to determine where to file a

case, if there is a foreign element involved, is the so called
locus actus or where an act has been done. In the case at
 KAZUHIRO HASEGAWA VS MINORU KITAMURA
538 SCRA 261 Conflict of Laws Private International Law
Jurisdiction Lex Loci Celebrationis Lex Loci Solutionis
State of the Most Significant Relationship Forum Non
Conveniens
FACTS:
In March 1999, Nippon Engineering Consultants Co., Ltd, a
Japanese firm, was contracted by the Department of Public
Works and Highways (DPWH) to supervise the construction of
the Southern Tagalog Access Road. In April 1999, Nippon
entered into an independent contractor agreement (ICA) with
Minoru Kitamura for the latter to head the said project. The ICA
was entered into in Japan and is effective for a period of 1 year
(so until April 2000). In January 2000, DPWH awarded the
Bongabon-Baler Road project to Nippon. Nippon subsequently
assigned Kitamura to head the road project. But in February
2000, Kazuhiro Hasegawa, the general manager of Nippon
informed Kitamura that they are pre-terminating his contract.
Kitamura sought Nippon to reconsider but Nippon refused to
negotiate. Kitamura then filed a complaint for specific
performance and damages against Nippon in the RTC of Lipa.
Hasegawa filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
contract was entered in Japan hence, applying the principle of
lex loci celebracionis, cases arising from the contract should be
cognizable only by Japanese courts. The trial court denied the
motion. Eventually, Nippon filed a petition for certiorari with the
Supreme Court.
Hasegawa, on appeal significantly changed its theory, this time
invoking forum non conveniens; that the RTC is an
inconvenient forum because the parties are Japanese
nationals who entered into a contract in Japan. Kitamura on
the other hand invokes the trial courts ruling which states that
matters connected with the performance of contracts are
regulated by the law prevailing at the place of performance, so
since the obligations in the ICA are executed in the Philippines,
courts here have jurisdiction.
ISSUE: Whether or not the complaint against Nippon should be
dismissed.
HELD:
No. The trial court did the proper thing in taking cognizance of
it. In the first place, the case filed by Kitamura is a complaint
for specific performance and damages. Such case is incapable
of pecuniary estimation; such cases are within the jurisdiction
of the regional trial court.
Hasegawa filed his motion to dismiss on the ground of forum
non conveniens. However, such ground is not one of those
provided for by the Rules as a ground for dismissing a civil
case.
The Supreme Court also emphasized that the contention that
Japanese laws should apply is premature. In conflicts cases,
there are three phases and each next phase commences when
one is settled, to wit:
1. Jurisdiction Where should litigation be initiated? Court
must have jurisdiction over the subject matter, the parties,
the issues, the property, the res. Also considers, whether
it is fair to cause a defendant to travel to this state; choice
of law asks the further question whether the application of
a substantive law which will determine the merits of the
case is fair to both parties.
2. Choice of Law Which law will the court apply? Once a
local court takes cognizance, it does not mean that the
local laws must automatically apply. The court must
determine which substantive law when applied to the
merits will be fair to both parties.
3. Recognition and Enforcement of Judgment Where can
the resulting judgment be enforced?
This case is not yet in the second phase because upon the
RTCs taking cognizance of the case, Hasegawa immediately
filed a motion to dismiss, which was denied. He filed a motion
for reconsideration, which was also denied. Then he bypassed
the proper procedure by immediately filing a petition for
certiorari. The question of which law should be applied should
have been settled in the trial court had Hasegawa not
improperly appealed the interlocutory order denying his MFR.
ASIAVEST LIMITED VS COURT OF APPEALS
295 SCRA 469 Conflict of Laws Private International Law
Service of Summons to a Non Resident Processual
Presumption
FACTS:
In 1984, a Hong Kong court ordered Antonio Heras to pay
US$1.8 million or its equivalent, with interest, to Asiavest Ltd.
Apparently, Heras guaranteed a certain loan in Hong Kong and
the debtor in said loan defaulted hence, the creditor, Asiavest,
ran after Heras. But before said judgment was issued and even
during trial, Heras already left for good Hong Kong and he
returned to the Philippines. So when in 1987, when Asiavest
filed a complaint in court seeking to enforce the foreign
judgment against Heras, the latter claim that he never received
any summons, not in Hong Kong and not in the Philippines. He
also claimed that he never received a copy of the foreign
judgment. Asiavest however contends that Heras was actually
given service of summons when a messenger from the Sycip
Salazar Law Firm served said summons by leaving a copy to
one Dionisio Lopez who was Heras son in law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the foreign judgment can be enforced
against Heras in the Philippines.
HELD:
No. Although the foreign judgment was duly authenticated
(Asiavest was able to adduce evidence in support thereto) and
Heras was never able to overcome the validity of it, it cannot
be enforced against Heras here in the Philippines because
Heras was not properly served summons. Hence, as far as
Philippine law is concerned, the Hong Kong court has never
acquired jurisdiction over Heras. This means then that
Philippine courts cannot act to enforce the said foreign
judgment.
The action against Heras is an action in personam and as far
as Hong Kong is concerned, Heras is a non resident. He is a
non resident because prior to the judgment, he already
abandoned Hong Kong. The Hong Kong law on service of
summons in in personam cases against non residents was
never presented in court hence processual presumption is
applied where it is now presumed that Hong Kong law in as far
as this case is concerned is the same as Philippine laws. And
under our laws, in an action in personam wherein the
defendant is a non-resident who does not voluntarily submit
himself to the authority of the court, personal service of
summons within the state is essential to the acquisition of
jurisdiction over her person. This method of service is possible
if such defendant is physically present in the country. If he is
not found therein, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over his
person and therefore cannot validly try and decide the case
against him. Without a personal service of summons, the Hong
Kong court never acquired jurisdiction. Needless to say, the
summons tendered to Lopez was an invalid service because
the same does not satisfy the requirement of personal service.
MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION VS NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION
343 SCRA 1 Private International Law Forum Non
Conveniens
FACTS:
In May 1988, Marcelo Santos was an overseas worker in
Oman. In June 1988, he was recruited by Palace Hotel in
Beijing, China. Due to higher pay and benefits, Santos agreed
to the hotels job offer and so he started working there in
November 1988. The employment contract between him and
Palace Hotel was however without the intervention of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). In
August 1989, Palace Hotel notified Santos that he will be laid
off due to business reverses. In September 1989, he was
officially terminated.
In February 1990, Santos filed a complaint for illegal dismissal
against Manila Hotel Corporation (MHC) and Manila Hotel
International, Ltd. (MHIL). The Palace Hotel was impleaded but
no summons were served upon it. MHC is a government
owned and controlled corporation. It owns 50% of MHIL, a
foreign corporation (Hong Kong). MHIL manages the affair of
the Palace Hotel. The labor arbiter who handled the case ruled
in favor of Santos. The National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) affirmed the labor arbiter.
ISSUE: Whether or not the NLRC has jurisdiction over the
case.
HELD:
No. The NLRC is a very inconvenient forum for the following
reasons:
1. The only link that the Philippines has in this case is the
fact that Santos is a Filipino;
2. However, the Palace Hotel and MHIL are foreign
corporations MHC cannot be held liable because it
merely owns 50% of MHIL, it has no direct business in the
affairs of the Palace Hotel. The veil of corporate fiction
cant be pierced because it was not shown that MHC is
directly managing the affairs of MHIL. Hence, they are
separate entities.
3. Santos contract with the Palace Hotel was not entered
into in the Philippines;
4. Santos contract was entered into without the intervention
of the POEA (had POEA intervened, NLRC still does not
have jurisdiction because it will be the POEA which will
hear the case);
5. MHIL and the Palace Hotel are not doing business in the
Philippines; their agents/officers are not residents of the
Philippines;
Due to the foregoing, the NLRC cannot possibly determine all
the relevant facts pertaining to the case. It is not competent to
determine the facts because the acts complained of happened
outside our jurisdiction. It cannot determine which law is
applicable. And in case a judgment is rendered, it cannot be
enforced against the Palace Hotel (in the first place, it was not
served any summons).
The Supreme Court emphasized that under the rule of forum
non conveniens, a Philippine court or agency may assume
jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so provided:
(1) that the Philippine court is one to which the parties may
conveniently resort to;
(2) that the Philippine court is in a position to make an
intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and
(3) that the Philippine court has or is likely to have power to
enforce its decision.
None of the above conditions are apparent in the case at bar.
FIRST PHILIPPINE INTERNATIONAL BANK VS CA
252 SCRA 259 Conflict of Laws Private International Law
Origin of Forum Non Conveniens
FACTS:
Producers Bank (now called First Philippine International
Bank), which has been under conservatorship since 1984, is
the owner of 6 parcels of land. The Bank had an agreement
with Demetrio Demetria and Jose Janolo for the two to
purchase the parcels of land for a purchase price of P5.5
million pesos. The said agreement was made by Demetria and
Janolo with the Banks manager, Mercurio Rivera. Later
however, the Bank, through its conservator, Leonida
Encarnacion, sought the repudiation of the agreement as it
alleged that Rivera was not authorized to enter into such an
agreement, hence there was no valid contract of sale.
Subsequently, Demetria and Janolo sued Producers Bank. The
regional trial court ruled in favor of Demetria et al. The Bank
filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals.
Meanwhile, Henry Co, who holds 80% shares of stocks with
the said Bank, filed a motion for intervention with the trial court.
The trial court denied the motion since the trial has been
concluded already and the case is now pending appeal.
Subsequently, Co, assisted by ACCRA law office, filed a
separate civil case against Carlos Ejercito as successor-in-
interest (assignee) of Demetria and Janolo seeking to have the
purported contract of sale be declared unenforceable against
the Bank. Ejercito et al argued that the second case constitutes
forum shopping.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is forum shopping.
HELD:
Yes. There is forum shopping because there is identity of
interest and parties between the first case and the second
case. There is identity of interest because both cases sought to
have the agreement, which involves the same property, be
declared unenforceable as against the Bank. There is identity
of parties even though the first case is in the name of the bank
as defendant, and the second case is in the name of Henry Co
as plaintiff. There is still forum shopping here because Henry
Co essentially represents the bank. Both cases aim to have the
bank escape liability from the agreement it entered into with
Demetria et al.
The Supreme Court also discussed that to combat forum
shopping, which originated as a concept in international law,
the principle of forum non conveniens was developed. The
doctrine of forum non conveniens provides that a court, in
conflicts of law cases, may refuse impositions on its jurisdiction
where it is not the most convenient or available forum and the
parties are not precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere.
**Forum Shopping: occurs when a party attempts to have his
action tried in a particular court or jurisdiction where he feels
he will receive the most favorable judgment or verdict.
MENANDRO LAUREANO VS COURT OF APPEALS
324 SCRA 414 Conflict of Laws Private International Law
Proof of Foreign Law - Applicability of Foreign Laws
FACTS:
In 1978, Menandro Laureano was hired as a pilot by the
Singapore Airlines Limited (SAL). In 1982 however, SAL was
hit by recession and so it had to lay off some
employees. Laureano was one of them. Laureano asked for
reconsideration but it was not granted. Aggrieved, Laureano
filed a labor case for illegal dismissal against SAL. But in 1987,
he withdrew the labor case and instead filed a civil case for
damages due to illegal termination of contract against SAL.
Laureano filed the case here in the Philippines. SAL moved for
the dismissal of the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
The motion was denied. On trial, SAL alleged that the
termination of Laureano is valid pursuant to Singaporean law.
The trial court ruled in favor of Laureano. SAL appealed the
case raising the issue of lack of jurisdiction, non-applicability of
Philippine laws, and estoppel, among others. The Court of
Appeals reversed the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not Singaporean Law is applicable to this
case.
HELD:
No. The specific Singaporean Law which holds valid the
dismissal of Laureano is not proved in court. As such, the trial
court cannot make a determination if the termination is indeed
valid under Singaporean Law. Philippine courts do not take
judicial notice of the laws of Singapore. SAL has the burden of
proof. SAL failed to prove such law hence Philippine law shall
apply. However, the case must be dismissed on the ground of
estoppel. Under our laws, all money claims arising from
employer-employee relationships must be filed within three
years from the time the cause of action accrued. Laureanos
cause of action accrued in 1982 when he was terminated but
he only filed the money claim in 1987 or more than three years
from 1982. Hence he is already barred by prescription.
OMANFIL INTERNATIONAL MANPOWER DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION VS NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION
00 SCRA 213 Conflict of Laws Private International Law
Proof of Foreign Law
FACTS:
In February 1993, Hyundai Engineering and Construction Co.,
Ltd., through its local agent, Omanfil International Manpower
Development Corporation, engaged Eduardo Felipe to work as
a rigger in Malaysia. In June 1993, the ferry boat in which
Eduardo was assigned met an accident. His body was never
found.
A provision in the Malaysia labor law provides:
Where death has resulted from the injury, a lump sum equal
to forty five months earnings or fourteen thousand four
hundred ringgit [RM], whichever is the less;
A local labor office in Malaysia then wrote a letter to Hyundai
advising the latter of the computation it arrived at, to wit;
45 months x US $620.04 (monthly salary of Eduardo) = US
$27,902.02.
RM14,400 which is equivalent to US $5,393.29 is less than US
$27,902.02, hence, Hyundai deposited the lesser amount with
the said labor office.
The wife of Eduardo, Lora Felipe, does not agree that Hyundai
is liable for the lesser amount hence she filed a labor case
against Hyundais agent, Omanfil. The labor arbiter ordered
Omanfil to pay $27,902.02 to Lora. This was affirmed by the
National Labor Relations Commission. It was ruled that the
Malaysian labor law is susceptible to two interpretations
because it is vague; that in case of doubt of labor laws, it must
be construed in favor of the laborer.
ISSUE: Whether or not the National Labor Relations is correct.
HELD:
No. The Malaysian Law in question is not vague. Clearly what
is due to Lora as death benefit (for her dead husband) is
14,400 Malaysian Ringgit since that amount is less than US
$27,902.02. Further, it appears that the Director General of
Labor of Malaysia certified that Eduardo is only entitled to a
maximum of RM14,000.00 pursuant to the labor law in
question. This certification is duly authenticated by Mr. Bayani
V. Mangibin, our Consul General in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
Such authentication of the said Certification, which provides an
interpretation of said foreign labor law by none other than the
Director of Labor of Malaysia is proof of the foreign law.
Further still, this was never contested by Lora.
WILDVALLEY SHIPPING CO., LTD. VS COURT OF
APPEALS
342 SCRA 213 Conflict of Laws Private International Law
Proof of Foreign Law
FACTS:
In the Orinoco River in Venezuela, it is a rule that ships
passing through it must be piloted by pilots familiar to the river.
Hence, in 1988 Captain Nicandro Colon, master of Philippine
Roxas, a ship owned by Philippine President Lines, Inc. (PPL),
obtained the services of Ezzar Vasquez, a duly accredited pilot
in Venezuela to pilot the ship in the Orinoco River.
Unfortunately, Philippine Roxas ran aground in the Orinoco
River while being piloted by Vasquez. As a result, the stranded
ship blocked other vessels. One such vessel was owned
Wildvalley Shipping Co., Ltd. (WSC). The blockade caused
$400k worth of losses to WSC as its ship was not able to make
its delivery. Subsequently, WSC sued PPL in the RTC of
Manila. It averred that PPL is liable for the losses it incurred
under the laws of Venezuela, to wit: Reglamento General de la
Ley de Pilotaje and Reglamento Para la Zona de Pilotaje No 1
del Orinoco. These two laws provide that the master and
owner of the ship is liable for the negligence of the pilot of the
ship. Vasquez was proven to be negligent when he failed to
check on certain vibrations that the ship was experiencing
while traversing the river.
ISSUE: Whether or not Philippine President Lines, Inc. is liable
under the said Venezuelan laws.
HELD:
No. The two Venezuelan Laws were not duly proven as fact
before the court. Only mere photocopies of the laws were
presented as evidence. For a copy of a foreign public
document to be admissible, the following requisites are
mandatory:
(1) It must be attested by the officer having legal custody of the
records or by his deputy; and
(2) It must be accompanied by a certificate by a secretary of
the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consular
or consular agent or foreign service officer, and with the seal of
his office.
And in case of unwritten foreign laws, the oral testimony of
expert witnesses is admissible, as are printed and published
books of reports of decisions of the courts of the country
concerned if proved to be commonly admitted in such courts.
Failure to prove the foreign laws gives rise to processual
presumption where the foreign law is deemed to be the same
as Philippine laws. Under Philippine laws, PPL nor Captain
Colon cannot be held liable for the negligence of Vasquez.
PPL and Colon had shown due diligence in selecting Vasquez
to pilot the vessel. Vasquez is competent and was a duly
accredited pilot in Venezuela in good standing when he was
engaged.
EDI-STAFFBUILDERS INTERNATIONAL, INC. VS
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION
537 SCRA 409 Conflict of Laws Private International Law
Proof of Foreign Law
In 1993, EDI-Staffbuilders, Inc. (EDI), upon request of Omar
Ahmed Ali Bin Bechr Est. (OAB), a company in Saudi Arabia,
sent to OAB resumes from which OAB can choose a computer
specialist. Eleazar Gran was selected. It was agreed that his
monthly salary shall be $850.00. But five months into his
service in Saudi Arabia, Gran received a termination letter and
right there and then was removed from his post. The
termination letter states that he was incompetent because he
does not know the ACAD system which is required in his line of
work; that he failed to enrich his knowledge during his 5 month
stay to prove his competence; that he is disobedient because
he failed to submit the required daily reports to OAB. Gran then
signed a quitclaim whereby he declared that he is releasing
OAB from any liability in exchange of 2,948.00 Riyal.
When Gran returned, he filed a labor case for illegal dismissal In 1985, the High Court of Malaysia ordered the Philippine
against EDI and OAB. EDI in its defense averred that the
National Construction Corporation (PNCC) to pay $5.1 million
dismissal is valid because when Gran and OAB signed the
to Asiavest Merchant Bankers (M) Berhad. This was the result
employment contract, both parties agreed that Saudi labor
laws shall govern all matters relating to the termination of of a recovery suit filed by Asiavest against PNCC in Malaysia

Grans employment; that under Saudi labor laws, Grans
termination due to incompetence and insubordination is valid;
that Grans insubordination and incompetence is outlined in the
termination letter Gran received. The labor arbiter dismissed
the labor case but on appeal, the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) reversed the decision of the arbiter. The
Court of Appeals likewise affirmed the NLRC.
for PNCCs failure to complete a construction project there
despite due payment from Asiavest. Despite demand, PNCC
failed to comply with the judgment in Malaysia hence Asiavest
filed a complaint for the enforcement of the Malaysian ruling
against PNCC in the Philippines. The case was filed with the
Pasig RTC which eventually denied the complaint. The Court

of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Saudi labor laws should be applied.

Asiavest appealed. In its defense, PNCC alleged that the

HELD:
No. The specific Saudi labor laws were not proven in court. foreign judgment cannot be enforced here because of want of

EDI did not present proof as to the existence and the specific jurisdiction, want of notice to PNCC, collusion and/or fraud,
provisions of such foreign law. Hence, processual presumption and there is a clear mistake of law or fact. Asiavest assailed
applies and Philippine labor laws shall be used. Under our
the arguments of PNCC on the ground that PNCCs counsel
laws, an employee like Gran shall only be terminated upon just
participated in all the proceedings in the Malaysian Court.
cause. The allegations against him, at worst, shall only merit a
suspension not a dismissal. His incompetence is not proven
ISSUE: Whether or not the Malaysian Court judgment should
because prior to being sent to Saudi Arabia, he underwent the
required trade test to prove his competence. The presumption be enforced against PNCC in the Philippines.

therefore is that he is competent and that it is upon OAB and

EDI to prove otherwise. No proof of his incompetence was ever HELD:
adduced in court. His alleged insubordination is likewise not
Yes. PNCC failed to prove and substantiate its bare
proven. It was not proven that the submission of daily track
allegations of want of jurisdiction, want of notice, collusion
records is part of his job as a computer specialist. There was
also a lack of due process. Under our laws, Gran is entitled to and/or fraud, and mistake of fact. On the contrary, Asiavest

the two notice rule whereby prior to termination he should
receive two notices. In the case at bar, he only received one
and he was immediately terminated on the same day he
received the notice.
Lastly, the quitclaim may not also release OAB from liability.
Philippine laws is again applied here sans proof of Saudi laws.
Under Philippine Laws, a quitclaim is generally frowned upon
and are strictly examined. In this case, based on the
circumstances, Gran at that time has no option but to sign the
quitclaim. The quitclaim is also void because his separation
pay was merely 2,948 Riyal which is lower than the $850.00
was able to present evidence as to the validity of the
proceedings that took place in Malaysia. Asiavest presented
the certified and authenticated copies of the judgment and the
order issued by the Malaysian Court. It also presented
correspondences between Asiavests lawyers and PNCCs
lawyers in and out of court which belied PNCCs allegation that
the Malaysian court never acquired jurisdiction over it. PNCCs
allegation of fraud is not sufficient too, further, it never invoked
the same in the Malaysian Court.

monthly salary (3,190 Riyal). The Supreme Court notes, to assail a foreign judgment the

party must present evidence of want of jurisdiction, want of

notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or

ASIAVEST MERCHANT BANKERS (M) BERHAD VS
fact. Otherwise, the judgment enjoys the presumption of
COURT OF APPEALS
on February 27, 2013 validity so long as it was duly certified and authenticated. In

this case, PNCC failed to present the required evidence.

361 SCRA 489 Conflict of Laws Private International Law

Foreign Judgments How Assailed

PHILIPPINE ALUMINUM WHEELS, INC. VS FASGI
ENTERPRISES, INC.

FACTS:
 Conflict of Laws Private International Law Foreign
Judgments When May It Be Enforced
FACTS:
In 1978, FASGI Enterprises Inc. (FASGI), a foreign corporation
organized under the laws of California, USA, entered into a
contract with Philippine Aluminum Wheels, Inc. (PAWI), a
Philippine corporation, whereby the latter agrees to deliver
8,594 wheels to FASGI. FASGI received the wheels and so it
paid PAWI $216,444.30. Later however, FASGI found out that
the wheels are defective and did not comply with certain US
standards. So in 1979, FASGI sued PAWI in a California court.
In 1980, a settlement was reached but PAWI failed to comply
with the terms of the agreement. A second agreement was
made but PAWI was again remiss in its obligation. The
agreement basically provides that PAWI shall return the
purchase price in installment and conversely, FASGI shall
return the wheel in installment. PAWI was only able to make
two installments (which were actually made beyond the
scheduled date). FASGI also returned the corresponding
number of wheels. Eventually in 1982, FASGI sought the
enforcement of the agreement and it received a favorable
judgment from the California court. PAWI is then ordered to
pay an equivalent of P252k plus damages but FASGI was not
ordered to return the remaining wheels. PAWI was not able to
comply with the court order in the US. So in 1983, FASGI filed
a complaint for the enforcement of a foreign judgment with
RTC-Makati. Hearings were made and in 1990, the trial judge
ruled against FASGI on the ground that the foreign judgment
is tainted with fraud because FASGI was not ordered to return
the remaining wheels (unjust enrichment) and that PAWIs
American lawyer entered into the agreements without the
consent of PAWI. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed
the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the foreign judgment may be enforced
here in the Philippines.
HELD:
Yes. The judgment is valid. A valid judgment rendered by a
foreign tribunal may be recognized insofar as the immediate
parties and the underlying cause of action are concerned so
long as it is convincingly shown that there has been an
opportunity for a full and fair hearing before a court of
competent jurisdiction; that trial upon regular proceedings has
been conducted, following due citation or voluntary
appearance of the defendant and under a system of
jurisprudence likely to secure an impartial administration of
justice; and that there is nothing to indicate either a prejudice in
court and in the system of laws under which it is sitting or fraud
in procuring the judgment. A foreign judgment is presumed to
be valid and binding in the country from which it comes, until a
contrary showing, on the basis of a presumption of regularity of
proceedings and the giving of due notice in the foreign forum.
In this case, PAWI was very well represented in the California
court. PAWIs insistence that its American lawyer colluded with
FASGI; that he entered into the compromise agreement
without PAWIs authority is belied by the fact that PAWI initially
complied with the agreement. It did not disclaim the
agreement. It sent two installments (though belatedly) but
failed to comply on the rest. It cannot now aver that the
agreement is without its authority. Further, it is just but fair for
the California court not to order FASGI to return the remaining
wheels because of PAWIs arrears.
PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RECLAIM PRACTICE OF LAW
OF BENJAMIN DACANAY
540 SCRA 424 Civil Law Private International Law
Nationality Theory Practice of Law is Reserved for Filipinos
FACTS:
In 1998, Atty. Benjamin Dacanay went to Canada to seek
medical help. In order for him to take advantage of Canadas
free medical aid program he became a Canadian citizen in
2004. In 2006 however, he re-acquired his Philippine
citizenship pursuant to Republic Act 9225 of the Citizenship
Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003. In the same year, he
returned to the Philippines and he now intends to resume his
practice of law.
ISSUE: Whether or not Benjamin Dacanay may still resume his
practice of law.
HELD:
Yes. As a rule, the practice of law and other professions in the
Philippines are reserved and limited only to Filipino citizens.
Philippine citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar.
So when Dacanay became a Canadian citizen in 2004, he
ceased to have the privilege to practice law in the Philippines.
However, under RA 9225, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a
citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost his
Philippine citizenship if he reacquires his Filipino citizenship in
accordance with RA 9225. Hence, when Dacanay reacquires
his Filipino citizenship in 2006, his membership to the
Philippine bar was deemed to have never been terminated.
But does this also mean that he can automatically resume his
practice of law right after reacquisition?
No. Dacanay must still comply with several conditions before
he can resume his practice of law, to wit:
(a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership
dues in the IBP;
(b) the payment of professional tax;
(c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory
continuing legal education; this is especially significant to

refresh the applicant/petitioners knowledge of Philippine laws
and update him of legal developments and
(d) the retaking of the lawyers oath which will not only remind
him of his duties and responsibilities as a lawyer and as an
officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to maintain
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines.
Compliance with these conditions will restore his good
standing as a member of the Philippine bar.
TONGOL vs. TONGOL
FACTS:
On August 19, 1996, Orlando filed before the RTC of Makati
City a verified petition for the declaration of nullity of his
marriage with Filipinas on the ground that the latter is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with her essential
marital obligations. Orlando Tongol alleged that Filipinas was
unable to perform her duty as a wife because of Filipinas
unbearable attitude that will lead to their constant quarrel. In
her Answer with Counter-Petition, Filipinas admitted that efforts
at reconciliation have been fruitless and that their marriage is a
failure. However, she claims that their marriage failed because
it is Orlandos insufficiency to fulfill his obligation as married
man. Both parties underwent a psychological exam which
proved that the respondent Filipinas Tongol has a
psychological insufficiency.
ISSUE: Does the psychological problem of Mrs. Filipina Tongol
enough to compel the court to nullify their marriage?
HELD:
No, as elucidated in Molina the psychological incapacity must
exist during the ceremony of the marriage, the psychological
incapacity must be apparent as to the extent that the other
party is incapable the significance of their marriage and lastly,
the malady must be incurable. The definition or manifestation
of marriage must within the scope of article 36of the Family
Code. As in the present case, the psychological sufficiency of
Mrs Tongol is not severe that would render her incapable of
recognize the sanctity of her marital contract with her husband,
second, Dr. Villegas failed to prove the that the ailment is
incurable. As to the facts of the psychological examination
report say: the emotional malady iscused merely by rejection of
Mrs. Tongol by her mother when she was young. Further, the
facts of the case did not show thatMrs. Tongol did not care
about the welfare of their children.And the financial issue as
being cited in the facts, the courtdeemed that such phenomena
is natural in evry marriage andcan be settled easily. Hence the
court dismissed the petitionof the nullity of marriage.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CIPRIANO ORBECIDO
III
GR. No. 154380, 5 October 2005
Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where
one party is later naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a
valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry, can the
Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?
FACTS:
On 24 May 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M.
Villanueva and their marriage was blessed with a son and a
daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly
V. Orbecido.
In 1986, his wife left for the United States bringing along their
son Kristoffer. A few years later, Cipriano discovered that his
wife had been naturalized as an American citizen and
sometime in 2000, learned from his son that his wife had
obtained a divorce decree. His wife then married Innocent
Stanley and is now currently living in San Gabriel, California
with her child by him. Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial
court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 of the Family Code (FC). No opposition was filed.
Finding merit in the petition, the court granted the same. The
Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent can remarry under Art. 26
of the Family Code
HELD:
The petition is granted. The OSG contends that par. 2 Art. 26
of FC is not applicable to the instant case because it only
applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage
celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien.
Furthermore, the OSG argues there is no law that governs the
respondents situation. The OSG posits that this is a matter of
legislation and not of judicial determination.
The respondent admits that Art. 26 is not directly applicable to
his case, but insists that since his naturalized alien wife
obtained a divorce decree which capacitated her to remarry, he
is likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section
12, Article II of the Constitution. The Court noted that the
petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial court
actually constituted a petition for declaratory relief. The
requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must
be a justiciable controversy; (2) the controversy must be
between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the
party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy;
and (4) that the issue is ripe for judicial determination. This
case satisfies all the requisites for the grant of a petition for
declaratory relief.
Article 26 does not appear to govern the situation presented by
the case at hand. It seems to apply only to cases where at the
time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties are a
Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one where
at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two
Filipino citizens, but later on, the wife was naturalized as an
American citizen and subsequently obtained a divorce granting
her capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an
American citizen while residing in the USA
Congress of the Philippines
Twelfth Congress
Third Regular Session
Begun held in Metro Manila on Monday, the twenty-eighth day
of July, two thousand three.
Republic Act No. 9225 August 29, 2003
AN ACT MAKING THE CITIZENSHIP OF PHILIPPINE
CITIZENS WHO ACQUIRE FOREIGN CITIZENSHIP
PERMANENT.
AMENDING FOR THE PURPOSE COMMONWEALTH ACT.
NO. 63, AS AMENDED AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the Philippines in Congress assembled:
Section 1. Short Title this act shall be known as the
"Citizenship Retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003."
Section 2. Declaration of Policy - It is hereby declared the
policy of the State that all Philippine citizens of another country
shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship
under the conditions of this Act.
Section 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship - Any provision of
law to the contrary notwithstanding, natural-born citizenship by
reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country
are hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine citizenship
upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:
"I _____________________, solemny swear (or affrim) that I
will support and defend the Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by
the duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby
declare that I recognize and accept the supreme authority of
the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance
thereto; and that I imposed this obligation upon myself
voluntarily without mental reservation or purpose of evasion."
 Natural born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity
of this Act, become citizens of a foreign country shall retain
their Philippine citizenship upon taking the aforesaid oath.
Section 4. Derivative Citizenship - The unmarried child,
whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen (18)
years of age, of those who re-acquire Philippine citizenship
upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed citizenship of the
Philippines.
Section 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities - Those who
retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship under this Act shall
enjoy full civil and political rights and be subject to all attendant
liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of the
Philippines and the following conditions:
(1) Those intending to exercise their right of surffrage must
Meet the requirements under Section 1, Article V of the
Constitution, Republic Act No. 9189, otherwise known as "The
Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003" and other existing
laws;
(2) Those seeking elective public in the Philippines shall meet
the qualification for holding such public office as required by
the Constitution and existing laws and, at the time of the filing
of the certificate of candidacy, make a personal and sworn
renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship before any public
officer authorized to administer an oath;
(3) Those appointed to any public office shall subscribe and
swear to an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and its duly constituted authorities prior to their
assumption of office: Provided, That they renounce their oath
of allegiance to the country where they took that oath;
(4) Those intending to practice their profession in the
Philippines shall apply with the proper authority for a license or
permit to engage in such practice; and
(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public
office in the Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended
to, those who:
(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the
country of which they are naturalized citizens; and/or
(b) are in active service as commissioned or non-
commissioned officers in the armed forces of the country which
they are naturalized citizens.
Section 6. Separability Clause - If any section or provision of
this Act is held unconstitutional or invalid, any other section or
provision not affected thereby shall remain valid and effective.
Section 7. Repealing Clause - All laws, decrees, orders, rules
and regulations inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are
hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 8. Effectivity Clause This Act shall take effect after
fifteen (15) days following its publication in theOfficial
Gazette or two (2) newspaper of general circulation.
Approved,
FRANKLIN DRILON JOSE DE VENECIA JR.
President of the Senate Speaker of the House of Representatives
This Act, which is a consolidation of Senate Bill No. 2130 and
House Bill No. 4720 was finally passed by the the House of
Representatives and Senate on August 25, 2003 and August
26, 2003, respectively.
OSCAR G. YABES ROBERTO P. NAZARENO
Secretary of Senate Secretary General
House of Represenatives
Approved: August 29, 2003
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO
President of the Philippines
VAN DORN vs. HON. ROMILLO and RICHARD UPTON
G.R. No. L-68470
October 8, 1985
FACTS:
Petitioner Alice Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines while
private respondent Richard Upton is a citizen of the USA. They
were married in Hongkong in 1972 and begot two children. The
parties were divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982. Alice has then
re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
In 1983, Richard filed suit against Alice in the RTC-Pasay,
stating that Alices business in Ermita, Manila is conjugal
property of the parties, and asking that Alice be ordered to
render an accounting of that business, and that Richard be
declared with right to manage the conjugal property.
Alice moved to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause
of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce
proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had
acknowledged that he and petitioner had no community
property as of June 11, 1982.
The Court below (presiding judge: Judge Romillo) denied the
MTD in the mentioned case on the ground that the property
involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce
Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is now the
subject of this certiorari proceeding.
ISSUE: What is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties
and their alleged conjugal property in the Philippines?
HELD:
Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to
dismiss the Complaint
For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine
whether the property relations between Alice and Richard, after
their marriage, were upon absolute or relative community
property, upon complete separation of property, or upon any
other regime. The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada
divorce of the parties.
The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had
obtained jurisdiction over petitioner who appeared in person
before the Court during the trial of the case. It also obtained
jurisdiction over private respondent who authorized his
attorneys in the divorce case to agree to the divorce on the
ground of incompatibility in the understanding that there were
neither community property nor community obligations.
As explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney he executed in
favor of the law firm of KARP & GRAD LTD. to represent him in
the divorce proceedings:
xxx xxx xxx
You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to
file an Answer, appear on my behalf and do all things
necessary and proper to represent me, without further
contesting, subject to the following:
1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of
incompatibility.
2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by
the Court.
3. That there are no community obligations to be adjudicated
by the court.
xxx xxx xxx
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada
divorce in any of the States of the United States. The decree is
binding on private respondent as an American citizen. What he
is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and
binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law
and public policy.
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in
Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are
covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same
being considered contrary to our concept of public police and
morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which
may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in
Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from
the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves
the marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no
longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to
sue in the case below as petitioners husband entitled to
exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the
Decision of his own countrys Court, which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not
repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before
said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
property
GERBERT R. CORPUZ VS. DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS
AND THE SOLICITOR GENERAL
G.R. No. 186571, August 11, 2010
FACTS:
Petitioner (Gerbert Corpuz) is a former Filipino citizen who
became a Canadian citizen through naturalization.
Subsequently, the petitioner married the respondent (Daisylyn
Sto. Tomas), a Filipina, in Pasig City. After the wedding,
petitioner went back to Canada due to work commitments;
however, when he came back he was shocked to discover that
the respondent is having an affair with another man. Thus,
petitioner went back to Canada and filed a petition for divorce.
The Superior Court of Justice, Windsor, Ontario, Canada
granted the petitioners petition for divorce. The divorce decree
took effect a month later, January 8, 2006.
Two years later, the petitioner has already moved on and
found another woman that he wants to marry. Thus, for his
love to his fiance; the petitioner went to the Pasig Civil
Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on
his and the respondents marriage certificate. Despite the
registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National
Statistics Office (NSO) informed the petitioner that the
marriage between him and the respondent still subsists under
the Philippine Law and to be enforceable, the foreign divorce
decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent
Philippine court, pursuant to NSO Circular No. 4, Series of
1982.
Accordingly, the petitioner filed a petition for judicial recognition
of foreign divorce and/or declaration of marriage dissolved with
the RTC. The RTC denied his petition, hence this recourse by
the petitioner.
ISSUE: Whether or not the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court
of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign divorce
decree.
RULING: No.
Even though the trial court is correct in its conclusion that the
alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code as the substantive right it
establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse due to the given
the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and as such the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code limits its
applicability for the benefit of the Filipino spouse.
However, we qualify the above conclusion made by the trial
court because in our jurisdiction, the foreign divorce decree is
presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with legal
interest to petitions for its recognition. Even though, the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code bestows no rights in
favor of aliens- with the complementary statement that his
conclusion is not a sufficient basis to dismiss the petition filed
by Corpuz before the RTC. the unavailability of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not
necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for
the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign
divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and conformity with
the aliens national law have been duly proven according to our
rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in
favor of Gerbert, pursuant to Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments.
This Section states:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.The
effect of a judgment or final order of a tribunal of a foreign
country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final
order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing,
the judgment or final order is conclusive upon the title of the
thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the
judgment or final order is presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by
evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the
foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a party with the requisite
interest to institute an action before our courts for the
recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we
have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an alien
abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the
divorce is valid according to his or her national law.
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce
judgment is the acknowledgment that our courts do not take
judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera
explained that, as a rule, no sovereign is bound to give effect
within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of
another country. This means that the foreign judgment and its
authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on
evidence, together with the aliens applicable national law to
show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or herself.
The recognition may be made in an action instituted
specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party
invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his claim or
defense.
In Gerberts case, since both the foreign divorce decree and
the national law of the alien, recognizing his or her capacity to
obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign
authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes
into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official
publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal
custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are
not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by
a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer
in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country
in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of
his office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy
of the divorce decree, as well as the required certificates
proving its authenticity, but failed to include a copy of the
Canadian law on divorce. Under this situation, we can, at this
point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of supporting
evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the
case to the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is
consistent with the Canadian divorce law.
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of
action, given the Article 26 interests that will be served and the
Filipina wifes (Daisylyns) obvious conformity with the petition.
A remand, at the same time, will allow other interested parties
to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a petitioners
presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction,
want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of
law or fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken
to ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is
made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have
the effect of res judicata between the parties, as provided in
Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the
practice of reciprocal recognition of foreign judgments between
nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign judgments of
divorce serves as the deeper basis for extending judicial
recognition and for considering the alien spouse bound by its
terms. This same effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for
the Filipino spouse were it not for the substantive rule that the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides.
Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce
decree.
LLORENTE VS CA
345 scra 592
Nationality Principle
FACTS:
Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente was married before a
parish priest. Before the outbreak of war, Lorenzo departed for
the United States and Paula was left at the conjugal home.
Lorenzo was naturalized by the United State. After the
liberation of the Philippines he went home and visited his wife
to which he discovered that his wife was pregnant and was
having an adulterous relationship. Lorenzo returned to the US
and filed for divorce. Lorenzo married Alicia LLorente; they
lived together for 25 years and begot 3 children. Lorenzo on
his last will and testament bequeathed all his property to Alicia
and their 3 children. Paula filed a petition for letters
administration over Lorenzos estate. The RTC ruled in favor of
Paula. On appeal, the decision was modified declaring Alicia
as co-owner of whatever properties they have acquired.
Hence, this petition to the Supreme Court.
ISSUES: Whether or not the divorce obtained by Lorenzo
capacitated him to remarry. Who are entitled to inherit from the
late Lorenzo Llorente?
HELD:
In Van Dorn vs Ramillo Jr. the Supreme Court held that owing
to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy
against absolute divorce. In the same case, the Court ruled
that aliens may obtain divorce abroad provided that they are
valid according to their national law. The Supreme Court held
that divorce obtained by Lorenzo from his first wife Paula was
valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity.
The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court of origin
for the determination of the intrinsic validity of Lorenzos will
and determine the successional rights allowing proof of foreign
law. The deceased is not covered by our laws on family rights
and duties, status, condition and legal capacity since he was a
foreigner.
RODOLFO SAN LUIS VS FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS-SAN
LUIS
Bigamy Void Marriage
During his lifetime, Felicisimo (Rodolfos dad) contracted three
marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March
17, 1942 out of which were born six children. On August 11,
1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
FACTS:
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee
Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on
October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a
Complaint for Divorce before the Family Court of the First
Circuit, State of Hawaii, which issued a Decree Granting
Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on December
14, 1973. On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married Felicidad San
Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos. He had no children with
respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their
marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992. Upon death
of his dad Rodolfo sought the dissolution of their conjugal
partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimos estate.
On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of
administration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
Rodolfo claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file
the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo
since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally
married to Merry Lee. Felicidad presented the decree of
absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit,
State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to
Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that
Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of
paragraph 2 Article 26 of the Family Code.
Rodolfo asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family
Code cannot be given retroactive effect to validate
respondents bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this
would impair vested rights in derogation of Article 256.
ISSUE: Whether or not Felicidads marriage to Felicisimo is
bigamous.
HELD:
The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which
absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested
Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition
as Felicisimos surviving spouse. However, the records show
that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the
divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of
respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A.
In Garcia v. Recio, the Court laid down the specific guidelines
for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It

held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is
insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due execution
must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a
writing or document may be proven as a public or official
record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication
or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal
custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the
Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a
certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in
the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of
his office.
With regard to respondents marriage to Felicisimo allegedly
solemnized in California, U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of
the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the Family
Law Act of California which purportedly show that their
marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As stated
in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of
foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved.
The case should be remanded to the trial court for further
reception of evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry
Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.
PILAPIL vs. HON IBAY-SOMERA, VICTOR AND GEILING et
al
G.R. No. 80116
June 30, 1989
FACTS:
Petitioner Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private
respondent Erich Geiling, a German national, were married in
Germany. After about three and a half years of marriage, such
connubial disharmony eventuated in Geiling initiating a divorce
proceeding against Pilapil in Germany. The Local Court,
Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce
on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses.
More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree,
Geiling filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal
of Manila alleging in one that, while still married to said Geiling,
Pilapil had an affair with a certain William Chia. The Assistant
Fiscal, after the corresponding investigation, recommended the
dismissal of the cases on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence. However, upon review, the respondent city fiscal
Victor approved a resolution directing the filing of 2 complaint
for adultery against the petitioner. The case entitled PP
Philippines vs. Pilapil and Chia was assigned to the court
presided by the respondent judge Ibay-Somera.
A motion to quash was filed in the same case which was
denied by the respondent. Pilapil filed this special civil action
for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a TRO, seeking
the annulment of the order of the lower court denying her
motion to quash.
As cogently argued by Pilapil, Article 344 of the RPC thus
presupposes that the marital relationship is still subsisting at
the time of the institution of the criminal action for adultery.
ISSUE: Did Geiling have legal capacity at the time of the filing
of the complaint for adultery, considering that it was done after
obtaining a divorce decree?
HELD:
WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioners MTQ
is SET ASIDE and another one entered DISMISSING the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The TRO issued in this
case is hereby made permanent.
NO
Under Article 344 of the RPC, the crime of adultery cannot be
prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by the
offended spouse. It has long since been established, with
unwavering consistency, that compliance with this rule is a
jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended
spouse to institute the action, it necessarily follows that such
initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation
to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is a
logical consequence since the raison detre of said provision of
law would be absent where the supposed offended party had
ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the time of
the filing of the criminal case.
Stated differently, the inquiry would be whether it is necessary
in the commencement of a criminal action for adultery that the
marital bonds between the complainant and the accused be
unsevered and existing at the time of the institution of the
action by the former against the latter.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a
valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany,
is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be
recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is
concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on
the matter of status of persons Under the same considerations
and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband
of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery
case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at
the time he filed suit.
REPUBLIC VS IYOY
(G.R. NO. 152577)
FACTS:
The case is a petition for review by the RP represented by the
Office of the Solicitor General on certiorari praying for the
reversal of the decision of the CA dated July 30, 2001 affirming
the judgment of the RTC declaring the marriage of Crasus L.
Iyoy(respondent) and Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and void based on
Article 36.
On December 16, 1961 Crasus Iyoy and Ada Rosal-Iyoy
married each other, they had 5 children. In 1984, Fely went to
the US, in the same year she sent letters to Crasus asking him
to sign divorce papers. In 1985, Crasus learned that Fely
married an American and had a child. Fely went back to the
Philippines on several occasions, during one she attended the
marriage of one of her children in which she used her
husbands last name as hers in the invitation.
March 25, 1997, Crasus filed a complaint for declaration of
nullity alleging that Felys acts brought danger and dishonor
to the family and were manifestations of her psychological
incapacity. Crasus submitted his testimony, the certification of
the recording of their marriage contract, and the invitation
where Fely used her new husbands last name as evidences.
Fely denied the claims and asserted that Crasus was a
drunkard, womanizer, had no job, and that since 1988 she was
already an American citizen and not covered by our laws. The
RTC found the evidences sufficient and granted the decree; it
was affirmed in the CA.
ISSUE:
Does abandonment and sexual infidelity per se constitute
psychological incapacity?
HELD:
The evidences presented by the respondent fail to establish alien at the time she obtained divorce, and such is valid in
psychological incapacity. theircountrys national law.

Furthermore, Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or Thus, Fe D. Quita is no longer recognized as a wife of Arturo.
inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital She cannot be the
obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less,
ill will, on the part of the errant spouse. Irreconcilable primary beneficiary or will be recognized as surviving spouse
differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and of Arturo.
irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual
infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by themselves, also
do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the
said Article. AZNAR VS. GARCIA 7 S 95

Finally, Article 36 is not to be confused with a divorce law Details

thatcuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore
manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness Category: Civil Law Jurisprudence
afflicting aparty even before the celebration of marriage. It is a
malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of FACTS:
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial
bond one is about to assume.
Edward S. Christensen, though born in New York,

migrated to California where he resided and consequently was

QUITA VS COURT OF APPEALS
considered a California Citizen for a period of nine years to
December 22, 1998 1913. He came to the Philippines where he became a

FACTS: domiciliary until the time of his death. However, during the

Fe D. Quita, the petitioner, and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, entire period of his residence in this country, he had always
were married in the Philippines on May 18, 1941. They got
considered himself as a citizen of California.
divorce in San Francisco on July 23, 1954.Both of them
remarried another person. Arturo remarried Bladina Dandan,
the respondent herewith. They were blessed with six children. In his will, executed on March 5, 1951, he instituted

On April 16, 1972, when Arturo died, the trial court was set to an acknowledged natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen as
declared as to who will be the intestate heirs. The trial court his only heir but left a legacy of some money in favor of Helen
invoking Tenchavez vs Escano case held that the divorce
acquired by the petitioner is not recognized in our country. Christensen Garcia who, in a decision rendered by the
Private respondent stressed that the citizenship of petitioner
Supreme Court had been declared as an acknowledged
was relevant in the light of the ruling in Van Dorn v. Rommillo
Jr that aliens who obtain divorce abroad are recognized in the natural daughter of his. Counsel of Helen claims that under Art.
Philippnes provided they are valid according to their national
law. The petitioner herself answered that she was an American 16 (2) of the civil code, California law should be applied, the
citizen since 1954. Through the hearing she also stated that
matter is returned back to the law of domicile, that Philippine
Arturo was a Filipino at the time she obtained the divorce.
Implying the she was no longer a Filipino citizen. law is ultimately applicable, that the share of Helen must be

The Trial court disregarded the respondents statement. The increased in view of successional rights of illegitimate children
net hereditary estate was ordered in favor the Fe D. Quita and
under Philippine laws. On the other hand, counsel for daughter
Ruperto, the brother of Arturo. Blandina and thePadlan
children moved for reconsideration. On February 15, 1988 Maria , in as much that it is clear under Art, 16 (2) of the Mew
partial reconsideration was granted declaring the Padlan
children, with the exception of Alexis, entitled to one-half of the Civil Code, the national of the deceased must apply, our courts
estate to the exclusion of Ruperto Padlan, and the other half to
must apply internal law of California on the matter. Under
Fe Quita.Private respondent was not declared an heir for her
marriage to Arturo was declared void since it was celebrated California law, there are no compulsory heirs and consequently
during the existence of his previous marriage to petitioner.
Blandina and her children appeal to the Court of Appeals that a testator should dispose any property possessed by him in
the case was decided without a hearing in violation of the
absolute dominion.
Rules of Court.

ISSUE: ISSUE: Whether Philippine Law or California Law should

(1) Whether or not Blandinas marriage to Arturo void ab initio. apply.

(2) Whether or not Fe D. Quita be declared the primary

HELD:
beneficiary as surviving spouse of Arturo.

HELD: The Supreme Court deciding to grant more successional rights

No. The marriage of Blandina and Arturo is not void. The to Helen Christensen Garcia said in effect that there be two
citizenship of Fe D.Quita at the time of their divorce is relevant
rules in California on the matter.
to this case. The divorce is valid here since she was already an

1. The conflict rule which should apply to
Californians outside the California, and
2. The internal Law which should apply to
California domiciles in califronia.
The California conflict rule, found on Art. 946 of the
California Civil code States that if there is no law to the
contrary in the place where personal property is situated, it is
deemed to follow the decree of its owner and is governed by
the law of the domicile.
Christensen being domiciled outside california, the
law of his domicile, the Philippines is ought to be followed.
Wherefore, the decision appealed is reversed and
case is remanded to the lower court with instructions
that partition be made as that of the Philippine law
provides.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE VS JUDGE LANTION
GR No 139465 ,Jan 18,2000
FACTS:
On January 13, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos
issued Presidential Decree No. 1069 "Prescribing the
Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed
Crimes in a Foreign Country". The Decree is founded on: the
doctrine of incorporation under the Constitution; the mutual
concern for the suppression of crime both in the state where it
was committed and the state where the criminal may have
escaped; the extradition treaty with the Republic of Indonesia
and the intention of the Philippines to enter into similar treaties
with other interested countries; and the need for rules to guide
the executive department and the courts in the proper
implementation of said treaties. On November 13, 1994, then
Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon, representing the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in
Manila the "Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United
States of America On June 18, 1999, the Department of
Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U.S.
Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition
of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the United States.
ISSUE: 1 Whether or not there is a conflict between the treaty
and the due process clause in the Constitution?
HELD:
1.NO.En contrario, these two components of the law of the
land are not pined against each other. There is no occasion to
choose which of the two should be upheld. Instead, we see a
void in the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, as
implemented by Presidential Decree No. 1069, as regards the
basic due process rights of a prospective extraditee at the
evaluation stage of extradition proceedings. From the
procedures earlier abstracted, after the filing of the extradition
petition and during the judicial determination of the propriety of
extradition, the rights of notice and hearing are clearly granted
to the prospective extraditee. However, prior thereto, the law is
silent as to these rights. Reference to the U.S. extradition
procedures also manifests this silence.In the absence of a law
or principle of law, we must apply the rules of fair play. An
application of the basic twin due process rights of notice and
hearing will not go against the treaty or the implementing law.
Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law precludes these
rights from a prospective extraditee. The doctrine of
incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals (or local
courts) are confronted with situations in which there appears to
be a conflict between a rule of international law and the
provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state.
Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give
effect to both since it is to be presumed that municipal law was
enacted with proper regard for the generally accepted
principles of international law in observance of the observance
of the Incorporation Clause in the above-cited constitutional
provision.
PETITION is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
EMERALD GARMENT MANUFACTURING
CORPORATION vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, BUREAU
OF PATENTS, TRADEMARKS AND TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER and H.D. LEE COMPANY, INC.
G.R. No. 100098, December 29, 1995
FACTS:
On 18 September 1981, private respondent H.D. Lee
Co., Inc. filed with the Bureau of Patents, Trademarks &
Technology Transfer (BPTTT) a Petition for Cancellation of
Registration No. SR 5054 for the trademark "STYLISTIC MR.
LEE" used on skirts, jeans, blouses, socks, briefs, jackets,
jogging suits, dresses, shorts, shirts and lingerie under Class
25, issued on 27 October 1980 in the name of petitioner
Emerald Garment Manufacturing Corporation.
Private respondent averred that petitioner's trademark
"so closely resembled its own trademark, 'LEE' as previously
registered and used in the Philippines cause confusion,
mistake and deception on the part of the purchasing public as
to the origin of the goods.
On 19 July 1988, the Director of Patents rendered a decision
granting private respondent's petition for cancellation and
opposition to registration. The Director of Patents, using the
test of dominancy, declared that petitioner's trademark was
confusingly similar to private respondent's mark because "it is
the word 'Lee' which draws the attention of the buyer and leads
him to conclude that the goods originated from the same
manufacturer. It is undeniably the dominant feature of the
mark.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a trademark causes confusion and is
likely to deceive the public is a question of fact which is to be
resolved by applying the "test of dominancy", meaning, if the
competing trademark contains the main or essential or
dominant features of another by reason of which confusion and
deception are likely to result.
HELD:

The word "LEE" is the most prominent and distinctive
feature of the appellant's trademark and all of the appellee's
"LEE" trademarks. It is the mark which draws the attention of
the buyer and leads him to conclude that the goods originated
from the same manufacturer. The alleged difference is too
insubstantial to be noticeable. The likelihood of confusion is
further made more probable by the fact that both parties are
engaged in the same line of business.
Although the Court decided in favor of the
respondent, the appellee has sufficiently established its right to
prior use and registration of the trademark "LEE" in
the Philippines and is thus entitled to protection from any
infringement upon the same. The dissenting opinion of Justice
Padilla is more acceptable
UNITED AIRLINES vs. UY G.R. No. 127768, November
19,1999
FACTS:
On October 13, 1989, respondent, a passenger of United
Airlines, checked in together with his luggage one piece of
which was found to be overweight at the airline counter. To his
utter humiliation, an employee of petitioner rebuked him saying
that he should have known the maximum weight allowance per
bag and that he should have packed his things accordingly.
Then, in a loud voice in front of the milling crowd, she told
respondent to repair his things and transfer some of them to
the light ones. Respondent acceded but his luggage was still
overweight. Petitioner billed him overweight charges but its
employee reused to honor the miscellaneous charges under
MCD which he offered to pay with. Not wanting to leave
without his luggage, he paid with his credit card. Upon arrival in
manila, he discovered that one of his bags had been slashed
and its contents stolen. In a letter dated October 16, 1989, he
notified petitioner of his loss and requested reimbursement.
Petitioner paid for his loss based on the maximum liability per
pound. Respondent considered the amount grossly
inadequate. He sent two more letters to petition but to no avail.
On June 9, 1992, respondent filed a complaint for damages
against petitioner Airline. Petitioner moved to dismiss the
complaint invoking the provisions of Article 29 of the Warsaw
Convention. Respondent countered that according to par. 2 of
Article 29, the method of calculating the period of limitation
shall be determined by the law of the court to which the case is
submitted.
ISSUES:
1) Does the Warsaw Convention preclude the operation of the
Civil Code and other pertinent laws?
2) Has the respondents cause of action prescribed?
HELD:
1) No. Within our jurisdiction we have held that the Warsaw
Convention can be applied, or ignored, depending on the
peculiar facts presented by each case. Convention provisions
do not regulate or exclude liabilities for other breaches of
contract by the carrier or misconduct of its officers and
employees, or for some particular or exceptional type of
damage. Neither may the Convention be invoked to justify the
disregard of some extraordinary type of damage. Neither may
the Convention be invoked to justify the disregard of some
extraordinary sort of damage resulting to a passenger and
preclude recovery therefore3 beyond the limits et by said
convention. Likewise, we have held that the Convention does
not preclude the operation of the Civil Code and other pertinent
laws. It does not regulate, much less exempt, the carrier from
liability for damages for violating the rights of its passengers
under the contract of carriage, especially if willful misconduct
on the part of the carriers employees is found or established.
2) No. While his 2nd cause of action (an action for damages
arising from theft or damage to property or goods) is well within
the bounds of the Warsaw convention, his 1st cause of action
(an action for damages arising from the misconduct of the
airline employees and the violation of respondents rights as
passengers) clearly is not.
The 2-yr limitation incorporated in Art. 29 of the Warsaw
Convention as an absolute bar to suit and not to be made
subject to the various tolling provisions of the laws of the
forum, forecloses the application of our own rules on
interruption of prescriptive periods. (Art. 29, par. 2 was
indented only to let local laws determine whether an action
shall be deemed commenced upon the filing of a complaint.)
Since, it is indisputable that respondent filed the present action
beyond the 2-yr time frame his 2nd cause of action must be
barred.
However, it is obvious that respondent was forestalled from
immediately filing an action because petitioner gave him the
runaround, answering his letters but not giving in to his
demands. True, respondent should have already filed an action
at the first instance when petitioner denied his claims but the
same could only be due to his desire to make an out-of-court
settlement for which he cannot be faulted. Hence, despite the
express mandate of Article 29 of the Warsaw Convention that
an action for damages should be filed within 2 years from the
arrival at the place of destination, such rule shall not be applied
in the instant case because of the delaying tactics employed by
petitioner airlines itself. Thus, respondents 2nd cause of action
cannot be considered as time barred.
AMERICAN AIRLINES, VS. COURT OF APPEALS, HON.
BERNARDO LL. SALAS and DEMOCRITO MENDOZA,
March 9, 2000
FACTS:
Plaintiff Mendoza filed an action for damages before the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu for the alleged embarrassment
and mental anguish he suffered at the Geneva airport when
the American Airlines security officers prevented him from
boarding the plane, detained him for about an hour and
allowed him to board the plane only after all the other
passengers have boarded. Petitioner American Airlines filed a
motion to dismiss the action for damages filed by the private
respondent for the lack of jurisdiction under section 28 (1) of
the Warsaw Convention. However the motion was denied. The
Court of Appeals later affirmed the trial courts decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the contract of transportation between
the private respondent and private respondent would be
considered as a single operation and part of the contract of
transportation entered into by the private respondent with
Singapore Airlines in Manila?
RULING:
No, the contract of carriage between the private responded
and Singapore Airlines although performed by different carriers
under a series of airlines tickets, including that issued by the
American Airlines constitutes a single operation. Members of
the TATA are under a general pool partnership agreement
wherein, they act as agent of each other in the issuance of
tickets to contracted passengers to boost ticket sales
worldwide which are inaccessible in some parts of the world.
Petitioners acquiescence to take place of the original
designated carrier binds it under the contract of carriage
entered into by the private respondent and Singapore Airlines
in Manila. Therefore, findings of the Court of Appeals are
affirmed. Case was ordered to be remanded for more
investigation for action against damages.
SBMA V. UNIVERSAL INTERNATIONAL GROUP OF
TAIWAN
September 14, 2000
FACTS:
UIG and SBMA entered into a Lease and
Development Agreement (LDA) wherein SBMA leased to
UIG the Binictan Golf Course and appurenant facilities
thereto to be transforemed into a world-class 18-hole golf
course/resort. The LDA contained pre-termination clauses
which authorizes SBMA, after due notice to UIG, to
terminate the lease and immediately take possession of
the property if UIG commits a material breach of any of the
contracts conditions. SBMA wrote UIG, calling its
attention to its failure to deliver its various contactual
obligations. UIG imputed the delay to the default of its
main contractor, FF Cruz, but committed itself to comply
with its undertakibngs. The following month, SBMA
declared UIG in default. Six months later, UIG still failed to
satisfy its obligations so SBMA served a letter of pre-
termination to UIG. Shortly thereafter, the golf course was
formally closed and SBMA took possession of the subject
premises.
UIG filed a complaint against SBMA for Injuction and
Damages with prayer for TRO and preliminary injuction.
TC granted UIGs prayer and ordered SBMA to
restore possession of the golf course to UIG. In a
subsequent order, TC denied SBMAs motion to dismiss.
CA upheld UIGs capacity to sue, holding that SBMA
is estopped from questioning its standing. It also held that
UIGDC1 and SBGCCI2 were real parties in interest
because they made substantial investments in the venture
and had been in possession in property when SBMA took
over.
ISSUES
1. WON UIG has capacity to sue.
2. WON UIGDC and SBGCCI are real parties in interest.
3. WON RTC has jurisdiction over the suit.
RULING:
1. YES. As a general rule, unlicensed foreign non-resident
corporations cannot file suits in the Philippines. A
corporation has legal status only within the state or
territory in which it was organized. For this reason, a
corporation organized in another country has no
personality to file suits in the Philippines. In order to
subject a foreign corporation doing business in the country
to the jurisdiction of our courts, it must acquire a license
from the SEC and appoint an agent for service of process.
Without such license, it cannot institute a suit in the
Philippines. However, after contracting with a foreign
1
UIG International Development Corporation
2
Subic Bay Gold and Country Club, Inc.
corporation, a domestic firm is estopped from denying the
formers capacity to sue.
2. YES. According to Sec. 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court
defines a real party in interest as the party who stands to
be benefited or injured by the judgment of the suit, or the
party entitled to the avails of the suit. In this case, the CA
made a factual finding that UIGDC and SBGCCI were in
possession of the property when SBMA took over.
Moreover, it also found that they had already made
substantial investments in the project. The CA is correct in
holding that UIGDC and SBGCCI stand to be benefitted or
injured by the present suit and should be deemed real
parties in interest.
3. YES. According to petitioners, the RTC has no
jurisdiction over the case because ejectment suits are
cognizable by municipal courts. However, the
complaint reveals that it sought to enjoin petitioners
from rescinding the contract and taking over the
property. While possession was a necessary
consequence of the suit, it was merely incidental. The
main issue is not ejectment, but whether SBMA could
rescind the LDA. Because it was a dispute that was
incapable of pecuniary estimation, it was within the
jurisdiction of the RTC.
4.
ERIKS PTE., LTD. V. COURT OF APPEALS
[February 6, 1997]
Effect of Doing Business in Philippines without a
License: Barred From Access to Courts
FACTS:
1. Petitioner Eriks Pte., Ltd. is a nonresident
foreign corporation engaged in the manufacture and
sale of elements used in sealing pumps, valves and
pipes for industrial purposes, and PVC pipes and
fittings for industrial uses.
2. Private respondent Delfin Enriquez, Jr., doing
business under the name and style of Delrene EB
Controls Center and/or EB Karmine Commercial,
ordered and received from petitioner various elements
used in sealing pumps, valves, pipes and control
equipment, PVC pipes and fittings.
3. The transfer of goods were perfected in
Singapore for private respondents account with a 90-
day credit term. Subsequently, demands were made
by petitioner upon private respondent to settle his
account, but the latter failed/refused to do so.
4. Petitioner corporation filed with the RTC a
complaint for the recovery of US$41,939.63. Private
respondent responded with a Motion to Dismiss,
contending that petitioner corporation had no legal
capacity to sue. The trial court dismissed the action
on the ground that petitioner is a foreign corporation
doing business in the Philippines without a license.
5. On appeal, the respondent court affirmed the
RTC as it deemed the series of transactions between
petitioner corporation and private respondent not to
be an isolated or casual transaction. Thus,
respondent court found petitioner to be without legal
capacity to sue.
ISSUE: Is a foreign corporation which sold its
products 16 times over a 5-month period to the same
Filipino buyer without first obtaining a license to do
business in the Philippines, prohibited from
maintaining an action to collect payment therefor in
Philippine courts? In other words, is such foreign
corporation doing business in the Philippines without
the required license and thus barred access to our
court system?
HELD:
1.The Corporation Code provides:
Section 133. Doing business without a license
No foreign corporation transacting business in the
Philippines without a license, or its successors or
assigns, shall be permitted to maintain or intervene in
any action, suit or proceeding in any court or
administrative agency of the Philippines; but such
corporation may be sued or proceeded against before
Philippine courts or administrative tribunals on any
valid cause of action recognized under Philippine
laws. The aforementioned provision prohibits, not
merely absence of the prescribed license, but it also
bars a foreign corporation doing business in the
Philippines without such license access to our courts.
A foreign corporation without such license is not ipso
facto incapacitated from bringing an action. A license
is necessary only if it is transacting or doing
business in the country.
2. The test to determine whether a foreign company
is doing business in the Philippines, thus: x x x The
true test, however, seems to be whether the foreign
corporation is continuing the body or substance of the
business or enterprise for which it was organized or
whether it has substantially retired from it and turned
it over to another. The term implies a continuity of
commercial dealings and arrangements, and
contemplates, to that extent, the performance of acts
or works or the exercise of some of the functions
normally incident to, and in progressive prosecution
of, the purpose and object of its organization
(Mentholaturn Co., Inc. v. Mangaliman).
3. The accepted rule in jurisprudence is that each
case must be judged in the light of its environmental
circumstances. It should be kept in mind that the
purpose of the law is to subject the foreign
corporation doing business in the Philippines to the
jurisdiction of our courts. It is not to prevent the
foreign corporation from performing single or isolated
acts, but to bar it from acquiring a domicile for the
purpose of business without first taking the steps
necessary to render it amenable to suits in the local
courts.
4. Thus, we hold that the series of transactions in
question could not have been isolated or casual
transactions. What is determinative of doing
business is not really the number or the quantity of
the transactions, but more importantly, the intention of
an entity to continue the body of its business in the
country. The number and quantity are merely
evidence of such intention. The phrase isolated
transaction has a definite and fixed meaning, i.e. a
transaction or series of transactions set apart from the
common business of a foreign enterprise in the sense
that there is no intention to engage in a progressive
pursuit of the purpose and object of the business
organization. Whether a foreign corporation is doing
business does not necessarily depend upon the
frequency of its transactions, but more upon the
nature and character of the transactions.
5. Accordingly, petitioner must be held to be
incapacitated to maintain the action a quo against
private respondent. By this judgment, we are not
foreclosing petitioners right to collect payment. Res
judicata does not set in a case dismissed for lack of
capacity to sue, because there has been no
determination on the merits. Moreover, this Court has
ruled that subsequent acquisition of the license will
cure the lack of capacity at the time of the execution
of the contract. By securing a license, a foreign entity
would be giving assurance that it will abide by the
decisions of our courts, even if adverse to it.
COMMUNICATION MATERIALS AND DESIGN, INC et al
vs.CA et al.
G.R. No. 102223
August 22, 1996
FACTS:
Petitioners COMMUNICATION MATERIALS AND DESIGN,
INC., (CMDI) and ASPAC MULTI-TRADE INC., (ASPAC) are
both domestic corporations.. Private Respondents ITEC, INC.
and/or ITEC, INTERNATIONAL, INC. (ITEC) are corporations
duly organized and existing under the laws of the State of
Alabama, USA. There is no dispute that ITEC is a foreign
corporation not licensed to do business in the Philippines.
ITEC entered into a contract with ASPAC referred to as
Representative Agreement. Pursuant to the contract, ITEC
engaged ASPAC as its exclusive representative in the
Philippines for the sale of ITECs products, in consideration of
which, ASPAC was paid a stipulated commission. Through a
License Agreement entered into by the same parties later on,
ASPAC was able to incorporate and use the name ITEC in its
own name. Thus , ASPAC Multi-Trade, Inc. became legally
and publicly known as ASPAC-ITEC (Philippines).
One year into the second term of the parties Representative
Agreement, ITEC decided to terminate the same, because
petitioner ASPAC allegedly violated its contractual commitment
as stipulated in their agreements. ITEC charges the petitioners
and another Philippine Corporation, DIGITAL BASE
COMMUNICATIONS, INC. (DIGITAL), the President of which
is likewise petitioner Aguirre, of using knowledge and
information of ITECs products specifications to develop their
own line of equipment and product support, which are similar, if
not identical to ITECs own, and offering them to ITECs former
customer.
The complaint was filed with the RTC-Makati by ITEC, INC.
Defendants filed a MTD the complaint on the following
grounds: (1) That plaintiff has no legal capacity to sue as it is a
foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines without
the required BOI authority and SEC license, and (2) that
plaintiff is simply engaged in forum shopping which justifies the
application against it of the principle of forum non
conveniens. The MTD was denied.
Petitioners elevated the case to the respondent CA on a
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 of the
Revised ROC. It was dismissed as well. MR denied, hence this
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.
ISSUE:
1. Did the Philippine court acquire jurisdiction over the person
of the petitioner corp, despite allegations of lack of capacity to
sue because of non-registration?
2. Can the Philippine court give due course to the suit or
dismiss it, on the principle of forum non convenience?
HELD: petition dismissed.
1. YES; We are persuaded to conclude that ITEC had been
engaged in or doing business in the Philippines for some
time now. This is the inevitable result after a scrutiny of the
different contracts and agreements entered into by ITEC with
its various business contacts in the country. Its arrangements,
with these entities indicate convincingly that ITEC is actively
engaging in business in the country.
A foreign corporation doing business in the Philippines may
sue in Philippine Courts although not authorized to do business
here against a Philippine citizen or entity who had contracted
with and benefited by said corporation. To put it in another
way, a party is estopped to challenge the personality of a
corporation after having acknowledged the same by entering
into a contract with it. And the doctrine of estoppel to deny
corporate existence applies to a foreign as well as to domestic
corporations. One who has dealt with a corporation of foreign
origin as a corporate entity is estopped to deny its corporate
existence and capacity.

In Antam Consolidated Inc. vs. CA et al. we expressed our

chagrin over this commonly used scheme of defaulting local
companies which are being sued by unlicensed foreign
companies not engaged in business in the Philippines to
invoke the lack of capacity to sue of such foreign companies.
Obviously, the same ploy is resorted to by ASPAC to prevent
the injunctive action filed by ITEC to enjoin petitioner from
using knowledge possibly acquired in violation of fiduciary
arrangements between the parties.

2. YES; Petitioners insistence on the dismissal of this action

due to the application, or non application, of the private
international law rule of forum non conveniens defies well-
settled rules of fair play. According to petitioner, the Philippine
Court has no venue to apply its discretion whether to give
cognizance or not to the present action, because it has not
acquired jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff in the case,
the latter allegedly having no personality to sue before
Philippine Courts. This argument is misplaced because the
court has already acquired jurisdiction over the plaintiff in the
suit, by virtue of his filing the original complaint. And as we
have already observed, petitioner is not at liberty to question
plaintiffs standing to sue, having already acceded to the same
by virtue of its entry into the Representative Agreement
referred to earlier.

Thus, having acquired jurisdiction, it is now for the Philippine

Court, based on the facts of the case, whether to give due
course to the suit or dismiss it, on the principle of forum non
convenience. Hence, the Philippine Court may refuse to
assume jurisdiction in spite of its having acquired jurisdiction.
Conversely, the court may assume jurisdiction over the case if
it chooses to do so; provided, that the following requisites are
met:

1) That the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may

conveniently resort to;
2) That the Philippine Court is in a position to make an
intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and,
3) That the Philippine Court has or is likely to have power to
enforce its decision.
The aforesaid requirements having been met, and in view of
the courts disposition to give due course to the questioned
action, the matter of the present forum not being the most
convenient as a ground for the suits dismissal, deserves
scant consideration.