CONFLICTS OF LAW
1. HILTON VS GUYOT
Facts:
Hilton (Plaintiff) and Libbey (Plaintiff), New York
citizens trading in Paris, were sued in France
by Guyot (Defendant), the administrator of a
French firm, for sums allegedly owed to that
firm. The Plaintiffs appeared and litigated the
merits in the French proceeding. The French
court rendered a judgment against them that
was affirmed by a higher court and became
final. Defendant then sought to enforce that
judgment in federal district court in New
York. That court held the judgment
enforceable without retrial on the merits. The
Plaintiffs then appealed to the U.S. Supreme
Court.
Issue:
Do laws have any effect, of their own force,
beyond the limits of the sovereignty from which
its authority is derived?
Held:
(Gray, J.) No. No law has any effect, of its
own force, beyond the limits of the sovereignty
from which its authority is derived. No
sovereign is bound, unless by special compact,
to execute within his dominions a judgment
rendered by the tribunals of another state, and
if execution be sought by suit upon the
judgment or otherwise, the tribunal in which
the suit is brought, or from which execution is
sought, is, on principle, at liberty to examine
into the merits of such judgment, and to give
effect to it or not, as may be found just and
equitable. However, the general comity, utility
and convenience of nations have established a
usage among most civilized states, by which
the final judgments of foreign courts of
competent jurisdiction are reciprocally carried
into execution, under certain regulations and
restrictions, which differ in different countries.
Additionally, judgments rendered in France, or
in any foreign country, by the laws of which
our own judgments are reviewable upon the
merits, are not entitled to full credit and
conclusive effect when sued upon in this
country, but are prima facie evidence only of
the justice of the plaintiffs’ claim. Reversed.
2. Saudi Arabian Airlines v. CA
Facts:
Saudi Arabian Airlines (SAUDIA) hired Milagros
Morada as a Flight Attendant for its airlines
based in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. While on a lay-
over in Jakarta, Morada went to a disco with
fellow crew members Thamer & Allah, both
Saudi nationals. Because it was almost
morning when they returned to their hotels,
they agreed to have breakfast together at the
room of Thamer. In which Allah left on some
pretext. Thamer attempted to rape Morada but
she was rescued by hotel personnel when they
heard her cries for help. Indonesian police
came and arrested Thamer and Allah, the latter
as an accomplice.
Morada refused to cooperate when SAUDIA’s
Legal Officer and its base manager tried to
negotiate the immediate release of the detained
crew members with Jakarta police.
Through the intercession of Saudi Arabian
government, Thamer and Allah were deported
and, eventually, again put in service by
SAUDIA. But Morada was transferred to
Manila.
One year and a half year later, Morada was
again ordered to see SAUDIA’s Chief Legal
Officer. Instead, she was brought to a Saudi
court where she was asked to sign a blank
document, which turned out to be a notice to
her to appear in court. Monada returned to
Manila.
The next time she was escorted by SAUDIA’s
legal officer to court, the judge rendered a
decision against her sentencing her to five
months imprisonment and to 286 lashes.
Apparently, she was tried by the court which
found her guilty of (1) adultery; (2) going to a
disco, dancing and listening to the music in
violation of Islamic laws; and (3) socializing
with the male crew, in contravention of Islamic
tradition.
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CONFLICTS OF LAW
After denial by SAUDIA, Morada sought help
from Philippine Embassy during the appeal.
Prince of Makkah dismissed the case against
her. SAUDIA fired her without notice.
Morada filed a complaint for damages against
SAUDIA, with the RTC of QC. SAUDIA filed
Omnibus Motion to Dismiss which raised the
ground that the court has no jurisdiction,
among others which was denied
ISSUE: Whether RTC of QC has jurisdiction to
hear and try the case
HELD: YES. The RTC of QC has jurisdiction
and Philippine law should govern. Its
jurisdiction has basis on Sec. 1 of RA 7691 and
Rules of Court on venue. Pragmatic
considerations, including the convenience of
the parties, also weigh heavily in favor of the
RTC QC assuming jurisdiction. Paramount is
the private interest of the litigant. Weighing the
relative claims of the parties, the court a quo
found it best to hear the case in the
Philippines. Had it refused to take cognizance
of the case, it would be forcing Morada to seek
remedial action elsewhere, i.e. in the Kingdom
of Saudi Arabia where she no longer maintains
substantial connections. That would have
caused a fundamental unfairness to her.
By filing a complaint, Morada has voluntarily
submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. By
filing several motions and praying for reliefs
(such as dismissal), SAUDIA has effectively
submitted to the trial court’s jurisdiction.
3. TESTATE OF BELLIS VS BELLIS
FACTS:
Amos Bellis was a citizen of the state of Texas
of the United States. In his first wife whom he
divorced, he had five legitimate children; by his
second wife, who survived him, he had three
legitimate children. Before he died, he made
two wills, one disposing of his Texas properties
and the other disposing his Philippine
Properties. In both wills, his illegitimate
children were not given anything. The
illegitimate children opposed the will on the
ground that they have been deprived of their
legitimes to which they should be entitled if
Philippine law were to apply.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the national law of the deceased
should determine the sucessional rights of the
illegitimate children.
HELD:
The Supreme Court held that the said children
are not entitled to their legitimes. Under the
Texas Law, being the national law of the
deceased, there are no legitimes. Further, even
if the deceased had given them share, such
would be invalid because the law governing the
deceased does not allow such.
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CONFLICTS OF LAW
4. GOVERNMENT OF PHILIPPINES VS
FRANK
Facts:
Through a contract executed in the US, Frank
agreed to work for Plaintiff in the Philippines.
The plaintiff paid Frank an advance payment
upon arriving in the Philippines as stipulated
in their contract.
While in the Philippines Frank left the service
of the Government. Since Frank abandoned the
contract, the Government filed a case against
him to collect the remaining money that was
paid in advanced.
Frank in his defense contends that he was an
adult in the US but he is a minor in the
Philippines. So the contract cannot be
enforced against him.
The lower court decided in favor of the plaintiff
and ordered the defendant to pay the amount
in question.
Issue:
Whether or not the court was correct in
rendering judgment in favor of the plaintiff.
Ruling:
Yes. The contention of the defendant that he is
an adult in the US but he is still a minor in the
Philippines where the contract was
implemented is not disputed. In fact the court
considered the defendant’s contention as a
reason to apply the principle: that when
matters bearing upon the execution,
interpretation and validity of the contract are
determined by the law of the place where the
contract is made or “lex loci celebrationis”.
Since the contract was made in the US and US
law considers the defendant of legal age, he has
the legal capacity to enter into a contract and
therefore making the contract enforceable
against him.
5. CADALIN VS POEA
FACTS:
Cadalin et al. are overseas contract workers
recruited by respondent-appellant AIBC for its
accredited foreign principal, Brown & Root, on
various dates from 1975 to 1983. As such, they
were all deployed at various projects in several
countries in the Middle East as well as in
Southeast Asia, in Indonesia and Malaysia. The
case arose when their overseas employment
contracts were terminated even before their
expiration. Under Bahrain law, where some of
the complainants were deployed, the
prescriptive period for claims arising out of a
contract of employment is one year.
ISSUE:
Whether it is the Bahrain law on prescription of
action based on the Amiri Decree No. 23 of
1976 or a Philippine law on prescription that
shall be the governing law
HELD:
As a general rule, a foreign procedural law will
not be applied in the forum. Procedural
matters, such as service of process, joinder of
actions, period and requisites for appeal, and
so forth, are governed by teh laws of the forum.
This is true even if the action is based upon a
foreign substantive law.
A law on prescription of actions is sui generis
in Conflict of Laws in the sense that it may be
viewed either as procedural or substantive,
depending on the characterization given such a
law.
However, the characterization of a statute into
a procedural or substantive law becomes
irrelevant when the country of the forum has a
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CONFLICTS OF LAW
“borrowing statute.” Said statute has the
practical effect of treating the foreign statute of
limitation as one of substance. A “borrowing
statute” directs the state of the forum to apply
the foreign statute of limitations to the pending
claims based on a foreign law. While there are
several kinds of “borrowing statutes,” one form
provides that an action barred by the laws of
the place where it accrued, will not be enforced
in the forum even though the local statute has
not run against it. Section 48 of our Code of
Civil Procedure is of this kind. Said Section
provides:
“If by the laws of the state or country where the
cause of action arose, the action is barred, it is
also barred in the Philippine Islands.”
In the light of the 1987 Constitution, however,
Section 48 cannot be enforced ex propio vigore
insofar as it ordains the application in this
jurisdiction of Section 156 of the Amiri Decree
No. 23 of 1976.
The courts of the forum will not enforce any
foreign claims obnoxious to the forum’s public
policy. To enforce the one-year prescriptive
period of the Amiri Decree No. 23 of 1976 as
regards the claims in question would
contravene the public policy on the protection
to labor.
6. HSBC VS SHERMAN
FACTS: It appears that sometime in 1981,
Eastern Book Supply Service PTE, Ltd.
(COMPANY), a company incorporated in
Singapore applied with and was granted by
HSBC Singapore branch an overdraft facility in
the maximum amount of Singapore dollars
200,000 with interest at 3% over HSBC prime
rate, payable monthly, on amounts due under
said overdraft facility.
As a security for the repayment by the
COMPANY of sums advanced by HSBC to it
through the aforesaid overdraft facility, in
1982, both private respondents and a certain
Lowe, all of whom were directors of the
COMPANY at such time, executed a Joint and
Several Guarantee in favor of HSBC whereby
private respondents and Lowe agreed to pay,
jointly and severally, on demand all sums owed
by the COMPANY to petitioner BANK under the
aforestated overdraft facility.
The Joint and Several Guarantee provides,
inter alia, that:
This guarantee and all rights, obligations and
liabilities arising hereunder shall be construed
and determined under and may be enforced in
accordance with the laws of the Republic of
Singapore. We hereby agree that the Courts of
Singapore shall have jurisdiction over all
disputes arising under this guarantee. …
The COMPANY failed to pay its obligation.
Thus, HSBC demanded payment and inasmuch
as the private respondents still failed to pay,
HSBC filed A complaint for collection of a sum
of money against private respondents Sherman
and Reloj before RTC of Quezon City.
Private respondents filed an MTD on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter. The trial court denied the motion. They
then filed before the respondent IAC a petition
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CONFLICTS OF LAW

for prohibition with preliminary injunction
and/or prayer for a restraining order. The IAC
rendered a decision enjoining the RTC Quezon
City from taking further cognizance of the case
and to dismiss the same for filing with the
proper court of Singapore which is the proper
forum. MR denied, hence this petition.
ISSUE: Do Philippine courts have jurisdiction
over the suit, vis-a-vis the Guarantee
stipulation regarding jurisdiction?
HELD: YES
One basic principle underlies all rules of
jurisdiction in International Law: a State does
not have jurisdiction in the absence of some
reasonable basis for exercising it, whether the
proceedings are in rem quasi in rem or in
personam. To be reasonable, the jurisdiction
must be based on some minimum contacts that
will not offend traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice
The defense of private respondents that the
complaint should have been filed in Singapore
is based merely on technicality. They did not
even claim, much less prove, that the filing of
the action here will cause them any
unnecessary trouble, damage, or expense. On
the other hand, there is no showing that
petitioner BANK filed the action here just to
harass private respondents.
courts of Singapore, to the exclusion of all the
rest, has jurisdiction. Neither did the clause in
question operate to divest Philippine courts of
jurisdiction. In International Law, jurisdiction
is often defined as the light of a State to
exercise authority over persons and things
within its boundaries subject to certain
exceptions. Thus, a State does not assume
jurisdiction over travelling sovereigns,
ambassadors and diplomatic representatives of
other States, and foreign military units
stationed in or marching through State
territory with the permission of the latter’s
authorities. This authority, which finds its
source in the concept of sovereignty, is
exclusive within and throughout the domain of
the State. A State is competent to take hold of
any judicial matter it sees fit by making its
courts and agencies assume jurisdiction over
all kinds of cases brought before them.

**

In the case of Neville Y. Lamis Ents., et al. v.

Lagamon, etc., where the stipulation was “[i]n
case of litigation, jurisdiction shall be vested in
the Court of Davao City.” We held:

Anent the claim that Davao City had been

stipulated as the venue, suffice it to say that a
stipulation as to venue does not preclude the
filing of suits in the residence of plaintiff or
defendant under Section 2 (b), Rule 4, ROC, in
the absence of qualifying or restrictive words in
the agreement which would indicate that the
place named is the only venue agreed upon by
the parties.
Applying the foregoing to the case at bar, the
parties did not thereby stipulate that only the

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CONFLICTS OF LAW
7. El Banco Espanol-Filipino vs. Vicente
Palanca
FACTS:
Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco
mortgaged various parcels of real property in
Manila to El Banco Espanol-Filipino.
Afterwards, Engracio returned to China and
there he died on January 29, 1810 without
returning again to the Philippines. The
mortgagor then instituted foreclosure
proceeding but since defendant is a non-
resident, it was necessary to give notice by
publication. The Clerk of Court was also
directed to send copy of the summons to the
defendant’s last known address, which is in
Amoy, China. It is not shown whether the Clerk
complied with this requirement. Nevertheless,
after publication in a newspaper of the City of
Manila, the cause proceeded and judgment by
default was rendered. The decision was likewise
published and afterwards sale by public
auction was held with the bank as the highest
bidder. On August 7, 1908, this sale was
confirmed by the court. However, about seven
years after the confirmation of this sale, a
motion was made by Vicente Palanca, as
administrator of the estate of the original
defendant, wherein the applicant requested the
court to set aside the order of default and the
judgment, and to vacate all the proceedings
subsequent thereto. The basis of this
application was that the order of default and
the judgment rendered thereon were void
because the court had never acquired
jurisdiction over the defendant or over the
subject of the action.
ISSUE:
* Whether or not the lower court acquired
jurisdiction over the defendant and the subject
matter of the action
* Whether or not due process of law was
observed
RULING:
On Jurisdiction
The word “jurisdiction” is used in several
different, though related, senses since it may
have reference (1) to the authority of the court
to entertain a particular kind of action or to
administer a particular kind of relief, or it may
refer to the power of the court over the parties,
or (2) over the property which is the subject to
the litigation.
The sovereign authority which organizes a
court determines the nature and extent of its
powers in general and thus fixes its
competency or jurisdiction with reference to the
actions which it may entertain and the relief it
may grant.
How Jurisdiction is Acquired
Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by the
voluntary appearance of a party in court and
his submission to its authority, or it is acquired
by the coercive power of legal process exerted
over the person.
Jurisdiction over the property which is the
subject of the litigation may result either from a
seizure of the property under legal process,
whereby it is brought into the actual custody of
the law, or it may result from the institution of
legal proceedings wherein, under special
provisions of law, the power of the court over
the property is recognized and made effective.
In the latter case the property, though at all
times within the potential power of the court,
may never be taken into actual custody at all.
An illustration of the jurisdiction acquired by
actual seizure is found in attachment
proceedings, where the property is seized at the
beginning of the action, or some subsequent
stage of its progress, and held to abide the final
6
CONFLICTS OF LAW
event of the litigation. An illustration of what
we term potential jurisdiction over the res, is
found in the proceeding to register the title of
land under our system for the registration of
land. Here the court, without taking actual
physical control over the property assumes, at
the instance of some person claiming to be
owner, to exercise a jurisdiction in rem over the
property and to adjudicate the title in favor of
the petitioner against all the world.
In the terminology of American law the action
to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a
proceeding quasi in rem, by which is expressed
the idea that while it is not strictly speaking an
action in rem yet it partakes of that nature and
is substantially such. The expression "action in
rem" is, in its narrow application, used only
with reference to certain proceedings in courts
of admiralty wherein the property alone is
treated as responsible for the claim or
obligation upon which the proceedings are
based. The action quasi rem differs from the
true action in rem in the circumstance that in
the former an individual is named as
defendant, and the purpose of the proceeding is
to subject his interest therein to the obligation
or lien burdening the property. All proceedings
having for their sole object the sale or other
disposition of the property of the defendant,
whether by attachment, foreclosure, or other
form of remedy, are in a general way thus
designated. The judgment entered in these
proceedings is conclusive only between the
parties.
It is true that in proceedings of this character,
if the defendant for whom publication is made
appears, the action becomes as to him a
personal action and is conducted as such. This,
however, does not affect the proposition that
where the defendant fails to appear the action
is quasi in rem; and it should therefore be
considered with reference to the principles
governing actions in rem.
8. CARBALLO VS ENCARNACION
Facts:
Mariano Ang filed a complaint (civil case No.
8769) against Antonio Carballo for the
collection of P1,860.84. The corresponding
summons was served upon defendant Carballo
for appearance and trial on October 10,...
1949. As counsel for him Atty. J. Gonzales
entered his written appearance on October 12,
1949. On the same day said counsel filed a
motion for postponement of the hearing for one
month on the ground that he was sick,
attaching a medical certificate to prove his...
illness.
the... municipal court warned the defendant
that the hearing could not wait until his
counsel recovered from his illness, and that if
said counsel could not attend the trial he
should obtain the services of another lawyer...
neither defendant nor his counsel appeared
although there was a written manifestation of
defendant's counsel requesting further
postponement because he was still sick. At the
request of plaintiff's counsel, defendant was...
declared in default. The evidence for the
plaintiff was received after which judgment was
rendered against the defendant ordering him to
pay the sum of P1,860.84 with legal interest.
The motion for new trial was denied. Through
his counsel defendant perfected his appeal to
the Court of First Instance of Manila and he
later filed an answer.
Court of First Instance in an order dated March
18, 1952, considering said decision final and
7
CONFLICTS OF LAW
unappealable because it had been rendered by
default, and held that the only jurisdiction left
to it was to order the execution of said decision,
so it... ordered the return of the record to the
municipal court for that purpose.
Defendant Carballo filed a motion for
reconsideration of the order dismissing his
appeal which motion was denied by an order
dated March 21, 1952, whereupon Carballo
filed the present petition for certiorari,
injunction, prohibition and mandamus
Issues:
whether defendant (now petitioner Carballo)
defaulted in the municipal court of
Manila
Ruling:
an appearance in whatever form without
expressly objecting to the jurisdiction of the
court over the person, is a submission to the
jurisdiction of the court over the person. It is,
therefore, clear that petitioner Carballo made
an appearance in... the municipal court.
9. GEMPERLE VS SCHENKER
Facts:
This case was the result of William
Gemperle’s retaliatory act when respondent
spouses Paul and Helen Schenker filed a case
against him for the enforcement of Schenker's
allegedly initial subscription to the shares of
stock of the Philippines-Swiss Trading Co., Inc.
and the exercise of his alleged pre-emptive
rights to the then unissued original capital
stock of said corporation and the increase
thereof, as well as for an accounting and
damages. Petitioner alleged that the said
complaint tainted his name as a businessman.
He then filed a complaint for damages and
prays for the retraction of statements made by
Helen Schenker.
Summons was personally served to
Helen Schenker but not to Paul Schenker.
Helen then filed an answer with a
counterclaim, but Paul Schenker filed a motion
to dismiss arguing that the court never
acquired jurisdiction over his person since
admittedly, he is a Swiss citizen, residing in
Zurich, Switzerland, and has not been actually
served with summons in the Philippines.
Issue:
Whether or not the court acquired
jurisdiction over the person of Paul Schenker.
Ruling:
Yes, although as a rule, when the
defendant is a non-resident and in an accion in
8
CONFLICTS OF LAW
personam, jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant can be acquired only through
voluntary appearance or personal service of
summons. But this case is an exception to the
said rule. The Supreme ratiocinated:
“We hold that the lower court had acquired
jurisdiction over said defendant, through
service of the summons addressed to him upon
Mrs. Schenker, it appearing from said answer
that she is the representative and attorney-in-
fact of her husband aforementioned civil case
No. Q-2796, which apparently was filed at her
behest, in her aforementioned representative
capacity. In other words, Mrs. Schenker had
authority to sue, and had actually sued on
behalf of her husband, so that she was, also,
empowered to represent him in suits filed
against him, particularly in a case, like the of
the one at bar, which is consequence of the
action brought by her on his behalf.”
Briefly, in an accion in personam where the
defendant is a non-resident, substituted service
of summons does not apply. However, by way
of exception, substituted service of summons
may be effected, if the following requisites are
present:
1. The summons is served to the spouse of
the defendant
2. The spouse must be residing in the
Philippines
3. The spouse is appointed as attorney-in-
fact of the spouse defendant in a previous case
involving the non-resident spouse.
10. CALUAG VS PECSON
FACTS: On August 10, 1937, Alejo filed a
complaint against Caluag and Garcia for the
redemption of one-half pro indiviso of a parcel
of land in Guiguinto, Bulacan. After trial, the
CFI Bulacan rendered judgment ordering
petitioners to execute a deed of sale in favor of
Fortunato Alejo, upon payment by plaintiff, as
purchase price, of the amount of P2,551.
Petitioners filed an appeal to the CA but it was
denied. Consequently, Alejo filed a Motion for
Execution.
When the petitioners opposed, Alejo filed before
CFI a petition for contempt and it was granted
by the respondent. A petition for certiorari was
filed against the respondent judge, allegedly
acted without or in excess of the jurisdiction of
the court in rendering the resolution which
declares the petitioners guilty of contempt of
court for not complying or performing its prior
order requiring the petitioners to execute a
deed of sale in favor of plaintiff over one-half of
the land pro indiviso in question. The
petitioners in support of the present petition for
certiorari, alleged other 2 grounds, to wit: (1)
that plaintiff's action abated or was
extinguished upon the death of the plaintiff
Fortunato Alejo, because his right of legal
redemption was a personal one, and therefore
not transferable to his successors in interest;
and (2) that, even assuming that it is a
personal one and therefore transferable, his
successors in interest have failed to secure the
substitution of said deceased by his legal
representative under section 17, Rule 3.
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CONFLICTS OF LAW
ISSUE: WON respondent Judge Angel Mojica
acted without jurisdiction in proceeding against
and declaring the petitioners guilty of
contempt.
HELD: Yes
RATIO: It is well settled that jurisdiction of the
subject matter of a particular case is something
more than the general power conferred by law
upon a court to take cognizance of cases of the
general class to which the particular case
belongs. The respondent Judge Mojica acted
not only without jurisdiction in proceeding
against and declaring the petitioners guilty of
contempt, but also in excess of jurisdiction in
ordering the confinement of the petitioners,
because it had no power to impose such
punishment upon the latter. The respondent
judge has no power under the law to order the
confinement of the petitioners until they have
compiled with the order of the court.
A wrong decision made within the limits of the
court's authority is erroneous and may be
corrected on appeal or other direct review, but
a wrong, or for that matter a correct, decision is
void, and may be set aside either directly or
collaterally, where the court exceeds its
jurisdiction and power in rendering it. Hence
though the court has acquired jurisdiction over
the subject matter and the particular case has
been submitted properly to it for hearing and
decision, it will overstep its jurisdiction if it
renders a judgment which it has no power
under the law to render.
11. PERKINS VS ROXAS
FACTS:
July 5, 1938, respondent Eugene Perkins filed
a complaint in the CFI- Manila against the
Benguet Consolidated Mining Company for the
recovery of a sum consisting of dividends which
have been declared and made payable on
shares of stock registered in his name,
payment of which was being withheld by the
company, and for the recognition of his right to
the control and disposal of said shares to the
exclusion of all others. The company alleged, by
way of defense that the withholding of plaintiff’s
right to the disposal and control of the shares
was due to certain demands made with respect
to said shares by the petitioner Idonah Perkins,
and by one Engelhard.
Eugene Perkins included in his modified
complaint as parties defendants petitioner,
Idonah Perkins, and Engelhard. Eugene
Perkins prayed that petitioner Idonah Perkins
and H. Engelhard be adjudged without interest
in the shares of stock in question and excluded
from any claim they assert thereon. Summons
by publication were served upon the
nonresident defendants Idonah Perkins and
Engelhard. Engelhard filed his answer.
Petitioner filed her answer with a
crosscomplaint in which she sets up a
judgment allegedly obtained by her against
respondent Eugene Perkins, from the SC of the
State of New York, wherein it is declared that
she is the sole legal owner and entitled to the
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CONFLICTS OF LAW

possession and control of the shares of stock in
question with all the cash dividends declared
thereon by the Benguet Consolidated Mining
Company.
Idonah Perkins filed a demurrer thereto on the
ground that “the court has no jurisdiction of
the subject of the action,” because the alleged
judgment of the SC of the State of New York is
res judicata. Petitioner’s demurrer was
overruled, thus this petition.
ISSUE:
WON in view of the alleged judgment entered in
favor of the petitioner by the SC of New York
and which is claimed by her to be res judicata
on all questions raised by the respondent,
Eugene Perkins, the local court has jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the action.
RULING:
By jurisdiction over the subject matter is meant
the nature of the cause of action and of the
relief sought, and this is conferred by the
sovereign authority which organizes the court,
and is to be sought for in general nature of its
powers, or in authority specially conferred. In
the present case, the amended complaint filed
by the respondent, Eugene Perkins alleged calls
for the adjudication of title to certain shares of
stock of the Benguet Consolidated Mining
Company and the granting of affirmative reliefs,
which fall within the general jurisdiction of the
CFI- Manila. Similarly CFI- Manila is
empowered to adjudicate the several demands
contained in petitioner’s crosscomplaint.
The petitioner expresses the fear that the
respondent judge may render judgment
“annulling the final, subsisting, valid judgment
rendered and entered in this petitioner’s favor
by the courts of the State of New York, which
decision is res judicata on all the questions
constituting the subject matter of civil case”
and argues on the assumption that the
respondent judge is without jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the cause. Whether or not the
respondent judge in the course of the
proceedings will give validity and efficacy to the
New York judgment set up by the petitioner in
her cross-complaint is a question that goes to
the merits of the controversy and relates to the
rights of the parties as between each other, and
not to the jurisdiction or power of the court.
The test of jurisdiction is whether or not the
tribunal has power to enter upon the inquiry,
not whether its conclusion in the course of it is
right or wrong. If its decision is erroneous, its
judgment can be reversed on appeal; but its
determination of the question, which the
petitioner here anticipates and seeks to
prevent, is the exercise by that court and the
rightful exercise of its jurisdiction.
Petition denied.

Idonah Perkins in her crosscomplaint brought

suit against Eugene Perkins and the Benguet
Consolidated Mining Company upon the
alleged judgment of the SC of the State of New
York and asked the court below to render
judgment enforcing that New York judgment,
and to issue execution thereon. This is a form
of action recognized by section 309 of the Code
of Civil Procedure (now section 47, Rule 39,
Rules of Court) and which falls within the
general jurisdiction of the CFI- Manila, to
adjudicate, settle and determine.

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CONFLICTS OF LAW
12. FIRST PHIL BANK VS CA
FACTS:
[D]uring the pendency of the proceedings in the
Court of Appeals, Henry Co and several other
stockholders of the Bank (petitioner), through
counsel Angara Abello Concepcion Regala and
Cruz, filed an action (Second Case) purportedly
a “derivative suit” with the Regional Trial Court
of Makati, Branch 134 against Encarnacion,
Demetria and Janolo “to declare any perfected
sale of the property as unenforceable and to
stop Ejercito from enforcing or implementing
the sale. In his answer, Janolo argued that the
Second Case was barred by litis pendentia by
virtue of the case then pending in the Court of
Appeals. During the pre-trial conference in the
Second Case, plaintiffs filed a Motion for Leave
of Court to Dismiss the Case Without
Prejudice. Private respondent opposed this
motion on the ground, among others, that
plaintiff’s act of forum shopping justifies the
dismissal of both cases, with prejudice. Private
respondent, in his memorandum, averred that
this motion is still pending in the Makati RTC.
[P]etitioners explain that there is no forum-
shopping because:
1) In the earlier or “First Case” from which
this proceeding arose, the Bank was impleaded
as a defendant, whereas in the “Second Case”
(assuming the Bank is the real party in interest
in a derivative suit), it was the plaintiff;
xxx
ISSUE:
Whether or not there is forum-shopping on the
part of petitioner Bank.
HELD:
YES. Petition was denied. Assailed decision was
affirmed. Petitioner was reprimanded. Costs
against the petitioner.
RATIO:
[W]here a litigant (or one representing the same
interest or person) sues the same party against
whom another action or actions for the alleged
violation of the same right and the enforcement
of the same relief is/are still pending, the
defense of litis pendencia in one case is a bar to
the others; and, a final judgment in one would
constitute res judicata and thus would cause
the dismissal of the rest. In either case, forum
shopping could be cited by the other party as a
ground to ask for summary dismissal of the
two (or more) complaints or petitions, and for
the imposition of the other sanctions, which are
direct contempt of court, criminal prosecution,
and disciplinary action against the erring
lawyer.
[W]hat is truly important to consider in
determining whether forum-shopping exists or
not is the vexation caused the courts and
parties-litigant by a party who asks different
courts and/or administrative agencies to rule
on the same or related causes and/or to grant
the same or substantially the same reliefs, in
the process creating the possibility of
conflicting decisions being rendered by the
different fora upon the same issue. In this case,
this is exactly the problem: a decision
recognizing the perfection and directing the
enforcement of the contract of sale will directly
conflict with a possible decision in the Second
Case barring the parties from enforcing or
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CONFLICTS OF LAW
implementing the said sale. Indeed, a final
decision in one would constitute res judicata in
the other.
13. FLUEMER VS HIX
FACTS
Petitioner theorized that the alleged will was
executed in Elkins, West Virginia, on November
3, 1925, by Hix who had his residence in that
jurisdiction. The will was presented for probate
in the Court of First Instance but no evidence
was introduced to show that the extract from
the laws of West Virginia was in force at the
time the alleged will was executed. For that
reason, the probate was denied.
ISSUE
Whether the courts of the Philippine Islands
are authorized to take judicial notice of foreign
laws insofar as wills are concerned.
RULING
NO. The laws of a foreign jurisdiction do not
prove themselves in our courts. Such laws
must be proved as facts. Here, the requirement
of law was not met. There was no extract from
the law attested by the certificate of the officer
having charge of the original, under the seal of
the State of West Virginia, as provided in the
Section 301 of the Code of Civil Procedure. In
addition, the due execution of the will was not
established. The only evidence on this point is
to be found in the testimony of the petitioner.
On the supposition that the witnesses to the
will reside without the Philippine Islands, it
would then the duty of the petitioner to prove
execution by some other means. (Code of Civil
Procedure, Sec. 633)
14. DAVAO LIGHT POWER VS CA
Facts
The Davao Light and Power Co., Inc. ("Davao
Light") filed a collection suit against
Queensland Hotel ("Queensland") and
Teodorico Adarna ("Adarna") with an ex parte
application for a writ of preliminary
attachment. On 3 May 1989, the trial court
issued an Order of Attachment, and the
corresponding Writ of Attachment on 11 May
1989. On 12 May 1989, the summons, a copy
of the complaint, and the writ of attachment
was served upon Queensland and Adarna.
Queensland and Adarna filed a motion to
discharge the attachment on the ground that at
the time the Order of Attachment and Writ of
Attachment were issued, the trial court has yet
to acquire jurisdiction over the cause of action
and over the persons of the defendants.
Issue
Whether or not the writ of preliminary
attachment was validly issued.
Held
Yes. A writ of preliminary attachment may be
issued before the court acquires jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant.
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CONFLICTS OF LAW

Ratio Decidendi
The court may validly issue a writ of
preliminary injunction prior to the acquisition
of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant.
There is an appreciable period of time between
the commencement of the action (takes place
upon the filing of an initiatory pleading) and
the service of summons to the defendant. In the
meanwhile, there are a number of actions
which the plaintiff or the court may validly
take, including the application for and grant of
the provisional remedy of preliminary
attachment. There is nothing in the law which
prohibits the court from granting the remedy
prior to the acquisition of jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant. In fact, Rule 57 of the
Rules of Court allows the granting of a writ of
preliminary injunction at the commencement of
the suit. In the cases of Toledo v. Burgos and
Filinvest Credit Corporation v. Relova, it was
held that notice and hearing are not
prerequisites to the issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment. Further, in the case of
Mindanao Savings & Loan Association, Inc. v. 15. HEINE VS NEW YORK INC
Court of Appeals, it was ruled that giving notice
to the defendant would defeat the purpose of Facts
the remedy by affording him or her the The New York Life Insurance Company and the
opportunity to dispose of his properties before Guardian Insurance Company ("the insurance
the writ can be issued. companies") were corporations created in New
A preliminary attachment may be discharged York, USA. As conditions to be allowed to
with the same ease as obtaining it. In any case, conduct business in Germany, they were made
the ease of availing the provisional remedy of to agree to be supervised by German
preliminary attachment is matched by the ease authorities, to invest the proceeds of policies in
with which it can be remedied by either the German securities, and to establish a local
posting of a counterbond, or by a showing of its agency to whom summons may be served. The
improper or irregular issuance. The second insurance companies were later sued before
means of defeating a preliminary attachement, courts in both the US and Germany for the
however, may not be availed of if the writ was recovery on some 240 life insurance policies
issued upon a ground which is at the same issued in Germany to German nationals,
time the applicant's cause of action. payable in German currency.
Preliminary attachment not binding until
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is Arguments for the Plaintiff
acquired. The writ of preliminary attachment, As the US courts have jurisdiction over the
however, even though validly issued, is not subject matter and the parties, they have no
binding upon the defendant until jurisdiction choice but to try the case.
over his person is first acquired.
Issue
Whether or not the US courts may dismiss the
case on the ground of forum non conveniens.

Held

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CONFLICTS OF LAW

Yes. Under the circumstances, the case may be

more suitably tried before German courts.

Ratio Decidendi:
The courts in both jurisdictions are competent
to try the case and summons may be served
upon the insurance companies in both
jurisdictions. Requiring the insurance
companies to defend their interests in the US
would subject them to great and unnecessary
inconvenience and expenses, including the
possibility of having to bring documentary
evidence all the way from their office in
Germany. Moreover, trying the case in the US
additionally burden the courts in that
jurisdiction, to the detriment of other litigants.
The assumption of jurisdiction over a case the
cause of action of which arose from another
jurisdiction and wherein both parties are non-
residents is discretionary upon the court.

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