G.R. No.

205249 October 15, 2014

SPOUSES BENEDICT and SANDRA MANUEL, Petitioners, vs. RAMON ONG, Respondent

FACTS:
1. Respondent Ramon Ong owns a property in La Trinidad, Benguet.
2. Spouses Manuel are not to do anything or build any structures on the property.
3. Spouses Manuel built structures on the said property owned by Ramon Ong hence the
filing of a complaint for accion reivindicatoria.

RULE 3, 4, 6, 7 - December 21, 2009 - respondent Ramon Ong (Ong) filed with the Regional
Trial Court, La Trinidad, Benguet, a complaint for accion reivindicatoria

RULE 10, 11 Sec. 3 - January 19, 2010 - Ong filed an "amended complaint."

RULE 14 - February 3, 2010 - summons was issued directed to the Spouses Manuel.
Per the sheriffs return on summons, on February 12, 2010, Sheriff Joselito Sales, along with
Ongs counsel, Atty. Christopher Donaal, and a certain Federico Laureano, attempted to
personally serve summons on the Spouses Manuel at their address in Lower Bacong, Loacan,
Itogon, Benguet. The Spouses Manuel, however, requested that service be made at another
time considering that petitioner Sandra Manuel's mother was then critically ill. The sheriffs
return further indicates that on March 16, 2010, another attempt at personal service was made.
After Sheriff Joselito Sales had personally explained to petitioner Sandra Manuel the content of
the summons and the complaint, the latter refused to sign and receive the summons and the
complaint. Sheriff Joselito Sales was thus prompted to merely tender the summons and
complaint to petitioner Sandra Manuel and to advise her to file their answer within fifteen (15)
days.

RULE 15 - April 23, 2010 - Ong filed with the Regional Trial Court a motion to declare the
Spouses Manuel in default.

RULE 34 - June 28, 2010 - the Regional Trial Court issued an order granting Ong's motion to
declare the Spouses Manuel in default.

RULE 15, 34 - Ong moved for the ex parte presentation of evidence, which the Regional Trial
Court granted.

RULE 15 - September 13, 2010 - the Spouses Manuel filed a motion to lift the order of default

RULE 34, 36 - November 30, 2010 - the Regional Trial Court denied the Spouses Manuels
motion to lift order of default.

RULE 41 - Spouses Manuel filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals

RULE 51 - June 28, 2012 decision of the Court of Appeals dismissed the Spouses Manuels
Rule 65 petition for lack of merit.

RULE 51, 52 - December 19, 2012 - Resolution of the Court of Appeals denied their motion for
reconsideration.

RULE 45 Appeal to the Supreme Court

ISSUES: 1. Whether Jurisdiction was validly acquired.
2. Whether the relief sought for by petitioner is to be granted.

RULING:
1..Jurisdiction over the persons of the Spouses Manuel acquired
t was held that jurisdiction over the persons of both defendants in Civil Case No. 09-CV-2582
the Spouses Benedict and Sandra Manuel was validly acquired. This is so because personal
service of summons, via tender to petitioner Sandra Manuel, was made by Sheriff Joselito Sales
on March 16, 2010.
Rule 14, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
SEC. 6. Service in person on defendant. Whenever practicable, the summons shall be served
by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he refuses to receive and sign for it,
by tendering it to him.
Tendering summons is itself a means of personal service as it is contained in Rule 14, Section
6. Personal service, as provided by Rule 14, Section 6, is distinguished from its alternative
substituted service as provided by Rule 14, Section 7:
SEC. 7. Substituted service. If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot be served within a
reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service may be effected (a) by leaving
copies of the summons at the defendant's residence with some person of suitable age and
discretion then residing therein, or (b) by leaving the copies at defendant's office or regular place
of business with some competent person in charge thereof. (Emphasis supplied)
In this case, the sheriffs return on summons indicated that Sheriff Joselito Sales endeavored to
personally hand the summons and a copy of the complaint to the Spouses Manuel on two (2)
separate occasions. He relented from doing so on the first occasion in deference to the medical
condition of petitioner Sandra Manuels mother. On the second occasion, he was constrained to
tender the summons and copy of the complaint as petitioner Sandra Manuel refused to accept
them.
The Spouses Manuel did not deny the occurrence of the events narrated in the sheriffs return
but claimed that no valid service of summons was made. They claimed that they did not reside
in Lower Bacong, Loacan, Itogon, Benguet, where the service of summons was made. From
this, they surmised that the "Sandra Manuel" who was specifically identified in the sheriffs return
was someone other than petitioner Sandra Manuel.
The Spouses Manuel cannot capitalize on the supposed variance of address. Personal service
of summons has nothing to do with the location where summons is served. A defendants
address is inconsequential. Rule 14, Section 6 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is clear in
what it requires: personally handing the summons to the defendant (albeit tender is sufficient
should the defendant refuse to receive and sign). What is determinative of the validity of
personal service is, therefore, the person of the defendant, not the locus of service.
In any case, the Court of Appeals is correct in pointing out that the Spouses Manuels self-
serving assertion must crumble in the face of the clear declarations in the sheriffs
return. Pursuant to Rule 131, Section 3(m) of the Revised Rules on Evidence,22 the acts of
Sheriff Joselito Sales and the events relating to the attempt to personally hand the summons
and a copy of the complaint to the Spouses Manuel, as detailed in the sheriffs return, enjoy the
presumption of regularity.23 Moreover, Sheriff Joselito Sales must be presumed to have taken
ordinary care and diligence in carrying out his duty to make service upon the proper person(s)
and not upon an impostor.24
A sheriffs return, if complete on its face, must be accorded the presumption of regularity and,
hence, taken to be an accurate and exhaustive recital of the circumstances relating to the steps
undertaken by a sheriff. In this case, the Spouses Manuel have harped on their (self-serving)
claim of maintaining residence elsewhere but failed to even allege that there was anything
irregular about the sheriffsreturn or that it was otherwise incomplete.
2. Spouses Manuel are not entitled to relief from the order of default
As valid service of summons was made on them, it was incumbent upon the Spouses Manuel,
pursuant to Rule 11, Section 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. to file their answer within
fifteen (15) days from March 16, 2011. Having failed to do so, they were rightly declared to be in
default. Rule 9, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides for when a party to an
action may be declared in default. Further, Rule 9, Section 3(b) governs the grant of relief from
orders of default. Pursuant to Rule 9, Section 3, a court may proceed to render judgment as the
pleading may warrant should a defendant fail to timely file his or her answer. However, a court
may decline from immediately rendering judgment and instead require the plaintiff to present
evidence. Per Rule 9, Section 3(a), a party declared to be in default shall nevertheless be
"entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings," although he or she may no longer take part in the
trial. The recognition that it is the defendant who is at fault and must suffer the consequences of
his or her own failure is analogous to the dismissal of an action due to the fault of a plaintiff, as
provided by Rule 17, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 17, Section 3
G.R. No. 135306 January 28, 2003

MVRS PUBLICATIONS, INC., MARS C. LACONSAY, MYLA C. AGUJA and AGUSTINO G.

BINEGAS, JR.,petitioners,
vs. ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC., ABDULRAHMAN R.T. LINZAG,
IBRAHIM F.P. ARCILLA, ABDUL RASHID DE GUZMAN, AL-FARED DA SILVA and IBRAHIM
B.A. JUNIO, respondents

FACTS:
1. ISLAMIC DAWAH are the representatives of the Muslim Communities in the Philippines.
2. MVRS released a publication in newspaper Bulgar stating that Muslims regard the pig
as a god in their belief.
3. ISLAMIC DAWAH filed an action for damages and class suit because of the damaging
publication against the Muslim faith.

RULE 3, 4, 6, 7 - ISLAMIC DA'WAH COUNCIL OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC and

ABDULRAHMAN R.T. LINZAG, IBRAHIM F.P. ARCILLA, ABDUL RASHID DE GUZMAN, AL-
FARED DA SILVA and IBRAHIM B.A. JUNIO, filed in the Regional Trial Court of Manila a
complaint for damages in their own behalf and as a class suit in behalf of the Muslim members
nationwide against MVRS PUBLICATIONS, INC., MARS C. LACONSAY, MYLA C. AGUJA and
AGUSTINO G. BINEGAS, JR.

RULE 11 - MVRS PUBLICATIONS, INC., and AGUSTINO G. BINEGAS, JR., in their defense,
contended that the article did not mention respondents as the object of the article and therefore
were not entitled to damages

RULE 36 June 30 1995 - the trial court dismissed the complaint holding that the plaintiffs failed
to establish their cause of action since the persons allegedly defamed by the article were not
specifically identified

RULE 42 Appeal was filed to the Court of Appeals

RULE 51 August 27, 1995 the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court.

RULE 45 Appeal to the Supreme Court

ISSUES: Whether the respondents have the right to institute the class suit.

RULING: No. As correctly pointed out by Mr. Justice Jose C. Vitug during the deliberations, "an
element of a class suit is the adequacy of representation. In determining the question of fair and
adequate representation of members of a class, the court must consider (a) whether the interest
of the named party is coextensive with the interest of the other members of the class; (b) the
proportion of those made parties as it so bears to the total membership of the class; and, (c) any
other factor bearing on the ability of the named party to speak for the rest of the class.

The rules require that courts must make sure that the persons intervening should be sufficiently
numerous to fully protect the interests of all concerned. In the present controversy, Islamic
Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc., seeks in effect to assert the interests not only of the
Muslims in the Philippines but of the whole Muslim world as well. Private respondents obviously
lack the sufficiency of numbers to represent such a global group; neither have they been able to
demonstrate the identity of their interests with those they seek to represent. Unless it can be
shown that there can be a safe guaranty that those absent will be adequately represented by
those present, a class suit, given its magnitude in this instance, would be unavailing."

G.R. No. 193089 July 9, 2012

ROSENA FONTELAR OGAWA, Petitioner vs. ELIZABETH GACHE MENIGISHI, Respondent.

(Bold Underline Cause of Action for Ogawas claim, Indented for Menigishis Counterclaim)

FACTS:

1. Ogawa lent P15,000.00, P100,000.00 and P8,000.00, in September 2000, August 2001,
and March 2003, respectively to Menigishi; Due to failure to pay, respondent offered to
sell to petition a building and its improvements in Sorsogon City for a consideration of
P1,500,000.00 with the agreement that her outstanding loans with petitioner be deducted
from the purchase price and the balance payable in installments.
2. Respondent was to deliver the title as condition for the sale in lieu of the payment of
loan.; Petitioner, thus, remitted the amounts of P150,000.00 and P250,000.00 to
respondent, leaving a balance of P100,000.00
3. Respondent backed out from the deal and reneged on her obligations; Respondent filed
a counterclaim respondent which specifically denied her indebtedness to petitioner and
claimed that it was the latter who owed her 1,000,000.00 Yen, equivalent to about
P500,000.00, as evidenced by a receipt. In partial payment of her indebtedness,
Respondent also sought reimbursement of the advances she allegedly made for the
wedding expenses of petitioner and Yashoyuki in the amount of 4,000,000.00.

RULE 3, 4, 6, 7 - January 26, 2004, petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money, damages,
breach of good human relation and unjust enrichment before the RTC

RULE 6, 11 Sec. 4 - In her Answer with Counterclaim, respondent specifically denied her
indebtedness to petitioner and claimed that it was the latter who owed her 1,000,000.00 Yen,
equivalent to about P500,000.00, as evidenced by a receipt

RULE 36 - September 1, 2005 - the RTC rendered a Decision finding that respondent was
indeed indebted to petitioner in the amounts of P150,000.00 and P250,772.90 or the total
amount of P400,772.90

RULE 41 - the CA affirmed the RTCs awards of the sums of P150,000.00 and P250,772.90 in
favor of petitioner and sustained the denial of respondent's counterclaim of 4,000,000.00 Yen for
lack of evidence.

RULE 45 Appeal to the Supreme Court was filed.

ISSUE: Whether the respondent was able to prove her counterclaim

Ruling: Petitioner failed to prove her counterclaim..

The RTC considered it as having failed to establish any right on the part of respondent to collect
from petitioner the purported indebtedness of 1,000,000.00 Yen, while on the other, the CA
found it sufficient to confer liability.

A receipt is defined as a written and signed acknowledgment that money or good was delivered
or received. The Receipt which respondent relies to support her counterclaim, sufficiently
satisfies this definition.
However, while indubitably containing the signatures of both parties, a plain reading of the
contents of Exhibit 1 negates any inference as to the nature of the transaction for which the
1,000,000 Yen was received and who between the parties is the obligor and the obligee. What is
apparent is a mere written and signed acknowledgment that money was received. There are no
terms and conditions found therein from which a right or obligation may be established. Hence, it
cannot be considered an actionable document9 upon which an action or defense may be
founded.

Consequently, there was no need to deny its genuineness and due execution under oath in
accordance with Section 8, Rule 8 of the Rules of Civil Procedure

Based on the testimony of Atty. Gerona in court, there is no established proof who is the obligor
or obligee in the in receipt presented. Hence respondent failed to prove her counterclaim.

"Preponderance of evidence" is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on
either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term "greater weight of
evidence" or "greater weight of credible evidence. From the evidence on record, it is clear that
respondent failed to prove her counterclaim by preponderance of evidence.1wphi1