BENGZON V SBRC

203 SCRA 767 Political Law Constitutional Law The Legislative Department Inquiry in Aid
of Legislation When not Allowed

It was alleged that Benjamin Kokoy Romualdez and his wife together with the Marcoses

unlawfully and unjustly enriched themselves at the expense of the Filipino people. That they

obtained with the help of the Bengzon Law Office and Ricardo Lopa Corys brother in law,
among others, control over some of the biggest business enterprises in the country including

MERALCO, PCI Bank, Shell Philippines and Benguet Consolidated Mining Corporation.

Senator Juan Ponce Enrile subsequently delivered a privilege speech alleging that Lopa took over

various government owned corporations which is in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt

Practices Act. Contained in the speech is a motion to investigate on the matter. The motion was
referred to the Committee on Accountability of Public Officers or the Blue Ribbon Committee.

After committee hearing, Lopa refused to testify before the committee for it may unduly

prejudice a pending civil case against him. Bengzon likewise refused invoking his right to due
process. Lopa however sent a letter to Enrile categorically denying his allegations and that his

allegations are baseless and malicious.

Enrile subsequently took advantage of the Senates privilege hour upon which he insisted to
have an inquiry regarding the matter. The SBRC rejected Lopas and Bengzons plea.

Claiming that the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is poised to subpoena them and require their

attendance and testimony in proceedings before the Committee, in excess of its jurisdiction and
legislative purpose, in clear and blatant disregard of their constitutional rights, and to their grave

and irreparable damage, prejudice and injury, and that there is no appeal nor any other plain,

speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, Bengzon et al filed a petition for
prohibition with a prayer for temporary restraining order and/or injunctive relief against the
SBRC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the inquiry sought by the SBRC be granted.

HELD: No, the inquiry cannot be given due course. The speech of Enrile contained no suggestion

of contemplated legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look into a possible violation of
Sec. 5 of RA No. 3019, otherwise known as The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. In other
words, the purpose of the inquiry to be conducted by the Blue Ribbon Committee was to find out

whether or not the relatives of Cory, particularly Lopa, had violated the law in connection with

the alleged sale of the 36 or 39 corporations belonging to Kokoy to the Lopa Group. There

appears to be, therefore, no intended legislation involved. Hence, the contemplated inquiry by
the SBRC is not really in aid of legislation because it is not related to a purpose within the

jurisdiction of Congress, since the aim of the investigation is to find out whether or not the

relatives of the President or Mr. Ricardo Lopa had violated Section 5 of RA No. 3019, the Anti-

Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, a matter that appears more within the province of the courts

rather than of the legislature. Besides, the Court may take judicial notice that Mr. Ricardo Lopa
died during the pendency of this case.

Corpus of CAMILO L. SABIO v.

HON. SENATOR RICHARD J. GORDON, et al.
G.R. No. 174340 17 October 2006,
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J. (En Banc)

FACTS:
Pursuant to Senate Resolution No. 455, Senator Gordon requested PCGG Chairman Sabio and
his Commissioners to appear as resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by
the Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public
Services.
Chairman Sabio declined the invitation because of prior commitment, and at the same time
invoked Section 4(b) of EO No. 1: No member or staff of the Commission shall be
required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative
proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1 limits power of legislative inquiry by exempting all
PCGG members or staff from testifying in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding.

RULING:
No. Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution grants the power of inquiry not only to the
Senate and the House of Representatives, but also to any of their respective
committees. Clearly, there is a direct conferral of investigatory power to the committees
and it means that the mechanism which the Houses can take in order to effectively perform its
investigative functions are also available to the committees.
It can be said that the Congress power of inquiry has gained more solid existence and expansive
construal. The Courts high regard to such power is rendered more evident in Senate
v. Ermita, where it categorically ruled that the power of inquiry is broad enough to cover
officials of the executive branch. Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine
in Arnault that the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for
legislation, is a proper subject for investigation and that the power of inquiry is co-
extensive with the power to legislate.
Considering these jurisprudential instructions, Section 4(b) is directly repugnant with Article VI,
Section 21. Section 4(b) exempts the PCGG members and staff from the Congress power
of inquiry. This cannot be countenanced. Nowhere in the Constitution is any provision
granting such exemption. The Congress power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses
everything that concerns the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly
needed statutes. It even extends to government agencies created by Congress and
officers whose positions are within the power of Congress to regulate or even abolish.
PCGG belongs to this class.
A statute may be declared unconstitutional because it is not within the legislative power to
enact; or it creates or establishes methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles; or its
purpose or effect violates the Constitution or its basic principles.

Moreover, Sec. 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 has been repealed by the Constitution because it is
inconsistent with the constitutional provisions on the Congress power of inquiry (Art. VI, Sec.
21), the principle of public accountability (Art. XI, Sec. 1), the policy of full disclosure (Art. II,
Sec. 28), and the right of access to public information (Art. III, Sec. 7).

Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad power of Congress, in
the absence of any constitutional basis.

Senate vs. Ermita , GR 169777, April 20, 2006

FACTS:
This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused power by
issuing E.O. 464 Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of Powers, Adherence to
the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in
Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and for Other Purposes.
Petitioners pray for its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional.
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate
Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the
attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices
including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces
of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP).
The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department
for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project, others on the
issues of massive election fraud in the Philippine elections, wire tapping, and the role of military
in the so-called Gloriagate Scandal.
Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as provided by
E.O. 464, Section 3 which requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure
the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress.

ISSUE:
Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials, enumerated in Section 2(b) to
secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress, valid and
constitutional?

RULING:
No. The enumeration in Section 2 (b) of E.O. 464 is broad and is covered by the executive
privilege. The doctrine of executive privilege is premised on the fact that certain information
must, as a matter of necessity, be kept confidential in pursuit of the public interest. The privilege
being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose information, in this case to
Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree as to outweigh the public interest in
enforcing that obligation in a particular case.
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch whenever it is
sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such information on the ground
that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the reason therefor and why it must be
respected.
The infirm provisions of E.O. 464, however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional
requests for information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its
reasons therefor. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power of Congress to
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated.

GUDANI VS. SENGA

GR No. 170165, August 15, 2006 [Article VI Sec. 22: Congress' Power of Inquiry; Legislative
Investigation]

FACTS:
The Senate invited Gen. Gudani and Lt. Col. Balutan to clarify allegations of 2004 election fraud
and the surfacing of the Hello Garci tapes. PGMA issued EO 464 enjoining officials of the
executive department including the military establishment from appearing in any legislative
inquiry without her consent. AFP Chief of Staff Gen. Senga issued a Memorandum, prohibiting
Gen. Gudani, Col. Balutan et al from appearing before the Senate Committee without
Presidential approval. However, the two appeared before the Senate in spite the fact that a
directive has been given to them. As a result, the two were relieved of their assignments for
allegedly violating the Articles of War and the time honoured principle of the Chain of
Command. Gen. Senga ordered them to be subjected before the General Court
Martial proceedings for willfuly violating an order of a superior officer.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the President has the authority to issue an order to the members of the AFP
preventing them from testifying before a legislative inquiry.

RULING:
Yes. The SC hold that President has constitutional authority to do so, by virtue of her power as
commander-in-chief, and that as a consequence a military officer who defies such injunction is
liable under military justice. At the same time, any chamber of Congress which seeks the
appearance before it of a military officer against the consent of the President has adequate
remedies under law to compel such attendance. Any military official whom Congress summons
to testify before it may be compelled to do so by the President. If the President is not so
inclined, the President may be commanded by judicial order to compel the attendance of the
military officer. Final judicial orders have the force of the law of the land which the President has
the duty to faithfully execute.
SC ruled in Senate v. Ermita that the President may not issue a blanket requirement of prior
consent on executive officials summoned by the legislature to attend a congressional hearing. In
doing so, the Court recognized the considerable limitations on executive privilege, and affirmed
that the privilege must be formally invoked on specified grounds. However, the ability of the
President to prevent military officers from testifying before Congress does not turn on executive
privilege, but on the Chief Executives power as commander-in-chief to control the actions and
speech of members of the armed forces. The Presidents prerogatives as commander-in-chief are
not hampered by the same limitations as in executive privilege.

At the same time, the refusal of the President to allow members of the military to appear before
Congress is still subject to judicial relief. The Constitution itself recognizes as one of the
legislatures functions is the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation. Inasmuch as it is ill-
advised for Congress to interfere with the Presidents power as commander-in-chief, it is
similarly detrimental for the President to unduly interfere with Congresss right to conduct
legislative inquiries. The impasse did not come to pass in this petition, since petitioners testified
anyway despite the presidential prohibition. Yet the Court is aware that with its pronouncement
today that the President has the right to require prior consent from members of the armed
forces, the clash may soon loom or actualize.

The duty falls on the shoulders of the President, as commander-in-chief, to authorize the
appearance of the military officers before Congress. Even if the President has earlier disagreed
with the notion of officers appearing before the legislature

testify, the Chief Executive is nonetheless obliged to comply with the final orders of the courts.

NERI VS. SENATE COMMITTEE

ROMULO L. NERI, petitioner vs. SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC

OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND COMMERCE,
AND SENATE COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY
G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008

FACTS: On April 21, 2007, the Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC)
entered into a contract with Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE) for the supply of
equipment and services for the National Broadband Network (NBN) Project in the amount of U.S.
$ 329,481,290 (approximately P16 Billion Pesos). The Project was to be financed by the Peoples
Republic of China.
The Senate passed various resolutions relative to the NBN deal. In the September 18, 2007
hearing Jose de Venecia III testified that several high executive officials and power brokers were
using their influence to push the approval of the NBN Project by the NEDA.
Neri, the head of NEDA, was then invited to testify before the Senate Blue Ribbon. He appeared
in one hearing wherein he was interrogated for 11 hrs and during which he admitted that Abalos
of COMELEC tried to bribe him with P200M in exchange for his approval of the NBN project. He
further narrated that he informed President Arroyo about the bribery attempt and that she
instructed him not to accept the bribe.

However, when probed further on what they discussed about the NBN Project, petitioner refused
to answer, invoking executive privilege. In particular, he refused to answer the questions on:
(a) whether or not President Arroyo followed up the NBN Project,
(b) whether or not she directed him to prioritize it, and
(c) whether or not she directed him to approve.
He later refused to attend the other hearings and Ermita sent a letter to the senate averring that
the communications between GMA and Neri are privileged and that the jurisprudence laid down
in Senate vs Ermita be applied. He was cited in contempt of respondent committees and an
order for his arrest and detention until such time that he would appear and give his testimony.

ISSUE:
Are the communications elicited by the subject three (3) questions covered by executive
privilege?

HELD:

The communications are covered by executive privilege

The revocation of EO 464 (advised executive officials and employees to follow and abide by the
Constitution, existing laws and jurisprudence, including, among others, the case of Senate v.
Ermita when they are invited to legislative inquiries in aid of legislation.), does not in any way
diminish the concept of executive privilege. This is because this concept has Constitutional
underpinnings.

The claim of executive privilege is highly recognized in cases where the subject of inquiry relates
to a power textually committed by the Constitution to the President, such as the area of military
and foreign relations. Under our Constitution, the President is the repository of the commander-
in-chief, appointing, pardoning, and diplomatic powers. Consistent with the doctrine of
separation of powers, the information relating to these powers may enjoy greater confidentiality
than others.
Several jurisprudence cited provide the elements of presidential communications privilege:
1) The protected communication must relate to a quintessential and non-delegable presidential
power.
2) The communication must be authored or solicited and received by a close advisor of the
President or the President himself. The judicial test is that an advisor must be in operational
proximity with the President.

3) The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may be overcome
by a showing of adequate need, such that the information sought likely contains important
evidence and by the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating
authority.
In the case at bar, Executive Secretary Ermita premised his claim of executive privilege on the
ground that the communications elicited by the three (3) questions fall under conversation and
correspondence between the President and public officials necessary in her executive and
policy decision-making process and, that the information sought to be disclosed might impair
our diplomatic as well as economic relations with the Peoples Republic of China. Simply put,
the bases are presidential communications privilege and executive privilege on matters relating
to diplomacy or foreign relations.

Using the above elements, we are convinced that, indeed, the communications elicited by the
three (3) questions are covered by the presidential communications privilege. First, the
communications relate to a quintessential and non-delegable power of the President, i.e. the
power to enter into an executive agreement with other countries. This authority of the President
to enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the Legislature has traditionally
been recognized in Philippine jurisprudence. Second, the communications are received by a
close advisor of the President. Under the operational proximity test, petitioner can be
considered a close advisor, being a member of President Arroyos cabinet. And third, there is no
adequate showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of the privilege and of
the unavailability of the information elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

Respondent Committees further contend that the grant of petitioners claim of executive
privilege violates the constitutional provisions on the right of the people to information on
matters of public concern.50 We might have agreed with such contention if petitioner did not
appear before them at all. But petitioner made himself available to them during the September
26 hearing, where he was questioned for eleven (11) hours. Not only that, he expressly
manifested his willingness to answer more questions from the Senators, with the exception only
of those covered by his claim of executive privilege.

The right to public information, like any other right, is subject to limitation. Section 7 of Article
III provides:
The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access
to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be
afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

ROMERO V. ESTRADA (2009)

G.R. No. 174105

Promulgated: April 2, 2009

Petitioners: REGHIS M. ROMERO II, EDMOND Q. SESE, LEOPOLDO T. SANCHEZ, REGHIS

M. ROMERO III, MICHAEL L. ROMERO, NATHANIEL L. ROMERO, and JEROME R. CANLAS

Respondent: SENATOR JINGGOY E. ESTRADA and SENATE COMMITTEE ON LABOR,

EMPLOYMENT AND HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT

Ponente: VELASCO, JR., J.

FACTS

Petitioners Romero II and other members of the Board of Directors of R-II Builders, Inc., were
invited on an investigation with regards to the investment of Overseas Workers Welfare
Administration (OWWA) funds in the Smokey Mountain project. The said investigation will aid
the Senate in determining possible amendments of Republic Act 8042 other known as the
Migrant Workers Act.

ISSUE

Whether the Senate Committees inquiry is sub judice to the subject raised at hand?

HELD

YES. As briefly stated in Arnualt vs. Nazareno;

The power of inquiry with process to enforce it is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the
legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of
information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and
where the legislative body does not itself possess the requisite information which is not
infrequently true recourse must be had to others who possess it.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance

Facts:

The value-added tax (VAT) is levied on the sale, barter or exchange of goods and properties as
well as on the sale or exchange of services. RA 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing
VAT system and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue Code.
There are various suits challenging the constitutionality of RA 7716 on various grounds.

One contention is that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as
required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the
consolidation of 2 distinct bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. There is also a contention that S.
No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings as required by the Constitution.

Issue:
Whether or not RA 7716 violates Art. VI, Secs. 24 and 26(2) ofthe Constitution

Held:

The argument that RA 7716 did not originate exclusively in the House of Representatives as
required by Art. VI, Sec. 24 of the Constitution will not bear analysis. To begin with, it is not the
law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to originate exclusively in the
House of Representatives. To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated
the legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially be the same
as the House bill would be to deny the Senates power not only to concur with amendments but
also to propose amendments. Indeed, what the Constitution simply means is that the initiative
for filing revenue, tariff or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills
and bills of local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory that,
elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be expected to be more
sensitive to the local needs and problems. Nor does the Constitutionprohibit the filing in the
Senate of a substitute bill in anticipation of its receipt of the bill from the House, so long as
action by the Senate as a body is withheld pending receipt of the House bill.

The next argument of the petitioners was that S. No. 1630 did not pass 3 readings on separate
days as required by the Constitution because the second and third readings were done on the
same day. But this was because the President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent. The
presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing but also that of
reading the bill on separate days. That upon the certification of a billby the President the
requirement of 3 readings on separate days and of printing and distribution can be dispensed
with is supported by the weightof legislative practice.

Alvarez V Guingona

In April 1993, House Bill 8817 (An Act Converting the Municipality of Santiago into an
Independent Component City to be known as the City of Santiago) was passed in the House of
Representatives.

In May 1993, a Senate Bill (SB 1243) of similar title and content with that of HB 8817 was
introduced in the Senate.

In January 1994, HB 8817 was transmitted to the Senate. In February 1994, the Senate

conducted a public hearing on SB 1243. In March 1994, the Senate Committee on Local
Government rolled out its recommendation for approval of HB 8817 as it was totally the same
with SB 1243. Eventually, HB 8817 became a law (RA 7720).

Now Senator Heherson Alvarez et al are assailing the constitutionality of the said law on the

ground that the bill creating the law did not originate from the lower house and that City of
Santiago was not able to comply with the income of at least P20M per annum in order for it to be
a city. That in the computation of the reported average income of P20,974,581.97, the IRA was
included which should not be.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not RA 7720 is invalid for not being originally from the HOR.

2. Whether or not the IRA should be included in the computation of an LGUs income.

HELD: 1. NO. The house bill was filed first before the senate bill as the record shows. Further,

the Senate held in abeyance any hearing on the said SB while the HB was on its 1st, 2nd and
3rd reading in the HOR. The Senate only conducted its 1st hearing on the said SB one month after
the HB was transmitted to the Senate (in anticipation of the said HB as well).

2. YES. The IRA should be added in the computation of an LGUs average annual
income as was done in the case at bar. The IRAs are items of income because they form part of
the gross accretion of the funds of the local government unit. The IRAs regularly and

automatically accrue to the local treasury without need of any further action on the part of the

local government unit. They thus constitute income which the local government can invariably
rely upon as the source of much needed funds.

To reiterate, IRAs are a regular, recurring item of income; nil is there a basis, too, to classify the

same as a special fund or transfer, since IRAs have a technical definition and meaning all its own
as used in the Local Government Code that unequivocally makes it distinct from special funds or

transfers referred to when the Code speaks of funding support from the national government,
its instrumentalities and government-owned-or-controlled corporations.

GARCIA V MATA
Facts: Garcia was a reserve officer on active duty who was reversed to inactive status. He filed
an action for mandamus to compel the DND and AFP to reinstate him to active service and
readjust his rank and pay emoluments.

Garcia claims that his reversion to inactive status is violation of RA 1600 which prohibits the
reversion of officers with at least 10 years of service.
On the other hand, the AFP and DND contend that the said provision of RA 1600 has no
relevance or pertinence to the budget in question or to any appropriation item therein. (RA 1600
was an appropriation law for 1956-57).

Issue: Whether RA 1600 is valid? Does it contain rider in an appropriation bill?

Held: The incongruity and irrelevancy are already evident. Section 11 of RA 1600 fails to
disclose the relevance to any appropriation item. RA 1600 is an appropriation law for the
operation of government while Section 11 refers to a fundamental governmental policy of calling
to active duty and the reversion of inactive statute of reserve officers in the AFP.

Hence it was A NON-APPROPRIATION ITEM INSERTED IN AN APPROPRIATION MEASURE, in

violation of the constitutional prohibition against RIDERS to the general appropriation act. It was
indeed a new and completely unrelated provision attached to the GAA.

It also violates the rule on one-bill, one subject. The subject to be considered must be expressed
in the title of the act. When an act contains provisions which are clearly not embraced in the
subject of the act, as expressed in the title, such provisions are void, inoperative and without
effect.

SECTION 11 is unconstitutional. Garcia cannot compel the AFP to reinstate him.

DEMETRIA V ALBA

Facts:

Petitioners assail the constitutionality of first paragraph of Sec 44 of PD 1177 (Budget Reform
Decree of 1977)as concerned citizens, members of the National Assembly, parties with general
interest common to all people of the Philippines, and as taxpayerson the primary grounds that
Section 44 infringes upon the fundamental law by authorizing illegal transfer of public moneys,
amounting to undue delegation of legislative powers and allowing the President to override the
safeguards prescribed for approving appropriations.
The Solicitor General, for the public respondents, questioned the legal standing of the petitioners
and held that one branch of the government cannot be enjoined by another, coordinate branch
in its performance of duties within its sphere of responsibility. It also alleged that the petition
has become moot and academic after the abrogation of Sec 16(5), Article VIII of the 1973
Constitution by the Freedom Constitution (which was where the provision under consideration
was enacted in pursuant thereof), which states that No law shall be passed authorizing any
transfer of appropriations, however, the Presidentmay by law be authorized to augment any
item in the general appropriations law for their respective offices from savings in other items of
their respective appropriations.

Issue:

1. W/N PD 1177 is constitutional

2. W/N the Supreme Court can act upon the assailed executive act

Held:

1. No. Sec 44 of PD 1177 unduly overextends the privilege granted under Sec16(5) by
empowering the President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department of the
Executive Department to any program of any department included in the General Appropriations
Act, without any regard as to whether or not the funds to be transferred are actually savings in
the item. It not only disregards the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to
an undue delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof.

Par. 1 of Sec. 44 puts all safeguards to forestall abuses in the expenditure of public funds to
naught. Such constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and void.

2. Yes. Where the legislature or executive acts beyond the scope of its constitutional powers, it
becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare what the other branches of the government has
assumed to do as void, as part of its constitutionally conferred judicial power. This is not to say
that the judicial power is superior in degree or dignity. In exercising this high authority, the
judges claim no judicial supremacy; they are only the administrators of the public will.

Petition granted. Par. 1, Sec. 44 OF PD 1177 null and void.

PHILCONSA vs. HON. SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, G.R. No. 113105 August 19, 1994
 Facts:
House Bill No. 10900, the General Appropriation Bill of 1994 (GAB of 1994), was
passed and approved by both houses of Congress on December 17, 1993. As passed, it imposed
conditions and limitations on certain items of appropriations in the proposed budget previously
submitted by the President. It also authorized members of Congress to propose and identify
projects in the pork barrels allotted to them and to realign their respective operating budgets.
Pursuant to the procedure on the passage and enactment of bills as prescribed by the
Constitution, Congress presented the said bill to the President for consideration and approval.
On December 30, 1993, the President signed the bill into law, and declared the same to
have become Republic Act NO. 7663, entitled AN ACT APPROPRIATING FUNDS FOR THE
OPERATION OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINES FROM JANUARY ONE TO DECEMBER
THIRTY ONE, NINETEEN HUNDRED AND NINETY-FOUR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES (GAA of
1994). On the same day, the President delivered his Presidential Veto Message, specifying the
provisions of the bill he vetoed and on which he imposed certain conditions, as follows:
1. Provision on Debt Ceiling, on the ground that this debt reduction scheme cannot be validly
done through the 1994 GAA. And that appropriations for payment of public debt, whether
foreign or domestic, are automatically appropriated pursuant to the Foreign Borrowing Act and
Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177 as reiterated under Section 26, Chapter 4, Book VI of E.O. No. 292,
the Administrative Code of 1987.
2. Special provisions which authorize the use of income and the creation, operation and
maintenance of revolving funds in the appropriation for State Universities and Colleges (SUCs),
3. Provision on 70% (administrative)/30% (contract) ratio for road maintenance.
4. Special provision on the purchase by the AFP of medicines in compliance with the Generics
Drugs Law (R.A. No. 6675).
5. The President vetoed the underlined proviso in the appropriation for the modernization of the
AFP of the Special Provision No. 2 on the Use of Fund, which requires the prior approval of the
Congress for the release of the corresponding modernization funds, as well as the entire Special
Provision No. 3 on the Specific Prohibition which states that the said Modernization Fund shall
not be used for payment of six (6) additional S-211 Trainer planes, 18 SF-260 Trainer planes
and 150 armored personnel carriers
6. New provision authorizing the Chief of Staff to use savings in the AFP to augment pension
and gratuity funds.
7. Conditions on the appropriation for the Supreme Court, Ombudsman, COA, and CHR, the
Congress.
Issue:
whether or not the conditions imposed by the President in the items of the GAA of
1994: (a) for the Supreme Court, (b) Commission on Audit (COA), (c) Ombudsman, (d)
Commission on Human Rights, (CHR), (e) Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Units (CAFGUS)
and (f) State Universities and Colleges (SUCs) are constitutional; whether or not the veto of the
special provision in the appropriation for debt service and the automatic appropriation of funds
therefore is constitutional
Held:
The veto power, while exercisable by the President, is actually a part of the
legislative process. There is, therefore, sound basis to indulge in the presumption of validity of a
veto. The burden shifts on those questioning the validity thereof to show that its use is a
violation of the Constitution.
The vetoed provision on the debt servicing is clearly an attempt to repeal Section 31 of
P.D. No. 1177 (Foreign Borrowing Act) and E.O. No. 292, and to reverse the debt payment
policy. As held by the court in Gonzales, the repeal of these laws should be done in a separate
law, not in the appropriations law.
In the veto of the provision relating to SUCs, there was no undue discrimination when the
President vetoed said special provisions while allowing similar provisions in other government
agencies. If some government agencies were allowed to use their income and maintain a
revolving fund for that purpose, it is because these agencies have been enjoying such privilege
before by virtue of the special laws authorizing such practices as exceptions to the one-fund
policy (e.g., R.A. No. 4618 for the National Stud Farm, P.D. No. 902-A for the Securities and
Exchange Commission; E.O. No. 359 for the Department of Budget and Managements
Procurement Service).
The veto of the second paragraph of Special Provision No. 2 of the item for the DPWH is
unconstitutional. The Special Provision in question is not an inappropriate provision which can be
the subject of a veto. It is not alien to the appropriation for road maintenance, and on the other
hand, it specifies how the said item shall be expended 70% by administrative and 30% by
contract.
The Special Provision which requires that all purchases of medicines by the AFP should
strictly comply with the formulary embodied in the National Drug Policy of the Department of
Health is an appropriate provision. Being directly related to and inseparable from the
appropriation item on purchases of medicines by the AFP, the special provision cannot be vetoed
by the President without also vetoing the said item.
The requirement in Special Provision No. 2 on the use of Fund for the AFP modernization
program that the President must submit all purchases of military equipment to Congress for its
approval, is an exercise of the congressional or legislative veto. However the case at bench is
not the proper occasion to resolve the issues of the validity of the legislative veto as provided in
Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 because the issues at hand can be disposed of on other grounds.
Therefore, being inappropriate provisions, Special Provisions Nos. 2 and 3 were properly
vetoed.
Furthermore, Special Provision No. 3, prohibiting the use of the Modernization fund for
payment of the trainer planes and armored personnel carriers, which have been contracted for
by the AFP, is violative of the Constitutional prohibition on the passage of laws that impair the
obligation of contracts (Art. III, Sec. 10), more so, contracts entered into by the Government
itself. The veto of said special provision is therefore valid.
The Special Provision, which allows the Chief of Staff to use savings to augment the
pension fund for the AFP being managed by the AFP Retirement and Separation Benefits System
is violative of Sections 25(5) and 29(1) of the Article VI of the Constitution.
Regarding the deactivation of CAFGUS, we do not find anything in the language used in
the challenged Special Provision that would imply that Congress intended to deny to the
President the right to defer or reduce the spending, much less to deactivate 11,000 CAFGU
members all at once in 1994. But even if such is the intention, the appropriation law is not the
proper vehicle for such purpose. Such intention must be embodied and manifested in another
law considering that it abrades the powers of the Commander-in-Chief and there are existing
laws on the creation of the CAFGUs to be amended.
On the conditions imposed by the President on certain provisions relating to
appropriations to the Supreme Court, constitutional commissions, the NHA and the DPWH, there
is less basis to complain when the President said that the expenditures shall be subject to
guidelines he will issue. Until the guidelines are issued, it cannot be determined whether they
are proper or inappropriate. Under the Faithful Execution Clause, the President has the power to
take necessary and proper steps to carry into execution the law. These steps are the ones to
be embodied in the guidelines.

PHILCONSA v. PEDRO M. GIMENEZ G.R. No. L-23326 December 18, 1965

Facts:
Philippine Constitution Association, Inc (PHILCONSA) assails the validity of RA 3836
insofar as the same allows retirement gratuity and commutation of vacation and sick leave to
Senators and Representatives, and to the elective officials of both Houses (of Congress). The
provision on retirement gratuity is an attempt to circumvent the Constitutional ban on increase
of salaries of the members of Congress during their term of office, contrary to the provisions of
Article VI, Section 14 of the Constitution. The same provision constitutes selfish class
legislation because it allows members and officers of Congress to retire after twelve (12) years
of service and gives them a gratuity equivalent to one year salary for every four years of
service, which is not refundable in case of reinstatement or re election of the retiree, while all
other officers and employees of the government can retire only after at least twenty (20) years
of service and are given a gratuity which is only equivalent to one month salary for every year of
service, which, in any case, cannot exceed 24 months. The provision on vacation and sick leave,
commutable at the highest rate received, insofar as members of Congress are concerned, is
another attempt of the legislator to further increase their compensation in violation of the
Constitution.
The Solicitor General counter-argued alleging that the grant of retirement or pension
benefits under Republic Act No. 3836 to the officers objected to by the petitioner does not
constitute forbidden compensation within the meaning of Section 14 of Article VI of the
Philippine Constitution. The law in question does not constitute class legislation. The payment of
commutable vacation and sick leave benefits under the said Act is merely in the nature of a
basis for computing the gratuity due each retiring member and, therefore, is not an indirect
scheme to increase their salary.
Issue:
whether Republic Act 3836 violates Section 14, Article VI, of the Constitution which
reads as follows:
The senators and the Members of the House of Representatives shall, unless otherwise provided
by law, receive an annual compensation of seven thousand two hundred pesos each, including
per diems and other emoluments or allowances, and exclusive only of travelling expenses to and
from their respective districts in the case of Members of the House of Representative and to and
from their places of residence in the case of Senators, when attending sessions of the Congress.
No increase in said compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all
the Members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such increase. Until
otherwise provided by law, the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives shall each receive an annual compensation of sixteen thousand pesos.
Held:
Yes. When the Constitutional Convention first determined the compensation for the
Members of Congress, the amount fixed by it was only P5,000.00 per annum but it embodies a
special proviso which reads as follows: No increase in said compensation shall take effect until
after the expiration of the full term of all the members of the National Assembly elected
subsequent to approval of such increase. In other words, under the original constitutional
provision regarding the power of the National Assembly to increase the salaries of its members,
no increase would take effect until after the expiration of the full term of the members of the
Assembly elected subsequent to the approval of such increase.
The Constitutional provision in the aforementioned Section 14, Article VI, includes in the
term compensation other emoluments. This is the pivotal point on this fundamental question
as to whether the retirement benefit as provided for in Republic Act 3836 fall within the purview
of the term other emoluments.
Emolument is defined as the profit arising from office or employment; that which is
received as compensation for services or which is annexed to the possession of an office, as
salary, fees and perquisites.
It is evident that retirement benefit is a form or another species of emolument, because it
is a part of compensation for services of one possessing any office.
Republic Act 3836 provides for an increase in the emoluments of Senators and Members
of the House of Representatives, to take effect upon the approval of said Act, which was on June
22, 1963. Retirement benefits were immediately available thereunder, without awaiting the
expiration of the full term of all the Members of the Senate and the House of Representatives
approving such increase. Such provision clearly runs counter to the prohibition in Article VI,
Section 14 of the Constitution. RA 3836 is therefore unconstitutional.

TIO V VIDEOGRAM
 151 SCRA 208 Political Law The Embrace of Only One Subject by a Bill

Delegation of Power Delegation to Administrative Bodies

In 1985, Presidential Dedree No. 1987 entitled An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory
Board was enacted which gave broad powers to the VRB to regulate and supervise the

videogram industry. The said law sought to minimize the economic effects of piracy. There was a

need to regulate the sale of videograms as it has adverse effects to the movie industry. The
proliferation of videograms has significantly lessened the revenue being acquired from the movie

industry, and that such loss may be recovered if videograms are to be taxed. Section 10 of the
PD imposes a 30% tax on the gross receipts payable to the LGUs.

In 1986, Valentin Tio assailed the said PD as he averred that it is unconstitutional on the
following grounds:

1. Section 10 thereof, which imposed the 30% tax on gross receipts, is a rider and is not
germane to the subject matter of the law.

2. There is also undue delegation of legislative power to the VRB, an administrative body,

because the law allowed the VRB to deputize, upon its discretion, other government
agencies to assist the VRB in enforcing the said PD.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Valentin Tios arguments are correct.

HELD: No.

1. The Constitutional requirement that every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be

expressed in the title thereof is sufficiently complied with if the title be comprehensive enough
to include the general purpose which a statute seeks to achieve. In the case at bar, the

questioned provision is allied and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for the

accomplishment of, the general object of the PD, which is the regulation of the video industry
through the VRB as expressed in its title. The tax provision is not inconsistent with, nor foreign
to that general subject and title. As a tool for regulation it is simply one of the regulatory and

control mechanisms scattered throughout the PD.

2. There is no undue delegation of legislative powers to the VRB. VRB is not being tasked to
legislate. What was conferred to the VRB was the authority or discretion to seek assistance in

the execution, enforcement, and implementation of the law. Besides, in the very language of the

decree, the authority of the BOARD to solicit such assistance is for a fixed and limited period
with the deputized agencies concerned being subject to the direction and control of the [VRB].

PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION, ET AL. vs. PETE PRADO

Facts;
Republic Act 7354 was passed into law stirring commotions from the Judiciary. Under its Sec 35
as implemented by Philippine Postal Corporation through its Circular No.92-28. The franking
privelege of the Supreme Court, COA, RTCs, MTC, MTCC, and other government offices were
withdrawn from them.
In addition, the petitioners raised the issue of constitutionality and the methods adopted prior it
becoming a law.
Issues;
WON RA 7354 is unconstitutional.
- Violative of Art VI Sec 26(1) which says '"Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only
one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof."

- Violative of Art VI Sec 26(2) which says 'No bill passed by either House shall become a law
unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form
have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage, except when the President
certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency.
Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon
shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal.

- Violative of the Equal protection clause

Ruling:

The Supreme Court sustained as to the violation of Art VI Sec 26(1) ruling further that it's
adoption is within the terms prescribed by law saying that the title of the bill is not required to
be an index to the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover every single detail of
the measure.

However, Sec 35 was ruled out to be in violation of the equal protection clause. The distinction
made by the law is superficial. It is not based on substantial distinctions that make real
differences between the Judiciary and the grantees of the franking privilege.

Therefore, RA 7354 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

Tan vs. Del Rosario Case Digest

Tan vs. Del Rosario

237 SCRA 324

Facts:
Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of RA 7496 or the simplified income
taxation scheme (SNIT) under Arts (26) and (28) and III (1). The SNIT contained changes in the
 tax schedules and different treatment in the professionals which petitioners assail as
unconstitutional for being isolative of the equal protection clause in the constitution.
Issue:

Is the contention meritorious?

Ruling:

No. uniformity of taxation, like the hindered concept of equal protection, merely
require that all subjects or objects of taxation similarly situated are to be treated alike both
privileges and liabilities. Uniformity, does not offend classification as long as it rest on
substantial distinctions, it is germane to the purpose of the law. It is not limited to existing only
and must apply equally to all members of the same class.

The legislative intent is to increasingly shift the income tax system towards the
scheduled approach in taxation of individual taxpayers and maintain the present global
treatment on taxable corporations. This classification is neither arbitrary nor inappropriate.

Gonzales v. Macaraig, Jr. 1990

GR 87636 -EN BANC

Facts:
December 16, 1988 Congress passed House Bill No. 19186 (GAB of Fiscal Year 1989) which
eliminated or decreased certain items included in the proposed budget submitted by the
president
December 29, 1988 President signed bill into law (RA 6688) but vetoed 7 special provisions
and Sec 55, a general provision.
February 2, 1989 Senate passed Res. No. 381 Senate as an institution decided to contest the
constitutionality of the veto of the president of SEC 55 only.
April 11, 1989 this petition was filed
January 19, 1990 filed motion for leave to file and to admit supplemental petition same issues
but included SEC 16 of House Bill 26934 (Gab for FY 1990 or RA 6831)
SEC. 55 disallows the president and heads of several department to augment any item in the
GAB thereby violation CONSTI ART VI SEC 25 (5) (page 459)
SEC 16 of the GAB of 1990 provides for the same and the reason for veto remains the same
with the additional legal basis of violation of PD 1177 SEC 44 and 45 as amended by RA 6670
that authorizes the president and the heads of depts. To use saving to augment any item of
appropriations in the exec branch of government (page 460)
ISSUE:
Whether or not the veto by the President of SEC 55 of GAB for FY 1989 and SEC 16 of GAB for
FY 1990 is unconstitutional.
 HELD:
The veto is CONSTITUTIONAL. Although the petitioners contend that the veto exceeded the
mandate of the line-veto power of the president because SEC 55 and SEC 16 are provisions the
court held that inappropriate provisions can be treated as items (Henry v. Edwards) and
therefore can be vetoed validly by the president. Furthermore inappropriate provisions must be
struck down because they contravene the constitution because it limits the power of the
executive to augment appropriations (ART VI SEC 25 PAR 5.)
The provisions are inappropriate because
o They do not relate to particular or distinctive appropriations
o Disapproved or reduces items are nowhere to be found on the face of the bill
o It is more of an expression of policy than an appropriation
Court also said that to make the GAB veto-proof would be logrolling on the part of the
legislative the subject matter of the provisions should be dealt with in separate and complete
legislation but because they are aware that it would be NOT passed in that manner they attempt
hide it in the GAB
If the legislature really believes that the exercise of veto is really invalid then congress SHOULD
resort to their constitutionally vested power to override the veto. (ART VI SEC 21 PAR 1)
DECISION: Veto UPHELD. Petition DISMISSED.

BENGZON V DRILON

208 SCRA 133 Political Law Veto Power of the President

In 1990, Congress sought to reenact some old laws (i.e. Republic Act No. 1797) that were
repealed during the time of former President Ferdinand Marcos. These old laws provided

certain retirement benefits to retired judges, justices, and members of the constitutional
commissions. Congress felt a need to restore these laws in order to standardize retirement

benefits among government officials. However, President Corazon Aquino vetoed the bill (House

Bill No. 16297) on the ground that the law should not give preferential treatment to certain or
select government officials.

Meanwhile, a group of retired judges and justices filed a petition with the Supreme Court asking

the court to readjust their pensions. They pointed out that RA 1797 was never repealed (by P.D.

No. 644) because the said PD was one of those unpublished PDs which were subject of the case
of Taada v. Tuvera. Hence, the repealing law never existed due to non publication and in effect,
RA 1797 was never repealed. The Supreme Court then readjusted their pensions.
Congress took notice of the readjustment and son in the General Appropriations Bill (GAB) for
1992, Congress allotted additional budget for pensions of retired justices. Congress however did

the allotment in the following manner: Congress made an item entitled: General Fund

Adjustment; included therein are allotments to unavoidable obligations in different brances of

the government; among such obligations is the allotment for the pensions of retired justices of
the judiciary.

However, President Aquino again vetoed the said lines which provided for the pensions of the
retired justices in the judiciary in the GAB. She explained that that portion of the GAB is already
deemed vetoed when she vetoed H.B. 16297.

This prompted Cesar Bengzon and several other retired judges and justices to question the

constitutionality of the veto made by the President. The President was represented by then
Executive Secretary Franklin Drilon.

ISSUE: Whether or not the veto of the President on that portion of the General Appropriations
bill is constitutional.

HELD: No. The Justices of the Court have vested rights to the accrued pension that is due to

them in accordance to Republic Act 1797 which was never repealed. The president has no power
to set aside and override the decision of the Supreme Court neither does the president have the

power to enact or amend statutes promulgated by her predecessors much less to the repeal of
existing laws.

The Supreme Court also explained that the veto is unconstitutional since the power of the
president to disapprove any item or items in the appropriations bill does not grant the authority

to veto part of an item and to approve the remaining portion of said item. It appears that in the

same item, the Presidents vetoed some portion of it and retained the others. This cannot be
done. The rule is: the Executive must veto a bill in its entirety or not at all; the Executive must

veto an entire line item in its entirety or not at all. In this case, the president did not veto the

entire line item of the general adjustment fund. She merely vetoed the portion which pertained
to the pensions of the justices but did not veto the other items covering obligations to the other
departments of the government.
Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan v Tan GR No 81311 June 30, 1988

FACTS:

EO 372 was issued by the President of the Philippines which amended the Revenue Code,

adopting the value-added tax (VAT) effective January 1, 1988. Four petitions assailed the
validity of the VAT Law from being beyond the President to enact; for being oppressive,

discriminatory, regressive and violative of the due process and equal protection clauses, among

others, of the Constitution. The Integrated Customs Brokers Association particularly contend that

it unduly discriminate against customs brokers (Section 103r) as the amended provision of the

Tax Code provides that service performed in the exercise of profession or calling (except
custom brokers) subject to occupational tax under the Local Tax Code and professional services
performed by registered general professional partnerships are exempt from VAT.

ISSUE:
Whether the E-VAT law is void for being discriminatory against customs brokers

RULING:

No. The phrase except custom brokers is not meant to discriminate against custom brokers but
to avert a potential conflict between Sections 102 and 103 of the Tax Code, as amended. The
distinction of the customs brokers from the other professionals who are subject to occupation

tax under the Local Tax Code is based on material differences, in that the activities of customs

partake more of a business, rather than a profession and were thus subjected to the percentage
tax under Section 174 of the Tax Code prior to its amendment by EO 273. EO 273 abolished the
percentage tax and replaced it with the VAT. If the Association did not protest the classification
of customs brokers then, there is no reason why it should protest now.

Province of Abra v Judge Hernando

107 SCRA 104 Political Law Exemption From Taxes The Church

The Province of Abra sought to tax the properties of the Roman Catholic Bishop, Inc. of

Bangued. Judge Harold Hernando dismissed the petition of Abra without hearing its side.

Hernando ruled that there is no question that the real properties sought to be taxed by the
Province of Abra are properties of the respondent Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued, Inc.
Likewise, there is no dispute that the properties including their produce are actually, directly and

exclusively used by the Roman Catholic Bishop of Bangued, Inc. for religious or charitable

purposes.

ISSUE: Whether or not the properties of the church (in this case) is exempt from taxes.

HELD: No, they are not tax exempt. It is true that the Constitution provides that charitable
institutions, mosques, and non-profit cemeteries are required that for the exemption of lands,

buildings, and improvements, they should not only be exclusively but also actually and

directly used for religious or charitable purposes. The exemption from taxation is not favored
and is never presumed, so that if granted it must be strictly construed against the taxpayer.

However, in this case, there is no showing that the said properties are actually and directly used
for religious or charitable uses.

Abra Valley College v. Aquino

G.R. No. L-39086 June 15, 1988

Facts:

Petitioner, an educational corporation and institution of higher learning duly

incorporated with the Securities and Exchange Commission in 1948, filed a complaint to annul
and declare void the Notice of Seizure and the Notice of Sale of its lot and building located at
Bangued, Abra, for non-payment of real estate taxes and penalties amounting to P5,140.31.
Said Notice of Seizure by respondents Municipal Treasurer and Provincial Treasurer,
defendants below, was issued for the satisfaction of the said taxes thereon.

The parties entered into a stipulation of facts adopted and embodied by the trial court in its
questioned decision. The trial court ruled for the government, holding that the second floor of
the building is being used by the director for residential purposes and that the ground floor used
and rented by Northern Marketing Corporation, a commercial establishment, and thus the
property is not being used exclusively for educational purposes. Instead of perfecting an appeal,
petitioner availed of the instant petition for review on certiorari with prayer for preliminary
injunction before the Supreme Court, by filing said petition on 17 August 1974.

Issue:
whether or not the lot and building are used exclusively for educational purposes
Held:
Section 22, paragraph 3, Article VI, of the then 1935 Philippine Constitution,
expressly grants exemption from realty taxes for cemeteries, churches and parsonages or
convents appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and improvements used exclusively for
religious, charitable or educational purposes. Reasonable emphasis has always been made that
the exemption extends to facilities which are incidental to and reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of the main purposes. The use of the school building or lot for commercial
purposes is neither contemplated by law, nor by jurisprudence. In the case at bar, the lease of
the first floor of the building to the Northern Marketing Corporation cannot by any stretch of the
imagination be considered incidental to the purpose of education. The test of exemption from
taxation is the use of the property for purposes mentioned in the Constitution.

The decision of the CFI Abra (Branch I) is affirmed subject to the modification that
half of the assessed tax be returned to the petitioner. The modification is derived from the fact
that the ground floor is being used for commercial purposes (leased) and the second floor being
used as incidental to education (residence of the director).

Pascual v Sec. of Public Works

110 Phil. 331 Political Law Appropriation For Private Use Not Allowed

In 1953, Republic Act No. 920 was passed. This law appropriated P85,000.00 for the

construction, reconstruction, repair, extension and improvement Pasig feeder road terminals.

Wenceslao Pascual, then governor of Rizal, assailed the validity of the law. He claimed that the

appropriation was actually going to be used for private use for the terminals sought to be
improved were part of the Antonio Subdivision. The said Subdivision is owned by Senator Jose

Zulueta who was a member of the same Senate that passed and approved the same RA. Pascual

claimed that Zulueta misrepresented in Congress the fact that he owns those terminals and that
his property would be unlawfully enriched at the expense of the taxpayers if the said RA would

be upheld. Pascual then prayed that the Secretary of Public Works and Communications be
restrained from releasing funds for such purpose. Zulueta, on the other hand, perhaps as an
afterthought, donated the said property to the City of Pasig.

ISSUE: Whether or not the appropriation is valid.

HELD: No, the appropriation is void for being an appropriation for a private purpose. The

subsequent donation of the property to the government to make the property public does not

cure the constitutional defect. The fact that the law was passed when the said property was still
a private property cannot be ignored. In accordance with the rule that the taxing power must

be exercised for public purposes only, money raised by taxation can be expanded only for public

purposes and not for the advantage of private individuals. Inasmuch as the land on which the
projected feeder roads were to be constructed belonged then to Zulueta, the result is that said
appropriation sought a private purpose, and, hence, was null and void.

Aglipay v Ruiz 64 PHIL 201 (1937)

Facts: Petitioner seeks the issuance of a writ of prohibition against respondent Director of Posts
from issuing and selling postage stamps commemorative of the 33rd International Eucharistic
Congress. Petitioner contends that such act is a violation of the Constitutional provision stating
that no public funds shall be appropriated or used in the benefit of any church, system of
religion, etc. This provision is a result of the principle of the separation of church and state, for
the purpose of avoiding the occasion wherein the state will use the church, or vice versa, as a
weapon to further their ends and aims. Respondent contends that such issuance is in accordance
to Act No. 4052, providing for the appropriation funds to respondent for the production and
issuance of postage stamps as would be advantageous to the government.

Issue: Whether or Not there was a violation of the freedom to religion.

Held: What is guaranteed by our Constitution is religious freedom and not mere religious
toleration. It is however not an inhibition of profound reverence for religion and is not a denial of
its influence in human affairs. Religion as a profession of faith to an active power that binds and
elevates man to his Creator is recognized. And in so far as it instills into the minds the purest
principles of morality, its influence is deeply felt and highly appreciated. The phrase in Act No.
4052 advantageous to the government does not authorize violation of the Constitution. The
issuance of the stamps was not inspired by any feeling to favor a particular church or religious
denomination. They were not sold for the benefit of the Roman Catholic Church. The postage
stamps, instead of showing a Catholic chalice as originally planned, contains a map of
the Philippines and the location of Manila, with the words Seat XXXIII International Eucharistic
Congress. The focus of the stamps was not the Eucharistic Congress but the city of Manila,
being the seat of that congress. This was to to advertise the Philippines and attract more
tourists, the officials merely took advantage of an event considered of international importance.
Although such issuance and sale may be inseparably linked with the Roman Catholic Church, any
benefit and propaganda incidentally resulting from it was no the aim or purpose of the
Government.

Guingona, Jr. vs. Carague

G.R. No. 94571. April 22, 1991

FACTS:

The 1990 budget consists of P98.4 Billion in automatic appropriation (with P86.8 Billion for debt
service) and P155.3 Billion appropriated under RA 6831, otherwise known as the General
Approriations Act, or a total of P233.5 Billion, while the appropriations for the DECS amount to
P27,017,813,000.00.

The said automatic appropriation for debt service is authorized by PD No. 18, entitled
Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as
Amended (Re: Foreign Borrowing Act), by PD No. 1177, entitled Revising the Budget Process
in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New Society, and by PD No.1967,
entitled An Act Strengthening the Guarantee and Payment Positions of the Republic of the
Philippines on its Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed Loans by
Appropriating Funds For The Purpose.

The petitioners were questioning the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt
service, it being higher than the budget for education, therefore it is against Section 5(5), Article
XIV of the Constitution which mandates to assign the highest budgetary priority to education.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the automatic appropriation for debt service is unconstitutional; it being higher
than the budget for education.

HELD:

No. While it is true that under Section 5(5), Article XIV of the Constitution Congress is mandated
to assign the highest budgetary priority to education, it does not thereby follow that the hands
of Congress are so hamstrung as to deprive it the power to respond to the imperatives of the
national interest and for the attainment of other state policies or objectives.

Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its good judgment, to provide an
appropriation, that can reasonably service our enormous debtIt is not only a matter of honor
and to protect the credit standing of the country. More especially, the very survival of our
economy is at stake. Thus, if in the process Congress appropriated an amount for debt service
bigger than the share allocated to education, the Court finds and so holds that said appropriation
cannot be thereby assailed as unconstitutional

OSMEA v. ORBOS, 220 SCRA 703

Facts: On October 10, 1984, Pres. Marcos issued P.D. 1956 creating a Special Account in the
General Fund, designated as the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF). The OPSF was designed to
reimburse oil companies for cost increases in crude oil and imported petroleum products
resulting from exchange rate adjustments and from increases in the world market prices of
crude oil.

Subsequently, the OPSF was reclassified into a "trust liability account," in virtue of E.O. 1024,
and ordered released from the National Treasury to the Ministry of Energy.

Pres. Aquino, amended P.D. 1956. She promulgated Executive Order No. 137 on February 27,
1987, expanding the grounds for reimbursement to oil companies for possible cost
underrecovery incurred as a result of the reduction of domestic prices of petroleum products, the
amount of the underrecovery being left for determination by the Ministry of Finance.

The petition avers that the creation of the trust fund violates 29(3), Article VI of the
Constitution, reading as follows:

(3) All money collected on any tax levied for a special purpose shall be treated as a special fund
and paid out for such purposes only. If the purpose for which a special fund was created has
been fulfilled or abandoned, the balance, if any, shall be transferred to the general funds of the
Government.

The petitioner argues that "the monies collected pursuant to . . P.D. 1956, as amended, must be
treated as a 'SPECIAL FUND,' not as a 'trust account' or a 'trust fund,' and that "if a special tax is
collected for a specific purpose, the revenue generated therefrom shall 'be treated as a special
fund' to be used only for the purpose indicated, and not channeled to another government
objective." Petitioner further points out that since "a 'special fund' consists of monies collected
through the taxing power of a State, such amounts belong to the State, although the use thereof
is limited to the special purpose/objective for which it was created."

He also contends that the "delegation of legislative authority" to the ERB violates 28 (2). Article
VI of the Constitution, viz.:

(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix, within specified limits, and subject
to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas,
tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts within the framework of the national
development program of the Government;

and, inasmuch as the delegation relates to the exercise of the power of taxation, "the limits,
limitations and restrictions must be quantitative, that is, the law must not only specify how to
tax, who (shall) be taxed (and) what the tax is for, but also impose a specific limit on how much
to tax.

Issues:

(1) Whether or Not the invalidity of the "TRUST ACCOUNT" in the books of account of the
Ministry of Energy (now, the Office of Energy Affairs), created pursuant to 8, paragraph 1, of
P.D. No. 1956, as amended, "said creation of a trust fund being contrary to Section 29 (3),
Article VI of the Constitution.

(2) Whether or Not the unconstitutionality of 8, paragraph 1 (c) of P.D. No. 1956, as amended
by Executive Order No. 137, for "being an undue and invalid delegation of legislative power to
the Energy Regulatory Board.

Held: The OPSF is a "Trust Account" which was established "for the purpose of minimizing the
frequent price changes brought about by exchange rate adjustment and/or changes in world
market prices of crude oil and imported petroleum products." Under P.D. No. 1956, as amended
by Executive Order No. 137 dated 27 February 1987, this Trust Account may be funded from any
of the following sources:

a) Any increase in the tax collection from ad valorem tax or customs duty imposed on petroleum
products subject to tax under this Decree arising from exchange rate adjustment, as may be
determined by the Minister of Finance in consultation with the Board of Energy;

b) Any increase in the tax collection as a result of the lifting of tax exemptions of government
corporations, as may be determined by the Minister of Finance in consultation with the Board of
Energy;

c) Any additional amount to be imposed on petroleum products to augment the resources of the
Fund through an appropriate Order that may be issued by the Board of Energy requiring
payment of persons or companies engaged in the business of importing, manufacturing and/or
marketing petroleum products;

d) Any resulting peso cost differentials in case the actual peso costs paid by oil companies in the
importation of crude oil and petroleum products is less than the peso costs computed using the
reference foreign exchange rate as fixed by the Board of Energy.

Hence, it seems clear that while the funds collected may be referred to as taxes, they are
exacted in the exercise of the police power of the State. Moreover, that the OPSF is a special
fund is plain from the special treatment given it by E.O. 137. It is segregated from the general
fund; and while it is placed in what the law refers to as a "trust liability account," the fund
nonetheless remains subject to the scrutiny and review of the COA. The Court is satisfied that
these measures comply with the constitutional description of a "special fund." Indeed, the
practice is not without precedent.

With regard to the alleged undue delegation of legislative power, the Court finds that the
provision conferring the authority upon the ERB to impose additional amounts on petroleum
products provides a sufficient standard by which the authority must be exercised. In addition to
the general policy of the law to protect the local consumer by stabilizing and subsidizing
domestic pump rates, 8(c) of P.D. 1956 expressly authorizes the ERB to impose additional
amounts to augment the resources of the Fund.

What petitioner would wish is the fixing of some definite, quantitative restriction, or "a specific
limit on how much to tax." The Court is cited to this requirement by the petitioner on the
premise that what is involved here is the power of taxation; but as already discussed, this is not
the case. What is here involved is not so much the power of taxation as police power. Although
the provision authorizing the ERB to impose additional amounts could be construed to refer to
the power of taxation, it cannot be overlooked that the overriding consideration is to enable the
delegate to act with expediency in carrying out the objectives of the law which are embraced by
the police power of the State.

The interplay and constant fluctuation of the various factors involved in the determination of the
price of oil and petroleum products, and the frequently shifting need to either augment or
exhaust the Fund, do not conveniently permit the setting of fixed or rigid parameters in the law
as proposed by the petitioner. To do so would render the ERB unable to respond effectively so as
to mitigate or avoid the undesirable consequences of such fluidity. As such, the standard as it is
expressed suffices to guide the delegate in the exercise of the delegated power, taking account
of the circumstances under which it is to be exercised.

First Lepanto Ceramics vs. CA [G.R. No. 110571, March 10, 1994]

Facts: The Omnibus Investments Code of 1981 as amended provided that appeals from
decisions of the Board of Investments (BOI) shall be the exclusive jurisdiction of the CA. Just a
few months after the 1987 Constitution took effect (July 17, 1987), the Omnibus Investments
Code of 1987 (EO 226) was promulgated which provided in Art 82 thereof that such appeals be
directly filed with the SC. The SC later promulgated, under its rule-making power, Circular No.
1-91 which confirmed that jurisdiction of the CA over appeals from the decisions of the BOI. SCs
Second Division, relying on said Circular, accordingly sustained the appellate jurisdiction of the
CA in this present case. Petitioner now move to reconsider and question the Second Divisions
ruling which provided:

.although the right to appeal granted by Art 82 of EO 226 is a substantive right which cannot
be modified by a rule of procedure, nonetheless, questions concerning where and in what
manner the appeal can be brought are only matters of procedure which this Court hast he power
to regulate.

They contend that Circular No. 191 (a rule of procedure) cannot be deemed to have superseded
Art 82 of EO 226 (a legislation).

Issue: Was the Court correct in sustaining the appellate jurisdiction of the CA in decisions from
the Board of Investments?
Held: Yes. EO 226 was promulgated after the 1987 Constitution took effect February 2, 1987.
Thus, Art 82 of EO 226, which provides for increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the SC, is
invalid and therefore never became effective for the concurrence of the Court was no sought in
its enactment. Thus, the Omnibus Investments Code of 1981 as amended still stands. The
exclusive jurisdiction on appeals from decisions of the BOI belongs to the CA.

Diaz v. CA
G.R. No. L-109698 December 5, 1
Facts:

On 23 January 1991, Davao Light and Power Company, Inc. (DLPC) filed with the
Energy Regulatory Board (ERB) an application for the approval of the sound value appraisal of its
property in service.

The Asian Appraisal Company valued the property and equipment of DLPC as of 12
March 1990 at One Billion One Hundred Forty One Million Seven Hundred Seventy Four
Thousand Pesos (P1,141,774,000.00).

On 6 December 1992, ERB approved the application of DLPC after deducting Fourteen
Million Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos (P14,800,000.00) worth of property and equipment which
were not used by DLPC in its operation.

On 6 July 1992, petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari before the
Supreme Court assailing the decision of ERB on the ground of lack of jurisdiction and/or grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

In our resolution of 8 September 1992, the Supreme Court referred the case for
proper disposition to the Court of Appeals which subsequently dismissed the petition on the
ground that (1) the filing of the petition for review with the Supreme Court was a wrong mode of
appeal, and (2) the petition did not comply with the provisions of Supreme Court Circular 1-88 in
that (a) it did not state the date when the petitioners received notice of the ERB decision, (b) it
did not state the date when the petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, and (c) it
inconsistently alleged different dates when petitioners supposedly received the denial of their
motion by ERB.

On 18 December 1992, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration contending that

our resolution of 8 September 1992 was a directive for the Court of Appeals to disregard the
above circular.
In its resolution of 24 March 1993, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration
for lack of merit.
Issue:
whether or not E.O. No. 172 is violative of Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution
Held:
Yes. Since Sec. 10 of E.O. No. 172 was enacted without the advice and concurrence
of the Supreme Court, this provision never became effective, with the result that it cannot be
deemed to have amended the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. Consequently, the authority
of the Court of Appeals to decide cases from the Board of Energy, now ERB, remains.

SUBIC BAY METROPOLITAN AUTHORITY vs. COMELEC

G.R. No. 125416 September 26, 1996

FACTS:
On March 13, 1992, Congress enacted RA. 7227
(The Bases Conversionand Development Act of 1992), which created the Subic EconomicZone.
RA 7227 likewise created SBMA to implement the declarednational policy of converting the
Subic military reservation intoalternative productive uses.

On November 24, 1992, the American navy turned over the Subicmilitary reservation to
the Philippines government. Immediately,petitioner commenced the implementation of its task,
particularly thepreservation of the sea-ports, airport, buildings, houses and otherinstallations left
by the American navy.

On April 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong, Bataan passed Pambayang Kapasyahan
Bilang 10 , Serye 1993 , expressing therein its absolute concurrence, as required by said Sec.
12 of RA 7227, to jointhe Subic Special Economic Zone and submitted such to the Office of the
President.

On May 24, 1993, respondents Garcia filed a petition with the Sangguniang Bayan of Morong to
annul Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg.10, Serye 1993.

The petition prayed for the following: a) to nullify PambayangKapasyang Blg. 10 for Morong to
join the Subic Special Economi Zone,b) to allow Morong to join provided conditions are met.

The Sangguniang Bayan ng Morong acted upon the petition bypromulgating

Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg. 18, Serye 1993, requesting Congress of the Philippines so amend
certain provisions of RA 7227.

Not satisfied, respondents resorted to their power initiative under theLGC of 1991.

On July 6, 1993, COMELEC denied the petition for local initiative on theground that the subject
thereof was merely a resolution and not anordinance.

On February 1, 1995, the President issued Proclamation No. 532 defining the metes and bounds
of the SSEZ including therein theportion of the former naval base within the territorial
jurisdiction of theMunicipality of Morong.

On June 18, 19956, respondent Comelec issued Resolution No. 2845and 2848, adopting a
"Calendar of Activities forlocal referendum and providing for "the rules and guidelines to
govern the conduct of the referendum

On July 10, 1996, SBMA instituted a petition for certiorari contesting the validity of Resolution
No. 2848 alleging that public respondent is intent on proceeding with a local initiative that
proposes anamendment of a national law

ISSUE

1. WON Comelec committed grave abuse of discretion in promulgatingResolution No. 2848 which
governs the conduct of the referendum proposing to annul or repeal Pambayang Kapasyahan Blg.
10
2. WON the questioned local initiative covers a subject within the powersof the people of Morong
to enact;i .e., whether such initiative "seeksthe amendment of a national law

HELD
1. YES. COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion.

FIRST. The process started by private respondents was an INITIATIVE butrespondent Comelec
made preparations for a REFERENDUM only.

In fact, in the body of the Resolution as reproduced in the footnote below, the word
"referendum" is repeated at least 27 times, but "initiative" is notmentioned at all. The Comelec
labeled the exercise as a "Referendum"; thecounting of votes was entrusted to a "Referendum
Committee"; thedocuments were called "referendum returns"; the canvassers,
"ReferendumBoard of Canvassers" and the ballots themselves bore the description"referendum".
To repeat, not once was the word "initiative" used in saidbody of Resolution No. 2848. And yet,
this exercise is unquestionably anINITIATIVE.
As defined, Initiative is the power of the people to propose bills and laws, and to enact or reject
them at the polls independent of the legislative assembly. On the other hand, referendum is the
right reserved to the people to adopt or reject any act or measure which has been passed by a
legislative body and which in most cases would without action on the part of electors become a
law.

In initiative and referendum, the Comelec exercises administration and supervision of the
process itself, akin to its powers over the conduct of elections. These law-making powers
belong to the people, hence the respondent Commission cannot control or change the
substance or the content of legislation.

2. The local initiative is NOT ultra vires because the municipal resolution isstill in the proposal
stage and not yet an approved law.

The municipal resolution is still in the proposal stage. It is not yet an approved law. Should the
people reject it, then there would be nothing to contest and to adjudicate. It is only when the
people have voted for it and ithas become an approved ordinance or resolution that rights
and obligations can be enforced or implemented there under. At this point, it is merely a
proposal and the writ or prohibition cannot issue upon a mere conjecture or possibility.
Constitutionally speaking, courts may decide only actual controversies, not hypothetical
questions or cases.

In the present case, it is quite clear that the Court has authority to review Comelec Resolution
No. 2848 to determine the commission of grave abuse of discretion. However, it does not have
the same authority in regard to the proposed initiative since it has not been promulgated or
approved, or passed upon by any "branch or instrumentality" or lower court, for that matter. The
Commission on Elections itself has made no reviewable pronouncements about the issues
brought by the pleadings. The Comelec simply includedverbatim the proposal in its questioned
Resolution No. 2848. Hence, there isreally no decision or action made by a branch,
instrumentality or court whichthis Court could take cognizance of and acquire jurisdiction over,
in theexercise of its review powers.