CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASES MAAARI bang litisin ng Sandiganbayan ang isang iskolar

ng bayan, at ang kanyang kapatid, na kapwa

Assignment (A-H of the syllabus) pinararatangan ng estafa ng pera ng bayan?

TOPIC: ON JURISDICTION C. SANDIGANBAYAN: Original The jurisdictional question is posed in this petition for
and Exclusive Jurisdiction (a. What offense or crime was certiorari assailing the Resolutions1 of the Sandiganbayan,
committed) Fifth Division, denying petitioners motion to quash the
information and her motion for reconsideration.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT The Antecedents
Manila
Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior student of
THIRD DIVISION the University of the Philippines-Cebu. A student of a state
university is known as a government scholar. She was
G.R. No. 162059 January 22, 2008 appointed by then President Joseph Estrada on December
21, 1999 as a student regent of UP, to serve a one-year term
HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, petitioner, starting January 1, 2000 and ending on December 31, 2000.
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE In the early part of 2000, petitioner discussed with President
PHILIPPINES, respondents. Estrada the renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex in UP
Diliman.2 On September 4, 2000, petitioner, with her
DECISION siblings and relatives, registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission the Office of the Student Regent
REYES, R.T., J.: Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI).3

CAN the Sandiganbayan try a government One of the projects of the OSRFI was the renovation of the
scholaran** accused, along with her brother, of swindling Vinzons Hall Annex.4 President Estrada gave Fifteen Million
government funds? Pesos (P15,000,000.00) to the OSRFI as financial assistance
for the proposed renovation. The source of the funds,
according to the information, was the Office of the President.
The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to
materialize.5 The succeeding student regent, Kristine Clare
Bugayong, and Christine Jill De Guzman, Secretary General
of the KASAMA sa U.P., a system-wide alliance of student
councils within the state university, consequently filed a
complaint for Malversation of Public Funds and Property
with the Office of the Ombudsman.6
On July 3, 2003, the Ombudsman, after due investigation,
found probable cause to indict petitioner and her brother
Jade Ian D. Serana for estafa, docketed as Criminal Case No.
27819 of the Sandiganbayan.7 The Information reads:
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III,
Office of the Special Prosecutor, hereby accuses
HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA and JADE IAN D.
SERANA of the crime of Estafa, defined and penalized
under Paragraph 2(a), Article 315 of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended committed as follows:
That on October, 24, 2000, or sometime prior or
subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, above-named accused, HANNAH
EUNICE D. SERANA, a high-ranking public officer,
being then the Student Regent of the University of the
Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City, while in the
performance of her official functions, committing the
offense in relation to her office and taking advantage
of her position, with intent to gain, conspiring with
her brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA, a private
individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously defraud the government by falsely and
fraudulently representing to former President Joseph
Ejercito Estrada that the renovation of the Vinzons
Hall of the University of the Philippines will be
renovated and renamed as "President Joseph Ejercito
Estrada Student Hall," and for which purpose accused
HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA requested the amount
of FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS (P15,000,000.00),
Philippine Currency, from the Office of the President,
and the latter relying and believing on said false
pretenses and misrepresentation gave and delivered
to said accused Land Bank Check No. 91353 dated
October 24, 2000 in the amount of FIFTEEN MILLION
PESOS (P15,000,000.00), which check was
subsequently encashed by accused Jade Ian D. Serana
on October 25, 2000 and misappropriated for their
personal use and benefit, and despite repeated
demands made upon the accused for them to return
aforesaid amount, the said accused failed and refused
to do so to the damage and prejudice of the
government in the aforesaid amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW. (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioner moved to quash the information. She claimed that
the Sandiganbayan does not have any jurisdiction over the
offense charged or over her person, in her capacity as UP
student regent.
Petitioner claimed that Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as
amended by R.A. No. 8249, enumerates the crimes or
offenses over which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction.8 It
has no jurisdiction over the crime of estafa.9 It only has
jurisdiction over crimes covered by Title VII, Chapter II,
Section 2 (Crimes Committed by Public Officers), Book II of
the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Estafa falling under Title X,
Chapter VI (Crimes Against Property), Book II of the RPC is
not within the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction.
She also argued that it was President Estrada, not the
government, that was duped. Even assuming that she
received the P15,000,000.00, that amount came from
Estrada, not from the coffers of the government.10
Petitioner likewise posited that the Sandiganbayan had no
jurisdiction over her person. As a student regent, she was
not a public officer since she merely represented her peers,
in contrast to the other regents who held their positions in
an ex officio capacity. She addsed that she was a simple
student and did not receive any salary as a student regent.
She further contended that she had no power or authority to
receive monies or funds. Such power was vested with the
Board of Regents (BOR) as a whole. Since it was not alleged
in the information that it was among her functions or duties
to receive funds, or that the crime was committed in
connection with her official functions, the same is beyond
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan citing the case of Soller
v. Sandiganbayan.11
The Ombudsman opposed the motion.12 It disputed
petitioners interpretation of the law. Section 4(b) of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606 clearly contains
the catch -all phrase "in relation to office," thus, the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the charges against
petitioner. In the same breath, the prosecution countered
that the source of the money is a matter of defense. It should
be threshed out during a full-blown trial.13
According to the Ombudsman, petitioner, despite her
protestations, iwas a public officer. As a member of the BOR,
she hads the general powers of administration and
exerciseds the corporate powers of UP. Based on Mechems
definition of a public office, petitioners stance that she was
not compensated, hence, not a public officer, is erroneous.
Compensation is not an essential part of public office.
Parenthetically, compensation has been interpreted to
include allowances. By this definition, petitioner was
compensated.14
Sandiganbayan Disposition
In a Resolution dated November 14, 2003, the
Sandiganbayan denied petitioners motion for lack of
merit.15 It ratiocinated:
The focal point in controversy is the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan over this case.
It is extremely erroneous to hold that only criminal
offenses covered by Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII,
Book II of the Revised Penal Code are within the
jurisdiction of this Court. As correctly pointed out by
the prosecution, Section 4(b) of R.A. 8249 provides
that the Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over
other offenses committed by public officials and
employees in relation to their office. From this
provision, there is no single doubt that this Court has
jurisdiction over the offense of estafa committed by a
public official in relation to his office.
Accused-movants claim that being merely a member
in representation of the student body, she was never
a public officer since she never received any
compensation nor does she fall under Salary Grade
27, is of no moment, in view of the express provision
of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8249 which provides:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:
(A) x x x
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the
positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989
(Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
xxxx
(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned or controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions or foundations.
(Italics supplied)
It is very clear from the aforequoted provision that
the Sandiganbayan has original exclusive jurisdiction
over all offenses involving the officials enumerated in
subsection (g), irrespective of their salary grades,
because the primordial consideration in the inclusion
of these officials is the nature of their responsibilities
and functions.
Is accused-movant included in the contemplated
provision of law?
A meticulous review of the existing Charter of the
University of the Philippines reveals that the Board of
Regents, to which accused-movant belongs,
exclusively exercises the general powers of
administration and corporate powers in the
university, such as: 1) To receive and appropriate to
the ends specified by law such sums as may be
provided by law for the support of the university; 2)
To prescribe rules for its own government and to
enact for the government of the university such
general ordinances and regulations, not contrary to
law, as are consistent with the purposes of the
university; and 3) To appoint, on recommendation of
the President of the University, professors,
instructors, lecturers and other employees of the
University; to fix their compensation, hours of
service, and such other duties and conditions as it
may deem proper; to grant to them in its discretion
leave of absence under such regulations as it may
promulgate, any other provisions of law to the
contrary notwithstanding, and to remove them for
cause after an investigation and hearing shall have
been had.
It is well-established in corporation law that the
corporation can act only through its board of
directors, or board of trustees in the case of non-
stock corporations. The board of directors or
trustees, therefore, is the governing body of the
corporation.
It is unmistakably evident that the Board of Regents
of the University of the Philippines is performing
functions similar to those of the Board of Trustees of
a non-stock corporation. This draws to fore the
conclusion that being a member of such board,
accused-movant undoubtedly falls within the
category of public officials upon whom this Court is
vested with original exclusive jurisdiction, regardless
of the fact that she does not occupy a position
classified as Salary Grade 27 or higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989.
Finally, this court finds that accused-movants
contention that the same of P15 Million was received
from former President Estrada and not from the
coffers of the government, is a matter a defense that
should be properly ventilated during the trial on the
merits of this case.16
On November 19, 2003, petitioner filed a motion for
reconsideration.17 The motion was denied with finality in a
Resolution dated February 4, 2004.18
Issue
Petitioner is now before this Court, contending that "THE
RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION IN NOT QUASHING THE INFORMATION AND
DISMISING THE CASE NOTWITHSTANDING THAT IS HAS
NO JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE CHARGED IN THE
INFORMATION."19
In her discussion, she reiterates her four-fold argument
below, namely: (a) the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction
over estafa; (b) petitioner is not a public officer with Salary
Grade 27 and she paid her tuition fees; (c) the offense
charged was not committed in relation to her office; (d) the
funds in question personally came from President Estrada,
not from the government.
Our Ruling
The petition cannot be granted.
Preliminarily, the denial of a motion to
quash is not correctible by certiorari.
We would ordinarily dismiss this petition
for certiorari outright on procedural grounds. Well-
established is the rule that when a motion to quash in a
criminal case is denied, the remedy is not a petition
for certiorari, but for petitioners to go to trial, without
prejudice to reiterating the special defenses invoked in their
motion to quash.20 Remedial measures as regards
interlocutory orders, such as a motion to quash, are frowned
upon and often dismissed.21 The evident reason for this rule
is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action.22
In Newsweek, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,23 the Court
clearly explained and illustrated the rule and the exceptions,
thus:
As a general rule, an order denying a motion to
dismiss is merely interlocutory and cannot be subject
of appeal until final judgment or order is rendered.
(Sec. 2 of Rule 41). The ordinary procedure to be
followed in such a case is to file an answer, go to trial
and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on
appeal from the final judgment. The same rule applies
to an order denying a motion to quash, except that
instead of filing an answer a plea is entered and no
appeal lies from a judgment of acquittal.
This general rule is subject to certain exceptions. If
the court, in denying the motion to dismiss or motion
to quash, acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion, then certiorari or
prohibition lies. The reason is that it would be unfair
to require the defendant or accused to undergo the
ordeal and expense of a trial if the court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense, or is
not the court of proper venue, or if the denial of the
motion to dismiss or motion to quash is made with
grave abuse of discretion or a whimsical and
capricious exercise of judgment. In such cases, the
ordinary remedy of appeal cannot be plain and
adequate. The following are a few examples of the
exceptions to the general rule.
In De Jesus v. Garcia (19 SCRA 554), upon the denial
of a motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction
over the subject matter, this Court granted the
petition for certiorari and prohibition against the
City Court of Manila and directed the respondent
court to dismiss the case.
In Lopez v. City Judge (18 SCRA 616), upon the denial
of a motion to quash based on lack of jurisdiction over
the offense, this Court granted the petition for
prohibition and enjoined the respondent court from
further proceeding in the case.
In Enriquez v. Macadaeg (84 Phil. 674), upon the
denial of a motion to dismiss based on improper
venue, this Court granted the petition for prohibition
and enjoined the respondent judge from taking
cognizance of the case except to dismiss the same.
In Manalo v. Mariano (69 SCRA 80), upon the denial
of a motion to dismiss based on bar by prior
judgment, this Court granted the petition
for certiorari and directed the respondent judge to
dismiss the case.
In Yuviengco v. Dacuycuy (105 SCRA 668), upon the
denial of a motion to dismiss based on the Statute of
Frauds, this Court granted the petition
for certiorari and dismissed the amended complaint.
In Tacas v. Cariaso (72 SCRA 527), this Court granted
the petition for certiorari after the motion to quash
based on double jeopardy was denied by respondent
judge and ordered him to desist from further action
in the criminal case except to dismiss the same.
In People v. Ramos (83 SCRA 11), the order denying
the motion to quash based on prescription was set
aside on certiorari and the criminal case was
dismissed by this Court.24
We do not find the Sandiganbayan to have committed a
grave abuse of discretion.
The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is
set by P.D. No. 1606, as amended, not by
R.A. No. 3019, as amended.
We first address petitioners contention that the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan is determined by Section 4 of R.A. No.
3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as
amended). We note that petitioner refers to Section 4 of the
said law yet quotes Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended,
in her motion to quash before the Sandiganbayan.25She
repeats the reference in the instant petition
for certiorari26 and in her memorandum of authorities.27
We cannot bring ourselves to write this off as a mere clerical
or typographical error. It bears stressing that petitioner
repeated this claim twice despite corrections made by the
Sandiganbayan.28
Her claim has no basis in law. It is P.D. No. 1606, as amended,
rather than R.A. No. 3019, as amended, that determines the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. A brief legislative history
of the statute creating the Sandiganbayan is in order. The
Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. 1486, promulgated
by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on June 11, 1978. It
was promulgated to attain the highest norms of official
conduct required of public officers and employees, based on
the concept that public officers and employees shall serve
with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty
and efficiency and shall remain at all times accountable to
the people.29
P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No. 1606 which
was promulgated on December 10, 1978. P.D. No. 1606
expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.30
P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March
23, 1983, further altering the Sandiganbayan
jurisdiction. R.A. No. 7975 approved on March 30, 1995
made succeeding amendments to P.D. No. 1606, which was
again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249.
Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further modified the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan. As it now stands, the Sandiganbayan
has jurisdiction over the following:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:
A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
other known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where
one or more of the accused are officials occupying the
following positions in the government, whether in a
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of
the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the
positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 989
(Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
" (a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members
of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city
department heads;
" (b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of
the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department
heads;
"(c ) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the
position of consul and higher;
" (d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval
captains, and all officers of higher rank;
" (e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while
occupying the position of provincial director and
those holding the rank of senior superintended or
higher;
" (f) City and provincial prosecutors and their
assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office
of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
" (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned or controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions or
foundations.
" (2) Members of Congress and officials thereof
classified as Grade "27'" and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989;
" (3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to
the provisions of the Constitution;
" (4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional
Commission, without prejudice to the provisions of
the Constitution; and
" (5) All other national and local officials classified as
Grade "27'" and higher under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989.
B. Other offenses of felonies whether simple or
complexed with other crimes committed by the
public officials and employees mentioned in
subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in
connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-
A, issued in 1986.
" In cases where none of the accused are occupying
positions corresponding to Salary Grade "27'" or
higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No.
6758, or military and PNP officer mentioned above,
exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested
in the proper regional court, metropolitan trial court,
municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial
court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective
jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
as amended.
" The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over final judgments,
resolutions or order of regional trial courts whether
in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of
their appellate jurisdiction as herein provided.
" The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the
writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas
corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and
processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over
petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto,
arising or that may arise in cases filed or which may
be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A,
issued in 1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over
these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme
Court.
" The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, as well as the implementing rules that the
Supreme Court has promulgated and may thereafter
promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review
to the Court of Appeals, shall apply to appeals and
petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In
all cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the
Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of
the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall
represent the People of the Philippines, except in
cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14
and 14-A, issued in 1986.
" In case private individuals are charged as co-
principals, accomplices or accessories with the public
officers or employees, including those employed in
government-owned or controlled corporations, they
shall be tried jointly with said public officers and
employees in the proper courts which shall exercise
exclusive jurisdiction over them.
" Any provisions of law or Rules of Court to the
contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and
the corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil
liability shall, at all times, be simultaneously
instituted with, and jointly determined in, the same
proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate
courts, the filing of the criminal action being deemed
to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil
action, and no right to reserve the filing such civil
action separately from the criminal action shall be
recognized: Provided, however, That where the civil
action had heretofore been filed separately but
judgment therein has not yet been rendered, and the
criminal case is hereafter filed with the
Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, said civil
action shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan or
 the appropriate court, as the case may be, for
consolidation and joint determination with the
criminal action, otherwise the separate civil action
shall be deemed abandoned."
Upon the other hand, R.A. No. 3019 is a penal statute
approved on August 17, 1960. The said law represses certain
acts of public officers and private persons alike which
constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may lead
thereto.31 Pursuant to Section 10 of R.A. No. 3019, all
prosecutions for violation of the said law should be filed with
the Sandiganbayan.32
R.A. No. 3019 does not contain an enumeration of the cases
over which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. In fact,
Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019 erroneously cited by petitioner,
deals not with the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but with
prohibition on private individuals. We quote:
Section 4. Prohibition on private individuals. (a) It
shall be unlawful for any person having family or
close personal relation with any public official to
capitalize or exploit or take advantage of such family
or close personal relation by directly or indirectly
requesting or receiving any present, gift or material
or pecuniary advantage from any other person
having some business, transaction, application,
request or contract with the government, in which
such public official has to intervene. Family relation
shall include the spouse or relatives by consanguinity
or affinity in the third civil degree. The word "close
personal relation" shall include close personal
friendship, social and fraternal connections, and
professional employment all giving rise to intimacy
which assures free access to such public officer.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to
induce or cause any public official to commit any of
the offenses defined in Section 3 hereof.
In fine, the two statutes differ in that P.D. No. 1606, as
amended, defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
while R.A. No. 3019, as amended, defines graft and corrupt
practices and provides for their penalties.
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over
the offense of estafa.
Relying on Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, petitioner contends
that estafa is not among those crimes cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan. We note that in hoisting this argument,
petitioner isolated the first paragraph of Section 4 of P.D. No.
1606, without regard to the succeeding paragraphs of the
said provision.
The rule is well-established in this jurisdiction that statutes
should receive a sensible construction so as to avoid an
unjust or an absurd conclusion.33 Interpretatio talis in
ambiguis semper fienda est, ut evitetur inconveniens et
absurdum. Where there is ambiguity, such interpretation as
will avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be
adopted. Kung saan mayroong kalabuan, ang
pagpapaliwanag ay hindi dapat maging mahirap at
katawa-tawa.
Every section, provision or clause of the statute must be
expounded by reference to each other in order to arrive at
the effect contemplated by the legislature.34 The intention of
the legislator must be ascertained from the whole text of the
law and every part of the act is to be taken into view. 35 In
other words, petitioners interpretation lies in direct
opposition to the rule that a statute must be interpreted as a
whole under the principle that the best interpreter of a
statute is the statute itself.36 Optima statuti interpretatrix est
ipsum statutum. Ang isang batas ay marapat na bigyan ng
kahulugan sa kanyang kabuuan sa ilalim ng prinsipyo
na ang pinakamainam na interpretasyon ay ang
mismong batas.
Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 reads:
B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or
complexed with other crimes committed by the
public officials and employees mentioned in
subsection a of this section in relation to their office.
Evidently, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other
felonies committed by public officials in relation to their
office. We see no plausible or sensible reason to
exclude estafa as one of the offenses included in Section
4(bB) of P.D. No. 1606. Plainly, estafa is one of those other
felonies. The jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin
requirements that (a) the offense is committed by public
officials and employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D. No.
1606, as amended, and that (b) the offense is committed in
relation to their office.
In Perlas, Jr. v. People,37 the Court had occasion to explain
that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over an indictment
for estafa versus a director of the National Parks
Development Committee, a government instrumentality.
The Court held then:
The National Parks Development Committee was
created originally as an Executive Committee on
January 14, 1963, for the development of the Quezon
Memorial, Luneta and other national parks
(Executive Order No. 30). It was later designated as
the National Parks Development Committee (NPDC)
on February 7, 1974 (E.O. No. 69). On January 9, 1966,
Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos and Teodoro F. Valencia were
designated Chairman and Vice-Chairman
respectively (E.O. No. 3). Despite an attempt to
transfer it to the Bureau of Forest Development,
Department of Natural Resources, on December 1,
 1975 (Letter of Implementation No. 39, issued
pursuant to PD No. 830, dated November 27, 1975),
the NPDC has remained under the Office of the
President (E.O. No. 709, dated July 27, 1981).
Since 1977 to 1981, the annual appropriations
decrees listed NPDC as a regular government agency
under the Office of the President and allotments for
its maintenance and operating expenses were issued
direct to NPDC (Exh. 10-A, Perlas, Item Nos. 2, 3).
The Sandiganbayans jurisdiction over estafa was reiterated
with greater firmness in Bondoc v.
Sandiganbayan. Pertinent parts of the Courts ruling in
38
Bondoc read:
Furthermore, it is not legally possible to transfer
Bondocs cases to the Regional Trial Court, for the
simple reason that the latter would not have
jurisdiction over the offenses. As already above
intimated, the inability of the Sandiganbayan to hold
a joint trial of Bondocs cases and those of the
government employees separately charged for the
same crimes, has not altered the nature of the
offenses charged, as estafa thru falsification
punishable by penalties higher than prision
correccional or imprisonment of six years, or a fine
of P6,000.00, committed by government employees
in conspiracy with private persons, including
Bondoc. These crimes are within the exclusive,
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. They
simply cannot be taken cognizance of by the regular
courts, apart from the fact that even if the cases could
be so transferred, a joint trial would nonetheless not
be possible.
Petitioner UP student regent
is a public officer.
Petitioner also contends that she is not a public officer. She
does not receive any salary or remuneration as a UP student
regent. This is not the first or likely the last time that We will
be called upon to define a public officer. In Khan, Jr. v. Office
of the Ombudsman, We ruled that it is difficult to pin down
the definition of a public officer.39 The 1987 Constitution
does not define who are public officers. Rather, the varied
definitions and concepts are found in different statutes and
jurisprudence.
In Aparri v. Court of Appeals,40 the Court held that:
A public office is the right, authority, and duty created
and conferred by law, by which for a given period,
either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the
creating power, an individual is invested with some
portion of the sovereign functions of the government,
to be exercise by him for the benefit of the public
([Mechem Public Offices and Officers,] Sec. 1). The
 right to hold a public office under our political system
is therefore not a natural right. It exists, when it exists
at all only because and by virtue of some law
expressly or impliedly creating and conferring it
(Mechem Ibid., Sec. 64). There is no such thing as a
vested interest or an estate in an office, or even an
absolute right to hold office. Excepting constitutional
offices which provide for special immunity as regards
salary and tenure, no one can be said to have any
vested right in an office or its salary (42 Am. Jur. 881).
In Laurel v. Desierto,41 the Court adopted the definition of
Mechem of a public office:
"A public office is the right, authority and duty,
created and conferred by law, by which, for a given
period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure
of the creating power, an individual is invested with
some portion of the sovereign functions of the
government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of
the public. The individual so invested is a public
officer."42
Petitioner claims that she is not a public officer with Salary
Grade 27; she is, in fact, a regular tuition fee-paying student.
This is likewise bereft of merit. It is not only the salary grade
that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The
Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other officers
enumerated in P.D. No. 1606. In Geduspan v. People,43 We
held that while the first part of Section 4(A) covers only
officials with Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part
specifically includes other executive officials whose
positions may not be of Salary Grade 27 and higher but who
are by express provision of law placed under the jurisdiction
of the said court. Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by express provision
of law.44
Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the
Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors
or trustees, or managers of government-owned or
controlled corporations, state universities or educational
institutions or foundations. Petitioner falls under this
category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR
performs functions similar to those of a board of trustees of
a non-stock corporation.45 By express mandate of law,
petitioner is, indeed, a public officer as contemplated by P.D.
No. 1606.
Moreover, it is well established that compensation is not an
essential element of public office.46 At most, it is merely
incidental to the public office.47
Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in the public
office. An investment in an individual of some portion of the
sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by
him for the benefit of the public makes one a public officer.48
The administration of the UP is a sovereign function in line
with Article XIV of the Constitution. UP performs a legitimate
governmental function by providing advanced instruction in
literature, philosophy, the sciences, and arts, and giving
professional and technical training.49 Moreover, UP is
maintained by the Government and it declares no dividends
and is not a corporation created for profit.50
The offense charged was committed
in relation to public office, according
to the Information.
Petitioner likewise argues that even assuming that she is a
public officer, the Sandiganbayan would still not have
jurisdiction over the offense because it was not committed
in relation to her office.
According to petitioner, she had no power or authority to act
without the approval of the BOR. She adds there was no
Board Resolution issued by the BOR authorizing her to
contract with then President Estrada; and that her acts were
not ratified by the governing body of the state university.
Resultantly, her act was done in a private capacity and not in
relation to public office.
It is axiomatic that jurisdiction is determined by the
averments in the information.51 More than that, jurisdiction
is not affected by the pleas or the theories set up by
defendant or respondent in an answer, a motion to dismiss,
or a motion to quash.52 Otherwise, jurisdiction would
become dependent almost entirely upon the whims of
defendant or respondent.53
In the case at bench, the information alleged, in no uncertain
terms that petitioner, being then a student regent of U.P.,
"while in the performance of her official
functions, committing the offense in relation to her office
and taking advantage of her position, with intent to gain,
conspiring with her brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA, a private
individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously defraud the government x x x." (Underscoring
supplied)
Clearly, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the Sandiganbayan when it did not quash the information
based on this ground.
Source of funds is a defense that should
be raised during trial on the merits.
It is contended anew that the amount came from President
Estradas private funds and not from the government
coffers. Petitioner insists the charge has no leg to stand on.
We cannot agree. The information alleges that the funds
came from the Office of the President and not its then
occupant, President Joseph Ejercito Estrada. Under the
information, it is averred that "petitioner requested the
amount of Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00),
Philippine Currency, from the Office of the President, and the
latter relying and believing on said false pretenses and
misrepresentation gave and delivered to said accused Land
Bank Check No. 91353 dated October 24, 2000 in the amount
of Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00)."
Again, the Court sustains the Sandiganbayan observation
that the source of the P15,000,000 is a matter of defense that
should be ventilated during the trial on the merits of the
instant case.54
name different from that with which he was authorized. We
severely reprimanded Atty. Ramos and warned that a
repetition may warrant suspension or disbarment.56
We admonish petitioners counsel to be more careful and
accurate in his citation. A lawyers conduct before the court
should be characterized by candor and fairness.57 The
administration of justice would gravely suffer if lawyers do
not act with complete candor and honesty before the
courts.58 WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of
merit. SO ORDERED.

A lawyer owes candor, fairness Republic of the Philippines

and honesty to the Court. SUPREME COURT
Manila
As a parting note, petitioners counsel, Renato G. dela Cruz,
misrepresented his reference to Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606 as EN BANC
a quotation from Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019. A review of his
motion to quash, the instant petition for certiorari and his G.R. No. 165835 June 22, 2005
memorandum, unveils the misquotation. We urge
petitioners counsel to observe Canon 10 of the Code of MAJOR GENERAL CARLOS F. GARCIA, Petitioner,
Professional Responsibility, specifically Rule 10.02 of the vs.
Rules stating that "a lawyer shall not misquote or SANDIGANBAYAN and the OFFICE OF THE
misrepresent." OMBUDSMAN, Respondents.

The Court stressed the importance of this rule in Pangan v. DECISION

Ramos,55 where Atty Dionisio D. Ramos used the name Pedro
Tinga, J.:
D.D. Ramos in connection with a criminal case. The Court
ruled that Atty. Ramos resorted to deception by using a
Petitioner Major General Carlos F. Garcia was the Deputy
Chief of Staff for Comptrollership, J6, of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines. Petitioner filed this Petition for certiorari
and prohibition under Rule 65 to annul and set aside public
respondent Sandiganbayans Resolution1 dated 29 October
2004 and Writ of Preliminary Attachment2dated 2 November
2004, and to enjoin public respondents Sandiganbayan and
Office of the Ombudsman from further proceeding with any
action relating to the enforcement of the assailed issuances.
On 27 September 2004, Atty. Maria Olivia Elena A. Roxas,
Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer II of the Field
Investigation Office of the Office of the Ombudsman, after
due investigation, filed a complaint against petitioner with
public respondent Office of the Ombudsman, for violation of
Sec. 8, in relation to Sec. 11 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
6713,3 violation of Art. 183 of the Revised Penal Code, and
violation of Section 52 (A)(1), (3) and (20) of the Civil
Service Law. Based on this complaint, a case for Violations of
R.A. No. 1379,4 Art. 183 of the Revised Penal Code, and Sec.
8 in relation to Sec. 11 of R.A. No. 6713, docketed as Case
No. OMB-P-C-04-1132-I, was filed against
petitioner.5 Petitioners wife Clarita Depakakibo Garcia, and
their three sons, Ian Carl, Juan Paolo and Timothy Mark, all
surnamed Garcia, were impleaded in the complaint for
violation of R.A. No. 1379 insofar as they acted as
conspirators, conduits, dummies and fronts of petitioner in
receiving, accumulating, using and disposing of his ill-gotten
wealth.
On the same day, 27 October 2004, the Republic of the
Philippines, acting through public respondent Office of the
Ombudsman, filed before the Sandiganbayan, a Petition with
Verified Urgent Ex Parte Application for the Issuance of a Writ
of Preliminary Attachment6 against petitioner, his wife, and
three sons, seeking the forfeiture of unlawfully acquired
properties under Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 1379, as amended. The
petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 0193, entitled
"Republic of the Philippines vs. Maj. Gen. Carlos F. Garcia, et
al." It was alleged that the Office of the Ombudsman, after
conducting an inquiry similar to a preliminary investigation
in criminal cases, has determined that a prima facie case
exists against Maj. Gen. Garcia and the other respondents
therein who hold such properties for, with, or on behalf of,
Maj. Gen. Garcia, since during his incumbency as a soldier
and public officer he acquired huge amounts of money and
properties manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such
public officer and his other lawful income, if any.7
Acting on the Republics prayer for issuance of a writ of
preliminary attachment, the Sandiganbayan issued the
questioned Resolution granting the relief prayed for. The
corresponding writ of preliminary attachment was
subsequently issued on 2 November 2004 upon the filing of
a bond by the Republic. On 17 November 2004, petitioner
(as respondent a quo) filed a Motion to Dismiss8 in Civil Case
No. 0193 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan over forfeiture proceedings under R.A. No.
1379. On even date, petitioner filed the present Petition,
raising the same issue of lack jurisdiction on the part of the
Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner argues in this Petition that the Sandiganbayan is
without jurisdiction over the "civil action" for forfeiture of
unlawfully acquired properties under R.A. No. 1379,
maintaining that such jurisdiction actually resides in the
Regional Trial Courts as provided under Sec. 29 of the law,
and that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in civil actions
pertains only to separate actions for recovery of unlawfully
acquired property against President Marcos, his family, and
cronies as can be gleaned from Sec. 4 of Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 1606,10 as amended, and Executive Orders (E.O.)
Nos. 1411 and 14-A.12
Theorizing that the Sandiganbayan, under P.D. No. 1606 or
the law creating it, was intended principally as a criminal
court, with no jurisdiction over separate civil actions,
petitioner points to President Corazon C. Aquinos issuances
after the EDSA Revolution, namely: (1) E.O. No. 1 creating
the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG)
for the recovery of ill-gotten wealth amassed by President
Ferdinand E. Marcos, his family and cronies, (2) E.O. No. 14
which amended P.D. No. 1606 and R.A. No. 1379 by
transferring to the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction over civil
actions filed against President Marcos, his family and cronies
based on R.A. No. 1379, the Civil Code and other existing
laws, and (3) E.O. No. 14-A whch further amended E.O. No.
14, P.D. No. 1606 and R.A. No. 1379 by providing that the
civil action under R.A. No. 1379 which may be filed against
President Marcos, his family and cronies, may proceed
independently of the criminal action.
Petitioner gathers from the presidential issuances that the
Sandiganbayan has been granted jurisdiction only over the
separate civil actions filed against President Marcos, his
family and cronies, regardless of whether these civil actions
were for recovery of unlawfully acquired property under
R.A. No. 1379 or for restitution, reparation of damages or
indemnification for consequential damages or other civil
actions under the Civil Code or other existing laws.
According to petitioner, nowhere in the amendments to P.D.
No. 1606 and R.A. No. 1379 does it provide that the
Sandiganbayan has been vested jurisdiction over separate
civil actions other than those filed against President Marcos,
his family and cronies.13 Hence, the Sandiganbayan has no
jurisdiction over any separate civil action against him, even
if such separate civil action is for recovery of unlawfully
acquired property under R.A. No. 1379.
Petitioner further contends that in any event, the petition for
forfeiture filed against him is fatally defective for failing to
comply with the jurisdictional requirements under Sec. 2,
R.A. No. 1379, 14 namely: (a) an inquiry similar to a
preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecution arm
of the government; (b) a certification to the Solicitor General
that there is reasonable ground to believe that there has
been violation of the said law and that respondent is guilty
thereof; and (c) an action filed by the Solicitor General on
behalf of the Republic of the Philippines.15 He argues that
only informations for perjury were filed and there has been
no information filed against him for violation of R.A. No.
1379. Consequently, he maintains, it is impossible for the
Office of the Ombudsman to certify that there is reasonable
ground to believe that a violation of the said law had been
committed and that he is guilty thereof. The petition is also
supposedly bereft of the required certification which should
be made by the investigating City or Provincial Fiscal (now
Prosecutor) to the Solicitor General. Furthermore, he opines
that it should have been the Office of the Solicitor General
which filed the petition and not the Office of the Ombudsman
as in this case. The petition being fatally defective, the same
should have been dismissed, petitioner concludes.
In their Comment,16 respondents submit the contrary, noting
that the issues raised by petitioner are not novel as these
have been settled in Republic vs. Sandiganbayan17 which
categorically ruled that "there is no issue that jurisdiction
over violations of [R.A.] Nos. 3019 and 1379 now rests with
the Sandiganbayan."18 Respondents argue that under the
Constitution19 and prevailing statutes, the Sandiganbayan is
vested with authority and jurisdiction over the petition for
forfeiture under R.A. No. 1379 filed against petitioner.
Respondents point to Sec. 4.a (1) (d) of P.D. 1606, as
amended, as the prevailing law on the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan, thus:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction.The Sandiganbayan shall exercise
exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title
VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of
the accused are officials occupying the following positions in
the government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim
capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions
of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade
27 and higher of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758),
specifically including:
.
(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains,
and all officers of higher ranks;
.
As petitioner falls squarely under the category of public
positions covered by the aforestated law, the petition for
forfeiture should be within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.
Respondents also brush off as inconsequential petitioners
argument that the petition for forfeiture is "civil" in nature
and the Sandiganbayan, having allegedly no jurisdiction over
civil actions, therefore has no jurisdiction over the petition,
since the same P.D. No. 1606 encompasses all cases
involving violations of R.A. No. 3019, irrespective of whether
these cases are civil or criminal in nature. The petition for
forfeiture should not be confused with the cases initiated
and prosecuted by the PCGG pursuant to E.O. Nos. 14 and 14-
A, as these are dealt with under a separate subparagraph of
P.D. No. 1606, as amended, in particular Sec. 4.c
thereof.20 Further, respondents stress that E.O. Nos. 14 and
14-A exclusively apply to actions for recovery of unlawfully
acquired property against President Marcos, his family, and
cronies. It would also not be accurate to refer to a petition
for forfeiture as a "civil case," since it has been held that
petitions for forfeiture are deemed criminal or penal and
that it is only the proceeding for its prosecution which is civil
in nature.21
The Office of the Ombudsman filed a
separate Comment,22 likewise relying on Republic v.
Sandiganbayan to argue that the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over the petition for forfeiture filed against
petitioner. The Ombudsman explains that the grant to the
Sandiganbayan of jurisdiction over violations of R.A. No.
1379 did not change even under the amendments of
R.A. No. 797523 and R.A. No. 829424, although it came to be
limited to cases involving high-ranking public officials as
enumerated therein, including Philippine army and air force
colonels, naval captains, and all other officers of higher rank,
to which petitioner belongs.25
In arguing that it has authority to investigate and initiate
forfeiture proceedings against petitioner, the Office of the
Ombudsman refers to both the Constitution26 and R.A. No.
6770.27 The constitutional power of investigation of the
Office of the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified; its
power to investigate any act of a public official or employee
which appears to be "illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient"
covers the unlawful acquisition of wealth by public officials
as defined under R.A. No. 1379. Furthermore, Sec. 15
(11)28 of R.A. No. 6770 expressly empowers the
Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute such cases of
unlawful acquisition of wealth. This authority of the
Ombudsman has been affirmed also in Republic vs.
Sandiganbayan.29
The Office of the Ombudsman then refutes petitioners
allegation that the petition for forfeiture filed against him
failed to comply with the procedural and formal
requirements under the law. It asserts that all the
requirements of R.A. No. 1379 have been strictly complied
with. An inquiry similar to a preliminary investigation was
conducted by a Prosecution Officer of the Office of the
Ombudsman. The participation of the Office of the Solicitor
General, claimed by petitioner to be necessary, is actually no
longer required since the Office of the Ombudsman is
endowed with the authority to investigate and prosecute the
case as discussed above.30
In addition, the Office of the Ombudsman alleges that the
present Petition should be dismissed for blatant forum-
shopping. Even as petitioner had filed a Motion to Dismiss as
regards the petition for forfeiture (docketed as Civil Case No.
0193) before the Sandiganbayan on the ground of the
Sandiganbayans alleged lack of jurisdiction, he filed the
instant Petition raising exactly the same issue, even though
the Motion to Dismiss in Civil Case No. 0193 is still pending
resolution.1avvphi1 Worse, it appears that the Motion to
Dismiss and the instant Petition were filed on the same day,
17 November 2004.
Petitioner refutes these arguments in his Reply31 and
enunciates that the Sandiganbayans criminal jurisdiction is
separate and distinct from its civil jurisdiction, and that the
Sandiganbayans jurisdiction over forfeiture cases had been
removed without subsequent amendments expressly
restoring such civil jurisdiction. His thesis is that R.A. No.
1379 is a special law which is primarily civil and remedial in
nature, the clear intent of which is to separate the prima
facie determination in forfeiture proceedings from the
litigation of the civil action. This intent is further
demonstrated by Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 1379 which grants the
authority to make an inquiry similar to a preliminary
investigation being done by the City or Provincial Fiscal, and
the authority to file a petition for forfeiture to the Solicitor
General.
Petitioner also points out in his Reply32 to the Comment of
the Office of the Ombudsman, that the use of the phrase
"violations of [R.A.] Nos. 3019 and 1379" in P.D. No. 1606, as
amended, implies jurisdiction over cases which are
principally criminal or penal in nature because the concept
of "violation" of certain laws necessarily carries with it the
concept of imposition of penalties for such violation. Hence,
when reference was made to "violations of [R.A.] Nos. 3019
and 1379," the only jurisdiction that can supposedly be
implied is criminal jurisdiction, not civil jurisdiction, thereby
highlighting respondent Sandiganbayans lack of
jurisdiction over the "civil case" for forfeiture of ill-gotten
wealth. Of course, petitioner does not rule out cases where
the crime carries with it the corresponding civil liability such
that when the criminal action is instituted, the civil action for
enforcement of the civil liability is impliedly instituted with
it, and the court having jurisdiction over the criminal action
also acquires jurisdiction over the ancillary civil action.
However, petitioner argues that the action for forfeiture
subject of this case is not the ancillary civil action impliedly
instituted with the criminal action. Rather, the petition for
forfeiture is an independent civil action over which the
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction. Petitioner points to P.D.
No. 1606, as amended, which treats of independent civil
actions only in the last paragraph of Sec. 4 thereof:
Any provisions of law or Rules of Court to the contrary
notwithstanding, the criminal action and the corresponding
civil action for the recovery of civil liability shall at all times
be simultaneously instituted with, and jointly determined in,
the same proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the
appropriate courts, the filing of the criminal action being
deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil
action, and no right to reserve the filing of such civil action
separately from the criminal action shall be
recognized: Provided, however, That where the civil action
had heretofore been filed separately but judgment therein
has not yet been rendered, and the criminal case is hereafter
filed with the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, said
civil action shall be transferred to the Sandiganbayan or the
appropriate court, as the case may be, for consolidation and
joint determination with the criminal action, otherwise the
separate civil action shall be deemed abandoned.
Petitioner however did not raise any argument to refute the
charge of forum-shopping.
The issues for resolution are: (a) whether the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over petitions for forfeiture
under R.A. No. 1379; (b) whether the Office of the
Ombudsman has the authority to investigate, initiate and
prosecute such petitions for forfeiture; and (c) whether
petitioner is guilty of forum-shopping.
The petition is patently without merit. It should be
dismissed.
The seminal decision of Republic v.
Sandiganbayan squarely rules on the issues raised by
33
petitioner concerning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
and the authority of the Office of the Ombudsman. After
reviewing the legislative history of the Sandiganbayan and
the Office of the Ombudsman, the Court therein resolved the
question of jurisdiction by the Sandiganbayan over
violations of R.A. No. 3019 and R.A. No. 1379. Originally, it
was the Solicitor General who was authorized to initiate
forfeiture proceedings before the then Court of First
Instance of the city or province where the public officer or
employee resides or holds office, pursuant to Sec. 2 of R.A.
No. 1379.Upon the creation of the Sandiganbayan pursuant
to P.D. No. 1486,34 original and exclusive jurisdiction over
such violations was vested in the said court.35 P.D. No.
160636 was later issued expressly repealing P.D. No. 1486, as
well as modifying the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by
removing its jurisdiction over civil actions brought in
connection with crimes within the exclusive jurisdiction of
said court.37 Such civil actions removed from the jurisdiction
of the Sandigabayan include those for restitution or
reparation of damages, recovery of instruments and effects
of the crime, civil actions under Articles 32 and 34 of the Civil
Code, and forfeiture proceedings provided for under R.A. No.
1379.38
Subsequently, Batas Pambansa Blg. 12939 abolished the
concurrent jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and the
regular courts and expanded the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over the offenses
enumerated in Sec. 4 of P.D. No. 1606 to embrace all such
offenses irrespective of the imposable penalty. Since this
change resulted in the proliferation of the filing of cases
before the Sandiganbayan where the offense charged is
punishable by a penalty not higher than prision
correccional or its equivalent, and such cases not being of a
serious nature, P.D. No. 1606 was again amended by P.D. No.
186040 and eventually by P.D. No. 1861.41
On the foregoing premises alone, the Court in Republic v.
Sandiganbayan, deduced that jurisdiction over violations of
R.A. No. 3019 and 1379 is lodged with the
Sandiganbayan.42 It could not have taken into consideration
R.A. No. 797543 and R.A. No. 824944 since both statutes
which also amended the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
were not yet enacted at the time. The subsequent
enactments only serve to buttress the conclusion that the
Sandiganbayan indeed has jurisdiction over violations of
R.A. No. 1379.
Under R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan is vested with
exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving
violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Sec.
2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or
more of the accused are officials occupying the following
positions whether in a permanent, acting or interim
capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense: (1)
Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of
regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade
'27' and higher, of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 989 (R.A. No. 6758), specifically
including: (a) Provincial governors, vice-governors,
members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department
heads; (b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of the
sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors,
engineers, and other city department heads; (c) Officials of
the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and
higher; (d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval
captains, and all officers of higher rank; (e) Officers of the
Philippine National Police while occupying the position of
provincial director and those holding the rank of senior
superintended or higher; (f) City and provincial prosecutors
and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the
Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor; (g)
Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of
government-owned or controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions or foundations; (2)
Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as
Grade '27' and up under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989; (3) Members of the judiciary
without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; (4)
Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commission,
without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution; and
(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade
'27' and higher under the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989.45
In the face of the prevailing jurisprudence and the present
state of statutory law on the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, petitioners argumentthat the
Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the petition for
forfeiture it being "civil" in nature and the Sandiganbayan
allegedly having no jurisdiction over civil actionscollapses
completely.
The civil nature of an action for forfeiture was first
recognized in Republic v. Sandiganbayan, thus: "[T]he rule is
settled that forfeiture proceedings are actions in rem and,
therefore, civil in nature."46 Then, Almeda, Sr.
v. Perez,47 followed, holding that the proceedings under R.A.
No. 1379 do not terminate in the imposition of a penalty but
merely in the forfeiture of the properties illegally acquired
in favor of the State. It noted that the
procedure outlined in the law leading to forfeiture is that
provided for in a civil action.48
However, the Court has had occasion to rule that forfeiture
of illegally acquired property partakes the nature of a
penalty. In Cabal v. Kapunan, Jr.,49 the Court cited
voluminous authorities in support of its declaration of the
criminal or penal nature of forfeiture proceedings, viz:
In a strict signification, a forfeiture is a divestiture of
property without compensation, in consequence of a default
or an offense, and the term is used in such a sense in this
article. A forfeiture, as thus defined, is imposed by way of
punishment not by the mere convention of the parties, but
by the lawmaking power, to insure a prescribed course of
conduct. It is a method deemed necessary by the legislature
to restrain the commission of an offense and to aid in the
prevention of such an offense. The effect of such a forfeiture
is to transfer the title to the specific thing from the owner to
the sovereign power. (23 Am. Jur. 599)
"In Black's Law Dictionary a 'forfeiture' is defined to be 'the
incurring of a liability to pay a definite sum of money as the
consequence of violating the provisions of some statute or
refusal to comply with some requirement of law.' It may be
said to be a penalty imposed for misconduct or breach of
duty.'" (Com. vs. French, 114 S.W. 255.)
.
"Generally speaking, informations for the forfeiture of goods
that seek no judgment of fine or imprisonment against any
person are deemed to be civil proceedings in rem. Such
proceedings are criminal in nature to the extent that where
the person using the res illegally is the owner of rightful
possessor of it the forfeiture proceeding is in the nature of a
punishment. They have been held to be so far in the nature
of
criminal proceedings that a general verdict on several
counts in an information is upheld if one count is good.
According to the authorities such proceedings, where the
owner of the property appears, are so far considered as
quasicriminal proceedings as to relieve the owner from
being a witness against himself and to prevent the
compulsory production of his books and papers. . . ." (23 Am.
Jur. 612)
. Forfeiture In Favor of the State Any Property Found to Have
"Proceedings for forfeitures are generally considered to be
civil and in the nature of proceedings in rem. The statute
providing that no judgment or other proceedings in civil
causes shall be arrested or reversed for any defect or want
of form is applicable to them. In some aspects, however, suits
for penalties and forfeitures are of quasi-criminal nature and
within the reason of criminal proceedings for all the
purposes of . . . that portion of the Fifth Amendment which
declares that no person shall be compelled in any criminal
case to be a witness against himself. The proceeding is one
against the owner, as well as against the goods; for it is his
breach of the laws which has to be proved to establish the
forfeiture and his property is sought to be forfeited." (15 Am.
Jur., Sec. 104, p. 368)50
Cabal v. Kapunan modified the earlier ruling in Almeda, Sr. v.
Perez.51 The Court in Cabal held that the doctrine laid down
in Almeda refers to the purely procedural aspect of the
forfeiture proceedings and has no bearing on the substantial
rights of respondents, particularly their constitutional right
against self-incrimination.52 This was reaffirmed and
reiterated in
Republic v. Agoncillo53 and Katigbak v. Solicitor General.54
The Sandiganbayan is vested with jurisdiction over
violations of R.A. No. 1379, entitled "An Act Declaring
Been Unlawfully Acquired By Any Public Officer or Employee
and Providing For the Proceedings Therefor." What acts
would constitute a violation of such a law? A reading of R.A.
No. 1379 establishes that it does not enumerate any
prohibited acts the commission of which would necessitate
the imposition of a penalty. Instead, it provides the
procedure for forfeiture to be followed in case a public
officer or employee has acquired during his incumbency an
amount of property manifestly out of proportion to his
salary as such public officer or employee and to his lawful
income and income from legitimately acquired
property.55 Section 1256 of the law provides a penalty but it
is only imposed upon the public officer or employee who
transfers or conveys the unlawfully acquired property; it
does not penalize the officer or employee for making the
unlawful acquisition. In effect, as observed in Almeda, Sr. v.
Perez, it imposes the penalty of forfeiture of the properties
unlawfully acquired upon the respondent public officer or
employee.57
It is logically congruent, therefore, that violations of R.A. No.
1379 are placed under the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, even though the proceeding is civil in
nature, since the forfeiture of the illegally acquired property
amounts to a penalty. The soundness of this reasoning
becomes even more obvious when we consider that the
respondent in such forfeiture proceedings is a public officer
or employee and the violation of R.A. No. 1379 was
committed during the respondent officer or employees
incumbency and in relation to his office. This is in line with
the purpose behind the creation of the Sandiganbayan as an
anti-graft courtto address the urgent problem of
dishonesty in public service.58
Following the same analysis, petitioner should therefore
abandon his erroneous belief that the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction only over petitions for forfeiture filed against
President Marcos, his family and cronies.
We come then to the question of authority of the Office of the
Ombudsman to investigate, file and
prosecute petitions for forfeiture under R.A. No. 1379. This
was the main issue resolved in Republic v. Sandiganbayan.59
Under Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 1379, it was the Solicitor General
who was authorized to initiate forfeiture proceedings before
the then Courts of First Instance. P.D. No. Decree No. 1486
was later issued on 11 June 1978 vesting the Sandiganbayan
with jurisdiction over R.A. No. 1379 forfeiture proceedings.
Sec. 12 of P.D. No. 1486 gave the Chief Special Prosecutor the
authority to file and prosecute forfeiture cases. This may be
taken as an implied repeal by P.D. No. 1486 of the
jurisdiction of the former Courts of First Instance and the
authority of the Solicitor General to file a petition for
forfeiture under Sec. 2 of R.A. No. 1379 by transferring said
jurisdiction and authority to the Sandiganbayan and the
Chief Special Prosecutor, respectively.60 An implied repeal is
one which takes place when a new law contains some
provisions which are contrary to, but do not expressly repeal
those of a former law.61 As a rule, repeals by implication are
not favored and will not be so declared unless it be manifest
that the legislature so intended. Before such repeal is
deemed to exist, it must be shown that the statutes or
statutory provisions deal with the same subject matter and
that the latter be inconsistent with the former. The language
used in the latter statute must be such as to render it
irreconcilable with what had been formerly enacted. An
inconsistency that falls short of that standard does not
suffice. What is needed is a manifest indication of the
legislative purpose to repeal.62
P.D. No. 1486 contains a repealing clause which provides
that "[A]ny provision of law, order, rule or regulation
inconsistent with the provisions of this Decree is hereby
repealed or modified accordingly."63 This is not an express
repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the
statutes that are intended to be repealed. Rather, it is a
clause which predicates the intended repeal upon the
condition that a substantial conflict must be found in
existing and prior laws.64
The conflict between P.D. No. 1486 and R.A. No. 1379 refers
to the jurisdiction over the forfeiture proceeding and the
authority to file the petition for forfeiture. As P.D. No. 1486
grants exclusive jurisdiction and authority to the
Sandiganbayan and the Chief Special Prosecutor, the then
Courts of First Instance and Solicitor General cannot
exercise concurrent jurisdiction or authority over such
cases. Hence, P.D. No. 1486 and Sec. 2, R.A. No. 1379 are
inconsistent with each other and the former should be
deemed to have repealed the latter.lawphil.net
On 11 June 1978, the same day that P.D. No. 1486 was
enacted, P.D. No. 148765 creating the Office of the
Ombudsman (then known as the Tanodbayan) was passed.
The Tanodbayan initially had no authority to prosecute
cases falling within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as
provided in Sec. 4 of P.D. No. 1486, such jurisdiction being
vested in the Chief Special Prosecutor as earlier mentioned.
On 10 December 1978, P.D. No. 1606 was enacted expressly
repealing P.D. No. 1486. Issued on the same date was P.D. No.
160766 which amended the powers of the Tanodbayan to
investigate administrative complaints67 and created the
Office of the Chief Special Prosecutor.68 P.D. No. 1607
provided said Office of the Chief Special Prosecutor with
exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigation of
all cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, file informations
therefor, and direct and control the prosecution of said
cases.69 P.D. No. 1607 also removed from the Chief Special
Prosecutor the authority to file actions for forfeiture under
R.A. No. 1379.70
The rule is that when a law which expressly repeals a prior
law is itself repealed, the law first repealed shall not be
thereby revived unless expressly so provided. From this it
may fairly be inferred that the old rule continues in force
where a law which repeals a prior law, not expressly but by
implication, is itself repealed; and that in such cases the
repeal of the repealing law revives the prior law, unless the
language of the repealing statute provides
otherwise. Hence, the repeal of P.D. No. 1486 by P.D. No.
71
1606 necessarily revived the authority of the Solicitor
General to file a petition for forfeiture under R.A. No. 1379,
but not the jurisdiction of the Courts of First Instance over
the case nor the authority of the Provincial or City Fiscals
(now Prosecutors) to conduct the preliminary investigation
therefore, since said powers at that time remained in the
Sandiganbayan and the Chief Special Prosecutor.72
The Tanodbayans authority was further expanded by P.D.
No. 163073 issued on 18 July 1990. Among other things, the
Tanodbayan was given the exclusive authority to conduct
preliminary investigation of all cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan, to file informations therefore and to direct
and control the prosecution of said cases.74 The power to
conduct the necessary investigation and to file and
prosecute the corresponding criminal and administrative
cases before the Sandiganbayan or the proper court or
administrative agency against any public personnel who has
acted in a manner warranting criminal and disciplinary
action or proceedings was also transferred from the Chief
Special Prosecutor to the Tanodbayan.75
Thereafter, P.D. No. 1606 was amended by P.D. Nos. 1860
and 186176 which granted the Tanodbayan the same
authority. The present Constitution was subsequently
ratified and then the Tanodbayan became known as the
Office of the Special Prosecutor which continued to exercise
its powers except those conferred on the Office of the
Ombudsman created under the Constitution.77 The Office of
the Ombudsman was officially created under R.A. No.
6770.78
At present, the powers of the Ombudsman, as defined by R.A.
No. 6770, corollary to Sec. 13, Art. XI of the Constitution,
include the authority, among others, to:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by
any person, any act or omission of any public officer or
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It has
primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of this primary
jurisdiction, may take over, at any stage, from any
investigatory agency of Government, the investigation of
such cases;79
(11) Investigate and initiate the proper action for the
recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth amassed
after 25 February 1986 and the prosecution of the parties
involved therein.80
Ostensibly, it is the Ombudsman who should file the petition
for forfeiture under R.A. No. 1379. However, the
Ombudsmans exercise of the correlative powers to
investigate and initiate the proper action for recovery of ill-
gotten and/or unexplained wealth is restricted only to cases
for the recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained wealth
amassed after 25 February 1986.81 As regards such wealth
accumulated on or before said date, the Ombudsman is
without authority to commence before the Sandiganbayan
such forfeiture actionsince the authority to file forfeiture
proceedings on or before 25 February 1986 belongs to the
Solicitor Generalalthough he has the authority to
investigate such cases for forfeiture even before 25 February
1986, pursuant to the Ombudsmans
general investigatory power under Sec. 15 (1) of R.A. No.
6770.82
It is obvious then that respondent Office of the Ombudsman
acted well within its authority in conducting the
investigation of petitioners illegally acquired assets and in
filing the petition for forfeiture against him. The contention
that the procedural requirements under Sec. 2 of R.A. No.
1379 were not complied with no longer deserve
consideration in view of the foregoing discussion.
Now to the charge that petitioner is guilty of forum-
shopping. Forum-shopping is manifest whenever a party
"repetitively avail[s] of several judicial remedies in different
courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially
founded on the same transactions and the same essential
facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the
same issues either pending in, or already resolved adversely
by, some other court."83 It has also been defined as "an act of
a party against whom an adverse judgment has been
rendered in one forum of seeking and possibly getting a
favorable opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or
the special civil action of certiorari, or the institution of two
or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause
on the supposition that one or the other court would make a
favorable disposition."84 Considered a pernicious evil, it
adversely affects the efficient administration of justice since
it clogs the court dockets, unduly burdens the financial and
human resources of the judiciary, and trifles with and mocks
judicial processes.85 Willful and deliberate forum-shopping
is a ground for summary dismissal of the complaint or
initiatory pleading with prejudice and constitutes direct
contempt of court, as well as a cause for administrative
sanctions, which may both be resolved and imposed in the
same case where the forum-shopping is found.86
There is ample reason to hold that petitioner is guilty of
forum-shopping. The present petition was filed
accompanied by the requisite Verification and Certification
Against Forum Shopping87 in which petitioner made the
following representation:
.
3.] As Petitioner, I have not heretofore commenced any other
action or proceeding in the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency, involving the same
issues as that in the above-captioned case.
4.] To the best of my knowledge, no such action or
proceeding is pending in the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency.
5.] If I should hereafter learn that such proceeding has been
commenced or is pending before the Supreme Court, the
Court of Appeals, or any other tribunal or agency, I
undertake to report that fact to this Honorable Court within
five (5) days from knowledge thereof.
However, petitioner failed to inform the Court that he had
filed a Motion to Dismiss88 in relation to the petition for
forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan. The existence of this
motion was only brought to the attention of this Court by
respondent Office of the Ombudsman in its Comment. A
scrutiny of the Motion to Dismiss reveals that petitioner
raised substantially the same issues and prayed for the same
reliefs therein as it has in the instant petition. In fact, the
Arguments and Discussion89 in the Petition of petitioners
thesis that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over
separate civil actions for forfeiture of unlawfully acquired
properties appears to be wholly lifted from the Motion to
Dismiss. The only difference between the two is that in
the Petition, petitioner raises the ground of failure of the
petition for forfeiture to comply with the procedural
requirements of R.A. No. 1379, and petitioner prays for the
annulment of the Sandiganbayans Resolution dated 29
October 2004 and Writ of Preliminary Attachment dated 2
November 2004. Nevertheless, these differences are only
superficial. Both Petition and Motion to Dismiss have the
same intent of dismissing the case for forfeiture filed against
petitioner, his wife and their sons. It is undeniable that
petitioner had failed to fulfill his undertaking. This is
incontestably forum-shopping which is reason enough to
dismiss the petition outright, without prejudice to the taking
of appropriate action against the counsel and party
concerned.90 The brazenness of this attempt at forum-
shopping is even demonstrated by the fact that both
the Petition and Motion to Dismiss were filed on the same
day, 17 November 2004. Petitioner should have waited for
the resolution of his Motion to Dismiss before resorting to
the petition at hand.
Petitioners counsel of record, Atty. Constantino B. De Jesus,
needs to be reminded that his primary duty is to assist the
courts in the administration of justice. As an officer of the
court, his duties to the court are more significant and
important than his obligations to his clients. Any conduct
which tends to delay, impede or obstruct the administration
thereof contravenes his oath of office.91 Atty. De Jesus failed
to accord due regard, as he must, the tenets of the legal
profession and the mission of our courts of justice. For this,
he should be penalized. Penalties imposed upon lawyers
who engaged in forum-shopping range from severe censure
to suspension from the practice of law.92 In the instant case,
we deem the imposition of a fine in the amount of
20,000.00 to be sufficient to make Atty. De Jesus realize the
seriousness of his naked abuse of the judicial process.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is
DISMISSED. Atty. Constantino B. De Jesus is DECLARED in
CONTEMPT of this Court and meted a fine of Twenty
Thousand Pesos (20,000.00) to be paid within ten (10)
days from the finality of this D E C I S I O N. Costs against
petitioner. SO ORDERED.
TOPIC: ON JURISDICTION C. SANDIGANBAYAN: Original of Criminal Case No. 90-3184 to the Regional Trial Court
and Exclusive Jurisdiction (b-1. Who committed the offense (RTC) of Naga City, Branch 21.
or crime)
The petition at bench arose from the following milieu:
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT The petitioner is a graduate of the Philippine Military
Manila Academy, a member of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and the Philippine Constabulary, as well
SECOND DIVISION as the Intelligence Group of the Philippine National
Police. On March 16, 1990, the petitioner was
G.R. No. 124644 February 5, 2004 conducting surveillance operations on drug
trafficking at the Sa Harong Caf Bar and
ARNEL ESCOBAL, petitioner, Restaurant located along Barlin St., Naga City. He
vs somehow got involved in a shooting incident,
HON. FRANCIS GARCHITORENA, Presiding Justice of the resulting in the death of one Rodney Rafael N. Nueca.
Sandiganbayan, Atty. Luisabel Alfonso-Cortez, On February 6, 1991, an amended Information was
Executive Clerk of Court IV of the Sandiganbayan, Hon. filed with the RTC of Naga City, Branch 21, docketed
David C. Naval, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial as Criminal Case No. 90-3184 charging the petitioner
Court of Naga City, Branch 21, Luz N. and a certain Natividad Bombita, Jr. alias "Jun
Nueca, respondents. Bombita" with murder. The accusatory portion of the
amended Information reads:
DECISION
That on or about March 16, 1990, in the City of Naga,
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court by virtue of the Presidential Waiver,
This is a petition for certiorari with a prayer for the issuance
dated June 1, 1990, with intent to kill, conspiring and
of a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction
confederating together and mutually helping each
filed by Arnel Escobal seeking the nullification of the remand
other, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
by the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan of the records
feloniously attack, assault and maul one Rodney
 Nueca and accused 2Lt Arnel Escobal armed with a
caliber .45 service pistol shoot said Rodney Nueca
thereby inflicting upon him serious, mortal and fatal
wounds which caused his death, and as a
consequence thereof, complainant LUZ N. NUECA,
mother of the deceased victim, suffered actual and
compensatory damages in the amount of THREE
HUNDRED SIXTY-SEVEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED
SEVEN & 95/100 (P367,107.95) PESOS, Philippine
Currency, and moral and exemplary damages in the
amount of ONE HUNDRED THIRTY-FIVE THOUSAND
(P135,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency.1
On March 19, 1991, the RTC issued an Order preventively
suspending the petitioner from the service under
Presidential Decree No. 971, as amended by P.D. No. 1847.
When apprised of the said order, the General Headquarters
of the PNP issued on October 6, 1992 Special Order No. 91,
preventively suspending the petitioner from the service
until the case was terminated.2
The petitioner was arrested by virtue of a warrant issued by
the RTC, while accused Bombita remained at large. The
petitioner posted bail and was granted temporary liberty.
When arraigned on April 9, 1991,3 the petitioner, assisted by
counsel, pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.
Thereafter, on December 23, 1991, the petitioner filed a
Motion to Quash4 the Information alleging that as mandated
by Commonwealth Act No. 408,5 in relation to Section 1,
Presidential Decree No. 1822 and Section 95 of R.A. No.
6975, the court martial, not the RTC, had jurisdiction over
criminal cases involving PNP members and officers.
Pending the resolution of the motion, the petitioner on June
25, 1993 requested the Chief of the PNP for his
reinstatement. He alleged that under R.A. No. 6975, his
suspension should last for only 90 days, and, having served
the same, he should now be reinstated. On September 23,
1993,6 the PNP Region V Headquarters wrote Judge David C.
Naval requesting information on whether he issued an order
lifting the petitioners suspension. The RTC did not reply.
Thus, on February 22, 1994, the petitioner filed a motion in
the RTC for the lifting of the order of suspension. He alleged
that he had served the 90-day preventive suspension and
pleaded for compassionate justice. The RTC denied the
motion on March 9, 1994.7 Trial thereafter proceeded, and
the prosecution rested its case. The petitioner commenced
the presentation of his evidence. On July 20, 1994, he filed a
Motion to Dismiss8the case. Citing Republic of
the Philippines v. Asuncion, et al.,9 he argued that since he
committed the crime in the performance of his duties, the
Sandiganbayan had exclusive jurisdiction over the case.
On October 28, 1994, the RTC issued an Order10 denying the
motion to dismiss. It, however, ordered the conduct of a
preliminary hearing to determine whether or not the crime
charged was committed by the petitioner in relation to his
office as a member of the PNP.
In the preliminary hearing, the prosecution manifested that
it was no longer presenting any evidence in connection with
the petitioners motion. It reasoned that it had already
rested its case, and that its evidence showed that the
petitioner did not commit the offense charged in connection
with the performance of his duties as a member of the
Philippine Constabulary. According to the prosecution, they
were able to show the following facts: (a) the petitioner was
not wearing his uniform during the incident; (b) the offense
was committed just after midnight; (c) the petitioner was
drunk when the crime was committed; (d) the petitioner
was in the company of civilians; and, (e) the offense was
committed in a beerhouse called "Sa Harong Caf Bar and
Restaurant."11
For his part, the petitioner testified that at about 10:00 p.m.
on March 15, 1990, he was at the Sa Harong Caf Bar and
Restaurant at Barlin St., Naga City, to conduct surveillance on
alleged drug trafficking, pursuant to Mission Order No. 03-
04 issued by Police Superintendent Rufo R. Pulido. The
petitioner adduced in evidence the sworn statements of
Benjamin Cario and Roberto Fajardo who corroborated his
testimony that he was on a surveillance mission on the
aforestated date.12
On July 31, 1995, the trial court issued an Order declaring
that the petitioner committed the crime charged while not in
the performance of his official function. The trial court added
that upon the enactment of R.A. No. 7975,13 the issue had
become moot and academic. The amendatory law
transferred the jurisdiction over the offense charged from
the Sandiganbayan to the RTC since the petitioner did not
have a salary grade of "27" as provided for in or by Section
4(a)(1), (3) thereof. The trial court nevertheless ordered the
prosecution to amend the Information pursuant to the ruling
in Republic v. Asuncion14 and R.A. No. 7975. The amendment
consisted in the inclusion therein of an allegation that the
offense charged was not committed by the petitioner in the
performance of his duties/functions, nor in relation to his
office.lawphi1.nt
The petitioner filed a motion for the reconsideration15 of the
said order, reiterating that based on his testimony and those
of Benjamin Cario and Roberto Fajardo, the offense
charged was committed by him in relation to his official
functions. He asserted that the trial court failed to consider
the exceptions to the prohibition. He asserted that R.A. No.
7975, which was enacted on March 30, 1995, could not be
applied retroactively.16
The petitioner further alleged that Luz Nacario Nueca, the
mother of the victim, through counsel, categorically and
unequivocably admitted in her complaint filed with the
Peoples Law Enforcement Board (PLEB) that he was on an
official mission when the crime was committed.
On November 24, 1995, the RTC made a volte face and issued
an Order reversing and setting aside its July 31, 1995 Order.
It declared that based on the petitioners evidence, he was
on official mission when the shooting occurred. It concluded
that the prosecution failed to adduce controverting evidence
thereto. It likewise considered Luz Nacario Nuecas
admission in her complaint before the PLEB that the
petitioner was on official mission when the shooting
happened.
The RTC ordered the public prosecutor to file a Re-Amended
Information and to allege that the offense charged was
committed by the petitioner in the performance of his
duties/functions or in relation to his office; and,
conformably to R.A. No. 7975, to thereafter transmit the
same, as well as the complete records with the stenographic
notes, to the Sandiganbayan, to wit:
WHEREFORE, the Order dated July 31, 1995 is hereby
SET ASIDE and RECONSIDERED, and it is hereby
declared that after preliminary hearing, this Court
has found that the offense charged in the Information
herein was committed by the accused in his relation
to his function and duty as member of the then
Philippine Constabulary.
Conformably with R.A. No. 7975 and the ruling of the
Supreme Court in Republic v. Asuncion, et al., G.R. No.
180208, March 11, 1994:
(1) The City Prosecutor is hereby ordered to
file a Re-Amended Information alleging that
the offense charged was committed by the
Accused in the performance of his
duties/functions or in relation to his office,
within fifteen (15) days from receipt hereof;
(2) After the filing of the Re-Amended
Information, the complete records of this case,
together with the transcripts of the
stenographic notes taken during the entire
proceedings herein, are hereby ordered
transmitted immediately to the Honorable
Sandiganbayan, through its Clerk of Court,
Manila, for appropriate proceedings.17
On January 8, 1996, the Presiding Justice of the
Sandiganbayan ordered the Executive Clerk of Court IV, Atty.
Luisabel Alfonso-Cortez, to return the records of Criminal
Case No. 90-3184 to the court of origin, RTC of Naga City,
Branch 21. It reasoned that under P.D. No. 1606, as amended
by R.A. No. 7975,18 the RTC retained jurisdiction over the
case, considering that the petitioner had a salary grade of
"23." Furthermore, the prosecution had already rested its
case and the petitioner had commenced presenting his
evidence in the RTC; following the rule on continuity of
jurisdiction, the latter court should continue with the case
and render judgment therein after trial.
Upon the remand of the records, the RTC set the case for trial
on May 3, 1996, for the petitioner to continue presenting his
evidence. Instead of adducing his evidence, the petitioner
filed a petition for certiorari, assailing the Order of the
Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan remanding the
records of the case to the RTC.
The threshold issue for resolution is whether or not the
Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan committed a grave
abuse of his discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction in ordering the remand of the case to the RTC.
The petitioner contends that when the amended information
was filed with the RTC on February 6, 1991, P.D. No. 1606
was still in effect. Under Section 4(a) of the decree, the
Sandiganbayan had exclusive jurisdiction over the case
against him as he was charged with homicide with the
imposable penalty of reclusion temporal, and the crime was
committed while in the performance of his duties. He further
asserts that although P.D. No. 1606, as amended by P.D. No.
1861 and by R.A. No. 7975 provides that crimes committed
by members and officers of the PNP with a salary grade
below "27" committed in relation to office are within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the proper RTC, the amendment
thus introduced by R.A. No. 7975 should not be applied
retroactively. This is so, the petitioner asserts, because
under Section 7 of R.A. No. 7975, only those cases where trial
has not begun in the Sandiganbayan upon the effectivity of
the law should be referred to the proper trial court.
The private complainant agrees with the contention of the
petitioner. In contrast, the Office of the Special Prosecutor
contends that the Presiding Justice of the Sandiganbayan
acted in accordance with law when he ordered the remand
of the case to the RTC. It asserts that R.A. No. 7975 should be
applied retroactively. Although the Sandiganbayan had
jurisdiction over the crime committed by the petitioner
when the amended information was filed with the RTC, by
the time it resolved petitioners motion to dismiss on July 31,
1995, R.A. No. 7975 had already taken effect. Thus, the law
should be given retroactive effect.
The Ruling of the Court
The respondent Presiding Justice acted in accordance with
law and the rulings of this Court when he ordered the
remand of the case to the RTC, the court of origin.
The jurisdiction of the court over criminal cases is
determined by the allegations in the Information or the
Complaint and the statute in effect at the time of the
commencement of the action, unless such statute provides
for a retroactive application thereof. The jurisdictional
requirements must be alleged in the Information.19 Such
jurisdiction of the court acquired at the inception of the case
continues until the case is terminated.20
Under Section 4(a) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended by P.D. No.
1861, the Sandiganbayan had exclusive jurisdiction in all
cases involving the following:
(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II,
Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code;
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public
officers and employees in relation to their office,
including those employed in government-owned or
controlled corporations, whether simple or
complexed with other crimes, where the penalty
prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional
or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine
of P6,000.00 .21
However, for the Sandiganbayan to have exclusive
jurisdiction under the said law over crimes committed by
public officers in relation to their office, it is essential that
the facts showing the intimate relation between the office of
the offender and the discharge of official duties must be
alleged in the Information. It is not enough to merely allege
in the Information that the crime charged was committed by
the offender in relation to his office because that would be a
conclusion of law.22 The amended Information filed with the
RTC against the petitioner does not contain any allegation
showing the intimate relation between his office and the
discharge of his duties. Hence, the RTC had jurisdiction over
the offense charged when on November 24, 1995, it ordered
the re-amendment of the Information to include therein an
allegation that the petitioner committed the crime in
relation to office. The trial court erred when it ordered the
elevation of the records to the Sandiganbayan. It bears
stressing that R.A. No. 7975 amending P.D. No. 1606 was
already in effect and under Section 2 of the law:
In cases where none of the principal accused are
occupying positions corresponding to salary grade
"27" or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act
No. 6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of
superintendent or higher, or their equivalent,
exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the
proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial
Court, Municipal Trial Court, and Municipal Circuit
Trial Court, as the case may be, pursuant to their
respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129.
Under the law, even if the offender committed the crime
charged in relation to his office but occupies a position
corresponding to a salary grade below "27," the proper
Regional Trial Court or Municipal Trial Court, as the case
may be, shall have exclusive jurisdiction over the case. In this
case, the petitioner was a Police Senior Inspector, with
salary grade "23." He was charged with homicide punishable
by reclusion temporal. Hence, the RTC had exclusive
jurisdiction over the crime charged conformably to Sections
20 and 32 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by
Section 2 of R.A. No. 7691.
The petitioners contention that R.A. No. 7975 should not be
applied retroactively has no legal basis. It bears stressing
that R.A. No. 7975 is a substantive procedural law which may
be applied retroactively.23
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is
DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
TOPIC: ON JURISDICTION C. SANDIGANBAYAN: Original
and Exclusive Jurisdiction (b-2. Private individuals
committing the offense or crime with public officers)
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 168539 March 25, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
vs.
HENRY T. GO, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari
assailing the Resolution1 of the Third Division2 of the
Sandiganbayan (SB) dated June 2, 2005 which quashed the
Information filed against herein respondent for alleged
violation of Section 3 (g) of Republic Act No. 3019 (R.A.
3019), otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act.
The Information filed against respondent is an offshoot of
this Court's Decision3 in Agan, Jr. v. Philippine International
Air Terminals Co., Inc. which nullified the various contracts
awarded by the Government, through the Department of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC), to Philippine
Air Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO) for the construction,
operation and maintenance of the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport International Passenger Terminal III
(NAIA IPT III). Subsequent to the above Decision, a certain
Ma. Cecilia L. Pesayco filed a complaint with the Office of the
Ombudsman against several individuals for alleged violation
of R.A. 3019. Among those charged was herein respondent,
who was then the Chairman and President of PIATCO, for
having supposedly conspired with then DOTC Secretary
Arturo Enrile (Secretary Enrile) in entering into a contract
which is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the
government.
On September 16, 2004, the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to indict,
among others, herein respondent for violation of Section
3(g) of R.A. 3019. While there was likewise a finding of
probable cause against Secretary Enrile, he was no longer
indicted because he died prior to the issuance of the
resolution finding probable cause.
Thus, in an Information dated January 13, 2005, respondent
was charged before the SB as follows:
On or about July 12, 1997, or sometime prior or subsequent
thereto, in Pasay City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the late ARTURO
ENRILE, then Secretary of the Department of Transportation
and Communications (DOTC), committing the offense in
relation to his office and taking advantage of the same, in
conspiracy with accused, HENRY T. GO, Chairman and
President of the Philippine International Air Terminals, Co.,
Inc. (PIATCO), did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
criminally enter into a Concession Agreement, after the
project for the construction of the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport International Passenger Terminal III
(NAIA IPT III) was awarded to Paircargo
Consortium/PIATCO, which Concession Agreement
substantially amended the draft Concession Agreement
covering the construction of the NAIA IPT III under Republic
Act 6957, as amended by Republic Act 7718 (BOT law),
specifically the provision on Public Utility Revenues, as well
as the assumption by the government of the liabilities of
PIATCO in the event of the latter's default under Article IV,
Section 4.04 (b) and (c) in relation to Article 1.06 of the
Concession Agreement, which terms are more beneficial to
PIATCO while manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the
government of the Republic of the Philippines.4
The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 28090.
On March 10, 2005, the SB issued an Order, to wit:
The prosecution is given a period of ten (10) days from today
within which to show cause why this case should not be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
accused considering that the accused is a private person and
the public official Arturo Enrile, his alleged co-conspirator,
is already deceased, and not an accused in this case.5
The prosecution complied with the above Order contending
that the SB has already acquired jurisdiction over the person
of respondent by reason of his voluntary appearance, when
he filed a motion for consolidation and when he posted bail.
The prosecution also argued that the SB has exclusive
jurisdiction over respondent's case, even if he is a private
person, because he was alleged to have conspired with a
public officer.6
On April 28, 2005, respondent filed a Motion to Quash7 the
Information filed against him on the ground that the
operative facts adduced therein do not constitute an offense
under Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. Respondent, citing the show
cause order of the SB, also contended that, independently of
the deceased Secretary Enrile, the public officer with whom
he was alleged to have conspired, respondent, who is not a
public officer nor was capacitated by any official authority as
a government agent, may not be prosecuted for violation of
Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019.
The prosecution filed its Opposition.8
On June 2, 2005, the SB issued its assailed Resolution,
pertinent portions of which read thus:
Acting on the Motion to Quash filed by accused Henry T. Go
dated April 22, 2005, and it appearing that Henry T. Go, the
lone accused in this case is a private person and his alleged
co-conspirator-public official was already deceased long
before this case was filed in court, for lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the accused, the Court grants the Motion
to Quash and the Information filed in this case is hereby
ordered quashed and dismissed.9
Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues, to
wit:
I
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED
AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER
NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR APPLICABLE
JURISPRUDENCE IN GRANTING THE DEMURRER TO
EVIDENCE AND IN DISMISSING CRIMINAL CASE NO. 28090
ON THE GROUND THAT IT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER
THE PERSON OF RESPONDENT GO.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED
AND DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A MANNER
NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW OR APPLICABLE
JURISPRUDENCE, IN RULING THAT IT HAS NO
JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF RESPONDENT GO
DESPITE THE IRREFUTABLE FACT THAT HE HAS ALREADY
POSTED BAIL FOR HIS PROVISIONAL LIBERTY
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED
WHEN, IN COMPLETE DISREGARD OF THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION, IT
QUASHED THE INFORMATION AND DISMISSED CRIMINAL
CASE NO. 2809010
The Court finds the petition meritorious.
Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 provides:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to
acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by
existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices
of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxxx
(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract
or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to
the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will
profit thereby.
The elements of the above provision are:
(1) that the accused is a public officer;
(2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on
behalf of the government; and
(3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and
manifestly disadvantageous to the government.11
At the outset, it bears to reiterate the settled rule that private
persons, when acting in conspiracy with public officers, may
be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for the pertinent
offenses under Section 3 of R.A. 3019, in consonance with
the avowed policy of the anti-graft law to repress certain
acts of public officers and private persons alike constituting
graft or corrupt practices act or which may lead
thereto.12 This is the controlling doctrine as enunciated by
this Court in previous cases, among which is a case involving
herein private respondent.13
The only question that needs to be settled in the present
petition is whether herein respondent, a private person, may
be indicted for conspiracy in violating Section 3(g) of R.A.
3019 even if the public officer, with whom he was alleged to
have conspired, has died prior to the filing of the
Information.
Respondent contends that by reason of the death of
Secretary Enrile, there is no public officer who was charged
in the Information and, as such, prosecution against
respondent may not prosper.
The Court is not persuaded.
It is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile's death, there is
no longer any public officer with whom respondent can be
charged for violation of R.A. 3019. It does not mean,
however, that the allegation of conspiracy between them can
no longer be proved or that their alleged conspiracy is
already expunged. The only thing extinguished by the death
of Secretary Enrile is his criminal liability. His death did not
extinguish the crime nor did it remove the basis of the charge
of conspiracy between him and private respondent. Stated
differently, the death of Secretary Enrile does not mean that
there was no public officer who allegedly violated Section 3
(g) of R.A. 3019. In fact, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman
for Luzon found probable cause to indict Secretary Enrile for
infringement of Sections 3 (e) and (g) of R.A. 3019.14 Were it
not for his death, he should have been charged.
The requirement before a private person may be indicted for
violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, among others, is that
such private person must be alleged to have acted in
conspiracy with a public officer. The law, however, does not
require that such person must, in all instances, be indicted
together with the public officer. If circumstances exist where
the public officer may no longer be charged in court, as in the
present case where the public officer has already died, the
private person may be indicted alone.
Indeed, it is not necessary to join all alleged co-conspirators
in an indictment for conspiracy.15 If two or more persons
enter into a conspiracy, any act done by any of them
pursuant to the agreement is, in contemplation of law, the
act of each of them and they are jointly responsible
therefor.16 This means that everything said, written or done
by any of the conspirators in execution or furtherance of the
common purpose is deemed to have been said, done, or
written by each of them and it makes no difference whether
the actual actor is alive or dead, sane or insane at the time of
trial.17 The death of one of two or more conspirators does
not prevent the conviction of the survivor or
survivors.18 Thus, this Court held that:
x x x [a] conspiracy is in its nature a joint offense. One person
cannot conspire alone. The crime depends upon the joint act
or intent of two or more persons. Yet, it does not follow that
one person cannot be convicted of conspiracy. So long as the
acquittal or death of a co-conspirator does not remove the
bases of a charge for conspiracy, one defendant may be
found guilty of the offense.19
The Court agrees with petitioner's contention that, as
alleged in the Information filed against respondent, which is
deemed hypothetically admitted in the latter's Motion to
Quash, he (respondent) conspired with Secretary Enrile in
violating Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 and that in conspiracy,
the act of one is the act of all. Hence, the criminal liability
incurred by a co-conspirator is also incurred by the other co-
conspirators.
Moreover, the Court agrees with petitioner that the avowed
policy of the State and the legislative intent to repress "acts
of public officers and private persons alike, which constitute
graft or corrupt practices,"20 would be frustrated if the death
of a public officer would bar the prosecution of a private
person who conspired with such public officer in violating
the Anti-Graft Law.
In this regard, this Court's disquisition in the early case of
People v. Peralta21 as to the nature of and the principles
governing conspiracy, as construed under Philippine
jurisdiction, is instructive, to wit:
x x x A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to
an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and
decide to commit it. Generally, conspiracy is not a crime
except when the law specifically provides a penalty therefor
as in treason, rebellion and sedition. The crime of conspiracy
known to the common law is not an indictable offense in the
Philippines. An agreement to commit a crime is a
reprehensible act from the view-point of morality, but as
long as the conspirators do not perform overt acts in
furtherance of their malevolent design, the sovereignty of
the State is not outraged and the tranquility of the public
remains undisturbed.
However, when in resolute execution of a common scheme,
a felony is committed by two or more malefactors, the
existence of a conspiracy assumes pivotal importance in the
determination of the liability of the perpetrators. In
stressing the significance of conspiracy in criminal law, this
Court in U.S. vs. Infante and Barreto opined that
While it is true that the penalties cannot be imposed for the
mere act of conspiring to commit a crime unless the statute
specifically prescribes a penalty therefor, nevertheless the
existence of a conspiracy to commit a crime is in many cases
a fact of vital importance, when considered together with the
other evidence of record, in establishing the existence, of the
consummated crime and its commission by the conspirators.
Once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the
conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the
extent and character of their respective active participation
in the commission of the crime or crimes perpetrated in
furtherance of the conspiracy because in contemplation of
law the act of one is the act of all. The foregoing rule is
anchored on the sound principle that "when two or more
persons unite to accomplish a criminal object, whether
through the physical volition of one, or all, proceeding
severally or collectively, each individual whose evil will
actively contributes to the wrong-doing is in law responsible
for the whole, the same as though performed by himself
alone." Although it is axiomatic that no one is liable for acts
other than his own, "when two or more persons agree or
conspire to commit a crime, each is responsible for all the
acts of the others, done in furtherance of the agreement or
conspiracy." The imposition of collective liability upon the
conspirators is clearly explained in one case where this
Court held that x x x it is impossible to graduate the separate
liability of each (conspirator) without taking into
consideration the close and inseparable relation of each of
them with the criminal act, for the commission of which they
all acted by common agreement x x x. The crime must
therefore in view of the solidarity of the act and intent which
existed between the x x x accused, be regarded as the act of
the band or party created by them, and they are all equally
responsible x x x
Verily, the moment it is established that the malefactors
conspired and confederated in the commission of the felony
proved, collective liability of the accused conspirators
attaches by reason of the conspiracy, and the court shall not
speculate nor even investigate as to the actual degree of
participation of each of the perpetrators present at the scene
of the crime. Of course, as to any conspirator who was
remote from the situs of aggression, he could be drawn
within the enveloping ambit of the conspiracy if it be proved
that through his moral ascendancy over the rest of the
conspirators the latter were moved or impelled to carry out
the conspiracy.
In fine, the convergence of the wills of the conspirators in the
scheming and execution of the crime amply justifies the
imputation to all of them the act of any one of them. It is in
this light that conspiracy is generally viewed not as a
separate indictable offense, but a rule for collectivizing
criminal liability.
xxxx
x x x A time-honored rule in the corpus of our jurisprudence
is that once conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators who
acted in furtherance of the common design are liable as co-
principals. This rule of collective criminal liability emanates
from the ensnaring nature of conspiracy. The concerted
action of the conspirators in consummating their common
purpose is a patent display of their evil partnership, and for
the consequences of such criminal enterprise they must be
held solidarily liable.22
This is not to say, however, that private respondent should
be found guilty of conspiring with Secretary Enrile. It is
settled that the absence or presence of conspiracy is factual
in nature and involves evidentiary matters.23 Hence, the
allegation of conspiracy against respondent is better left
ventilated before the trial court during trial, where
respondent can adduce evidence to prove or disprove its
presence.
Respondent claims in his Manifestation and Motion24 as well
as in his Urgent Motion to Resolve25 that in a different case,
he was likewise indicted before the SB for conspiracy with
the late Secretary Enrile in violating the same Section 3 (g)
of R.A. 3019 by allegedly entering into another agreement
(Side Agreement) which is separate from the Concession
Agreement subject of the present case. The case was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 28091. Here, the SB, through
a Resolution, granted respondent's motion to quash the
Information on the ground that the SB has no jurisdiction
over the person of respondent. The prosecution questioned
the said SB Resolution before this Court via a petition for
review on certiorari. The petition was docketed as G.R. No.
168919. In a minute resolution dated August 31, 2005, this
Court denied the petition finding no reversible error on the
part of the SB. This Resolution became final and executory
on January 11, 2006. Respondent now argues that this
Court's resolution in G.R. No. 168919 should be applied in
the instant case.
The Court does not agree. Respondent should be reminded
that prior to this Court's ruling in G.R. No. 168919, he already
posted bail for his provisional liberty. In fact, he even filed a
Motion for Consolidation26 in Criminal Case No. 28091. The
Court agrees with petitioner's contention that private
respondent's act of posting bail and filing his Motion for
Consolidation vests the SB with jurisdiction over his person.
The rule is well settled that the act of an accused in posting
bail or in filing motions seeking affirmative relief is
tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of
the court.27
Thus, it has been held that:
When a defendant in a criminal case is brought before a
competent court by virtue of a warrant of arrest or
otherwise, in order to avoid the submission of his body to
the jurisdiction of the court he must raise the question of the
courts jurisdiction over his person at the very earliest
opportunity. If he gives bail, demurs to the complaint or files
any dilatory plea or pleads to the merits, he thereby gives the
court jurisdiction over his person. (State ex rel. John Brown
vs. Fitzgerald, 51 Minn., 534)
xxxx
As ruled in La Naval Drug vs. CA [236 SCRA 78, 86]:
"[L]ack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant may
be waived either expressly or impliedly. When a defendant
voluntarily appears, he is deemed to have submitted himself
to the jurisdiction of the court. If he so wishes not to waive
this defense, he must do so seasonably by motion for the
purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court;
otherwise, he shall be deemed to have submitted himself to
that jurisdiction."
Moreover, "[w]here the appearance is by motion for the
purpose of objecting to the jurisdiction of the court over the
person, it must be for the sole and separate purpose of
objecting to said jurisdiction. If the appearance is for any
other purpose, the defendant is deemed to have submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the court. Such an appearance
gives the court jurisdiction over the person."
Verily, petitioners participation in the proceedings before
the Sandiganbayan was not confined to his opposition to the
issuance of a warrant of arrest but also covered other
matters which called for respondent courts exercise of its
jurisdiction. Petitioner may not be heard now to deny said
courts jurisdiction over him. x x x.28
In the instant case, respondent did not make any special
appearance to question the jurisdiction of the SB over his
person prior to his posting of bail and filing his Motion for
Consolidation. In fact, his Motion to Quash the Information
in Criminal Case No. 28090 only came after the SB issued an
Order requiring the prosecution to show cause why the case
should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over his
person.
As a recapitulation, it would not be amiss to point out that
the instant case involves a contract entered into by public
officers representing the government. More importantly, the
SB is a special criminal court which has exclusive original
jurisdiction in all cases involving violations of R.A. 3019
committed by certain public officers, as enumerated in P.D.
1606 as amended by R.A. 8249. This includes private
individuals who are charged as co-principals, accomplices or
accessories with the said public officers. In the instant case,
respondent is being charged for violation of Section 3(g) of
R.A. 3019, in conspiracy with then Secretary Enrile. Ideally,
under the law, both respondent and Secretary Enrile should
have been charged before and tried jointly by the
Sandiganbayan. However, by reason of the death of the
latter, this can no longer be done. Nonetheless, for reasons
already discussed, it does not follow that the SB is already
divested of its jurisdiction over the person of and the case
involving herein respondent. To rule otherwise would mean
that the power of a court to decide a case would no longer be
based on the law defining its jurisdiction but on other
factors, such as the death of one of the alleged offenders.
Lastly, the issues raised in the present petition involve
matters which are mere incidents in the main case and the
main case has already been pending for over nine (9) years.
Thus, a referral of the case to the Regional Trial Court would
further delay the resolution of the main case and it would, by
no means, promote respondent's right to a speedy trial and
a speedy disposition of his case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of
the Sandiganbayan dated June 2, 2005, granting
respondent's Motion to Quash, is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Sandiganbayan is forthwith DIRECTED to
proceed with deliberate dispatch in the disposition of
Criminal Case No. 28090.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. Nos. 140576-99 December 13, 2004
JOSE S. RAMISCAL, JR., petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (Fourth Division),
ALBANO & ASSOCIATES and the ASSOCIATION OF
GENERALS & FLAG OFFICERS, INC., respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Revised Rules of Court, of the Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan, dated June 9, 1999 in Criminal Cases Nos.
25122 to 25145, and its Resolution dated October 22, 1999,
denying the motion for reconsideration thereof.
The Antecedents
The Armed Forces of the Philippines Retirement and
Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS) was established in
December 1973 and started its actual operations in 1976.
Created under Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 361, as
amended, the AFP-RSBS was designed to establish a
separate fund to guarantee continuous financial support to
the AFP military retirement system as provided for in
Republic Act No. 340.1 Under the decree, the AFP-RSBS was
to be funded from three principal sources: (a) congressional
appropriations and compulsory contributions from
members of the AFP; (2) donations, gifts, legacies, bequests
and others to the system; and (3) all earnings of the system
which shall not be subject to any tax whatsoever.2 AFP-RSBS
is a government-owned or controlled corporation (GOCC)
under Rep. Act No. 9182, otherwise known as "The Special
Purpose Vehicle Act of 2002." It is administered by the Chief
of Staff of the AFP through a Board of Trustees and
Management Group.3 Its funds are in the nature of public
funds.4
On December 18, 1997, Luwalhati R. Antonino, then a
member of the House of Representatives representing the
First District of the Province of South Cotabato, filed a
"Complaint-Affidavit"5 with the Office of the Ombudsman for
Mindanao. She alleged that anomalous real estate
transactions involving the Magsaysay Park at General Santos
City and questionable payments of transfer taxes prejudicial
to the government had been entertained into between
certain parties. She then requested the Ombudsman to
investigate the petitioner, Retired Brig. Gen. Jose S. Ramiscal,
Jr., then President of the AFP-RSBS,6 together with twenty-
seven (27) other persons7 for conspiracy in
misappropriating AFP-RSBS funds and in defrauding the
government millions of pesos in capital gains and
documentary stamp taxes.8
On January 28, 1999, after the requisite preliminary
investigation, Special Prosecutor Joy C. Rubillar-Arao filed
twenty-four (24) separate Informations with the
Sandiganbayan against the petitioner and several other
accused. The filing of the Informations was duly approved by
then Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto. The first twelve (12)
Informations were for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act
No. 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 25122 to
25133.9 All were similarly worded, except for the names of
the other accused, the dates of the commission of the offense,
and the property involved. Representative of the said
Informations is that filed in Criminal Case No. 25122, the
inculpatory portion of which reads:
That sometime on September 24, 1997, and prior, or
subsequent thereto, in General Santos City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused JOSE RAMISCAL, JR., a high
ranking public official being then the President, and
WILFREDO PABALAN, a low ranking public officer
being the Project Director, both of the AFP-RSBS,
while in the performance of their official duties,
taking advantage of their official positions and
committing the offense in relation to their offices,
conspiring together and confederating with NILO
FLAVIANO and ALEX GUAYBAR, both private
individuals, did, there and then, willfully, unlawfully
and criminally execute and/or cause the execution of
a falsified Deed of Sale covering Lot-X-4, a real
property located at General Santos City, by making it
appear therein that the purchase price of the said lot
is only TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED NINETY-
SEVEN THOUSAND (P2,997,000.00) PESOS
at P3,000.00 per square meter, when in truth and in
fact, as all the accused very well knew and, in fact,
agreed, that the same was sold for P10,500.00 per
square meter or a total of TEN MILLION FOUR
HUNDRED EIGHTY-NINE THOUSAND FIVE
HUNDRED (P10,489,500.00) PESOS, and use the said
falsified Deed of Sale as basis for payment of capital
gains and documentary stamp taxes relative to the
sale of the subject lot in the amount of
only P299,700.00 and P89,910.00, respectively,
when the capital gains, and documentary stamp and
other taxes should have been P524,475.00
and P157,342.50, respectively, thereby short-
changing and causing undue injury to the
government through evident bad faith and manifest
partiality in the total amount of TWO HUNDRED
NINETY-TWO THOUSAND TWO HUNDRED SEVEN
and 50/100 PESOS (P292,207.50), more or less.
CONTRARY TO LAW.10
On the other hand, twelve (12) other separate Informations
indicted the accused for Falsification of Public Documents,
defined and penalized under paragraph 4, Article 171 of the
Revised Penal Code, docketed therein as Criminal Cases Nos.
25134 to 25145.11 Save with respect to the names of the
other accused, the dates of the commission of the felonies,
and the property involved in each case, the Informations
were, likewise, similarly worded, representative of which is
that in Criminal Case No. 25134. The accusatory portion
reads:
That on or about September 24, 1997, and sometime
prior, or subsequent thereto, in General Santos City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, accused JOSE RAMISCAL, JR., a
high-ranking public official being then the President,
and WILFREDO PABALAN, a low-ranking public
officer being the Project Director, both of the AFP-
RSBS, while in the performance of their duties, taking
advantage of their official positions and committing
the offense in relation to their offices, conspiring and
confederating with each other and with accused NILO
FLAVIANO and JACK GUIWAN, both private
individuals, acting with unfaithfulness and with
malicious intent, did, there and then, willfully,
unlawfully and criminally falsify a public document
by executing and/or causing to be executed a Deed of
Sale for a 999-sq. m. property particularly identified
as Lot-X-5 located at General Santos City and stating
therein a purchase price of only P3,000.00 per square
meter or a total of TWO MILLION NINE HUNDRED
NINETY-SEVEN THOUSAND (P2,997,000.00) PESOS
when in truth and in fact, as all the accused very well
knew and, in fact, agreed, the purchase price of said
lot is P10,500.00 per square meter or a total of TEN
MILLION FOUR HUNDRED EIGHTY-NINE
THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED (P10,489,500.00)
PESOS, thereby perverting the truth.
CONTRARY TO LAW.12
On February 2, 1999, the petitioner filed an Urgent Motion
to Dismiss the Informations and to Defer the Issuance of
Warrant of Arrest, alleging want of jurisdiction.13 He,
likewise, filed an Urgent Manifestation and Motion to
Suspend Proceedings14 on February 16, 1999, because of the
pendency of his motion for reinvestigation with the Office of
the Ombudsman. The Office of the Special Prosecutor
opposed the said motions.15
Meanwhile, pending resolution of the aforementioned
motions, the law firm of Albano & Associates filed a "Notice
of Appearance"16 as private prosecutors in all the
aforementioned cases for the Association of Generals and
Flag Officers, Inc. (AGFOI)17 on March 9, 1999. The notice of
appearance was apparently made conformably to the letter-
request of Retired Commodore Ismael Aparri and Retired
Brig. Gen. Pedro Navarro, who are members thereof.
In a Resolution18 dated April 5, 1999, the Sandiganbayan
denied the earlier motions filed by the petitioner for lack of
merit. Consequently, a warrant of arrest against him was
issued.19 He posted a cash bail bond for his provisional
liberty.20
On April 6, 1999, the petitioner opposed the appearance of
the law firm of Albano & Associates as private prosecutors,
contending that the charges brought against him were
purely public crimes which did not involve damage or injury
to any private party; thus, no civil liability had arisen.21 He
argued that under Section 16 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure, "an offended party may be allowed to intervene
through a special prosecutor only in those cases where there
is civil liability arising from the criminal offense
charged."22 He maintained that if the prosecution were to be
allowed to prove damages, the prosecution would thereby
be proving another crime, in violation of his constitutional
right to be informed of the nature of the charge against him.
In its comment, the law firm contended that its clients,
Commodore Aparri and Brig. Gen. Navarro, were members
of the AGFOI and contributors of AFP-RSBS. It alleged that as
such members-contributors, they "have been disadvantaged
or deprived of their lawful investments and residual interest
at the AFP-RSBS" through the criminal acts of the petitioner
and his cohorts. It posited that its clients, not having waived
the civil aspect of the cases involved, have all the right to
intervene pursuant to Section 16, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court. Moreover, the law firm averred that its appearance
was in collaboration with the Office of the Ombudsman, and
that their intervention in any event, was subject to the
direction and control of the Office of the Special
Prosecutor.23
Replying to the comment, the petitioner refuted the
allegation of AGFOI that he had civil interest in the criminal
cases involved. He posited that AGFOI was neither a member
nor a beneficiary of the AFP-RSBS. Moreover, considering
that it was funded partly by the national government and
individual soldiers by way of salary deductions, the AGFOI
never contributed a single centavo to the funds of the AFP-
RSBS. He further averred that AGFOI, as an organization, has
a distinct personality of its own, apart from the individual
members who compose it.24 Hence, it is of no moment if
some members of AGFOI are or have been members and
beneficiaries of the AFP-RSBS.
Meanwhile, on June 6, 1999, the petitioner filed a "Motion for
Reinvestigation"25 with the Sandiganbayan, mentioning
therein his unresolved motion for reconsideration with the
Office of the Ombudsman. He prayed that the proceeding be
suspended and his arraignment deferred pending the
resolution of the reinvestigation.
The Sandiganbayan granted the motion in its Order dated
June 11, 1999. The fallo of the said resolution reads:
WHEREFORE, the prosecution is given 60 days from
today within which to elevate its evidence and to do
whatever is appropriate on the Motion for
 Reconsideration dated February 12, 1999 and
supplemental motion thereof dated May 28, 1999 of
accused Jose Ramiscal, Jr. and to inform this Court
within the said period as to its findings and
recommendations together with the action thereon
of the Ombudsman.
As prayed for in open court by Pros. Monteroso, this
authority from the Court for the prosecution to
evaluate its evidence and take such appropriate
action as regards accused Ramiscals subject motion
shall also include the case regarding all the accused.
SO ORDERED.26
In the meantime, in a Resolution27 dated June 9, 1999, the
Sandiganbayan made short shrift of the petitioners
opposition and denied his plea for the denial of the
appearance of the law firm.28 In justifying its resolution, the
Sandiganbayan declared as follows:
Considering that the offended parties are members of the
AFP-RSBS, as represented by the two (2) flag officers, and
their right may be affected by the action of the Court
resolving the criminal and civil aspects of the cases, there
appears a strong legal presumption that their appearance
should not be disturbed. After all, their appearance is subject
to the direct supervision and control of the public
prosecutor.29
The petitioner moved for a reconsideration30 of the
Sandiganbayans Resolution of June 9, 1999, which was
opposed31 by the prosecution. The Sandiganbayan issued a
Resolution32 denying the same on October 22, 1999.
The petitioner filed the instant petition under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure, for the nullification of the June 9,
1999 and October 22, 1999 Resolutions of the graft court,
and raised the following issues:
I
WHETHER OR NOT, BY NATURE, THE SUBJECT
CRIMINAL INDICTMENTS FOR VIOLATIONS OF
SECTION 3(E), REPUBLIC ACT NO. 3019 AND
ARTICLE 172, IN RELATION TO ARTICLE 171, OF
THE REVISED PENAL CODE GIVE RISE TO CIVIL
LIABILITY IN FAVOR OF ANY PRIVATE PARTY.
II
WHETHER OR NOT AGFOI AS REPRESENTED BY
ALBANO & ASSOCIATES ARE PRIVATE INJURED
PARTIES ENTITLED TO INTERVENE AS THE
PRIVATE PROSECUTOR IN THE SUBJECT CASES.33
In support of his petition, the petitioner reiterated the same
arguments he put forth before the Sandiganbayan.
The Special Prosecutor, for his part, avers that the remedy
resorted to by the petitioner under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Civil Procedure was improper since the assailed Resolutions
of the Sandiganbayan are interlocutory in nature and not
final; hence, the remedy of the petitioner was to file a
petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court. He also argues that the petition is premature
because the reinvestigation of the cases had not yet been
completed. On the merits of the petition, he posits that the
AGFOI is a member of the AFP-RSBS, and that its rights may
be affected by the outcome of the cases. He further alleged
that the appearance of the private prosecutor was subject to
the direct supervision and control of the public prosecutor.
The petitioner, however, asserts, by way of reply, that the
assailed orders of the Sandiganbayan are final orders; hence,
his recourse under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure
was proper.
The Ruling of the Court
The Assailed Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan
are Interlocutory in Nature
The word interlocutory refers to something intervening
between the commencement and the end of a suit which
decides some point or matter but is not a final decision of the
whole controversy. The Court distinguished a final order or
resolution from an interlocutory one in Investments, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals34 as follows:
A "final" judgment or order is one that finally
disposes of a case, leaving nothing more to be done
by the Court in respect thereto, e.g., an adjudication
on the merits which, on the basis of the evidence
presented at the trial, declares categorically what the
rights and obligations of the parties are and which
party is in the right; or a judgment or order that
dismisses an action on the ground, for instance, of res
adjudicata or prescription. Once rendered, the task of
the Court is ended, as far as deciding the controversy
or determining the rights and liabilities of the
litigants is concerned. Nothing more remains to be
done by the Court except to await the parties next
move (which, among others, may consist of the filing
of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, or the
taking of an appeal) and ultimately, of course, to
cause the execution of the judgment once it becomes
"final" or, to use the established and more distinctive
term, "final and executory."35
Conversely, an order that does not finally disposes of
the case, and does not end the Courts task of
adjudicating the parties contentions and
determining their rights and liabilities as regards
 each other, but obviously indicates that other things
remain to be done by the Court, is "interlocutory,"
e.g., an order denying a motion to dismiss under Rule
16 of the Rules, or granting a motion for extension of
time to file a pleading, or authorizing amendment
thereof, or granting or denying applications for
postponement, or production or inspection of
documents or things, etc. Unlike a "final" judgment or
order, which is appealable, as above pointed out, an
"interlocutory" order may not be questioned on
appeal except only as part of an appeal that may
eventually be taken from the final judgment rendered
in this case.36
The rule is founded on considerations of orderly procedure,
to forestall useless appeals and avoid undue inconvenience
to the appealing party by having to assail orders as they are
promulgated by the court, when all such orders may be
contested in a single appeal.37
Under Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, only final
judgments, orders or resolutions of the Court of Appeals or
Sandiganbayan may be assailed therein. The remedy is a
mode of appeal on questions of law only.38
In the present case, the Sandiganbayan merely resolved to
allow the appearance of the law firm of Albano & Associates
as private prosecutors, on its finding that the AGFOI,
represented by Commodore Aparri and Brig. Gen. Navarro
who were, likewise, investors/members of the AFP-RSBS, is
the offended party whose rights may be affected by the
prosecution of the criminal and civil aspects of the cases and
the outcome thereof. Furthermore, the private prosecutor is
subject to the direct supervision and control of the public
prosecutor. The Sandiganbayan did not dispose of the cases
on their merits, more specifically, the guilt or innocence of
the petitioner or the civil liabilities attendant to the
commission of the crimes charged. Assuming that the
Ombudsman would maintain the finding of probable cause
against the petitioner after the reinvestigation of the cases,
and, thereafter, the Sandiganbayan would sustain the
finding of probable cause against the petitioner and issue
warrants for his arrest, the graft court would then have to
proceed to trial, receive the evidence of the parties and
render judgment on the basis thereof. The petitioner would
then have the following options: (a) to proceed to trial, and,
if convicted, file a petition for review under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court to this Court; or (b) to file a petition for
certiorari, under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, to nullify the
resolutions of the Sandiganbayan on the ground of grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction in issuing the said resolutions and decision.
Nevertheless, in the interest of substantial justice, we shall
treat the petition as one filed under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court. Dismissal of appeal purely on technical grounds is
frowned upon where the policy of the courts is to encourage
hearings of appeal on their merits. The rules of procedure
ought not to be applied in a very rigid technical sense, as they
are used only to help secure, not override substantial justice. If
a technical and rigid enforcement of the rules is made, their
aim would be defeated. Consequently, in the interest of justice,
the instant petition for review may be treated as a special civil
action on certiorari.39 As we held in Salinas v. NLRC,40 a
petition which should have been brought under Rule 65 and
not under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, is not an inflexible
rule. The strict application of procedural technicalities
should not hinder the speedy disposition of the case on the
merits.41
Although there is no allegation in the petition at bar that the
Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of its discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction, nonetheless, the
petitioner made the following averments: that the graft
court arbitrarily declared the AGFOI to be the offended party
despite the plain language of the Informations and the
nature of the crimes charged; and that the graft court
blatantly violated basic procedural rules, thereby eschewing
the speedy and orderly trial in the above cases. He, likewise,
averred that the Sandiganbayan had no authority to allow
the entry of a party, through a private prosecutor, which has
no right to the civil liabilities of the accused arising from the
crimes charged, or where the accused has no civil liabilities
at all based on the nature of said crimes. The petitioner also
faulted the Sandiganbayan for rejecting his opposition
thereto, in gross violation of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure and the Revised Penal Code. Indeed, such
allegations are sufficient to qualify the petition as one under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. As we held in People v. Court of
Appeals:42
The public respondent acts without jurisdiction if it
does not have the legal power to determine the case;
there is excess of jurisdiction where the respondent,
being clothed with the power to determine the case,
oversteps its authority as determined by law. There
is grave abuse of discretion where the public
respondent acts in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary
or despotic manner in the exercise of its judgment as
to be said to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.43
Besides, unless we resolve the present petition on its merits,
other parties, like the private respondents herein, may,
likewise, enter their appearance as offended parties and
participate in criminal proceedings before the
Sandiganbayan.
The Appearance of the Law Firm Albano & Associates
The respondent law firm entered its appearance as private
prosecutor for AGFOI, purportedly upon the request of
Commodore Aparri and Brig. Gen. Navarro, quoted infra:
Atty. Antonio Albano
Practicing Lawyer
Albano-Irao Law Offices
 Dear Atty. Albano:
We represent a number of Retired Generals and other
Star Rank Officers who rightfully claim to have been
disadvantaged or deprived of our lawful investments
and residual interest at the Retirement Separation
Benefit System, AFP because of alleged plunder of the
Systems Funds, Large Scale Estafa and Falsification
of Public Documents.
We are requesting that you appear in our behalf as
private prosecutor of our case.
Thank you very much.
(Sgd.) COMMO. ISMAEL D. APARRI (RET)
(Sgd.) BGEN. PEDRO I. NAVARRO (RET)44
As gleaned from the letter-request, the legal services of the
respondent law firm were not engaged by the AGFOI itself; it
was Commodore Aparri and Brig. Gen. Navarro who did so,
for and in behalf of the other retired generals and star rank
officers claiming to have residual interests in or to be
investors of the AFP-RSBS, the vendee of the lots subject of
the Informations against the petitioner. Moreover, there is
no showing in the records that the Board of Directors of the
AGFOI, authorized them to engage the services of the
respondent law firm to represent it as private prosecutor in
the above cases. Neither is there any resolution on record
issued by the Board of Directors of the AGFOI authorizing
Commodore Aparri and Brig. Gen. Navarro to secure the
services of the respondent law firm to represent it as the
private prosecutor in said cases. If at all, the respondent law
firm is the counsel of Aparri and Navarro only.
The AGFOI and/or Commodore
Aparri and/or Brig. Gen.
Navarro Are Not the Offended
Parties in the Informations filed
Before the Sandiganbayan
The petitioner avers that the crimes charged are public
offenses and, by their very nature, do not give rise to
criminal liabilities in favor of any private party. He asserts
that, as gleaned from the Informations in Criminal Cases Nos.
25122 to 25133 for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No.
3019, the offended party is the government because based
on the deeds of sale executed in favor of the AFP-RSBS, as
vendee, it was deprived of capital gains and the
documentary stamp taxes. He contends that the
Informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 25134 to 25145, for
falsification of public document under paragraph 4, Article
171 of the Revised Penal Code, do not contain any allegation
that the AGFOI or any private party sustained any damage
caused by the said falsifications. The petitioner further
argues that absent any civil liability arising from the crimes
charged in favor of AGFOI, the latter cannot be considered
the offended party entitled to participate in the proceedings
before the Sandiganbayan. According to the petitioner, this
view conforms to Section 16, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure, which reads:
SEC. 16. Intervention of the offended party in criminal
action. Where the civil action for recovery of civil
liability is instituted in the criminal action pursuant
to Rule 111, the offended party may intervene by
counsel in the prosecution of the offense.
The petitioner posits that the AGFOI is not a member,
beneficiary or contributor of the AFP-RSBS, and that even if
it were so, it would not sustain a direct and material damage
by an adverse outcome of the cases. Allowing the AGFOI to
intervene would open the floodgates to any person similarly
situated to intervene in the proceedings and, thus, frustrate
the speedy, efficient and inexpensive disposition of the
cases.
In his Comment, the Special Prosecutor avers that the AGFOI
is entitled to intervene in the proceedings in the
Sandiganbayan because it is a member of the AFP-RSBS,
whose rights may be affected by the outcome of the cases.
The AGFOI and the respondent law firm contend that the
latter has a right to intervene, considering that such
intervention would enable the members of AGFOI to assert
their rights to information and access to the official records,
documents, and papers, a right granted by no less than
paragraph 7, Article IV of the 1987 Constitution.
Furthermore, the funds of the AFP-RSBS are impressed with
public character because the government provided for its
initial funds, augmented from time to time by the salary
contributions of the incumbent AFP soldiers and officers.
We agree with the contention of the petitioner that the
AGFOI, and even Commodore Aparri and Brig. Gen. Navarro,
are not the offended parties envisaged in Section 16, Rule
110, in relation to Section 1, Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
Under Section 5, Rule 11045 of the Rules, all criminal actions
covered by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted
under the direct supervision and control of the public
prosecutor. Thus, even if the felonies or delictual acts of the
accused result in damage or injury to another, the civil action
for the recovery of civil liability based on the said criminal
acts is impliedly instituted46 and the offended party has not
waived the civil action, reserved the right to institute it
separately or instituted the civil action prior to the criminal
action, the prosecution of the action inclusive of the civil
action remains under the control and supervision of the
public prosecutor.47 The prosecution of offenses is a public
function.48 Under Section 16, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the offended party may intervene in the
criminal action personally or by counsel, who will act as
private prosecutor for the protection of his interests and in
the interest of the speedy and inexpensive administration of
justice. A separate action for the purpose would only prove
to be costly, burdensome and time-consuming for both
parties and further delay the final disposition of the case.
The multiplicity of suits must be avoided.49 With the implied
institution of the civil action in the criminal action, the two
actions are merged into one composite proceeding, with the
criminal action predominating the civil. The prime purpose
of the criminal action is to punish the offender in order to
deter him and others from committing the same or similar
offense, to isolate him from society, reform and rehabilitate
him or, in general, to maintain social order.
On the other hand, the sole purpose of the civil action is for
the resolution, reparation or indemnification of the private
offended party for the damage or injury he sustained by
reason of the delictual or felonious act of the
accused.50 Under Article 104 of the Revised Penal Code, the
following are the civil liabilities of the accused:
ART. 104. What is included in civil liability. The civil
liability established in Articles 100, 101, 102 and 103
of this Code includes:
1. Restitution;
2. Reparation of the damage caused;
3. Indemnification for consequential damages.
Thus, when the offended party, through counsel, has
asserted his right to intervene in the proceedings, it is error
to consider his appearance merely as a matter of tolerance.51
The offended party may be the State or any of its
instrumentalities, including local governments or
government-owned or controlled corporations, such as the
AFP-RSBS, which, under substantive laws, are entitled to
restitution of their properties or funds, reparation, or
indemnification. For instance, in malversation of public
funds or property under Article 21752 of the Revised Penal
Code, frauds under Article 21353 of the Revised Penal Code,
and violations of the Forestry Code of the Philippines, P.D.
No. 705, as amended, to mention a few, the government is
the offended party entitled to the civil liabilities of the
accused. For violations of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No.
3019,54 any party, including the government, may be the
offended party if such party sustains undue injury caused by
the delictual acts of the accused. In such cases, the
government is to be represented by the public prosecutor
for the recovery of the civil liability of the accused.
Under Section 16, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, the offended party may also be a private
individual whose person, right, house, liberty or property
was actually or directly injured by the same punishable act
or omission of the accused,55 or that corporate entity which
is damaged or injured by the delictual acts complained of.
Such party must be one who has a legal right; a substantial
interest in the subject matter of the action as will entitle him
to recourse under the substantive law, to recourse if the
evidence is sufficient or that he has the legal right to the
demand and the accused will be protected by the satisfaction
of his civil liabilities. Such interest must not be a mere
expectancy, subordinate or inconsequential. The interest of
the party must be personal; and not one based on a desire to
vindicate the constitutional right of some third and
unrelated party.56
Hence, even if the members of AGFOI may also be members
or beneficiaries of the AFP-RSBS, the respondent AGFOI does
not have a legal right to intervene in the criminal cases
merely and solely to enforce and/or protect the
constitutional right of such members to have access to the
records of AFP-RSBS. Neither are such members entitled to
intervene therein simply because the funds of the AFP-RSBS
are public or government funds. It must be stressed that any
interest of the members of the AFP-RSBS over its funds or
property is merely inchoate and incidental. Such funds
belong to the AFP-RSBS which has a juridical personality
separate and independent of its members/beneficiaries.
As gleaned from the Informations in Criminal Cases Nos.
25122 to 25133 for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No.
3019, the offended party is the government, which was
allegedly deprived by the petitioner and the other accused of
the capital gains and documentary stamp taxes, based on the
actual and correct purchase price of the property stated
therein in favor of the AFP-RSBS. The AGFOI was not
involved whatsoever in the sales subject of the crimes
charged; neither was it prejudiced by the said transactions,
nor is it entitled to the civil liability of the petitioner for said
cases. Thus, it is not the offended party in the said cases.
We agree with the petitioner that the AGFOI is not even the
offended party in Criminal Cases Nos. 25134 to 25145 for
falsification of public documents under paragraph 4, Sec. 1,
Article 171, of the Revised Penal Code. It bears stressing that
in the felony of falsification of public document, the
existence of any prejudice caused to third person or the
intent to cause damage, at the very least, becomes
immaterial. The controlling consideration is the public
character of a document and the violation of the public faith
and the destruction of truth therein solemnly proclaimed.
The offender does not, in any way, have civil liability to a
third person.57
However, if, in a deed of sale, the real property covered
thereby is underpriced by a public officer and his co-
conspirators to conceal the correct amount of capital gains
and documentary stamp taxes due on the sale causing undue
injury to the government, the offenders thereby commit two
crimes (a) falsification of public document defined in
paragraph 4, Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code; and (b)
violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, a special penal
law. The offender incurs civil liability to the government as
the offended party for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act
No. 3019, but not for falsification of public document under Republic of the Philippines
paragraph 4, Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code. SUPREME COURT
Manila
On the other hand, if, under the deed of sale, the AFP-RSBS
was made liable for the payment of the capital gains and EN BANC
documentary stamp taxes and, thereafter, gave the correct
amount thereof to the petitioner to be paid to the G.R. No. 154473 April 24, 2009
government, and the petitioner and his co-accused pocketed
the difference between the correct amount of taxes and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and PHOTOKINA
amount entrusted for payment, then the AFP-RSBS may be MARKETING CORPORATION, Petitioners,
considered the offended party entitled to intervene in the vs.
above criminal cases, through the Government Corporate ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO, Respondent.
Counsel.58
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
In fine, the AGFOI is not the offended party entitled to
G.R. No. 155573 April 24, 2009
intervene in said cases.
PHOTOKINA MARKETING CORPORATION, Petitioner,
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition
vs.
is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan
ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO, Respondent.
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. No costs.
DECISION
SO ORDERED.
NACHURA, J.:

Before the Court are two consolidated petitions for review

on certiorari filed under Rules 45 and 122 of the Rules of
Court: (1) G.R. No. 154473 assailing the June 18, 20021 and
the June 23, 20022 Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Quezon City, Branch 102 in Criminal Case No. Q-02-
109407; and (2) G.R. No. 155573 challenging the June 25,
20023 and the September 18, 20024 Orders of the RTC of
Quezon City, Branch 101 in Criminal Case No. Q-02-109406.
The petitions, while involving the same issues, rest on
different factual settings, thus:
G.R. No. 154473
On January 31, 2002, respondent Alfredo L. Benipayo, then
Chairman of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC),
delivered a speech in the "Forum on Electoral Problems:
Roots and Responses in the Philippines" held at the Balay
Kalinaw, University of the Philippines-Diliman Campus,
Quezon City.5 The speech was subsequently published in the
February 4 and 5, 2002 issues of the Manila Bulletin.6
Petitioner corporation, believing that it was the one alluded
to by the respondent when he stated in his speech that
Even worse, the Commission came right up to the brink of
signing a 6.5 billion contract for a registration solution that
could have been bought for 350 million pesos, and an ID
solution that isnt even a requirement for voting. But reason
intervened and no contract was signed. Now, they are at it
again, trying to hoodwink us into contract that is so grossly
disadvantageous to the government that it offends common
sense to say that it would be worth the 6.5 billion-peso price
tag.7
filed, through its authorized representative, an Affidavit-
Complaint8 for libel.
Arguing that he was an impeachable officer, respondent
questioned the jurisdiction of the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City (OCP-QC).9 Despite the challenge,
the City Prosecutor filed an Information10 for libel against
the respondent, docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-02-
109407, with the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 102.
Petitioner later filed a Motion for Inhibition and
Consolidation,11 contending that Judge Jaime N. Salazar of
Branch 102 could not impartially preside over the case
because his appointment to the judiciary was made possible
through the recommendation of respondents father-in-law.
Petitioner further moved that the case be ordered
consolidated with the other libel case [Criminal Case No. Q-
02-103406, which is the subject of G.R. No. 155573] pending
with Branch 101 of the RTC.
While the said motion remained unresolved, respondent, for
his part, moved for the dismissal of the case on the assertion
that the trial court had no jurisdiction over his person for he
was an impeachable officer and thus, could not be criminally
prosecuted before any court during his incumbency; and
that, assuming he can be criminally prosecuted, it was the
Office of the Ombudsman that should investigate him and
the case should be filed with the Sandiganbayan.12
On June 18, 2002, the trial court issued the challenged
Order13 dismissing Criminal Case No. Q-02-109407 and
considering as moot and academic petitioners motion to
inhibit. While the RTC found that respondent was no longer
an impeachable officer because his appointment was not
confirmed by Congress, it ruled that the case had to be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction considering that the alleged
libel was committed by respondent in relation to his office
he delivered the speech in his official capacity as COMELEC
Chair. Accordingly, it was the Sandiganbayan that had
jurisdiction over the case to the exclusion of all other courts.
On motion for reconsideration, the trial court adhered to its
ruling that it was not vested with jurisdiction to hear the
libel case.14
Aggrieved, petitioners timely filed before the Court, on pure
questions of law, the instant Petition for Review on
Certiorari15 under Rule 122 in relation to Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court raising the following grounds:
I. THE TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE FIRST RESOLVED THE
MOTION TO INHIBIT BEFORE RESOLVING THE MOTION TO
DISMISS;
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CRIME
OF LIBEL IN THIS CASE WAS COMMITTED BY ACCUSED "IN
RELATION TO HIS OFFICE;" AND
III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT IT HAD NO
JURISDICTION IN THIS CASE.16
G.R. No. 155573
On March 13, 2002, respondent, as COMELEC Chair, and
COMELEC Commissioner Luzviminda Tangcangco were
guests of the talk show "Point Blank," hosted by Ces Drilon
and televised nationwide on the ANC-23 channel. The
television shows episode that day was entitled "COMELEC
Wars."17 In that episode, the following conversation
transpired:
Drilon: Are you saying, Chairman, that COMELEC funds are
being used for a "PR" campaign against you? Is that what you
are saying?
Benipayo: No, I think [its] not COMELEC funds, [its]
Photokina funds. You know, admittedly, according to
[c]harg d[a]ffaires of the U.S. Embassy[,] in a letter sent to
me in July of 2001, it is whats been [so] happening to the
Photokina deal, they have already spent in excess of 2.4
[m]illion U.S. [d]ollars. At that time[,] thats about 120
[m]illion pesos and I said, what for[?] [T]hey wouldnt tell
me, you see. Now you asked me, [who is] funding this? I think
its pretty obvious.18
Petitioner considered respondents statement as
defamatory, and, through its authorized representative, filed
a Complaint-Affidavit19 for libel. Respondent similarly
questioned the jurisdiction of the OCP-QC.20 The City
Prosecutor, however, consequently instituted Criminal Case
No. Q-02-109406 by filing the corresponding
Information21 with the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 101.
Respondent also moved for the dismissal of the information
raising similar arguments that the court had no jurisdiction
over his person, he being an impeachable officer; and that,
even if criminal prosecution were possible, jurisdiction
rested with the Sandiganbayan.22
On June 25, 2002, the trial court issued the assailed
Order23 dismissing Criminal Case No. Q-02-109406 for lack
of jurisdiction over the person of the respondent. The RTC,
in the further assailed September 18, 2002 Order,24 denied
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.25
Displeased with the rulings of the trial court, petitioners
seasonably filed before this Court, on pure questions of law,
another Petition for Review on Certiorari26 under Rule 122
in relation to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising the
following grounds:
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CRIME
OF LIBEL IN THIS CASE WAS COMMITTED BY RESPONDENT
"IN RELATION TO HIS OFFICE"; AND
II. IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY ALLEGATION IN THE
INFORMATION THAT THE CRIME OF LIBEL WAS
COMMITTED BY RESPONDENT IN RELATION TO HIS
OFFICE, THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT IT HAD
NO JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE BELOW.
III. EVEN ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT THE
SANDIGANBAYAN HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE, THE
TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE ENDORSED THE CASE TO THE
SANDIGANBAYAN INSTEAD OF DISMISSING IT
OUTRIGHT. 27
Considering that the two petitions, as aforesaid, involve the
same issues and the same parties, the Court, upon the
recommendation of the Clerk of Court,28 consolidated the
cases.29
The core issue for the resolution of the Court in these twin
cases is whether the RTC has jurisdiction over libel cases to
the exclusion of all other courts.
The Ruling of the Court
The Court observes that the parties have argued at length in
their pleadings on the issue of whether the alleged criminal
acts of respondent are committed in relation to his office.
They are of the conviction that the resolution of the said
question will ultimately determine which courtthe RTC or
the Sandiganbayanhas jurisdiction over the criminal cases
filed. The Court, however, notes that both parties are
working on a wrong premise. The foremost concern, which
the parties, and even the trial court, failed to identify, is
whether, under our current laws, jurisdiction over libel
cases, or written defamations to be more specific, is shared
by the RTC with the Sandiganbayan. Indeed, if the said courts
do not have concurrent jurisdiction to try the offense, it
would be pointless to still determine whether the crime is
committed in relation to office.
Uniformly applied is the familiar rule that the jurisdiction of
the court to hear and decide a case is conferred by the law in
force at the time of the institution of the action, unless a
latter statute provides for a retroactive application
thereof.30 Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC),31 as
amended by Republic Act No. 4363,32 is explicit on which
court has jurisdiction to try cases of written defamations,
thus:
The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written
defamations as provided for in this chapter, shall be filed
simultaneously or separately with the court of first
instance [now, the Regional Trial Court] of the province or
city where the libelous article is printed and first published
or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the
time of the commission of the offense xxx.33 [Underscoring
and italics ours.]1avvphi1.zw+
More than three decades ago, the Court, in Jalandoni v.
Endaya,34 acknowledged the unmistakable import of the
said provision:
There is no need to make mention again that it is a court of
first instance [now, the Regional Trial Court] that is
specifically designated to try a libel case. Its language is
categorical; its meaning is free from doubt. This is one of
those statutory provisions that leave no room for
interpretation. All that is required is application. What the
law ordains must then be followed.35
This exclusive and original jurisdiction of the RTC over
written defamations is echoed in Bocobo v.
Estanislao,36where the Court further declared that
jurisdiction remains with the trial court even if the libelous
act is committed "by similar means,"37 and despite the fact
that the phrase "by similar means" is not repeated in the
latter portion of Article 360.38 In these cases, and in those
that followed, the Court had been unwavering in its
pronouncement that the expanded jurisdiction of the
municipal trial courts cannot be exercised over libel cases.
Thus, in Manzano v. Hon. Valera,39 we explained at length
that:
The applicable law is still Article 360 of the Revised Penal
Code, which categorically provides that jurisdiction over
libel cases [is] lodged with the Courts of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Courts).
This Court already had the opportunity to rule on the matter
in G.R. No. 123263, People vs. MTC of Quezon City, Branch 32
and Isah v. Red wherein a similar question of jurisdiction
over libel was raised. In that case, the MTC judge opined that
it was the first level courts which had jurisdiction due to the
enactment of RA 7691. Upon elevation of the matter to us,
respondent judges orders were nullified for lack of
jurisdiction, as follows:
"WHEREFORE, the petition is granted: the respondent
Courts Orders dated August 14, 1995, September 7, 1995,
and October 18, 1995 are declared null and void for having
been issued without jurisdiction; and said Court is enjoined
from further taking cognizance of and proceeding with
Criminal Case No. 43-00548, which it is commanded to
remand to the Executive Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City for proper disposition."
Another case involving the same question was cited as
resolving the matter:
"Anent the question of jurisdiction, we ** find no reversible
error committed by public respondent Court of Appeals in
denying petitioners motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction. The contention ** that R.A. 7691 divested the
Regional Trial Courts of jurisdiction to try libel cases cannot
be sustained. While libel is punishable by imprisonment of
six months and one day to four years and two months (Art.
360, Revised Penal Code) which imposable penalty is lodged
within the Municipal Trial Courts jurisdiction under R.A. No.
7691 (Sec. 32 [2]), said law however, excludes therefrom **
cases falling within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Regional Trial Courts **. The Court in Bocobo vs. Estanislao,
72 SCRA 520 and Jalandoni vs. Endaya, 55 SCRA 261,
correctly cited by the Court of Appeals, has laid down the
rule that Regional Trial courts have the exclusive
jurisdiction over libel cases, hence, the expanded
jurisdiction conferred by R.A. 7691 to inferior courts cannot
be applied to libel cases."
Conformably with [these] rulings, we now hold that public
respondent committed an error in ordering that the criminal
case for libel be tried by the MTC of Bangued.
For, although RA 7691 was enacted to decongest the clogged
dockets of the Regional Trail Courts by expanding the
jurisdiction of first level courts, said law is of a general
character. Even if it is a later enactment, it does not alter the
provision of Article 360 of the RPC, a law of a special nature.
"Laws vesting jurisdiction exclusively with a particular
court, are special in character, and should prevail over the
Judiciary Act defining the jurisdiction of other courts (such
as the Court of First Instance) which is a general law." A later
enactment like RA 7691 does not automatically override an
existing law, because it is a well-settled principle of
construction that, in case of conflict between a general law
and a special law, the latter must prevail regardless of the
dates of their enactment. Jurisdiction conferred by a special
law on the RTC must therefore prevail over that granted by Lastly, in Administrative Order No. 104-96 issued 21
a general law on the MTC. October 1996, this Court delineated the proper jurisdiction
over libel cases, hence settled the matter with finality:
Moreover, from the provisions of R.A. 7691, there seems to
be no manifest intent to repeal or alter the jurisdiction in "RE: DESIGNATION OF SPECIAL COURTS FOR KIDNAPPING,
libel cases. If there was such intent, then the amending law ROBBERY, CARNAPPING, DANGEROUS DRUGS CASES AND
should have clearly so indicated because implied repeals are OTHER HEINOUS CRIMES; INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
not favored. As much as possible, effect must be given to all RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND JURISDICTION IN LIBEL CASES.
enactments of the legislature. A special law cannot be
repealed, amended or altered by a subsequent general law xxxx
by mere implication. Furthermore, for an implied repeal, a
pre-condition must be found, that is, a substantial conflict C
should exist between the new and prior laws. Absent an
"LIBEL CASES SHALL BE TRIED BY THE REGIONAL TRIAL
express repeal, a subsequent law cannot be construed as
COURTS HAVING JURISDICTION OVER THEM TO THE
repealing a prior one unless an irreconcilable inconsistency
EXCLUSION OF THE METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURTS,
or repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and old laws.
MUNICIPAL TRIAL COURTS IN CITIES, MUNICIPAL TRIAL
The two laws, in brief, must be absolutely incompatible. In
COURTS AND MUNICIPAL CIRCUIT TRIAL COURTS."
the law which broadened the jurisdiction of the first level
(Underscoring supplied)40
courts, there is no absolute prohibition barring Regional
Trial Courts from taking cognizance of certain cases over
As we have constantly held in Jalandoni, Bocobo, People v.
which they have been priorly granted special and exclusive
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Br. 32,41Manzano,
jurisdiction. Such grant of the RTC (previously CFI) was
and analogous cases, we must, in the same way, declare
categorically contained in the first sentence of the amended
herein that the law, as it still stands at present, dictates that
Sec. 32 of B.P. 129. The inconsistency referred to in Section
criminal and civil actions for damages in cases of written
6 of RA 7691, therefore, does not apply to cases of criminal
defamations shall be filed simultaneously or separately with
libel.
the RTC to the exclusion of all other courts. A subsequent
enactment of a law defining the jurisdiction of other courts
cannot simply override, in the absence of an express repeal
or modification, the specific provision in the RPC vesting in WHEREFORE, premises considered, the consolidated
the RTC, as aforesaid, jurisdiction over defamations in petitions for review on certiorari are GRANTED. Criminal
writing or by similar means.42The grant to the Cases Nos. Q-02-109406 and Q-02-109407 are REINSTATED
Sandiganbayan43 of jurisdiction over offenses committed in and REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City
relation to (public) office, similar to the expansion of the for further proceedings.
jurisdiction of the MTCs, did not divest the RTC of its
exclusive and original jurisdiction to try written defamation SO ORDERED.
cases regardless of whether the offense is committed in
relation to office. The broad and general phraseology of
Section 4, Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by
TOPIC: ON JURISDICTION C. SANDIGANBAYAN: Original
Republic Act No. 8249,44 cannot be construed to have
and Exclusive Jurisdiction (c. How was the offense or crime
impliedly repealed, or even simply modified, such exclusive
committed)
and original jurisdiction of the RTC.45
Republic of the Philippines
Since jurisdiction over written defamations exclusively rests
SUPREME COURT
in the RTC without qualification, it is unnecessary and futile
Manila
for the parties to argue on whether the crime is committed
in relation to office. Thus, the conclusion reached by the trial
EN BANC
court that the respondent committed the alleged libelous
acts in relation to his office as former COMELEC chair, and G.R. No. 128096 January 20, 1999
deprives it of jurisdiction to try the case, is, following the
above disquisition, gross error. This Court, therefore, orders PANFILO M. LACSON, petitioner, vs.
the reinstatement of Criminal Cases Nos. Q-02-109406 and
Q-02-109407 and their remand to the respective Regional THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SANDIGANBAYAN,
Trial Courts for further proceedings. Having said that, the OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, THE
Court finds unnecessary any further discussion of the other DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MYRNA ABALORA, NENITA
issues raised in the petitions. ALAP-AP, IMELDA PANCHO MONTERO, and THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
ROMEO M. ACOP AND FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA,
JR., petitioner-intervenors.
MARTINEZ, J.:
The constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of Republic Act No.
8249 an act which further defines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan is being challenged in this petition for
prohibition and mandamus. Petitioner Panfilo Lacson, joined
by petitioners-intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco
Zubia, Jr., also seeks to prevent the Sandiganbayan from
proceedings with the trial of Criminal Cases Nos. 23047-
23057 (for multiple murder) against them on the ground of
lack of jurisdiction.
The antecedents of this case, as gathered from the parties'
pleadings and documentary proofs, are as follows:
In the early morning of May 18, 1995, eleven (11) persons
believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang,
reportedly an organized crime syndicate which had been
involved in a spate of bank robberies in Metro Manila, where
slain along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City by
elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task
Group (ABRITG) headed by Chieff Superintendent Jewel
Canson of the Philippine National Police (PNP). The ABRITG
was composed of police officers from the Traffic
Management Command (TMC) led by petitioner-intervenor
Senior Superintendent Francisco Zubia, Jr.; Presidential
Anti-Crime Commission Task Force Habagat (PACC-TFH)
headed by petitioner Chief Superintendent Panfilo M.
Lacson; Central Police District Command (CPDC) led by Chief
Superintendent Ricardo de Leon; and the Criminal
Investigation Command (CIC) headed by petitioner-
intervenor Chief Superintendent Romeo Acop.
Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a
member of the CIC, that what actually transpired at dawn of
May 18, 1995 was a summary execution (or a rub out) and
not a shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng gang
members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desierto
formed a panel of investigators headed by the Deputy
Ombudsman for Military Affairs, Bienvenido Blancaflor, to
investigate the incident. This panel later absolved from any
criminal liability all the PNP officers and personal allegedly
involved in May 18, 1995 incident, with a finding that the
said incident was a legitimate police operation.1
However, a review board led by Overall Deputy Ombudsman
Francisco Villa modified modified the Blancaflor panel's
finding and recommended the indictment for multiple
murder against twenty-six (26) respondents, including
herein petitioner and intervenors. The recommendation was
approved by the Ombudsman except for the withdrawal of
the charges against Chief Supt. Ricardo de Leon.
Thus, on November 2, 1995, petitioner Panfilo Lacson was
among those charged as principal in eleven (11) information
for murder2 before the Sandiganbayan's Second Division,
while intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. were
among those charged in the same informations as
accessories after-in-the-fact.
Upon motion by all the accused in the 11 information,3 the
Sandiganbayan allowed them to file a motion for
reconsideration of the Ombudsman's action.4
After conducting a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed on
March 1, 1996 eleven (11) amended informations5before
the Sandiganbayan, wherein petitioner was charged only as
an accessory, together with Romeo Acop and Francisco
Zubia, Jr. and other. One of the accused6 was dropped from
the case.
On March 5-6, 1996, all the accused filed separate motions
questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting
that under the amended informations, the cases fall within
the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to
Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of Republic Act No.
7975.7 They contend that the said law limited the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or
more of the "principal accused" are government officials
with Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher, or PNP officials with the
rank of Chief Superintendent (Brigadier General) or higher.
The highest ranking principal accused in the amended
informations has the rank of only a Chief Inspector, and none
has the equivalent of at least SG 27.
Thereafter, in a Resolution 8 dated May 8, 1996
(promulgated on May 9, 1996), penned by Justice
Demetriou, with Justices Lagman and de Leon concurring,
and Justices Balajadia and Garchitorena dissenting,9 the
Sandiganbayan admitted the amended information and
ordered the cases transferred to the Quezon City Regional
Trial Court which has original and exclusive jurisdiction
under R.A. 7975, as none of the principal accused has the
rank of Chief Superintendent or higher.
On May 17, 1996, the Office of the Special Prosecutor moved
for a reconsideration, insisting that the cases should remain
with the Sandiganbayan. This was opposed by petitioner and
some of the accused.
While these motions for reconsideration were pending
resolution, and even before the issue of jurisdiction cropped
up with the filing of the amended informations on March 1,
1996, House Bill No. 229910 and No. 109411 (sponsored by
Representatives Edcel C. Lagman and Lagman and Neptali M.
Gonzales II, respectively), as well as Senate Bill No.
84412 (sponsored by Senator Neptali Gonzales), were
introduced in Congress, defining expanding the jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan. Specifically, the said bills sought,
among others, to amend the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan by deleting the word "principal" from the
phrase "principal accused" in Section 2 (paragraphs a and c)
of R.A. No. 7975.
These bills were consolidated and later approved into law as
R.A. No. 824913 by the President of the Philippines on
February 5, 1997.
Subsequently, on March 5, 1997, the Sandiganbayan
promulgated a Resolution14 denying the motion for
reconsideration of the Special Prosecutor, ruling that it
"stands pat in its resolution dated May 8, 1996."
On the same day15 the Sandiganbayan issued and
ADDENDUM to its March 5, 1997 Resolution, the pertinent
portion of which reads:
After Justice Lagman wrote the Resolution
and Justice Demetriou concurred in it, but
before Justice de Leon. Jr. rendered his
concurring and dissenting opinion, the
legislature enacted Republic Act 8249 and the
President of the Philippines approved it on
February 5, 1997. Considering the pertinent
provisions of the new law, Justices Lagman
and Demetriou are now in favor of granting, as
they are now granting, the Special
Prosecutor's motion for reconsideration.
Justice de Leon has already done so in his
concurring and dissenting opinion.
xxx xxx xxx
Considering that three of the accused in each
of these cases are PNP Chief Superintendents:
namely, Jewel T. Canson, Romeo M. Acop and
Panfilo M. Lacson, and that trial has not yet
begun in all these cases in fact, no order of
arrest has been issued this court has
competence to take cognizance of these cases.
To recapitulate, the net result of all the
foregoing is that by the vote of 3 of 2, the court
admitted the Amended Informations in these
cases by the unanimous vote of 4 with 1
neither concurring not dissenting, retained
jurisdiction to try and decide the
cases16 (Empahasis supplied)
Petitioner now questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of
R.A. No. 8249, including Section 7 thereof which provides
that the said law "shall apply to all cases pending in any court
over which trial has not begun as to the approval hereof."
Petitioner argues that:
a) The questioned provisions of the statute
were introduced by the authors thereof in bad
faith as it was made to precisely suit the
situation in which petitioner's cases were in at
the Sandiganbayan by restoring jurisdiction
thereof to it, thereby violating his right to
procedural due process and the equal
protection clause of the Constitution. Further,
from the way the Sandiganbayan has foot-
dragged for nine (9) months the resolution of
a pending incident involving the transfer of
the cases to the Regional Trial Court, the
passage of the law may have been timed to
overtake such resolution to render the issue
therein moot, and frustrate the exercise of
petitioner's vested rights under the old
Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975)
b) Retroactive application of the law is plan
from the fact that it was again made to suit the
peculiar circumstances in which petitioner's
cases were under, namely, that the trial had
not yet commenced, as provided in Section 7,
to make certain that those cases will no longer
be remanded to the Quezon City Regional
Trial Court, as the Sandiganbayan alone
should try them, thus making it an ex post
factolegislation and a denial of the right of
petitioner as an accused in Criminal Case Nos.
23047-23057 to procedural due process.
c) The title of the law is misleading in that it
contains the aforesaid "innocuous" provisions
in Sections 4 and 7 which actually expands
rather than defines the old Sandiganbayan law
(RA 7975), thereby violating the one-title one-
subject requirement for the passage of
statutes under Section 26 (1), Article VI of the
Constitution.17
For their part, the intervenors, in their petition-in-
intervention, add that "while Republic Act No. 8249
innocuously appears to have merely expanded the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the introduction of
Section 4 and 7 in said statute impressed upon it the
character of a class legislation and an ex-post facto statute
intended to apply specifically to the accused in the Kuratong
Baleleng case pending before the Sandiganbayan.18 They
further argued that if their case is tried before the
Sandiganbayan their right to procedural due process would
be violated as they could no longer avail of the two-tiered
appeal to the Sandiganbayan, which they acquired under
R.A. 7975, before recourse to the Supreme Court.
Both the Office of the Ombudsman and the Solicitor-General
filed separate pleadings in support of the constitutionality of
the challenged provisions of the law in question and praying
that both the petition and the petition-in-intervention be
dismissed.
This Court then issued a Resolution19 requiring the parties
to file simultaneously within a nonextendible period of ten
(10) days from notice thereof additional memoranda on the
question of whether the subject amended informations filed
a Criminal Case Nos. 23047-23057 sufficiently allege the
commission by the accused therein of the crime charged
within the meaning Section 4 b of Republic Act No. 8249, so
as to bring the said cases within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The parties, except for the Solicitor General who is
representing the People of the Philippines, filed the required
supplemental memorandum within the nonextendible
reglementary period.
The established rule is that every law has in its favor the
presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its
nullification there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of
the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative
one. 20 The burden of proving the invalidity of the law lies
with those who challenge it. That burden, we regret to say,
was not convincingly discharged in the present case.
The creation of the Sandiganbayn was mandated in Section
5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 5. The Batasang Pambansa shall create a
special court, to be known as Sandiganbayan,
which shall have jurisdiction over criminal
and civil cases involving graft and corrupt
practices and such other offenses committed
by public officers and employees including
those in government-owned or controlled
corporations, in relation to their office as may
be determined by law.
The said special court is retained in the new (1987)
Constitution under the following provisions in Article XI,
Section 4:
Sec. 4. The present anti-graft court known as
the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function
and exercise its jurisdiction as now or
hereafter may be provided by law.
Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, Presidential Decree
No. 148621 created the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, the
following laws on the Sandiganbayan, in chronological
order, were enacted: P.D. No. 1606,22 Section 20 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 123,23 P.D. No. 1860,24 P.D. No. 1861,25 R.A.
No. 7975, 26 and R.A. No. 8249.27 Under the latest
amendments introduced by Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following cases:
Sec 4. Section 4 of the same decree [P.D. No.
1606, as amended] is hereby further amended
to read as follows:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all
cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No.
1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Titile VII, Book
II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or
more of the accused are officials occupying the
following positions in the government,
whether in a permanent, acting or interim
capacity, at the time of the commission of the
offense:
assessors, engineers, and other
city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic
service occupying the position
of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine Army and air
force colonels, naval captains,
and all officers of higher rank;

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying (e) Officers of the Philippines
the positions of regional director and higher, National Police while occupying
otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher, the position of provincial
of the Compensation and Position director and those holding the
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. rank of senior superintendent or
6758), specifically including: higher.

(a) Provincial governors, vice- (f) City of provincial

governors, members of the prosecutors and their
sangguniang panlalawigan, and assistants, and officials and
provincial treasurers, prosecutors in the Office of the
assessors, engineers, and other Ombudsman and special
provincial department heads; prosecutor;

(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, (g) Presidents, directors or

members of the sangguniang trustees or managers of
panlungsod, city treasurers, government-owned or
controlled corporations, state
 universities or educational
institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof
classified as-Grade "27" and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act
of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without
prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution;
(4) Chairman and members of the
Constitutional Commissions, without
prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution;
(5) All other national and local officials
classified as Grade "27" or higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act
of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or
complexed with other crimes committed by
the public officials and employees mentioned in
Subsection a of this section in relation to their
office.
c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to
and connection with Executive Orders Nos.
1,2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.
In cases where none of the accused are
occupying positions corresponding to salary
Grade "27" or higher, as prescribed in the said
Republic Act 6758, or military and PNP
officers mentioned above, exclusive original
jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the
proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial
court, municipal trial court, and municipal
circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant
to their jurisdictions as privided in Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over final judgments,
resolutions or orders of regional trial courts
whether in the exercise of their own original
jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction
as herein provided.
The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction over petitions of the
issuance of the writs of mandamus,
prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus,
injunctions, and other ancillary writs and
processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction
and over petitions of similar nature,
including quo warranto, arising or that may
arise in cases filed or which may be filed under
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued
in 1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over
these petitions shall not be exclusive of the
Supreme Court.
The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, as well as the implementing rules
that the Supreme Court has promulgated and
may hereafter promulgate, relative to
appeals/petitions for review to the Court of
Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions
for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all
cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from
the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the
Office of the Ombudsman, through its special
prosecutor, shall represent the People of the
Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to
Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 4-A, issued
in 1986.
In case private individuals are charged as co-
principals, accomplices or accessories with
the public officers or employee, including
those employed in government-owned or
controlled corporations, they shall be tried
jointly with said public officers and employees
in the proper courts which shall exercise
exclusive jurisdiction over them.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)
Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 8249 states:
Sec. 7. Transitory provision This act shall
apply to all cases pending in any court over
which trial has not begun as of the approval
hereof. (Emphasis supplied)
The Sandiganbayan law prior to R.A. 8249 was R.A. 7975.
Section 2 of R.A. 7975 provides:
Sec. 2. Section 4 of the same decree
[Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended) is
hereby further amended to read as follows:
Sec 4. Jurisdiction The Sandiganbayan shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all
cases involving:
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No.
1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book
II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or
more of the pricipal accused are afficials
occupying the following positions in the
government, whether in a permanent, acting
or interim capacity, at the time of the
commission of the offense:
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying
the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as Grade "27" and higher,
of the Compensation and Position
Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No.
6758), specifically including:
(a) Provincial governors, vice-
governors, members of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, and
provincial treasurers,
assessors, engineer, and other
provincial department heads;
(b) City mayors, vice-mayors,
members of the sangguniang
panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other
city department heads;
(c) Officials of the diplomatic
service occupying the position
of consul and higher;
(d) Philippine Army and air
force colonels, naval captains,
and all officers of higher rank;
(e) PNP chief superintendent
and PNP officers of higher rank;
(f) City and provincial
prosecutors and their
assistants, and officials and
prosecutors in the Office of the
Ombudsman and special
prosecutor;
(g) Presidents, directors or
trustees, or managers of
government-owned or
controlled corporations, state
universities or educational
institutions or foundations;
(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof
classified as Grade "27" and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act
of 1989;
(3) Members of the judiciary without
prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution;
(4) Chairman and members of the
Constitutional Commissions, without
prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution;
(5) All other national and local officials
classified as Grade "27" or higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act
of 1989.
b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the
public officials and employees mentioned in
Subsection a of this section in relation to their
office.
c. Civil and criminal cases files pursuant to and
in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2,
14, and 4-A.
In cases where none of the principal accused
are occupying positions corresponding to
salary Grade "27" or higher, as presribed in
the said Republic Act 6758, or PNP officers
occupying the rank of superintendent or
higher, or their equivalent, exclusive
jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the
proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial
court, municipal trial court, and municipal
circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant
to their respective jurisdictions as provided in
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive
appellate jurisdiction on appelas from the
final judgment, resolutions or orders of
regular court where all the accused are
occupying positions lower than grade "27," or
not otherwise covered by the preceding
enumeration.
xxx xxx xxx
In case private individuals are charged as co-
principals, accomplices or accessories with
the public officers or employees, including
those employed in government-owned or
controlled corporations, they shall be tried
jointly with said public officers and employees
in the proper courts which shall have
exclusive jurisdiction over them.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)
Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 7975 reads:
Sec. 7. Upon the effectivity of this Act, all
criminal cases in which trial has not begun in
 the Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the
proper courts.
Under paragraphs a and c, Section 4 of R.A. 8249, the word
"principal" before the word "accused" appearing in the
above-quoted Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A. 7975,
was deleted. It is due to this deletion of the word "principal"
that the parties herein are at loggerheads over the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner and
intervenors, relying on R.A. 7975, argue that the Regional
Trial Court, not the Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction over the
subject criminal cases since none of the principal accused
under the amended information has the rank of
Superintendent28 or higher. On the other hand, the Office of
the Ombudsman, through the Special Prosecutor who is
tasked to represent the People before the Supreme Court
except in certain cases,29 contends that the Sandiganbayan
has jurisdiction pursuant to R.A. 8249.
A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of R.A. 8249 reveals
that to fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, the following requisites must concur: (1)
the offense committed is a violation of (a) R.A. 3019, as
amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), (b) R.A.
1379 (the law on ill-gotten wealth), (c) Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code (the law on
bribery),30 (d) Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A, issued
in 1986 (sequestration cases),31 or (e) other offenses or
felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes; (2)
the offender comitting the offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and
(e) is a public official or employee32holding any of the
positions enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4; and (3)
the offense committed is in relation to the office.
Considering that herein petitioner and intervenors are being
charged with murder which is a felony punishable under
Title VIII of the Revised Penal Code, the governing on the
jurisdictional offense is not paragraph a but paragraph b,
Section 4 of R.A. 8249. This paragraph b pertains to "other
offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other
crimes committed by the public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection a of (Section 4, R.A. 8249) in
relation to their office. "The phrase" other offenses or
felonies" is too broad as to include the crime of murder,
provided it was committed in relation to the accused's
officials functions. Thus, under said paragraph b, what
determines the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction is the official
position or rank of the offender that is, whether he is one
of those public officers or employees enumerated in
paragraph a of Section 4. The offenses mentioned in
pargraphs a, b and c of the same Section 4 do not make any
reference to the criminal participation of the accused public
officer as to whether he is charged as a principal, accomplice
or accessory. In enacting R.A. 8249, the Congress simply
restored the original provisions of P.D. 1606 which does not
mention the criminal participation of the public officer as a
requisite to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner and entervenors' posture that Section 4 and 7 of
R.A. 8249 violate their right to equal protection of the
law33 because its enactment was particularly directed only
to the Kuratong Baleleng cases in the Sandiganbayan, is a
contention too shallow to deserve merit. No concrete
evidence and convincing argument were presented to
warrant a declaration of an act of the entire Congress and
signed into law by the highest officer of the co-equal
executive department as unconstitutional. Every
classification made by law is presumed reasonable. Thus, the
party who challenges the law must present proof of
arbitrariness.34
It is an established precept in constitutional law that the
guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated
by a legislation based on reasonable classification. The
classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when there is
concurrence of four elements, namely:
(1) it must rest on substantial distinction;
(2) it must be germane to the purpose of the
law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions
only, and
(4) must apply equaly to all members of the
same class,35
all of which are present in this case.
The challengers of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 failed to
rebut the presumption of constitutionality and reasonables
of the questioned provisions. The classification between
those pending cases involving the concerned public officials
whose trial has not yet commence and whose cases could
have been affected by the amendments of the
Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under R.A. 8249, as against
those cases where trial had already started as of the
approval of the law, rests on substantial distinction that
makes real differences.36 In the first instance, evidence
against them were not yet presented, whereas in the latter
the parties had already submitted their respective proofs,
examined witnesses and presented documents. Since it is
within the power of Congress to define the jurisdiction of
courts subject to the constitutional limitations,37 it can be
reasonably anticipated that an alteration of that jurisdiction
would necessarily affect pending cases, which is why it has
to privide for a remedy in the form of a transitory provision.
Thus, petitioner and intervenors cannot now claim that
Sections 4 and 7 placed them under a different category from
those similarly situated as them. Precisely, paragraph a of
Section 4 provides that it shall apply to "all case involving"
certain public officials and, under the transitory provision in
Section 7, to "all cases pending in any court." Contrary to
petitioner and intervenors' argument, the law is not
particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases.
The transitory provision does not only cover cases which are
in the Sandiganbayan but also in "any court." It just
happened that Kuratong Baleleng cases are one of those
affected by the law. Moreover, those cases where trial had
already begun are not affected by the transitory provision
under Section 7 of the new law (R.A. 8249).
In their futile attempt to have said sections nullified, heavy
reliance is premised on what is perceived as bad faith on the
part of a Senator and two Justices of the Sandiganbaya38 for
their participation in the passage of the said provisions. In
particular, it is stressed that the Senator had expressed
strong sentiments against those officials involved in the
Kuratong Baleleng cases during the hearings conducted on
the matter by the committee headed by the Senator.
Petitioner further contends that the legislature is biased
against him as he claims to have been selected from among
the 67 million other Filipinos as the object of the deletion of
the word "principal" in paragraph a, Section 4 of P.D. 1606,
as amended, and of the transitory provision of R.A.
8249.39 R.A 8249, while still a bill, was acted, deliberated,
considered by 23 other Senators and by about 250
Representatives, and was separately approved by the Senate
and House of Representatives and, finally, by the President
of the Philippines.
On the perceived bias that the Sandiganbayan Justices
allegedly had against petitioner during the committe
hearings, the same would not constitute sufficient
justification to nullify an otherwise valid law. Their presence
and participation in the legislative hearings was deemed
necessary by Congress since the matter before the
committee involves the graft court of which one is the head
of the Sandiganbayan and the other a member thereof. The
Congress, in its plenary legislative powers, is particularly
empowered by the Constitution to invite persons to appear
before it whenever it decides to conduct inquiries in aid of
legislation.40
Petitioner and entervenors further further argued that the
retroactive application of R.A. 8249 to the Kuratong Baleleng
cases constitutes an ex post facto law41 for they are deprived
of their right to procedural due process as they can no longer
avail of the two-tiered appeal which they had allegedly
acquired under R.A. 7975.
Again, this contention is erroneous. There is nothing ex post
facto in R.A. 8249. In Calder v. Bull,42 an ex post factolaw is
one
(a) which makes an act done
criminal before the passing of
the law and which was innocent
when committed, and punishes
such action; or
(b) which aggravates a crime or
makes it greater than when it
was committed; or
 (c) which changes the (g) deprives a person accussed
punishment and inflicts a of crime of some lawful
greater punishment than the protection to which he has
law annexed to the crime when become entitled, such as the
it was committed. protection of a former
conviction or acquittal, or a
(d) which alters the legal rules proclamation of a amnesty.45
of evidence and recieves less or
different testimony that the law Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity of
required at the time of the penal laws.46 R.A. 8249 is not penal law. It is a substantive
commission of the offense on law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal
order to convict the laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain
defendant.43 acts and establish penalties for their violations;47 or those
that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide dor
(e) Every law which, in relation their punishment.48 R.A 7975, which amended P.D. 1606 as
to the offense or its regards the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction, its mode of appeal
consequences, alters the and other procedural matters, has been declared by the
situation of a person to his Court as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural statute, i.e.
disadvantage.44 one which prescribes rules of procedure by which courts
applying laws of all kinds can properly administer
This Court added two more to the list, namely: justice.49 Not being a penal law, the retroactive application
of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.
(f) that which assumes to
regulate civil rights and Petitioner's and entervenors' contention that their right to a
remedies only but in effect two-tiered appeal which they acquired under R.A. 7975 has
imposes a penalty or been diluted by the enactment of R.A. 8249, is incorrect. The
deprivation of a right which same contention has already been rejected by the court
when done was lawful; several times50 considering that the right to appeal is not a
natural right but statutory in nature that can be regulated by
law. The mode of procedure provided for in the statutory
right of appeal is not included in the prohibition against ex
post facto laws.51 R.A. 8249 pertains only to matters of
procedure, and being merely an amendatory statute it does
not partake the nature of an ex post facto law. It does not
mete out a penalty and, therefore, does not come within the
prohibition.52 Moreover, the law did not alter the rules of
evidence or the mode of trial.53 It has been ruled that
adjective statutes may be made applicable to actions
pending and unresolved at the time of their passage.54
In any case; R.A. 8249 has preserved the accused's right to
appeal to the Supreme Court to review questions of
law.55 On the removal of the intermediate review of facts, the
Supreme Court still has the power of review to determine if
he presumption of innocence has been convincing
overcome.56
Another point. The challenged law does not violate the one-
title-one-subject provision of the Constitution. Much
emphasis is placed on the wording in the title of the law that
it "defines" the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction when what it
allegedly does is to "expand" its jurisdiction. The expantion
in the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, if it can be
considered as such, does not have to be expressly stated in
the title of the law because such is the necessary
consequence of the amendments. The requirement that
every bill must only have one subject expressed in the
title57is satisfied if the title is comprehensive enough, as in
this case, to include subjects related to the general purpose
which the statute seeks to achieve.58 Such rule is liberally
interpreted and should be given a practical rather than a
technical construction. There is here sufficient compliance
with such requirement, since the title of R.A. 8249 expresses
the general subject (involving the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan and the amendment of P.D. 1606, as
amended) and all the provisions of the law are germane to
that general subject.59 The Congress, in employing the word
"define" in the title of the law, acted within its power since
Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution itself empowers the
legislative body to "define, prescribe, and apportion the
jurisdiction of various courts.60
There being no unconstitutional infirmity in both the subject
amendatory provision of Section 4 and the retroactive
procedural application of the law as provided in Section 7 of
R.A. No. 8249, we shall now determine whether under the
allegations in the Informations, it is the Sandiganbayan or
Regional Trial Court which has jurisdictions over the
multiple murder case against herein petitioner and
entervenors.
The jurisdiction of a court is defined by the Constitution or
statute. The elements of that definition must appear in the
complaint or information so as to ascertain which court has
jurisdiction over a case. Hence the elementary rule that the
jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the
complaint or informations,61 and not by the evidence
presented by the parties at the trial.62
As stated earlier, the multiple murder charge against
petitioner and intervenors falls under Section 4 [paragraph
b] of R.A. 8249. Section 4 requires that the offense charged
must be committed by the offender in relation to his office in
order for the Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction over
it.63 This jurisdictional requirement is in accordance with
Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution which
mandated that the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction
over criminal cases committed by the public officers and
employees, including those in goverment-owned or
controlled corporations, "in relation to their office as may be
determined by law." This constitutional mandate was
reiterated in the new (1987) Constitution when it declared
in Section 4 thereof that the Sandiganbayan shall continue to
function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or hereafter
may be provided by law.
The remaining question to be resolved then is whether the
offense of multiple murder was committed in relation to the
office of the accussed PNP officers.
In People vs. Montejo,64 we held that an offense is said to have
been committed in relation to the office if it (the offense) is
"intimately connected" with the office of the offender and
perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official
functions.65 This intimate relation between the offense
charged and the discharge of official duties "must be alleged
in the informations."66
As to how the offense charged be stated in the informations,
Section 9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates:
Sec. 9 Couse of accusation The acts or
omissions complied of as constituting the
offense must be stated in ordinary and concise
language without repetition not necessarily in
the terms of the statute defining the offense, but
in such from as is sufficient to enable a person
of common understanding to know what
offense is intended to be charged, and enable
the court to pronounce proper judgment.
(Emphasis supplied)
As early as 1954 we pronounced that "the factor that
characterizes the charge is the actual recital of the
facts."67The real nature of the criminal charge is determined
not from the caption or preamble of the informations nor
from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have
been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by the
actual recital of facts in the complaint or information.68
The noble object or written accusations cannot be
overemphasized. This was explained in U.S. v. Karelsen: 69
 The object of this written accusations was
First; To furnish the accused with such a
descretion of the charge against him as will
enable him to make his defense and second to
avail himself of his conviction or acquittal for
protection against a further prosecution for
the same cause and third, to inform the court
of the facts alleged so that it may decide
whether they are sufficient in law to support a
conviction if one should be had. In order that
the requirement may be satisfied, facts must
be stated, not conclusions of law. Every crime
is made up of certain acts and intent these
must be set forth in the complaint with
reasonable
particularly of time, place, names (plaintiff
and defendant) and circumstances. In short,
the complaint must contain a specific
allegation of every fact and circumstance
necessary to constitute the crime charged.
(Emphasis supplied)
It is essential, therefore, that the accused be informed of the
facts that are imputed to him as "he is presumed to have no
indefendent knowledge of the facts that constitute the
offense."70
Applying these legal principles and doctrines to the present
case, we find the amended informations for murder against
herein petitioner and intervenors wanting of specific factual
averments to show the intimate relation/connection
between the offense charged and the discharge of official
function of the offenders.
In the present case, one of the eleven (11) amended
informations71 for murder reads:
AMENDED INFORMATIONS
The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer
III. Office of the Ombudsman hereby accuses
CHIEF INSP. MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, CHIEF
INSP. ERWIN T. VILLACORTE, SENIOR INSP.
JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL, INSP. RICARDO G.
DANDAN, SPO4 VICENTE P. ARNADO, SPO4
ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON, SPO2 VIRGILIO V.
PARAGAS, SPO2 ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1
WILFREDO C. CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO O.
AGBALOG, SPO1 OSMUNDO B. CARINO, CHIEF
SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON, CHIEF SUPT.
ROMEO M. ACOP, CHIEF SUPT. PANFILO M.
LACSON, SENIOR SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA
JR., SUPT. ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP.
CESAR O. MANCAO III, CHIEF INSP. GIL L.
MENESES, SENIOR INSP. GLENN DUMLAO,
SENIOR INSP. ROLANDO ANDUYAN, INSP.
CEASAR TANNAGAN, SPO3 WILLY NUAS,
SPO3 CICERO S. BACOLOD, SPO2 NORBERTO
LASAGA, PO2 LEONARDO GLORIA, and PO2
ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG of the crime of
Murder as defined and penalize under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code committed as
follows
That on or about May 18, 1995 in Mariano
Marcos Avenue, Quezon City Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of his Honorable Court,
the accused CHIEF INSP. MICHAEL RAY
AQUINO, CHIEF INSP. ERWIN T. VILLACORTE,
SENIOR INSP. JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL, INSP.
RICARDO G. DANDAN, SPO4 VICENTE
ARNADO, SPO4 ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON,
SPO2 VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, SPO2 ROLANDO
R. JIMENEZ, SPO1 WILFREDO C. CUARTERO,
SPO1 ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, and SPO1
OSMUNDO B. CARINO, all taking advantage of
their public and official positions as officers
and members of the Philippine National Police
and committing the acts herein alleged in
relation to their public office, conspiring with
intent to kill and using firearms with
treachery evident premeditation and taking
advantage of their superior strenghts did then
and there willfully unlawfully and feloniously
shoot JOEL AMORA, thereby inflicting upon
the latter mortal wounds which caused his
instantaneous death to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of the said victim.
That accused CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON,
CHIEF SUPT. ROMOE M. ACOP, CHIEF SUPT.
PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR SUPT.
FRANCISCO G. ZUBIAM JR., SUPT. ALMARIO A.
HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO II,
CHIEF INSP. GIL L. MENESES, SENIOR INSP.
GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP. ROLANDO
ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN, SPO3
WILLY NUAS, SPO3 CICERO S. BACOLOD, PO2
ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG committing the acts
in relation to office as officers and members of
the Philippine National Police are charged
herein as accessories after-the-fact for
concealing the crime herein above alleged by
among others falsely representing that there
where no arrest made during
the read conducted by the accused herein at
Superville Subdivision, Paranaque, Metro
Manila on or about the early dawn of May 18,
1995.
CONTRARY LAW.
While the above-quoted information states that the above-
named principal accused committed the crime of murder "in
relation to thier public office, there is, however, no specific
allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by the said
principal accused was intimately related to the discharge of
their official duties as police officers. Likewise, the amended
information does not indicate that the said accused arrested
and investigated the victim and then killed the latter while
in their custody.
Even the allegations concerning the criminal participation of
herein petitioner and intevenors as among the accessories
after-the-facts, the amended information is vague on this. It
is alleged therein that the said accessories concelead "the
crime herein-above alleged by, among others, falsely
representing that there were no arrests made during the
raid conducted by the accused herein at Superville
Subdivision, Paranaque Metro Manila, on or about the early
dawn of May 18, 1995." The sudden mention of the "arrests
made during the raid conducted by the accused" surprises
the reader. There is no indication in the amended
information that the victim was one of those arrested by the
accused during the "raid." Worse, the raid and arrests were
allegedly conducted "at Superville Subdivision, Paranaque,
Metro Manila" but, as alleged in the immediately preceding
paragraph of the amended information, the shooting of the
victim by the principal accused occurred in Mariano Marcos
Avenue, Quezon City." How the raid, arrests and shooting
happened in the two places far away from each other is
puzzling. Again, while there is the allegation in the amended
information that the said accessories committed the offense
"in relation to office as officers and members of the (PNP),"
we, however, do not see the intimate connection between
the offense charged and the accused's official functions,
which, as earlier discussed, is an essential element in
determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
The stringent requirement that the charge be set forth with
such particularly as will reasonably indicate the exact
offense which the accused is alleged to have committed in
relation to his office was, sad to say, not satisfied. We believe
that the mere allegation in the amended information that the
offense was committed by the accused public officer in
relation to his office is not sufficient. That phrase is merely a
conclusion between of law, not a factual avernment that
would show the close intimacy between the offense charged
and the discharge of the accused's official duties.
In People vs. Magallanes, 72 where the jurisdiction between
the Regional Trial Court and the Sandiganbayan was at issue,
we ruled:
It is an elementary rule that jurisdiction is
determined by the allegations in the
complaint or information and not by the result
of evidence after trial.
In (People vs) Montejo (108 Phil 613 (1960),
where the amended information alleged
Leroy S. Brown City Mayor of
Basilan City, as such, has
organized groups of police
patrol and civilian commandoes
consisting of regular policeman
and . . . special policemen
appointed and provided by him
with pistols and higher power
guns and then established a
camp . . . at Tipo-tipo which is
under his command . . .
supervision and control where
his co-defendants were
stationed entertained criminal
complaints and conducted the
corresponding investigations as
well as assumed the authority
to arrest and detain person
without due process of law and
without bringing them to the
proper court, and that in line
with this set-up established by
said Mayor of Basilan City as
such, and acting upon his orders
his co-defendants arrested and
maltreated Awalin Tebag who
denied in consequence thereof.
In the aforecited case of People vs. Montejo, it is noteworthy
that the phrase committed in relation to public office "does
we held that the offense charged was
committed in relation to the office of the
accused because it was perpetreated while
they were in the performance, though
improper or irregular of their official
functions and would not have been committed
had they not held their office, besides, the
accused had no personal motive in
committing the crime thus, there was an
intimate connection between the offense and
the office of the accused.
Unlike in Montejo the informations in
Criminal Cases Nos. 15562 and 15563 in the
court below do not indicate that the accused
arrested and investigated the victims and then
killed the latter in the course of the
investigation. The informations merely allege
that the accused for the purpose of extracting
or extortin the sum of P353,000.00 abducted,
kidnapped and detained the two victims, and
failing in their common purpose they shot;
and killed the said victims. For the purpose of
determining jurisdiction, it is these allegations
that shall control, and not the evidence
presented by the prosecution at the trial.
not appear in the information, which only signifies that the
said phrase is not what determines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. What is controlling is the specific factual
allegations in the information that would indicate the close
intimacy between the discharge of the accused's official
duties and the commission of the offense charged, in order
to qualify the crime as having been committed in relation to
public office.
Consequently, for failure to show in the amended
informations that the charge of murder was intimately
connected with the discharge of official functions of the
accused PNP officers, the offense charged in the subject
criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial
Court,73 not the Sandiganbayan.
WHEREFORE, the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A.
8249 is hereby sustained. The Addendum to the March 5,
1997 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is REVERSED. The
Sandiganbayan is hereby directed to transfer Criminal Cases
Nos. 23047 to 23057 (for multiple murder) to the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City which has exclusive original
jurisdiction over the said cases.1wphi1.nt
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. Nos. 111771-77 November 9, 1993
ANTONIO L. SANCHEZ, petitioner,
vs.
The Honorable HARRIET O. DEMETRIOU (in her
capacity as Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court,
NCR, Branch 70, Pasig), The Honorable FRANKLIN
DRILON (in his capacity as Secretary of Justice),
JOVENCITO R. ZUO, LEONARDO C. GUIYAB, CARLOS L.
DE LEON, RAMONCITO C. MISON, REYNALDO J. LUGTU,
and RODRIGO P. LORENZO, the last six respondents in
their official capacities as members of the State
Prosecutor's Office), respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
There is probably no more notorious person in the country
today than Mayor Antonio L. Sanchez of Calauan, Laguna,
who stands accused of an unspeakable crime. On him, the
verdict has already been rendered by many outraged
persons who would immediately impose on him an angry
sentence. Yet, for all the prejudgments against him, he is
under our Constitution presumed innocent as long as the
contrary has not been proved. Like any other person accused
of an offense, he is entitled to the full and vigilant protection
of the Bill of Rights.
Sanchez has brought this petition to challenge the order of
the respondent judge denying his motion to quash the
informations for rape with homicide filed against him and
six other persons. We shall treat it as we would any other
suit filed by any litigant hoping to obtain a just and impartial
judgment from this Court.
The pertinent facts are as follows:
On July 28, 1993, the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission
requested the filing of appropriate charges against several
persons, including the petitioner, in connection with the
rape-slay of Mary Eileen Sarmenta and the killing of Allan
Gomez.
Acting on this request, the Panel of State Prosecutors of the
Department of Justice conducted a preliminary investigation
on August 9, 1993. Petitioner Sanchez was not present but
was represented by his counsel, Atty. Marciano Brion, Jr.
On August 12, 1993, PNP Commander Rex Piad issued an
"invitation" to the petitioner requesting him to appear for
investigation at Camp Vicente Lim in Canlubang, Laguna. It
was served on Sanchez in the morning of August 13,1993,
and he was immediately taken to the said camp.
At a confrontation that same day, Sanchez was positively
identified by Aurelio Centeno, and SPO III Vivencio
Malabanan, who both executed confessions implicating him
as a principal in the rape-slay of Sarmenta and the killing of
Gomez. The petitioner was then placed on "arrest status"
and taken to the Department of Justice in Manila.
The respondent prosecutors immediately conducted an
inquest upon his arrival, with Atty. Salvador Panelo as his
counsel.
After the hearing, a warrant of arrest was served on Sanchez.
This warrant was issued on August 13, 1993, by Judge Enrico
A. Lanzanas of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 7,
in connection with Criminal Cases Nos. 93-124634 to 93-
124637 for violation of Section 8, in relation to Section 1, of
R.A. No. 6713. Sanchez was forthwith taken to the CIS
Detention Center, Camp Crame, where he remains confined.
On August 16, 1993, the respondent prosecutors filed with
the Regional Trial Court of Calamba, Laguna, seven
informations charging Antonio L. Sanchez, Luis Corcolon,
Rogelio Corcolon, Pepito Kawit, Baldwin Brion, Jr., George
Medialdea and Zoilo Ama with the rape and killing of Mary
Eileen Sarmenta.
On August 26, 1993, Judge Eustaquio P. Sto. Domingo of that
court issued a warrant for the arrest of all the accused,
including the petitioner, in connection with the said crime.
The respondent Secretary of Justice subsequently expressed
his apprehension that the trial of the said cases might result
in a miscarriage of justice because of the tense and partisan
atmosphere in Laguna in favor of the petitioner and the
relationship of an employee, in the trial court with one of the
accused. This Court thereupon ordered the transfer of the
venue of the seven cases to Pasig, Metro Manila, where they
were raffled to respondent Judge Harriet Demetriou.
On September 10, 1993, the seven informations were
amended to include the killing of Allan Gomez as an
aggravating circumstance.
On that same date, the petitioner filed a motion to quash the
informations substantially on the grounds now raised in this
petition. On September 13, 1993, after oral arguments, the
respondent judge denied the motion. Sanchez then filed with
this Court the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition
with prayer for a temporary restraining order/writ of
injunction.
The petitioner argues that the seven informations filed
against him should be quashed because: 1) he was denied
the right to present evidence at the preliminary
investigation; 2) only the Ombudsman had the competence
to conduct the investigation; 3) his warrantless arrest is
illegal and the court has therefore not acquired jurisdiction
over him, 4) he is being charged with seven homicides
arising from the death of only two persons; 5) the
informations are discriminatory because they do not include
Teofilo Alqueza and Edgardo Lavadia; and 6) as a public
officer, he can be tried for the offense only by the
Sandiganbayan.
The respondents submitted a Comment on the petition, to
which we required a Reply from the petitioner within a non-
extendible period of five days.1 The Reply was filed five days
late. 2 The Court may consider his non-compliance an
implied admission of the respondents' arguments or a loss
of interest in prosecuting his petition, which is a ground for
its dismissal. Nevertheless, we shall disregard this
procedural lapse and proceed to discuss his petition on the
basis of the arguments before us.
The Preliminary Investigation.
The records of the hearings held on August 9 and 13, 1993,
belie the petitioner's contention that he was not accorded
the right to present counter-affidavits.
During the preliminary investigation on August 9, 1993, the
petitioner's counsel, Atty. Marciano Brion, manifested that
his client was waiving the presentation of a counter-
affidavit, thus:
Atty. Brion, Jr.:
[W]e manifest that after reviewing them there
is nothing to rebut or countermand all these
statements as far as Mayor Sanchez is
concerned, We are not going to submit any
counter-affidavit.
ACSP Zuo to Atty. Brion:
xxx xxx xxx
Q. So far, there are no other
statements.
A. If there is none then, we will
not submit any counter-
affidavit because we believe
there is nothing to rebut or
countermand with all these
statements.
Q. So, you are waiving your
submission of counter-
affidavit?
A. Yes, your honor, unless there
are other witnesses who will
come up soon. 3
Nonetheless, the head of the Panel of Prosecutors,
respondent Jovencito Zuo, told Atty. Brion that he could
still file a counter-affidavit up to August 27, 1993. No such
counter-affidavit was filed.
During the hearing on August 1'3, 1993, respondent Zuo
furnished the petitioner's counsel, this time Atty. Salvador
Panelo, with copies of the sworn statements of Centeno and
Malabanan, and told him he could submit counter-affidavits
on or before August 27, 1993. The following exchange
ensued:
ACSP Zuo:
For the record, we are
furnishing to you the sworn
statement of witness Aurelio
Centeno y Roxas and the sworn
statement of SPO3 Vivencio
Malabanan y Angeles.
Do I understand from you that
you are again waiving the
submission of counter-
affidavit?
 Atty. Panelo:
Yes.
ACSP Zuo:
So, insofar as the respondent,
Mayor Antonio Sanchez is
concerned, this case is
submitted for resolution. 4
On the other hand, there is no support for the petitioner's
subsequent manifestation that his counsel, Atty. Brion, was
not notified of the inquest held on August 13, 1993, and that
he was not furnished with the affidavits sworn to on that
date by Vivencio Malabanan and Aurelio Centeno, or with
their supplemental affidavits dated August 15, 1993.
Moreover, the above-quoted excerpt shows that the
petitioner's counsel at the hearing held on August 13, 1993,
was not Atty. Brion but Atty. Panelo.
The petitioner was present at that hearing and he never
disowned Atty. Panelo as his counsel. During the entire
proceedings, he remained quiet and let this counsel speak
and argue on his behalf. It was only in his tardy Reply that he
has suddenly bestirred himself and would now question his
representation by this lawyer as unauthorized and
inofficious.
Section 3, Paragraph (d), Rule 112 of the Rules of Court,
provides that if the respondent cannot be subpoenaed or, if
subpoenaed, does not submit counter-affidavits, the
investigating officer shall base his resolution on the evidence
presented by the complainant.
Just as the accused may renounce the right to be present at
the preliminary investigation5, so may he waive the right to
present counter-affidavits or any other evidence in his
defense.
At any rate, it is settled that the absence of a preliminary
investigation does not impair the validity of the information
or otherwise render the same defective and neither does it
affect the jurisdiction of the court over the case or constitute
a ground for quashing the information.6
If no preliminary investigation has been held, or if it is
flawed, the trial court may, on motion of the accused, order
an investigation or reinvestigation and hold the proceedings
in the criminal case in abeyance. 7 In the case at bar,
however, the respondent judge saw no reason or need for
such a step. Finding no arbitrariness in her factual
conclusions, we shall defer to her judgment.
Jurisdiction of the Ombudsman
Invoking the case of Deloso v. Domingo, 8 the petitioner
submits that the proceedings conducted by the Department
of Justice are null and void because it had no jurisdiction
over the case. His claim is that it is the Office of the
Ombudsman that is vested with the power to conduct the
investigation of all cases involving public officers like him, as
the municipal mayor of Calauan, Laguna.
The Ombudsman is indeed empowered under Section 15,
paragraph (1) of R.A. 6770 to investigate and prosecute, any
illegal act or omission of any public official. However, as we
held only two years ago in the case of Aguinaldo v.
Domagas, 9 this authority "is not an exclusive authority but
rather a shared or concurrent authority in. respect of the
offense charged."
Petitioners finally assert that the information
and amended information filed in this case
needed the approval of the Ombudsman. It is
not disputed that the information and
amended information here did not have the
approval of the Ombudsman. However, we do
not believe that such approval was necessary
at all. In Deloso v. Domingo, 191 SCRA. 545
(1990), the Court held that the Ombudsman
has authority to investigate charges of illegal
or omissions on the part of any public official,
i.e., any crime imputed to a public official. It
must, however, be pointed out that the
authority of the Ombudsman to investigate
"any [illegal] act or omission of any public
official" (191 SCRA at 550)
is not an exclusiveauthority but rather a
shared or concurrent authority in respect of
the offense here charged, i.e., the crime of
sedition. Thus, the non-involvement of the
office of the Ombudsman in the present case
does not have any adverse legal consequence
upon the authority the panel of prosecutors to
file and prosecute the information or
amended information.
In fact, other investigatory agencies, of the government such
as the Department of Justice, in connection with the charge
of sedition, 10 and the Presidential Commission on Good
Government, in ill-gotten wealth cases,11 may conduct the
investigation,
The Arrest
Was petitioner Sanchez arrested on August 13, 1993?
"Arrest" is defined under Section 1, Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court as the taking of a person into custody in order that he
may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense.
Under Section 2 of the same Rule, an arrest is effected by an
actual restraint of the person to be arrested or by his
voluntary submission to the custody of the person making
the arrest.
Application of actual force, manual touching of the body,
physical restraint or a formal declaration of arrest is not,
required. It is enough that there be an intent on the part of
one of the parties to arrest the other and an intent onthe part
of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that
submission is necessary. 12
The petitioner was taken to Camp Vicente Lim, Canlubang,
Laguna, by virtue of a letter-invitation issued by PNP
Commander Rex Piad requesting him to appear at the said
camp for investigation.
In Babst v. National Intelligence Board 13 this Court declared:
Be that as it may, it is not idle to note that
ordinarily, an invitation to attend a hearing
and answer some questions, which the person
invited may heed or refuse at his pleasure, is
not illegal or constitutionally objectionable.
Under certain circumstances, however, such
an invitation can easily assume a different
appearance. Thus, where the invitation comes
from a powerful group composed
predominantly of ranking military
officers issued at a time when the country has
just emerged from martial rule and when the
suspension of the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus has not entirely been lifted,
and the designated interrogation site is a
military camp, the same can be easily
taken, not as a strictly voluntary
invitation which it purports to be, but as an
authoritative command which one can only
defy at his peril. . . . (Emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, the invitation came from a high-ranking
military official and the investigation of Sanchez was to be
made at a military camp. Although in the guise of a request,
it was obviously a command or an order of arrest that the
petitioner could hardly he expected to defy. In fact,
apparently cowed by the "invitation," he went without
protest (and in informal clothes and slippers only) with the
officers who had come to fetch him.
It may not be amiss to observe that under R.A. No. 7438, the
requisites of a "custodial investigation" are applicable even
to a person not formally arrested but merely "invited" for
questioning.
It should likewise be noted that at Camp Vicente Lim, the
petitioner was placed on "arrest status" after he was pointed
to by Centeno and Malabanan as the person who first raped
Mary Eileen Sarmenta. Respondent Zuo himself
acknowledged during the August 13, 1993 hearing that, on
the basis of the sworn statements of the two state witnesses,
petitioner had been "arrested."
We agree with the petitioner that his arrest did not come
under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, providing as
follows:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.
A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been
committed and he has personal knowledge of
facts indicating that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a
prisoner who has escapes from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving
final judgment or temporarily confined while
his case is pending, or has escaped while being
transferred from one confinement to another.
It is not denied that the arresting officers were not present
when the petitioner allegedly participated in the killing of
Allan Gomez and the rape-slay of Mary Eileen Sarmenta.
Neither did they have any personal knowledge that the
petitioner was responsible therefor because the basis of the
arrest was the sworn statements of Centeno and Malabanan.
Moreover, as the rape and killing of Sarmenta allegedly took
place on June 28-June 29, 1993, or forty-six days before the
date of the arrest, it cannot be said that the offense had "in
fact just been committed" when the petitioner was arrested.
The original warrantless arrest of the petitioner was
doubtless illegal. Nevertheless, the Regional Trial Court
lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioner by virtue of the warrant of arrest it issued on
August 26, 1993 against him and the other accused in
connection with the rape-slay cases. It was belated, to be
sure, but it was nonetheless legal.
Even on the assumption that no warrant was issued at all,
we find that the trial court still lawfully acquired jurisdiction
over the person of the petitioner. The rule is that if the
accused objects to the jurisdiction of the court over his
person, he may move to quash the information, but only on
that ground. If, as in this case, the accused raises other
grounds in the motion to quash, he is deemed to have waived
that objection and to have submitted his person to the
jurisdiction of that court.14
The Court notes that on August 13, 1993, after the petitioner
was unlawfully arrested, Judge Lanzanas issued a warrant of
arrest against Antonio L. Sanchez in connection with
Criminal Cases Nos. 93-124634 to 93-124637 for violation
of R.A No. 6713. 15 Pending the issuance of the warrant of
arrest for the rape-slay cases, this first warrant served as the
initial justification for his detention.
The Court also adverts to its uniform ruling that the filing of
charges, and the issuance of the corresponding warrant of
arrest, against a person invalidly detained will cure the
defect of that detention or at least deny him the right to be
released because of such defect. * Applicable by analogy to
the case at bar is Rule 102 Section 4 of the Rules of Court
that:
Sec, 4. When writ is not allowed or discharge
authorized. If it appears that the person
alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the
custody of an officer under process issued by
a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or
order of a court of record, and that the court
or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process,
render the judgment, or make the order, the
writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction
appears after the writ is allowed, the person
shall not be discharged by reason of any
informality or defect in the process, judgment,
or order. Nor shall, anything in this rule be
held to authorize the discharge of a person
charged with or convicted of an offense in the
Philippines or of a person suffering
imprisonment under lawful judgment.
In one case, 16 the petitioner, sued on habeas corpus on the
ground that she had been arrested by virtue of a John Doe
warrant. In their return, the respondents declared that a
new warrant specifically naming her had been issued, thus
validating her detention. While frowning at the tactics of the
respondents, the Court said:
The, case has, indeed, become moot and
academic inasmuch as the new warrant of
arrest complies with the requirements of the
Constitution and the Rules of Court regarding
the particular description of the person to be
arrested. While the first warrant was
unquestionably void, being a general warrant,
release of the petitioner for that reason will be
a futile act as it will be followed by her
immediate re-arrest pursuant to the new and
valid warrant, returning her to the same
prison she will just have left. This Court will
not participate in such a meaningless charade.
The same doctrine has been consistently followed by the
Court, 17 more recently in the Umil case. 18
The Informations
The petitioner submits that the seven informations charging
seven separate homicides are absurd because the two
victims in these cases could not have died seven times.
This argument was correctly refuted by the Solicitor General
in this wise:
Thus, where there are two or more offenders
who commit rape, the homicide committed on
the occasion or by reason of each rape, must
be deemed as a constituent of the special
complex crime of rape with homicide.
Therefore, there will be as many crimes of
rape with homicide as there are rapes
committed.
In effect, the presence of homicide qualifies
the crime of rape, thereby raising its penalty
to the highest degree. Thus, homicide
committed on the occasion or by reason of
rape, loses its character as an independent
offense, but assumes a new character, and
functions like a qualifying circumstance.
However,by fiction of law, it merged with rape
to constitute an constituent element of a
special complex crime of rape with homicide
with a specific penalty which is in the highest
degree, i.e. death (reduced to reclusion
perpetua with the suspension of the
application of the death penalty by the
Constitution).
It is clearly provided in Rule 110 of the Rules of Court that:
Sec. 13. Duplicity of offense. A complaint or
information must charge but one offense,
except only in those cases in which existing
laws prescribe a simple punishment for
various offenses.
Rape with homicide comes within the exception under R.A.
2632 and R.A. 4111, amending the Revised Penal Code.
The petitioner and his six co-accused are not charged with
only one rape committed by him in conspiracy with the
other six. Each one of the seven accused is charged with
having himself raped Sarmenta instead of simply helping
Sanchez in committing only one rape. In other words, the
allegation of the prosecution is that the girl was raped seven
times, with each of the seven accused taking turns in abusing
her with the assistance of the other six. Afterwards, their lust
satisfied, all seven of them decided to kill and thus silence
Sarmenta.
Every one of the seven accused is being charged separately
for actually raping Sarmenta and later killing her instead of
merely assisting the petitioner in raping and then slaying
her. The separate informations filed against each of them
allege that each of the seven successive rapes is complexed
by the subsequent slaying of Sarmenta and aggravated by
the killing of Allan Gomez by her seven attackers. The
separate rapes were committed in succession by the seven
accused, culminating in the slaying of Sarmenta.
It is of course absurd to suggest that Mary Eileen Sarmenta
and Allan Gomez were killed seven times, but the
informations do not make such a suggestion. It is the
petitioner who does so and is thus hoist by his own petard.
The Alleged Discrimination
The charge of discrimination against the petitioner because
of the non-inclusion of Teofilo Alqueza and Edgardo Lavadia
in the informations must also be dismissed.
While the prosecuting officer is required by law to charge all
those who in his opinion, appear to be guilty, he nevertheless
cannot be compelled to include in the information a person
against whom he believes no sufficient evidence of guilt
exists. 19 The appreciation of the evidence involves the use
of discretion on the part of the prosecutor, and we do not
find in the case at bar a clear showing by the petitioner of a
grave abuse of such discretion. 20
The decision of the prosecutor may be reversed or modified
by the Secretary of Justice or in special cases by the
President of the Philippines. 21 But even this Court cannot
order the prosecution of a person against whom the
prosecutor does not find sufficient evidence to support at
least a prima facie case. The courts try and absolve or convict
the accused but as a rule have no part in the initial decision
to prosecute him.
The possible exception is where there is an unmistakable
showing of a grave abuse of discretion that will justify
judicial intrusion into the precincts of the executive. But in
such a case the proper remedy to call for such exception is a
petition for mandamus, not certiorari or
prohibition.22 Moreover, before resorting to this relief, the
party seeking the inclusion of another person as a co-
accused in the same case must first avail itself of other
adequate remedies such as the filing of a motion for such
inclusion.23
At any rate, it is a preposterous contention that because no
charges have been filed against Alqueza and Lavadia, the
charges against the petitioner and his co-accused should
also be dropped.
Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
The petitioner argued earlier that since most of the accused
were incumbent public officials or employees at the time of
the alleged commission of the crimes, the cases against them
should come under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
and not of the regular courts. This contention was
withdrawn in his Reply but we shall discuss it just the same
for the guidance of all those concerned.
Section 4, paragraph (a) of P.D. No, 1606, as amended by P.D.
No.1861, provides:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan
shall exercise:
a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:
(1) Violations of Republic Act
No. 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
Republic Act No. 1379, and
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of
the Revised Penal Code:
(2) Other offenses or felonies
committed by public officers
and employees in relation to
their office, including those
employed in government-
owned or controlled
corporations, whether simple
or complexed with other
crimes, where the penalty
prescribed by law is higher
than prision correccional or
imprisonment for six (6) years,
or a fine of P6,000.00. . . .
(Emphasis supplied)
The crime of rape with homicide with which the petitioner
stands charged obviously does not fall under paragraph (1),
which deals with graft and corruption cases. Neither is it
covered by paragraph (2) because it is not an offense
committed in relation to the office of the petitioner.
In Montilla v, Hilario,24 this Court described the "offense
committed in relation to the office" as follows:
[T]he relation between the crime and the
office contemplated by the Constitution is, in
our opinion, direct and not accidental. To fall
into the intent of the Constitution, the relation
has to be such that, in the legal sense, the
offense cannot exist without the office. In
other words, the office must be a constituent
element of the crime as defined in the statute,
such as, for instance, the crimes defined and
punished in Chapter Two to Six, Title Seven, of
the Revised Penal Code.
Public office is not of the essence of murder.
The taking of human life is either murder or
homicide whether done by a private citizen or
public servant, and the penalty is the same
except when the perpetrator. being a public
functionary took advantage of his office, as
alleged in this case, in which event the penalty
is increased.
 But the use or abuse of office does not adhere
to the crime as an element; and even as an
aggravating circumstance, its materiality
arises not from the allegations but on the
proof, not from the fact that the criminals are
public officials but from the manner of the
commission of the crime
There is no direct relation between the commission of the
crime of rape with homicide and the petitioner's office as
municipal mayor because public office is not an essential
element of the crime charged. The offense can stand
independently of the office. Moreover, it is not even alleged
in the information that the commission of the crime charged
was intimately connected with the performance of the
petitioner's official functions to make it fall under the
exception laid down in People v. Montejo. 25
In that case, a city mayor and several detectives were
charged with murder for the death of a suspect as a result of
a "third degree" investigation held at a police substation. The
appearance of a senator as their counsel was questioned by
the prosecution on the ground that he was inhibited by the
Constitution from representing them because they were
accused of an offense committed in relation to their office.
The Court agreed. It held that even if their position was not
an essential ingredient of the offense, there was
nevertheless an intimate connection between the office and
the offense, as alleged in the information, that brought it
within the definition of an offense "committed in relation to
the public office."
As Chief Justice Concepcion said:
It is apparent from these allegations that,
although public office is not an element of the
crime of murder in abstract, as committed by
the main respondents herein, according to the
amended information, the offense therein
charged is intimately connected with their
respective offices and was perpetrated while
they were in the performance, though
improper or irregular, of their official
functions. Indeed they had no personal motive
to commit the crime and they would not have
committed it had they not held their aforesaid
offices. The co-defendants of respondent
Leroy S. Brown, obeyed his instructions
because he was their superior officer, as
Mayor of Basilan City. (Emphasis supplied).
We have read the informations in the case at bar and find no
allegation therein that the crime of rape with homicide
imputed to the petitioner was connected with the discharge
of his functions as municipal mayor or that there is an
"intimate connection" between the offense and his office. It
follows that the said crime, being an ordinary offense, is
triable by the regular courts and not the Sandiganbayan.
Conclusion TOPIC: ON JURISDICTION H. MILITARY COURTS:
Cybercrime
As above demonstrated, all of the grounds invoked by the
petitioner are not supported by the facts and the applicable Republic of the Philippines
law and jurisprudence. They must, therefore, all be rejected. SUPREME COURT
In consequence, the respondent judge, who has started the Manila
trial of the criminal cases against the petitioner and his co-
accused, may proceed therewith without further hindrance. EN BANC

It remains to stress that the decision we make today is not a
decision on the merits of the criminal cases being tried
below. These will have to be decided by the respondent
judge in accordance with the evidence that is still being
received. At this time, there is yet no basis for judgment, only
uninformed conjecture. The Court will caution against such
irrelevant public speculations as they can be based only on
imperfect knowledge if not officious ignorance.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The respondent
judge is DIRECTED to continue with the trial of Criminal
Cases Nos. 101141, 101142, 101143, 101144, 101145,
101146 and 101147 and to decide them with deliberate
dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
AND HANNAH SERANA V SANDIGANBAYAN CASE
G.R. No. 203335 February 18, 2014
JOSE JESUS M. DISINI, JR., ROWENA S. DISINI, LIANNE
IVY P. MEDINA, JANETTE TORAL and ERNESTO SONIDO,
JR., Petitioners,
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE
INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY
OFFICE, THE CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
POLICE and THE DIRECTOR OF THE NATIONAL BUREAU
OF INVESTIGATION, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203299
LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO, Petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION and
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203306
ALAB NG MAMAMAHAYAG (ALAM), HUKUMAN NG
MAMAMAYAN MOVEMENT, INC., JERRY S. YAP, BERTENI
"TOTO" CAUSING, HERNANI Q. CUARE, PERCY LAPID,
TRACY CABRERA, RONALDO E. RENTA, CIRILO P.
SABARRE, JR., DERVIN CASTRO, ET AL., Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, represented by President
Benigno Simeon Aquino III, SENATE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, and HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203359
SENATOR TEOFISTO DL GUINGONA III, Petitioner,
vs.
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE,
THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR
AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE CHIEF OF THE
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, and DIRECTOR OF THE
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203378
ALEXANDER ADONIS, ELLEN TORDESILLAS, MA. GISELA
ORDENES-CASCOLAN, H. HARRY L. ROQUE, JR., ROMEL
R. BAGARES, and GILBERT T. ANDRES, Petitioners,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE DEPARTMENT OF
BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT, THE DEPARTMENT OF
JUSTICE, THE DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE,
AND THE INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS
TECHNOLOGY OFFICE-DEPARTMENT OF SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203391
HON. RAYMOND V. PALATINO, HON. ANTONIO TINIO,
VENCER MARI CRISOSTOMO OF ANAKBAYAN, MA.
KATHERINE ELONA OF THE PHILIPPINE COLLEGIAN,
ISABELLE THERESE BAGUISI OF THE NATIONAL UNION
OF STUDENTS OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL., Petitioners,
vs.
PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as Executive
Secretary and alter-ego of President Benigno Simeon
Aquino III, LEILA DE LIMA in her capacity as Secretary
of Justice, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203407
BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN SECRETARY
GENERAL RENATO M. REYES, JR., National Artist
BIENVENIDO L. LUMBERA, Chairperson of Concerned
Artists of the Philippines, ELMER C. LABOG,
Chairperson of Kilusang Mayo Uno, CRISTINA E.
PALABAY, Secretary General of Karapatan, FERDINAND
R. GAITE, Chairperson of COURAGE, JOEL B.
MAGLUNSOD, Vice President of Anakpawis Party-List,
LANA R. LINABAN, Secretary General Gabriela Women's
Party, ADOLFO ARES P. GUTIERREZ, and JULIUS GARCIA
MATIBAG, Petitioners,
vs.
BENIGNO SIMEON C. AQUINO III, President of the
Republic of the Philippines, PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,
Executive Secretary, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
represented by SENATE PRESIDENT JUAN PONCE
ENRILE, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, represented by
SPEAKER FELICIANO BELMONTE, JR., LEILA DE LIMA,
Secretary of the Department of Justice, LOUIS
NAPOLEON C. CASAMBRE, Executive Director of the
Information and Communications Technology Office,
NONNATUS CAESAR R. ROJAS, Director of the National
Bureau of Investigation, D/GEN. NICANOR A.
BARTOLOME, Chief of the Philippine National Police,
MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary of the Department of
the Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203440
MELENCIO S. STA. MARIA, SEDFREY M. CANDELARIA,
AMPARITA STA. MARIA, RAY PAOLO J. SANTIAGO,
GILBERT V. SEMBRANO, and RYAN JEREMIAH D. QUAN
(all of the Ateneo Human Rights Center),Petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE PAQUITO OCHOA in his capacity as
Executive Secretary, HONORABLE LEILA DE LIMA in her
capacity as Secretary of Justice, HONORABLE MANUEL
ROXAS in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of
Interior and Local Government, The CHIEF of the
Philippine National Police, The DIRECTOR of the
National Bureau of Investigation (all of the Executive
Department of Government), Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203453
NATIONAL UNION OF JOURNALISTS OF THE
PHILIPPINES (NUJP), PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE
(PPI), CENTER FOR MEDIA FREEDOM AND
RESPONSIBILITY, ROWENA CARRANZA PARAAN,
MELINDA QUINTOS-DE JESUS, JOSEPH ALWYN ALBURO,
ARIEL SEBELLINO AND THE PETITIONERS IN THE e-
PETITION http://www.nujp.org/no-to-
ra10175/, Petitioners,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF THE INTERIOR AND
LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE SECRETARY OF BUDGET
AND MANAGEMENT, THE DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, THE DIRECTOR OF THE
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, THE
CYBERCRIME INVESTIGATION AND COORDINATING
CENTER, AND ALL AGENCIES AND INSTRUMENTALITIES
OF GOVERNMENT AND ALL PERSONS ACTING UNDER
THEIR INSTRUCTIONS, ORDERS, DIRECTION IN
RELATION TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF REPUBLIC
ACT NO. 10175, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203454
PAUL CORNELIUS T. CASTILLO & RYAN D.
ANDRES, Petitioners,
vs.
THE HON. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE THE HON.
SECRETARY OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT,Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203469
ANTHONY IAN M. CRUZ; MARCELO R. LANDICHO;
BENJAMIN NOEL A. ESPINA; MARCK RONALD C.
RIMORIN; JULIUS D. ROCAS; OLIVER RICHARD V.
ROBILLO; AARON ERICK A. LOZADA; GERARD ADRIAN
P. MAGNAYE; JOSE REGINALD A. RAMOS; MA. ROSARIO
T. JUAN; BRENDALYN P. RAMIREZ; MAUREEN A.
HERMITANIO; KRISTINE JOY S. REMENTILLA; MARICEL
O. GRAY; JULIUS IVAN F. CABIGON; BENRALPH S. YU;
CEBU BLOGGERS SOCIETY, INC. PRESIDENT RUBEN B.
LICERA, JR; and PINOY EXPAT/OFW BLOG AWARDS,
INC. COORDINATOR PEDRO E. RAHON; Petitioners,
vs.
HIS EXCELLENCY BENIGNO S. AQUINO III, in his capacity
as President of the Republic of the Philippines; SENATE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by HON. JUAN PONCE
ENRILE, in his capacity as Senate President; HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, represented by FELICIANO R.
BELMONTE, JR., in his capacity as Speaker of the House
of Representatives; HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his
capacity as Executive Secretary; HON. LEILA M. DE
LIMA, in her capacity as Secretary of Justice; HON.
LOUIS NAPOLEON C. CASAMBRE, in his capacity as
Executive Director, Information and Communications
Technology Office; HON. NONNATUS CAESAR R. ROJAS,
in his capacity as Director, National Bureau of
Investigation; and P/DGEN. NICANOR A. BARTOLOME,
in his capacity as Chief, Philippine National
Police, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203501
PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
HIS EXCELLENCY BENIGNO S. AQUINO III, in his official
capacity as President of the Republic of the Philippines;
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his official capacity as
Executive Secretary; HON. LEILA M. DE LIMA, in her
official capacity as Secretary of Justice; LOUIS
NAPOLEON C. CASAMBRE, in his official capacity as
Executive Director, Information and Communications
Technology Office; NONNATUS CAESAR R. ROJAS, in his
official capacity as Director of the National Bureau of
Investigation; and DIRECTOR GENERAL NICANOR A.
BARTOLOME, in his official capacity as Chief of the
Philippine National Police,Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203509
BAYAN MUNA REPRESENTATIVE NERI J.
COLMENARES, Petitioner,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO OCHOA,
JR., Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203515
NATIONAL PRESS CLUB OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.
represented by BENNY D. ANTIPORDA in his capacity as
President and in his personal capacity, Petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PRES. BENIGNO SIMEON
AQUINO III, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, DEPARTMENT
OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL POLICE, NATIONAL BUREAU OF
INVESTIGATION, DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
MANAGEMENT AND ALL OTHER GOVERNMENT
INSTRUMENTALITIES WHO HAVE HANDS IN THE
PASSAGE AND/OR IMPLEMENTATION OF REPUBLIC
ACT 10175, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 203518
PHILIPPINE INTERNET FREEDOM ALLIANCE, composed
of DAKILA-PHILIPPINE COLLECTIVE FOR MODERN
HEROISM, represented by Leni Velasco, PARTIDO
LAKAS NG MASA, represented by Cesar S. Melencio,
FRANCIS EUSTON R. ACERO, MARLON ANTHONY
ROMASANTA TONSON, TEODORO A. CASIO, NOEMI
LARDIZABAL-DADO, IMELDA ORALES, JAMES
MATTHEW B. MIRAFLOR, JUAN G.M. RAGRAGIO, MARIA
FATIMA A. VILLENA, MEDARDO M. MANRIQUE, JR.,
LAUREN DADO, MARCO VITTORIA TOBIAS SUMAYAO,
IRENE CHIA, ERASTUS NOEL T. DELIZO, CRISTINA
SARAH E. OSORIO, ROMEO FACTOLERIN, NAOMI L.
TUPAS, KENNETH KENG, ANA ALEXANDRA C.
CASTRO, Petitioners,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF
JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF INTERIOR AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT, THE SECRETARY OF SCIENCE AND
TECHNOLOGY, THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY OFFICE, THE DIRECTOR
OF THE NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, THE
CHIEF, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE, THE HEAD OF
THE DOJ OFFICE OF CYBERCRIME, and THE OTHER
MEMBERS OF THE CYBERCRIME INVESTIGATION AND
COORDINATING CENTER, Respondents.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
These consolidated petitions seek to declare several
provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) 10175, the Cybercrime
Prevention Act of 2012, unconstitutional and void.
The Facts and the Case
The cybercrime law aims to regulate access to and use of the
cyberspace. Using his laptop or computer, a person can
connect to the internet, a system that links him to other
computers and enable him, among other things, to:
1. Access virtual libraries and encyclopedias for all
kinds of information that he needs for research,
study, amusement, upliftment, or pure curiosity;
2. Post billboard-like notices or messages, including
pictures and videos, for the general public or for
special audiences like associates, classmates, or
friends and read postings from them;
3. Advertise and promote goods or services and make
purchases and payments;
4. Inquire and do business with institutional entities
like government agencies, banks, stock exchanges,
trade houses, credit card companies, public utilities,
hospitals, and schools; and
5. Communicate in writing or by voice with any
person through his e-mail address or telephone.
This is cyberspace, a system that accommodates millions
and billions of simultaneous and ongoing individual
accesses to and uses of the internet. The cyberspace is a boon
to the need of the current generation for greater information
and facility of communication. But all is not well with the
system since it could not filter out a number of persons of ill
will who would want to use cyberspace technology for
mischiefs and crimes. One of them can, for instance, avail
himself of the system to unjustly ruin the reputation of
another or bully the latter by posting defamatory statements
against him that people can read.
And because linking with the internet opens up a user to
communications from others, the ill-motivated can use the
cyberspace for committing theft by hacking into or
surreptitiously accessing his bank account or credit card or
defrauding him through false representations. The wicked
can use the cyberspace, too, for illicit trafficking in sex or for
exposing to pornography guileless children who have access
to the internet. For this reason, the government has a
legitimate right to regulate the use of cyberspace and
contain and punish wrongdoings.
Notably, there are also those who would want, like vandals,
to wreak or cause havoc to the computer systems and
networks of indispensable or highly useful institutions as
well as to the laptop or computer programs and memories
of innocent individuals. They accomplish this by sending
electronic viruses or virtual dynamites that destroy those
computer systems, networks, programs, and memories. The
government certainly has the duty and the right to prevent
these tomfooleries from happening and punish their
perpetrators, hence the Cybercrime Prevention Act.
But petitioners claim that the means adopted by the
cybercrime law for regulating undesirable cyberspace
activities violate certain of their constitutional rights. The
government of course asserts that the law merely seeks to
reasonably put order into cyberspace activities, punish
wrongdoings, and prevent hurtful attacks on the system.
Pending hearing and adjudication of the issues presented in
these cases, on February 5, 2013 the Court extended the
original 120-day temporary restraining order (TRO) that it
earlier issued on October 9, 2012, enjoining respondent
government agencies from implementing the cybercrime
law until further orders.
The Issues Presented
Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of the following
provisions of the cybercrime law that regard certain acts as
crimes and impose penalties for their commission as well as
provisions that would enable the government to track down
and penalize violators. These provisions are:
a. Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access;
b. Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference;
c. Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting;
d. Section 4(b)(3) on Identity Theft;
e. Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex;
f. Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography;
g. Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial
Communications;
h. Section 4(c)(4) on Libel;
i. Section 5 on Aiding or Abetting and Attempt in the
Commission of Cybercrimes;
j. Section 6 on the Penalty of One Degree Higher;
k. Section 7 on the Prosecution under both the
Revised Penal Code (RPC) and R.A. 10175;
l. Section 8 on Penalties;
m. Section 12 on Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data;
n. Section 13 on Preservation of Computer Data;
o. Section 14 on Disclosure of Computer Data;
p. Section 15 on Search, Seizure and Examination of
Computer Data;
q. Section 17 on Destruction of Computer Data;
r. Section 19 on Restricting or Blocking Access to
Computer Data;
s. Section 20 on Obstruction of Justice;
t. Section 24 on Cybercrime Investigation and
Coordinating Center (CICC); and
u. Section 26(a) on CICCs Powers and Functions.
Some petitioners also raise the constitutionality of related
Articles 353, 354, 361, and 362 of the RPC on the crime of
libel.
The Rulings of the Court
Section 4(a)(1)
Section 4(a)(1) provides:
Section 4. Cybercrime Offenses. The following acts
constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under this
Act:
(a) Offenses against the confidentiality, integrity and
availability of computer data and systems:
(1) Illegal Access. The access to the whole or any part of a
computer system without right.
Petitioners contend that Section 4(a)(1) fails to meet the
strict scrutiny standard required of laws that interfere with
the fundamental rights of the people and should thus be
struck down.
The Court has in a way found the strict scrutiny standard, an
American constitutional construct,1 useful in determining
the constitutionality of laws that tend to target a class of
things or persons. According to this standard, a legislative
classification that impermissibly interferes with the exercise
of fundamental right or operates to the peculiar class
disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed
unconstitutional. The burden is on the government to prove
that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling
state interest and that it is the least restrictive means to
protect such interest.2 Later, the strict scrutiny standard was
used to assess the validity of laws dealing with the regulation
of speech, gender, or race as well as other fundamental
rights, as expansion from its earlier applications to equal
protection.3
In the cases before it, the Court finds nothing in Section
4(a)(1) that calls for the application of the strict scrutiny
standard since no fundamental freedom, like speech, is
involved in punishing what is essentially a condemnable act
accessing the computer system of another without right. It
is a universally condemned conduct.4
Petitioners of course fear that this section will jeopardize the
work of ethical hackers, professionals who employ tools and
techniques used by criminal hackers but would neither
damage the target systems nor steal information. Ethical
hackers evaluate the target systems security and report
back to the owners the vulnerabilities they found in it and
give instructions for how these can be remedied. Ethical
hackers are the equivalent of independent auditors who
come into an organization to verify its bookkeeping
records.5
Besides, a clients engagement of an ethical hacker requires
an agreement between them as to the extent of the search,
the methods to be used, and the systems to be tested. This is
referred to as the "get out of jail free card."6Since the ethical
hacker does his job with prior permission from the client,
such permission would insulate him from the coverage of
Section 4(a)(1).
Section 4(a)(3) of the Cybercrime Law
Section 4(a)(3) provides:
Section 4. Cybercrime Offenses. The following acts
constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under this
Act:
(a) Offenses against the confidentiality, integrity and
availability of computer data and systems:
xxxx
(3) Data Interference. The intentional or reckless
alteration, damaging, deletion or deterioration of computer
data, electronic document, or electronic data message,
without right, including the introduction or transmission of
viruses.
Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(3) suffers from
overbreadth in that, while it seeks to discourage data
interference, it intrudes into the area of protected speech
and expression, creating a chilling and deterrent effect on
these guaranteed freedoms.
Under the overbreadth doctrine, a proper governmental
purpose, constitutionally subject to state regulation, may not
be achieved by means that unnecessarily sweep its subject
broadly, thereby invading the area of protected
freedoms.7 But Section 4(a)(3) does not encroach on these
freedoms at all. It simply punishes what essentially is a form
of vandalism,8 the act of willfully destroying without right
the things that belong to others, in this case their computer
data, electronic document, or electronic data message. Such
act has no connection to guaranteed freedoms. There is no
freedom to destroy other peoples computer systems and
private documents.
All penal laws, like the cybercrime law, have of course an
inherent chilling effect, an in terrorem effect9 or the fear of
possible prosecution that hangs on the heads of citizens who
are minded to step beyond the boundaries of what is proper.
But to prevent the State from legislating criminal laws
because they instill such kind of fear is to render the state
powerless in addressing and penalizing socially harmful
conduct.10 Here, the chilling effect that results in paralysis is
an illusion since Section 4(a)(3) clearly describes the evil
that it seeks to punish and creates no tendency to intimidate
the free exercise of ones constitutional rights.
Besides, the overbreadth challenge places on petitioners the
heavy burden of proving that under no set of circumstances
will Section 4(a)(3) be valid.11 Petitioner has failed to
discharge this burden.
Section 4(a)(6) of the Cybercrime Law
Section 4(a)(6) provides:
Section 4. Cybercrime Offenses. The following acts
constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under this
Act:
(a) Offenses against the confidentiality, integrity and
availability of computer data and systems:
xxxx
(6) Cyber-squatting. The acquisition of domain name over
the internet in bad faith to profit, mislead, destroy the
reputation, and deprive others from registering the same, if
such a domain name is:
(i) Similar, identical, or confusingly similar to an
existing trademark registered with the appropriate
government agency at the time of the domain name
registration;
(ii) Identical or in any way similar with the name of a
person other than the registrant, in case of a personal
name; and
(iii) Acquired without right or with intellectual
property interests in it.
Petitioners claim that Section 4(a)(6) or cyber-squatting
violates the equal protection clause12 in that, not being
narrowly tailored, it will cause a user using his real name to
suffer the same fate as those who use aliases or take the
name of another in satire, parody, or any other literary
device. For example, supposing there exists a well known
billionaire-philanthropist named "Julio Gandolfo," the law
would punish for cyber-squatting both the person who
registers such name because he claims it to be his pseudo-
name and another who registers the name because it
happens to be his real name. Petitioners claim that,
considering the substantial distinction between the two, the
law should recognize the difference.
But there is no real difference whether he uses "Julio
Gandolfo" which happens to be his real name or use it as a
pseudo-name for it is the evil purpose for which he uses the
name that the law condemns. The law is reasonable in
penalizing him for acquiring the domain name in bad faith to
profit, mislead, destroy reputation, or deprive others who
are not ill-motivated of the rightful opportunity of
registering the same. The challenge to the constitutionality
of Section 4(a)(6) on ground of denial of equal protection is
baseless.
Section 4(b)(3) of the Cybercrime Law
Section 4(b)(3) provides:
Section 4. Cybercrime Offenses. The following acts
constitute the offense of cybercrime punishable under this
Act:
xxxx
b) Computer-related Offenses:
xxxx
(3) Computer-related Identity Theft. The intentional
acquisition, use, misuse, transfer, possession, alteration, or
deletion of identifying information belonging to another,
whether natural or juridical, without right: Provided: that if
no damage has yet been caused, the penalty imposable shall
be one (1) degree lower.
Petitioners claim that Section 4(b)(3) violates the
constitutional rights to due process and to privacy and
correspondence, and transgresses the freedom of the press.
The right to privacy, or the right to be let alone, was
institutionalized in the 1987 Constitution as a facet of the
right protected by the guarantee against unreasonable
searches and seizures.13 But the Court acknowledged its
existence as early as 1968 in Morfe v. Mutuc,14 it ruled that
the right to privacy exists independently of its identification
with liberty; it is in itself fully deserving of constitutional
protection.
Relevant to any discussion of the right to privacy is the
concept known as the "Zones of Privacy." The Court
explained in "In the Matter of the Petition for Issuance of
Writ of Habeas Corpus of Sabio v. Senator Gordon"15 the
relevance of these zones to the right to privacy:
Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws.
Within these zones, any form of intrusion is impermissible
unless excused by law and in accordance with customary
legal process. The meticulous regard we accord to these
zones arises not only from our conviction that the right to
privacy is a "constitutional right" and "the right most valued
by civilized men," but also from our adherence to the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights which mandates
that, "no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference
with his privacy" and "everyone has the right to the
protection of the law against such interference or attacks."
Two constitutional guarantees create these zones of privacy:
(a) the right against unreasonable searches16 and seizures,
which is the basis of the right to be let alone, and (b) the right
to privacy of communication and correspondence.17 In
assessing the challenge that the State has impermissibly
intruded into these zones of privacy, a court must determine
whether a person has exhibited a reasonable expectation of
privacy and, if so, whether that expectation has been
violated by unreasonable government intrusion.18
The usual identifying information regarding a person
includes his name, his citizenship, his residence address, his
contact number, his place and date of birth, the name of his
spouse if any, his occupation, and similar data.19 The law
punishes those who acquire or use such identifying
information without right, implicitly to cause damage.
Petitioners simply fail to show how government effort to
curb computer-related identity theft violates the right to investigation, has nothing to fear since a special
privacy and correspondence as well as the right to due circumstance is present to negate intent to gain which is
process of law. required by this Section.

Also, the charge of invalidity of this section based on the Section 4(c)(1) of the Cybercrime Law
overbreadth doctrine will not hold water since the specific
conducts proscribed do not intrude into guaranteed Section 4(c)(1) provides:
freedoms like speech. Clearly, what this section regulates are
specific actions: the acquisition, use, misuse or deletion of Sec. 4. Cybercrime Offenses. The following acts constitute
personal identifying data of another. There is no the offense of cybercrime punishable under this Act:
fundamental right to acquire anothers personal data.
xxxx
Further, petitioners fear that Section 4(b)(3) violates the
(c) Content-related Offenses:
freedom of the press in that journalists would be hindered
from accessing the unrestricted user account of a person in
(1) Cybersex. The willful engagement, maintenance,
the news to secure information about him that could be
control, or operation, directly or indirectly, of any lascivious
published. But this is not the essence of identity theft that
exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity, with the aid of
the law seeks to prohibit and punish. Evidently, the theft of
a computer system, for favor or consideration.
identity information must be intended for an illegitimate
purpose. Moreover, acquiring and disseminating Petitioners claim that the above violates the freedom of
information made public by the user himself cannot be expression clause of the Constitution.21 They express fear
regarded as a form of theft. that private communications of sexual character between
husband and wife or consenting adults, which are not
The Court has defined intent to gain as an internal act which
regarded as crimes under the penal code, would now be
can be established through the overt acts of the offender, and
regarded as crimes when done "for favor" in cyberspace. In
it may be presumed from the furtive taking of useful
common usage, the term "favor" includes "gracious
property pertaining to another, unless special circumstances
kindness," "a special privilege or right granted or conceded,"
reveal a different intent on the part of the perpetrator.20 As
or "a token of love (as a ribbon) usually worn
such, the press, whether in quest of news reporting or social
conspicuously."22 This meaning given to the term "favor"
embraces socially tolerated trysts. The law as written would
invite law enforcement agencies into the bedrooms of
married couples or consenting individuals.
But the deliberations of the Bicameral Committee of
Congress on this section of the Cybercrime Prevention Act
give a proper perspective on the issue. These deliberations
show a lack of intent to penalize a "private showing x x x
between and among two private persons x x x although that
may be a form of obscenity to some."23 The understanding of
those who drew up the cybercrime law is that the element of
"engaging in a business" is necessary to constitute the illegal
cybersex.24 The Act actually seeks to punish cyber
prostitution, white slave trade, and pornography for favor
and consideration. This includes interactive prostitution and
pornography, i.e., by webcam.25
The subject of Section 4(c)(1)lascivious exhibition of
sexual organs or sexual activityis not novel. Article 201 of
the RPC punishes "obscene publications and exhibitions and
indecent shows." The Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003
penalizes those who "maintain or hire a person to engage in
prostitution or pornography."26 The law defines prostitution
as any act, transaction, scheme, or design involving the use
of a person by another, for sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct in exchange for money, profit, or any other
consideration.27
The case of Nogales v. People28 shows the extent to which
the State can regulate materials that serve no other purpose
than satisfy the market for violence, lust, or
pornography.29 The Court weighed the property rights of
individuals against the public welfare. Private property, if
containing pornographic materials, may be forfeited and
destroyed. Likewise, engaging in sexual acts privately
through internet connection, perceived by some as a right,
has to be balanced with the mandate of the State to eradicate
white slavery and the exploitation of women.
In any event, consenting adults are protected by the wealth
of jurisprudence delineating the bounds of obscenity.30The
Court will not declare Section 4(c)(1) unconstitutional
where it stands a construction that makes it apply only to
persons engaged in the business of maintaining, controlling,
or operating, directly or indirectly, the lascivious exhibition
of sexual organs or sexual activity with the aid of a computer
system as Congress has intended.
Section 4(c)(2) of the Cybercrime Law
Section 4(c)(2) provides:
Sec. 4. Cybercrime Offenses. The following acts constitute
the offense of cybercrime punishable under this Act:
xxxx
(c) Content-related Offenses:
xxxx
(2) Child Pornography. The unlawful or prohibited acts
defined and punishable by Republic Act No. 9775 or the Anti-
Child Pornography Act of 2009, committed through a
computer system: Provided, That the penalty to be imposed
shall be (1) one degree higher than that provided for in
Republic Act No. 9775.
It seems that the above merely expands the scope of the
Anti-Child Pornography Act of 200931 (ACPA) to cover
identical activities in cyberspace. In theory, nothing
prevents the government from invoking the ACPA when
prosecuting persons who commit child pornography using a
computer system. Actually, ACPAs definition of child
pornography already embraces the use of "electronic,
mechanical, digital, optical, magnetic or any other means."
Notably, no one has questioned this ACPA provision.
Of course, the law makes the penalty higher by one degree
when the crime is committed in cyberspace. But no one can
complain since the intensity or duration of penalty is a
legislative prerogative and there is rational basis for such
higher penalty.32 The potential for uncontrolled
proliferation of a particular piece of child pornography when
uploaded in the cyberspace is incalculable.
Petitioners point out that the provision of ACPA that makes
it unlawful for any person to "produce, direct, manufacture
or create any form of child pornography"33 clearly relates to
the prosecution of persons who aid and abet the core
offenses that ACPA seeks to punish.34 Petitioners are wary
that a person who merely doodles on paper and imagines a
sexual abuse of a 16-year-old is not criminally liable for
producing child pornography but one who formulates the
idea on his laptop would be. Further, if the author bounces
off his ideas on Twitter, anyone who replies to the tweet
could be considered aiding and abetting a cybercrime.
The question of aiding and abetting the offense by simply
commenting on it will be discussed elsewhere below. For
now the Court must hold that the constitutionality of Section
4(c)(2) is not successfully challenged.
Section 4(c)(3) of the Cybercrime Law
Section 4(c)(3) provides:
Sec. 4. Cybercrime Offenses. The following acts constitute
the offense of cybercrime punishable under this Act:
xxxx
(c) Content-related Offenses:
xxxx
(3) Unsolicited Commercial Communications. The
transmission of commercial electronic communication with
the use of computer system which seeks to advertise, sell, or
offer for sale products and services are prohibited unless:
(i) There is prior affirmative consent from the
recipient; or
(ii) The primary intent of the communication is for
service and/or administrative announcements from
the sender to its existing users, subscribers or
customers; or
(iii) The following conditions are present:
(aa) The commercial electronic
communication contains a simple, valid, and
reliable way for the recipient to reject receipt
of further commercial electronic messages
(opt-out) from the same source;
(bb) The commercial electronic
communication does not purposely disguise
the source of the electronic message; and
(cc) The commercial electronic
communication does not purposely include
misleading information in any part of the
message in order to induce the recipients to
read the message.
The above penalizes the transmission of unsolicited
commercial communications, also known as "spam." The
term "spam" surfaced in early internet chat rooms and
interactive fantasy games. One who repeats the same
sentence or comment was said to be making a "spam." The
term referred to a Monty Pythons Flying Circus scene in
which actors would keep saying "Spam, Spam, Spam, and
Spam" when reading options from a menu.35
The Government, represented by the Solicitor General,
points out that unsolicited commercial communications or
spams are a nuisance that wastes the storage and network
capacities of internet service providers, reduces the
efficiency of commerce and technology, and interferes with
the owners peaceful enjoyment of his property.
Transmitting spams amounts to trespass to ones privacy
since the person sending out spams enters the recipients
domain without prior permission. The OSG contends that
commercial speech enjoys less protection in law.
But, firstly, the government presents no basis for holding
that unsolicited electronic ads reduce the "efficiency of
computers." Secondly, people, before the arrival of the age of
computers, have already been receiving such unsolicited ads
by mail. These have never been outlawed as nuisance since
people might have interest in such ads. What matters is that
the recipient has the option of not opening or reading these
mail ads. That is true with spams. Their recipients always
have the option to delete or not to read them.
To prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads would deny
a person the right to read his emails, even unsolicited
commercial ads addressed to him. Commercial speech is a
separate category of speech which is not accorded the same
level of protection as that given to other constitutionally
guaranteed forms of expression but is nonetheless entitled
to protection.36 The State cannot rob him of this right
without violating the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of
expression. Unsolicited advertisements are legitimate forms
of expression.
Articles 353, 354, and 355 of the Penal Code
Section 4(c)(4) of the Cyber Crime Law
Petitioners dispute the constitutionality of both the penal
code provisions on libel as well as Section 4(c)(4) of the
Cybercrime Prevention Act on cyberlibel.
The RPC provisions on libel read:
Art. 353. Definition of libel. A libel is public and malicious
imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect, real or
imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status, or
circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit, or
contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to blacken the
memory of one who is dead.
Art. 354. Requirement for publicity. Every defamatory
imputation is presumed to be malicious, even if it be true, if
no good intention and justifiable motive for making it is
shown, except in the following cases:
1. A private communication made by any person to
another in the performance of any legal, moral or
social duty; and
2. A fair and true report, made in good faith, without
any comments or remarks, of any judicial, legislative
or other official proceedings which are not of
confidential nature, or of any statement, report or
speech delivered in said proceedings, or of any other
act performed by public officers in the exercise of
their functions.
Art. 355. Libel means by writings or similar means. A libel
committed by means of writing, printing, lithography,
engraving, radio, phonograph, painting, theatrical
exhibition, cinematographic exhibition, or any similar
means, shall be punished by prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods or a fine ranging from 200 to
6,000 pesos, or both, in addition to the civil action which may
be brought by the offended party.
The libel provision of the cybercrime law, on the other hand,
merely incorporates to form part of it the provisions of the
RPC on libel. Thus Section 4(c)(4) reads:
Sec. 4. Cybercrime Offenses. The following acts constitute
the offense of cybercrime punishable under this Act:
xxxx
(c) Content-related Offenses:
xxxx
(4) Libel. The unlawful or prohibited acts of libel as
defined in Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, committed through a computer system or any
other similar means which may be devised in the future.
Petitioners lament that libel provisions of the penal
code37 and, in effect, the libel provisions of the cybercrime
law carry with them the requirement of "presumed malice"
even when the latest jurisprudence already replaces it with
the higher standard of "actual malice" as a basis for
conviction.38 Petitioners argue that inferring "presumed
malice" from the accuseds defamatory statement by virtue
of Article 354 of the penal code infringes on his
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression.
Petitioners would go further. They contend that the laws on
libel should be stricken down as unconstitutional for
otherwise good jurisprudence requiring "actual malice"
could easily be overturned as the Court has done in Fermin
v. People39 even where the offended parties happened to be
public figures.
The elements of libel are: (a) the allegation of a discreditable
act or condition concerning another; (b) publication of the
charge; (c) identity of the person defamed; and (d) existence
of malice.40
There is "actual malice" or malice in fact41 when the offender
makes the defamatory statement with the knowledge that it
is false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or
not.42 The reckless disregard standard used here requires a
high degree of awareness of probable falsity. There must be
sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the accused
in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of the
statement he published. Gross or even extreme negligence is
not sufficient to establish actual malice.43
The prosecution bears the burden of proving the presence of
actual malice in instances where such element is required to
establish guilt. The defense of absence of actual malice, even
when the statement turns out to be false, is available where
the offended party is a public official or a public figure, as in
the cases of Vasquez (a barangay official) and Borjal (the
Executive Director, First National Conference on Land
Transportation). Since the penal code and implicitly, the
cybercrime law, mainly target libel against private persons,
the Court recognizes that these laws imply a stricter
standard of "malice" to convict the author of a defamatory
statement where the offended party is a public figure.
Societys interest and the maintenance of good government
demand a full discussion of public affairs.44
Parenthetically, the Court cannot accept the proposition that
its ruling in Fermin disregarded the higher standard of
actual malice or malice in fact when it found Cristinelli
Fermin guilty of committing libel against complainants who
were public figures. Actually, the Court found the presence
of malice in fact in that case. Thus:
It can be gleaned from her testimony that petitioner had the
motive to make defamatory imputations against
complainants. Thus, petitioner cannot, by simply making a
general denial, convince us that there was no malice on her
part. Verily, not only was there malice in law, the article
being malicious in itself, but there was also malice in fact, as
there was motive to talk ill against complainants during the
electoral campaign. (Emphasis ours)
Indeed, the Court took into account the relatively wide
leeway given to utterances against public figures in the
above case, cinema and television personalities, when it
modified the penalty of imprisonment to just a fine of
6,000.00.
But, where the offended party is a private individual, the
prosecution need not prove the presence of malice. The law
explicitly presumes its existence (malice in law) from the
defamatory character of the assailed statement.45 For his
defense, the accused must show that he has a justifiable
reason for the defamatory statement even if it was in fact
true.46
Petitioners peddle the view that both the penal code and the
Cybercrime Prevention Act violate the countrys obligations
under the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR). They point out that in Adonis v. Republic of the
Philippines,47 the United Nations Human Rights Committee
(UNHRC) cited its General Comment 34 to the effect that
penal defamation laws should include the defense of truth.
But General Comment 34 does not say that the truth of the
defamatory statement should constitute an all-
encompassing defense. As it happens, Article 361 recognizes
truth as a defense but under the condition that the accused
has been prompted in making the statement by good
motives and for justifiable ends. Thus:
Art. 361. Proof of the truth. In every criminal prosecution
for libel, the truth may be given in evidence to the court and
if it appears that the matter charged as libelous is true, and,
moreover, that it was published with good motives and for
justifiable ends, the defendants shall be acquitted.
Proof of the truth of an imputation of an act or omission not
constituting a crime shall not be admitted, unless the
imputation shall have been made against Government
employees with respect to facts related to the discharge of
their official duties.
In such cases if the defendant proves the truth of the
imputation made by him, he shall be acquitted.
Besides, the UNHRC did not actually enjoin the Philippines,
as petitioners urge, to decriminalize libel. It simply
suggested that defamation laws be crafted with care to
ensure that they do not stifle freedom of
expression.48Indeed, the ICCPR states that although
everyone should enjoy freedom of expression, its exercise
carries with it special duties and responsibilities. Free
speech is not absolute. It is subject to certain restrictions, as
may be necessary and as may be provided by law.49
The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that libel is not a
constitutionally protected speech and that the government
has an obligation to protect private individuals from
defamation. Indeed, cyberlibel is actually not a new crime
since Article 353, in relation to Article 355 of the penal code,
already punishes it. In effect, Section 4(c)(4) above merely
affirms that online defamation constitutes "similar means"
for committing libel.
But the Courts acquiescence goes only insofar as the
cybercrime law penalizes the author of the libelous
statement or article. Cyberlibel brings with it certain
intricacies, unheard of when the penal code provisions on
libel were enacted. The culture associated with internet
media is distinct from that of print.
The internet is characterized as encouraging a freewheeling,
anything-goes writing style.50 In a sense, they are a world
apart in terms of quickness of the readers reaction to
defamatory statements posted in cyberspace, facilitated by
one-click reply options offered by the networking site as
well as by the speed with which such reactions are
disseminated down the line to other internet users. Whether
these reactions to defamatory statement posted on the
internet constitute aiding and abetting libel, acts that Section
5 of the cybercrime law punishes, is another matter that the
Court will deal with next in relation to Section 5 of the law.
Section 5 of the Cybercrime Law
Section 5 provides:
Sec. 5. Other Offenses. The following acts shall also
constitute an offense:
(a) Aiding or Abetting in the Commission of
Cybercrime. Any person who willfully abets or aids
 in the commission of any of the offenses enumerated
in this Act shall be held liable.
(b) Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrime. Any
person who willfully attempts to commit any of the
offenses enumerated in this Act shall be held liable.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section 5 that
renders criminally liable any person who willfully abets or
aids in the commission or attempts to commit any of the
offenses enumerated as cybercrimes. It suffers from
overbreadth, creating a chilling and deterrent effect on
protected expression.
The Solicitor General contends, however, that the current
body of jurisprudence and laws on aiding and abetting
sufficiently protects the freedom of expression of "netizens,"
the multitude that avail themselves of the services of the
internet. He points out that existing laws and jurisprudence
sufficiently delineate the meaning of "aiding or abetting" a
crime as to protect the innocent. The Solicitor General
argues that plain, ordinary, and common usage is at times
sufficient to guide law enforcement agencies in enforcing the
law.51 The legislature is not required to define every single
word contained in the laws they craft.
Aiding or abetting has of course well-defined meaning and
application in existing laws. When a person aids or abets
another in destroying a forest,52 smuggling merchandise
into the country,53 or interfering in the peaceful picketing of
laborers,54 his action is essentially physical and so is
susceptible to easy assessment as criminal in character.
These forms of aiding or abetting lend themselves to the
tests of common sense and human experience.
But, when it comes to certain cybercrimes, the waters are
muddier and the line of sight is somewhat blurred. The idea
of "aiding or abetting" wrongdoings online threatens the
heretofore popular and unchallenged dogmas of cyberspace
use.
According to the 2011 Southeast Asia Digital Consumer
Report, 33% of Filipinos have accessed the internet within a
year, translating to about 31 million users.55 Based on a
recent survey, the Philippines ranks 6th in the top 10 most
engaged countries for social networking.56 Social
networking sites build social relations among people who,
for example, share interests, activities, backgrounds, or real-
life connections.57
Two of the most popular of these sites are Facebook and
Twitter. As of late 2012, 1.2 billion people with shared
interests use Facebook to get in touch.58 Users register at
this site, create a personal profile or an open book of who
they are, add other users as friends, and exchange messages,
including automatic notifications when they update their
profile.59 A user can post a statement, a photo, or a video on
Facebook, which can be made visible to anyone, depending
on the users privacy settings.
If the post is made available to the public, meaning to
everyone and not only to his friends, anyone on Facebook
can react to the posting, clicking any of several buttons of
preferences on the programs screen such as "Like,"
"Comment," or "Share." "Like" signifies that the reader likes
the posting while "Comment" enables him to post online his
feelings or views about the same, such as "This is great!"
When a Facebook user "Shares" a posting, the original
"posting" will appear on his own Facebook profile,
consequently making it visible to his down-line Facebook
Friends.
Twitter, on the other hand, is an internet social networking
and microblogging service that enables its users to send and
read short text-based messages of up to 140 characters.
These are known as "Tweets." Microblogging is the practice
of posting small pieces of digital contentwhich could be in
the form of text, pictures, links, short videos, or other
mediaon the internet. Instead of friends, a Twitter user
has "Followers," those who subscribe to this particular
users posts, enabling them to read the same, and
"Following," those whom this particular user is subscribed
to, enabling him to read their posts. Like Facebook, a Twitter
user can make his tweets available only to his Followers, or
to the general public. If a post is available to the public, any
Twitter user can "Retweet" a given posting. Retweeting is
just reposting or republishing another persons tweet
without the need of copying and pasting it.
In the cyberworld, there are many actors: a) the blogger who
originates the assailed statement; b) the blog service
provider like Yahoo; c) the internet service provider like
PLDT, Smart, Globe, or Sun; d) the internet caf that may
have provided the computer used for posting the blog; e) the
person who makes a favorable comment on the blog; and f)
the person who posts a link to the blog site.60 Now, suppose
Maria (a blogger) maintains a blog on WordPress.com (blog
service provider). She needs the internet to access her blog
so she subscribes to Sun Broadband (Internet Service
Provider).
One day, Maria posts on her internet account the statement
that a certain married public official has an illicit affair with
a movie star. Linda, one of Marias friends who sees this post,
comments online, "Yes, this is so true! They are so immoral."
Marias original post is then multiplied by her friends and
the latters friends, and down the line to friends of friends
almost ad infinitum. Nena, who is a stranger to both Maria
and Linda, comes across this blog, finds it interesting and so
shares the link to this apparently defamatory blog on her
Twitter account. Nenas "Followers" then "Retweet" the link
to that blog site.
Pamela, a Twitter user, stumbles upon a random persons
"Retweet" of Nenas original tweet and posts this on her
Facebook account. Immediately, Pamelas Facebook Friends
start Liking and making Comments on the assailed posting.
A lot of them even press the Share button, resulting in the
further spread of the original posting into tens, hundreds,
thousands, and greater postings.
The question is: are online postings such as "Liking" an
openly defamatory statement, "Commenting" on it, or
"Sharing" it with others, to be regarded as "aiding or
abetting?" In libel in the physical world, if Nestor places on
the office bulletin board a small poster that says, "Armand is
a thief!," he could certainly be charged with libel. If Roger,
seeing the poster, writes on it, "I like this!," that could not be
libel since he did not author the poster. If Arthur, passing by
and noticing the poster, writes on it, "Correct!," would that
be libel? No, for he merely expresses agreement with the
statement on the poster. He still is not its author. Besides, it
is not clear if aiding or abetting libel in the physical world is
a crime.
But suppose Nestor posts the blog, "Armand is a thief!" on a
social networking site. Would a reader and his Friends or
Followers, availing themselves of any of the "Like,"
"Comment," and "Share" reactions, be guilty of aiding or
abetting libel? And, in the complex world of cyberspace
expressions of thoughts, when will one be liable for aiding or
abetting cybercrimes? Where is the venue of the crime?
Except for the original author of the assailed statement, the
rest (those who pressed Like, Comment and Share) are
essentially knee-jerk sentiments of readers who may think
little or haphazardly of their response to the original posting.
Will they be liable for aiding or abetting? And, considering
the inherent impossibility of joining hundreds or thousands
of responding "Friends" or "Followers" in the criminal
charge to be filed in court, who will make a choice as to who
should go to jail for the outbreak of the challenged posting?
The old parameters for enforcing the traditional form of libel
would be a square peg in a round hole when applied to
cyberspace libel. Unless the legislature crafts a cyber libel
law that takes into account its unique circumstances and
culture, such law will tend to create a chilling effect on the
millions that use this new medium of communication in
violation of their constitutionally-guaranteed right to
freedom of expression.
The United States Supreme Court faced the same issue in
Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union,61 a case involving the
constitutionality of the Communications Decency Act of
1996. The law prohibited (1) the knowing transmission, by
means of a telecommunications device, of
"obscene or indecent" communications to any recipient
under 18 years of age; and (2) the knowing use of an
interactive computer service to send to a specific person or
persons under 18 years of age or to display in a manner
available to a person under 18 years of age communications
that, in context, depict or describe, in terms "patently
offensive" as measured by contemporary community
standards, sexual or excretory activities or organs.
Those who challenged the Act claim that the law violated the
First Amendments guarantee of freedom of speech for being
overbroad. The U.S. Supreme Court agreed and ruled:
The vagueness of the Communications Decency Act of 1996
(CDA), 47 U.S.C.S. 223, is a matter of special concern for two
reasons. First, the CDA is a content-based regulation of
speech. The vagueness of such a regulation raises special U.S.
Const. amend. I concerns because of its obvious chilling
effect on free speech. Second, the CDA is a criminal statute.
In addition to the opprobrium and stigma of a criminal
conviction, the CDA threatens violators with penalties
including up to two years in prison for each act of violation.
The severity of criminal sanctions may well cause speakers
to remain silent rather than communicate even arguably
unlawful words, ideas, and images. As a practical matter, this
increased deterrent effect, coupled with the risk of
discriminatory enforcement of vague regulations, poses
greater U.S. Const. amend. I concerns than those implicated
by certain civil regulations.
xxxx
The Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA), 47 U.S.C.S.
223, presents a great threat of censoring speech that, in
fact, falls outside the statute's scope. Given the vague
contours of the coverage of the statute, it unquestionably
silences some speakers whose messages would be entitled
to constitutional protection. That danger provides further
reason for insisting that the statute not be overly broad. The
CDAs burden on protected speech cannot be justified if it
could be avoided by a more carefully drafted statute.
(Emphasis ours)
Libel in the cyberspace can of course stain a persons image
with just one click of the mouse. Scurrilous statements can
spread and travel fast across the globe like bad news.
Moreover, cyberlibel often goes hand in hand with
cyberbullying that oppresses the victim, his relatives, and
friends, evoking from mild to disastrous reactions. Still, a
governmental purpose, which seeks to regulate the use of
this cyberspace communication technology to protect a
persons reputation and peace of mind, cannot adopt means
that will unnecessarily and broadly sweep, invading the area
of protected freedoms.62
If such means are adopted, self-inhibition borne of fear of
what sinister predicaments await internet users will
suppress otherwise robust discussion of public issues.
Democracy will be threatened and with it, all liberties. Penal
laws should provide reasonably clear guidelines for law
enforcement officials and triers of facts to prevent arbitrary
and discriminatory enforcement.63 The terms "aiding or
abetting" constitute broad sweep that generates chilling
effect on those who express themselves through cyberspace
posts, comments, and other messages.64 Hence, Section 5 of
the cybercrime law that punishes "aiding or abetting" libel
on the cyberspace is a nullity.
When a penal statute encroaches upon the freedom of
speech, a facial challenge grounded on the void-for-
vagueness doctrine is acceptable. The inapplicability of the
doctrine must be carefully delineated. As Justice Antonio T.
Carpio explained in his dissent in Romualdez v. Commission
on Elections,65 "we must view these statements of the Court
on the inapplicability of the overbreadth and vagueness
doctrines to penal statutes as appropriate only insofar as
these doctrines are used to mount facial challenges to penal
statutes not involving free speech."
In an "as applied" challenge, the petitioner who claims a
violation of his constitutional right can raise any
constitutional ground absence of due process, lack of fair
notice, lack of ascertainable standards, overbreadth, or
vagueness. Here, one can challenge the constitutionality of a
statute only if he asserts a violation of his own rights. It
prohibits one from assailing the constitutionality of the
statute based solely on the violation of the rights of third
persons not before the court. This rule is also known as the
prohibition against third-party standing.66
But this rule admits of exceptions. A petitioner may for
instance mount a "facial" challenge to the constitutionality of
a statute even if he claims no violation of his own rights
under the assailed statute where it involves free speech on
grounds of overbreadth or vagueness of the statute.
The rationale for this exception is to counter the "chilling
effect" on protected speech that comes from statutes
violating free speech. A person who does not know whether
his speech constitutes a crime under an overbroad or vague
law may simply restrain himself from speaking in order to
avoid being charged of a crime. The overbroad or vague law
thus chills him into silence.67
As already stated, the cyberspace is an incomparable,
pervasive medium of communication. It is inevitable that
any government threat of punishment regarding certain
uses of the medium creates a chilling effect on the
constitutionally-protected freedom of expression of the
great masses that use it. In this case, the particularly
complex web of interaction on social media websites would
give law enforcers such latitude that they could arbitrarily
or selectively enforce the law.
Who is to decide when to prosecute persons who boost the
visibility of a posting on the internet by liking it? Netizens
are not given "fair notice" or warning as to what is criminal
conduct and what is lawful conduct. When a case is filed, how
will the court ascertain whether or not one netizens
comment aided and abetted a cybercrime while another
comment did not?
Of course, if the "Comment" does not merely react to the
original posting but creates an altogether new defamatory
story against Armand like "He beats his wife and children,"
then that should be considered an original posting published
on the internet. Both the penal code and the cybercrime law
clearly punish authors of defamatory publications. Make no
mistake, libel destroys reputations that society values.
Allowed to cascade in the internet, it will destroy
relationships and, under certain circumstances, will
generate enmity and tension between social or economic
groups, races, or religions, exacerbating existing tension in
their relationships.
In regard to the crime that targets child pornography, when
"Google procures, stores, and indexes child pornography
and facilitates the completion of transactions involving the
dissemination of child pornography," does this make Google
and its users aiders and abettors in the commission of child
pornography crimes?68 Byars highlights a feature in the
American law on child pornography that the Cybercrimes
law lacksthe exemption of a provider or notably a plain
user of interactive computer service from civil liability for
child pornography as follows:
No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall
be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information
provided by another information content provider and
cannot be held civilly liable for any action voluntarily taken
in good faith to restrict access to or availability of material
that the provider or user considers to be obscene...whether
or not such material is constitutionally protected.69
When a person replies to a Tweet containing child
pornography, he effectively republishes it whether wittingly
or unwittingly. Does this make him a willing accomplice to
the distribution of child pornography? When a user
downloads the Facebook mobile application, the user may
give consent to Facebook to access his contact details. In this
way, certain information is forwarded to third parties and
unsolicited commercial communication could be
disseminated on the basis of this information.70 As the
source of this information, is the user aiding the distribution
of this communication? The legislature needs to address this
clearly to relieve users of annoying fear of possible criminal
prosecution.
Section 5 with respect to Section 4(c)(4) is unconstitutional.
Its vagueness raises apprehension on the part of internet
users because of its obvious chilling effect on the freedom of
expression, especially since the crime of aiding or abetting
ensnares all the actors in the cyberspace front in a fuzzy way.
What is more, as the petitioners point out, formal crimes
such as libel are not punishable unless consummated.71 In
the absence of legislation tracing the interaction of netizens
and their level of responsibility such as in other countries,
Section 5, in relation to Section 4(c)(4) on Libel, Section
4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications, and
Section 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography, cannot stand scrutiny.
But the crime of aiding or abetting the commission of
cybercrimes under Section 5 should be permitted to apply to
Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access, Section 4(a)(2) on Illegal
Interception, Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference, Section
4(a)(4) on System Interference, Section 4(a)(5) on Misuse of
Devices, Section 4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting, Section 4(b)(1)
on Computer-related Forgery, Section 4(b)(2) on Computer-
related Fraud, Section 4(b)(3) on Computer-related Identity
Theft, and Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex. None of these
offenses borders on the exercise of the freedom of
expression.
The crime of willfully attempting to commit any of these
offenses is for the same reason not objectionable. A hacker
may for instance have done all that is necessary to illegally
access another partys computer system but the security
employed by the systems lawful owner could frustrate his
effort. Another hacker may have gained access to usernames
and passwords of others but fail to use these because the
system supervisor is alerted.72 If Section 5 that punishes any
person who willfully attempts to commit this specific offense
is not upheld, the owner of the username and password
could not file a complaint against him for attempted hacking.
But this is not right. The hacker should not be freed from
liability simply because of the vigilance of a lawful owner or
his supervisor.
Petitioners of course claim that Section 5 lacks positive
limits and could cover the innocent.73 While this may be true
with respect to cybercrimes that tend to sneak past the area
of free expression, any attempt to commit the other acts
specified in Section 4(a)(1), Section 4(a)(2), Section 4(a)(3),
Section 4(a)(4), Section 4(a)(5), Section 4(a)(6), Section
4(b)(1), Section 4(b)(2), Section 4(b)(3), and Section 4(c)(1)
as well as the actors aiding and abetting the commission of
such acts can be identified with some reasonable certainty
through adroit tracking of their works. Absent concrete
proof of the same, the innocent will of course be spared.
Section 6 of the Cybercrime Law
Section 6 provides:
Sec. 6. All crimes defined and penalized by the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, and special laws, if committed by,
through and with the use of information and
communications technologies shall be covered by the
relevant provisions of this Act: Provided, That the penalty to
be imposed shall be one (1) degree higher than that
provided for by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and
special laws, as the case may be.
Section 6 merely makes commission of existing crimes
through the internet a qualifying circumstance. As the
Solicitor General points out, there exists a substantial
distinction between crimes committed through the use of
information and communications technology and similar
crimes committed using other means. In using the
technology in question, the offender often evades
identification and is able to reach far more victims or cause
greater harm. The distinction, therefore, creates a basis for
higher penalties for cybercrimes.
Section 7 of the Cybercrime Law
Section 7 provides:
Sec. 7. Liability under Other Laws. A prosecution under
this Act shall be without prejudice to any liability for
violation of any provision of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, or special laws.
The Solicitor General points out that Section 7 merely
expresses the settled doctrine that a single set of acts may be
prosecuted and penalized simultaneously under two laws, a
special law and the Revised Penal Code. When two different
laws define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one does not bar
prosecution of the other although both offenses arise from
the same fact, if each crime involves some important act
which is not an essential element of the other.74 With the
exception of the crimes of online libel and online child
pornography, the Court would rather leave the
determination of the correct application of Section 7 to
actual cases.
Online libel is different. There should be no question that if
the published material on print, said to be libelous, is again
posted online or vice versa, that identical material cannot be
the subject of two separate libels. The two offenses, one a
violation of Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code and the
other a violation of Section 4(c)(4) of R.A. 10175 involve
essentially the same elements and are in fact one and the
same offense. Indeed, the OSG itself claims that online libel
under Section 4(c)(4) is not a new crime but is one already
punished under Article 353. Section 4(c)(4) merely
establishes the computer system as another means of
publication.75 Charging the offender under both laws would
be a blatant violation of the proscription against double
jeopardy.76
The same is true with child pornography committed online.
Section 4(c)(2) merely expands the ACPAs scope so as to
include identical activities in cyberspace. As previously
discussed, ACPAs definition of child pornography in fact
already covers the use of "electronic, mechanical, digital,
optical, magnetic or any other means." Thus, charging the
offender under both Section 4(c)(2) and ACPA would
likewise be tantamount to a violation of the constitutional
prohibition against double jeopardy.
Section 8 of the Cybercrime Law
Section 8 provides:
Sec. 8. Penalties. Any person found guilty of any of the
punishable acts enumerated in Sections 4(a) and 4(b) of this
Act shall be punished with imprisonment of prision mayor
or a fine of at least Two hundred thousand pesos
(Ph200,000.00) up to a maximum amount commensurate
to the damage incurred or both.
Any person found guilty of the punishable act under Section
4(a)(5) shall be punished with imprisonment of prision
mayor or a fine of not more than Five hundred thousand
pesos (Ph500,000.00) or both.
If punishable acts in Section 4(a) are committed against
critical infrastructure, the penalty of reclusion temporal or a
fine of at least Five hundred thousand pesos
(Ph500,000.00) up to maximum amount commensurate to
the damage incurred or both, shall be imposed.
Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts
enumerated in Section 4(c)(1) of this Act shall be punished
with imprisonment of prision mayor or a fine of at least Two
hundred thousand pesos (Ph200,000.00) but not
exceeding One million pesos (Ph1,000,000.00) or both.
Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts
enumerated in Section 4(c)(2) of this Act shall be punished
with the penalties as enumerated in Republic Act No. 9775
or the "Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009:" Provided, That
the penalty to be imposed shall be one (1) degree higher
than that provided for in Republic Act No. 9775, if committed
through a computer system.
Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts
enumerated in Section 4(c)(3) shall be punished with
imprisonment of arresto mayor or a fine of at least Fifty
thousand pesos (Ph50,000.00) but not exceeding Two
hundred fifty thousand pesos (Ph250,000.00) or both.
Any person found guilty of any of the punishable acts
enumerated in Section 5 shall be punished with
imprisonment one (1) degree lower than that of the
prescribed penalty for the offense or a fine of at least One
hundred thousand pesos (Ph100,000.00) but not
exceeding Five hundred thousand pesos (Ph500,000.00) or
both.
Section 8 provides for the penalties for the following crimes:
Sections 4(a) on Offenses Against the Confidentiality,
Integrity and Availability of Computer Data and Systems;
4(b) on Computer-related Offenses; 4(a)(5) on Misuse of
Devices; when the crime punishable under 4(a) is
committed against critical infrastructure; 4(c)(1) on
Cybersex; 4(c)(2) on Child Pornography; 4(c)(3) on
Unsolicited Commercial Communications; and Section 5 on
Aiding or Abetting, and Attempt in the Commission of
Cybercrime.
The matter of fixing penalties for the commission of crimes
is as a rule a legislative prerogative. Here the legislature
prescribed a measure of severe penalties for what it regards
as deleterious cybercrimes. They appear proportionate to
the evil sought to be punished. The power to determine
penalties for offenses is not diluted or improperly wielded
simply because at some prior time the act or omission was
but an element of another offense or might just have been
connected with another crime.77 Judges and magistrates can
only interpret and apply them and have no authority to
modify or revise their range as determined by the legislative
department.
The courts should not encroach on this prerogative of the
lawmaking body.78
Section 12 of the Cybercrime Law
Section 12 provides:
Sec. 12. Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data. Law
enforcement authorities, with due cause, shall be authorized
to collect or record by technical or electronic means traffic
data in real-time associated with specified communications
transmitted by means of a computer system.
Traffic data refer only to the communications origin,
destination, route, time, date, size, duration, or type of
underlying service, but not content, nor identities.
All other data to be collected or seized or disclosed will
require a court warrant.
Service providers are required to cooperate and assist law
enforcement authorities in the collection or recording of the
above-stated information.
The court warrant required under this section shall only be
issued or granted upon written application and the
examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and
the witnesses he may produce and the showing: (1) that
there are reasonable grounds to believe that any of the
crimes enumerated hereinabove has been committed, or is
being committed, or is about to be committed; (2) that there
are reasonable grounds to believe that evidence that will be
obtained is essential to the conviction of any person for, or
to the solution of, or to the prevention of, any such crimes;
and (3) that there are no other means readily available for
obtaining such evidence.
Petitioners assail the grant to law enforcement agencies of
the power to collect or record traffic data in real time as
tending to curtail civil liberties or provide opportunities for
official abuse. They claim that data showing where digital
messages come from, what kind they are, and where they are
destined need not be incriminating to their senders or
recipients before they are to be protected. Petitioners invoke
the right of every individual to privacy and to be protected
from government snooping into the messages or
information that they send to one another.
The first question is whether or not Section 12 has a proper
governmental purpose since a law may require the
disclosure of matters normally considered private but then
only upon showing that such requirement has a rational
relation to the purpose of the law,79 that there is a
compelling State interest behind the law, and that the
provision itself is narrowly drawn.80 In assessing
regulations affecting privacy rights, courts should balance
the legitimate concerns of the State against constitutional
guarantees.81
Undoubtedly, the State has a compelling interest in enacting
the cybercrime law for there is a need to put order to the
tremendous activities in cyberspace for public good.82 To do
this, it is within the realm of reason that the government
should be able to monitor traffic data to enhance its ability
to combat all sorts of cybercrimes.
Chapter IV of the cybercrime law, of which the collection or
recording of traffic data is a part, aims to provide law
enforcement authorities with the power they need for
spotting, preventing, and investigating crimes committed in
cyberspace. Crime-fighting is a state business. Indeed, as
Chief Justice Sereno points out, the Budapest Convention on
Cybercrimes requires signatory countries to adopt
legislative measures to empower state authorities to collect
or record "traffic data, in real time, associated with specified
communications."83 And this is precisely what Section 12
does. It empowers law enforcement agencies in this country
to collect or record such data.
But is not evidence of yesterdays traffic data, like the scene
of the crime after it has been committed, adequate for
fighting cybercrimes and, therefore, real-time data is
superfluous for that purpose? Evidently, it is not. Those who
commit the crimes of accessing a computer system without
right,84 transmitting viruses,85 lasciviously exhibiting sexual
organs or sexual activity for favor or consideration;86 and
producing child pornography87 could easily evade detection
and prosecution by simply moving the physical location of
their computers or laptops from day to day. In this digital
age, the wicked can commit cybercrimes from virtually
anywhere: from internet cafs, from kindred places that
provide free internet services, and from unregistered mobile
internet connectors. Criminals using cellphones under pre-
paid arrangements and with unregistered SIM cards do not
have listed addresses and can neither be located nor
identified. There are many ways the cyber criminals can
quickly erase their tracks. Those who peddle child
pornography could use relays of computers to mislead law
enforcement authorities regarding their places of
operations. Evidently, it is only real-time traffic data
collection or recording and a subsequent recourse to court-
issued search and seizure warrant that can succeed in
ferreting them out.
Petitioners of course point out that the provisions of Section
12 are too broad and do not provide ample safeguards
against crossing legal boundaries and invading the peoples
right to privacy. The concern is understandable. Indeed, the
Court recognizes in Morfe v. Mutuc88 that certain
constitutional guarantees work together to create zones of
privacy wherein governmental powers may not intrude, and
that there exists an independent constitutional right of
privacy. Such right to be left alone has been regarded as the
beginning of all freedoms.89
But that right is not unqualified. In Whalen v. Roe,90 the
United States Supreme Court classified privacy into two
categories: decisional privacy and informational privacy.
Decisional privacy involves the right to independence in
making certain important decisions, while informational
privacy refers to the interest in avoiding disclosure of
personal matters. It is the latter rightthe right to
informational privacythat those who oppose government
collection or recording of traffic data in real-time seek to
protect.
Informational privacy has two aspects: the right not to have
private information disclosed, and the right to live freely
without surveillance and intrusion.91 In determining
whether or not a matter is entitled to the right to privacy,
this Court has laid down a two-fold test. The first is a
subjective test, where one claiming the right must have an
actual or legitimate expectation of privacy over a certain
matter. The second is an objective test, where his or her
expectation of privacy must be one society is prepared to
accept as objectively reasonable.92
Since the validity of the cybercrime law is being challenged,
not in relation to its application to a particular person or
group, petitioners challenge to Section 12 applies to all
information and communications technology (ICT) users,
meaning the large segment of the population who use all
sorts of electronic devices to communicate with one another.
Consequently, the expectation of privacy is to be measured
from the general publics point of view. Without reasonable
expectation of privacy, the right to it would have no basis in
fact.
As the Solicitor General points out, an ordinary ICT user who
courses his communication through a service provider, must
of necessity disclose to the latter, a third person, the traffic
data needed for connecting him to the recipient ICT user. For
example, an ICT user who writes a text message intended for
another ICT user must furnish his service provider with his
cellphone number and the cellphone number of his
recipient, accompanying the message sent. It is this
information that creates the traffic data. Transmitting
communications is akin to putting a letter in an envelope
properly addressed, sealing it closed, and sending it through
the postal service. Those who post letters have no
expectations that no one will read the information appearing
outside the envelope.
Computer datamessages of all kindstravel across the
internet in packets and in a way that may be likened to
parcels of letters or things that are sent through the posts.
When data is sent from any one source, the content is broken
up into packets and around each of these packets is a
wrapper or header. This header contains the traffic data:
information that tells computers where the packet
originated, what kind of data is in the packet (SMS, voice call,
video, internet chat messages, email, online browsing data,
etc.), where the packet is going, and how the packet fits
together with other packets.93 The difference is that traffic
data sent through the internet at times across the ocean do
not disclose the actual names and addresses (residential or
office) of the sender and the recipient, only their coded
internet protocol (IP) addresses. The packets travel from
one computer system to another where their contents are
pieced back together.
Section 12 does not permit law enforcement authorities to
look into the contents of the messages and uncover the
identities of the sender and the recipient.
For example, when one calls to speak to another through his
cellphone, the service providers communications system
will put his voice message into packets and send them to the
other persons cellphone where they are refitted together
and heard. The latters spoken reply is sent to the caller in
the same way. To be connected by the service provider, the
sender reveals his cellphone number to the service provider
when he puts his call through. He also reveals the cellphone
number to the person he calls. The other ways of
communicating electronically follow the same basic pattern.
In Smith v. Maryland,94 cited by the Solicitor General, the
United States Supreme Court reasoned that telephone users
in the 70s must realize that they necessarily convey phone
numbers to the telephone company in order to complete a
call. That Court ruled that even if there is an expectation that
phone numbers one dials should remain private, such
expectation is not one that society is prepared to recognize
as reasonable.
In much the same way, ICT users must know that they
cannot communicate or exchange data with one another
over cyberspace except through some service providers to
whom they must submit certain traffic data that are needed
for a successful cyberspace communication. The conveyance
of this data takes them out of the private sphere, making the
expectation to privacy in regard to them an expectation that
society is not prepared to recognize as reasonable.
The Court, however, agrees with Justices Carpio and Brion
that when seemingly random bits of traffic data are gathered
in bulk, pooled together, and analyzed, they reveal patterns
of activities which can then be used to create profiles of the
persons under surveillance. With enough traffic data,
analysts may be able to determine a persons close
associations, religious views, political affiliations, even
sexual preferences. Such information is likely beyond what
the public may expect to be disclosed, and clearly falls within
matters protected by the right to privacy. But has the
procedure that Section 12 of the law provides been drawn
narrowly enough to protect individual rights?
Section 12 empowers law enforcement authorities, "with
due cause," to collect or record by technical or electronic
means traffic data in real-time. Petitioners point out that the
phrase "due cause" has no precedent in law or jurisprudence
and that whether there is due cause or not is left to the
discretion of the police. Replying to this, the Solicitor General
asserts that Congress is not required to define the meaning
of every word it uses in drafting the law.
Indeed, courts are able to save vague provisions of law
through statutory construction. But the cybercrime law,
dealing with a novel situation, fails to hint at the meaning it
intends for the phrase "due cause." The Solicitor General
suggests that "due cause" should mean "just reason or
motive" and "adherence to a lawful procedure." But the
Court cannot draw this meaning since Section 12 does not
even bother to relate the collection of data to the probable
commission of a particular crime. It just says, "with due
cause," thus justifying a general gathering of data. It is akin
to the use of a general search warrant that the Constitution
prohibits.
Due cause is also not descriptive of the purpose for which
data collection will be used. Will the law enforcement
agencies use the traffic data to identify the perpetrator of a
cyber attack? Or will it be used to build up a case against an
identified suspect? Can the data be used to prevent
cybercrimes from happening?
The authority that Section 12 gives law enforcement
agencies is too sweeping and lacks restraint. While it says
that traffic data collection should not disclose identities or
content data, such restraint is but an illusion. Admittedly,
nothing can prevent law enforcement agencies holding these
data in their hands from looking into the identity of their
sender or receiver and what the data contains. This will
unnecessarily expose the citizenry to leaked information or,
worse, to extortion from certain bad elements in these
agencies.
Section 12, of course, limits the collection of traffic data to
those "associated with specified communications." But this
supposed limitation is no limitation at all since, evidently, it
is the law enforcement agencies that would specify the
target communications. The power is virtually limitless,
enabling law enforcement authorities to engage in "fishing
expedition," choosing whatever specified communication
they want. This evidently threatens the right of individuals
to privacy.
The Solicitor General points out that Section 12 needs to
authorize collection of traffic data "in real time" because it is
not possible to get a court warrant that would authorize the
search of what is akin to a "moving vehicle." But warrantless
search is associated with a police officers determination of
probable cause that a crime has been committed, that there
is no opportunity for getting a warrant, and that unless the
search is immediately carried out, the thing to be searched
stands to be removed. These preconditions are not provided
in Section 12.
The Solicitor General is honest enough to admit that Section
12 provides minimal protection to internet users and that
the procedure envisioned by the law could be better served
by providing for more robust safeguards. His bare assurance
that law enforcement authorities will not abuse the
provisions of Section 12 is of course not enough. The grant
of the power to track cyberspace communications in real
time and determine their sources and destinations must be
narrowly drawn to preclude abuses.95
Petitioners also ask that the Court strike down Section 12 for
being violative of the void-for-vagueness doctrine and the
overbreadth doctrine. These doctrines however, have been
consistently held by this Court to apply only to free speech
cases. But Section 12 on its own neither regulates nor
punishes any type of speech. Therefore, such analysis is
unnecessary.
This Court is mindful that advances in technology allow the
government and kindred institutions to monitor individuals
and place them under surveillance in ways that have
previously been impractical or even impossible. "All the
forces of a technological age x x x operate to narrow the area
of privacy and facilitate intrusions into it. In modern terms,
the capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private
life marks the difference between a democratic and a
totalitarian society."96 The Court must ensure that laws
seeking to take advantage of these technologies be written
with specificity and definiteness as to ensure respect for the
rights that the Constitution guarantees.
Section 13 of the Cybercrime Law
Section 13 provides:
Sec. 13. Preservation of Computer Data. The integrity of
traffic data and subscriber information relating to
communication services provided by a service provider shall
be preserved for a minimum period of six (6) months from
the date of the transaction. Content data shall be similarly
preserved for six (6) months from the date of receipt of the
order from law enforcement authorities requiring its
preservation.
Law enforcement authorities may order a one-time
extension for another six (6) months: Provided, That once
computer data preserved, transmitted or stored by a service
provider is used as evidence in a case, the mere furnishing to
such service provider of the transmittal document to the
Office of the Prosecutor shall be deemed a notification to
preserve the computer data until the termination of the case.
The service provider ordered to preserve computer data
shall keep confidential the order and its compliance.
Petitioners in G.R. 20339197 claim that Section 13
constitutes an undue deprivation of the right to property.
They liken the data preservation order that law enforcement
authorities are to issue as a form of garnishment of personal
property in civil forfeiture proceedings. Such order prevents
internet users from accessing and disposing of traffic data
that essentially belong to them.
No doubt, the contents of materials sent or received through
the internet belong to their authors or recipients and are to
be considered private communications. But it is not clear
that a service provider has an obligation to indefinitely keep
a copy of the same as they pass its system for the benefit of
users. By virtue of Section 13, however, the law now requires
service providers to keep traffic data and subscriber
information relating to communication services for at least
six months from the date of the transaction and those
relating to content data for at least six months from receipt
of the order for their preservation.
Actually, the user ought to have kept a copy of that data
when it crossed his computer if he was so minded. The
service provider has never assumed responsibility for their
loss or deletion while in its keep.
At any rate, as the Solicitor General correctly points out, the
data that service providers preserve on orders of law
enforcement authorities are not made inaccessible to users
by reason of the issuance of such orders. The process of
preserving data will not unduly hamper the normal
transmission or use of the same.
Section 14 of the Cybercrime Law
Section 14 provides:
Sec. 14. Disclosure of Computer Data. Law enforcement
authorities, upon securing a court warrant, shall issue an
order requiring any person or service provider to disclose or
submit subscribers information, traffic data or relevant data
in his/its possession or control within seventy-two (72)
hours from receipt of the order in relation to a valid
complaint officially docketed and assigned for investigation
and the disclosure is necessary and relevant for the purpose
of investigation.
The process envisioned in Section 14 is being likened to the
issuance of a subpoena. Petitioners objection is that the
issuance of subpoenas is a judicial function. But it is well-
settled that the power to issue subpoenas is not exclusively
a judicial function. Executive agencies have the power to
issue subpoena as an adjunct of their investigatory powers.98
Besides, what Section 14 envisions is merely the
enforcement of a duly issued court warrant, a function
usually lodged in the hands of law enforcers to enable them
to carry out their executive functions. The prescribed
procedure for disclosure would not constitute an unlawful
search or seizure nor would it violate the privacy of
communications and correspondence. Disclosure can be
made only after judicial intervention.
Section 15 of the Cybercrime Law
Section 15 provides:
Sec. 15. Search, Seizure and Examination of Computer Data.
Where a search and seizure warrant is properly issued,
the law enforcement authorities shall likewise have the
following powers and duties.
Within the time period specified in the warrant, to conduct
interception, as defined in this Act, and:
(a) To secure a computer system or a computer data
storage medium;
(b) To make and retain a copy of those computer data
secured;
(c) To maintain the integrity of the relevant stored
computer data;
(d) To conduct forensic analysis or examination of
the computer data storage medium; and
(e) To render inaccessible or remove those computer
data in the accessed computer or computer and
communications network.
Pursuant thereof, the law enforcement authorities may
order any person who has knowledge about the functioning
of the computer system and the measures to protect and
preserve the computer data therein to provide, as is
reasonable, the necessary information, to enable the
undertaking of the search, seizure and examination.
Law enforcement authorities may request for an extension
of time to complete the examination of the computer data
storage medium and to make a return thereon but in no case
for a period longer than thirty (30) days from date of
approval by the court.
Petitioners challenge Section 15 on the assumption that it
will supplant established search and seizure procedures. On
its face, however, Section 15 merely enumerates the duties
of law enforcement authorities that would ensure the proper
collection, preservation, and use of computer system or data
that have been seized by virtue of a court warrant. The
exercise of these duties do not pose any threat on the rights
of the person from whom they were taken. Section 15 does
not appear to supersede existing search and seizure rules
but merely supplements them.
Section 17 of the Cybercrime Law
Section 17 provides:
Sec. 17. Destruction of Computer Data. Upon expiration of
the periods as provided in Sections 13 and 15, service
providers and law enforcement authorities, as the case may
be, shall immediately and completely destroy the computer
data subject of a preservation and examination.
Section 17 would have the computer data, previous subject
of preservation or examination, destroyed or deleted upon
the lapse of the prescribed period. The Solicitor General
justifies this as necessary to clear up the service providers
storage systems and prevent overload. It would also ensure
that investigations are quickly concluded.
Petitioners claim that such destruction of computer data
subject of previous preservation or examination violates the
users right against deprivation of property without due
process of law. But, as already stated, it is unclear that the
user has a demandable right to require the service provider
to have that copy of the data saved indefinitely for him in its
storage system. If he wanted them preserved, he should have
saved them in his computer when he generated the data or
received it. He could also request the service provider for a
copy before it is deleted.
Section 19 of the Cybercrime Law
Section 19 empowers the Department of Justice to restrict or
block access to computer data:
Sec. 19. Restricting or Blocking Access to Computer Data.
When a computer data is prima facie found to be in violation
of the provisions of this Act, the DOJ shall issue an order to
restrict or block access to such computer data.
Petitioners contest Section 19 in that it stifles freedom of
expression and violates the right against unreasonable
searches and seizures. The Solicitor General concedes that
this provision may be unconstitutional. But since laws enjoy
a presumption of constitutionality, the Court must satisfy
itself that Section 19 indeed violates the freedom and right
mentioned.
Computer data99 may refer to entire programs or lines of
code, including malware, as well as files that contain texts,
images, audio, or video recordings. Without having to go into
a lengthy discussion of property rights in the digital space, it
is indisputable that computer data, produced or created by
their writers or authors may constitute personal property.
Consequently, they are protected from unreasonable
searches and seizures, whether while stored in their
personal computers or in the service providers systems.
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that
the right to be secure in ones papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and
for any purpose shall be inviolable. Further, it states that no
search warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge. Here, the Government,
in effect, seizes and places the computer data under its
control and disposition without a warrant. The Department
of Justice order cannot substitute for judicial search warrant.
The content of the computer data can also constitute speech.
In such a case, Section 19 operates as a restriction on the
freedom of expression over cyberspace. Certainly not all
forms of speech are protected. Legislature may, within
constitutional bounds, declare certain kinds of expression as
illegal. But for an executive officer to seize content alleged to
be unprotected without any judicial warrant, it is not enough
for him to be of the opinion that such content violates some
law, for to do so would make him judge, jury, and
executioner all rolled into one.100
Not only does Section 19 preclude any judicial intervention,
but it also disregards jurisprudential guidelines established
to determine the validity of restrictions on speech.
Restraints on free speech are generally evaluated on one of
or a combination of three tests: the dangerous tendency
doctrine, the balancing of interest test, and the clear and
present danger rule.101 Section 19, however, merely
requires that the data to be blocked be found prima facie in
violation of any provision of the cybercrime law. Taking
Section 6 into consideration, this can actually be made to
apply in relation to any penal provision. It does not take into
consideration any of the three tests mentioned above.
The Court is therefore compelled to strike down Section 19
for being violative of the constitutional guarantees to
freedom of expression and against unreasonable searches
and seizures.
Section 20 of the Cybercrime Law
Section 20 provides:
Sec. 20. Noncompliance. Failure to comply with the
provisions of Chapter IV hereof specifically the orders from
law enforcement authorities shall be punished as a violation
of Presidential Decree No. 1829 with imprisonment of
prision correctional in its maximum period or a fine of One
hundred thousand pesos (Php100,000.00) or both, for each
and every noncompliance with an order issued by law
enforcement authorities.
Petitioners challenge Section 20, alleging that it is a bill of
attainder. The argument is that the mere failure to comply
constitutes a legislative finding of guilt, without regard to
situations where non-compliance would be reasonable or
valid.
But since the non-compliance would be punished as a
violation of Presidential Decree (P.D.) 1829,102 Section 20
necessarily incorporates elements of the offense which are
defined therein. If Congress had intended for Section 20 to
constitute an offense in and of itself, it would not have had
to make reference to any other statue or provision.
P.D. 1829 states:
Section 1. The penalty of prision correccional in its
maximum period, or a fine ranging from 1,000 to 6,000
pesos, or both, shall be imposed upon any person who
knowingly or willfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or
delays the apprehension of suspects and the investigation
and prosecution of criminal cases by committing any of the
following acts:
x x x.
Thus, the act of non-compliance, for it to be punishable, must
still be done "knowingly or willfully." There must still be a
judicial determination of guilt, during which, as the Solicitor
General assumes, defense and justifications for non-
compliance may be raised. Thus, Section 20 is valid insofar
as it applies to the provisions of Chapter IV which are not
struck down by the Court.
Sections 24 and 26(a) of the Cybercrime Law
Sections 24 and 26(a) provide:
Sec. 24. Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center.
There is hereby created, within thirty (30) days from the
effectivity of this Act, an inter-agency body to be known as
the Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center
(CICC), under the administrative supervision of the Office of
the President, for policy coordination among concerned
agencies and for the formulation and enforcement of the
national cybersecurity plan.
Sec. 26. Powers and Functions. The CICC shall have the
following powers and functions:
(a) To formulate a national cybersecurity plan and extend
immediate assistance of real time commission of cybercrime
offenses through a computer emergency response team
(CERT); x x x.
Petitioners mainly contend that Congress invalidly
delegated its power when it gave the Cybercrime
Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC) the power to
formulate a national cybersecurity plan without any
sufficient standards or parameters for it to follow.
In order to determine whether there is undue delegation of
legislative power, the Court has adopted two tests: the
completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the
first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and
conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it
reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to
enforce it.1avvphi1 The second test mandates adequate
guidelines or limitations in the law to determine the
boundaries of the delegates authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot.103
Here, the cybercrime law is complete in itself when it
directed the CICC to formulate and implement a national
cybersecurity plan. Also, contrary to the position of the
petitioners, the law gave sufficient standards for the CICC to
follow when it provided a definition of cybersecurity.
Cybersecurity refers to the collection of tools, policies, risk
management approaches, actions, training, best practices,
assurance and technologies that can be used to protect cyber
environment and organization and users assets.104 This
definition serves as the parameters within which CICC
should work in formulating the cybersecurity plan.
Further, the formulation of the cybersecurity plan is
consistent with the policy of the law to "prevent and combat
such [cyber] offenses by facilitating their detection,
investigation, and prosecution at both the domestic and
international levels, and by providing arrangements for fast
and reliable international cooperation."105 This policy is
clearly adopted in the interest of law and order, which has
been considered as sufficient standard.106 Hence, Sections
24 and 26(a) are likewise valid.
WHEREFORE, the Court DECLARES:
1. VOID for being UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
a. Section 4(c)(3) of Republic Act 10175 that
penalizes posting of unsolicited commercial
communications;
b. Section 12 that authorizes the collection or
recording of traffic data in real-time; and
c. Section 19 of the same Act that authorizes
the Department of Justice to restrict or block
access to suspected Computer Data.
2. VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL:
a. Section 4(a)(1) that penalizes accessing a
computer system without right;
b. Section 4(a)(3) that penalizes data
interference, including transmission of
viruses;
c. Section 4(a)(6) that penalizes cyber-
squatting or acquiring domain name over the
internet in bad faith to the prejudice of others;
d. Section 4(b)(3) that penalizes identity theft
or the use or misuse of identifying information
belonging to another;
e. Section 4(c)(1) that penalizes cybersex or
the lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or
sexual activity for favor or consideration;
f. Section 4(c)(2) that penalizes the
production of child pornography;
g. Section 6 that imposes penalties one degree
higher when crimes defined under the
Revised Penal Code are committed with the
use of information and communications
technologies;
h. Section 8 that prescribes the penalties for
cybercrimes;
i. Section 13 that permits law enforcement
authorities to require service providers to
preserve traffic data and subscriber
information as well as specified content data
for six months;
j. Section 14 that authorizes the disclosure of
computer data under a court-issued warrant;
k. Section 15 that authorizes the search,
seizure, and examination of computer data
under a court-issued warrant;
l. Section 17 that authorizes the destruction of
previously preserved computer data after the
expiration of the prescribed holding periods;
m. Section 20 that penalizes obstruction of
justice in relation to cybercrime
investigations;
n. Section 24 that establishes a Cybercrime
Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC);
o. Section 26(a) that defines the CICCs Powers
and Functions; and
p. Articles 353, 354, 361, and 362 of the
Revised Penal Code that penalizes libel.
Further, the Court DECLARES:
 1. Section 4(c)(4) that penalizes online libel as VALID 1. Online libel as to which, charging the offender
and CONSTITUTIONAL with respect to the original under both Section 4(c)(4) of Republic Act 10175 and
author of the post; but VOID and Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code constitutes a
UNCONSTITUTIONAL with respect to others who violation of the proscription against double jeopardy;
simply receive the post and react to it; and as well as

2. Section 5 that penalizes aiding or abetting and
attempt in the commission of cybercrimes as VA L I D
and CONSTITUTIONAL only in relation to Section
4(a)(1) on Illegal Access, Section 4(a)(2) on Illegal
Interception, Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference,
Section 4(a)(4) on System
2. Child pornography committed online as to which,
charging the offender under both Section 4(c)(2) of
Republic Act 10175 and Republic Act 9775 or the
Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009 also constitutes
a violation of the same proscription, and, in respect to
these, is VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

Interference, Section 4(a)(5) on Misuse of Devices, Section SO ORDERED.

4(a)(6) on Cyber-squatting, Section 4(b)(1) on Computer-
related Forgery, Section 4(b)(2) on Computer-related Fraud,
Section 4(b)(3) on Computer-related Identity Theft, and
Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex; but VOID and
UNCONSTITUTIONAL with respect to Sections 4(c)(2) on
Child Pornography, 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial
Communications, and 4(c)(4) on online Libel.1wphi1

Lastly, the Court RESOLVES to LEAVE THE

DETERMINATION of the correct application of Section 7 that
authorizes prosecution of the offender under both the
Revised Penal Code and Republic Act 10175 to actual cases,
WITH THE EXCEPTION of the crimes of: