The Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation Employees Union results of the strike vote to NCMB pursuant to Article
CMB pursuant to Article 263 of the Labor
vs. NLRC
GR No. 156635 January 11, 2016
Facts: Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation Employees Union
(Union) was the duly recognized collective bargaining agent of the rank-
and-file employees of Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation
(HSBC). The company and the union was governed by a CBA which
includes a salary structure of the employees comprising of grade levels,
entry level pay rates and the individual pays depending on the length of
service.
HSBC (company) announced the implementation of a job evaluation
program (JEP) retroactively. The JEP consists of a job designation per grade
level with salary scale which provides the minimum and maximum pay an
employee is entitled per grade level. The Union sent letter to company and
demanded the suspension of the JEP because it constitutes an unfair labor
practice (ULP). It also inform HSBC that it would exercise its right to
concerted action.
On the same day the Union members started picketing during breaktime.
HSBC (company) in its letter to the union insist that the JEP was an express
recognition of its obligation under the CBA.
The Union's concerted activities persisted for 11 month, which impelled
HSBC to suspend the negotiations and issued memoranda, warnings and
reprimands to remind the members of the Union to comply with HSBC's
Code of Conduct. Due to the sustained concerted actions, HSBC filed a
complaint for ULP in the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor
Relations Commission (NLRC) he NLRC, and directed the remand of the
case to the Labor Arbiter for further proceedings.
The Union conducted a strike after majority of the members of the Union
voted in favor of a strike in protest of the continued implementation of the
JEP. The Union's officers and members walked out and gathered outside the
premises of HSBC's offices. It was alleged that there were Union members
who blocked the entry and exit points of the bank premises preventing bank
officers from entering the bank including its CEO. HSBC filed its
complaint to declare the strike illegal with prayer for temporary restraining
order and injunction with NLRC.
When HSBC issued return-to-work notices to the striking employees only
25 employees complied and returned to work. Due to the continuing
concerted actions, HSBC terminated employment of the the individual
petitioners.
The Labor Arbiter (LA) declared the strike illegal for failure of the Union to
file the notice of strike, observe the cooling-off period; and to submit the
1
Code and because of the illegality of the strike the Union members and
officers were deemed to have lost their employment status. NLRC
modified the ruling of LA that the dismissal of the 18 Union members
unlawful for failure of HSBC to accord procedural due process.
Issues:
Whether or Not the strike commenced by the union is lawfully conducted?
Whether or Not dismissal of the union members is valid?
Ruling:
NO. The petitioners neither filed the notice of strike with the DOLE, nor
observed the cooling-off period, nor submitted the result of the strike vote
although the strike vote was conducted, the same was done by open, not
secret, balloting,42 in blatant violation of Article 26. Petitioners strike was
rendered unlawful because their picketing which constituted an obstruction
to the free use of the employer's property or the comfortable enjoyment of
life or property, when accompanied by intimidation, threats, violence, and
coercion as to constitute nuisance, should be regulated. The strike, even if
justified as to its ends, could become illegal because of the means
employed, especially when the means came within the prohibitions under
Article 264(e) of the Labor Code.
The procedural requirements for a valid strike are, therefore, the following,
to wit: ( 1) a notice of strike filed with the DOLE at least 30 days before the
intended date thereof, or 15 days in case of ULP; (2) a strike vote approved
by the majority of the total union membership in the bargaining unit
concerned, obtained by secret ballot in a meeting called for that purpose;
and (3) a notice of the results of the voting at least seven days before the
intended strike given to the DOLE. These requirements are mandatory, such
that non-compliance therewith by the union will render the strike illegal.
On the second issue.
NO. The failure by HSBC to strictly observe the twin-notice requirement
resulted in the illegal dismissal.
As a general rule, the mere finding of the illegality of the strike does not
justify the wholesale termination of the strikers from their employment the
responsibility for the illegal strike is individual instead of collective.
Under Article 264 there is a need to distinguish between the officers and the
members of the union who participate in an illegal strike. The officers may
be deemed terminated from their employment upon a finding of their
knowing participation in the illegal strike, but the members of the union
shall suffer the same fate only if they are shown to have knowingly
participated in the commission of illegal acts during the strike.
HSBC fail to give them sufficient opportunity to present their side and
adequate opportunity to answer the charges against them. The twin
requirement of notice and hearing in termination cases are as much
indispensable and mandatory as the procedural requirements enumerated in
Article 262 of the Labor Code. HSBC notice to return-to work is not as
substantial compliance with due process requirement.
HIJO RESOURCES CORPORATION vs. EPIFANIO P. MEJARES,
REMEGIO C. BAL URAN, JR., DANTE SAYCON, and CECILIO
CUCHARO, represented by NAMABDJERA-HRC
G.R. No. 208986 January 13, 2016
FACTS: Petitioners claimed that they were employed by HPI as farm
workers in HPI’s plantations as area harvesters, packing house workers,
loaders, or labellers. HRC, formerly known as Hijo Plantation Incorporated
(HPI), owns agricultural lands. Respondents assert that contractor-growers
receive compensation and are under the control of HRC. Petitioners formed
their union NAMABDJERA-HRC registered with the Department of Labor
and Employment (DOLE). Later, they filed a petition for certification.
When HRC learned that complainants formed a union, the three contractor-
growers filed a notice of cessation of business that led to the termination of
complainant’s employment. Petitioners, represented by NAMABDJERA-
HRC, filed a case for unfair labor practices, illegal dismissal, and illegal
deductions.
DOLE Med-Arbiter Jasa dismissed the petition for certification election
claiming there was no employer-employee relationship. Petitioners did not
appeal but pursued the illegal dismissal case. Labor Arbiter Sagmit held that
res judicata does not apply and that finding by the Med-Arbiter that no
employment relationship exists between HRC and complainants does not
bar the Labor Arbiter from making his own independent finding on the
same issue. HRC filed TRO and seeks to nullify the orders of LA Sagmit.
NLRC granted the petition holding that LA Sagmit gravely abused her
discretion. Court of Appeals concluded that the decision in a certification
election case does not foreclose further dispute as to the existence or non-
existence of an employer-employee relationship between HRC and the
complainants. CA set aside the NLRC decision and remanded case to Labor
Arbiter for further proceedings.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Labor Arbiter, in the illegal dismissal case, is
bound by the ruling of the Med-Arbiter regarding the existence or non-
existence of employer-employee relationship between the parties in the
certification election case
RULING: No. The decision in a certification election case, by the very
nature of that proceeding, does not foreclose all further dispute between the
parties as to the existence or non-existence of an employer-employee
2
relationship. The Med-Arbiter’s order in this case dismissing the petition
for certification election based on non-existence of employer-employee
relationship was issued after the members of the respondent union were
dismissed from their employment.
The purpose of a petition for certification election is to determine which
organization will represent the employees in their collective bargaining with
the employer. The respondent union, without its member-employees, was
stripped of its personality to challenge the Med-Arbiter’s decision in the
certification election case. Thus, the members of the respondent union were
left with no option but to pursue their illegal dismissal case filed before the
Labor Arbiter. To dismiss the illegal dismissal case filed before the Labor
Arbiter on the basis of the pronouncement of the Med-Arbiter in the
certification election case that there was no employer-employee relationship
between the parties would be tantamount to denying due process to the
complainants in the illegal dismissal case.
ALLAN M. MENDOZA vs. OFFICERS OF MANILA WATER
EMPLOYEES UNION (MWEU), EDUARDO B. BORELA,
BUENAVENTURA QUEBRAL, ELIZABETH COMETA et al.
G.R. No. 201595 January 25, 2016
Facts: Petitioner was a member of the Manila Water Employees Union
(MWEU) a duly registered labor organization of the rank-and-file
employees within Manila Water Company. During the period material to
this Petition, Eduardo Borela as President and Chairman of the MWEU
Executive Board, Buenaventur Quebral as First Vice-President and
Treasurer, and Elizabeth Cometa as Secretary.
Union Secretary (Cometa) informed Petitioner (Mendoza) that the union
was unable to deduct the increased P200.00 union dues from his salary due
to lack of the required check-off authorization from him and that his failure
to pay the unions he can be sanctioned.
Quebral (Vice President and Treasurer) informed Borela (President and
Chairman) about the failure of petitioner together with others to pay their
union dues such failure amounts to violation of MWEU’s Constitution and
By-Laws Borela referred the situation to the grievance committee for
investigation after which it recommended that petitioner be suspended for
30 days.
When Petitioner learned about the suspension he indicated his intention to
appeal to the General Membership Assembly in accordance with union’s
Constitution and By-Laws, which grants him the right to appeal any
arbitrary resolution, policy and rule promulgated by the Executive Board.
Petitioner sent two letters about its intention to appeal but both were not
acted upon.
When MWEU scheduled an election of officers Mendoza filed certificate of
candidacy but was disqualified for not being a member of good standing
due to his suspension. Later Mendoza was expelled from the union, all his
pleas for appeal were let unheeded.
Petitioner then joined another union (WATER-AFWC) and was elected
union President. Other MWEU members were inclined to join WATER-
AFWC, but MWEU director Torres threatened others that they will not get
benefits from the new CBA, on the proposed CBA it contains a provisions
that in that in the event of retrenchment, non-MWEU members shall be
removed first, and that upon the signing of the CBA, only MWEU members
shall receive a signing bonus.
Petitioner filed a complaint for unfair labor practice against MWEU, the
Labor Arbiter ordered that the case be referred to the Union level. While
NLRC declared order of LA null and void for being rendered without
jurisdiction and conflict fall under the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Labor
Relations, as these are inter/intra-union disputes.
Petitioner filed appeal to CA arguing that unfair labor practices is
cognizable by the Labor Arbiter; that the fact that the dispute is inter- or
intra-union in nature cannot erase the fact that respondents were guilty of
unfair labor practices in interfering and restraining him in the exercise of
his right to self-organization as member of both MWEU and WATER-
AFWC, and in discriminating against him and other members through the
provisions of the proposed 2008 CBA which they drafted.
Issue: Whether or Not labor organization MWEU committed unfair labor
practice against the petitioner?
Ruling:
Yes. Unfair labor practices may be committed both by the employer under
Article 248 and by labor organizations under Article 249 of the Labor Code.
Mendoza claim on illegal suspension on the union, the documentary
evidence is clear that when petitioner letter about his suspension. He
immediately and timely filed a written appeal. However, the Executive
Board did not act. The Court finds that petitioner was illegally suspended
and thereafter unlawfully expelled from MWEU due to respondents’ failure
to act on his written appeals. The petitioner was unceremoniously
suspended, disqualified and deprived of his right to run for the position of
MWEU Vice-President in the September 14, 2007 election of officers,
expelled from MWEU, and forced to join another union, WATER-AFWC.
For these, respondents are guilty of unfair labor practices under Article 249
(a) and (b) – that is, violation of petitioner’s right to self-organization,
unlawful discrimination, and illegal termination of his union membership –
3
which case falls within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor
Arbiters, in accordance with Article 217 of the Labor Code.
Samahan ng Magsasaka at Mangingisda sa Sitio Nasawe, Inc v. Tan,
GR 196028, 18 April 2016
FACTS: Petitioner is an association of farmers and fishermen residing at
Sitio Talaga, Barangay Ipag, Mariveles, Bataan. It that its members “have
resided in the area for several years doing farming activities” from which
they “derive their income for their daily sustenance.” In 1995, the
Philippine Commission on Good Governance (PCGG) published in the
newspaper an Invitation to Bid for the sale of its assets, which included 34
hectares of a 129.4227-hectare land in Barangay Ipag, Mariveles, Bataan,
previously owned by Anchor Estate Corporation. The PCGG sequestered
the properties of said Corporation after it was identified to be a dummy
corporation of the late President Ferdinand E. Marcos. Respondent Tomas
Tan emerged as the highest bidder in the bidding of the 34-hectare property.
The PCGG Committee on Privatization approved the sale and a Notice of
Award was issued to the respondent. The Office of the President (OP) also
approved the sale of the property. The PCGG, representing the Republic of
the Philippines, executed a Deed of Sale in the respondent’s favor. Then
Chairman of the PCGG Committee on Privatization Sarmiento wrote the
DAR requesting to stop the acquisition of the property under the CARP. It
appeared that a Notice of Coverage had been issued over the 129.4227-
hectare land and that the 34 hectares sold by the PCGG to Tan had been
already identified for CARP coverage and targeted for acquisition in the
year 2000. In an Order, DAR Secretary Morales, Jr. granted Sarmiento’s
request and lifted the Notice of Coverage on the 129.4227-hectare property.
Secretary Morales also ordered to stop the acquisition proceedings on the
property. Thereafter, the petitioner filed with the DAR a Petition to Revoke
Secretary Morales’s order. The DAR denied both the petitioner’s petition
and its subsequent motion for reconsideration. The DAR based its denial
on the ground that the subject property, being government-owned, does not
fall as ‘private agricultural land’ subject to the CARP. The petitioner then
appealed to the OP, which dismissed the same for lack of merit and
affirmed the DAR Secretary’s Order. The motion for reconsideration was
denied. The petitioner then filed a Petition for Review under Rule 43 with
the CA. The CA held that, while the lifting of the subject Notice of
Coverage was irregular and erroneous, the petitioner’s petition for review
must be dismissed on the ground that the petitioner was not a real party in
interest to the case. Nothing is stated as to them being beneficiaries, or at
least potential beneficiaries, under CARP.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly held petitioners as not a real party
in interest.
HELD: Yes. The petitioner is not a real party-in-interest to question the
July 26, 2000 DAR Order. The Constitutional right to form associations
does not make the petitioner a real party-in-interest in this case. While
organizations and associations may represent their members before the
DAR, these members must have such real, actual, material, or substantial
interest in the subject matter of the action, NOT merely an expectancy, or a
future contingent interest. Here, the petitioner alleged that it is duly
registered with the SEC acting on behalf of its farmers and fishermen
members which allegation gave it the right to represent its members.
However, it failed to allege and prove that these members are identified
and registered qualified beneficiaries of the subject land, or have already
been actually awarded portions of it, or have been issued Certificates of
Land Ownership Award for which they could validly claim the status of the
land’s grantees having a real, actual, material interest to question the Order
of the DAR Secretary lifting the Notice of Coverage. Not being identified
and duly registered qualified beneficiaries, these members’ interest over the
subject land were at most an expectancy that, unfortunately for them, did
not ripen to actual award and ownership. Thus, notwithstanding its
representative capacity, the petitioner and its members are not real parties-
in-interest to question the DAR’s Order. The constitutional considerations:
provisions governing agrarian reform program do not entail automatic grant
of lands to every farmer and farmworker. Social justice in the land reform
program also applies to landowners, not merely to farmers and
farmworkers. This is precisely why the law – RA No. 6657 – and the
applicable rules provide for the procedure for determining the proper
beneficiaries and grantees or awardees of the lands covered or to be covered
under the CARP. Jurisprudence dictates that the “CARL is specific in its
requirements for registering qualified beneficiaries.” Those who have not
been identified and registered as qualified beneficiaries are not real parties-
in-interest. Furthermore, the SC held that DAR Order has already attained
finality is no longer reviewable by the Court.
WILLIAM GO QUE CONSTRUCTION AND/OR WILLIAM GO
QUE vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND DANNY SINGSON, RODOLFO
PASAQUI, LENDO LOMINIQUI, AND JUN ANDALES
 official agency and the Joint-Affidavit identifying Andales and assuring that
G.R. No. 191699, April 19, 2016
4
Facts: Singson, Pasaqui, Lominiqui, and Andales filed complaints for illegal
dismissal against William Go Que Construction and/or William Go Que
before the NLRC, claiming that they were hired as steelmen on various
dates, and were regular employees of Go Que until their illegal dismissal on
June 3, 2006. Go Que averred that they were hired as project employees,
and that sometime in May 2006, he learned that some workers were getting
excess and cutting unused steel bars, and selling them to junk shops,
prompting him to announce that he will bring the matter to the proper
authorities. Thereafter, the private respondents no longer reported for work.
The LA ruled that the employees were illegally dismissed by Go Que and
declared that they were regular employees and not project or contractual
employees considering that there was no written contract duly signed by
said employees and that they were continuously employed to perform the
same tasks for 2 to 8 years. However, the NLRC reversed the ruling of the
LA. The private respondents then filed a petition for certiorari before the
CA but the CA noted that the Affidavit of Service and the Verification/
Certification of Non-Forum Shopping contained a defective jurat. The CA
required private respondents anew to submit a Verification/Certification of
Non-Forum Shopping with a properly accomplished jurat indicating
competent evidence of their identities. After submitting photocopies of Ids
and a Joint-Affidavitattesting to the identity of Andales who was unable to
submit his ID , the CA held that these served as competent evidence of
private respondents' identities and cured the defect. The CA also dismissed
the petition with respect to Singson and Pasaqui on account of the
Satisfaction of Judgment/Release of Claim they had submitted after
amicable settlement with Go Que.
Issues: 1. WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition with respect to
Singson and Pasaqui
2. WON the CA erred in refusing to dismiss the petition on the ground of
non-compliance with the requirements of verification and certification
against forum shopping.
Ruling: 1. No. The settled rule is that legitimate waivers resulting from
voluntary settlements of laborers' claims should be treated and upheld as the
law between the parties. Since Singson and Pasaqui filed a motion to
dismiss the petition filed by them after having entered into an amicable
settlement with Go Que, there is no longer any justiciable controversy
between them, rendering the instant case moot and academic and
dismissible with respect to them.
2. Yes. The IDs presented by the private respondents were not issued by an
he was a party-litigant is not competent evidence of Andales's identity
under Section 12 (b), Rule II of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice,
considering that they (i.e., Singson, Pasaqui, and Lominiqui) themselves are
privy to the instrument, i.e., the Verification/Certification of Non-Forum
Shopping, in which Andales's participation is sought to be proven. To note,
it cannot be presumed that an affiant is personally known to the notary
public; the jurat must contain a statement to that effect. Tellingly, the
notarial certificate of the Verification/Certification of Non-Forum Shopping
attached to the petition before the CA did not state whether they presented
competent evidence of their identities, or that they were personally known
to the notary public, and, thus, runs afoul of the requirements of verification
and certification against forum shopping under Section 1,68 Rule 65, in
relation to Section 3,69 Rule 46, of the Rules of Court. Because of this, the
fact that even one of the private respondents swore that the allegations in
the pleading are true and correct of his knowledge and belief is shrouded in
doubt. There was also no substantial compliance with the certification
against forum shopping requirement and non-compliance therewith or a
defect therein, unlike in verification, is generally not curable by its
subsequent submission or correction thereof, unless there is a need to relax
the Rule on the ground of 'substantial compliance' or presence of'special
circumstances or compelling reasons. Here, the CA did not mention - nor
does there exist - any perceivable special circumstance or compelling
reason which justifies the rules' relaxation. At all events, it is uncertain if
any of the private respondents certified under oath that no similar action has
been filed or is pending in another forum.
EDREN RICASATA v. CARGO SAFEWAY
GR Nos. 208896-97, Apr 06, 2016
FACTS: Ricasata was hired as an engine fitter for M.V. Uni Chart, a ship
owned by Evergreen Marine Corporation, represented in the Philippines by
its local manning agency, Cargo Safeway. The deployment was for a period
of nine months with a basic monthly salary of US$704 and was found fit for
sea duty without restrictions and was deployed. His work included handling
noisy equipment such as grinders, generators, and pumps in the vessel's
engine room on a regular eight to five shift schedule. Ricasata experienced
severe pain in his ears. He reported it to the Chief Engineer and requested
for a medical check-up, but his request was denied. He experienced another
bout of severe pain in his ears, but wad again denied. He was then replaced
by a reliever and thereafter disembarked from the vessel and returned to the
Philippines. Ricasata underwent an Audiogram and was diagnosed with
"Permanent Medical Unfitness with a Disability Grade 1" due to a
"profound hearing loss." Ricasata filed an action against Cargo Safeway
and Evergreen Marine before the NLRC, for his claim. Cargo Safeway and
5
Evergreen Marine moved for the dismissal of the case and its referral for
Voluntary Arbitration on the ground that Ricasata's employment was
covered by a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between the
Associated Marine Officers' and Seamen's Union of the Philippines and the
National Chinese Seamen's Union. The Panel of Arbitrators ruled in favour
of Ricasata and also rejected the contention of Cargo Safeway and
Evergreen Marine that the flexibility provision of the CBA for the
completion of the contract "one month more or one month less as a result of
operational convenience or convenience of the port of call" should apply to
justify Ricasata's early embarkment.. Ricasata appealed for the
modification of the Decision of the Panel of Arbitrators by increasing the
award for back disability benefit and sick allowance but was denied by CA
on the ground that that entitlement to disability benefits is a matter
governed by law and contract and not solely by medical findings and that
Ricasata forfeited his claim for compensation by failing to comply with the
mandatory reporting requirements.
ISSUE:
(1) Whether or not Ricasata is entitled to disability benefits, sickness
allowance, and attorney's fees.
(2) Whether Ricasata was able to finish his contract of employment
HELD:
(1) Ricasata arrived in the Philippines on 23 March 2010. On 29
March 2010, he underwent an Audiogram at the Seamen's Hospital. On 27
April 2010, Dr. Lara-Orencia diagnosed him with "Permanent Medical
Unfitness with a Disability Grade 1" based on the Audiogram.
It is a settled rule that for a seaman's disability claim to prosper, it is
mandatory that within three days from repatriation, he is examined by a
company-designated physician. His failure to do so will result to the
forfeiture of his right to claim for compensation and disability benefits.
Ricasata failed to comply with this requirement. He also failed to show that
he was physically incapacitated to be medically examined by a company-
designated physician that would have justified his non-compliance with the
mandatory three-day period. We note the finding of the Court of Appeals
that Ricasata was inconsistent on whether he was referred to a company-
designated physician. In his Petition before the Court of Appeals, he alleged
that Cargo Safeway referred him to a company-designated physician while
in his Memorandum; he alleged that Cargo Safeway refused to refer him for
post-medical check-up. Considering the foregoing, the Court of Appeals did
not err in ruling that Ricasata failed to prove that he is entitled to the
disability benefits and sickness allowance that he was claiming.
(2) In their Comment, Cargo Safeway and Evergreen Marine contend that
Ricasata is not entitled to unearned wages, unearned leave pay, and basic
wages corresponding to the unserved portion of his contract. They invoke
Section 19(C) of the POEA-SEC to the effect that "[i]f the vessel arrives at
a convenient port within a period of three (3) months before the expiration
of his contract, the master/employer may repatriate the seafarer from such
port x x x.” but the Court did not agree because Cargo Safeway and
Evergreen Marine only quoted a portion of Section 19(C) of POEA-SEC
and if quoted in full, will not apply to this case. Section 19(C) of POEA-
SEC states that the mode of termination it provides may only be exercised
by the master/employer if the original period of the seafarer is at least ten
months. Ricasata's contract of employment is only for nine months.
Granting that the provision is applicable, Cargo Safeway and Evergreen
Marine failed to present proof that they paid Ricasata all his earned wages,
his leave pay for the entire contract period, and his termination pay
equivalent to one month of his basic salary. The Court held that the
provision of the CBA was specific: the flexibility period is one month more
or one month less from the term of the contract. Ricasata disembarked one
and a half months before the expiration of his contract, meaning it does not
fall within the one month more or one month less covered by the CBA. The
CBA also provides that if any lesser period is agreed for operational
convenience, it should be specified in the employment contract. No such
provision is present in this case. Hence, the flexibility provision of the CBA
does not also apply to this case.
Robina Farms Cebu v. Villa
G.R. No. 175869, April18, 2016
FACTS: Respondent Elizabeth Villa brought against the petitioner her
complaint for illegal suspension, illegal dismissal, non-payment of overtime
pay, and nonpayment of service incentive leave pay in the RAB No. VII of
the NLRC in Cebu City. In her verified position paper, Villa averred that
she had been employed by petitioner Robina Farms as sales clerk since
August 1981; that in the later part of 2001, the petitioner had enticed her to
avail herself of the company's special retirement program; that on March 2,
2002, she had received a memorandum from Lily Ngochua requiring her to
explain her failure to issue invoices for unhatched eggs in the months of
6
January to February 2002; that she had explained that the invoices were not
delivered on time because the delivery receipts were delayed and
overlooked; that despite her explanation, she had been suspended for 10
days; that upon reporting back to work, she had been advised to cease
working because her application for retirement had already been approved;
that she had been subsequently informed that her application had been
disapproved, and had then been advised to tender her resignation with a
request for financial assistance; that she had manifested her intention to
return to work but the petitioner had confiscated her gate pass; and that she
had since then been prevented from entering the company premises and had
been replaced by another employee. The petitioner admitted that Villa had
been its sales clerk at Robina Farms. It stated that her attention had been
called by the accounting department to explain her failure to issue invoices
for the unhatched eggs for the month of February; After the administrative
hearing Villa was found to have violated the company rule on the timely
issuance of the invoices that had resulted in delay in the payment of buyers
considering that the payment had depended upon the receipt of the invoices;
that she had been suspended from her employment as a consequence; that
after serving the suspension, she had returned to work and had followed up
her application for retirement with Lucina de Guzman, who had then
informed her that the management did not approve the benefits equivalent
to 86% of her salary rate applied for, but only 1/2 month for every year of
service; and that disappointed with the outcome, she had then brought her
complaint against the petitioners LA rendered a decision finding that Villa
had not been dismissed from employment. The NLRC rendered its
judgment dismissing the appeal by the petitioner but granting that of Villa.
CA upheld the finding of the NLRC that the petitioner had illegally
dismissed Villa
ISSUE: Whether or not Villa illegally dismissed?
HELD: Yes, private respondent was illegally dismissed. It is undeniable
that private respondent was suspended for ten (10) days. Ordinarily, after an
employee [has] served her suspension, she should be admitted back to work
and to continue to receive compensation for her services. In the case at bar,
it is clear that private respondent was not admitted immediately after her
suspension. When she reported back after her suspension, she was advised
not to report back anymore as her application was approved, which was
latter [sic] on disapproved. She was then advised to tender a resignation
letter with request for financial assistance by Lucy de Guzman. After that
another letter of petitioner Lily Ngochua advised private respondent to do
the same. Clearly, these acts are strong indication that petitioners wanted to
severe [sic] the employer-employee relationship between them and that of
private respondent. This is buttressed by the fact that when private
respondent signified her intention to return back to work after learning of
the disapproval of her application, she was prevented to enter the
petitioner's premises by confiscating her ID and informing her that a new
employee has already replaced her.
Moreover, private respondent’s application for early retirement did not
manifest her intention to sever the employer-employee relationship.
Although she applied for early retirement, she did so upon the belief that
she would receive a higher benefit based on the petitioner's offer. As such,
her consent to be retired could not be fairly deemed to have been knowingly
and freely given.
DIVINE WORD COLLEGE OF LAOAG vs. SHIRLEY B. MINA, as
heir-substitute of the late DELFIN A. MINA
 that the transfer is not unreasonable, inconvenient or prejudicial to the
G.R. No. 195155
Facts: DWCL is a non-stock educational institution offering catholic
education to the public. It is run by the Society of Divine Word (SVD), a
congregation of Catholic priests. Then, the Society of Divine Word
Educational Association (DWEA) established a Retirement Plan to provide
retirement benefits for qualified employees of their member institutions.
Said retirement plan contains a clause about the portability of benefits.
Mina was first employed in as a high school teacher, and later on a high
school principal, at the Academy of St. Joseph (ASJ), a school run by the
SVD. Then, he transferred to DWCL and was accorded a permanent status
after a year of probationary status. He was subsequently transferred to
DWCL’s college department as an Associate Professor III. Thereafter, Mina
was assigned as the College Laboratory Custodian of the School of Nursing
and was divested of his teaching load, subject to automatic termination and
without need for any further notification.
Mina was thereafter offered early retirement but initially declined it. He
later received a Memorandum from the Office of the Dean enumerating
specific acts of gross or habitual negligence, insubordination, and reporting
for work under the influence of alcohol. He answered the allegations but
sensing that it was useless, he negotiated for his retirement benefits. Then, it
was made to appear that his services were terminated by reason of
redundancy to avoid any tax implications. Mina was also made to sign a
deed of waiver and quitclaim. Mina then filed a case for illegal dismissal
and recovery of separation pay and other monetary claims.
The LA ruled that there was no constructive dismissal and that his
retirement pay should include the number of years he had worked for ASJ.
However, the NLRC ruled otherwise as to the constructive dismissal. The
NLRC also held that Mina was not deemed to have waived all his claims
against DWCL as quitclaims cannot bar employees from demanding
7
benefits to which they are legally entitled, but disregarded his years of
service in ASJ for the computation of retirement pay. The CA sustainedthe
NLRC's ruling.
Issues:WON there was constructive dismissal
WON the retirement benefits should include Mina's service in ASJ
Ruling:Yes. The Constitution and the Labor Code mandate that employees
be accorded security of tenure. The right of employees to security of tenure,
however, does not give the employees vested rights to their positions to the
extent of depriving management of its prerogative to change their
assignments or to transfer them. In cases of transfer of an employee, the
employer is charged with the burden of proving that its conduct and action
are for valid and legitimate grounds such as genuine business necessity and
employee. If the employer cannot overcome this burden of proof, the
employee’s transfer shall be tantamount to unlawful constructive dismissal.
Here, Mina’s transfer clearly amounted to a constructive dismissal since for
almost 23 years, he was a teacher enjoying a permanent status but then was
appointed as a college laboratory custodian, which is a clear relegation from
his previous position. Not only that. He was also divested of his teaching
load and his appointment even became contractual in nature and was
subject to automatic termination after one year "without any further
notification." DWCL failed to show any reason for Mina’s transfer and that
it was not unreasonable, inconvenient, or prejudicial to him. Mina’s
appointment as laboratory custodian was a demotion.
SC also affirmed that the eight years of service rendered by Mina in ASJ
shall not be included in the computation of his retirement benefits. No
adequate proof is shown that he has complied with the portability clause of
the DWEA Retirement Plan. The employee has the burden of proof to show
compliance with the requirements set forth in retirement plans, being in the
nature of privileges granted to employees. Failure to overcome the burden
of proof would necessarily result in the employee’s disqualification to
receive the benefits.
Mariano v. Martinez Memorial Colleges, Inc,
GR 194119, 13 April 2016
FACTS: Martinez Memorial Colleges, Inc. (MMC) is a private educational
institution, with respondents Martinez as the College incumbent President
and Del Rio as the College Executive Vice-President. The petitioner was
MMC's Assistant Cashier. Part of her job was to accept payments and issue
receipts and deposit slips to MMC students. In 2008, the petitioner went on
an authorized leave of absence, as she and her husband Dario Mariano
(Dario), Director for Finance of MMC, would be vacationing. When the
petitioner returned to work, she received a Memorandum signed by the
respondents, stating that in line with the streamlining activities of MMC,
she would be transferred from the Cashier's Office to the Office of the Vice-
President (OVP) for Finance, her husband's office. Dario then advised the
petitioner to file an extended leave of absence, which was granted.
Subsequently, the petitioner went to MMC to file another application for
leave as she was not feeling well but this was denied by the Human
Resources. The resident physician at Martinez Memorial Hospital
recommended her confinement and she was later hospitalized. In the
meantime Muallil was tasked to conduct an audit review of MMC's Finance
Department. Muallil submitted her report and findings, which showed the
petitioner's improper handling of cash accounts of MMC. A separate
account called "non-essential accounts" (containing a total amount of
P40,490,619.26) in which some collections of MMC were deposited and
diverted from MMC's general fund was likewise discovered. Thereafter,
Dario received a letter from Martinez, addressed to the petitioner, where the
latter was asked to explain in writing, within five days, her possible
involvement in the diversion of MMC's funds. In a letter, they explained
that the MMC Board of Directors sanctioned the non-essential account. The
petitioner did not submit any separate reply. Then, petitioner received a
letter from Martinez, informing her that her employment has been
terminated on the ground of serious or gross dishonesty in relation to the
discovered misappropriation and diversion of funds of MMC, and
aggravated by her continuous absence from office without leave or any
explanation. Petitioner amended her earlier complaint of constructive
dismissal to illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter declared the dismissal as
illegal for failure of the respondents to prove lawful or just cause for the
termination of her employment and for their failure to accord her due
process. On appeal, the NLRC vacated and set aside the LA' s decision. The
CA denied the petitioner’s appeal, saying that the petitioner was the
Assistant Cashier who performs the duties of a cashier, position that
requires a high degree of trust and confidence, and her infraction reasonably
taints the trust and confidence reposed upon her by her employer
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner Mariano was illegally dismissed.
RULING: No. The petition is denied for lack of merit. The CA correctly
ruled that MMC's act of transferring the petitioner from the Cashier's Office
to the OVP for Finance is a valid exercise of management prerogative. The
Court has often declined to interfere in legitimate business decisions of
employers, as long as the company's exercise of the same is in good faith to
advance its interest and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing
the rights of employees under the laws or valid agreements. In this case, the
MMC's exercise of its management prerogative was done for the
8
advancement of its interest and not for the purpose of defeating the lawful
rights of the petitioner. It was within MMC's discretion to allow husband
and wife to be in one department and there is no express prohibition on this
matter. The Board of Directors' decision to transfer the petitioner to her
husband's department did not cause any conflict at all and the same was on
an interim basis only. As regards the petitioner's dismissal from
employment, the Court also affirms the CA ruling that the NLRC did not
commit any grave abuse of discretion in declaring its validity. In this case,
MMC's ground for terminating the petitioner's employment was "serious or
gross dishonesty and for having committed an offense against [MMC],"
which was based on the findings in the System Review Report submitted by
Muallil. The Court has ruled that in dismissing a cashier on the ground of
loss of confidence, it is sufficient that there is some basis for the same or
that the employer has a reasonable ground to believe that the employee is
responsible for the misconduct, thus making him unworthy of the trust and
confidence reposed in him. Courts cannot justly deny the employer the
authority to dismiss him for employers are allowed wider latitude in
dismissing an employee for loss of trust and confidence. The petitioner
contends that she had no opportunity to defend herself from the charges as
MMC deliberately failed to provide her a copy of the System Review
Report. The letter that Martinez sent to the petitioner ordering her to explain
in writing her possible involvement in the diversion of MMC's funds
complies with the first written notice requirement as it specified the ground
for termination and gave the petitioner an opportunity to explain her side.
The due process mandate does not require that the entire report from which
the termination is based should be attached to the notice. What is essential
is that the particular acts or omissions for which her dismissal is sought are
indicated in the letter. Accordingly, the CA's denial of the petitioner's
petition must be upheld.
BLUE EAGLE MANAGEMENT, INC. vs. NAVAL
G.R. No. 192488. April 19, 2016
FACTS: By virtue of a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), finalized on
September 29, 2006, Ateneo de Manila University (ADMU), owner of the
Moro Lorenzo Sports Center (MLSC) located within the ADMU
compound, gave petitioner BEMI the authority to manage and operate the
following businesses at MLSC. Petitioners Bonoan and Dela Rama were
then the General Manager and Human Resources (HR) Manager,
respectively, of petitioner BEMI. Respondent was hired on January 15,
2005 by petitioner BEMI as a member of its maintenance staff.
During its first year of operation in 2005, petitioner BEMI suffered
financial losses. In an attempt to reduce its financial losses, the
Management of petitioner BEMI (Management) resolved to decrease the
operational expenses of the company. One of the measures the Management
intended to implement was the downsizing of its workforce. Pursuant to
such decision of the Management, petitioners Bonoan and Dela Rama
evaluated and identified several employees who could be the subject of
retrenchment proceedings, taking into consideration the employees’
positions and tenures at petitioner BEMI. After their evaluation, petitioners
Bonoan and Dela Rama identified five employees for retrenchment.
Respondent was included in the list because she was one of the employees
with the shortest tenures.
Before actually commencing retrenchment proceedings, petitioner Dela
Rama separately met with each of the five aforementioned employees and
presented to them the option of resigning instead. The employees who
would choose to resign would no longer be required to report for work after
their resignation but would still be paid their full salary for February 2006
and their prorated 13th month pay, plus financial assistance in the amount
of one-month salary for every year of service at petitioner BEMI. This
option would also give the employees free time to seek other employment
while still receiving salary from petitioner BEMI.
Since all the five employees identified for retrenchment decided to
voluntarily resign instead and avail themselves of the financial package
offered by petitioner BEMI, there was no more need for the company to
initiate retrenchment proceedings. The five employees were instructed to
return on February 28, 2006 to comply with the exit procedure of petitioner
BEMI and receive the amounts due them by reason of their voluntary
resignation.
On February 28, 2006, the resigned employees, except for respondent,
completed their exit procedures, received the amounts due them, and
executed release waivers and quitclaims in favor of petitioner BEMI.
Respondent’s nonappearance on prompted petitioner Bonoan to write her a
letter stating that in connection with respondent’s voluntary resignation, she
must comply with the exit procedures of petitioner BEMI. Respondent
appeared at petitioner Bonoan’s office on March 3, 2006. Because
respondent was finding it difficult to find new employment, she asked if it
was possible for her to return to work for petitioner BEMI. However,
petitioner Bonoan replied that respondent’s resignation had long been
approved and that petitioner BEMI would not be able to rehire respondent
given the difficult financial position of the company. Petitioner Bonoan
advised respondent to just receive the amount she was entitled to by reason
of her voluntary resignation.
9
On the afternoon of March 3, 2006, respondent filed a complaint for illegal
dismissal against petitioners before the NLRC. The Labor Arbiter rendered
a Decision on October 12, 2006 finding that respondent was illegally
dismissed. According to the Labor Arbiter, petitioners were not able to
prove that petitioner BEMI was suffering from serious business losses that
would have justified retrenchment of its employees. Petitioners appealed
before the NLRC. The NLRC reversed the assailed decision. This prompted
respondent to file a Petition for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The
Court of Appeals, in a Decision dated March 11, 2010, favored respondent.
The Court of Appeals denied the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioners.
Petitioners now come before the Court via the instant Petition for Review
on Certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent was illegally dismissed; which depends
on the question of whether or not respondent’s resignation was voluntary.
HELD: For the resignation of an employee to be a viable defense in an
action for illegal dismissal, an employer must prove that the resignation was
voluntary, and its evidence thereon must be clear, positive, and convincing.
The employer cannot rely on the weakness of the employee’s evidence. In
this case, petitioners, as employers, were able to present sufficient evidence
to establish that respondent’s resignation was voluntary. As borne out by the
Financial Statements for 2005 of petitioner BEMI, there was ground for the
company to implement a retrenchment of its employees at the time
respondent resigned.
The evaluation and identification of the employees to be retrenched were
jointly undertaken by petitioners Bonoan and Dela Rama, as the General
Manager and HR Manager, respectively, of petitioner BEMI, based on fair
and reasonable criteria, i.e., the employees’ positions and tenures at the
company. Respondent was included in the final list of five employees to be
retrenched because she was one of the employees with the shortest tenures.
That there were four other employees of petitioner BEMI who were to be
retrenched and similarly offered the option of resigning in exchange for a
more favorable financial package refutes respondent’s insinuation of a
scheme by petitioners to remove her because of Dr. Florendo’s complaint
against her for the incident that took place in December 2005.
Because the five employees to be retrenched opted to voluntarily resign
instead and avail themselves of the financial package offered, there was no
more need for petitioner BEMI to comply with the notice requirement to the
Department of Labor and Employment. Said five employees were to receive
more benefits than what the law prescribed in case of retrenchment,
particularly: (a) full salary for February 2006 although they were no longer
required to report to work after submission of their resignation letters in
mid-February 2006; (b) prorated 13th month pay; and (c) financial
assistance equivalent to one-month salary for every year of service.
The foregoing circumstances persuade the Court that no fraud or deception
was employed upon respondent to resign because petitioner BEMI was
indeed about to implement in good faith a retrenchment of its employees in
order to advance its interest and not merely to defeat or circumvent the
respondent’s right to security of tenure.
COCOPLANS, INC. vs. VILLAPANDO
G.R. No. 183129. May 30, 2016
FACTS: Respondent Ma. Socorro R. Villapando, began working as a
financial Advisor for petitioner Cocoplans, Inc., (Cocoplans) in 1995. In
2000, she was eventually promoted to Division Head/Senior Sales Manager.
On 2002, however, her employment was terminated by Cocoplans, through
its President, Michelena, on the alleged ground that she was deliberately
influencing people to transfer to another company thereby breaching the
trust and losing the confidence given to her by Cocoplans. Consequently,
Villapando filed an action for illegal dismissal alleging that she was
dismissed without the just cause mandated by law.
On 2004, the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Villapando finding that she
was illegally terminated from her employment. However, the NLRC
disagreed with the Labor Arbiter in its Decision holding that the matter of
resignation is a nonissue as the termination of Villapando’s employment
was affected for reasons other than her resignation. Yet, in its 2008
Decision, the CA disagreed with the NLRC and reinstated the Labor
Arbiter’s Decision, finding that while Villapando was duly afforded the
required due process mandated by law, the evidence adduced by herein
petitioners was not substantial enough to support their allegation that
Villapando deliberately influenced people to transfer to another company.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent was terminated for just cause.
HELD: Settled is the rule that to constitute a valid dismissal from
employment, two (2) requisites must concur, viz.: (a) the employee must be
afforded due process, i.e., he must be given an opportunity to be heard and
defend himself; and (b) the dismissal must be for a valid cause, as provided
in Article 282 of the Labor Code, or for any of the authorized causes under
Articles 283 and 284 of the same Code. In the case before the Court, it is
already undisputed that petitioners duly afforded Villapando the opportunity
to be heard and defend herself, thereby complying with the first requisite.
The issue that remains, therefore, is whether Villapando was dismissed for
valid and just cause.
10
To be a valid ground for dismissal, loss of trust and confidence must be
based on a willful breach of trust and founded on clearly established facts.
A breach is willful if it is done intentionally, knowingly and purposely,
without justifiable excuse, as distinguished from an act done carelessly,
thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently. It must rest on substantial
grounds and not on the employer’s arbitrariness, whims, caprices or
suspicion; otherwise, the employee would eternally remain at the mercy of
the employer. Loss of confidence must not also be indiscriminately used as
a shield by the employer against a claim that the dismissal of an employee
was arbitrary. And, in order to constitute a just cause for dismissal, the act
complained of must be work-related and show that the employee concerned
is unfit to continue working for the employer.
In the instant case, the Court does not find the evidence presented by
petitioners to be substantial enough to discharge the burden of proving that
Villapando was, indeed, dismissed for just cause. Thus, in view of the
irregularities identified by the CA, the Court cannot take Ms. Gurango’s
affidavit into account. In dismissing an employee for just cause, it must be
shown that the employer fairly made a determination of just cause in good
faith, taking into consideration all of the evidence available to him. Thus,
not only is there no showing that said affidavit was considered by
petitioners in arriving at their decision to dismiss Villapando; Villapando
never had the opportunity to address the accusations stated therein. As such,
the Court cannot consider the same.
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC. vs. LIGAN
G.R. No. 203932. June 8, 2016
FACTS: PAL and Synergy Services Corporation (Synergy) entered into a
station services agreement and a janitorial services agreement whereby
Synergy provided janitors and station attendants to PAL at Mactan airport.
Enrique Ligan was among the personnel of Synergy posted at PAL to carry
out the contracted tasks. Claiming to be performing duties directly desirable
and necessary to the business of PAL, the respondents, along with 12 other
co-employees, filed complaints in March 1992 against PAL and Synergy in
the NLRC Region VII Office in Cebu City for regularization of their status
as employees of PAL, underpayment of salaries and nonpayment of
premium pay for holidays, premium pay for rest days, service incentive
leave pay, 13th month pay and allowances.
In the Decision dated August 29, 1994, the Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled that
Synergy was an independent contractor and dismissed the complaint for
regularization, but granted the complainants’ money claims. On appeal, the
NLRC, 4th Division, Cebu City on January 5, 1996 declared Synergy a
labor-only contractor and ordered PAL to accept the complainants as regular
employees and as such, to pay their salaries, allowances and other benefits
under the Collective Bargaining Agreement subsisting during the period of
their employment. PAL went to this Court on certiorari, but the case was
referred to the CA. On September 29, 2000, the CA, in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No.
52329, affirmed the NLRC in toto.
Meanwhile, while the above regularization cases were pending in the CA,
PAL terminated its service agreements with Synergy effective June 30,
1998, alleging serious business losses. Consequently, Synergy also
terminated its employment contracts with the respondents, who forthwith
filed individual complaints for illegal dismissal against PAL. PAL in turn
filed a third party complaint against Synergy.
In his Decision dated July 27, 1998, Executive LA Reynoso A. Belarmino
declared that Synergy was an independent contractor and the respondents
were its regular employees, and therefore Synergy was solely liable for the
payment of their separation pay, wage differential, and attorney’s fees. In
their appeal to the NLRC, the respondents cited seven previous cases
wherein the NLRC also declared that Synergy was a labor-only contractor.
They argued that Synergy and PAL dismissed them without just cause. In
the Decision dated August 27, 2004, the NLRC found that the functions
performed by the respondents under Synergy’s service contracts with PAL
indicated that they were directly related to PAL’s air transport business.
PAL’s motion for reconsideration having denied, it filed a petition for
certiorari before the CA. On February 15, 2012, the CA dismissed PAL’s
petition, and on September 27, 2012, it also denied its motion for
reconsideration.
Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari was filed by PAL.
ISSUE: Whether the termination of the respondents’ employment by
Synergy in June 1998 was without just cause and observance of due
process.
HELD:
PAL has insisted that the NLRC erroneously relied on an inexistent CA
decision, and therefore its decision is void, but the CA in its resolution of
September 27, 2012 has concluded that “[a] perusal of the Decision of the
NLRC shows that it is not without basis,” that the NLRC “made findings of
facts, analyzed the legal aspects of the case taking into consideration the
evidence presented and formed conclusions after noting the relevant facts of
the case.” But more importantly, the Court cannot lose sight of the settled
rule that in illegal dismissal cases, the onus to prove that the employee was
not dismissed, or if dismissed, that his dismissal was not illegal, rests on the
employer, and that its failure to discharge this burden signifies that the
11
dismissal is not justified and therefore illegal. Unfortunately, in this
petition, PAL has advanced no such justification whatsoever to dismiss or
retrench the respondents. The Court is left with no conclusion: PAL’s
petition is misleading and clearly baseless and dilatory.
G.R. No. 205061, June 08, 2016
EMERTIA G. MALIXI vs. MEXICALI PHILIPPINES AND/OR
FRANCESCA MABANTA,
Facts: Petitioner was hired by respondents as a team leader at delivery
service. Due to her satisfactory performance, she was then transferred at a
newly opened branch in Alabang Town Center as a store manager. In
December 2008, she was compelled to sign an end of contract letter due to
her criminal complaint for sexual harassment against the respondent’s
operations manager. However, she refused to do so. Thereafter, Luna went
to the branch and caused the signing of the same and informed her that it
was her last day.
Respondents denied responsibilities to the petitioner on the ground that she
was no longer an employee of Mexicali but rather Calexico. That the two
are distinct and Separate Corporation. Petitioner alleged that it was
Mexicali who engaged, dismissed and controlled her. That her resignation
was a condition for her promotion as a store manager.
The Labor Arbiter ruled in favour of the petitioner. Declaring that Mexicali
and Calexico are one and the same with interlocking board of directors. The
NLRC, nevertheless, ordered Mexicali, being the employer of Teves and
Luna who caused petitioner's termination from her employment with
Calexico, to reinstate petitioner to her job at Calexico but without paying
her any backwages. The CA affirmed the decision of NLRC that there was
no illegal dismissal.
Issue: Whether or not there was an illegal dismissal
Held: The Court finds that there exists no employer-employee relationship
between petitioner and respondents as to hold the latter liable for illegal
dismissal. "Resignation is the voluntary act of an employee who is in a
situation where one believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in
favor of the exigency of the service, and one has no other choice but to
dissociate oneself from employment. It is a formal pronouncement or
relinquishment of an office, with the intention of relinquishing the office
accompanied by the act of relinquishment. As the intent to relinquish must
concur with the overt act of relinquishment, the acts of the employee before
and after the alleged resignation must be considered in determining whether
he or she, in fact, intended to sever his or her employment."30 Here,
petitioner tendered her resignation letter preparatory to her transfer to
Calexico for a higher position and pay. In the said letter, she expressed her
gratitude and appreciation for the two months of her employment with
Mexicali and intimated that she regrets having to leave the company.
Clearly, expressions of gratitude and appreciation as well as manifestation
of regret in leaving the company negates the notion that she was forced and
coerced to resign. In the same vein, an inducement for a higher position and
salary cannot defeat the voluntariness of her actions. It should be
emphasized that petitioner had an option to decline the offer for her transfer,
however, she opted to resign on account of a promotion and increased pay.
"In termination cases, the employee is not afforded any option; the
employee is dismissed and his only recourse is to institute a complaint for
illegal dismissal against his employer x x x."31 Clearly, this does not hold
true for petitioner in the instant case. Further, as aptly observed by the CA,
petitioner is a managerial employee, who, by her educational background
could not have been coerced, forced or induced into resigning from her
work.
YUMANG v. RADIO PHILIPPINES NETWORK, INC. G.R No. 201016
FACTS:
On May 1, 1998, the petitioner Leoncia A. Yumang started her employment
with the respondent Radio Philippines Network, Inc. She was a member of
the Radio Philippines Network Employees Union (RPNEU) which had a
collective bargaining agreement with RPN 9 effective July 1, 2004 to June
30, 2009.
Allegedly, after the conclusion of the CBA, a new Toyota Revo driven by
RPNEU President Reynato Siozon Jr., was found to be registered in the
name of the RPN 9 General Manager. The petitioner and 14 other union
members filed complaints with the DOLE-NCR against the RPNEU
officers and members of the Board of Directors for: impeachment, an audit
of union funds, and the conduct of a snap election.
On August 17, 2005, Mediator-Arbiter Clarissa G. Beltran-Lerios (Med-
Arbiter Lerios) ordered the conduct of a referendum to determine whether
the incumbent RPNEU officers would be impeached. The union officers
and the BOD appealed to the Bureau of Labor Relations. BLR Director
Henry Parel granted the appeal and reversed Med-Arbiter Lerios' ruling.


In the meantime or on June 1, 2005, two complaints were filed with the
RPNEU Executive Board against several union members. The complaints
involved alleged violations of the RPNEU Constitution and Bylaws (CBL),
6 principally: (1) the commission of acts inimical to the interests of the
12
union and the general membership; (2) the attempt to form another union;
and (3) an appeal to the general membership urging them to commence
legal action without exhausting remedies under the RPNEU CBL.
The CA denied the petition and affirmed the NLRC ruling
ISSUES:
• WON the CA committed grave abuse of discretion
• WON the expulsion of the petitioner was justified
HELD:
We find no reversible error in the CA's affirmation of the NLRC's
acceptance of the appeal despite its non-perfection as described by the
petitioner. Article 227 (formerly Art. 221) of the Labor Code (renumbered
by R. A. No. 10151, An Act Allowing the Employment of Night
Workers), provides that "In any proceeding before the Commission or any
of the Labor Arbiters, the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or
equity shall not be controlling and it is the spirit and intention of this Code
that the Commission and its members and the Labor Arbiter shall use every
and all means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively
and without regard to technicalities of law or procedure, all in the interest of
due process.
In the issue of the expulsion case, which is paramount in the mind of the
management, we asked ourselves whether the so-called General Assembly
resolution that they tout as having reversed the expulsion case actually
occurred. When asked whether a General Assembly meeting was actually
held to discuss the reversal of the expulsion case, no categorical answer was
given by Ms. Ruth Yap, et al. In our search for truth, we called some
members who signed and asked them if indeed a General Assembly was
called and if any deliberation on the expulsion was discussed, the answer of
the member-signatories that we called was negative. In fact they said that
one of the 15 in the group of Ms.Yap approached them and appealed to
them to sign lest they be expelled from the union.
The constitution and bylaws of the union provide that charges for any
violations thereof shall be filed before the said board. But as explained by
the lower court, if the complainants had done so the board of directors
would in effect be acting as respondent investigator and judge at the same
time. To follow the procedure indicated would be a farce under the
circumstances; where exhaustion of administrative remedies within the
union itself would practically amount to a denial of justice or would be
illusory or vain, it will not be insisted upon.

The records show that there was no categorical finding of the petitioner's
guilt on this question. But we find the petitioner well within her rights as a
union member when she took the officers to task for then handling of the
affairs of the union, especially with respect to matters relating to the union
funds and the quality of the union leadership. The union President's
integrity was itself put in serious doubt when he was seen using a vehicle
registered in the name of the RPN9 General Manager after the conclusion
of the July 1, 2004 to June 30, 2009 CBA.
In sum, the court finds merit in the petition. The petitioner was illegally
dismissed, as her expulsion from the union had no basis.
BARRIO FIESTA RESTAURANT v. BERONIA, G.R No. 206690
FACTS:
ON Aug. 17, 2009, respondent Helen C. Beronia filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal and money claims against petitioners Barrio Fiesta
Restaurant, Liberty Ilagan, Sunshine Ongpauco-Ikeda, and Marico
Cristobal. The petitioners, through Atty. Richard Neil S. Chua of Ligon
Solis Mejia Florendo law firm, denied the claims prayed for. In a decision
dated May 31, 2010, the labor arbiter (LA) declared that Beronia had been
illegally dismissed. The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
reversed the LA’s ruling in its Dec. 7, 2010 decision. Beronia moved for
reconsideration of the NLRC decision. On Jan. 13, 2011, the petitioners
filed their opposition to Beronia’s motion for reconsideration. The
opposition was signed and personally filed by Ilagan and Ikeda. In its July
21, 2012 decision, the Court of Appeals (CA) reinstated the LA decision.
On Nov. 29, 2012, the petitioners, through Real Bartolo & Real law offices,
filed with the CA an entry of appearance with manifestation and motion for
reconsideration. In its April 5, 2013 resolution, the CA denied petitioners’
motion for reconsideration for being 138 days late, pointing out that
petitioners’ counsel has long received a copy of its June 21, 2012 decision.
Before the Supreme Court, the petitioners asked for a liberal application of
the procedural rules, reasoning that they believed all the while that they
were being represented by their former counsel, Ligon, et. al., through Atty.
Chua. They argued that the procedural lapse before the CA was clearly due
to a miscommunication with the law firm for which they should not be
made to suffer, in the interest of substantial justice.
ISSUE: Does this argument find merit?
13
HELD: No. In the present case, the only permissible consideration we can
take is to determine whether circumstances exist to excuse the petitioners’
delay in the filing of their motion for reconsideration. If there are none, as
indeed we find because the petitioners utterly failed to show us one, then
the delay is fatal.
We note that on Jan. 13, 2011, the petitioners filed an Opposition, dated
January 5, 2011, to the motion filed by Beronia seeking reconsideration of
the NLRC’s Dec. 7, 2010 decision. Significantly, this Jan. 5, 2011
opposition was signed personally by petitioners Ilagan and Ikeda, on behalf
of themselves and of petitioner Barrio Fiesta, instead of by Atty. Chua for
Ligon, et al. as the petitioners’ counsel. As a rule, when a party to a
proceeding is represented by counsel, it is the counsel who signs any
pleading filed in the course of the proceeding. The party represented does
not have to sign the pleadings, save only in the specific instances required
by the rules; they appear before the court and participate in the proceedings
only when specifically required by the court or tribunal. In the petitioners’
case, they were themselves aware that Beronia sought reconsideration of the
NLRC decision as they had, in fact, personally opposed this motion instead
of through their counsel on record, Ligon, et al. Had they still been
represented by their counsel, through Atty. Chua as they claim, the latter
would have signed and filed the opposition in their behalf. Viewed in this
light, the petitioners must have known that Ligon, et al. no longer
represented them in this case; this was true even at the NLRC level and
before the case reached the CA. (Brion, J.; SC 2nd Division, Barrio Fiesta
Restaurant, et. al. vs. Helen C. Beronia, G.R. No. 206690, July 11, 2016).
GUAGUA NATIONAL COLLEGES v. GUAGUA NATIONAL
COLLEGES FACULTY LABOR UNION, G.R No. 204693
FACTS:
GNC is an educational institution located in Sta. Filomena, Guagua,
Pampanga. On the other hand, respondents Guagua National Colleges
Faculty Labor Union (GNCFLU) and Guagua National Colleges Non-
Teaching and Maintenance Labor Union (GNCNTMLU) were the
bargaining agents for GNC's faculty members and non-teaching and
maintenance personnel, respectively.
Beginning 1994 until their present dispute, the parties concluded their
Collective Bargaining Agreements (CBA) without issue as follows: (1)
CBA effective June 1, 1994 to May 31, 1999 (1994-1999 CBA), the
economic provisions of which were renegotiated on November 3, 1997 for
years 1997-1999; (2) CBA effective June 1,1999 to May 31, 2004, the
economic provisions of which were renegotiated on July 4, 2002 for years
2002-2004; and, (3) CBA effective June 1, 2004 to May 31, 2009. The
aforementioned CBAs applied to both GNCFLU and GNCNTMLU without
distinction. Significantly, the 1994-1999 CBA has a "no-strike, no lock-out"
clause under Section 17 thereof which likewise provides for mechanism for
grievance resolution and voluntary arbitration. This provision was
considered carried over in the subsequent CBAs.
Respondents alleged that after several mediation meetings, the parties
finally agreed on the details regarding the grant of signing bonus. Hence,
they undertook to compose the final draft of the 2009-2014 CBA which it
submitted to the NCMB on May 14, 2010 and copy furnished GNC on May
21, 2010. Respondents likewise averred that the parties already agreed to
schedule the signing of the said CBA on May 28, 2010.
GNC, on the other hand, contended that during mediation meetings with the
NCMB, respondents submitted several CBA drafts for its consideration.
Upon its receipt on May 21, 2010 of another draft CBA23 from respondents
under cover letter dated May 20, 2010, it decided to secure the services of
Atty. Padilla to assist it in its negotiations with respondents. Hence, on May
28, 2010, Atty. Padilla appeared before the NCMB and asked for 10 days to
submit GNC's comment/counter-proposal to the purported draft CBA of
respondents. However, on June 1, 2010, respondents filed a notice of strike.
GNC called attention to the fact that when it requested the Secretary of
Labor and Employment to assume jurisdiction over the dispute, it also
prayed that the same be ordered submitted to the grievance machinery and
voluntary arbitration provided for under the parties' CBA. It stressed that its
participation in the compulsory arbitration proceeding should therefore not
be construed as a waiver of its position that jurisdiction over the dispute
rests with the voluntary arbitrator in view of the parties' agreement in the
CBA, the pertinent provisions of the Labor Code.
The NLRC rendered a decision that GNC committed unfair labor practice
by violating the statutory duty to bargain collectively in good faith.
GNC’s motion for reconsideration was denied for lack of merit. It sought
recourse from the CA through a petition for certiorari.
The CA also denied the petition for lack of merit, the motion for
reconsideration was likewise denied.
ISSUE:
WHETHER THE CA COMMITTED GRIEVOUS AND IRREVERSIBLE
ERROR WHEN IT DISMISSED GNC's PETITION FOR CERTIORARI
AND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
14
HELD:
GNC asserts that it is the voluntary arbitrator which has jurisdiction over
the grounds cited by respondents in their notice of strike in view of Section
17 of the parties' 1994-1999 CBA. The said provision contains the
agreement of the parties on a "no strike, no lock-out" policy and on
grievance resolution and voluntary arbitration which was carried over to
their subsequent CBAs up to the existing one. According to GNC,
respondents should not have filed a notice of strike in view of such "no-
strike, no lock-out" clause and also since respondents' grounds for strike are
within the scope of "grievance" to be resolved in accordance with the said
Section 17. It argues that respondents, by the simple expedient of filing a
notice of strike, were able to circumvent the "no strike, no lock-out" clause
and the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration provision of their
CBA.
Indeed, the parties through their CBA, agreed to a "no-strike, no lock-out"
policy and to resolve their disputes through grievance machinery and
voluntary arbitration. Despite these, respondents were justified in filing a
notice of strike in light of the facts of this case. It is settled that a "no strike,
no lock-out" provision in the CBA "may [only] be invoked by [an]
employer when the strike is economic in nature or one which is conducted
to force wage or other agreements from the employer that are not mandated
to be granted by law. It [is not applicable when the strike] is grounded on
unfair labor practice."48 Here, while respondents enumerated four grounds
in their notice of strike, the facts of the case reveal that what primarily
impelled them to file said notice was their perception of bad faith
bargaining and violation of the duty to bargain collectively by GNC -
charges which constitute unfair labor practice under Article 248(g) of the
Labor Code.
The CA, on certiorari petition, found merit in the University's argument
that the Secretary of Labor abused his/her discretion in resolving the
economic issues on the ground that the same were proper subject of the
grievance machinery as embodied in the parties' CBA. Accordingly, the said
court directed the parties to submit the economic issues to voluntary
arbitration.
This Court affirmed the CA's ruling based on the following ratiocinations:
We xxx find logic in the CA's directive for the herein parties to proceed
with voluntary arbitration as provided in their CBA. As we see it, the issue
as to the economic benefits, which included the issue on the formula in
computing the TIP share of the employees, is one that arises from the
interpretation or implementation of the CBA. To be sure, the parties' CBA
provides for a grievance machinery to resolve any 'complaint or
dissatisfaction arising from the interpretation or implementation of the CBA
and those arising from the interpretation of enforcement of company
personnel policies.' Moreover, the same CBA provides that should the
grievance machinery fail to resolve the grievance or dispute, the same shall
be 'referred to a Voluntary Arbitrator for arbitration and final resolution.'
However, through no fault of the University these processes were not
exhausted. It must be recalled that while undergoing preventive mediation
proceedings before the NCMB, the Union declared a bargaining deadlock,
filed a notice of strike and thereafter, went on strike. The University filed a
Motion to Strike Out Notice of Strike and to Refer the Dispute to Voluntary
Arbitration but the motion was not acted upon by the NCMB. As borne by
the records, the University has been consistent in its position that the Union
must exhaust the grievance machinery provisions of the CBA which ends in
voluntary arbitration.
HSY Marketing Ltd. Co. v. VILLASTIQUE, G.R No. 2119569
FACTS:
On January 3, 2003, petitioner hired respondent as a field driver for
Fabulous Jeans & Shirt & General Merchandise, tasked to deliver ready-to-
wear items and/or general merchandise for a daily compensation of
P370.00. On January 10, 2011, respondent figured in an accident when the
service vehicle he was driving in Iligan City bumped a pedestrian, Ryan
Dorataryo. Fabulous jeans shouldered the hospitalization and medical
expenses of Dorataryo which respondent was asked to reimburse, but to no
avail.
On February 24, 2011, respondent was allegedly required to sign a
resignation letter, which he refused to do. A couple of years later. He tried
to collect his salary for that week but was told that it was withheld because
of his refusal to resign. Convinced that he was already terminated on
February 26, 2011, he lost no time in filing a complaint for illegal dismissal
with money claims against petitioner, Fabulous Jeans and its owner before
the NLRC.
In their defense, petitioner, et al. contended that respondent had committed
several violations in the course of his employment, and had been found by
his superior and fellow employees to be a negligent and reckless driver,
which resulted in the vehicular mishap involving Dorataryo. After they
paid for Dorataryo's hospitalization and medical expenses, respondent went
15
on absence without leave, presumably to evade liability for his recklessness.
Since respondent was the one who refused to report for work, he should be
considered as having voluntarily severed his own employment. Thus, his
money claims cannot prosper, as he was not terminated.
LA dismissed the charge of illegal dismissal. Petitioner appealed to NLRC.
NLRC affirmed the finding of LA that there was no illegal dismissal.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration, but was denied.
CA affirmed NLRC decision.
ISSUE: WON respondent was illegally dismissed.
HELD: Respondent had not been dismissed at all. Other that the latter’s
unsubstantiated allegation of having been verbally terminated from his
work, no substantial evidence was presented to show that he was indeed
dismissed or was prevented from returning to his work. In the absence of
any showing of an overt or positive act proving that petitioner had
dismissed respondent, the latter’s claim of illegal dismissal cannot be
sustained as such supposition would be self-serving, conjectural and of no
probative value.
Similarly, petitioner’s claims of respondent’s voluntary resignation and/or
abandonment deserve scant consideration, considering petitioner’s failure to
discharge the burden of proving the deliberate and unjustified refusal of
respondent to resume his employment without any intention of returning. It
was incumbent upon petitioner to ascertain respondent’s interest or non-
interest in the continuance of his employment, but to no avail.
Hence, since there is no dismissal or abandonment to speak of, the
appropriate course of action is to reinstate the employee.
PENINSULA EMPLOYEE UNION v. ESQUIVEL, G.R No. 218454
FACTS:
On December 13, 2007, Peninsula Employees Union’ (PEU) Board of
Directors passed Local Board Resolution No. 12, series of 20078
authorizing, among others, the affiliation of PEU with NUWHRAIN, and
the direct membership of its individual members thereto. On the same day,
the said act was submitted to the general membership, and was duly ratified
by 223 PEU members. Beginning January 1, 2009, PEU-NUWHRAIN
sought to increase the union dues/agency fees from one percent (1%) to two
percent (2%) of the rank and file employees’ monthly salaries, brought
about by PEU’s affiliation with NUWHRAIN, which supposedly requires
its affiliates to remit to it two percent (2%) of their monthly salaries.
The non-PEU members objected to the assessment of increased agency fees
arguing that: (a) the new CBA is unenforceable since no written CBA has
been formally signed and executed by PEU-NUWHRAIN and the Hotel;
(b) the 2% agency fee is exorbitant and unreasonable; and (c) PEU-
NUWHRAIN failed to comply with the mandatory requirements for such
increase.
OSEC’s June 2, 2010 decision upheld PEU-NUWHRAIN's right to collect
agency fees from the non-PEU members in accordance with Article 4,
Section 2 of the expired CBA, which was declared to be in full force and
effect pursuant to the October 10, 2008 Decision, but only at the rate of one
percent (1%), and denied its bid to increase the agency fees to two percent
(2%) for failure to show that its general membership approved the same
PEU moved for reconsideration. On March 6, 2012, the OSEC issued an
Order partially granting PEU-NUWHRAIN's motion for reconsideration,
and declaring it entitled to collect two percent (2%) agency fees from the
non-PEU members beginning July 2010 since the GMR showing approval
for the increase of the union dues from one percent (1%) to two percent
(2%) was only procured at that time
CA reinstated the June 2, 2010 OSEC’s decision.
PEU-NUWHRAIN moved for reconsideration, which was denied.
ISSUE:
• WON PEU-NUWHRAIN has right to collect the increased agency
fees
• WON PEU-NUWHRAIN failed to comply with the mandatory
requirements for such increase
HELD:
1. Yes. The recognized collective bargaining union which successfully
negotiated the CBA with the employer is given the right to collect a
reasonable fee called “agency fee” from non-union members who are
employees of the appropriate bargaining unit, in an amount
equivalent to the dues and other fees paid by union members, in case
they accept the benefits under the CBA. While the collection of
agency fees is recognized by Article 259 (formerly Article 248) of the
Labor Code, as amended, the legal basis of the union’s right to
agency fees is neither contractual nor statutory, but quasi-contractual,
deriving from the established principle that non-union employees
may not unjustly enrich themselves by benefiting from employment
16
conditions negotiated by the bargaining union. In the present case,
PEU-NUWHRAIN’s right to collect agency fees is not disputed.
2. Yes. Case law interpreting Article 250 (n) and (o) of the Labor Code
mandates the submission of three (3) documentary requisites in order
to justify a valid levy of increased union dues. These are: (a) an
authorization by a written resolution of the majority of all the
members at the general membership meeting duly called for the
purpose; (b) the secretary’s record of the minutes of the meeting,
which shall include the list of all members present, the votes cast, the
purpose of the special assessment or fees and the recipient of such
assessment or fees; and (c) individual written authorizations for
check-off duly signed by the employees conceded. In the present
case, however, PEU-NUWHRAIN failed to show compliance with
the foregoing requirements. It attempted to remedy the “inadvertent
omission” of the matter of the approval of the deduction of two
percent (2%) union dues from the monthly basic salary of each union
member.
PEOPLE’S SECURITY INC. v. FLORES, G.R No. 211312
FACTS: Julius S. Flores and Esteban S. Tapiru (respondents) were security
guards previously employed by People's Security, Inc. (PSI). The
respondents were assigned at the various facilities of Philippine Long
Distance Telephone Company (PLDT) pursuant to a security services
agreement between PSI and PLDT
On October 1, 2001, however, PSI's security services agreement with PLDT
was terminated and, accordingly, PSI recalled its security guards assigned
to PLDT including the respondents.
On October 8, 2001, the respondents, together with several other security
guards employed by PSI, filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) against PLDT and PSI,
claiming that they are PLDT employees.
Thereafter, PSI assigned the respondents to the facilities of its other clients
such as the warehouse of a certain Marivic Yulo in Sta. Ana, Manila and
Trinity College's Elementary Department in Quezon City.
On January 13, 2003, the respondents were relieved from their respective
assignments pursuant to Special Order No. 200310108 dated January 10,
2003 issued by Col. Leonardo L. Aquino, the Operations Manager of PSI.9
Accordingly, Flores and Tapiru, on September 6 and 27, 2005, respectively,
filed with the Regional Arbitration Branch of the NLRC in Quezon City a
complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of service incentive
leave pay and cash bond, with prayer for separation pay, against PSI and
its President Nestor Racho (Racho) (collectively, the petitioners).
Respondents claimed that, after they were relieved from their assignment in
the warehouse in Sta. Ana, Manila on January 13, 2003, they repeatedly
reported to PSI's office for possible assignment, but the latter refused to
give them any assignment.
Petitioners, in their position paper, claimed that the respondents were
merely relieved from their assignment in the warehouse in Sta. Ana, Manila
and that the same was on account of their performance evaluation, which
indicated that they were ill-suited for the said assignment.
On January 30, 2009, the LA rendered a Decision finding that the
respondents were illegally dismissed from their employment and, thus,
directing the petitioners jointly and severally liable to pay the former
separation pay and back wages.
On appeal, the NLRC, in its Decision dated April 14, 2010, reversed the LA
Decision dated January 30, 2009. On April 25, 2013, the CA rendered the
herein assailed Decision, reversing the NLRC's Decision dated April 14,
2010 and Resolution dated June 15, 2010. In finding that the respondents
were illegally dismissed, the CA found that the petitioners failed to
prove that the respondents had abandoned their work and that their
defense of abandonment was negated by the filing of a case for illegal
dismissal.
In this petition for review on certiorari, the petitioners claim that the CA
committed reversible error in ruling that the respondents were illegally
dismissed from their employment. They maintain that PSI never
terminated the respondents' employment. On the contrary, they claim
that the respondents freely and voluntarily resigned from their employment.
Petitioners also claim that the CA erred when it ruled that they should be
held jointly and solitarily liable to pay the respondents separation pay and
back wages considering that there was absolutely no allegation or proof of
participation, bad faith, or malice on the part of Racho in dealing with the
respondents.
ISSUES:
17
▪ Whether respondents were illegally dismissed?
▪ Whether Racho is jointly and solidarily liable with PSI for the
payment of the monetary awards to the respondents?
HELD:
▪ Yes
As rule, employment cannot be terminated by an employer without any just
or authorized cause. No less than the 1987 Constitution in Section 3, Article
13 guarantees security of tenure for workers and because of this, an
employee may only be terminated for just or authorized causes that must
comply with the due process requirements mandated by law. Hence,
employers are barred from arbitrarily removing their workers whenever and
however they want.
Further, as aptly ruled by the CA, the petitioners miserably failed to prove
that the respondents abandoned their work. Abandonment is a matter of
intention and cannot lightly be inferred or legally presumed from certain
equivocal acts. For abandonment to exist, two requisites must concur: first,
the employee must have failed to report for work or must have been absent
without valid or justifiable reason; and second, there must have been a clear
intention on the part of the employee to sever the employer-employee
relationship as manifested by some overt acts. The Court is not convinced
that the respondents failed to report for work or have been absent without
valid or justifiable cause. After the petitioners relieved them from their
previous assignment in Sta. Ana, Manila, the respondents were no longer
given any assignment.
What is more, PSI did not afford the respondents due process. The validity
of the dismissal of an employee hinges not only on the fact that the
dismissal was for a just or authorized cause, but also on the very manner of
the dismissal itself. It is elementary that the termination of an employee
must be effected in accordance with law. It is required that the employer
furnish the employee with two written notices: (1) a written notice served
on the employee specifying the ground or grounds for termination, and
giving to said employee reasonable opportunity within which to explain his
side; and (2) a written notice of termination served on the employee
indicating that upon due consideration of all the circumstances, grounds
have been established to justify his termination.

• No
Anent, the propriety of holding Racho, PSI's President, jointly and
solidarily liable with PSI for the payment of the money awards in favor of
the respondents, the Court finds for the petitioners.
The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil applies only when the corporate
fiction is used to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud, or
defend crime. In the absence of malice, bad faith, or a specific provision of
law making a corporate officer liable, such corporate officer cannot be
made personally liable for corporate liabilities.
The respondents failed to adduce any evidence to prove that Racho, as
President and General Manager of PSI, is hiding behind the veil of
corporate fiction to defeat public convenience, justify wrong, protect fraud,
or defend crime. Thus, it is only PSI who is responsible for the respondents'
illegal dismissal
MARINA’S CREATION ENTERPRISES v. ANCHETA, G.R No. 218333
FACTS:
Petitioner Marina Creation Enterprises (Marina) is engaged in the business
of making shoes and bags. In 2010, Marina hired respondent Romeo V.
Ancheta (Ancheta) as a sole attacher in Marina. In 2011, Ancheta suffered a
stroke and was placed under home care. Thereafter, Ancheta suffered
another stroke and was confined at St. Victoria Hospital in Marikina City
for 4 days.
Ancheta filed for a Sickness Notification with the Social Security System
(SSS) and was paid sickness benefits. The physician who examined
Ancheta told that he would be fit to resume work after ninety (90) days.
When Ancheta reported for work. He was required by Marina to submit a
new medical certificate before he could resume his work in Marina.
However, Ancheta did not comply and therefore was not able to resume
work. He filed a complaint with the LA against Marina for illegal dismissal
and non-payment of separation pay.
Ancheta alleged that he recovered from his illness and went to work but
Marina advised him to just wait for the companies call. He was also told
that he should take more rest and that Marina employed 2 new workers as
his replacement. He alleged that there was no notice for his termination.
On the other hand, Marina claimed that Ancheta was employed on a piece
rate bases and was not terminated but instead was not allowed to work
18
because of his failure to submit a medical clearance showing he was fit to
resume to work. Furthermore, it is the companies precautionary measure to
avoid any incident that would endanger the life of Ancheta.
The Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission ruled in
favor of Marina but reversed by The Court of Appeals stating that the
medical certificate given by Ancheta’s examining physician attached to his
SSS Sickness Notification was enough proof that he is fit to work.
ISSUE:
The issue in this case is whether Ancheta was illegally dismissed by
Marina.
HELD:
Yes, In its petition, Marina argues that the company's action of requiring
Ancheta to undergo a medica1 examination and to submit a medical
certificate was a valid exercise of management prerogative. Marina's
contention is not correct. Article 279 of the Labor Code provides: "In cases
of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an
employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this title. x x x."
Since Ancheta was a regular employee of Marina, Ancheta's employment
can only be terminated by Marina based on just or authorized causes
provided in the Labor Code. In its position paper, Marina admitted that the
company had refused to give Ancheta work assignments until Ancheta
submitted a new medical certificate. It is Marina's position that Ancheta's
employment would not continue if Ancheta would not submit a new
medical certificate. Marina's action in refusing to accept Ancheta
notwithstanding the medical certificate attached to Ancheta's SSS Sickness
Notification stating that Ancheta was physically fit to resume his work in
Marina on 12 August 2011 amounts to an illegal dismissal of Ancheta.
Book VI, Rule I, Section 8 of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code
provides:



Section 8. Disease as a ground for dismissal. - Where the employee suffers
from a disease and his continued employment is prohibited by law or
prejudicial to his health or to the health of his co-employees, the employer
shall not terminate his employment unless there is a certification by a
competent public health authority that the disease is of such nature or
at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a period of six (6) months
even with proper medical treatment. If the disease or ailment can be
cured within the period, the employer shall not terminate the employee but
shall ask the employee to take a leave. The employer shall reinstate the
employee to his former position immediately upon the restoration of his
normal health. (Emphasis supplied)
The Implementing Rules of the Labor Code impose upon the employer the
duty not to terminate an employee until there is a certification by a
competent public health authority that the employee's disease is of such
nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a period of six
months even with proper medical treatment. In this case, Marina terminated
Ancheta from employment without seeking a prior certification from a
competent public health authority that Ancheta's disease is of such nature or
at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a period of six months even
with proper medical treatment. Hence, Ancheta was illegally dismissed by
Marina.
WESLEYAN UNIVERSITY-PHILIPPINES v. MAGLAYA Sr. G.R No.
212774
FACTS:
Wesleyan University-Philippines (WUP) is a non-stock, non-profit, non-
sectarian educational corporation duly organized and existing under the
Philippine laws.
Respondent Atty. Guillermo T. Maglaya, Sr. (Maglaya) was appointed as a
corporate member and was elected as a member of the Board of Trustees
(Board), both for a period of five years. Then he was elected as President of
the University for a five-year term and was re-elected as a trustee.
In a Memorandum created by the incumbent Bishops of the United
Methodist Church (Bishops) apprised all the corporate members of the
expiration of their terms, unless renewed by the former. The said members,
including Maglaya, sought the renewal of their membership in the WUP's
Board, and signified their willingness to serve the corporation.
Maglaya learned that the Bishops created an Ad Hoc Committee to plan the
efficient and orderly turnover of the administration of the WUP in view of
the alleged "gentleman's agreement” and that the Bishops have appointed
the incoming corporate members and trustees. He clarified that there was no
agreement and any discussion of the turnover because the corporate
members still have valid and existing corporate terms.
Complaint was filed as the termination of their membership in the
corporation necessarily resulted in the conclusion of their positions as
members of the Board pursuant to the WUP by-laws.
Thereafter, Maglaya filed the present illegal dismissal case against the
WUP, claiming that he was unceremoniously dismissed in a wanton,
reckless, oppressive and malevolent manner. He also alleged that he
faithfully discharged his necessary and desirable functions as President.
19
WUP, on the other hand, asseverated that the dismissal or removal of
Maglaya, being a corporate officer and not a regular employee, is a
corporate act or intra-corporate controversy under the jurisdiction of the
RTC. WUP also maintained that since Maglaya's appointment was not
renewed, he ceased to be a member of the corporation and of the Board;
thus, his term for presidency has also been terminated.
The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of WUP and held that the action between
employers and employees where the employer-employee relationship is
merely incidental is within the exclusive and original jurisdiction of the
regular courts. This instant case involves intra-corporate dispute, which was
definitely beyond the jurisdiction of the labor tribunal.
Ruling in favor of Maglaya, the NLRC explicated that although the position
of the President of the University is a corporate office, the manner of
Maglaya's appointment, and his duties, salaries, and allowances point to his
being an employee and subordinate.
In a Resolution, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by WUP.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not Maglaya is a corporate officer or a mere employee.
HELD: This Court expounded that an "office" is created by the charter of
the corporation and the officer is elected by the directors or stockholders,
while an "employee" usually occupies no office and generally is employed
not by action of the directors or stockholders but by the managing officer of
the corporation who also determines the compensation to be paid to such
employee.
It is under the By-laws of WUP that the president was one of the officers of
the corporation, and was an honorary member of the Board. He was
appointed by the Board and not by a managing officer of the corporation.
The Court held that one who is included in the by-laws of a corporation in
its roster of corporate officers is an officer of said corporation and not a
mere employee.
A corporate officer's dismissal is always a corporate act, or an intra-
corporate controversy which arises between a stockholder and a
corporation, and the nature is not altered by the reason or wisdom with
which the Board of Directors may have in taking such action. The issue of
the alleged termination involving a corporate officer, not a mere employee,
is not a simple labor problem but a matter that comes within the area of
corporate affairs and management and is a corporate controversy in
contemplation of the Corporation Code.
In sum, this Court finds that the NLRC erred in assuming jurisdiction over,
and thereafter in failing to dismiss, Maglaya's complaint for illegal
dismissal against WUP, since the subject matter of the instant case is an
intra-corporate controversy which the NLRC has no jurisdiction.
TURKS SHAWARMA COMPANY v. FELICIANO PAJARON, G.R. No.
207156
FACTS:
Gem Zeñarosa, owner of Turks Shawarma Company, hired Feliciano Z.
Pajaron in May 2007 as service crew and Larry A. Carbonilla in April 2007
as head crew. On April 15, 2010, Pajaron and Carbonilla filed their
respective Complaints for constructive and actual illegal dismissal, non-
payment of overtime pay, holiday pay, holiday premium, rest day premium,
service incentive leave pay and 13th month pay against petitioners.
Pajaron alleged that on April 9, 2010, Zeñarosa asked him to sign a piece of
paper stating that he was receiving the correct amount of wages and that he
had no claims whatsoever from petitioners. Disagreeing to the truthfulness
of the statements, Pajaron refused to sign the paper prompting Zeñarosa to
fire him from work. Carbonilla, on the other hand, alleged that sometime in
June 2008, he had an altercation with his supervisor Conchita Marcillana
while at work. When the incident was brought to the attention of Zeñarosa,
he was immediately dismissed from service. He was also asked by Zeñarosa
to sign a piece of paper acknowledging his debt amounting to ₱7,000.00.
Both Pajaron and Carbonilla claimed that there was no just or authorized
cause for their dismissal and that petitioners also failed to comply with the
requirements of due process. Petitioners denied having dismissed Pajaron
and Carbonilla; they averred that they actually abandoned their work.
The Labor Arbiter found credible Pajaron and Carbonilla's version and held
them constructively and illegally dismissed by petitioners. The National
Labor Relations Commission and Court of Appeals both denied the Motion
for Reconsideration of the petitioners.
ISSUE: Whether the Labor Arbiter's Decision declaring Pajaron and
Carbonilla illegally terminated from employment was not based on
substantial evidence.
HELD: The Court ruled that the Labor Arbiter's Decision declaring Pajaron
and Carbonilla illegally dismissed was supported by substantial evidence.
While petitioners vehemently argue that Pajaron and Carbonilla abandoned
their work, the records are devoid of evidence to show that there was intent
on their part to forego their employment. In fact, petitioners adamantly
admitted that they refused to rehire Pajaron and Carbonilla despite
persistent requests to admit them to work. Hence, petitioners essentially
admitted the fact of dismissal. However, except for their empty and general
allegations that the dismissal was for just causes, petitioners did not proffer
any evidence to support their claim of misconduct or misbehavior on the
20
part of Pajaron and Carbonilla. "In termination cases, the burden of proof
rests on the employer to show that the dismissal is for a just cause."37 For
lack of any clear, valid, and just cause in terminating Pajaron and
Carbonilla's employment, petitioners are indubitably guilty of illegal
dismissal.
PNCC Skyway Corporation v. SECRETARY OF LABOR AND
EMPLOYMENT, G.R No. 196110
FACTS:
The Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC) was awarded by
the Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) with the franchise of constructing,
operating and maintaining the north and south expressways, including the
South Metro Manila Skyway (referred as Skyway herein). It created the
petitioner PNCC Skyway Corporation (PSC) on December 15, 1998, for the
purpose of taking charge of its traffic safety, maintaining its facilities and
collecting toll.
Eight years have passed, the Citra Metro Manila Tollway Corporation
(Citra), a private investor under a build-and-transfer scheme, entered into an
agreement with the TRB and the PNCC to transfer the operation of the
Skyway from petitioner PSC to the Skyway O & M Corporation (SOMCO).
The said transfer provided for a five-month transition period from July 2007
until the full turn-over of the Skyway at 10:00 p.m. of December 31, 2007
upon which petitioner PSC will close its operation.
However, on December 28, 2007 or three (3) days before the full transfer of
the operation of the Skyway to SOMCO, petitioner PSC served termination
letters to its employees, many of whom were members of private
respondent PNCC Skyway Traffic Management and Security Division
Worker's Organization (Union).
According to the letter, PSC has no choice but to close its operations
resulting in the termination of its employees effective January 31, 2008.
However, the employees are entitled to receive separation pay amounting to
250% of the basic monthly pay for every year of service, among others
things. Petitioner PSC, likewise, served a notice of termination to the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).
On that same day of December 28, 2007, private respondent Union,
immediately upon receipt of the termination letters, filed a Notice of Strike
before the DOLE alleging that the closure of the operation of PSC is
tantamount to union-busting because it is a means of terminating employees
who are members thereof. In addition, the notices of termination were
served on its employees three (3) days before petitioner PSC ceases its
operations, hence violating the employees' right to due process.
As a matter of fact, the employees were no longer allowed to work as of
January 1, 2008. Private respondent Union, thus, prayed that petitioner PSC
be held guilty of unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal. It, likewise,
prayed for the reinstatement of all dismissed employees, along with the
award of backwages, moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees.
PSC denied that the closure of its operation was intended to remove
employees who are members of private respondent Union. Instead, it
claimed that it was done in good faith and in the exercise of management
prerogative, considering that it was anchored on an agreement between the
TRB, the PNCC and the private investor Citra.
PSC likewise denied that it had violated the right to due process of its
employees, considering that the notices of termination were served on
December 28, 2007 while the termination was effective only on January 31,
2008. PSC alleged that the Union was guilty of an illegal strike when it
started a strike on the same day it filed a notice of strike on December 28,
2007.
Public Respondent Secretary of Labor found that there was authorized
cause for the closure of the operation however it failed to comply with the
procedural requirements set forth under Article 283 of the Labor Code.
On appeal, PSC filed a petition for certiorari alleging grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the
Secretary of Labor when it additionally directed payment of an additional
₱30,000.00 to PSC's former employees pursuant to Article 283 of the Labor
Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not PSC failed to comply with the procedural requirements of
Article 283 of the Labor Code
HELD:
YES. The SC agreed with the appellate court's stance that public respondent
Secretary of Labor committed no grave abuse of discretion in its resolution
that while there was an authorized cause for the closure of PSC's operations
and the subsequent termination of its employees, it however failed to
comply with the procedural requirements set forth under Article 283 of the
Labor Code, that is, by serving notices of termination upon the employees
and the DOLE at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof.
Article 283 of the Labor Code provides the three requirements are
necessary for a valid cessation of business operations which are as follows:
(a) service of a written notice to the employees and to the DOLE at least
21
one month before the intended date thereof; (b) the cessation of business
must be bona fide in character; and (c) payment to the employees of
termination pay amounting to one month pay or at least one-half month pay
for every year of service, whichever is higher.
The required written notice under Article 283 of the Labor Code is to
inform the employees of the specific date of termination or closure of
business operations and must be served upon them at least one (1) month
before the date of effectivity to give them sufficient time to make the
necessary arrangements. The purpose of this requirement is to give
employees time to prepare for the eventual loss of their jobs, as well as to
give DOLE the opportunity to ascertain the veracity of the alleged cause of
termination.
Thus, considering that the notices of termination were given merely three
(3) days before the cessation of the PSC's operation, it defeats the very
purpose of the required notice and the mandate of Article 283 of the Labor
Code. Neither the payment of employees' salaries for the said one-month
period nor the employees' alleged actual knowledge of the ASTOA is
sufficient to replace the formal and written notice required by the law.
Moreover, as early as July 2007, PSC already had knowledge of the
eventual take-over by SOMCO of the Skyway by December 31, 2007.
Thus, considering that PSC had ample time of more than five (5) months to
serve the notice of termination to its employees, its failure to comply with
the notice requirement under Article 283 of the Labor Code is inexcusable.
PJ LHUILLIER, INC v. CAMACHO, G.R No. 223073
FACTS:
On 2011, petitioner P.J. Lhuillier, Inc. (PJLI), the owner and operator of the
"Cebuana Lhuillier" chain of pawnshops, hired petitioner Feliciano
Vizcarra as PLJI's Regional Manager for Northern and Central Luzon
pawnshop operations and respondent Camacho as Area Operations
Manager (AOM) for Area 213, covering the province of Pangasinan.
Camacho was assigned to administer and oversee the operations of PJLI's
pawnshop branches in the area.
On May 15, 2012, Vizcarra received several text messages from some
personnel assigned in Area 213, reporting that Camacho brought along an
unauthorized person, a non-employee, during the QTP operation (pull-out
of "rematado" pawned items) from the different branches of Cebuana
Lhuillier Pawnshop in Pangasinan.
During the formal investigation on June 1, 2012, Camacho admitted that he
brought along a non-employee, Marasigan, during the QTP operations on
May 15, 2012. He explained that on May 12, 2012, he went home to Manila
to celebrate Mother's Day with his family on May 13, 2012. He drove
himself using the service vehicle assigned to him and arrived in Manila at
around 11:00 o'clock in the evening.
Camacho admitted that he knew that it was prohibited to bring unauthorized
personnel, especially a non-employee, during the QTP operations because
this was discussed in the seminars facilitated by the company's Security
Service Division. He only realized his mistake at the end of their 13-branch
stop when he noticed that his companions were unusually quiet throughout
the trip. It was also discovered that Camacho committed another violation
of company policy when he allowed an unauthorized person to drive a
company vehicle.
On June 14, 2012, the Formal Investigation Committee issued the Report of
Formal Investigation. The committee concluded that Camacho was guilty as
charged. This prompted Camacho to file a complaint before the Labor
Arbiter (LA) against the petitioners for illegal dismissal, money claims,
damages, and attorney's fees.
The NLRC reversed and set aside the May 14, 2013 Decision of the LA. It
declared the dismissal of Camacho as illegal. It opined that there was no
indication that Camacho, in allowing his mother's driver to be present
during the conduct of the QTP operation, was motivated by malicious intent
so as to construe the infraction as serious misconduct punishable by
dismissal.
The CA reversed the NLRC resolutions. It held that contrary to the findings
of the LA and the NLRC, the misconduct of Camacho was not of a serious
nature as to warrant a dismissal from work. At most, said the CA, he was
negligent and remiss in the exercise of his duty as an AOM.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Camacho was illegally dismissed
HELD:
The Court finds merit in the petition.
Article 282(c) of the Labor Code authorizes the employer to dismiss an
employee for committing fraud or for willful breach of trust reposed by the
employer on the employee. Loss of confidence, however, is never intended
to provide the employer with a blank check for terminating its employee
a. "Loss of trust and confidence" should not be loosely applied in justifying
the termination of an employee." For loss of trust and confidence to be valid
22
ground for termination, the employer must establish that: (1) the employee
holds a position of trust and confidence; and (2) the act complained against
justifies the loss of trust and confidence.
The first requisite mandates that the erring employee must be holding a
position of trust and confidence. Loss of trust and confidence is not a one-
size- fits-all cause that can be applied to all employees without distinction
on their standing in the work organization. Distinction yet should be made
as to what kind of position of trust is the employee occupying.
The law contemplates two (2) classes of positions of trust. The first class
consists of managerial employees. They are as those who are vested with
the power or prerogative to lay down management policies and to hire,
transfer, suspend, layoff, recall, discharge, assign or discipline employees or
effectively recommend such managerial actions. The second class consists
of cashiers, auditors, property custodians, etc. who, in the normal and
routine exercise of their functions, regularly handle significant amounts of
money or property.
Clearly from the foregoing, it can be deduced that Camacho held a
managerial position and, therefore, enjoyed the full trust and confidence of
his superiors. As a managerial employee, he was "bound by more exacting
work ethics" and should live up to this high standard of responsibility."
The second requisite for loss of confidence as a valid ground for
termination is that it must be based on a willful breach of trust and founded
on clearly established facts.
As can be culled from the records of the case, Camacho admitted that he
had committed a breach of trust when he brought along his mother's driver,
an unauthorized person, during the QTP operation, a very sensitive and
confidential operation. As explained by PJLI in its petition for review:
Camacho, as AOM, was a managerial employee. As such, he could be
terminated on the ground of loss of confidence by mere existence of a basis
for believing that he had breached the trust of his employer. Proof beyond
reasonable doubt is not required. It would already be sufficient that there is
some basis for such loss of confidence, such as when the employer has
reasonable ground to believe that the concerned employee is responsible for
the purported misconduct and the nature of his participation therein. This
distinguishes a managerial employee from a fiduciary rank-and-file where
loss of trust and confidence, as ground for valid dismissal, requires proof of
involvement in the alleged events in question, and that mere uncorroborated
assertion and accusation by the employer will not be sufficient.
In this case, there was such basis. It was established that Camacho had
breached PJLI's trust when he took an unauthorized person with him to the
QTP operation which was already a violation of company existing policy
and security protocol. His explanation that his alleged misdeed was brought
about by his poor physical and health condition on that day could not
prevail over two significant details that PJLI pointed out in its petition.
Although it may be true that PJLI did not sustain damage or loss on account
of Camacho's action, this is not reason enough to absolve him from the
consequence of his misdeed. The fact that an employer did not suffer
pecuniary damage will not obliterate the respondent's betrayal of trust and
confidence reposed on him by his employer.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the National
Labor Relations Commission is REINSTATED.
STA. ANA v. MANILA JOCKEY CLUB, INC. G.R No. 208459
FACTS:
Julieta Sta. Ana was hired by MJCI as outlet teller of its off-track betting
(OTB) station in Tayuman, Manila. As teller, Sta. Ana performed the
following duties and functions:
1. Waits on [OTB] tellers' booth for customers/clients; sells betting tickets.
2. Answers bettor's inquiries, provides information on racing events, assists
patrons with information, and takes bet orders.
3. Processes cash payments through terminal registers; balances registers
and makes daily ticket sales reports after the races.
4. Handles cash and transactions with due diligence and honesty to the
bettors and to the company as well.
5. Coordinates with the Betting Operations Department (BOD) on matters
beyond the standard operating procedure of the BOD.
6. Strictly observes and implements' company policies and procedures to
protect the interests of the company against unscrupulous bettors and
operators
7. Reports incidents to the company on matters pertaining to the operations.
8, Submits or remits the cash sales for the day to the official collection team
and/or to the assigned banks with night depository box.1âwphi1
9. May be assigned to different OTBs as necessary to the company's
operations.
10. Performs miscellaneous job-related duties as assigned.8
It was found out by MJCI that its treasury department has been illegally
appropriating funds and lending it out to the employees of the latter
corporation. The Special Disciplinary Committee of MJCI found Sta. Ana
conducting her lending business during office hours and using the funds and
personnel of MJCI; thus, she was found guilty of dishonesty and other
fraudulent acts by the said committee.
23
On her defense, she alleged that she started her lending business 15 years
ago prior to the takeover of the new management of MJCI and she sold her
fishing vessels 2 years ago to finance her lending business.
She was eventually terminated by MJCI. Consequently, she filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal.
Note that Sta. Ana was dismissed for willful breach of trust and confidence.
The LA dismissed the Complaint for lack of merit.
The NLRC affirmed the LA Decision. It ruled that MJCI validly dismissed
Sta. Ana for loss of trust and confidence.
The CA also affirmed the NLRC Resolutions.
ISSUE: Whether Sta. Ana was validly dismissed on the ground of loss of
trust and confidence.
HELD: The Supreme Court enumerated the elements to legally dismiss an
employee on the ground of loss and trust, to wit:
“The employer must establish that:
a) the employee occupied a position of trust and confidence, or has been
routinely charged with the care and custody of the employer’s money or
property;
b) the employee committed a willful breach of trust based on clearly
established facts; and
c) such loss of trust relates to the employee’s performance of duties.”
In the case at bar, only the first element was proven by MCJI. The SC ruled
that nowhere in the evidence presented by MJCI that Sta. Ana utilized the
funds of the corporation for her lending business. Also, Sta. Ana was able to
present documents to show her capability to engage in loan operations.
Quoting the words of the SC:
“Particularly, it [MJCI] failed to establish that Sta. Ana used its employee
for her personal business during office hours, and used its money, without
authority, to lend money to another”
MJCI failed to prove that Sta. Ana committed willful breach of its
trust. Particularly, it failed to establish that Sta. Ana used its employee for
her personal business during office hours, and used its money; without
authority, to lend money to another. Hence, to dismiss her on the ground of
loss of trust and confidence is unwarranted.
Under these circumstances. Sta. Ana is also entitled to receive backwages
and separation pay.
DE OCAMPO MEMORIAL SCHOOLS, INC. v. BIGKIS
MANGGAGAWA SA DE OCAMPO, INC, G.R No. 192648
FACTS:
De Ocampo Memorial Schools, Inc. a domestic corporation has two main
divisions; De Ocampo Memorial Medical Center (DOMMC), its hospital
entity, and the De Ocampo Memorial Colleges (DOMC), its school entity.
A Union Registration was issued in favor of Bigkis Manggagawa sa De
Ocampo Memorial Medical Center - LAKAS (BMDOMMC) while Bigkis
Manggagawa sa De Ocampo Memorial School, Inc. (BMDOMSI) was later
declared a legitimate labor organization. Due to this, De Ocampo Memorial
Schools, Inc. filed a Petition for Cancellation of Ce1iificate of Registration
to cancel the Certificate of Registration of BMDOMSI on the following
grounds: 1) misrepresentation, false statement and fraud in connection with
its creation and registration as a labor union as it shared the same set of
officers and members with BMDOMMC; 2) mixed membership of rank-
and-file and managerial/supervisory employees; and 3) inappropriate
bargaining unit.
DOLE-NCR ruled that BMDOMSI committed misrepresentation by making
it appear that the bargaining unit is composed of faculty and technical
employees. In fact, all the union officers and most of the members are from
the General Services Division. Furthermore, the members of the union do
not share commonality of interest, as it is composed of academic and non-
academic personnel. However, reversed the Regional Director's finding.
The CA affirmed the decision of the Regional Director but also ruled that
there was no commonality of interest present.
ISSUE: Whether or not the union committed fraud and misrepresentation
by having same set of officers with BMDOMMC
HELD: No. For fraud and misrepresentation to constitute grounds for
cancellation of union registration under the Labor Code Art. 247, the nature
of the fraud and misrepresentation must be grave and compelling enough to
vitiate the consent of a majority of union members. Moreover, there is
nothing in the form "Report of Creation of Local Chapter" that requires the
applicant to disclose the existence of another union, much less the names of
the officers of such other union. Although commonality of interest is absent,
it is not a ground for cancellation of union registration.
27. MANGGAGAWA NG KOMUNIKASYON SA PILIPINAS V. PLDT
G.R. NO. 190389 April 19, 2017
FACTS:
Labor organization Manggagawa ng Komunikasyon sa Pilipinas (MKP),
which represented the employees of Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Company, filed a notice of strike with the National Conciliation and
Mediation Board. MKP charged Philippine Long Distance Telephone
24
Company with unfair labor practice "for transferring several employees of
its Provisioning Support Division to Bicutan, Taguig." The notice of strike
contains the following unfair labor practices:
1. PLDT's abolition of the Provisioning Support Division
2. PLDT's unreasonable refusal to honor its commitment before
this Honorable Office that it will provide MKP its
comprehensive plan/s with respect to personnel downsizing/
reorganization and closure of exchanges.
3. PLDT's continued hiring of "contractual," "temporary,"
"project," and "casual" employees for regular jobs performed
by union members, resulting in the decimation of the union
membership and in the denial of the right to self-organization
to the concerned employees
Another notice of strike was filed by MKP. The labor organization accused
PLDT of unfair labor practice where PLDT's alleged restructuring of its
[Greater Metropolitan Manila] Operation Services December 31, 2002 and
its closure of traffic operations at the Batangas, Calamba, Davao, Iloilo,
Lucena, Malolos and Tarlac Regional Operator Services effective December
31, 2002. These twin moves unjustly imperil the job security of 503 of
MKP's members and will substantially decimate the parties' bargaining unit.
Secretary of Labor and Employment certified the labor dispute at the PLDT
to the NLRC compulsory Arbitration pursuant to Article 263 (g) of Labor
Code. All striking workers are hereby directed to return to work within
twenty four (24) hours from receipt of this Order, except those who were
terminated due to redundancy. The employer is hereby enjoined to accept
the striking workers under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to
the strike. The parties are likewise directed to cease and desist from
committing any act that might worsen the situation.
CA nullified and set aside the order of Secretary of Labor and Employment.
PLDT appealed CA’s decision to the SC. SC upheld the CA’s decision and
ordered to readmit all the workers under the same terms and conditions
prevailing before the strike.
However, NLRC dismissed MKP’s charges of unfair labor practices against
PLDT. MKP filed a petition for certiorari with CA. CA upheld the validity
of PLDT’s redundancy program.
Consequently, Sec of Labor and Employment dismissed MKP’s motion for
execution of the SC’s decision of readmitting all the workers. MKP filed a
petition for certiorari before CA. CA found that NLRC did not commit
grave abuse of discretiona and that PLDT’s redundancy program was not
unattended by unfair labor practice.
ISSUES:
 1. WHETHER THE COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION IN UPHOLDING THE VALIDITY OF PLDT’S
2002 REDUNDANCY PROGRAM
2. WHETHER THE RETURN-TO-WORK ORDER OF THE
SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT WAS
RENDERED MOOT WHEN THE NLRC UPHELD THE
VALIDITY OF THE REDUNDANCY PROGRAM
RULING:
1. NO. The Court did not commit grave abuse of discretion when it
regarded the technological advancements resulting in less work for
the redundated employees as justifying PLDT’s declaration of
redundancy.
PLDT’s declaration of redundancy was backed by substantial evidence
showing a consistent decline for operator-assisted calls for both local and
international calls because of cheaper alternatives like direct dialing
services, and the growth of wireless communication. Thus, the National
Labor Relations Commission did not commit grave abuse of discretion
when it upheld the validity of PLDT's redundancy program. Redundancy is
ultimately a management prerogative, and the wisdom or soundness of such
business judgment is not subject to discretionary review by labor tribunals
or even this Court, as long as the law was followed and malicious or
arbitrary action was not shown.
2. YES. Return-to-work order aims to preserve the status quo ante
while the validity of redundancy program is being threshed out in
the proper forum. When the petitioner filed its Motion for
Execution pursuant to the Court’s ruling in PLDT, there was no
longer any existing basis for the return-to-work order. This was
because the Secretary of Labor and Employment’s return-to-work
order had been superseded by the NLRC’s Resolution. Hence, the
Secretary did not err in dismissing the motion for execution on the
ground of mootness.
28. EDITHA M. CATOTOCAN v. LOURDES SCHOOL OF QUEZON
CITY, INC./LOURDES SCHOOL, INC. AND REV. FR. CESAR F.
ACUIN, OFM CAP, RECTOR
FACTS:
Editha Catotocan was a music teacher with a monthly salary Php30,081.00
of Lourdes School of Quezon City (LSQC). By the school year 2005-2006,
she had already served for 35 years.
LSQC has an existing retirement plan providing for retirement at 60 years
old, or separation pay depending on the number of years
On November 25, 2003, LSQC issued another retirement plan providing
that “an employee may apply for retirement or be retired by the school
25
when he /she reaches the age of 60 years or when he/she completes 30 years
of service, whichever comes first”.
Catotocan and other co-employees assailed the said order. They believed
that they do not deserve to be retired and be rehired when they are, in fact,
very much capable of doing their duties and responsibilities.
LSQC retired Catotocan sometime in June 2006 after completing 35 years
of service. Full retirement benefits were given to her computed based on the
latest salary multiplied by the total years of service. Under the school's
retirement policy, 60% of her retirement benefit was paid in lump sum by
the trustee bank, and the balance was to be paid in equal monthly pensions
over the next 3 years.
60% or Php571,701.00 was credited to her savings account, which she
opened in accordance with the school's retirement policy.
Catotocan was told that if she desires, she may signify in writing her intent
to continue serving the school on a contractual basis. She responded by
submitting a "Letter of Intent" on February 14, 2006.
LSQC rehired Catotocan twice as a Grade School Guidance Counselor. On
the 3rd re-application, LSQC no longer considered her application for the
position.
Catotocan filed a complaint to the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal, which
the latter dismissed for lack of merit. The Labor Arbiter pointed out that,
although there were exchanges of communications between her and
respondents regarding her earlier opposition to the school's retirement
policy, her subsequent actions, however, such as opening her own
individual savings account where the retirement benefits were deposited
and credited thereto, her subsequent withdrawals therefrom, her application
for contractual employment after her retirement, constituted implied
consent to the assailed addendum in LSQC's retirement policy and, in
effect, abandoned her objection thereto.
NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter's decision. The NLRC held that
Catotocan performed all the acts that a retired employee would do after
retirement under the new school policy. These were voluntary acts and she
cannot be considered to have been forced to retire or to have been illegally
dismissed.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
ISSUE:
Whether or no Catotocan was illegally dismissed by LSQC.
RULING:
No, she was not for there was no illegal dismissal.
Retirement is the result of a bilateral act of the parties, a voluntary
agreement between the employer and the employee whereby the latter, after
reaching a certain age, agrees to sever his or her employment with the
former. Article 287 of the Labor Code is the primary provision: In the
absence of a retirement plan or agreement providing for retirement
benefits of employees in the establishment, an employee upon reaching
the age of sixty (60) years or more, but not beyond sixty-five (65) years
which is hereby declared the compulsory retirement age, who has served at
least five (5) years in the said establishment, may retire and shall be entitled
to retirement pay equivalent to at least one-half (1/2) month salary for every
year of service, a fraction of at least six (6) months being considered as one
whole year.
Jurisprudence is replete with cases discussing the employer's prerogative to
lower the compulsory retirement age subject to the consent of its
employees.
Thus LSQC's retirement plan, allowing employers to retire employees who
have not yet reached the compulsory retirement age of 65 years are not per
se repugnant to the constitutional guaranty of security of tenure. The Labor
Code permits employers and employees to fix the applicable retirement age
at 60 years or below, provided that the employees' retirement benefits under
any CBA and other agreements shall not be less than those provided therein.
Acceptance by the employees of an early retirement age option must be
explicit, voluntary, free, and uncompelled. While an employer may
unilaterally retire an employee earlier than the legally permissible ages
under the Labor Code, this prerogative must be exercised pursuant to a
mutually instituted early retirement plan. Due process only requires that
notice of the employer's decision to retire an employee be given to the
employee.
Here, the CA and the NLRC did not gravely abuse its discretion. It must be
stressed that Catotocan's subsequent actions after her "retirement" are
actually tantamount to her consent to the addendum to the LSQC's
retirement policy of retiring her from service upon serving the school for
at least thirty (30) continuous years, to wit: (1) after being notified that she
was being retired from service by LSQC, she opened a savings account with
BDO, the trustee bank; (2) she accepted all the proceeds of her retirement
package: the lump sum and all the monthly payments credited to her
account until June 2009; (3) upon acceptance of the retirement benefits,
there was no notation that she is accepting the retirement benefits under
protest or without prejudice to the filing of an illegal dismissal case. We
also did not find an iota of evidence showing that LSQC exerted undue
influence against Catotocan to acquire her consent on the school's
retirement policy. Suffice it to say that from the foregoing, Catotocan
performed all the acts to ratify her retirement in accordance with LSQC's
retirement policy.
26
Although there was an exchange of communications about the retirees'
objection to the new retirement policy years earlier, eventually, appellant
assented thereto when she opened a savings account with BDO, withdrew
the money for her personal use and applied again for a teaching job with the
school.
While it is true that the acceptance of retirement pay and her eventual
appointment as Guidance Counselor did not amount to a waiver to contest
her alleged forced retirement or illegal dismissal, the voluntary nature of
her acts from June 2006 up to June 2009 clearly belies her claim of illegal
dismissal.
Obviously, appellant filed this complaint claiming illegal dismissal after she
had benefited from the proceeds of her retirement in June 2006, and
received salaries as Guidance Counselor of the appellee school for the
subsequent three (3) years which ended in 2009. By her actuations, she is
already estopped from questioning the legality of the new retirement policy.
Moreover, in the Letter dated August 6, 2006 addressed to Fr. Acuin,
Catotocan, along with other co-employees, referred to themselves as
"retirees" and even signed as "the retired employees." The context of the
letter does not, in any way, show any animosity with LSQC which would
otherwise indicate that they still harbor ill feelings towards LSQC due to
their alleged illegal dismissal. Thus, We hold that Catotocan's filing of the
illegal dismissal case was just an afterthought subsequent to LSQC's denial
of her fourth re-application for the Guidance Counselor position.
It must be stressed also that Catotocan's repeated application and availment
of the re-hiring program of LSQC for qualified retirees for 3 consecutive
years is a supervening event that would reveal that she has already
voluntarily and freely signified her consent to the retirement policy despite
her initial opposition to it. In this case, not only did Catotocan received all
of her retirement benefits but she also applied and availed the LSQC's re-
hiring policy of retirees.
29. UST vs. SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA NG UST
GR No. 184262, April 24, 2017
Facts:
A complaint for regularization and illegal dismissal was filed by
respondents Samahang Manggagawa ng UST and Pontesor, et
al. (respondents) against petitioner before the NLRC. Respondents alleged
that on various periods spanning the years 1990-1999, petitioner repeatedly
hired Pontesor, et al. to perform various maintenance duties within its
campus. Respondents insisted that in view of Pontesor, et al.' s performance
of such maintenance tasks throughout the years, they should be deemed
regular employees of petitioner. Respondents further argued that for as long
as petitioner continues to operate and exist as an educational institution,
with rooms, buildings, and facilities to maintain, the latter could not
dispense with Pontesor, et al. 's services which are necessary and desirable
to the business of petitioner.
On the other hand, while petitioner admitted that it repeatedly hired
Pontesor, et al. in different capacities throughout the aforesaid years, it
nevertheless maintained that they were merely hired on a per-project basis,
as evidenced by numerous Contractual Employee Appointments
(CEAs) signed by them. In this regard, petitioner pointed out that each of
the CEAs that Pontesor, et al. signed defined the nature and term of the
project to which they are assigned, and that each contract was renewable in
the event the project remained unfinished upon the expiration of the
specified term. In accordance with the express provisions of said CEAs,
Pontesor, et al. 's project employment were automatically terminated: (a)
upon the expiration of the specific term specified in the CEA; (b) when the
project is completed ahead of such expiration; or (c) in cases when their
employment was extended due to the non-completion of the specific project
for which they were hired, upon the completion of the said project. As such,
the termination of Pontesor, et al. 's employment with petitioner was validly
made due to the completion of the specific projects for which they were
hired.
Issue: WON Respondent Pontesor is a regular employee thus rendering the
dismissal invalid
Held:
YES. Pontesor should be considered regularized casual employees who
enjoy security of tenure. The law provides for two (2) types of regular
employees, namely: (a) those who are engaged to perform activities which
are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the
employer ; and (b) those who have rendered at least one year of service,
whether continuous or broken, with respect to the activity in which they are
employed. The primary standard, therefore, of determining regular
employment is the reasonable connection between the particular activity
performed by the employee in relation to the usual trade or business of the
employer. The test is whether the former is usually necessary or desirable in
the usual business or trade of the employer. The connection can be
determined by considering the nature of work performed and its relation to
the scheme of the particular business or trade in its entirety. Also, if the
employee has been performing the job for at least a year, even if the
performance is not continuous and merely intermittent, the law deems
repeated and continuing need for its performance as sufficient evidence of
the necessity if not indispensability of that activity to the business. Hence,
27
the employment is considered regular, but only with respect to such activity
and while such activity exists
In the case at bar, a review of Pontesor, et al. 's respective CEAs reveal that
petitioner repeatedly rehired them for various positions in the nature of
maintenance workers for various periods spanning the years 1990-1999.
Although nature of work are not necessary and desirable to petitioner's
usual business as an educational institution; nonetheless, it is clear that their
respective cumulative periods of employment as per their respective CEAs
each exceed one (1) year. Thus, Pontesor, et al. fall under the second
category of regular employees under Article 295 of the Labor Code.
Accordingly, they should be deemed as regular employees but only with
respect to the activities for which they were hired and for as long as such
activities exist.
3 0 . Z A M B R A N O , E T. A L V. P H I L I P P I N E M A R K E T
MANUFACTURING CORPORATION
G.R. NO. 224099, June 21, 2017
FACTS:
Petitioners were terminated on the ground of cessation of operation due to
serious business losses. They allege that their dismissal was without just
cause and in violation of due process because the closure of Phil Carpet was
a mere pretense to transfer its operations to Pacific Carpet. They claimed
that the job orders of some regular clients of Phil Carpet was transferred to
Pacific Carpet and that several machines were moved from Phil Carpet to
Pacific Carpet. Petitioners also alleged that their dismissal was constituted
with unfair labor practice as it involved mass dismissal of its union officers
and members.
Respondent countered that it permanently closed and totally ceased its
operations because there had been a steady decline in the demand for its
products due to global recession, stiffer competition and the effects of a
changing market. Respondent also faithfully complied with the requisites
for closure and cessation of business under the Labor Code.
LA dismissed the complaints for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice.
NLRC affirmed LA’s ruling. CA ruled that the total cessation of Phil
Carpet’s manufacturing operations was not made in bad faith because the
same was clearly due to economic necessity.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the petitioners were dismissed from employment for a
lawful cause
2. Whether the petitioners’ termination from employment constitutes
unfair labor practice
 3. Whether Pacific Carpet may be held liable for Phil Carpet’s
obligations
4. Whether the quitclaims signed by the petitioners are valid and
binding
RULING:
1. YES. Petitioners were terminated for an authorized cause.
Under Article 283 of the Labor Code, three requirements are necessary for a
valid cessation of business operations: (a) service of a written notice to the
employees and to the DOLE at least one month before the intended date
thereof; (b) the cessation of business must be bona fide in character; and (c)
payment to the employees of termination pay amounting to one month pay
or at least one-half month pay for every year of service, whichever is
higher.
In this case, the LA's findings that Phil Carpet suffered from serious
business losses which resulted in its closure were affirmed in toto by the
NLRC, and subsequently by the CA. It is a rule that absent any showing
that the findings of fact of the labor tribunals and the appellate court are not
supported by evidence on record or the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts, the Court shall not examine anew the evidence
submitted by the parties.
2. NO. The dismissal did not amount to unfair labor practice.
Good faith is presumed and he who alleges bad faith has the duty to prove
the same.
The petitioners miserably failed to discharge the duty imposed upon them.
They did not identify the acts of Phil Carpet which, they claimed,
constituted unfair labor practice. They did not even point out the specific
provisions which Phil Carpet violated. Thus, they would have the Court
pronounce that Phil Carpet committed unfair labor practice on the ground
that they were dismissed from employment simply because they were union
officers and members. The constitutional commitment to the policy of
social justice, however, cannot be understood to mean that every labor
dispute shall automatically be decided in favor of labor.
In this case, as far as the pieces of evidence offered by the petitioners are
concerned, there is no showing that the closure of the company was an
attempt at union-busting. Hence, the charge that Phil Carpet is guilty of
unfair labor practice must fail for lack of merit.
3. NO. Pacific Carpet is not liable for Phil Carpet’s obligations.
This Court has declared that "mere ownership by a single stockholder or by
another corporation of all or nearly all of the capital stock of a corporation
is not of itself sufficient ground for disregarding the separate corporate
personality." It has likewise ruled that the "existence of interlocking
directors, corporate officers and shareholders is not enough justification to
28
pierce the veil of corporate fiction in the absence of fraud or other public
policy considerations."
The petitioners failed to present substantial evidence to prove their
allegation that Pacific Carpet is a mere alter ego of Phil Carpet.
4. YES. The quitclaims were valid and binding upon the petitioners.
The contents of the quitclaims, which were in Filipino, were clear and
simple, such that it was unlikely that the petitioners did not understand what
they were signing.
31. Sumifru Corp. v. Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa Suyapa Farm
GR. No. 202091, June 7, 2017
FACTS:
Sumifru is a domestic corporation and is the surviving corporation
after its merger with Fresh Banana Agricultural Corporation (FBAC) in
2008. FBAC was engaged in the buying, marketing, and exportation of
Cavendish bananas. Respondent Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa Suyapa Farm
(NAMASUFA-NAFLU-KMU) (NAMASUFA) is a labor organization
affiliated with the National Federation of Labor Unions and Kilusang Mayo
Uno.
Private respondent Nagkahiusang Mamumuo sa Suyapa filed a Petition for
Certification Election before the DOLE Regional Office in Davao City.
NAMASUFA sought to represent all rank-and-file employees, numbering
around 140, of packing plant 90 of FBAC. NAMASUFA claimed that there
was no existing union in the aforementioned establishment. FBAC filed an
Opposition arguing that there exists no employer-employee relationship
between it and the workers involved as the members of NAMASUFA are
actually employees of A2Y Contracting Services (A2Y), a duly licensed
independent contractor, as evidenced by the payroll records of the latter.
NAMASUFA countered that its members were former workers of Stanfilco
before FBAC took over its operations sometime in 2002. The said former
employees were then required to join the Compostela Banana Packing Plant
Workers’ Cooperative (CBPPWC) before they were hired and allowed to
work at the Packing Plant of FBAC. It further alleged that the members of
NAMASUFA were working at PP 90 long before A2Y came.
ISSUE: WON the members of the Union are employees of SUmifru
HELD:
Yes. The Court affirmed the ruling of the Med Arbiter granting the Petition
for Certification Election of NAMASUFA and declared that Sumifru was
the employer of the workers concerned.
Based on the “four-fold test”, the elements to determine the existence of an
employment relationship are: (a) the selection and engagement of the
employee; (b) the payment of wages; (c) the power of dismissal; and (d) the
employer’s power to control the employee’s conduct. The most important
element is the employer’s control of the employee’s conduct, not only as to
the result of the work to be done, but also as to the means and methods to
accomplish it.
On the first factor, it is apparent that the staff of respondent FBAC advised
those who are interested to be hired in the Packing Plant to become
members first of CBPPWC and get a recommendation from it. On the
second factor, while the respondent tried to impress upon us that workers
are paid by A2Y Contracting Services, this at best is but an administrative
arrangement. The payroll summary submitted does not contain the relevant
information such as the employee’s rate of pay, deductions made and the
amount actually paid to the employee. On the third factor, it is very clear
that respondent FBAC is the authority that imposes disciplinary measures
against erring workers. This alone proves that it wields disciplinary
authority over them. Finally, on the fourth factor which is the control test,
the fact that the respondent FBAC gives instructions to the workers on how
to go about their work is sufficient indication that it exercises control over
their movements. The workers are instructed as to what time they are
supposed to report and what time they are supposed to return. They were
required to fill up monitoring sheets as they go about their jobs and even the
materials which they used in the packing plant were supplied by FBAC.
Viewed from the above circumstances, it is clear that respondent FBAC is
the real employer of the workers of Packing Plant 90. They are in truth and
in fact the employees of the respondent and its attempt to seek refuge on
A2Y Contracting Services as the ostensible employer was nothing but an
elaborate scheme to deprive them their right to self-organization.
32. PANALIGAN v PHYVITA ENTERPRISES CORPORATION
G.R. No. 202086, June 21, 2017
Facts:
Phyvita Enterprises Corporation is a domestic corporation engaged in the
business of health club massage parlor, spa and other related services under
the name and style of Starfleet Reflex Zone. Panaligan et al were employees
of Corporation assigned as Roomboys.
Sometime in Jan 2005, the Corporation discovered that the amount of
180,000 including some receipts and payroll were missing. The Corporation
conducted police investigation and while it was pending, Panaligan et al
with some employees filed a complaint before the DOLE against
Corporation for 1.underpayment of wages, 2.non payment of special and
legal holidays, 3.5 days service incentive leave, 4.night shift differential
pay, 5.no pay slip, 6.signing of blank payroll. In the interim, the
29
Corporation accused the Panaligan et al of theft and stated that the latter
were responsible for the loss of the money and properties. Later,
Corporation terminated the employer-employee relationship between them
and Panaligan et al based on loss of trust and confidence. Also, the
Corporation filed a criminal complaint of theft against the Pangilinan et al,
but the same was dismissed by the city prosecutor, there being no sufficient
evidence. 

Pangilinan et al filed a complaint with the LA alleging that they were
illegally dismissed. The Corporation, on their defense, stated that the
dismissal was legal because the alleged criminal complaint was enough
evidence to produce a substantial evidence. LA ruled in favor of the
Corporation. NLRC reversed the decision of LA and decided in favor of
Panaligan et al. CA reversed the decision of NLRC.


Issue:
Whether or not, Panaligan et al. were illegally dismissed.


Held: Yes, Panaligan et al. were illegally dismissed.
ARTICLE 297. Termination by Employer. - An employer may terminate an
employment for any of the following causes:(a) Serious misconduct or
willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer
or representative in connection with his work;(b) Gross and habitual neglect
by the employee of his duties;(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee
of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized
representative;(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee
against the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family
or his duly authorized representative; and(e) Other causes analogous to the
foregoing.
Misconduct is improper or wrong conduct; it is the transgression of some
established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty,
willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in
judgment. The misconduct, to be serious within the meaning of the Labor
Code, must be of such a grave and aggravated character and not merely
trivial or unimportant. Thus, for misconduct or improper behavior to be a
just cause for dismissal, (a) it must be serious; (b) it must relate to the
performance of the employee's duties; and (c) it must show that the
employee has become unfit to continue working for the employer.
On the other hand, loss of trust and confidence, as a just cause for
termination of employment, is premised on the fact that an employee
concerned holds a position where greater trust is placed by management and
from whom greater fidelity to duty is correspondingly expected. The
betrayal of this trust is the essence of the offense for which an employee is
penalized.
Thus, it must be proved that the employees must be guilty of an actual and
willful breach of trust and that they committed a serious misconduct duly
supported by substantial evidence. However, in the case at hand, the
Corporation failed to adduce evidence supporting the accusation. Hence a
Corporation dismissed criminal complaint does not tantamount to a ground
for termination of employment, the employees were illegally dismissed.
33. IBON v. GENGHIS KHAN SECURITY SERVICES
G.R. No. 221085
FACTS:
Ravengar G. Ibon was employed as a security guard by Genghis Khan
Security Services sometime in June 2008. He was initially assigned to Mr.
Solis in Quezon City. However, in June 2009, Ibon was transferred to the
Aspen Tower Condominium until his last duty on October 4, 2010.
Thereafter, respondent promised to provide him a new assignment, which,
however, did not happen.
On May 10, 2011, Ibon filed a complaint against respondent for illegal
dismissal. He alleged that he was no longer assigned to a new post after his
last duty. Respondent denied that Ibon was placed on a floating status for
more than six (6) months. It claimed that Ibon was suspended on October 4,
2010 for sleeping on the job. It also averred that Ibon was endorsed to
another client for re-assignment, but the client refused because Ibon’s
license was due for renewal, and that they sent a letter to Ibon requiring him
to report back to work.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Ibon was constructively dismissed
HELD:
YES. In Reyes v. RP Guardians Security Agency, it was held that temporary
displacement or temporary off-detail of security guard is, generally, allowed
in a situation where a security agency's client decided not to renew their
service contract with the agency and no post is available for the relieved
security guard. Such situation does not normally result in a constructive
dismissal. Nonetheless, when the floating status lasts for more than six (6)
months, the employee may be considered to have been constructively
dismissed. No less than the Constitution guarantees the right of workers to
security of tenure, thus, employees can only be dismissed for just or
authorized causes and after they have been afforded the due process of law.
In this case, aside from respondent's bare assertions that Ibon was
suspended, which the latter had denied, there was no evidence of the
30
imposition of said penalty. Respondent could have easily produced
documents to support its contention that Ibon had been suspended,
considering that employers are required to observe due process in the
discipline of employees. Respondent could not rely on its letter requiring
Ibon to report back to work to refute a finding of constructive dismissal.
The letters merely requested him to report back to work and to explain why
he failed to report to the office after inquiring about his posting status. More
importantly, there was no proof that Ibon had received the letters.
In Tatel v. JFLP Investigation, the court held that [1] an employer must
assign the security guard to another posting within six (6) months from his
last deployment, otherwise, he would be considered constructively
dismissed; and [2] the security guard must be assigned to a specific or
particular client. A general return-to-work order does not suffice.
Applying the foregoing to the present controversy, respondent should have
deployed petitioner to a specific client within six (6) months from his last
assignment. The correspondences allegedly sent to petitioner merely
required him to explain why he did not report to work. He was never
assigned to a particular client. Thus, even if petitioner actually received the
letters of respondent, he was still constructively dismissed because none of
these letters indicated his reassignment to another client.
34. BRAVO vs. URIOS COLLEGE
G.R. No. 198066, June 7, 2017
FACTS:
Bravo was employed as a part-time teacher in 1988 by Urios College. In
addition to his duties as a part-time teacher, Bravo was designated as the
school's comptroller from June 1, 2002 to May 31, 2002. Urios College
organized a committee to formulate a new "ranking system for non-
academic employees for school year 2001-2002” where Bravo
recommended that "the position of Comptroller should be classified as a
middle management position.
A committee to review the ranking system implemented during school year
2001-2002 was formed and found out that the ranking system for school
year 2001-2002 caused salary distortions. There were also discrepancies in
the salary adjustments of Bravo and of two (2) other employees. The
committee discovered that "the Comptroller's Office solely prepared and
implemented the [s]alary [a]djustment [s]chedule" without prior approval
from the Human Resources Department. The committee recommended that
Bravo be administratively charged for serious misconduct or willful breach
of trust.
On March 16, 2005, Bravo received a show cause memo requiring him to
explain in writing why his services should not be terminated for his alleged
acts of serious misconduct. A committee was organized to investigate the
matter. Hearings were conducted thereafter. Bravo was found guilty of
serious misconduct for which he was ordered to return the sum of ₱
179,319.16, representing overpayment of his monthly salary. On July 25,
2005, Urios College notified Bravo of its decision to terminate his
services for serious misconduct and loss of trust and confidence. Upon
receipt of the termination letter, Bravo immediately filed before Executive
Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal dismissal with a prayer for the
payment of separation pay, damages, and attorney's fees.
The Executive Labor dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. On appeal,
the National Labor Relations Commission found that Bravo's dismissal
from service was illegal. The Court of Appeals reversed the National Labor
Relations Commission's Resolution and reinstated the decision of Executive
Labor Arbiter Pelaez.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the petitioner's employment was terminated for a just
cause; and
(2) Whether or not the petitioner was deprived of procedural due process
RULING:
(1) YES. Under Article 297 of the Labor Code, an employer may terminate
the services of an employee for “fraud or willful breach by the employee of
the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative”
Due to the nature of his occupation, petitioner's employment may be
terminated for willful breach of trust under Article 297(c), not Article
297(a), of the Labor Code. A dismissal based on willful breach of trust or
loss of trust and confidence under Article 297 of the Labor Code entails the
concurrence of two (2) conditions. First, the employee whose services are to
be terminated must occupy a position of trust and confidence. And that
there must be the presence of some basis for the loss of trust and
confidence. This means that "the employer must establish the existence of
an act justifying the loss of trust and confidence." Otherwise, employees
will be left at the mercy of their employers. Different rules apply in
determining whether loss of trust and confidence may validly be used as a
justification in termination cases.1âwphi1 Managerial employees are treated
differently than fiduciary rank-and-file employees.
[W]ith respect to rank-and-file personnel, loss of trust and confidence as
ground for valid dismissal requires proof of involvement in the alleged
events in question, and that mere uncorroborated assertions and accusations
by the employer will not be sufficient. But, as regards a managerial
employee, mere existence of a basis for believing that such employee has
breached the trust of his employer would suffice for his dismissal. Hence, in
the case of managerial employees, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not
31
required, it being sufficient that there is some basis for such loss of
confidence, such as when the employer has reasonable ground to believe
that the employee concerned is responsible for the purported misconduct,
and the nature of his participation therein renders him unworthy of the trust
and confidence demanded by his position.
The Supreme Court holds that petitioner was validly dismissed based on
loss of trust and confidence. Petitioner was not an ordinary rank-and-file
employee. His position of responsibility on delicate financial matters
entailed a substantial amount of trust from respondent. It was reasonable for
the employer to trust that he had basis for his computations especially with
respect to his own compensation. Petitioner's act in assigning to himself a
higher salary rate without proper authorization is a clear breach of the trust
and confidence reposed in him. Petitioner's position made him accountable
in ensuring that the Comptroller's Office observed the company's
established procedures. It was reasonable that he should be held liable by
respondent on the basis of command responsibility.
RULING:
(2) NO. Any meaningful opportunity for the employee to present evidence
and address the charges against him or her satisfies the requirement of
ample opportunity to be heard.
In this case, respondent complied with all the requirements of procedural
due process in terminating petitioner's employment. Respondent furnished
petitioner a show cause memo stating the specific grounds for dismissal.
The show cause memo also required petitioner to answer the charges by
submitting a written explanation. Respondent even informed petitioner that
he may avail the services of counsel. Respondent then conducted a
thorough investigation. Three (3) hearings were conducted on separate
occasions. The findings of the investigation committee were then sent to
petitioner. Lastly, petitioner was given a notice of termination containing
respondent’s final decision. There was a just cause for terminating
petitioner from employment, there is no basis to award him separation pay
and backwages.
35. JAVINES VS. XLIBRIS
GR. No. 214301, June 7, 2007
Facts:

Javines was hired by respondent Xlibris as operations manager in
September 2011. In July 2012, Javines submitted meal receipts for
reimbursement at the finance department of the company, wherein
falsification was discovered. A notice to explain was issued against him,
charging him with acts constituting dishonesty for allegedly tampering meal
receipts from fast food chains with the total amount of P811.00 to
P10,821.00. He submitted his written explanation, denying having tampered c) matters whose consideration is necessary in arriving at a just decision
the receipts. He countered the allegations by explaining that it was the and complete resolution of the case, or in serving the interests of justice or
supervisors who submitted the receipts to him; he merely prepared the avoiding dispensing piecemeal justice;

reimbursement request, and that he had no knowledge nor participation in d) matters raised in the trial court and are of record having some bearing on
the tampering of the receipts.
 the issue submitted that the parties failed to raise or that the lower court
An administrative hearing was conducted. Javines failed to explain why and ignored;

how the incident transpired. He instead requested for further investigation e) matters closely related to an error assigned; and

because he cannot recall who submitted the receipts to him. On the same f) matters upon which the determination of a question properly assigned is
day, notices to explain were sent to the supervisors under Javines, who dependent.

likewise denied participation in the tampering of the receipts. Xlibris None of the aforesaid instances exists in the instant case. Hence, CA cannot
terminated Javines’ employment through an end of employment notice.
 be faulted for not discussing said issue in its decision as the same was
Javines then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, which was dismissed by already resolved with finality.

the Labor Arbiter who found that the dismissal was for a just cause and with
due process. On appeal, NLRC modified the decision, noting that while the 36. LUIS S. DOBLE, JR. v. ABB, INC.
dismissal was for a just cause, Javines was not afforded due process in that G.R. No. 215627, June 5, 2017
no other hearing was called to afford him the opportunity to confront the Facts:
witnesses against him before he was dismissed. Thus, P10,000.00 worth of Doble, Jr., a duly licensed engineer, was hired by respondent ABB Inc. as
nominal damages was awarded in his favor. Javines did not move for Junior Design Engineer on March 29, 1993. Doble rose through the ranks
reconsideration; only Xlibris elevated the case to CA on certiorari on the and was promoted up to Vice President and Local Division Manager of
issue that NLRC abused its discretion by holding that Xlibris failed to Power System Division. However, on March 2, 2012, Doble was called by
afford Javines due process. By way of comment, Javines reiterated that he Country Manager and President Nitin Desai, and was informed that his
was not granted further investigation when he requested. CA granted the performance rating for 2011 was 1, which is equivalent to unsatisfactory
petition and held that Javines was not given an opportunity to rebut the performance. Doble had a meeting and during the meeting, President Desai
additional pieces of evidence secured by Xlibris. However, CA reduced the explained to Doble that the Global and Regional Management have
nominal damages from P10,000.00 to P1,000.00 considering that the altered demanded for a change in leadership due to the extent of losses and level of
meal receipts show a discrepancy of P10,000.00. discontent among the ranks of the PS Division. Desai then raised the option
Issues:
 for Doble to resign. Thereafter, HR manager Miranda told Doble that he
1. Whether or not Javines was dismissed for a just cause
 would be paid separation pay equivalent to 75% of his monthly salary for
2. Whether or not the issue as to whether the requirements of procedural every year of service, provided he would submit a letter of resignation, and
due process to constitute a valid dismissal were complied with has been gave him until 12:45 PM within which to decide. Shocked by the abrupt
resolved with finality decision of the management, Doble asked why he should be the one made
Ruling:
 to resign. Miranda said that it was the decision of the management and left
1. Yes, Javines was dismissed for a just cause, as uniformly held by the him alone in the conference room to decide whether or not to resign. At this
Labor Arbiter and NLRC.
 juncture, the parties gave contrasting accounts on the ensuing events which
2. Yes, the issue has attained finality. For failure to file the requisite petition led to the termination of Doble’s employment. Then, Doble filed a
before CA, the NLRC decision attained finality and had been placed complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement and payment of
beyond the appellate court’s power of review. The appellate court is given backwages, other monetary claims and damages. In a decision the LA held
broad discretionary powers to waive lack of proper assignment of errors and that Doble was illegally dismissed because his resignation was involuntary,
to consider errors not assigned in the following circumstances:
 and ordered ABB Inc. to pay his backwages and separation pay, since
a) when the question affects jurisdiction over the subject matter;
 reinstatement is no longer feasible. The NLRC granted the appeal filed by
b) matters that are evidently plain or clerical errors within contemplation of ABB Inc. and Desai, and dismissed the partial appeal of Doble. They found
law;
 that the resignation of Doble being voluntary, there can be no illegal
32
dismissal and no basis for the award of other monetary claims, damages and
attorney’s fees. Dissatisfied with the NLRC decision and resolution, Doble
filed a petition for certiorari before the CA.
Issues: Whether or not, Dolbe was illegally dismissed.
Held: No, Doble was not illegally dismissed.
In illegal dismissal cases, the fundamental rule is that when an employer
interposes the defense of resignation, the burden to prove that the employee
indeed voluntarily resigned necessarily rests upon the employer. But, since
Doble claims to have been forced to submit a resignation letter, it is
incumbent upon him to prove with clear and convincing evidence that his
resignation was not voluntary, but was actually a case of constructive
dismissal.
Constructive dismissal is defined as quitting or cessation of work because
continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely;
when there is a demotion in rank or a diminution of pay and other benefits.
It exists if an act of clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an
employer becomes so unbearable on the part of the employee that it could
foreclose any choice by him except to forego his continued employment.
There is involuntary resignation due to the harsh, hostile, and unfavorable
conditions set by the employer. The test of constructive dismissal is whether
a reasonable person in the employee's position would have felt compelled to
give up his employment/position under the circumstances.
On the other hand, "resignation is the voluntary act of an employee who is
in a situation where one believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed
in favor of the exigency of the service, and one has no other choice but to
dissociate oneself from employment. It is a formal pronouncement or
relinquishment of an office, with the intention of relinquishing the office
accompanied by the act of relinquishment. As the intent to relinquish must
concur with the overt act of relinquishment, the acts of the employee before
and after the alleged resignation must be considered in determining whether
he or she, in fact, intended to sever his or her employment."
In the case at bar, it appears that Doble was not coerced into submitting a
resignation letter. He is holding one of the top positions in the company and
answerable only to the President, herein Desai. He is a highly educated
man. It is improbable that a man of his stature may be pressured into doing
something that he does not want to do. In fact, even if the option to resign
originated from the employer, what is important for resignation to be
deemed voluntary is that the employee's intent to relinquish must concur
with the overt act of relinquishment. It was proved by substantial evidence
that Doble voluntarily resigned, as shown by the following documents (1)
the affidavit of ABB Inc.’s HR Manager Miranda; (2) the resignation letter;
(3) the Employee Clearance Sheet; (4) the Certificate of Employment; (5)
33
photocopy of BPI’s manager’s check representing the separation benefit; (6)
Employee Final Pay Computation showing in the payment of leave credits,
rice subsidy and bonuses; and, (7) the Receipt, Release and Quitclaim.
37. United Polyresins Inc. v. Pinuela
G.R. No. 209555, July 31, 2017
FACTS:
United Polyresins, Inc. (UPI) is a registered domestic corporation while
Ernesto Uy Soon, Jr. and Julito Uy Soon are its corporate officers.
Marcelino Pinuela was employed by UPI in 1987. He was a member of the
labor union, Polyresins Rank and File Association (PORFA), and was
elected President thereof. Under the existing CBA between UPI and
PORFA, it was provided that UPI shall grant to PORFA PHP 300,000 as the
union’s capital for establishing a cooperative to meet the needs of its
members. The CBA also contained a union security clause which provided
that employees who cease to be PORFA members in good standing by
reason of his resignation or expulsion shall not be retained in the employ of
UPI.
During Pinuela’s term as PORFA President, it appeared that UPI
automatically deducted from the respective salaries of PORFA members
amounts representing union membership dues and loan payments. These
amounts, which totalled ₱2,402,533.43, were then regularly turned over by
UPI to PORFA in the form of fifty eight (58) crossed checks. Several days
before the PHP 300,000 loan became due, the union officers and UPI met to
discuss the proposed new CBA. However, UPI told Pinuela that it will not
discuss the proposed CBA until the loan is paid. Pinuela told UPI that the
union did not have the finances. Because of the recurring threat of failed
CBA negotiations and salary deductions as a means of recovering the
amount of the loan, the union members began to demand the holding of a
special election of union officers. A special election was held, and a new
union President and set of officers were elected. When the new union
officers conducted an investigation and found that the union had no more
funds as they were utilized in the prosecution of cases during Pinuela’s
incumbency. Pinuela also failed to make a formal turnover of documents to
the new President.
The officers held that these violations constituted an infringement if the
union’s Constitution which prohibit the misappropriation of union funds
and property and give ground for the impeachment and recall of union
officers. Thus, PORFA wrote a letter communicating Pinuela’s expulsion
from the union. Eventually, UPI issued a letter of termination to Pinuela.
ISSUE:
 1. Whether or not Pinuela was illegally dismissed
HELD:
Yes. The union and UPI claimed that the dismissal was based on the union
security clause. Pinuela’s expulsion from the union was based on the
union’s constitution. However, these provisions provides for the
impeachment and recall of union officers, not expulsion from union
membership. Any officer found guilty of violating these provisions shall
simply be removed, impeached or recalled, from office, but not expelled or
stripped of union membership. It was therefore error on the part of PORFA
and UPI to terminate Pinuela’s employment based on Article XV, Section 1,
paragraphs (e) and (f) of the union's Constitution. Such a ground does not
constitute just cause for termination.
In addition, the union may not insist on expelling Pinuela from PORFA and
assist in his dismissal from UPI without just cause, since it is an unfair labor
practice for a labor organization to "cause or attempt to cause an employer
to discriminate against an employee, including discrimination against an
employee with respect to whom membership in such organization has been
denied or to terminate an employee on any ground other than the usual
terms and conditions under which membership or continuation of
membership is made available to other members."
38. GENP ACT SERVICES, INC. v. FALCESO 
 tried to remedy respondents' situation by assigning them to other accounts,
[July 31, 2017, G.R. No. 227695]
FACTS:
Genp Act Services, Inc. is engaged in business process outsourcing,
particularly servicing various multinational clients, including Allstate
Insurance Company.
On different dates spanning the years 2007 to 2011, Genpact hired
respondents Maria Katrina Santos-Falceso, Janice Ann M. Mendoza, and
Jeffrey S. Mariano to various positions to service its Allstate account.
However, on April 19, 2012, Allstate ended its account with
Genpact, resulting in respondents being placed on floating status, and
eventually, terminated from service.
Respondents filed a complaint before the NLRC for illegal dismissal, non-
payment of separation pay, damages, and attorney's fees against Genpact
and/or its Country Manager, Reyes. They alleged that after Allstate
terminated its contract with Genpact, they were initially placed on
"benching" status with pay, and after five (5) months, Genpact gave them
the option to either "voluntarily resign" or to "be involuntarily terminated
on the ground of redundancy" with severance pay of one-half (½) month
basic salary for every year of service, in either case. Left without the option
to continue their employment with Genpact, respondents chose the latter
34
option and were made to sign quitclaims as a condition for receiving any
and all forms of monetary benefits.
Respondents argued that the termination of Genpact and Allstate's
agreement neither amounted to a closure of business nor justified their
retrenchment.
In their defense, petitioners justified respondents' termination of
employment on the ground of closure or cessation of Allstate's account with
Genpact as part of the former' s "[g]lobal [d]ownsizing due to heavy losses
caused by declining sales in North America." Further, petitioners claimed
that they incessantly pursued efforts to retain respondents within their
organization, but the same proved futile, thus, leaving them with no other
choice but to provide respondents with the option to either resign or be
separated on account of redundancy - an option which they reported to the
DOLE and resorted to in the exercise of management prerogative with
utmost good faith. Lastly, petitioners pointed out that respondents were
properly given separation pay, as well as unpaid allowances and 13th month
pay, thus, rendering the latter's monetary claims bereft of merit.
The Labor Arbiter dismissed respondents' complaint for lack of merit. The
LA found that respondents' termination from service was due to the
untimely cessation of the operations of Genpact's client, Allstate, wherein
respondents were assigned. In this regard, the LA pointed out that Genpact
but such efforts proved futile as respondents were hired specifically to
match the needs of Allstate. Furthermore, the LA took Genpact's act of
paying respondents their separation pay computed at one-half (½) month
pay for every year of service as a sign of good faith. Thus, the LA
concluded that there was an authorized cause in terminating respondents'
services, and that Gen pact complied with DOLE's reportorial requirements
in doing so.
NLRC affirmed the LA ruling. It held that Allstate's pullout from Gen pact
does not mean an automatic termination of the employees assigned to the
Allstate account, such as respondents, but purports that the employees
assigned to the withdrawing client would be "benched" or placed on
floating status as contemplated in Article 286 (now Article 301) of the
Labor Code, as amended. In fact, the NLRC pointed out that Genpact
recognized the applicability of the said provision in the case of respondents,
as well as other similarly-situated employees, considering that: (a) it
embarked on a Retention Effort Program which resulted in the
redeployment of more or less 100 of its employees affected by Allstate's
pullout; (b) it placed respondents and the other similarly-situated employees
on "benching" status with full pay; (c) it only resorted to termination after
alleged incessant efforts to find a suitable position for respondents proved
unsuccessful; and (d) such terminations were done during the six (6)-month
period within which employees were allowed to be placed on floating
status. Thus, Genpact's acts of placing respondents on "benching" or
floating status, and thereafter, terminating their employment were made in
the exercise of its management prerogative in good faith and in accordance
with internal hiring procedures. As such, it cannot be said that respondents
were illegally dismissed from service.
Respondents moved for reconsideration, which was partly granted by the
NLRC ordering the increase of respondents' entitlement to separation pay to
one (1) month salary for every year of service. In said Resolution, the
NLRC held that since respondents' positions were rendered superfluous by
the closure of the Allstate account, then it follows that they were terminated
on account of redundancy pursuant to Article 286 (now Article 301), in
relation to Article 283 (now Article 298) of the Labor Code. As such, they
should be paid separation pay amounting to one (1) month salary for every
year of service, instead of the one-half (½) month salary for every year of
service. Notably, the NLRC Resolution explicitly stated that "[n]o further
motion of similar import shall be entertained."
CA dismissed outright the petition for certiorari purely on procedural
grounds.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA correctly dismissed outright the certiorari petition
filed by petitioners before it on procedural grounds.
RULING:
The petition is meritorious. (The case was remanded to the CA. The SC
only ruled on the procedural process of the case.)
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is a special
civil action that may be resorted to only in the absence of appeal or any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. It is
adopted to correct errors of jurisdiction committed by the lower court or
quasi-judicial agency, or when there is grave abuse of discretion on the part
of such court or agency amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Given the special and extraordinary nature of a Rule 65 petition, the general
rule is that a motion for reconsideration must first be filed with the lower
court prior to resorting to the extraordinary remedy of certiorari, since a
motion for reconsideration may still be considered as a plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. The rationale for the
prerequisite is to grant an opportunity for the lower court or agency to
correct any actual or perceived error attributed to it by the re-examination
of the legal and factual circumstances of the case. This notwithstanding, the
foregoing rule admits of well-defined exceptions, such as: (a) where the
order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no
35
jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings
have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same
as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an
urgent necessity for the resolution of the question and any further delay
would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the
subject matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the
circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e) where
petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for
relief; (j) where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent
and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the
proceedings in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due
process; (h) where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner
had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of
law or where public interest is involved.
A judicious review of the records reveals that the exceptions in
items (d) and (e) are attendant in this case.
The dispositive portion of the NLRC's June 30, 2014 Resolution, it
explicitly warns the litigating parties that the NLRC shall no longer
entertain any further motions for reconsideration. Irrefragably, this
circumstance gave petitioners the impression that moving for
reconsideration before the NLRC would only be an exercise in futility in
light of the tribunal's aforesaid warning.
The remedy of filing a motion for reconsideration may be availed of once
by each party. In this case, only respondents had filed a motion for
reconsideration before the NLRC. Applying the foregoing provision,
petitioners also had an opportunity to file such motion in this case, should
they wish to do so. However, the tenor of such warning effectively deprived
petitioners of such opportunity, thus, constituting a violation of their right to
due process.
All told, petitioners were completely justified in pursuing a direct recourse
to the CA through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court.
CASE NO. 39
SONEDCO WORKERS FREE LABOR UNION (SWOFLU) vs.
UNIVERSAL ROBINA CORPORATION
G.R. No. 220383 July 5, 2017
FACTS:
In 2007, while there was no Collective Bargaining Agreement in effect,
URC-SONEDCO offered, among other benefits, a P16.00/day wage
increase to their employees. To receive the benefits, employees had to sign
a waiver that said: "In the event that a subsequent [Collective Bargaining
Agreement] is negotiated between Management and Union, the new
[Collective Bargaining Agreement] shall only be effective [on] January 1,
2008." Realizing that the waiver was an unfair labor practice, some
members of SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union refused to sign. URC-
SONEDCO offered the same arrangement in 2008. It extended an
additional P16.00/day wage increase to employees who would agree that
any Collective Bargaining Agreement negotiated for that year would only
be effective on January 1, 2009.6 Several members of SONEDCO Workers
Free Labor Union again refused to waive their rights. Consequently, they
did not receive the wage increase which already amounted to a total of
P32.00/day, beginning 2009. 
 SWOFLU is entitled to a wage increase of P16.00 for the years 2007 and
On July 2, 2009, SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union and its members
who refused to sign the 2007 and 2008 waivers filed a complaint for unfair
labor practices against URC-SONEDCO. They argued that the requirement
of a waiver prior to the release of the wage increase constituted interference
to the employees' right to self-organization, collective bargaining, and
concerted action. They asked that they be granted a P16.00/day wage
increase for 2007 and an additional P16.00/day wage increase for
2008.8SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union also demanded a continuing
wage increase of P32.00/day "from January 1, 2009 onwards." Both the
National Labor Relations Commission and the Court of Appeals found
URC-SONEDCO not guilty of unfair labor practice.10 Nonetheless, they
ordered URC-SONEDCO to give petitioners the same benefits their co-
workers received in 2007 and 2008. However, SONEDCO Workers Free
Labor Union's claim for the 2009 wage increase was denied. Since a new
Collective Bargaining Agreement was already in effect by 2009, this
Collective Bargaining Agreement governed the relationship between the
management and the union.11 The Court of Appeals ruled: “As there was no
provision in the existing CBA regarding wage increase of [P]16.00 per day,
the [National Labor Relations Commission] was correct in ruling that it
cannot further impose private respondents to pay petitioners the subject
wage increase for the year 2009 and onwards.”
ISSUES:
Whether or not respondent Universal Robina Corp. –SONEDCO is guilty of
unfair labor practice?
Whether or not petitioner SWOFLU is entitled to wage increase?
HELD:
36
Yes. The Supreme Court held that URC-SONEDCO is guilty of unfair labor
practice for failing to bargain with SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union
in good faith.13 URC-SONEDCO restricted SONEDCO Workers Free
Labor Union's bargaining power when it asked the rank-and-file employees
to sign a waiver foregoing Collective Bargaining Agreement negotiations in
exchange for wage increases.14 Thus, this Court ordered URC-SONEDCO
to grant the union members the 2007 and 2008 wage increases.
Nevertheless, this Court denied the claim for the 2009 wage increase and
ruled that if SONEDCO Workers Free Labor Union wished to continue
receiving the additional wage after 2008, the proper recourse was to include
it in the 2009 Collective Bargaining Agreement. By reason of the unfair
labor practice on the party of respondent URC – SONEDCO, petitioner
2008. The grant of the P32.00/day wage increase is not an additional benefit
outside the Collective Bargaining Agreement of 2009. By granting this
increase to petitioners, this Court is eliminating the discrimination against
them, which was a result of respondent's unfair labor practice. The wage
increase was integrated in the salary of those who signed the waivers. When
the affiants waived their rights, respondent rewarded them with a P32.00/
day wage increase that continues to this day. The respondent company
granted this benefit to its employees to induce them to waive their
collective bargaining rights. This Court has declared this an unfair labor
practice. Accordingly, it is illegal to continue denying the petitioners the
wage increase that was granted to employees who signed the waivers. To
rule otherwise will perpetuate the discrimination against petitioners. All the
consequences of the unfair labor practice must be addressed.
CASE NO. 40
August 22, 2017 G.R. No. 178379
CRISPIN S. FRONDOZO,* DANILO M. PEREZ, JOSE A. ZAFRA,
ARTURO B. VITO, CESAR S. CRUZ, NAZARIO C. DELA CRUZ,
and LUISITO R. DILOY, Petitioners, vs. MANILA ELECTRIC
COMPANY,, Respondent.
A Notice of Strike filed by the MERALCO Employees and Workers
Association (MEWA), on the ground of ULP. Then Acting Secretary· of the
DOLE certified the labor dispute to the NLRC for compulsory arbitration,
ordered all the striking workers to return to work, and directed MERALCO
to accept the striking workers back to work under the same terms and
conditions existing prior to the work stoppage.
MERALCO terminated the services of Petitioners for having committed
unlawful acts and violence during the strike. Then MEWA filed a second
Notice of Strike on the ground of discrimination and union busting that
resulted to the dismissal from employment of 25 union officers and
workers.
The labor dispute resulted to the filing of two complaints for illegal
dismissal. The NLRC consolidated the two illegal dismissal cases and
rendered a Decision stating among others, that it upholds the dismissal of
the workers in view of the illegal acts they committed during the subject
strike. However, the NLRC First Division subsequently modified said
Decision and ruled that said dismissal of employees was unjustified and
ordered their reinstatement without loss of seniority rights.
From the two conflicting resolutions of the NLRC, two petitions
for certiorari were filed before the Court of Appeals: 1. CA-G.R. SP No.
72480 filed by MERALCO; and 2. CA-G.R. SP No. 72509 filed by the
Petitioners. And from which the CA arrived at 2 conflicting decisions as
well.
The Petitioners moved for the issuance of an Alias Writ of Execution for the
satisfaction of their accrued wages arising from the recall of their payroll
reinstatement which was granted by the Labor Arbiter. Subsequently, a
Second Alias Writ of Execution24 was issued directing the Sheriff to cause
the reinstatement of the respondents and to collect the amount representing
backwages. MERALCO filed an urgent motion for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction directed against
the Second Alias Writ of Execution, which the NLRC granted and was
affirmed by the CA.
Issue: Did the CA commit a grave abuse of discretion in affirming the
NLRC’s Decision? From the conflicting decisions, which should prevail?
Ruling: No. The situation in this case is analogous to a change in the
situation of the parties making execution unjust or
inequitable. MERALCO's refusal to reinstate petitioners and to pay their
backwages is justified by the Decision of the CA in the 1st petition filed
before it. On the other hand, petitioners' insistence on the execution of
judgment is anchored on the the CA’s Decision in the 2nd petition filed by
said Petitioners. Given this situation, we see no reversible error on the part
of the Court of Appeals in holding that the NLRC did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in suspending the proceedings. Grave abuse of
discretion implies that the respondent court or tribunal acted in a capricious,
whimsical, arbitrary or despotic manner in the exercise of its jurisdiction as
to be equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.
Decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 72480 should prevail. This Court actually
ruled on the merits of the assailed CA Decisions in G.R. No. 161159 and
37
G.R. No. 161311. The Court's Third Division denied the petition in G.R.
No. 161159 on the ground that the Petitioners failed to show that a
reversible error had been committed by the Court of Appeals in rendering
its Decision in CAG.R. SP No. 72480 (in favor of MERALCO). The Court's
Third Division also denied the petition in G.R. No. 161311 for failure of the
petitioners to show that a reversible error had been committed by the
appellate court in the same case, CA-G.R. SP No. 72480.
In one case, 46 this Court explained that "[ w ]hen the Court does not find
any reversible error in the decision of the CA and denies the petition, there
is no need for the Court to fully explain its denial, since it already means
that it agrees with and adopts the findings and conclusions of the CA".
Hence, the Court's Third Division adopted the findings and conclusions
reached by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72480 which dismissed
petitioners from the service. Such decisions have already became final and
executory.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We REMAND this case to the
NLRC for the execution of this Court's Decision in G.R. Nos. 161159 and
161311.
Case 41
Pedro C. Perea vs. Elburg Shipmanagement Philippines, Inc., et al.;
G.R. No. 206178; August 9, 2017
FACTS:
Perea entered into a Contract of Employment with Elburg Shipmanagement
Philippines, Inc. (Elburg) under its principal Augustea Atlantica SRL/Italy.
Perea was hired as a fitter and was deployed to work aboard MV Lemno.
While repairing apipe, Perea had difficulty breathing. The following day, he
had chest pains with palpitations. He was seen by a doctor that same
afternoon and was advised to take medication and to rest for three (3)
consecutive days. However, he did not feel any better even after resting and
taking medications; thus, he asked to be repatriated.
A few days later, Perea was welding when the oxygen and acetylene torch
he was holding exploded. He hit his left shoulder and twisted his fingers in
trying to avoid the explosion. He took a pain reliever to ease the pain but
three days later, he found that two of his fingers had grown numb. He was
sent to a medical facility in Tuzla, Turkey because of continued chest pains.
He was pronounced to have soft tissue trauma and was told to rest, avoid
exertion, and avoid using his right arm. The following day, he was
transferred to SEMA Hospital where he was declared to be suffering from
“[C]ubital [T]unnel Syndrome, soft, tissue injury of the right elbow.” The
treatment proposed was to put his right arm in a sling and to rest for
recovery for 10 days. He was soon repatriated to the Philippines.
After conducting laboratory examinations and other medical procedures on
Perea, company-designated physicians Dr. Karen Hao-Quan (Dr. Hao-
Quan) and Dr. Robert D. Lim (Dr. Lim) gave an initial impression, “To
Consider Cubital Tunnel Syndrome, Right; Hypertension; Rule Out
Ischemic Heart Disease” and recommended that a Dipyridamole Thallium
Scan be conducted. In a letter to Elburg, Dr. Hao-Quan stated that the cause
of hypertension was not work-related and opined that Perea’s estimated
length of treatment would be approximately three to four months. Perea
filed a complaint for underpayment of his sick leave pay, permanent
disability benefits, compensatory, moral and exemplary damages, and
attorney’s fees. Perea consulted Dr. Antonio C. Pascual (Dr. Pascual), an
internist, cardiologist, and echocardiographer, who diagnosed him with
“Uncontrolled Hypertension [and] Coronary Artery Disease.” Dr. Pascual
found Perea to be medically unfit to work as a seafarer.
After a series of examinations, Dr. Hao-Quan and Dr. Lim certified that
Perea was cleared of the injuries that caused his repatriation. The parties
met for mediation proceedings and a possible compromise agreement but
were unsuccessful They were then directed to submit their respective
position papers, together with their supporting evidence. The Labor Arbiter
dismissed Perea’s complaint for lack of merit.
The Labor Arbiter ruled that the Collective Bargaining Agreement could not
apply to Perea’s claim for disability benefits because its effectivity period
was only from March 28, 2008 to December 31, 2009. The Collective
Bargaining Agreement had already lapsed by the time Perea was repatriated
to the Philippines by late May 2010.
The Labor Arbiter ruled that while Section 32-A of the POEA Contract
provided that hypertension may be compensable, this was applicable only if
it caused “impairment of function[s] of body organs like kidneys, heart and
brain, resulting in permanent disability.” The Labor Arbiter held that Perea’s
hypertension did not impair the functions of his organs, as evidenced by Dr.
Hao-Quan and Dr. Lim’s medical reports. Between the findings of Dr. Hao-
Quan and Dr. Lim and those of Dr. Pascual, the Labor Arbiter gave more
weight to the findings of the company-designated physicians who
concluded that Perea was not suffering from coronary disease based on the
results of a coronary angiogram.
ISSUE:
38
Whether or not the medical findings of company-designated physician who
conducted extensive examination prevail over private physician who
examined the seafarer only once and did not order medical tests?
HELD:
For an illness or injury to be compensable under the POEA Contract, it
must have been work-related and acquired during the term of the seafarer’s
contract. Work-related illness is defined as “any sickness resulting to
disability or death as a result of an occupational disease listed under Section
32-A of this Contract with the conditions set therein satisfied.
Hypertension classified as primary or essential is considered compensable if
it causes impairment of function[s] of body organs like kidneys, heart, eyes
and brain, resulting in permanent disability; Provided, that, the following
documents substantiate it: (a) chest x-ray report, (b) ECG report, (c) blood
chemistry report, (d) funduscopy report, and (f) C-T scan.
As between the findings made by the company-designated physicians who
conducted an extensive examination on the petitioner and Dr. Pascual who
saw petitioner on only one occasion and did not even order that medical
tests be done to support his declaration that petitioner is unfit to work as [a]
seaman, the company-designated physicians’ findings that petitioner has
been cleared for work should prevail.
The court further held that the doctor who have had a personal knowledge
of the actual medical condition, having closely, meticulously and regularly
monitored and actually treated the seafarer’s illness, is more qualified to
assess the seafarer’s disability.
CASE NO. 42
WILLIAM R. WENCESLAO v. MAKATI DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION
Facts:
The case stemmed from a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal and Monetary
Claims filed by the petitioners against private respondent Makati
Development Corporation (MDC) before the Labor Arbiter.[4] Records show
that the petitioners were former construction workers of MDC.[5] In their
complaint, the petitioners claimed that they were regular employees of
MDC and were illegally dismissed for refusing to apply and be transferred
to another contractor, Asiapro Multi-Purpose Cooperative.[6] In due course,
the Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. In affirming the
status of the petitioners as project employees, the Labor Arbiter relied on
the evidence of MDC showing that the petitioners had worked in several of
its other projects before being engaged in the West Tower @ One Serendra
Project and the North Triangle Building Project.[7] The Labor Arbiter ruled
that repeated re-employment does not make a project employee a regular
employee.[8] The dispositive portion of the Decision of the Labor Arbiter
reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the complaint for illegal dismissal is
DISMISSED for lack of merit.
Respondent Makati Development Corporation, however, is directed to pay
the aggregate sum of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTEEN THOUSAND
THREE HUNDRED FOURTEEN & 78/100 PESOS
(P118,314.78) representing complainants’ prorated 13th month pay for 2015,
as follows:
All other claims, including those of complainants Virgilio B. Cristobal,
Noel N. Damiasan, James M. Real, Vivencio B. Rodrigo and Alfredo T.
Visaya, are hereby denied for lack of merit. The computation hereto
attached is made an integral part hereof.[9]
On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Fourth
Division affirmed[10] in toto the decision[11] of the Labor Arbiter. The
dispositive portion of the NLRC Decision dated 31 May 2016, states:
WHEREFORE, considering the foregoing, the appeal filed by the 21
complainants is DENIED for lack of merit.Accordingly, the decision
rendered by Labor Arbiter Raymund M. Celino on 29th February 2016 is
hereby AFFIRMED in toto.[12]. Undaunted, the petitioners filed before the
CA a Petition for Certiorari alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to
lack or excess of jurisdiction of the NLRC for issuing the order affirming
the decision of the Labor Arbiter.
The CA dismissed the petition on two grounds:
( 1 the petition is non-compliant with Section 3, Rule 46 of the Rules of Court;
) and
( 2 the petition, on its face, lacks merit for failing to illustrate public
) respondent’s grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in renderinthe assailed 31 May 2016 Decision and 26 July 2016
Resolution.[14]
Issue:
The threshold issue is whether the CA was justified in dismissing the
petition for certiorari due to the failure of the petitioners to attach the
pertinent records of the case.
Ruling:
39
First, the matter concerning the nature of the petition.
While the pleading filed by the petitioners is denominated as “Petition for
Review on Certiorari” pursuant to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, its
contents, however, particularly the ground raised and supporting arguments,
assert grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction
on the part of the CA, an averment apposite in a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. The seeming inconsistency of the petition’s
style and substance must be resolved as its proper characterization, on
whether it is pursued under Rule 45 or Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, would
objectively determine its outright dismissal for being the wrong remedy.
Accordingly, if the petition is to be treated as a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65, then it should appropriately be dismissed because there is a plain,
adequate, and speedy remedy available under the circumstances. It is settled
that a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 is an original or
independent action based on grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction; and it will lie only if there is no appeal or any other
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[34] In this
case, what the petitioners seek to be annulled are the resolutions of the CA
dismissing their petition for certiorari and the motion for reconsideration
from such dismissal being, without a doubt, a final order for the complete
disposition of such petition. Consequently, the petitioner’s right and
available legal recourse to assail such resolutions is an appeal by certiorari
under Rule 45 instead of a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65.
Proceeding to the merits, we find that the CA did not err, much less commit
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of or excess of jurisdiction, in
dismissing the petition for certiorari due to procedural lapses and lack of
substantive merit of the said petition. The CA pointed to the petitioners’
failure to state the material dates and to attach the certified true copies of
the assailed decision and resolution of the NLRC as well as the other
pertinent documents referred to in the petition, such as the labor arbiter’s
decision, the petitioner’s Appeal Memorandum and Motion for
Reconsideration.[37] The CA also determined that the petition, on its face,
did not establish the whimsical exercise of discretion which the NLRC
supposedly had committed.[38]
While the CA invoked several grounds in dismissing the petition, the
petitioners raised before this Court only the issue on the necessity of
attaching to the petition relevant portions of the case records.
Second, petitioner's entitlement to separation pay primarily hinges on their
employment status. As earlier discussed, petitioners merely offered a self-
serving conclusion that they are "regular employees" based on the factual
allegation contained in the petition. Petitioners' allegation has no weight or
persuasive effect upon this Court absent any evidence to support the same.
To be circumspect, it is worth pointing out that a project employee may
nevertheless receive separation pay. Under Section 3.2 of DOLE Order No.
19, Series of 1993, project employee's entitlement to separation pay is
qualified by certain conditions, to wit:
3.2. Project employees not entitled to separation. - The project employees
contemplated by paragraph 2.1. hereof are not by law entitled to separation
pay if their services are terminated as a result of the completion of the
project or any phase thereof in which they are employed. Likewise, project
employees whose services are terminated because they have no more work
to do or their services are no longer needed in the particular phase of the
project are not by law entitled to separation pay.
 require us to inquire into the factual matters which the Court cannot do in a


3.3. Project employees entitled to separation pay. -
 Moreover, factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies like the NLRC, when


a) Project employees whose aggregate period of continuous employment in
a construction company is at least one year shall be considered regular
employees, in the absence of a "day certain" agreed upon by the parties for
the termination of their relationship. Project employees who have become
regular shall be entitled to separation pay.



x x x x
 Certiorari dated 10 April 2017, is DENIED. The 23 August 2016 and 26


b) If the project or the phase of the project the employee is working on has
not yet been completed and his services are terminated without just cause or
unauthorized cause and there is no showing that his services are
unsatisfactory, the project employee is entitled to reinstatement with
backwages to his former position or substantially equivalent position. If the
reinstatement is no longer possible, the employee is entitled to his salaries
for the unexpired portion of the agreement.
In the case at bench, the petitioners did not present any evidence, by way of
contract of employment or other relevant proof which would establish the
facts pertaining to their tenure. Without basis to rule on the same, this
Court can only rely on the findings of public respondent adjudging them
to be not entitled to separation pay.
 however, there were eight employees – who had rendered at least ten years


It bears stressing that the factual findings of administrative or quasi-judicial
bodies, which are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their
respective jurisdictions, are generally accorded not only respect but even
finality, and bind the Court when supported by substantial evidence.[47]
(emphasis supplied)
40
The petitioners' argument that the CA should have proceeded in the
resolution of the case must fail.
As noted, the dismissal by the CA of the petition for certiorari was not
purely on a technicality but also on a ruling on the substantive merits of the
case. However, we will not dwell on the disquisition of the CA as to the
nature of the employment of the petitioners and their subsequent
termination for two reasons: first, the only issue raised before this Court
concerns the failure to attach the material documents in the petition for
certiorari; second, the determination on whether the petitioners were project
employees and whether they were illegally dismissed would necessarily
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are conclusive upon the parties and
binding on this Court.[48]



In fine, we find no compelling reason to set aside the dismissal by the CA
of this petition for certiorari.



WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error, the Petition for Review on
January 2017 Resolutions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
147009 are hereby AFFIRMED.
Case 43
Read-Rite Philippines, Inc. Vs. Gina G. Francisco, et al
G.R. No. 195457, August 16, 2017
Facts:
In April 1999, Read-Rite began implementing a retrenchment program due
to serious business losses. About 200 employees were terminated and they
were each given involuntary separation benefits equivalent to one month
pay per year of service. From this first batch of retrenched employees,
of service that apparently received additional voluntary separation benefits
All of the respondents received involuntary separation benefits equivalent
to one month pay per year of service. Accordingly, they each executed a
Release, Waiver and Quitclaim[10] (quitclaim), which stated, among others,
that they had each received from Read-Rite the full payment of all
compensation due them and they will not undertake any action against the
company to demand further compensation.
Meanwhile in February 2002 and February 2003, respondents filed
complaints against Read-Rite.Respondents sought the payment of
additional voluntary separation benefits, legal interest thereon, and
attorney’s fees. They argued that Read-Rite discriminated against them by
not granting the aforesaid benefits, the award of which had since become a
company policy.
Issue: WON were arbitrarily discriminated upon when they were not
awarded additional voluntary separation benefits despite being in Read-
Rite’s employ for at least ten years.
Held: In granting the claim of the first batch of retrenched BSSI
employees, the Court found that “there was impermissible discrimination
against [them] in the payment of their separation benefits. The law requires
an employer to extend equal treatment to its employees. It may not, in the
guise of exercising management prerogatives, grant greater benefits to some
and less to others.”[34] However, in so ruling, the Court took into account
the following findings of the NLRC:
“The respondent argued that the giving of more separation benefit to the
second and third batches of employees separated was their expression of
gratitude and benevolence to the remaining employees who have tried to
save and make the company viable in the remaining days of operations.
This justification is not plausible. There are workers in the first batch who
have rendered more years of service and could even be said to be more
efficient than those separated subsequently, yet they did not receive the
same recognition. Understandably, their being retained longer in their job
and be not included in the batch that was first terminated, was a concession
enough and may already be considered as favor granted by the respondents
to the prejudice of the complainants. As it happened, there are workers in
the first batch who have rendered more years in service but received lesser
separation pay, because of that arrangement made by the respondents in
paying their termination benefits[.] x x x. [35] (Emphasis supplied, citation
omitted.)”
Clearly, BSSI admitted that it purposely favored the second and third
batches of retrenched employees by giving them a higher separation pay
and a mid-year bonus as a reward for their efforts during the last days of the
41
company. In contrast to the instant case, however, Read-Rite made no such
admission. Quite the opposite, Read-Rite has consistently claimed that the
payment of additional voluntary separation benefits to the eight retrenched
employees in April 1999 was made by mistake and was no longer repeated
in the next batches of retrenchment.
CASE NO. 44
Adtel Inc. vs. Valdez
Facts: Adtel, Inc. (Adtel) is a domestic corporation engaged in the
distribution of telephone units, gadgets, equipment, and allied products. On
9 September 1996, Adtel hired Marijoy A. Valdez (respondent) to work as
an accountant for the company. Adtel promoted respondent as the
company's purchasing and logistics supervisor.4 Adtel then entered into a
dealership agreement with respondent's husband, Angel Valdez (Mr.
Valdez), to distribute Adtel's wideband VHF-UHF television antem1as. The
dealership agreement was for twelve (12) months and the agreement was
extended for another three (3) months.5 On 3 February 2006, Mr. Valdez
filed a civil case against Adtel for specific performance and damages for the
execution of the terms of the dealership agreement.6 On 10 May 2006, Mr.
Valdez also instituted a criminal complaint for libel against Adtel's
chairman, president, and officers.
On 22 May 2006, Adtel issued a memorandum8 directing respondent to
show cause in writing why she should not be terminated for conflict of
interest and/or serious breach of trust and confidence.The memorandum
stated that the filing of cases by respondent's husband created a conflict of
interest since respondent had access to vital information that can be used
against Adtel.Respondent was placed under preventive suspension by Adtel.
On 23 May 2006, respondent denied the charges of Adtel. Respondent
contended that the cases had nothing to do with her being an employee of
Adtel and had not affected her performance in the company.
On 29 May 2006, Adtel terminated respondent from the company.
Respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter. In
her Position Paper,respondent alleged that she did not violate any company
rule or policy; neither was she guilty of fraud, nor willful breach of trust.
Respondent contended that she was illegally dismissed without just cause
and was entitled to separation pay, backwages, and damages.
Issue: Whether or not the dismissal of Valdez was illegal.
Held:Yes.The NLRC held that Adtel failed to substantially prove the
existence of an act or omission personally attributable to the respondent to
serve as a just cause to terminate her employment.The CA denied the
motion for extension and dismissed Adtel's petition for certiorari for being
filed beyond the reglementary period. The Supreme Court affirmed the
decision of the CA.
CASE NO. 45
Sterling Paper Products Enterprises, INc. vs KMM – Katipunan and
raymonf Esponga
Facts:
Petitioner hired respondent Raymond Esponga as a machine operator. June
2006, Sterling imposed a 20-day suspension on several employees
including Esponga, for allegedly participating in a wildcat strike. The
Notice of Disciplinary Action contained a warning that a repetition of a
similar offense would compel the management to impose the maximum
penalty of termination of services. Sterling averred, their supervisor Mercy
Vinoya (Vinoya), found Esponga and his co-employees about to take a nap
on the sheeter machine. She called their attention and prohibited them from
taking a nap thereon for safety reasons. Esponga and his co-employees then
transferred to the mango tree near the staff house. When Vinoya passed by
the staff house, she heard Esponga utter, "Huwag maingay, puro bawal. "
She then confronted Esponga, who responded in a loud and disrespectful
tone. When Vinoya turned away, Esponga gave her the "dirty finger" sign in
front of his co-employees. The incident was witnessed by Mylene
Pesimo (Pesimo), who executed a handwritten statement,. Esponga was
found to have been not working as the machine assigned to him was not
running instead he was having a conversation with his co-employees,
Bobby Dolor and Ruel Bertulfo. Additionally, he failed to submit his daily
reports.
Esponga submitted his written explanation denying the charges against him.
He claimed that he did not argue with Vinoya as he was not in the area
where the incident reportedly took place. Esponga further reasoned that
during the time when he was not seen operating the machine assigned to
him, he was at the Engineering Department and then he proceeded to the
comfort room.
Labor Arbiter’s ruling: Esponga was illegally dismissed. It held that
Sterling failed to discharge the burden of proof for failure to submit in
42
evidence the company's code of conduct, which was used as basis to
dismiss Esponga.
Appeal to the NLRC: NLRC reversed and set aside the LA ruling. It
declared that Esponga's dismissal was valid. The NLRC observed that as a
result of incident, Esponga no longer performed his duties and simply spent
the remaining working hours talking with his co-workers
Issue: W/N the cause of Esponga’s dismissal amounts to serious
misconduct
Ruling: YES. Accusatory and inflammatory language used by an employee
towards his employer or superior can be a ground for dismissal or
termination. Esponga's assailed conduct was related to his work. Vinoya did
not prohibit him from taking a nap. She merely reminded him that he could
not do so on the sheeter machine for safety reasons. Esponga's acts reflect
an unwillingness to comply with reasonable management directives.
CASE NO. 46
Yu v SR METALS, INC. (SRMI) G.R. No. 214249, September 25, 2017
The Facts


SR Metals, Inc. Workers Union - FFW Chapter (SRMIWU-FFW) is a
legitimate labor organization and certified as the sole and exclusive
bargaining agent of all rank-and-file employees of SR Metals, Inc. (SRMI).
On the other hand, SRMI is a corporation duly organized and existing under
the Philippine laws and engaged in mining business at Agusan del Norte.



A. Illegal Dismissal Cases



Subject of this petition are the fifteen (15) groups of employees who filed
cases for illegal dismissal and money claims before the NLRC.
Executive Labor Arbiter (ELA) Noel Augusto S. Magbanua (Magbanua)
issued separate rulings on the 15 cases. Those regular employees of SRMI
were found to have been illegally dismissed. On the other hand, the labor
arbiter did not find merit in the complaints for illegal dismissal of those
who were project or fixed-term employees; contractual employees; one
whose services as house helpers were not directly related to the mining
business; those who lacked interest to pursue the case for failure to submit
Position Paper; and who was not an employee of SRMI but of SAN R
Mining & Const. Corp.
Both the aggrieved employees and the SRMI appealed to the NLRC


B. Unfair Labor Practice Case
 2 (b) and (d) of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice. Petitioners' motion for


Meantime, while the illegal dismissal cases were pending, Angat
Kalawakang Hanapbuhay, Inc. - Union of Filipino Workers (AKHSRMI-
UFW) and SRMIWU-FFW — the two unions that were organized within
SRMI - agreed to a consent election, which was eventually conducted on
October 28, 2010. Upon opening and canvassing of the ballots, all 75 votes
were for SRMIWU-FFW. The Med-Arbiter rendered an Order proclaiming
SRMIWU-FFW as the winner in the CE and as the certified sole and
exclusive bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of SRMI.
SRMIWU-FFW demanded for the negotiation of a collective bargaining
agreement (CBA) but SRMI refused to bargain. SRMI countered that it does
not recognize the legitimacy of the union, which was organized only after
the contracts of employment of its members ceased and only after they filed
illegal dismissal cases against SRMI. Hence, SRMIWU-FFW filed ULP
against SRMI for refusal to bargain.
Ruling of the NLRC


The NLRC held that there were valid fixed-term contracts that negated the
regularity of petitioners' employment. NLRC also ruled that SRMI did not
commit ULP for refusal to negotiate with SRMIWU-FFW. It was opined:
 the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory; and (f) the other party


“Clearly, under the circumstances, the company would have cried foul, as it
did, given that the members thereof were already separated from
employment. Added to this is the fact that at the time the consent election
was conducted and upon the certification of the Union as the sole and
exclusive bargaining agent, illegal dismissal cases were already on the
wheels of arbitration. Being the respondent in the copious illegal dismissal
cases which covered the majority, if not the entire, membership of the
Union, SRMI cannot be expected to sit down and negotiate for a CBA with
a union whose members were already separated from the company due to
expiration of contracts or completion of the projects for which they were
hired, lest SRMI be misconstrued to have deserted its postulation on the
validity of the separation from employment of the workers involved.”
 Hence, SC ruled that the case be remanded to the CA based on two
43
Ruling of the CA


The petition for certiorari was dismissed for failure to state the date of
filing of the Motion for Reconsideration before the NLRC and to indicate
the serial number of the notary public's commission in violation of Section
reconsideration was denied.
SC Ruling


The petition is partially granted.



In particular, there are three material dates that must be stated in a petition
for certiorari brought under Rule 65: (a) the date when notice of the
judgment or final order or resolution was received, (b) the date when a
motion for new trial or for reconsideration when one such was filed, and,
(c) the date when notice of the denial thereof was received. These dates
should be reflected in the petition to enable the reviewing court to
determine if the petition was filed on time.


Nonetheless, procedural rules are designed to promote or secure, rather than
frustrate or override, substantial justice. The Court restated the reasons that
may provide justification for a court to suspend a strict adherence to
procedural rules, such as: (a) matters of life, liberty, honor or property; (b)
the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (c) the merits of the
case; (d) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the
party favored by the suspension of the rules; (e) a lack of any showing that
will not be unjustly prejudiced thereby.2
In the case at bar, the procedural lapses cited by the CA do not affect the
merits of the petition; procedural rules should have been relaxed in order to
serve substantial justice. What the CA should have done was to require
petitioners' counsel to submit the lacking information instead of dismissing
the case outright. Petitioners, who are merely rank-and-file employees and
are mostly, if not all, minimum wage earners, must not be penalized for the
honest mistakes of their counsel. They deserve to have their case properly
ventilated at the appellate court since what is at stake is their means of
livelihood.
grounds: First, the cases of illegal dismissal and ULP involved matters that
are not purely legal in nature. There are facts that need to be ascertained,
established, and resolved in relation to the legal issues raised. Unfortunately
for petitioners, this Court is not a trier of facts.37 And Second, based on the
records, the pleadings, and other evidence, the determinative facts are not
yet complete, hence, SC is not yet in a position to resolve the dispute with
finality.
47) Case Title: NYK-FIL Management, Inc. vs. Gener G. Dabu
 amended its decision and granted Dabu’s (MR).
G.R. No. 225142 Sept. 13, 2017

FACTS: 



1. Petitioner NYK-Fil Ship Management, Inc., a local manning agent,
hired respondent Gener G. Dabu to work as oiler for nine months on
board the vessel M/V Hojin with a monthly basic salary of US$584.00.



2. March 25, 2013 - Respondent underwent a pre-employment medical
examination (PEME) on where he disclosed that he has diabetes mellitus.
The doctor who conducted the PEME noted that respondent has diabetes
mellitus type 2, controlled with medications.
3. On April 10, 2013, respondent consulted a doctor in Sri Lanka who found
him with elevated blood sugar level and was suffering from diabetes
mellitus, and declared him unfit for sea duty.
 1) Art. 262-A of the Labor Code provides:
4. April 12, 2013- Respondent was repatriated to Manila.
5. July 18, 2013- the company-designated physician declared that
respondent's diabetes mellitus is not work-related. However, respondent's
treatment was continued for a maximum period of 130 days. Respondent
continued his follow-up consultations as he still complained of body pains
and weakness and was prescribed medicines.
6. Respondent wrote letters to petitioner appealing for the continuation of
his treatment since his sickness was work-related taking into account his 23
years of working in petitioner's various vessels.
7. Respondent then consulted Two (2) other doctors, Dr. Efren R. Vicaldo
and Dr. Czarina Sheherazade Mae A. Miguel, who both found that this
ilness is work-aggravated/ related. 
 must be appealed before the Court of Appeals within 10 calendar days from


8. Dabu sought payment of disability benefits, damages and attorney's fees
from petitioner, but was denied. Dabu then filed a notice to arbitrate with
the National Conciliation Mediation Board (NCMB).
 Voluntary Arbitrator's decision "shall be final and executory after ten (10)


44
9. November 28, 2014- the NCMB-Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators (PVA)
ruled in favor of Dabu, and ordered respondent to pay him $60,000
10. COURT OF APPEALS

Petitioner appeled the PVA’s decision, on September 15, 2015, the Court of
Appeals reversed the PVA Decision, and dismissed Dabu’s complaint.
However, after Dabu filed a Motion for Reconsideration (MR), the CA




CA dismissed petitioner's petition on the ground of being FILED OUT
OF TIME. 



11. Petitioner filed for review on the ground that the Court of Appeals
committed a serious error in redering the amended decision on the ground
that it was allegedly filed out of time. 



ISSUE: WON the CA committed an error in rendering the amended
decision. 



HELD: SUPREME COURT HELD no merit in the petition.

The Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
RATIO: 





The award or decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator or Panel of Voluntary
Arbitrators shall contain the facts and the law on which it is based. It shall
be final and executory after ten (10) calendar days from receipt of the
copy of the award or decision by the parties.
2) Clearly, the decision of the voluntary arbitrator becomes final and
executory after 10 days from receipt thereof.
3) In Philippine Electric Corporation (PHILEC) v. Court of Appeals:



It is true that Rule 43, Section 4 of the Rules of Court provides for a 15-day
reglementary period for filing an appeal: Despite Rule 43 providing for a
15-day period to appeal, SC ruled that the Voluntary Arbitrator's decision
receipt of the decision as provided in the Labor Code.
4) We ruled that Article 262-A of the Labor Code allows the appeal of
decisions rendered by Voluntary Arbitrators. Statute provides that the
calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award or decision by the
parties." Being provided in the statute, this 10-day period must be complied
with; otherwise, no appellate court will have jurisdiction over the appeal.
This absurd situation occurs when the decision is appealed on the 11th to
15th day from receipt as allowed under the Rules, but which decision, under
the law, has already become final and executory.
5) Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution provides, the SUPREME
COURT "shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights" in
promulgating rules of procedure in courts. The 10-day period to appeal
under the Labor Code being a substantive right, this period cannot be
diminished, increased, or modified through the Rules of Court.
6) In Shioji v. Harvey, this court held that the "rules of court, promulgated
by authority of law, have the force and effect of law, if not in conflict with
positive law." Rules of Court are "subordinate to the statute." In case of
conflict between the law and the Rules of Court, "the statute will prevail."
7) The rule, therefore, is that a Voluntary Arbitrator's award or decision
shall be appealed before the Court of Appeals within 10 days from receipt
of the award or decision. Should the aggrieved party choose to file a motion
for reconsideration with the Voluntary Arbitrator, the motion must be filed
within the same 10-day period since a motion for reconsideration is filed
"within the period for taking an appeal."23
8) IN THIS CASE, petitioner received the PVA decision on February 9,
2015, and filed the petition for review 15 days after receipt thereof, i.e.,
on February 24, 2015. The CA, upon respondent's motion for
reconsideration, rendered its Amended Decision dated March 3, 2016
dismissing the petition and vacating the earlier decision it made granting the
petition. The CA dismissed the petition for being filed out of time, citing
the PHILEC case above-quoted.
Case no.48
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 185938, September 06, 2017
ALICIA M.L. COSETENG AND DILIMAN PREPARATORY
SCHOOL, Petitioners, v. LETICIA P. PEREZ, Respondent.
Facts:
In 1972,4 Perez was hired by the School as a teacher for elementary
students.In 1994, she was assigned to teach Grade V Level students with
working hours from 7:30 a.m. to 12:30 noon.6 Sometime in August 1994,
several students reported that Perez collected payment from them for
subscription to Saranggola magazine, an educational publication endorsed
by the School. However, they did not receive their copies of the magazine,
while students from other sections had already received theirs. Thereafter,
the School created a committee to conduct an investigation. Perez admitted
45
she failed to remit the subscription payment supposedly due to her busy
schedule, but agreed to return the payment of the students instead. 

Based on the findings of the School's investigating committee, a case for
misappropriation amounting to estafa could allegedly be built against Perez.
However, in view of her extensive service to the school, as well as to give
her the benefit of the doubt, the investigating committee reduced its
findings to negligence and recommended that Perez be suspended without
pay for ten working days.10 Accordingly, Perez was suspended from work
from April 10 to 25, 1995.11 A co-teacher suspected that cheating occurred
on January 26, 1995, during the Math quarterly examinations of Grade V
students proctored by Perez. Upon the teacher's inquiry, the student
admitted she cheated by copying the answers of another student with the
consent and instruction of Perez.12 Perez was suspended from work
effective May 26, 1995 to June 11, 1995 with one week commutation. She
was then directed to report to work on June 13, 1995 for her assignment.16
Perez correspondingly served out her suspension. Thereafter, nothing more
was heard from Perez, until she filed a Complaint19 for payment of
separation benefits with the Labor Arbiter (LA) on June 15, 1998. In her
Position Paper,20 Perez argued that she was constructively dismissed from
employment21 and prayed that she be granted separation pay in light of her
twenty-three (23) years of service to the School.22 Perez also submitted an
Affidavit23 executed by one Teresita Limochin (Limochin), who attested
that she received separation pay from the School following her voluntary
resignation.
On April 24, 2000, the LA rendered a Decision34 granting Perez's claim for
separation pay due to its conclusion that the petitioners have, as a practice,
given separation pay to its employees who resigned.35 However, the LA
decreed that Perez resigned voluntarily from work and was not
constructively dismissed.36
Feeling aggrieved, the petitioners made a partial appeal on the LA Decision
with tlie National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).


On May 10, 2002, the NLRC promulgated its Decision38 modifying the LA
ruling. While tlie NLRC affirmed the grant of separation pay to Perez, it
deemed Perez as constructively dismissed from employment because she
was placed on floating status.39 The NLRC also ruled that it was erroneous
to hold Coseteng liable for Perez's money claims as the former was neither
a proper party to the case nor did she act with malice or bad faith.40 The
NLRC modified the LA judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, the decision dated 24 April 2000 is MODIFIED. The
complaint against Alicia Coseteng is dismissed and the award of attorney's
fees is deleted.


In its Decision43 dated July 29, 2008, the CA dismissed the petition. It held
that Perez's cause of action had not prescribed since "an employee has four
years within which to institute an action for illegal dismissal."44 As with the
NLRC, the CA ruled that Perez was constructively dismissed from
employment, necessitating an award for separation pay. The CA considered
Perez's reassignment as a demotion amounting to additional penalty for her
infractions.
The decision of the public respondent Commission dated May 10, 2002
and its resolution dated June 21, 2002 are hereby REVERSED AND SET
ASIDE. The temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction prayed for by the petitioners, being a mere adjunct in this
petition, is perforce DENIED. No pronouncement as to costs.
 As a general rule, an employee who voluntarily resigns from employment is
ISSUES:


WON Perez failed to discharge her burden of proving that her resignation
was involuntary.
WON Perez was neither demoted nor was she placed on floating status.
WON there is no basis for the CA's inference that the School has a practice
or policy of granting separation pay to resigned employees, nor can Perez
claim separation pay under the principle of social justice in view of her
dishonest acts unbecoming of a teacher.48
HELD:


At the outset, the Court reiterates that only questions of law, not questions
of fact, may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
While it is true that factual findings made by quasi-judicial and
administrative tribunals, if supported by substantial evidence, are accorded
great respect and even finality by the courts, this general rule admits of
exceptions. When there is a showing that a palpable and demonstrable
mistake that needs rectification has been committed or when the factual
findings were arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence on record,
these findings may be examined by the courts.52
The Court also clarifies that while the term "floating status" was used
extensively in the pleadings, as well as in the decisions of the labor
tribunals and the CA, the petitioners aptly argued that Perez was not placed
under floating status in its legal sense. Under case law,53 with reference to
46
Article 28654 of the Labor Code, floating status refers to a temporary lay-off
or off-detail of an employee by reason of a bonafide suspension of the
operation of a business or undertaking which shall not exceed six months. 

Perez was not constructively dismissed from employment



While Perez has enjoyed her position of having a regular teaching load and
advisory class for years, and may have to adjust to her temporary
assignment, it is a recognized rule that "not every inconvenience,
disruption, difficulty, or disadvantage that an employee must endure results
in a finding of constructive dismissal."71 Having failed to prove that her
transfer was a result of discrimination, bad faith or disdain by the
petitioners, Perez's claim of constructive dismissal must necessarily fail.



No separation pay may be granted to Perez



not entitled to separation pay, except when it is stipulated in the
employment contract or CBA, or it is sanctioned by established employer
practice or policy.72 To be considered as a regular company practice, the
employee must prove by substantial evidence that the giving of the benefit
is done over a long period of time, and that it has been made consistently
and deliberately.73



In an effort to show that the School has a policy of granting separation pay
to its employees who resigned, Perez submitted an Affidavit74 executed by
Limochin, a co-teacher who received separation pay from the School
despite having resigned from work.



A scrutiny of Limochin's affidavit reveals that the School's grant of
separation benefits or financial assistance to her was an isolated act, not
borne out by any established employer practice or policy. All in all, the
Court disagrees with the view of the labor tribunals and the CA relative to
the award of separation benefits to Perez. They clearly overlooked the lack
of substantial evidence proving that the School grants separation pay to all
its employees who resigned; its one-time act of giving separation benefits or
financial assistance to an employee could hardly be considered as a practice
done consistently and deliberately over a long period of time. Having
voluntarily resigned from work, Perez is not entitled to separation pay or
financial assistance. To reiterate, there is no evidence that payment of
separation pay is stipulated in her employment contract or is sanctioned by
an established practice or policy of the School.



Petitioners are not entitled to damages and attorney's fees
 saying, "Matapang ka ha! Matapang ka!" Respondent replied, "Candy, ikaw


Anent the petitioners' prayer for moral damages on account of the
complaint filed by Perez, the Court denies the same for the reason that
moral damages are not automatically granted; "there must still be proof of
the existence of the factual basis of the damage and its causal relation to the
defendants' acts."77
 that she did not hit Banayad's ear and that it was the latter who provoked


With respect to exemplary damages, Article 2229 of the Civil Code states
that, "[e]xemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example
or correction for the public good, in addition to the moral, temperate,
liquidated or compensatory damages." Since the Court has adjudged the
petitioners as not entitled to moral damages, their plea for award of
exemplary damages cannot be granted pursuant, to the aforestated
provision.
 refused as it pertained to the promotion of Banayad as Strategy and Control


On the subject of attorney's fees, the Court holds that while the petitioners
were compelled to engage the services of a counsel and incurred litigation
expenses to defend their interests, it appears that Perez was not impelled by
malice and bad faith in filing her complaint.
Case No. 49
Fabricator Philippines, Inc. v. Estolas
G.R. Nos. 224308-09
September 27, 2017
FACTS:
Petitioner Fabricator Philippines which is a domestic corporation engaged
in the manufacture and sale of motorcycle parts, with Victor Lim as its
President hired Respondent Jeanie Rose Q. Estolas as a welder.
Before break time of July 2, 2011, while waiting for a replacement part she
requested to be installed on the welding machine she was using, respondent
Estolas took a seat and rested. At that time, another employee, Rosario
Banayad, passed by and saw her sitting, then uttered "Ayos ka ha." The
matter was brought to the attention of Assembly Action Team Leader,
Warlito Abaya, who confronted respondent about the said incident.
Thereafter, while Abaya and Banayad were talking to each other,
respondent told the latter in the vernacular "Ang kitid ng utak mo[.] [B]akit
hindi mo muna ako tinanong kung bakit ako nakaupo[?] [B]akit hindi mo
muna tinanong kung ano [ang] nasa likod ng nakita mo?" Banayad retorted,
47
pa naman ang nagdadasal araw-araw, tapos ganyan ang ugali mo!"
Consequently, Abaya directed respondent to see Lim in his office. During
their meeting, the latter (Estolas) allegedly asked what she would feel if he
would hit her ear, then proceeded to hit her ear. Respondent reasoned out
her. However, Lim insisted that respondent was rude towards Banayad.
Thus, on July 13, 2011, respondent was issued a suspension order effective
the following day for a period of days. While she was in the locker area, the
company guard on duty informed respondent to report for work the
following day.
On November 28, 2011, Lim directed respondent to sign a paper, which she
Group-Senior Assistant 1. On November 30, 2011, respondent received a
letter from Lim directing her to seek the assistance of a lawyer for the
hearing on December 7, 2011. At the scheduled hearing, respondent was
required to sign the statements of Banayad and other witnesses, which she
refused to follow. Thereafter, on December 16, 2011, respondent was served
a notice of termination effective December 17, 2011, finding her guilty of
serious misconduct.
Hence, Respondent Estolas filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with
claims for moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees filed
before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). The The Labor
Arbiter (LA) ruled in favor of respondent Estolas after finding that although
the respondent may have indeed committed acts of misconduct, the same
were not willful and intentional in character. As such, the penalty meted on
respondent, i.e., dismissal, was not commensurate to the offense charged
against her.
Aggrieved, petitioner and Lim appealed to the NLRC which initially issued
a Resolution dismissing the appeal on technical grounds. Upon
reconsideration, however, the NLRC modified LA ruling by deleting the
award of separation pay and backwages, and in lieu thereof, ordered
respondent's reinstatement to her former position without loss of seniority
rights, opining it as the commensurate penalty for the latter's act of
professional misconduct.
Both parties moved for reconsideration, which were, however, denied in a
NLRC Resolution. Dissatisfied, they elevated the matter to the Court of
Appeals (CA) via their respective petitions for certiorari.
The CA reinstated the LA ruling with modifications: (a) ordering petitioner
to pay respondent backwages from the time she was illegally dismissed
until finality of the ruling less her salary for 15 days corresponding to her
suspension, and separation pay computed from the time respondent was
hired until finality of the decision, plus legal interest of 6% per annum from
finality of the decision until fully paid; (b) absolving Lim from any personal
liability arising from respondent's illegal dismissal; and (c) ordering the LA
to make a recomputation of the total monetary benefits awarded and due
respondent.
Agreeing with the findings of the labor tribunals a quo, the CA held that
respondent's acts did not amount to gross misconduct that would have
justified her termination from work. In this regard, it found that the NLRC
gravely abused its discretion in deleting the award of backwages, pointing
out that respondent was already suspended for 3 days for her misconduct,
and thus, a second disciplinary proceeding, which resulted in her dismissal,
as well as the consequent filing of the instant case, was no longer
warranted. Nonetheless, the CA opined that respondent's infraction was
minor, for which a 15-day suspension would have sufficed.
Undaunted, petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied
in a Resolution; hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that respondent was illegally
dismissed
HELD:
YES. Article 297 (formerly Article 282) 45 of the Labor Code, as amended,
lists serious misconduct as one of the just causes for an employee's
dismissal from work, pertinent portions of which read:
Article 297 [282]. Termination by Employer. — An employer may
terminate an employment for any of the following causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employe e of the
lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work;
48
Misconduct is defined as an improper or wrong conduct. It is a
transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden
act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent
and not mere error in judgment. To constitute a valid cause for the dismissal
within the text and meaning of the foregoing provision, the following
elements must concur: (a) the misconduct must be serious; (b) it must relate
to the performance of the employee's duties, showing that the employee has
become unfit to continue working for the employer; and (c) it must have
been performed with wrongful intent.
In this case, the tribunals a quo aptly observed that while respondent indeed
committed some sort of misconduct when she engaged in a verbal tussle
with Banayad during work hours and in front of their superior, Abaya, the
same was not serious enough to warrant respondent's dismissal. Neither was
it shown that respondent performed such act of misconduct with wrongful
intent nor did the same render her unfit to continue working for petitioner.
As such, the tribunals a quo correctly concluded that petitioner illegally
dismissed respondent. It is settled that "where the factual findings of the
labor tribunals or agencies conform to, and are affirmed by the CA, the
same are accorded respect and finality and are binding upon this Court," as
in this case.
Moreover, it is well to stress that (July 13, 2011) petitioner already issued
an order suspending respondent for a period of 3 days on account of her
misconduct. Thus, petitioner could no longer subject respondent to another
disciplinary proceeding based on the same act of misconduct. Clearly,
respondent could not have been validly terminated from work.
Disposition: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the CA
Decision and Resolution in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 133794 and 133833 are
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, deleting the deduction of
salary/wages for 15 days from the award of backwages in favor of
respondent Jeanie Rose Q. Estolas. The rest of the CA ruling STANDS.
CASE NO. 50
Allan John Uy Reyes vs Global Beer Below Zero, Inc.
G.R. No. 222816, October 4, 2017
Facts:
Petitioner Reyes was an employee of respondent Global as Operations
Manager. On January 18, 2012, Reyes, in accordance with his duties
reported to the main office of respondent Global in Makati instead of going
to the Pasig warehouse in order to request for budget because there was a
scheduled delivery in the following day. The following day, Reyes ran late
because according to him, his three-year-old son was sick. Around 10:30
a.m. of the same day, respondent Global’s Vice-President for Operations,
Vinson CO Say (Co Say), Reyes’ immediate and direct superior at that time,
called Reyes and asked him why he was not yet at the office. Reyes
apologized and said that he was on his way. According to Reyes, he tried to
explain why he was late, but Co Say did not listen and the latter shouted at
the other end of the line and told Reyes not to report for work anymore.
Reyes further claimed that Co Say angrily retorted that he will talk to him
the following week before Co Say hung up the phone. As instructed, Reyes
did not report for work on the following days and waited for further
instructions from Co Say. On January 24, 2012, Reyes received a text
message from Co Say stating the following, “Allan, let’s meet thu, puno aka
today, bukas.” Around 1:28 p.m. of January 26, 2012, Reyes received a text
message from Co Say which says, “Allan, let’s meet in Starbucks
Waltermart around 3:00.” During the said meeting, Co Say told Reyes to no
longer report for work and insisted that he file a resignation letter which
Reyes refused to do because he believed that he had not done anything that
would warrant his dismissal from the company. Thus, Reyes instituted a
complaint for constructive dismissal on February 22, 2012 and amended the
same complaint on March 29, 2012, changing his cause of action to illegal
dismissal. Respondent Global, on the other hand, claimed that Reyes was
not dismissed from service, but the latter stopped reporting for work on his
own volition after repeatedly violating company rules and regulations. He
committed a total of six (6) absences constituting those without filing leave
of absence and not following the prior notice rule. He also incurred a total
balance of Php 7,977.10 for personal use of WAP services, and his absences
resulted in several work remaining undone. LA Ruling: The LA ruled in
favor of complainant. According to the LA, Reyes had no intention of
quitting his job as seen from his filing of applications of leaves of absences
days before he supposedly abandoned his job and hist texting Co Say about
is work on the day he supposedly abandoned his job. It also found that the
accusation that Reyes committed serious misconduct and was negligent in
the performance of his duty is more consistent with a finding that there was
dismissal than with finding that there was an abandonment of employment.
The Labor Arbiter further ruled that the word “turnover” in Co Say’s last
text message to Reyes indicates that on the date that it was sent, the latter
was already expected to turnovers duties to his replacement and belies the
49
claim of Co Say that he asked Reyes to return to work in order to possibly
explain his numerous absences, negligence in performing his duties and
serious misconduct. NLRC Ruling: On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the LA.
The NLRC ruled that Reyes sufficiently alleged the surrounding
circumstances of his dismissal and was able to state, with the required
particularities how he was terminated from his employment; thus,
respondent Global should have proven that it was legally done. According
to the NLRC, respondent Global failed to disprove Reyes’ allegation that he
was verbally dismissed twice by Co Say, hence, there is no evidence
showing that Reyes was dismissed from his job for cause and that he was
afforded procedural due process. Respondent filed with the CA a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65. CA Ruling: The CA reversed the NLRC. In
finding merit to respondent Global’s petition, the CA ruled that the “text”
messages allegedly sent by Co Say and Tet Manares to Reyes could hardly
meet the standard of clear, positive and convincing evidence to prove
Reyes’ bare assertion that he was verbally terminated from employment by
Co Say, no corroborative and competent evidence was adduced by Reyes to
substantiate his claim that he was illegally dismissed. The CA, instead,
found that there was no overt or positive act on the part of respondent
Global proving that it had dismissed Reyes. Hence, the present petition,
after the denial of Reyes’ motion for reconsideration.
Issue/s:
Whether or not the word “turnover” means dismissal from employment?
Whether or not unauthenticated text message can be given credence in a
labor case?
Ruling:
The SC found merit in the petition. Verbal notice of termination can hardly
be considered as valid or legal. To constitute valid dismissal from
employment, two requisites must concur: (1) the dismissal must be for a
just or authorized cause; and (2) the employee must be afforded an
opportunity to be heard and to defend himself. In justifying that such verbal
command not to report for work from respondent Global’s Vice President
for Operations Co Say as not enough to be construed as overt acts of
dismissal, the CA cited the case of Noblejas v. Italian Maritime Academy
Phils., Inc. In the said case, an employee filed an illegal dismissal case after
the secretary of the company’s Managing Director told him, “No, you better
pack up all your things now and go, you are now dismissed and you are no
longer part of this office -clearly, you are terminated from this day on.”
There was no dismissal to speak of because the secretary’s words were not
enough to be construed as overt acts of dismissal. Be that as it may, the cases. Thus, the “text” messages may be given credence especially if they
factual antecedents of that case is different in this case. In the present case, corroborate the other pieces of evidence presented. Again, while as a rule,
the one who verbally directed Reyes to no longer report for work was his the Court strictly adheres to the rules of procedure, it may take exception to
immediate or direct supervisor, the VicePresident for Operations, who has such general rule when a strict implementation of the rules would cause
the capacity and authority to terminate Reyes’ services, while in Noblejas, substantial injustice to the parties. Having thus proven the fact of being
the one who gave the instruction was merely the secretary of the company’s dismissed, the burden to prove that such dismissal was not done illegally is
Managing Director. Hence, in Noblejas, the Court found it necessary that now shifted to the employer to show by substantial evidence that the
the employee should have clarified the statement of the secretary from his employee’s termination from service is for a just and valid cause. In this
superiors before the same employee instituted an illegal dismissal case. In case, respondent Global asserts that there was no dismissal; instead, there
the present case, Co Say’s verbal instruction, being Reyes’ immediate was abandonment of the part of Reyes of his employment. The Labor
supervisor, was authoritative, therefore, Reyes was not amiss in thinking Arbiter, however, found that on the days that Reyes supposedly abandoned
that his employment has indeed already been terminated. The text messages his employment according to respondent Global, no such indication was
produced in a machine copy by Reyes tended to show that he was actually found as Reyes filed applications for leave and even sent “text” messages to
dismissed from his work. The text message purportedly sent by respondent his immediate or direct superior regarding his work. Abandonment requires
Co Say that: “Tet will contact you plus turnover” was clear enough. A literal the deliberate, unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his
interpretation of said text message leaves no doubt that the complainant’s employment, without any intention of returning. For abandonment to exist,
days with the respondent company was numbered. The word “turnover” two factors must be present: (1) the failure to report for work or absence
simply connotes “to transfer,” “to yield” or “to return.” In employment without valid of justifiable reason; and (2) a clear intention to sever
parlance, the word “turnover” is associated with severance of employment. employer-employee relationship, with the second element as the more
An employee makes proper “turnover” of pending work before he leaves determinative factor being manifested by some overt acts. In this case, no
his employment. The text message of respondent Co Say was followed by such abandonment was proven by respondent Global. In fact, Reyes would
another message from Ms. Tet Manares which stated that: “Kuya, pianos ko not have filed a case for illegal dismissal if he really intended to abandon
na kay gen salary mo.” This is consistent with the first message that Tel will his work. Employees who take steps to protest their dismissal cannot
contact the complainant. True enough, Ms. Tet Manares contacted the logically be said to have abandoned their work.
complainant informing him that his salary was already being prepared. The
two (2) text messages, when taken together, support complainant’s
insistence that he was actually dismissed from his work. Respondent Co
Say’s text message regarding “turnover” and Ms. Manares’ text message
regarding the preparation of the complainant’s salary were quite consistent
with the complainant’s allegation that he was dismissed by respondent Co
Say during their telephone conversation and during their meeting at
Starbucks Waltermart. Global’s assertion that the purported text messages
submitted by Reyes should not be given credence as he failed to
authenticate the same in accordance with the Rules of Court, deserves scant
consideration. In labor cases, the strict adherence to the rules of evidence
may be relaxed consistent with the higher interest of substantial justice. In
labor cases, rules of procedure should not be applied in a very rigid and
technical sense. They are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment
of justice, and where their strict application would result in the frustration
rather than promotion of substantial justice, technicalities must be avoided.
It is well settled that the application of technical rules of procedure may be
relaxed to serve the demands of substantial justice, particularly in labor
50