CASE DIGESTS

1. Fabian vs Desierto, GR No. 129742

FACTS:

Petitioner Teresita G. Fabian was the major stockholder and president of PROMAT Construction Development
Corporation (PROMAT) engaged in the construction business. Private
respondent Nestor V. Agustin was the incumbent District Engineering District (FMED) when he allegedly
committed the offenses for which he was administratively charged in the Office in the office of the
Ombudsman.

PROMAT participated in biddings for government construction, particularly with the FMED. Respondent used
his office to inveigle petitioner into an amorous relationship with him. The affair lasted for a while, and private
respondent gifted petitioner public works contracts.

Later, petitioner attempted to end their relationship, but respondent refused and harassed and threatened
her. Petitioner filed an administrative case against him for grave misconduct committed by him as then
Assistant Regional Director, Region IV-A, Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH). The said
complaint sought the dismissal of private respondent for violation of Sec. 19, R.A. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of
1989) and Sec. 36 of PD 807 (Civil Service Decree), with an ancillary prayer for his preventive suspension.

The Graft Investigator issued a resolution finding private respondents guilty of grave misconduct and ordering
his dismissal from the service with forfeiture of all benefits under the law.
Herein respondent Ombudsman, in an Order dated February 26, 1996, approved the aforesaid resolution with
modifications, by finding private respondent guilty of misconduct and meting out the penalty of suspension
without pay for one year.
After private respondent moved for reconsideration, respondent Ombudsman discovered that the former's
new counsel had been his "classmate and close associate" hence he inhibited himself. The case was
transferred to respondent Deputy Ombudsman Jesus F. Guerrero who, in the now challenged Joint Order of
June 18, 1997, set aside the February 26, 1997 Order of respondent Ombudsman and exonerated private
respondents from the administrative charges.

Petitioner’s Argument
Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989) provides that, “In all administrative diciplinary
cases, orders, directives or decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court
by filing a petition for certiorari […] in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.”

But Section 7, Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07 (Rules of Procedure of the office of the
Ombudsman), provides that when a respondent is absolved of the charges in an administrative proceeding
decision of the ombudsman is final and unappealable.

She submits that the office of the ombudsman has no authority under the law to restrict the right of appeal
allowed by Republic Act No. 6770, nor to limit the power of review of this Court. Because of these provisions,
she claims that she found it "necessary to take an alternative recourse under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court,
because of the doubt it creates on the availability of appeals under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.”

Respondents’ Argument
Respondent argues that the Office of the Ombudsman is empowered to promulgate its own Rules of
Procedure. Respondents consequently contend that, on the foregoing constitutional and statutory authority,
petitioner cannot assail the validity of the rules of procedure formulated by the Office of the Ombudsman
governing the conduct of proceeding before it, including those with respect to the availabity or non-avalability
of appeal in administrative cases. Such as Sec. 7, Rule III of AO No.07.

ISSUE
Is Sec. 27 of RA 6770 and Sec. 7, Rule III of A.O. No. 07 violative of the constitutional provision in Sec. 30,
Article VI of the 1987 Constitution that "(n)o law shall be passed increasing the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court as provided in this Constitution without its advice and consent”?

RULING

The Court was intrigued by the fact, which does appear to have been seriously considered before, that the
administrative liability of a public official could fall under the jurisdiction of both the Civil Service Commission
and the Office of the Ombudsman. Thus, the offenses imputed to herein private respondent were based on
both Section 19 of Republic Act. No. 6770 and Section 36 of Presidential Decree No. 807. Yet, pursuant to the
amendment of section 9, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 by Republic Act No. 7902, all adjudications by Civil Service
Commission in administrative disciplinary cases were made appealable to the Court of Appeals effective
March 18, 1995, while those of the Office of the Ombudsman are appealable to this Court.
It could thus be possible that in the same administrative case involving two respondents, the proceedings
against one could eventually have been elevated to the Court of Appeals, while the other may have found its
way to the Ombudsman from which it is sought to be brought to this Court. Yet systematic and efficient case
management would dictate the consolidation of those cases in the Court of Appeals, both for expediency and
to avoid possible conflicting decisions.

Section 27 of Republic Act No. 6770 cannot validly authorize an appeal to this Court from decisions of the
Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases. It consequently violates the proscription in
Section 30, Article VI of the Constitution against a law which increases the Appellate jurisdiction of this Court.

Appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to
the Court of Appeals under the provisions of Rule 43.

Section 27 of RA 6770 (Ombudsman Act of 1989), together with Section 7, Rule III of AO Order No. 07 (Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman), and any other provision of law or issuance implementing the
aforesaid Act and insofar as they provide for appeals in administrative disciplinary cases from the Office of the
Ombudsman to the Supreme Court, are hereby declared INVALID and of no further force and effect.
 2. Office of the Ombudsman vs Masing GR No. 165416

FACTS

In G.R. NOS. 165416 and 165731, respondent Florita A. Masing was the former Principal of the Davao City
Integrated Special School (DCISS) in Bangkal, Davao City. Respondent Jocelyn A. Tayactac was an office clerk in
the same school. In 1997, respondents were administratively charged before the Office of the Ombudsman for
Mindanao for allegedly collecting unauthorized fees, failing to remit authorized fees, and to account for public
funds.
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over them.
Respondents alleged that the DECS has jurisdiction over them which shall exercise the same through a
committee to be constituted under Sec. 9 of R.A. 4670, otherwise known as the "The Magna Carta for Public
School Teachers." The motion was denied, as well as respondents' motion for reconsideration.
The Ombudsman for Mindanao rendered a joint decision finding respondents Masing and Tayactac guilty.
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration which the Ombudsman denied
Respondents sought recourse to the Court of Appeals via a Petition for Review under Rule 43 of the Rules of
Court. The CA granted their petition and set aside the order of the Ombudsman, dismissed their cases, and
ordered their immediate reinstatement.
The Office of the Ombudsman filed an Omnibus Motion to Intervene and for Reconsideration. The Court of
Appeals denied the omnibus motion on the grounds that (1) intervention is not proper because it is sought by
the quasi-judicial body whose judgment is on appeal, and (2) intervention, even if permissible, is belated
under Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court
Hence, the petition before us by the Office of the Ombudsman, docketed as G.R. No. 165416.
The complainant-parents filed their own Petition for Review of the Court of Appeals' decision dated February
27, 2004, docketed as G.R. No. 165731.
In G.R. No. 165584, respondent Florita A. Masing faced yet another administrative case before the Office of
the Ombudsman-Mindanao filed by Erlinda P. Tan.5 The charges were oppression, serious misconduct,
discourtesy in the conduct of official duties, and physical or mental incapacity or disability due to immoral or
vicious habits.
As in the other administrative cases, respondent Masing filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
Office of the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the case. The motion was denied, as well as respondent's
motion for reconsideration.
On December 27, 1999, the Ombudsman for Mindanao found respondent Masing guilty as charged and
ordered her suspension for six (6) months without pay. The DECS Regional Director, Regional Office No. XI, was
ordered to implement the decision upon its finality.
Respondent Masing filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals which set aside the decision of the
Ombudsman. The Office of the Ombudsman filed an Omnibus Motion to Intervene and for
Reconsideration which the Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution dated September 30, 2004. Hence, this
petition by the Office of the Ombudsman, docketed as G.R. No. 165584.
The cases are consolidated in this proceeding.
ISSUE

Whether the Office of the Ombudsman may directly discipline public school teachers and employees.

RULING

The authority of the Ombudsman to act on complaints filed against public officers and employees is explicit in
Article XI, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution.
“The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any
form or manner against public officials or employees of the Government, or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and shall, in appropriate
cases, notify the complainants of the action taken and the result thereof.”
Article XI, Section 13 of the same Constitution delineates the powers, functions and duties of the Ombudsman.
The enumeration of these powers is non-exclusive. Congress enacted R.A. No. 6770, otherwise known as The
Ombudsman Act of 1989, on November 17, 1989 giving the Office such other powers that it may need to
efficiently perform the task given by the Constitution.
In fine, the manifest intent of the lawmakers was to bestow on the Office of the
Ombudsman full administrative disciplinary authority in accord with the constitutional deliberations.
Ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 6770 is intended to play a more active role in the
enforcement of laws on anti-graft and corrupt practices and other offenses committed by public officers and
employees.
We reiterated this ruling in Office of the Ombudsman v. Laja,34 where we emphasized that "the Ombudsman's
order to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an officer or employee is not merely advisory
or recommendatory but is actually mandatory." Implementation of the order imposing the penalty is,
however, to be coursed through the proper officer.
Section 15(3) also states that the Ombudsman in the alternative may "enforce its disciplinary authority as
provided in Section 21" of RA 6770.
It is erroneous, therefore, for respondents to contend that R.A. No. 4670 confers an exclusive disciplinary
authority on the DECS over public school teachers and prescribes an exclusive procedure in administrative
investigations involving them. The power of the Ombudsman is conferred by the Constitution. The 1987
Constitution and R.A. No. 6770 were quite explicit in conferring authority on the Ombudsman to act on
complaints against all public officials and employees, except for officials who may be removed only by
impeachment or over members of Congress and the Judiciary. If an issue should ever arise, therefore, it should
rather be whether the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 6770 have abrogated R.A. No. 4670.
Wherefore, the petition is granted. The assailed decisions and resolutions are set aside.
 3. Information Technology Foundation of the Philippines vs COMELEC, 419 SCRA 141

FACTS

Congress passed RA 8046 authorizing COMELEC to conduct a a nationwide demonstration of a computerized election
system and allowed the poll body to pilot-test the system in the March 1996 elections in the ARMM

Congress passed RA 8436 authorizng COMELEC to use an automated election system (AES) for the process of voting,
counting votes and canvassing/consolidating the results of the national and local elections, and acquire automated
counting machines.

In 2002, Comelec adopted in its Resolution 02-0170 a modernization program for the 2004 elections. It resolved to
conduct biddings for the three (3) phases of its Automated Election System; namely, Phase I - Voter Registration and
Validation System; Phase II - Automated Counting and Canvassing System; and Phase III - Electronic Transmission.

COMELEC issued an Invitation to Apply and Eligibility to Bid. Out of the 57 bidders, the Bids and Awards Committee
found MPC and the Total Information Management Corporation (TIMC) eligible and were referred to the Technical
Working Group and DOST for technical evaluation.

In its Report, said that both MPC and TIMC had obtained a number of failed marks in the technical evaluation. Despite
this, Comelec en banc promulgated Resolution No. 6074 awarding the project to MPC. The Commission publicized this
Resolution and the award of the project to MPC on May 16, 2003.

On May 29, 2003, five individuals and entities (including the herein Petitioners Information Technology Foundation of
the Philippines, and Ma. Corazon Akol) wrote a letter to Comelec Chairman Benjamin Abalos Sr. protesting the award of
the Contract to Respondent MPC "due to glaring irregularities in the manner in which the bidding process had been
conducted." Citing therein the noncompliance with eligibility as well as technical and procedural requirements (many of
which have been discussed at length in the Petition), they sought a re-bidding.

In a letter-reply dated June 6, 2003, the Comelec chairman rejected the protest and declared that the award
"would stand up to the strictest scrutiny.”
The petitioners filed this case, Petition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking (1) to declare null and void
Resolution No. 6074 of the COMELEC which awarded the contract to Mega Pacific Consortium (MPC); (2) to
enjoin the implementation of any further contract that may have been entered into by Comelec either with
MPC and/or Mega Pacific eSolutions, Inc. (MPEI); and (3) to compel Comelec to conduct a re-bidding of the
project.
ISSUE

1. Whether or not the petitioners have locus standi

2. Whether or not the petition is premature due to non-exhaustion of administrative remedies (RELEVANT
ISSUE)
3. Whether the Commission on Elections gravely abused its discretion when in the exercise of its administrative
functions awarded the contract to MPC.

RULING

The petition is meritorious.

1. The Petitioners have locus standi

The petitioners, suing in their capacities as taxpayers, registered voters and concerned citizens, respond that
the issues central to this case are "of transcendental importance and of national interest." The Court agrees.
the subject matter of this case is "a matter of public concern and imbued with public interest"; in other words,
it is of "paramount public interest" and "transcendental importance." This fact alone would justify relaxing the
rule on legal standing, following the liberal policy of this Court whenever a case involves "an issue of
overarching significance to our society." Petitioners’ legal standing should therefore be recognized and upheld.
Moreover, this Court has held that taxpayers are allowed to sue when there is a claim of "illegal disbursement
of public funds," or if public money is being "deflected to any improper purpose"; or when petitioners seek to
restrain respondent from "wasting public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional
law."

2. The petition is not premature for non-exhaustion of administrative remedies

Respondents claim that petitioners acted prematurely, since they had not first utilized the protest mechanism
available to them under RA 9184, the Government Procurement Reform Act, for the settlement of disputes
pertaining to procurement contracts.

Section 55 of RA 9184 states that protests of decisions of the Bidding and Awards Committee in all stages of
procurement may be lodged with the head of the procuring entity by filing a verified position paper and
paying a protest fee. Section 57 of the same law mandates that in no case shall any such protest stay or delay
the bidding process, but it must first be resolved before any award is made.

On the other hand, Section 58 provides that court action may be resorted to only after the protests
contemplated by the statute shall have been completed. Cases filed in violation of this process are to be
dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Regional trial courts shall have jurisdiction over final decisions of the head of
the procuring entity, and court actions shall be instituted pursuant to Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.

According to respondents, the Report should have been appealed to the Comelc en banc, pursuant to the
aforementioned sections of RA 9184. In the absence of such appeal, the determination and recommendation
of the BAC had become final.

The Court is not persuaded.

Petitioners could not have appealed the BAC’s recommendation or report to the head of the procuring entity
(the chairman of Comelec), when the Comelec en banc had already approved the award of the contract to
MPC even before petitioners learned of the BAC recommendation.

To put it bluntly, the Comelec en banc itself made it legally impossible for petitioners to avail themselves of the
administrative remedy that the Commission is so impiously harping on. There is no doubt that they had not
been accorded the opportunity to avail themselves of the process provided under Section 55 of RA 9184,
according to which a protest against a decision of the BAC may be filed with the head of the procuring entity.

Aside from this, the letter addressed to Chairman Benjamin Abalos Sr. dated May 29, 2003 serves to eliminate
the prematurity issue as it was an actual written protest against the decision of the poll body to award the
Contract. Such letter-protest is sufficient compliance with the requirement to exhaust administrative remedies
particularly because it hews closely to the procedure outlined in Section 55 of RA 9184.

And even without that May 29, 2003 letter-protest, the Court still holds that petitioners need not exhaust
administrative remedies in the light of Paat v. Court of Appeals.29 Paat enumerates the instances when the rule
on exhaustion of administrative remedies may be disregarded, as follows:
"(1) when there is a violation of due process,

(2) when the issue involved is purely a legal question,

(3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction,

(4) when there is estoppel on the part of the administrative agency concerned,

(5) when there is irreparable injury,

(6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the
implied and assumed approval of the latter,

(7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable,

(8) when it would amount to a nullification of a claim,

(9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings,

(10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and

(11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention."

The present controversy precisely falls within the exceptions listed as Nos. 7, 10 and 11: "(7) when to require
exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable; (10) when the rule does not provide a plain,
speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial
intervention." As already stated, Comelec itself made the exhaustion of administrative remedies legally
impossible or, at the very least, "unreasonable."

The peculiar circumstances surrounding the unconventional rendition of the BAC Report and the precipitate
awarding of the Contract by the Comelec en banc -- plus the fact that it was racing to have its Contract with
MPC implemented in time for the elections in May 2004 (barely four months away) -- have combined to bring
about the urgent need for judicial intervention, thus prompting this Court to dispense with the procedural
exhaustion of administrative remedies in this case.

3. There was grave abuse by the COMELEC

The Commission on Elections approved the assailed Resolution and awarded the subject Contract not only in
clear violation of law and jurisprudence, but also in reckless disregard of its own bidding rules and procedure.
For the automation of the counting and canvassing of the ballots in the 2004 elections, Comelec awarded the
Contract to "Mega Pacific Consortium" an entity that had not participated in the bidding. Despite this grant,
the poll body signed the actual automation Contract with "Mega Pacific eSolutions, Inc.," a company that
joined the bidding but had not met the eligibility requirements and failed to pass eight critical requirements
designed to safeguard the integrity of elections, especially the following three items:
1. They failed to achieve the accuracy rating criteria of 99.9995 percent set-up by the Comelec itself
2. They were not able to detect previously downloaded results at various canvassing or consolidation
levels and to prevent these from being inputted again
 3. They were unable to print the statutorily required audit trails of the count/canvass at different levels
without any loss of data
Because of the foregoing violations of law and the glaring grave abuse of discretion committed by Comelec, the court
declared the resolution and contract void. The illegal, imprudent and hasty actions of the Commission have not only
desecrated legal and jurisprudential norms but have also cast serious doubts upon the poll bodys ability and capacity to
conduct automated elections. Truly, the pith and soul of democracy -- credible, orderly, and peaceful elections -- has
been put in jeopardy by the illegal and gravely abusive acts of Comelec.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Court hereby declares NULL  and VOID Comelec Resolution No. 6074
awarding the contract for Phase II of the AES to Mega Pacific Consortium (MPC). Also declared null and void is the
subject Contract executed between Comelec and Mega Pacific eSolutions (MPEI). 55 Comelec is further ORDERED  to
refrain from implementing any other contract or agreement entered into with regard to this project.

*Grave Abuse of Discrection - (1) when an act is done contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence; or (2) when
it is executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily out of malice, ill will or personal bias.
 4. DAR vs Apex Investment and Financing Corporation, 401 SCRA 283

FACTS:

DAR Filed this case assailing the decision of the CA.

Respondent, Apex Investment and Financing Corp. (now SM Investments Corp.) owns several lots located in Paliparan,
Dasmarinas, Cavite.

The Municipal Agrarian Reform Office (MARO) of Dasmarinas initiated compulsory acquisition proceedings of the
mentioned lots pursuant to the CAR Law. Respondent was issued a Notice of Coverage and a Notice of Acquisition sent
to its office. Respondent denied having received the notices.

Respondent learned of the compulsory acquisition proceedings from the December 11, 1997 issue of the Balita.
Petitioner sent respondent a copy of the Notice of Land Valuation and Acquisition dated July 24, 1997, offering to pay
it P229,014.33 as compensation for the lot.

Respondent filed with the PARO a Protest rejecting the offer of compensation and contending that its lands are not
covered by R.A. No. 6657 because they were classified as residential even prior to the effectivity of the law. The PARO
forwarded to petitioner DAR the said protest after a year.

Respondent received a letter from petitioner requiring it to submit certified true copies of the TCTs covering its lots and
a Certification from the HLURB attesting that they are within the residential zone of Dasmarias. Respondent learned that
on June 24, 1999, the Registry of Deeds of Cavite cancelled one of its titles, TCT No. T-90476, and in lieu thereof, issued
TCT No. T-868471 in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, and was later cancelled and issued to Angel Umali, a
farmer beneficiary.

Respondent filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition praying that the compulsory acquisition
proceedings over its landholdings be declared void and that the TCT issued to Angel Umali be cancelled. Petitioner
alleged that the respondent failed to exhaust all administrative remedies.

The CA rendered its decision in favor of respondent and granted its petition. The petitioner moved for reconsideration
but was denied.

The petitioner then filed this petition for review on certiorari.

ISSUE

1. Whether or not the respondent corp. violated the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies
2. Whether or not respondent was denied due process
3. Whether or not the parcels of land are residential and covered by RA 6657

RULING

1. The respondent did not violate the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies

This Court has consistently held that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a relative one and is
flexible depending on the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial settings of a case. Among others,
it is disregarded where, as in this case, (a) there are circumstances indicating the urgency of judicial intervention; 4 and
(b) the administrative action is patently illegal and amounts to lack or excess of jurisdiction

The PARO did not take immediate action on respondents Protest filed on January 12, 1998. It was only on February 15,
1999, or after more than one year, that it forwarded the same to petitioner DAR.
In Natalia Realty vs. Department of Agrarian Reform,6 we held that the aggrieved landowners were not supposed to wait
until the DAR acted on their letter-protests (after it had sat on them for almost a year) before resorting to judicial
process. The landowners had to act to assert and protect their interests. Thus, their petition for certiorari was allowed
even though the DAR had not yet resolved their protests.

Respondent here could not be expected to wait for petitioner DAR to resolve its protest before seeking judicial
intervention. Obviously, petitioner might continue to alienate respondents lots during the pendency of its protest.
Hence, the Court of Appeals did not err in concluding that based on the circumstances of this case, respondent need not
exhaust all administrative remedies before filing its petition for certiorari and prohibition.

2. Petitioner was deprived of its constitutional right to due process

Respondent did not receive the Notice of Acquisition and Notice of Coverage sent to the latter’s old address, which are
necessary for due process in Agrarian Reform proceedings. Clearly, respondent was deprived of its right to procedural
due process.

3. Respondent’s parcel of land is residential and not covered by RA 6657

The Municipal Engineer certified that respondents lands are within the residential zone of Dasmarias, based on the Land
Use Plan of that municipality duly approved by the HLURB in its Resolution No. R-42-A-3 dated February 11, 1981
 5. Corpus vs Cuaderno, 4 SCRA 749

FACTS

Corpus, petitioner-appellant, was holding the position of Special Assistant to the Governor of the Central Bank of the
Philippines - a position declared by the President of the Philippines as "highly technical in nature and placed in the
exempt class" He was charged in an administrative case, for alleged dishonesty, incompetence, neglect of duty and/or
abuse of authority, oppression, misconduct, etc. preferred against him by employees of the Bank, resulting in his
suspension by the Monetary Board of the Bank and the creation of a 3-man committee to investigate him. The
committee reported that it found no basis to recommend disciplinary action against respondent and recommends that
he be reinstated.

The Monetary Board disagreed with the committee report and adopted Resolution No. 957 which considered "the
respondent, R. Marino Corpus, resigned as of the date of his suspension" and appointed respondent Mario Marcos to
the vacated position.

Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus and quo warranto, with preliminary mandatory injunction and
damages, against the herein respondents.

An order was issued by the court below holding in abeyance the resolution of the motions to dismiss until the trial,
stating that the grounds alleged therein do not appear to be indubitable. Subsequently, petitioner manifested in open
court that he was abandoning his prayer for the issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction so that the case can be
speedily terminated.

Another order was issued granting the motions to dismiss the amended petition, on the ground that petitioner did not
exhaust all administrative remedies available to him in law.

Petitioner thus brought this appeal.

ISSUE

Whether or not the lower court erred in dismissing his petition for certiorari, mandamus  and  quo warranto, with
preliminary mandatory injunction and damages

RULING

The lower court was of the opinion that petitioner-appellant should have exhausted all administrative remedies
available to him, such as an appeal to the Commissioner of Civil Service, under Republic Act No. 2260, or the President of
the Philippines who under the Constitution and the law is the head of all the executive departments of the government
including its agencies and instrumentalities.

True, the appellant did not elevate his case for review either by the President or the Civil Service Commission. However,
it is our opinion that a report to these administrative appeals is voluntary or permissive, considering the facts obtaining
in this case.

(1) There is no law requiring an appeal to the President in a case like the one at bar.
(2) While there are provisions in the Civil Service Law regarding appeals to the Commissioner of Civil Service and the
Civil Service Board of Appeals, We believe the petitioner is not bound to observe them, considering his status
and the Charter of the Central Bank. By RA 265 creating the Central Bank, Sec 14 vests the Monetary Board the
power to investigate and remove its officials except the governor thereof. The Civil Service Law is the general
legal provision for the investigation, suspension or removal of civil service employees, whereas Section 14 is a
special provision of law which must govern the investigation, suspension or removal of employees of the Central
Bank, though they may be subject to the Civil Service Law and Regulations in other respects.

It is evident that an appeal by petitioner to the Commissioner of Civil Service is not required or at most is permissive and
voluntary.
There is another reason. It must be remembered that the amended petition is for certiorari, mandamus  and  quo
warranto. In quo warranto proceedings, "When the action is against a person for usurping an office or franchise, the
complaint shall set forth the name of the person who claims to be entitled thereto. If any, with an averment of his right
to the same and that the defendant is unlawfully in possession thereof."

the need for speed in the determination of controversies to public offices. the Government must be immediately
informed or advised if any person claims to be entitled to an office or position in the civil service as against another
actually holding it, so that the Government may not be faced with the predicament of having to pay two salaries, one,
for the person actually holding the office, although illegally, and another, for one not actually rendering service although
entitled to do so.

While it may be desirable that administrative remedies be first resorted to, no one is compelled or bound to do so; and
as said remedies neither are prerequisite to nor bar the institution of quo warranto proceedings, it follows that he who
claims the right to hold a public office allegedly usurped by another and who desires to seek redress in the courts,
should file the proper judicial action within the reglementary period. As emphasized in Bautista vs. Fajardo, 38 Phil. 624,
and Tumulak vs. Egay, 46 O.G. 3683, public interest requires that the right to a public office should be determined as
speedily as practicable.

Upon the foregoing, we have to disagree with the legal opinion of the trial judge and hold that the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies is inapplicable and does not bar the present proceedings.
 6. Amadore vs Romulo, 466 SCRA 397 Bernardo vs CA, 429 SCRA 285

FACTS

ISSUE

Whether or not the appeal from the resolution of the Office of the President filed on time with the Court of Appeals

RULING
7. Bukidnon Doctors’ Hospital, Inc. vs MBTC, 463 SCRA 222