Hidalgo vs Republic of the Philippines, GR No.
179793, July 5, 2010 Ruling:
Facts:
AFPCES is a unit/facility of the Armed Forces of the Philippines intended to
benefit the veterans, their widows and orphans, and the members of the AFP
and their dependents. Petitioners, numbering 65 in all, were hired as regular
employees of AFPCES.
Several of them had worked with AFPCES for a number of years, ranging
from 4 to 31 years. Since the start of their employment, petitioners were
enrolled in the Social Security System (SSS), with respondent AFPCES
paying its corresponding employer’s share in their monthly SSS contribution.
Between 1999 and 2001, however, AFPCES advised petitioners to undergo
an indefinite leave of absence without pay, allegedly upon a conditional
promise that they would be allowed to return to work as soon as AFPCES’
tax subsidy is released and upon resumption of its store operations. 9
When AFPCES failed to recall petitioners to their work as allegedly promised,
petitioners filed a complaint for illegal (constructive) dismissal with damages
against AFPCES before the NLRC. Labor Arbiter rendered a decision in
favor of petitioners. AFPCES filed an appeal before. Meanwhile, petitioners
sought the immediate execution of the Labor Arbiter’s decision.
AFPCES filed a petition before the appellate court to enjoin the NLRC from
dismissing the appeal and granting execution of the Labor Arbiter’s decision.
This was however denied. Subsequently, the NLRC dismissed AFPCES’
appeal.
Following NLRC’s dismissal, AFPCES filed with the CA a motion to lift the
writ of garnishment and to stay the execution of the Labor Arbiter’s monetary
award. This was granted. Undaunted, petitioners were able to secure an alias
writ of execution after due hearing before the Labor Arbiter. The issue was
again brought before the Court of Appeals.CA ruled in favour of AFPCES.
It explained that since AFPCES is a governmental agency that has no
personality separate and distinct from the AFP, petitioners are considered
civil service employees, and that complaints for illegal dismissal should
therefore be lodged not with the Labor Arbiter but with the CSC.
Issue:
Which quasi-judicial agency has jurisdiction to hear and decide complaints
for illegal dismissal against an adjunct government agency engaged in
proprietary function?  proceedings already accomplished – the Court deems it best, pro hac vice,
Section 2 (1), Article IX B of the 1987 Constitution defines the scope of the
civil service, as follows:
"Sec. 2. (1) The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-
owned or controlled corporations with original charters.
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 807 or the Civil Service Decree of the
Philippines declares that the Civil Service Commission shall be the central
personnel agency to set standards and to enforce the laws governing the
discipline of civil servants. Subsequently, Executive Order (EO) No. 180
defined government employees as all employees of all branches,
subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including
government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters. It
provided that the Civil Service and labor laws shall be followed in the
resolution of complaints, grievances and cases involving government
employees.
Accordingly, AFPCES is an agency under the direct control and supervision
of the AFP as it was established to take charge of the operations and
management of all commissary facilities in military establishments all over
the country. By clear implication of law, all AFPCES personnel should
therefore be classified as government employees and any appointment,
promotion, discipline and termination of its civilian staff should be governed
by appropriate civil service laws and procedures.
Such fact cannot be negated by the failure of respondents to follow
appropriate civil service rules in the hiring, appointment, discipline and
dismissal of petitioners. Neither can it be denied by the fact that respondents
chose to enroll petitioners in the SSS instead of the GSIS. Such
considerations cannot be used against the CSC to deprive it of its jurisdiction.
Note: However, given petitioners’ peculiar situation, the Court is constrained
not to deny the petition entirely, but instead to refer it to the CSC pro hac
vice. The Court notes that this case has been pending for nearly a decade,
but deciding it on the merits at this juncture, while ideal and more
expeditious, is not possible. The records of the case fail to adequately spell
out the validity of the complaint for illegal dismissal as well as the actual
amount of the claim. In fact, the records even fail to disclose the amount of
salary received by petitioners while they were engaged to work in AFPCES’
facilities. But rather than directing petitioners to re-file and relitigate their
claim before the CSC – a step which will only duplicate much of the
to order the NLRC to forward the entire records of the case directly to the
CSC which is directed to take cognizance of the case. 
Manalo vs Roldan-Confesor, 215 SCRA 808
Facts:
In response to a newspaper advertisement looking for a couple to work as
driver and tutor cum baby sitter, petitioners Vicente and Gloria Manalo went
to Career Planners Specialists International, Inc. (CPSI), a licensed service
contracting firm owned by private respondents, the spouses Victor and
Elnora Fernandez. According to petitioners, a placement fee of P40,000.00
was imposed as a precondition for the processing of their papers. They paid
only P30,000.00 in cash and executed a promissory note for the balance.
Then they were allowed by respondent Elnora Fernandez to sign their
contract papers but did not issue a receipt for the placement fee despite
demand.
Contrary to the representation of her recruiter, Gloria was actually hired as a
domestic help and not as a tutor, so that after working for only twenty-five
(25) days in Jeddah, she returned to Manila. Soon after, Vicente also
resigned from his work and followed her home. He could not stand the
unbearable working conditions of his employment.
Petitioners sued private respondents before the Philippines Overseas
Employment Administration (POEA) charging them with illegal
exaction, 1 false adverstisement, 2 and violation of other pertinents laws, rules
and regulations.
Mainly, on the basis of the transcripts of petitioners' testimonies in the
clarificatory questioning, the POEA issued its Order giving more weight and
credence to petitioners' version. Private respondents filed a motion for
reconsideration wherein POEA issued a resolution setting arise its earlier
order. Petitioners appealed to the Secretary of Labor who sustained the
reconsideration of POEA. In her Order, then Undersecretary Ma. Nieves
Roldan-Confesor denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration.  affecting suspension, revocation or cancellation of Authority, the POEA has
In the present recourse, petitioners claim that public respondent POEA
committed a fatal jurisdictional error when it resolved private respondents'
motion for reconsideration in violation of Rule V, Book VI of the 1985 POEA
Rules and Regulations directing the transmittal of motions for reconsideration
to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) for determination.
Issue:
Whether or not POEA has jurisdiction over the case.
Ruling:
Yes.
The alleged procedural lapse by respondent POEA was raised by petitioners
only before the Court, notwithstanding that such ground was already existing
when they appealed to the Secretary of Labor. Ironically, petitioners now
question the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Labor over the appeal which they
themselves elevated to that office. Clearly, it would be the height of
unfairness and inequity petitioners were allowed to backtrack after getting an
unfavorable verdict from public respondents whose authority they themselves
involved.
The 1985 POEA Rules and Regulations is divided into eight (8) Books. Book
VI, cited by petitioners, is entitled "Adjudication Rules". The procedure
outlined therein relates to the original and exclusive jurisdiction exercised by
POEA through its Adjudication Department "to hear and decide all cases
involving employer-employee relations arising out of or by virtue of a law or
contact involving Filipino workers for overseas employment." On the other
hand, Book II entitled "Licensing and Regulations", notably Rule VI cited by
private respondents, refers particularly to the procedure for suspension,
cancellation and revocation of Authority or License through the POEA
Licensing and Regulation Office (LRO).
The controversy in the present case centers on the liability of private
respondents for illegal exaction, false advertisement and violation of pertinent
laws and rules on recruitment of overseas workers and the resulting
imposition of penalty of suspension of the Authority of respondent CPSI.
Quite plainly, the concern here is not employer-employee relations, the
procedure of which is outlined in Book VI; rather, with the suspension or
revocation of Authority embodied in Book II.
Evidently, no jurisdictional error was accordingly committed because in cases
authority under Sec. 18, Rule VI, Book II, to resolve motions for
reconsideration which may thereafter be appealed to the Secretary of Labor.
Section 18, provides: "A motion for reconsideration of an order of suspension
(issued by POEA) or an appeal to the Minister (now Secretary of Labor) from
an order cancelling a license or authority may be entertained only when filed
with the LRO within ten (10) working days from the service of the order or
decision" (parenthesis supplied).

Garcia vs Drilon, GR No. 179267, June 25, 2013
Facts:
On March 23, 2006, Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private respondent) filed, for
herself and in behalf of her minor children, a verified petition before the
RTC of Bacolod City for the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order
(TPO) against her husband, Jesus C. Garcia (petitioner), pursuant to R.A.
9262. She claimed to be a victim of physical abuse; emotional,
psychological, and economic violence as a result of marital infidelity on
the part of petitioner, with threats of deprivation of custody of her children
and of financial support.
This was granted by the RTC. During the pendency of the case, petitioner
filed before the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition challenging the
constitutionality of R.A. 9262. This was dismissed. His motion for
reconsideration of having been denied, petitioner comes now to the Court
alleging that R.A. No. 9262 is invalid and unconstitutional because,
among others, it allows undue delegation of judicial power to the
barangay officials.
Issue:
Whether or not the granting of power to issue protection orders to
barangay officials constitutes an undue delegation of judicial power.
Ruling:
No. The delegation of power to barangay officials to issue protection
orders as provided for in Section 14 of the VAWC Law does not amount
to an undue delegation of judicial power. The BPO issued by the Punong
Barangay or, in his unavailability, by any available Barangay Kagawad,
merely orders the perpetrator to desist from (a) causing physical harm to
the woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause the woman or her
child physical harm. Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus,
purely executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty under the Local
Government Code to "enforce all laws and ordinances," and to "maintain
public order in the barangay." The mere fact that an officer is required by
law to inquire into the existence of certain facts and to apply the law
thereto in order to determine what his official conduct shall be and the
fact that these acts may affect private rights do not constitute an exercise
of judicial powers."
The Punong Barangay must determine reasonable ground to believe that
an imminent danger of violence against the woman and her children
exists or is about to recur that would necessitate the issuance of a BPO.
The preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor is, concededly,
an executive, not a judicial, function. The same holds true with the
issuance of a BPO.
On the issue raised by petitioner that since barangay officials and other
law enforcement agencies are required to extend assistance to victims of
violence and abuse, it would be very unlikely that they would remain
objective and impartial, and that the chances of acquittal are nil, suffice it
to say that assistance by barangay officials and other law enforcement
agencies is consistent with their duty to enforce the law and to maintain
peace and order.
NASECO Guards Association vs National Service Corporation, GR No.
165442, August 25, 2010
Facts:
Respondent National Service Corporation (NASECO) is a wholly-owned
subsidiary of the PNB organized under the Corporation Code in
1975. Petitioner NASECO Guards Association-PEMA (NAGA-PEMA) is the
collective bargaining representative of the regular rank and file security
guards of respondent.  Meanwhile, NASECO Employees Union-PEMA
(NEMU-PEMA) is the collective bargaining representative of the regular rank
and file (non-security) employees of respondent.
On June 8, 1995, petitioner and respondent agreed to sign a CBA on non-
economic terms. Because of respondent’s refusal to bargain for economic
benefits in the CBA, petitioner filed a notice of strike.  Following conciliation
hearings, the parties again commenced CBA negotiations but failed to reach
an agreement.
Meanwhile, respondent and NEMU-PEMA entered into a CBA on non-
economic terms.  Unfortunately, a dispute among the leaders of NEMU-
PEMA arose. Hence, the negotiations concerning the economic terms of the
CBA were put on hold until the internal dispute could be resolved.
On April 29, 1997, petitioner filed a notice of strike before the NCMB against
respondent and PNB due to a bargaining deadlock.  The following day,
NEMU-PEMA likewise filed a notice of strike against respondent and PNB on
the ground of ULP.  Efforts by the NCMB to conciliate failed. DOLE Secretary
assumed jurisdiction over the strike notices.
DOLE Secretary then issued a Resolution directing petitioner and respondent
to execute a new CBA incorporating therein his dispositions regarding
benefits of the employees. The charge of unfair labor practice against
respondent and PNB was also dismissed. Respondent promptly filed a
petition for certiorari before the CA questioning the DOLE Secretary’s order
and arguing that the ruling awarding them monetary benefits was inimical
and deleterious to its financial standing and will result in closure and
cessation of business for the company.
By Decision (first CA Decision), the CA partly granted the petition and ruled
that a recomputation and reevaluation of the benefits awarded was in order.
In compliance with the CA directive, several clarificatory hearings were
conducted. An Order was then issued by DOLE Secretary reducing the
monetary award.
From a procedural standpoint, a reevaluation is a continuation of the original
case and not a new proceeding. Hence, the evidence, financial reports and
other documents submitted by the parties in the course of the original
proceeding are to be visited and reviewed again. In this light, the respondent
has been given the opportunity to be heard by the DOLE Secretary.
Also, contrary to the claim of the respondent that it was barred by the DOLE
Secretary to introduce supporting documents during the recomputation and
reevaluation, the records show that an Order by then Secretary of Labor
Patricia A. Sto. Tomas dated July 11, 2002 specifically allowed both parties
to submit their respective computations as regards the awarded benefits.
It is thus inaccurate for the respondent to claim that it was denied due
process because it had all the opportunity to introduce any supporting
document in the course of the recomputation and reevaluation of the DOLE
Secretary.

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration with the DOLE Secretary

which was denied. Respondent thus filed a petition for certiorari with the CA
arguing that the DOLE Secretary, in issuing the above Order deprived
respondent of due process of law for there was no reevaluation that took
place in the DOLE. Respondent claimed that what the DOLE Secretary
should have done was to let the parties introduce evidence to show the
proper computation of the monetary awards under the approved CBA.

In its second Decision, the CA granted the petition. A motion for

reconsideration was filed by herein petitioner but the same was denied.
Hence, this petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the respondent’s right to due process was violated.

Ruling:

The respondent’s right to due process in this case has not been denied. The
order in the first CA decision to recompute and reevaluate was satisfied when
the DOLE Secretary reexamined their initial findings and adjusted the
awarded benefits. A reevaluation, contrary to what the respondent claims, is
a process by which a person or office (in this case the DOLE secretary)
revisits its own initial pronouncement and makes another assessment of its
findings. A reevaluation does not necessitate the introduction of new
materials for review nor does it require a full hearing for new arguments.