OPOSA v.

FACTORAN
224 SCRA 792

FACTS: Petitioners, all minors, represented by their respective parents, filed a

complaint against DENR Secretary Factoran praying that he be ordered; (1) to
cancel all existing timber license agreement in the country and (2) to cease and
desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber
license agreement, claiming to represent their generation as well as generation yet
unborn, petitioners asserted that the continued allowances by defendant of TLA
holders cut and deforest the remaining forest stands will work great damage and
irrepairable injury to plaintiff and their successor. They maintained that the
granting of the TLA violated their right to a balanced and healthful ecology.
Respondent Judge Rosario dismissed the case claiming that it has no cause of action
since the petitioners failed to allege a specific legal right violated by the DENR
Secretary. Hence, this special civil action for certiorari.

ISSUE: Do the petitioners have a cause of action against Factoran?

HELD: Yes. The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental/legal right- the right
to a balanced and healthful ecology as solemnly incorporated under Article II
Section 16 of the 1987 Constitution.

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to
refrain from impairing the environment and the judicious management and
conservation of the countrys forest for which the DENR is primarily responsible as
mandated by Executive Order No. 192.

GUINGONA v. CARAGUE
196 SCRA 221
FACTS: President Aquino, pursuant to Section 22, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution submitted to Congress the 1990 Budget. The said budget consists of
P98.4-Billion in automatic appropriation with P86.8-Billion for debt service and
P155.5-B appropriated under Republic Act No. 6831, otherwise known as General
Appropriation Act. It appears that the amount set aside for debt servicing in greater
than the amount set aside for education which in accordance with Section 5, Article
XIVof the Constitution should be given the highest appropriation.

It was further alleged that PD81 (Amending Certain Provisions of Republic Act No.
4870) Presidential Decree No. 1177 (Revising the Budget Process in Order to
Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New Society) and Presidential
Decree No. 1967 (an Act Strengthening the Guarantee and payment Position of the
Republic of the Philippines on it Contingent Liabilities Arising out of Relent and
Guaranteed Loans by Appropriating Funds for the Purpose), used by President
Aquino to justify the payment of debt and automatic appropriation for debt-
servicing are inoperative.

The petitioner as Senators, seek the declaration of the unconstitutionality of

Presidential Decree No. 81 Section 31 of Presidential Decree No. 1177 and
Presidential Decree No. 1967. The petitioner further seek to restrain the
disbursement for debt service under the 1990 budget pursuant to said Presidential
Decrees.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not the appropriation of the P86-Billion in the P223-Billion 1990
budget violates Section 5 Article XIV of the Constitution
(2) Whether or not above-mentioned P.D.s are still operative
(3) Whether or not the P.D.s are violative of Section 29 (1) Article VI of the
Constitution

HELD:

(1) It was believed that Section 5 Article XIV was not violated. It was said that
while education is and should be the priority in appropriation in order that
the lost glory of the teaching profession may be regained, it does not follow
that the hands of Congress are so strong as to deprive it of the power to
respond to the imperatives of national interest and for the attainment of
other state policies or objection.

(2) It was also pointed out that there has been compliance with the aforesaid
constitutional provisions because since 1985, the budget for education
increased and has in fact received the lions share in every appropriation.
 Section 7 of PD 61 provides All revenue realized from the projects financed
by such loans after deducting the actual and necessary operating and
maintenance expenses is appropriated for servicing foreign debt. In the
same section, it also provides such amount necessary to cover the payment
of the principal and interest of such loans, credit or indebtedness as and
when they shall become due is hereby appropriated.

Section 31 of PD 1177 provides all expenditures for the payment of the

principal and interest on public debt are automatically appropriated.

Section 1 of PD 1967 provides such amounts as may be necessary to effect

payment on foreign or domestic loan are appropriated

It must be remembered that the budgeting process consists of 4 parts, i.e. (a)
budget preparation; (b) legislative authorization; (c) budget execution and
(d) budget accountability.

There being no under delegation of legislative power as clearly above shown,

petitioner insists nevertheless, that subject PDs constitute undue delegation
of legislative power to the executive on the alleged ground that the
appropriation therein are not exact, certain or definite, invoking in support
thereof of the Constitution of Nebraska. Unlike the said Constitution, our
constitution does not require a definite exact or specific appropriation made
by law. Section 29, Article VI provides no money shall be paid out of the
treasury except in pursuance of an appropriate made by law.

More significantly, there is no provision in our Constitution that provides or

prescribed any particular form of words or religious recitals in which an
authorization or appropriation by Congress shall be made except that to be
made by law, such as precisely the authorization or appropriation may be
implied as well as expressly for the current fiscal year just as said
appropriation may be made in general as well as in specific terms. The
Congressional authorization may be embodied in annual law, such as the
general appropriation act or in special provision of law of general or special
application which appropriates public funds for specific public purpose, such
as the questioned decrees an appropriation measure is different if the
legislative intention clearly and certainly appears from the language
employed whether in the past or in the present.

(3) In the basis of such, the Supreme Court upheld that there was no violation of
Section 29 Article VI and that the Presidential Decrees are still operative.

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION CULTURE & SPORTS v. SAN DIEGO

180 SCRA 533

FACTS: The private respondent is a graduate of the University of the East with a
degree of Bachelor of Science in Zoology. The petitioner claims that he took the
NMAT three times and flunked it as many times. When he applied to take it again,
the petitioner rejected his application on the basis of the aforesaid rule which is xxx
(h) A student shall be allowed only three (3) chances to take the NMAT. After three
(3) successive failures, a student shall not be allowed to take the NMAT for the
fourth time. xxx. He then went to the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela to compel
his admission to the test.

His original petition for mandamus, he first invoked his constitutional rights to
academic freedom and quality education. By agreement of the parties, the private
respondent was allowed to take the NMAT scheduled on April 16, 1989, subject to
the outcome of his petition.

In an amended petition, he challenged the constitutionality of MECS Order No. 12,

Series of 1972, containing the above-cited rule, further raising additional grounds
which were: due process and equal protection.

Respondent Judge rendered a decision declaring the challenged order invalid and
granting the petition. She further held that the petitioner had been deprived of his
right to pursue a medical education through an arbitrary exercise of police power.

ISSUE: Whether a person who has thrice failed the National Medical Admission Test
(NMAT) is entitled to take it again?

HELD: No, he is not entitled to retake the NMAT Test. The court upheld the
constitutionality of the NMAT as a measure intended to limit the admission to
medical schools only to those who have initially proved their competence and
preparation for a medical education.

The subject of the challenged regulation is certainly within the ambit of the police
power. It is the right and indeed the responsibility of the State to ensure that the
medical profession is not infiltrated by incompetents to whom patients may
unwarily entrust their lives and health.

The method employed by the challenged regulation is not relevant to the purpose of
the law nor is it arbitrary or oppressive. The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate
the medical schools and ultimately the medical procession from the intrusion of
those not qualified to be doctors.

57. Virtouso v. Municipal Judge, 82 SCRA 191

Francisco Virtuoso v Municipal Judge (82 SCRA 191)
FACTS:
Petitioner Francisco Virtuoso is a 17 year old minor who allegedly stole a TV set.
Petitioner filed an application for a writ of habeas corpus and premised his plea for
liberty primarily on the ground that the preliminary examination which led to the
issuance of a warrant of arrest against him was a useless formality, as the
respondent Judge, failed to meet the strict standard required by the Constitution to
ascertain whether there was probable cause. He likewise alleged that aside from the
constitutional infirmity that tainted the procedure followed in the preliminary
examination, the bail imposed was clearly excessive.
ISSUE:
Will the petition prosper?
HELD:
Petitioner, is a 17 year old minor entitled to the protection and benefits of the Child
and Youth Welfare Code, a youthful offender being defined therein as "one who is
over nine years but under eighteen years of age at the time of the commission of the
offense." As such, he could be provisionally released on recognizance, in the
discretion of the court.
The courts, whenever appropriate, should give vitality and force to the Youth and
Welfare Code to implement the constitutional mandate recognizing the vital role of
the youth in national building.
PETITION GRANTED.