Sec 19 (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, Issue: Whether the Court may proceed
may proceed to automatically review
degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall the
death penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it.
Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion
perpetua.
(2) The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading
punishment against any prisoner or detainee or the use of
substandard or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman
conditions shall be dealt with by law.
People vs. Estoista
G.R. No. L-5793, August 27, 1953
Facts:
The defendant took a shot at a wild rooster and hit Diragon Dima
a laborer of the family who was setting a trap for wild chicken and
whose presence was not perceived by the accused. He was
prosecuted for homicide through reckless imprudence and illegal
possession of firearm under one information. The appellant was
acquitted of the first offense and found guilty of the second, for
which he was sentenced to one year imprisonment.
Issue:
whether the prohibition of the Constitution against infliction of
cruel and unusual punishment applies both to the form of the
penalty and the duration of imprisonment
Ruling:
No. The court held that confinement from 5 to 10 years for
possessing of carrying firearm is not cruel or unusual, having due
regard to the prevalent conditions which the law proposes to
suppress or curb.
To violate the constitutional guarantee, penalty must be flagrant
and plainly oppressive, disproportionate to the nature of the
offense as to shock the senses of the community.
In the case at bar, it cannot be said to be cruel and unusual,
barbarous, or excessive to the extent of being shocking to public
conscience. It is of interest to note that the validity on
constitutional grounds of the Act in question was contested
neither at the trial nor in the elaborate printed brief for the
appellant; it was raised for the first time in the course of the oral
argument in the Court of Appeals. It is also noteworthy, as
possible gauge of popular and judicial reaction to the duration of
the imprisonment stipulated in the statute, that some members
of the court at first expressed opposition to any recommendation
for executive clemency for the appellant, believing that he
deserved imprisonment within the prescribed range.
People v. Esparas (1996)
Facts: Esparas was charged with violation of DDA for importing
20kg of shabu. After arraignment and pleading not guilty, she
escaped from jail and was tried in absentia. She was found guilty
and was sentenced to death. She remains at large at present. This
is the issue.
Esparass death sentence despite her absence.
Held: Yes. In US v. Laguna (1910), the Court held that its power to
review a decision imposing the death penalty cannot be waived
either by the accused or by the courts. There, the Court said,
mainly, that the judgment of conviction (capital punishment of
death) entered on trial is not final, cannot be executed, and is
wholly without force or effect until the cause has been passed
upon by the Supreme Court. TC acts as a commissioner who takes
the testimony and reports the same to the Court with its
recommendation. A decision of TC does not become final unless
and until it has been reviewed by the Court. An accused who was
sentenced with the highest penalty is entitled under the law to
have the sentence and all the facts and circumstances upon which
it is founded placed before the Court, as the highest tribunal of
the land, to the end that its justice and legality may be clearly and
conclusively determined. Such procedure is merciful. It gives a
second chance for life. Neither the courts nor the accused can
waive it. It is a positive provision of the law that brooks no
interference and tolerates no evasions. (The Court here applied
Sec. 50, Gen. Orders No. 58.)
A little history on the matter: The 1935 Constitution did not
prohibit the imposition of the death penalty. Section 2(4) of Art.
VIII provided for review by the Court of death penalty cases. Both
the Rules of Court of 1940 and 1964 require the transmission to
the Court of the records of all cases in which the death penalty
was imposed by TC, whether the defendant has appealed or not,
for review and judgment. These rules were taken from the
General Orders itself. The 1973 Constitution did not also prohibit
death penalty. Sec. 9, Rule 122 provided the procedure for review
of death penalty cases by the Court. Sec. 10, Rule 122 of the 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure even reenacted said procedure of
review and even expressly used the term "automatic review and
judgment" by the Court.
So in People v. Villanueva (1953), the Court held that the
withdrawal of appeal by a death convict does not deprive the
Court of jurisdiction to review his conviction. In People v. Cornelio
(1971), which involved the escape of a death convict, the Court
held that said escape does not relieve the Court of its duty of
reviewing his conviction. In People v. Daban (1972), the Court
said, speaking about convictions by TC of death penalty on the
defendant, that until after the Court has spoken en consulta, no
finality could be attached to said decision. This automatic review
cannot be waived by the accused nor by the courts. The mere fact
of escape of the accused cannot be a bar at all. In People v.
Saliling (1976), the Court said that it is not precluded from
reviewing the death sentence of an accused who is at large. In
People v. Buynay (1984), the Court reiterated the rule that escape
of a death convict will not automatically result in the dismissal of
his appeal.
But finally, the 1987 Constitution was enacted. It prohibits the
imposition of the death penalty unless for compelling reasons
involving heinous crimes as determined by Congress. On
December 13, 1993, Congress reimposed the death penalty in
cases involving the commission of heinous crimes. This revived
the procedure by which the Court reviews death penalty cases per
the Rules. It remains automatic, does not depend on the whims of
the death convict, continues to be mandatory, and leaves the
Court without any option.
Sec. 8, Rule 124, authorizing the dismissal of an appeal when the
appellant jumps bail, does not apply to cases where the death
penalty is imposed. In death penalty cases, automatic review is
mandatory. This is the text and tone of Sec. 10, Rule 122, which is
the more applicable rule. There is more wisdom in mandating the
review by the Court of all death penalty cases, regardless of the
wish of the convict and regardless of the will of the Court. Nothing
less than life is at stake and any court decision authorizing the
State to take life must be as error-free as possible. An appellant
may withdraw his appeal not because he is guilty but because of
his wrong perception of the law, or because he may want to avail
of the more speedy remedy of pardon, or because of his
frustration and misapprehension that he will not get justice from
the authorities. Nor should the Court be influenced by the
seeming repudiation of its jurisdiction when a convict
escapes. The Court has the duty to review all death penalty
cases. No litigant can repudiate this power which is bestowed by
the Constitution. The power is more of a sacred duty which the
Court has to discharge to assure the People that the innocence of
a citizen is the main concern especially in crimes that that shock
the conscience. This concern cannot be diluted.
An accused does not cease to have rights just because of his
conviction. This principle is implicit in the Constitution which
recognizes that an accused, to be right, while the majority, even if
overwhelming, has no right to be wrong.
COUNSEL FOR THE ACCUSED IS GIVEN A NEW PERIOD OF 30 DAYS
FROM NOTICE HEREOF TO FILE THE BRIEF OF ESPARAS.
LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO
vs.
THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
G.R. No. 132601. October 12, 1998
FACTS :
On June 25, 1996, petitioner was convicted for the rape of his
common law spouses ten year old daughter and was sentenced
to death penalty. He filed a Motion for Reconsideration and
Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration raising for the first time
the constitutionality of RA 7659 The Death Penalty Law, and
the imposition of death penalty for the crime of rape. The
motions were denied with the court finding no reason to declare
it unconstitutional and pronouncing Congress compliant with the
requirements for its imposition.
Act 8177 was passed amending Art. 8 of the RPC as amended by
Sec. 24 of RA 7659. The mode of execution was changed from
electrocution to lethal injection. The Secretary of Justice
promulgated the rules and regulations to implement R.A 8177 and
directed the Director of Bureau of Corrections to prepare the
Lethal Injection Manual.
Petitioner filed a petition for prohibition, injunction and TRO to
enjoin the Secretary of Justice and Director of Bureau of Prisons
from carrying out the execution, contending that RA 8177 and its
implementing rules are unconstitutional and void. The Executive
Judge of the RTC of Quezon City and Presiding Judge of RTC
Branch 104 were later impleaded to enjoin them from setting a
date of execution.
On March 3, 1998 , the court required respondents to comment
and mandated the parties to mantain status quo . Petitioner filed
a very urgent motion to clarify status quo and to request for TRO
until resolution of the petition.
The Solicitor General filed a comment on the petition dismissing
the claim that the RA in question is unconstitutional and
providing arguments in support of his contention. CHR filed a
motion for Leave of Court to Intervene and appear as Amicus
Curiae alleging that the death penalty is cruel and degrading citing
applicable provisions and statistics showing how other countries
have abolished the death penalty and how some have become
abolitionists in practice . Petitioner filed a reply stating that lethal
injection is cruel, degrading , inhuman and violative of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
ISSUE :
WON R.A. 8117 and its implementing rules are violative of the
unconstitutional proscription against cruel, degrading and
inhuman punishment, violative of international treaty and
obligations , discriminatory and an undue delegation of
legislative powers.
RULING :
I. LETHAL INJECTION, NOT CRUEL, DEGRADING OR
INHUMAN PUNISHMENT UNDER SECTION 19, ARTICLE III
OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.
Article III, Section 19 (1) of the 1987 Constitution proscribes
the imposition of "cruel, degrading or inhuman"
punishment. This is the challenge thrown at RA 8177 and
its implementing rules and regulations.
The court explains that any infliction of pain in lethal injection is
merely incidental in carrying out the execution of death penalty
and does not fall within the constitutional proscription against
cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment. "In a limited sense,
anything is cruel which is calculated to give pain or distress, and
since punishment imports pain or suffering to the convict, it may
be said that all punishments are cruel. The Constitution,
however, does not mean that crime, for this reason, is to go
unpunished."
II.REIMPOSITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY LAW DOES NOT
VIOLATE INTERNATIONAL TREATY OBLIGATIONS
Petitioner disputes that the reimposition of the death penalty law
violates the International Covenant on Civil And Political Rights,
which was adopted by the General Assembly of the United
Nations on December 16, 1996, signed and ratified by the
Philippines on December 19, 1966 and October 23, 1986,
respectively.
Although Article 6 of said covenant highlights an individuals right
to life, it also particularly recognizes that capital punishment is an
allowable limitation on the right to life, subject to the limitation
that it be imposed for the "most serious crimes".
The petitioner's assertion of our obligation under the Second
Optional Protocol has gone astray since dates and circumstances
related to its adoption prove that the Philippines neither signed
nor ratified said document.
III. THERE IS NO UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE
POWER IN R.A. NO. 8177 TO THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
AND THE DIRECTOR OF BUREAU OF CORRECTIONS, BUT
SECTION 19 OF THE RULES AND REGULATIONS TO
IMPLEMENT R.A. NO. 8177 IS INVALID.
The separation of power is a fundamental principle in our system
of government and each department has exclusive cognizance of
matters placed within its jurisdiction, and is supreme within its
own sphere. A consequence of the doctrine of separation of
powers is the principle of non-delegation of powers. In Latin
maxim, the rule is : potestas delegata non delegari potest." (what
has been delegated, cannot be delegated). There are however
exceptions to this rule and one of the recognized exceptions is
Delegation to Administrative Bodies
The Secretary of Justice in conjunction with the Secretary of
Health and the Director of the Bureau of Corrections are
empowered to promulgate rules and regulations on the subject of
lethal injection.
The reason for delegation of authority to administrative agencies
is the increasing complexity of the task of government requiring
expertise as well as the growing inability of the legislature to cope
directly with the myriad problems demanding its attention.
Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the
Government the power to fill in the details in the execution,
enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall
a violation of the principle of separation of powers, that said law:
(a) be complete in itself it must set forth therein the policy to be
executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate and (b)
fix a standard the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or
determinable to which the delegate must conform in the
performance of his functions.
Considering the scope and the definiteness of RA 8177, which
changed the mode of carrying out the death penalty, the Court
finds that the law sufficiently describes what job must be done,
who is to do it, and what is the scope of his authority.
RA 8177 likewise provides the standards which define the
legislative policy, mark its limits, map out its boundaries, and
specify the public agencies which will apply it. It indicates the
circumstances under which the legislative purpose may be carried
out.
Sec 20
No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll
tax.
SERAFIN VS. LINDAYAG
[67 SCRA 166; ADM. MATTER. NO. 297-MJ; 30 SEPT 1975]
Facts: Plaintiff failed to pay a simple indebtedness for P1500
Carmelito Mendoza, then municipal secretary and his wife
Corazon Mendoza and therefore an estafa case was filed against
her. Complainant admitted complaint. Now complainant filed a
case against respondent Judge for not dismissing the case and
issuing a warrant of arrest as it falls on the category of a simple
indebtedness, since elements of estafa are not present. Further
she contended that no person should be imprisoned for non-
payment of a loan of a sum of money. Two months after
respondent dismissed plaintiffs case. (Judge here committed
gross ignorance of law. Even if complainant desisted case was
pursued.)
Issue: Whether or Not there was a violation committed by the
judge when it ordered the imprisonment of plaintiff for non-
payment of debt?
Held: Yes. Since plaintiff did not commit any offense as, his debt
is considered a simple loan granted by her friends to her. There is
no collateral or security because complainant was an old friend of
the spouses who lent the money and that when they wrote her a
letter of demand she promised to pay them and said that if she
failed to keep her promise, they could get her valuable things at
her home. Under the Constitution she is protected. Judge
therefore in admitting such a "criminal complaint" that was
plainly civil in aspects from the very face of the complaint and the
"evidence" presented, and issuing on the same day the warrant of
arrest upon his utterly baseless finding "that the accused is
probably guilty of the crime charged," respondent grossly failed to
perform his duties properly.
Lozano v Martinez
This is a consolidation of 8 cases; the petition arose from cases
involving prosecution of offenses under the BP 22 also known as
Bouncing Check Law. The defendant in these cases moved
seasonably to quash the information on the ground that the acts
charged did not constitute an offense, the statute being
unconstitutional. The motions were denied by the respondent
trial court, except in one case, which is the subject of G.R No.
75789, wherein the trial court under Judge Martinez, declared the
law unconstitutional and dismissed the case. The parties adversely
affected have come to the court for remedy. Those who question
the constitutionality of the said statute insist the following
ground:
1) It offends the constitutional provision forbidding
imprisonment for debt;
2) it impairs freedom of contract;
3) it contravenes the equal protection clause;
4) it unduly delegates legislative and executive powers; and
5) its enactment is flawed in the sense that during its passage the
interim Batasan violated the constitutional provision prohibiting
to a bill on Third Reading.
ISSUE: Whether or not BP 22 or the Bouncing Check Law is
unconstitutional.
RULING:
1.No, the enactment of the assailed statute is a valid exercise of
Police power and is not repugnant to the constitutional
inhibition against imprisonment for debt. It may be
constitutionally impermissible for the legislature to penalize a
person for non-payment of debt ex contractu, but certainly it is
within the prerogative of the lawmaking body to prescribe
certain acts deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare.
Acts mala in se are not only acts which the law can punish. An
act may not be considered by society as inherently wrong,
hence, not malum in se, but because of the harm that it inflicts
on the community, it can be outlawed and criminally punished
as malum prohibitum. The state can do this in the exercise of its
police power.
The enactment of the said statute is a declaration by the
legislature that, as a matter of public policy, the making and
issuance of a worthless check is deemed a public nuisance to be
abated by the imposition of penal sanctions.
The Supreme Court however also explained that (regardless of
their previous explanation on ex delicto debts) the non-payment
of a debt is not the gravamen of the violations of BP 22. The
gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making
and issuing a worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon
its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an
obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or
designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the
law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of
worthless checks and putting them in circulation. Because of its
deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is
proscribed by the law. The law punishes the act not as an
offense against property, but an offense against public order.
2. No. The freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected
is freedom to enter into "lawful" contracts. Contracts which
contravene public policy are not lawful. Besides, we must bear in
mind that checks cannot be categorized as mere contracts. It is a
commercial instrument which, in this modem day and age, has
become a convenient substitute for money; it forms part of the
banking system and therefore not entirely free from the
regulatory power of the state.
3. No. Petitioners contend that the payee is just as responsible for
the crime as the drawer of the check, since without the
indispensable participation of the payee by his acceptance of the
check there would be no crime. This argument is tantamount to
saying that, to give equal protection, the law should punish both
the swindler and the swindled. Moreover, the clause does not
preclude classification of individuals, who may be accorded
different treatment under the law as long as the classification is
no unreasonable or arbitrary.
PEOPLE VS. OBSANIA
29 JUN 1968
DOCTRINES: WHERE A CRIMINAL CASE IS DISMISSED PROVISIONALLY NOT ONLY
WITH THE EXPRESS CONSENT OF THE ACCUSED BUT EVEN UPON THE URGING OF
HIS COUNSEL THERE CAN BE NO DOUBLE JEOPARDY UNDER SECT. 9 RULE 113,
IF THE INDICTMENT AGAINST HIM IS REVIVED BY THE FISCAL.
A DISMISSAL OF A CASE WITH EXPRESS CONSENT OF THE ACCUSED WILL NOT
BAR ANOTHER PROSECUTION FOR THE SAME OFFENSE OR AN APPEAL BY THE
PROSECUTION FROM SUCH DISMISSAL.
Facts:
On 22 November 1964, barely a day after the occurrence of the
alleged crime, Erlinda Dollente, the 14-year old victim, and her
parents, Ciriaco Dollente and Carmelita Lureta, filed in the
municipal court of Balungao, Pangasinan a complaint for rape
with robbery, alleging "That on or about 21st day of November
1964, at around 2:00 to 3:00 in the afternoon, particularly in sitio
Cawakalan, barrio of Capulaan municipality of Balungao, Province
of Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the
Honorable Court, the said accused Willy Obsania, armed with a
dagger, by means of violence and intimidation, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously did then and there have carnal
knowledge of the complainant Erlinda Dollente, against her will
and on the roadside in the ricefields at the abovementioned place
while she was alone on her way to barrio San Raymundo."
After the case was remanded to the Court of First
Instance of Pangasinan for further proceedings, the assistant
provincial fiscal filed information for rape against the accused,
embodying the allegations of the complaint, with an additional
averment that the offense was committed "with lewd designs".
Obsania pleaded not guilty upon arraignment, and
forthwith with his counsel moved for the dismissal of the case
contending that the complaint was fatally defective for failure to
allege "lewd designs" and that the subsequent information filed
by the fiscal which averred "lewd designs" did not cure the
jurisdictional infirmity.
 On 8 January 1965, the trial court granted the motion
and ordered dismissal of the action, ruling that "the failure of the
complaint filed by the offended party to allege that the acts
committed by the accused were with 'lewd designs' does not give
this Court jurisdiction to try the case." From this order, the fiscal
appealed..
Issue: Whether or Not the present appeal places the accused in
Double Jeopardy.
Held: In order that the accused may invoke double jeopardy, the
following requisites must have obtained in the original
prosecution, a) valid complaint, b) competent court, c) the
defendant had pleaded to the charge, d) defendant was acquitted
or convicted or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent.
In the case at bar, the converted dismissal was ordered by the
Trial Judge upon the defendant's motion to dismiss. The doctrine
of double jeopardy as enunciated in People vs. Salico applies to
wit when the case is dismissed with the express consent of the
defendant, the dismissal will not be a bar to another prosecution
for the same offense because his action in having the case is
dismissed constitutes a waiver of his constitutional right/privilege
for the reason that he thereby prevents the Court from
proceeding to the trial on the merits and rendering a judgment of
conviction against him.
In essence, where a criminal case is dismissed provisionally not
only with the express consent of the accused but even upon the
urging of his counsel there can be no double jeopardy under Sect.
9 Rule 113, if the indictment against him is revived by the fiscal.
People v. Adil April 22, 1977
Sec 21 Double Jeopardy
Doctrine: No double jeopardy as the deformity did not exist and
could not have been apprehended at the time the first
information was filed.
Doctrine of Supervening Event - the accused may be prosecuted
for another offense if a subsequent development changes the
character of the first indictment under which he may already been
charged or convicted.
Facts: Case No. 3335 was filed in the inferior court of Janiuay,
Iloilo the charge against Fama Jr. for slight physical injuries only,
because according to the certification of the attending physician,
the injuries suffered by the offended party Viajar, would require
medical attendance from 5 to 9 days only "baring complications."
Indeed, when the complaint was filed on April 15, 1975, only
three days had passed since the incident in which the injuries
were sustained took place, and there were yet no indications of a
graver injury or consequence to be suffered by said offended
party. Evidently, it was only later, after Case No. 3335 had already
been filed and the wound on the face of Viajar had already
healed, that the alleged deformity became apparent that led to
filing another case. The accused entered a plea of not guilty.
On June 8 1975, complainant Viajar again filed a second complaint
with the provincial Fiscal of Iloilo against Atty Alfredo Fama, Raul
Fama and Fama Jr. Same information was alleged in criminal case
5241. After preliminary investigation, fiscal filed the information
but now there is an added phrase barring complications but
leaving a permanent scar and deforming on the right face which
charge only Fama Jr of serious physical injury. Fama Jr, filed an
urgent motion to deter proceedings in Criminal case 5241 (second
case filed), claiming that he was already charged and pleaded not
guilty in criminal case 3335, and in such case he would be in
double jeopardy. Fiscal after filing the second case sought the
dismissal of the first case (criminal case 3335), but the court did
not act upon it. Instead, the case was set for hearing, and in view
of the postponements asked by the Fiscal in order to await the
resolution of the issue of double jeopardy in Case No. 5241. On its
decision, the court dismissed the case due to postponements.
Fama Jr. filed an addendum to his memorandum in Case No. 5241
inviting attention to the above dismissal order and reiterating his
theory of double jeopardy. On September 22, 1975, respondent
court issued the impugned order sustaining the contention of
double jeopardy and dismissing Case No. 5241. It was invoked by
respondent court that in the case of Silva, there was no question
that the extent of the damage to property and physical injuries
suffered by the offended parties therein were already existing and
known when the prior minor case was prosecuted.
Issue: Whether or not the filing of the second complaint
constitutes double jeopardy
HELD: No. There is no double jeopardy as the deformity did not
exist and could not have been apprehended at the time the first
information was filed.
As court held in People vs. Yorac "Stated differently, if
after the first prosecution 'a new fact supervenes' on which
defendant may be held liable, resulting in altering the character of
the crime and giving rise to a new and distinct offense, 'the
accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if indicted for the
new offense." In Melo vs. People, this rule of identity does not
apply, however, when the second offense was not in existence at
the time of the first prosecution, for the simple reason that in
such case there is no possibility for the accused during the first
prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that was then
inexistent. Thus, where the accused was charged with physical
injuries and after conviction the injured dies, the charge of
homicide against the same accused does not put him twice in
jeopardy." Also in People vs Buling, deformity may be considered
as a supervening fact. In People vs. Manolong, "No finding was
made in the first examination that the injuries had caused
deformity and the loss of the use of the right hand. As nothing
was mentioned in the first medical certificate about the deformity
and the loss of the use of the right hand, we presumed that such
fact was not apparent or could have been discernible at the time
the first examination was made. The course (not the length) of
the healing of an injury may not be determined before hand; it
can only be definitely known after the period of healing has
ended. That is the reason why the court considered that there
was a supervening fact occurring since the filing of the original
information."
 In the view circumstances of this case, the plea of
double jeopardy of private respondent Fama Jr., cannot hold. It
was, therefore, a grave error correctible by certiorari for
respondent court to have dismissed Criminal Case No. 5241.
People vs. Relova
Sec. 21
FACTS: In this petition for certiorari and mandamus, People of the
Philippines seeks to set aside the orders of Respondent Judge
Hon. Relova quashing an information for theft filed against Mr.
Opulencia on the ground of double jeopardy and denying the
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
On Feb.1 1975, Batangas police together with personnel of
Batangas Electric Light System, equipped with a search warrant
issued by a city judge of Batangas to search and examine the
premises of the Opulencia Carpena Ice Plant owned by one
Manuel Opulencia. They discovered electric wiring devices have
been installed without authority from the city government and
architecturally concealed inside the walls of the building. Said
devices are designed purposely to lower or decrease the readings
of electric current consumption in the plants electric meter.
The case was dismissed on the ground of prescription for the
complaint was filed nine months prior to discovery when it should
be 2 months prior to discovery that the act being a light felony
and prescribed the right to file in court. On Nov 24, 1975, another
case was filed against Mr. Opulencia by the Assistant City Fiscal of
Batangas for a violation of a Batangas Ordinance regarding
unauthorized electrical installations with resulting damage and
prejudice to City of Batangas in the amount of P41,062.16.
Before arraignment, Opulencia filed a motion to quash on the
ground of double jeopardy. The Assistant fiscals claim is that it is
not double jeopardy because the first offense charged against the
accused was unauthorized installation of electrical devices
without the approval and necessary authority from the City
Government which was punishable by an ordinance, where in the
case was dismissed, as opposed to the second offense which is
theft of electricity which is punishable by the Revised Penal Code
making it a different crime charged against the 1st complaint
against Mr.Opulencia.
Issue: Whether or Not the accused Mr. Opulencia can invoke
double jeopardy as defense to the second offense charged against
him by the assistant fiscal of Batangas on the ground of theft of
electricity punishable by a statute against the Revised Penal Code.
Held: Yes, Mr. Opulencia can invoke double jeopardy as defense
for the second offense because as tediously explained in the case
of Yap vs Lutero, the bill of rights give two instances or kinds of
double jeopardy.
The first would be that No person shall be twice put in jeopardy
of punishment for the same offense and the second sentence
states that If an act is punishable by a law or an ordinance, the
conviction or acquittal shall bar to another prosecution for the
same act. In the case at bar,
it was very evident that the charges filed against Mr. Opulencia
will fall on the 2nd kind or definition of double jeopardy wherein
it contemplates double jeopardy of punishment for the same act.
It further explains that even if the offenses charged are not the
same, owing that the first charge constitutes a violation of an
ordinance and the second charge was a violation against the
revised penal code, the fact that the two charges sprung from one
and the same act of conviction or acquittal under either the law or
the ordinance shall bar a prosecution under the other thus making
it against the logic of double jeopardy.
The fact that Mr. Opulencia was acquitted on the first offense
should bar the 2nd complaint against him coming from the same
identity as that of the 1st offense charged against Mr.Opulencia.
The law here seeks to prevent harassment of an accused person
by multiple prosecutions for offenses which though different from
one another are nonetheless each constituted by a common set
or overlapping sets of technical elements.
Sec 21 No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for
the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance,
conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to
another prosecution for the same act.
People vs. City Court of Silay
Facts: That sometime on January 4,1974, accused Pacifico Sensio,
Romeo Millan and Wilfredo Jochico who were then scalers at the
Hawaiian-Philippine Company, weighed cane cars No.1743,1686
and 1022 loaded with sugar canes which were placed in tarjetas
(weight report cards), Apparently, it was proven and shown that
there was padding of the weight of the sugar canes and that p
information on the tarjetas were to be false making it appear to
be heavier than its actual weight. The three accused then were
charged with Falsification by private individuals and use of
falsified document. After the prosecution had presented, the
respondent moved to dismiss the charge against them on the
ground that the evidences presented were not sufficient to
establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Acting on the
motion, respondent court issued its order dismissing the case on
the ground that the acts committed by the accused do not
constituted the crime of falsification as strictly enumerated in the
revised penal code defining the crime of falsification which was
charged earlier and that their case be dismissed. People asserts
that the plea of double jeopardy is not tenable even if the case at
bar was dismissed because according to them, it was done with
the consent of the accused therefore waiving there defense of
double jeopardy. The accused on the other hand, reiterated the
fact that the dismissal was due to lack of merits of the
prosecution which would have the same effect as an acquittal
which will bar the prosecution from prosecuting the accused for it
will be unjust and unconstitutional for the accused due to double
jeopardy rule thus the appeal of the plaintiff.
Issue: Whether or Not the grant of petition by the court would
place the accused Sensio, Millan and Jochico in double jeopardy
Held: Yes the revival of the case will put the accused in double
jeopardy for the very reason that the case has been dismissed
earlier due to lack of merits. It is true that the criminal case of
falsification was dismissed on a motion of the accused however
this was a motion filed after the prosecution had rested its case,
calling for the evidence beyond reasonable ground which the
prosecution had not been able to do which would be tantamount
to acquittal therefore will bar the prosecution of another case. As
it was stated on the requirements of a valid defense of double
jeopardy it says: That there should be a valid complaint, second
would be that such complaint be filed before a competent court
and to which the accused has pleaded and that defendant was
previously acquitted, convicted or dismissed or otherwise
terminated without express consent of the accused in which were
all present in the case at bar. There was indeed a valid, legitimate
complaint and concern against the accused Sensio, Millan and
Jochico which was filed at a competent court with jurisdiction on
the said case. It was also mentioned that the accused pleaded not
guilty and during the time of trial, it was proven that the case
used against the accused were not sufficient to prove them guilty
beyond reasonable doubt therefore dismissing the case which
translates to acquittal. It explained further that there are two
instances when we can conclude that there is jeopardy when first
is that the ground for the dismissal of the case was due to
insufficiency of evidence and second, when the proceedings have
been reasonably prolonged as to violate the right of the accused
to a speedy trial. In the 2 requisites given, it was the first on that is
very much applicable to our case at bar where there was dismissal
of the case due to insufficiency of evidence which will bar the
approval of the petition in the case at bar for it will constitute
double jeopardy on the part of the accused which the law
despises.
Paulin vs. Gimenez
Facts: Respondent and Brgy Capt. Mabuyo, while in a jeep, were
smothered with dust when they were overtaken by the vehicle
owned by Petitioner Spouses (Paulin). Irked by such, Mabuyo
followed the vehicle until the latter entered the gate of an
establishment. He inquired the nearby security guard for the
identity of the owner of the vehicle. Later that day, while engaged
in his duties, petitioners allegedly pointed their guns at him. Thus,
he immediately ordered his subordinate to call the police and
block road to prevent the petitioners escape. Upon the arrival of
the police, petitioners put their guns down and were immediately
apprehended.
A complaint grave threats was filed against the petitioners
(Criminal Case No. 5204). It was dismissed by the court acting on
the motion of the petitioners. Mabuyo filed a MOR thus the
dismissal was reversed. Thereafter, petitioners filed for
certiorari, prohibition, damages, with relief of preliminary
injunction and the issuance of a TRO (CEB-9207). Petition is
dismissed for lack of merit and for being a prohibited pleading and
ordered to proceed with the trial of the case. Hence, this instant
petition.
Issue: Whether or Not the judge ignored petitioners right against
double jeopardy by dismissing CEB-9207.
Held: For double jeopardy to attach, the dismissal of the case
must be without the express consent of the accused. Where the
dismissal was ordered upon motion or with the express assent of
the accused, he has deemed to have waived his protection against
double jeopardy. In the case at bar, the dismissal was granted
upon motion of the petitioners. Double jeopardy thus did not
attach.
For double jeopardy to be validly invoked by petitioners, the
following requisites must have been obtained in the original
prosecution:
a) a valid complaint or information;
b) a competent court;
c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and
d) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against
him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent (People v. Obsania, 23 SCRA 1249 [1968]; Caes v. IAC ,
179 SCRA 54 [1989]).
Furthermore, such dismissal is not considered as an acquittal. The
latter is always based on merit that shows that the defendant is
beyond reasonable doubt not guilty. While the former, in the case
at bar, terminated the proceedings because no finding was made
as to the guilt or innocence of the petitioners.
The lower court did not violate the rule when it set aside the
order of dismissal for the reception of further evidence by the
prosecution because it merely corrected its error when it
prematurely terminated and dismissed the case without giving
the prosecution the right to complete the presentation of its
evidence. The rule on summary procedure was correctly applied.
Icasiano vs. Sandiganbayan [G.R. No. 95642, May 28, 1992
Facts:
Judge Icasiano, herein petitioner issued 2 orders of detention
against Romana Magbago for contempt of court. Because of this
Magbago filed an administrative complaint on February 1987 with
the Supreme Court against Judge Icasiano. After evaluation of the
SC the case was dismissed due to lack of merit. Meanwhile on
March 1987 Magbago also filed with the Ofice of the ombudsman
and this time Magbago claimed Icasiano violated the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Act which was docketed as TBP-87-00924. However
this case was dismissed again due to lack of merit. The office of
the Ombudsman received anothercomplaint from Magbago
docketed as TBP-87-01546 though the exact date of filing is
unknown the records of the case was transmitted to the new
office of the ombudsman. Unfortunately the transmitted records
did not contain the earlier resolution of dismissal in TBP-87-
00924. Special Prosecutor Nicanor Cruz, Jr. who was assigned to
investigate the case (TBP-87-01546) appeared completely
unaware of the earlier case, TBP-87-00924. The corresponding
information against Icasiano was thereafter filed with the
Sandiganbayan (Criminal Case 14563). After said information was
filed on 21 March 1990, Icasiano (as accused) filed a motion for
reinvestigation. Icasiano's motion for reinvestigation was denied
in the 29 June 1990 resolution, of the Sandiganbayan. Icasiano
then moved to quash the information on the grounds, among
others, that the accused shall be placed in double jeopardy due to
the Supreme Court earlier dismissed the administrative complaint
against him.
Issue: WON there is Double Jeopardy
Held:
After a closer look at the records of the case, the Court is of the
view that the distinction between administrative and criminal
proceedings must be upheld, and that a prosecution in one is not
a bar to the other.
It is, therefore, correct for the Sandiganbayan to hold that double
jeopardy does not apply in the present controversy because the
Supreme Court case (against the herein petitioner) was
administrative in character while the Sandiganbayan case also
against said petitioner is criminal in nature.
When the Supreme Court acts on complaints against judges or
any of the personnel under its supervision and control, it acts as
personnel administrator, imposing discipline and not as a court
judging justiciable controversies. Administrative procedure need
not strictly adhere to technical rules. Substantial evidence is
sufficient to sustain conviction. Criminal proceedings before the
Sandiganbayan, on the other hand, while they may involve the
same acts subject of the administrative case, require proof of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.
To avail of the protection against double jeopardy, it is
fundamental that the following requisites must have obtained in
the original prosecution: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) a
competent court; (c) a valid arraignment; (d) the defendant had
pleaded to the charge; and (e) the defendant was acquitted, or
convicted, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent. All these elements do
not apply to the present case.
People vs. Balisacan
G.R. No. L-26376. August 31, 1966
Fact/s: The herein accused, with intent to kill, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and stab one
Leonicio Bulaoat, inflicting upon the latter wounds that
immediately caused his death. The accused entered a plea of
guilty. In doing so he was assisted by counsel. At his de oficio
counsel's petition, however, he was allowed to present evidence
to prove mitigating circumstances. He testified to the effect that
he stabbed the deceased in self- defense, because the latter was
strangling him. And he further stated that after the incident he
surrendered himself voluntarily to the police authorities.
Issue: Whether or not the appeal placed the accused in double
jeopardy?
Held: A plea of guilty is an unconditional admission of guilt with
respect to the offense charged. It forecloses the right to defend
oneself from said charge and leaves the court with no alternative
but to impose the penalty fixed by law under the circumstances.
In this case, the defendant was only allowed to testify in order to
establish mitigating circumstances, for the purpose of fixing the
penalty. Said testimony, therefore, could not be taken as a trial on
the merits, to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused. In
the present case, it is true; the accused had first entered a plea of
guilty. Subsequently, however, he testified, in the course of being
allowed to prove mitigating circumstances that he acted in
complete self-defense. Said testimony, therefore as the court a
quo recognized in its decision had the effect of vacating his
plea of guilty and the court a quo should have required him to
plead anew on the charge, or at least direct that a new plea of not
guilty be entered for him. This was not done. It follows that in
effect there having been no standing plea at the time the court a
quo rendered its judgment of acquittal; there can be no double
jeopardy with respect to the appeal herein. It clearly acted
without due process of law. The acquittal, therefore, being a
nullity for want of due process, is no acquittal at all, and thus
cannot constitute a proper basis for a claim of former jeopardy.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby set aside and
this case is remanded to the court a quo for further proceedings
under another judge of said court, that is, for plea by the
defendant, trial with presentation of evidence for the prosecution
and the defense, and judgment thereafter. No costs. So ordered.
PEOPLE V PINEDA
FACTS:
The petitioner was earlier accused of the crime of
Falsification of Public Document, defined and penalized under
Article 171 of the Revise[d] Penal Code. That on or about February
12, 1992 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of
Davao, Andres S. Suero being then the Administrative Officer and
Property Inspector of the Department of Education, Culture and
Sports (DECS), Region XI, Davao City, with salary grades below
grade 27, while in the performance of their official duties, and
taking advantage of their official positions, in conspiracy with one
another, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
falsify or cause to be falsified an undated Inspection
Report affixing their signatures thereto, making it appear that
various furniture purchase[d] from, and delivered by Business
International Wood Products under Delivery Receipt Nos. 9758,
9759, 9760 and 9761, in the total amount of P1,033,450.00, have
all been delivered and duly inspected, thereby justifying the
release of the payment to Business International Wood Products
in the aforesaid amount, when in truth and in fact, no such
complete delivery was made and inspected, to the damage and
prejudice of the government.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the formal admission of similarity of
primordial legal issue as well as identical parties, public
documents involved and questioned transactions, would amount
to double jeopardy upon the filing of the instant case after the
dismissal of the earlier complaint?
HELD:
We hold that the instant case does not constitute
double jeopardy , for which the following requisites must concur:
(1) the first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2)
the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the
second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first.
It is undisputed that the two charges stem from the
same transaction. However, it has been consistently held that the
same act may give rise to two or more separate and distinct
offenses. No double jeopardy attaches, as long as there is a
variance between the elements of the offenses charged. The
constitutional right against double jeopardy protects from a
second prosecution for the same offense, not for a different one.
Indeed, the crime under Section 3(e) of RA 3019 shares two
common elements with the felony under Article 171 of the
Revised Penal Code -- that the offender is a public officer and that
the act is related to the officers public position. However, the
latter offense is not necessarily inclusive of the former. The
essential elements of each are not included among or do not form
part of those enumerated in the former. For there to be double
jeopardy, the elements of one offense should -- like the ribs of an
umbrella -- ideally encompass those of the other. The elements of
a violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 fall outside the realm of
those of falsification of a public document and vice versa. At most,
the two offenses may be considered as two conjoined umbrellas
with one or two common ribs. Clearly, one offense does not
include the other.
Esmea vs. Pogoy
G.R. No. L-54110, February 20, 1981
Facts:
Petitioners Esmea and Alba were charged with grave coercion in
the Court of Cebu City for allegedly forcing Fr. Thomas Tibudan to
withdraw a sum of money worth P5000 from the bank to be given
to them because the priest lost in a game of chance. During
arraignment, petitioners pleaded Not Guilty. No trial came in
after the arraignment due to the priests request to move it on
another date. Sometime later Judge Pogoy issued an order
setting the trial Aug.16,1979 but the fiscal informed the court that
it received a telegram stating that the complainant was sick. The
accused invoked their right to speedy trial. Respondent judge
dismissed the case because the trial was already dragging the
accused and that the priests telegram did not have a medical
certificate attached to it in order for the court to recognize the
complainants reason to be valid in order to reschedule again
another hearing. After 27 days the fiscal filed a motion to revive
the case and attached the medical certificate of the priest proving
the fact that the priest was indeed sick of influenza. On
Oct.24,1979, accused Esmea and Alba filed a motion to dismiss
the case on the ground of double jeopardy.
Issue:
Whether or Not the revival of grave coercion case, which was
dismissed earlier due to complainants failure to appear at the
trial, would place the accused in double jeopardy
Held:
Yes, revival of the case will put the accused in double jeopardy for
the very reason that the case has been dismissed already without
the consent of the accused which would have an effect of an
acquittal on the case filed. The dismissal was due to
complainants incapability to present its evidence due to non
appearance of the witnesses and complainant himself which
would bar further prosecution of the defendant for the same
offense. For double jeopardy to exist these three requisites
should be present, that one, there is a valid complaint or
information filed second, that it is done before a court of
competent jurisdiction and third, that the accused has been
arraigned and has pleaded to the complaint or information. In the
case at bar, all three conditions were present, as the case filed
was grave coercion, filed in a court of competent jurisdiction as to
where the coercion took place and last the accused were
arraigned and has pleaded to the complaint or the information.
When these three conditions are present then the acquittal,
conviction of the accused, and the dismissal or termination of the
case without his express consent constitutes res judicata and is a
bar to another prosecution for the offense charged. In the case, it
was evidently shown that the accused invoked their right to a
speedy trial and asked for the trial of the case and not its
termination which would mean that respondents had no
expressed consent to the dismissal of the case which would make
the case filed res judicata and has been dismissed by the
competent court in order to protect the respondents as well for
their right to speedy trial which will be equivalent to acquittal of
the respondents which would be a bar to further prosecution.
PEOPLE VS. TAMPAL
[244 SCRA 202; G.R. NO. 102485; 22 MAY 1995]
Facts: Luis Tampal, Domingo Padumon, Arsenio Padumon, Samuel
Padumon, Pablito Suco, Dario Suco and Galvino Cadling were
charged of robbery with homicide and multiple serious physical
injuries in the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga with Hon.
Wilfredo Ochotorena as presiding judge. However, only private
respondents, Luis Tampal, Domingo Padumon, Arsenio Padumon,
and Samuel Padumon were arrested, while the others remained
at large.
The case was set for hearing on July 26, 1991, but Assistant
Provincial Prosecutor Wilfredo Guantero moved for
postponement due to his failure to contact the material
witnesses. The case was reset without any objection from the
defense counsel. The case was called on September 20, 1991 but
the prosecutor was not present. The respondent judge considered
the absence of the prosecutor as unjustified, and dismissed the
criminal case for failure to prosecute. The prosecution filed a
motion for reconsidereation, claiming that his absence was
because such date was a Muslim holiday and the office of the
Provincial prosecutor was closed on that day. The motion was
denied by respondent judge.
Issues:
(1) Whether or Not the postponement is a violation of the right of
the accused to a speedy disposition of their cases.
(2) Whether or Not the dismissal serves as a bar to reinstatement
of the case.
Held: In determining the right of an accused to speedy disposition
of their case, courts should do more than a mathematical
computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled
hearings of the case. What are violative of the right of the accused
to speedy trial are unjustified postponements which prolong trial
for an unreasonable length of time. In the facts above, there was
no showing that there was an unjust delay caused by the
prosecution, hence, the respondent judge should have given the
prosecution a fair opportunity to prosecute its case.
The private respondents cannot invoke their right against double
jeopardy. In several cases it was held that dismissal on the
grounds of failure to prosecute is equivalent to an acquittal that
would bar another prosecution for the same offense, but in this
case, this does not apply, considering that the rights of the
accused to a speedy trial was not violated by the State. Therefore,
the order of dismissal is annulled and the case is remanded to the
court of origin for further proceedings.
Melo v People
Petitioner Conrado Melo was charged in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, on December 27, 1949, with frustrated
homicide, for having allegedly inflicted upon Benjamin Obillo,. On
December 29, 1949, at eight o'clock in the morning, the accused
pleaded not guilty to the offense charged, and at 10:15 in the
evening of the same day Benjamin Obillo died from his wounds.
Evidence of death was available to the prosecution only on
January 3, 1950, and on the following day, January 4, 1950, an
amended information was filed charging the accused with
consummated homicide. The accused filed a motion to quash the
amended information alleging double jeopardy, motion that was
denied by the respondent court; hence, the instant petition for
prohibition to enjoin the respondent court from further
entertaining the amended information.
Issue: does it constitute double jeopardy?
Held
The protection of the Constitution inhibition is against a second
jeopardy for the same offense, the only exception being, as stated
in the same Constitution, that "if an act is punished by a law and
an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute
a bar to another prosecution for the same act."
General rule: construed to mean not only the second offense
charged is exactly the same as the one alleged in the first
information, but also that the two offenses are identical. Under
the Rules of Court, there is identity between two offenses not
only when the second offense is exactly the same as the first, but
also when the second offense is an attempt to commit the first or
a frustration thereof, or when it necessary includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the first
information. (Rule 113, sec. 9)
In this connection, an offense may be said to necessarily include
another when some of the essential ingredients of the former as
alleged in the information constitute the latter. And vice-versa, an
offense may be said to be necessarily included in another when all
the ingredients of the former constitute a part of the elements
constituting the latter (Rule 116, sec. 5.) In other words, on who
has been charged with an offense cannot be again charged with
the same or identical offense though the latter be lesser or
greater than the former.
HOWEVER, this rule of identity does not apply, when the second
offense was not in existence at the time of the first prosecution,
for the simple reason that in such case there is no possibility for
the accused, during the first prosecution, to be convicted for an
offense that was then inexistent. Thus, where the accused was
charged with physical injuries and after conviction the injured
person dies, the charge for homicide against the same accused
does not put him twice in jeopardy. This is the ruling laid down by
the Supreme Court of the United States in the Philippines case of
Diaz vs. U. S. "where after the first prosecution a new fact
supervenes for which the defendant is responsible, which changes
the character of the offense and, together with the fact existing at
the time, constitutes a new and distinct offense"
An offense may be said to necessarily include or to be necessarily
included in another offense, for the purpose of determining the
existence of double jeopardy, when both offenses were in
existence during the pendency of the first prosecution, for
otherwise, if the second offense was then inexistence, no
jeopardy could attach therefor during the first prosecution, and
consequently a subsequent charge for the same cannot constitute
second jeopardy.
Note: When a person who has already suffered his penalty for an
offense, is charged with a new and greater offense under the Diaz
doctrine, said penalty may be credited to him in case of conviction
for the second offense.
Petition denied.
People v. Adil April 22, 1977
Sec 21 Double Jeopardy
Doctrine: No double jeopardy as the deformity did not exist and
could not have been apprehended at the time the first
information was filed.
Doctrine of Supervening Event - the accused may be prosecuted
for another offense if a subsequent development changes the
character of the first indictment under which he may already been
charged or convicted.
Facts: Case No. 3335 was filed in the inferior court of Janiuay,
Iloilo the charge against Fama Jr. for slight physical injuries only,
because according to the certification of the attending physician,
the injuries suffered by the offended party Viajar, would require
medical attendance from 5 to 9 days only "baring complications."
Indeed, when the complaint was filed on April 15, 1975, only
three days had passed since the incident in which the injuries
were sustained took place, and there were yet no indications of a
graver injury or consequence to be suffered by said offended
party. Evidently, it was only later, after Case No. 3335 had already
been filed and the wound on the face of Viajar had already
healed, that the alleged deformity became apparent that led to
filing another case. The accused entered a plea of not guilty.
On June 8 1975, complainant Viajar again filed a second complaint
with the provincial Fiscal of Iloilo against Atty Alfredo Fama, Raul
Fama and Fama Jr. Same information was alleged in criminal case
5241. After preliminary investigation, fiscal filed the information
but now there is an added phrase barring complications but
leaving a permanent scar and deforming on the right face which
charge only Fama Jr of serious physical injury. Fama Jr, filed an
urgent motion to deter proceedings in Criminal case 5241 (second
case filed), claiming that he was already charged and pleaded not
guilty in criminal case 3335, and in such case he would be in
double jeopardy. Fiscal after filing the second case sought the
dismissal of the first case (criminal case 3335), but the court did
not act upon it. Instead, the case was set for hearing, and in view
of the postponements asked by the Fiscal in order to await the
resolution of the issue of double jeopardy in Case No. 5241. On its
decision, the court dismissed the case due to postponements.
Fama Jr. filed an addendum to his memorandum in Case No. 5241
inviting attention to the above dismissal order and reiterating his
theory of double jeopardy. On September 22, 1975, respondent
court issued the impugned order sustaining the contention of
double jeopardy and dismissing Case No. 5241. It was invoked by
respondent court that in the case of Silva, there was no question
that the extent of the damage to property and physical injuries
suffered by the offended parties therein were already existing and
known when the prior minor case was prosecuted.
Issue: Whether or not the filing of the second complaint
constitutes double jeopardy
HELD: No. There is no double jeopardy as the deformity did not
exist and could not have been apprehended at the time the first
information was filed.
As court held in People vs. Yorac "Stated differently, if
after the first prosecution 'a new fact supervenes' on which
defendant may be held liable, resulting in altering the character of
the crime and giving rise to a new and distinct offense, 'the
accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if indicted for the
new offense." In Melo vs. People, this rule of identity does not
apply, however, when the second offense was not in existence at
the time of the first prosecution, for the simple reason that in
such case there is no possibility for the accused during the first
prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that was then
inexistent. Thus, where the accused was charged with physical
injuries and after conviction the injured dies, the charge of
homicide against the same accused does not put him twice in
jeopardy." Also in People vs Buling, deformity may be considered
as a supervening fact. In People vs. Manolong, "No finding was
made in the first examination that the injuries had caused
deformity and the loss of the use of the right hand. As nothing
was mentioned in the first medical certificate about the deformity
and the loss of the use of the right hand, we presumed that such
fact was not apparent or could have been discernible at the time
the first examination was made. The course (not the length) of
the healing of an injury may not be determined before hand; it
can only be definitely known after the period of healing has
ended. That is the reason why the court considered that there
was a supervening fact occurring since the filing of the original
information."
In the view circumstances of this case, the plea of
double jeopardy of private respondent Fama Jr., cannot hold. It
was, therefore, a grave error correctible by certiorari for
respondent court to have dismissed Criminal Case No. 5241.
People vs. Relova
Sec. 21
FACTS: In this petition for certiorari and mandamus, People of the
Philippines seeks to set aside the orders of Respondent Judge
Hon. Relova quashing an information for theft filed against Mr.
Opulencia on the ground of double jeopardy and denying the
petitioners motion for reconsideration.
On Feb.1 1975, Batangas police together with personnel of
Batangas Electric Light System, equipped with a search warrant
issued by a city judge of Batangas to search and examine the
premises of the Opulencia Carpena Ice Plant owned by one
Manuel Opulencia. They discovered electric wiring devices have
been installed without authority from the city government and
architecturally concealed inside the walls of the building. Said
devices are designed purposely to lower or decrease the readings
of electric current consumption in the plants electric meter.
The case was dismissed on the ground of prescription for the
complaint was filed nine months prior to discovery when it should
be 2 months prior to discovery that the act being a light felony
and prescribed the right to file in court. On Nov 24, 1975, another
case was filed against Mr. Opulencia by the Assistant City Fiscal of
Batangas for a violation of a Batangas Ordinance regarding
unauthorized electrical installations with resulting damage and
prejudice to City of Batangas in the amount of P41,062.16.
Before arraignment, Opulencia filed a motion to quash on the
ground of double jeopardy. The Assistant fiscals claim is that it is
not double jeopardy because the first offense charged against the
accused was unauthorized installation of electrical devices
without the approval and necessary authority from the City
Government which was punishable by an ordinance, where in the
case was dismissed, as opposed to the second offense which is
theft of electricity which is punishable by the Revised Penal Code
making it a different crime charged against the 1st complaint
against Mr.Opulencia.

Issue: Whether or Not the accused Mr. Opulencia can invoke

double jeopardy as defense to the second offense charged against
him by the assistant fiscal of Batangas on the ground of theft of
electricity punishable by a statute against the Revised Penal Code.

Held: Yes, Mr. Opulencia can invoke double jeopardy as defense

for the second offense because as tediously explained in the case
of Yap vs Lutero, the bill of rights give two instances or kinds of
double jeopardy.

The first would be that No person shall be twice put in jeopardy

of punishment for the same offense and the second sentence
states that If an act is punishable by a law or an ordinance, the
conviction or acquittal shall bar to another prosecution for the
same act. In the case at bar,

it was very evident that the charges filed against Mr. Opulencia
will fall on the 2nd kind or definition of double jeopardy wherein
it contemplates double jeopardy of punishment for the same act.

It further explains that even if the offenses charged are not the
same, owing that the first charge constitutes a violation of an
ordinance and the second charge was a violation against the
revised penal code, the fact that the two charges sprung from one
and the same act of conviction or acquittal under either the law or
the ordinance shall bar a prosecution under the other thus making
it against the logic of double jeopardy.

The fact that Mr. Opulencia was acquitted on the first offense
should bar the 2nd complaint against him coming from the same
identity as that of the 1st offense charged against Mr.Opulencia.
The law here seeks to prevent harassment of an accused person
by multiple prosecutions for offenses which though different from
one another are nonetheless each constituted by a common set
or overlapping sets of technical elements.