1. Abenion v. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corp., G.R. Nos.
200749 & 208725, In the Report and Recommendation dated March 27, 2008, the IBP-CBD,
[February 6, 2017
2. Manuel Ubas Sr, petitioner vs. Wilson Chan, respondent
GR. NO. 215910, February 06, 2017
3. VIDAD R. MUNAR, BENNY O. TAGUBA, REYNALD S. LAMPITOC, ADELINA A.
FARNACIO, ANITA R. DOMINGO, LUZ T. DOMINGO, EVANGELINE G.
VINARAO, MOISES J. BARTOLOME, JR., ROSARIO R. RAMONES, MERCEDITA
G. PIMENTEL, MYRNA A. CAMANTE, LEONIDA A. RUMBAOA, NORMA U.
VILLANUEVA, ANTONIA M. TANGONAN, ASUNCION C. MARQUEZ, JULIETA B.
MADRID, ESTRELLA C. ARELLANO, LUDIVINA B. SALES, JEANY M.
FLORENTINO, and SHRI B. VISAYA, petitioners, vs. ATTY. ELMER T. BAUTISTA
and ATTY. WINSTON F. GARCIA, respondents.
A.C. No. 7424. February 8, 2017
FACTS:
The petitioners are public school teachers and members of the GSIS residing in
the provinces of Isabela and Ifugao.They alleged that the marketing representatives of
the GSIS and the San Lorenzo Ruiz Realty and Development Corporation (SLRRDC),
namely Ferdinand Patajo, Levy Gonzales and Martina Guerrero (Representatives), visited
a number of public schools in the provinces of Isabela and Ifugao, and enticed the
teachers to avail of SLRRDC's low-cost housing units in San Lorenzo Ruiz
Subdivision (the Subdivision) located at Marabulig I, Cauayan, Isabela
The petitioners claimed that they were induced to sign blank forms to
supposedly reserve housing units in the Subdivision and were not given the opportunity
to review its contents due to the Representatives' excuse of being in a hurry. The
Representatives, however, assured them that they will return with the filled-up forms for
the petitioners' inspection and final decision, and that more GSIS personnel would
meet them regarding the housing project and loan. The petitioners highly relied on the
said assurances by signing the blank forms in contemplation of a good future investment.
Apparently, none of the Representatives or any person from SLRRDC or GSIS
returned as promised for the supposed further orientation and explanation on the housing
project and loan.
Petititioner found out that that there is deduction on the salaryf for the amount
of 5000 and they get only 1000 take home a month. They alleged that the signiture was
forge.
Elvira Agcaoili of the GSIS Main Office visited GSIS invited the petitioner for
forum and convinced them to go on with the housing loan on the premise that the GSIS
was after their welfare but to no avail. She agreed to stop the salary deductions against
the monthly pay of the petitioners by cancelling the Deeds of Conditional Sale (DCS).
She, however, told them that it would take six months to do so. It was only in or about
August 2003 that the Notices of Cancellation were mostly sent to them by the GSIS.
In 2004, the petitioners received notices from the GSIS that they still remain
liable to pay for the accrued interests of the principal amount of the h
On January 19, 2004, Atty. Bautista issued a Memorandum regarding the right of
GSIS to retain ownership of the subject housing units and to collect the purchase price
thereof through monthly salary deduction against the petitioners. Atty Garcia GeneraL
Manager enforce and implement the same.
Petitioner then filed for Disbarment complaint against the respondents.
through Commissioner Hababag, found no merit in the complaint because the disbarment
suit constitutes an unwarranted and improper collateral attack against the validity of
Board Resolution No. 48 which the GSIS-BOT adopted pursuant to its mandate; that such
collateral attack against an official act of the GSIS-BOT infringes public interest and
militates against the legal presumption on the regularity of performance of an official
duty; and, that the petitioners failed to avail of the remedy of a petition in assailing the
resolution's validity before the GSIS-BOT as set forth in Sections 30 and 31 of R.A. No.
8921. Thus, the dismissal of the complaint was recommended.
IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report of Commissioner
Hababag a
nd hereby d
ismissed the complaint.
Issue: Whether or not the proper remedy of the petitioner is to file a disbarment complaint.
HELD:
The findings and recommendation of the IBP are well-taken.
The petitioners clarify that the instant administrative case is directed against the
fitness of the respondents as members of the legal profession and not against the validity
of Board Resolution No. 48.
A careful perusal of the allegations in the complaint would show that the issue
hinges on the validity of Board Resolution No. 48 which allowed GSIS to collect arrears for
the cancelled housing loans. As aptly found by the IBP Board of Governors, the
controversy should have been resolved in accordance with the GSIS Law as set forth in
Sections 30 and 31 of R.A. No. 8291 which confers original and exclusive jurisdiction on
the GSIS on matters arising therefrom such as in the instant case. The Court quotes the
IBP-CBD Report and Recommendation, to wit:
The disbarment suit is a[n] unwarranted and improper collateral attack against
the validity of a Board Resolution duly adopted by the GSIS[-BOT] in accordance with its
mandate. The complaint assails the validity of Board Resolution No. 48.
A collateral attack against the official act of a duly mandated body such as the
GSIS[-BOT], will undermine public interest and will militate against the legal presumption
that an official duty has been regularly performed
[R.A. No.] 8291 or the GSIS Act of 1997 provides a remedy for [the petitioners].
Herein [petitioners]/borrowers should have filed a petition before the GSIS[-BOT] to
question the validity of Board Resolution No. 48.
It is well-settled that protection is afforded to members of the Bar who are at
times maliciously charged, not just by their clients. Regrettably, the failure of the
petitioners to discharge the burden that the acts of the respondents-lawyers violated
Canons 1 and 5, Rules 1.01 and 1.02 of the CPR and the Attorney's Oath warrants the
dismissal of the instant petition.
Nonetheless, they still remain liable to pay the arrears indicated in their GSIS
records not only for failing to discharge the burden of proving their allegations in the
complaint but also for resorting to a wrong remedy.
ousing loan.
Petition is Dismissed.
4. DASMARIAS T. ARCAINA and MAGNANI T. BANTA, petitioners, vs. NOEMI
L. INGRAM, represented by MA. NENETTE L. ARCHINUE, respondent.
G.R. No. 196444. February 15, 2017
FACTS:
 Arcaina is the owner of Lot No. 3230 (property) located at Salvacion, Sto.
Domingo, Albay. Sometime in 2004, her attorney-in-fact, Banta, entered into a contract
with Ingram for the sale of the property. Banta showed Ingram and the latter's
attorney-in-fact, respondent Ma. Nenette L. Archinue (Archinue), the metes and bounds of
the property and represented that Lot No. 3230 has an area of more or less 6,200 square
meters (sq. m.) per the tax declaration covering it. The contract price was P1,860,000.00,
with Ingram making installment payments for the property from May 5, 2004 to February
10, 2005 totaling P1,715,000.00. Banta and Ingram thereafter executed a Memorandum of
Agreement acknowledging the previous payments and that Ingram still had an obligation to
pay the remaining balance in the amount of P145,000.00. They also separately executed
deeds of absolute sale over the property in Ingram's favor. 1542 of the Civil Code governs the sale, viz.:
Subsequently, Ingram caused the property to be surveyed and discovered that Lot
No. 3230 has an area of 12,000 sq. m. Upon learning of the actual area of the property,
Banta allegedly insisted that the difference of 5,800 sq. m. remains unsold. shall be no increase or decrease of the price, although there be a
This was opposed by Ingram who claims that she owns the whole lot by virtue of
the sale. Thus, Archinue, on behalf of Ingram, instituted the recovery case, docketed as
Civil Case No. S-241, against petitioners before the MCTC.
After Ingram presented her evidence, petitioners filed a demurrer on the grounds
that (1) Ingram failed to sufficiently establish her claim and (2) her claim lacks basis in fact
and in law.
MCTC granted petitioner's' demurrer and counterclaim against Ingram, thus it
Dismissed the case for insufficiency of the evidence and order Ingram to pay 145,000 for
the balance.
Further, Archinue stated that she was made aware before their ocular visit to the
property that the lot being sold is only 6,200 sq. m. based on the tax declaration covering
it,
Art. 1540. If, in the case of the preceding article, there is a
greater area or number in the immovable than that stated in the
contract, the vendee may accept the area included in the contract and
reject the rest. If he accepts the whole area, he must pay for the same
at the contract rate.
Accordingly, since Ingram failed to show that she paid for the value of the excess
land area, the MCTC held that she cannot claim ownership and possession of the whole
property.
RTC reversed and set aside the decision of MCTC. property for sale and when Ingram accepted the offer, the object of their consent or
Hence, the RTC concluded that the area of Lot No. 3230 as shown by the
boundaries indicated in the deeds of sale is only 6,200 sq. m. more or less. Having
sold Lot No. 3230 to Ingram, Arcaina must vacate it.
The CA also agreed with the RTC that the sale was made for a lump sum and not
on a per-square-meter basis. The parties merely agreed on the purchase price of
P1,860,000.00 for the 6,200 sq. m. lot, with the deed of sale providing for the specific
boundaries of the property. Citing Rudolf Lietz, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the CA explained
that in case of conflict between the area and the boundaries of a land subject of the sale,
the vendor is obliged to deliver to the vendee everything within the boundaries. This is in
consonance with Article 1542 of the Civil Code
ISSUE:
Whether the sale was made on a lump sum or per-square-meter basis. the Spouses Ingram.
HELD:
We now resolve the main issue in this case and hold that Lot No. 3230 was sold
for a lump sum. In sales involving real estate, the parties may choose between two types
of pricing agreement: a unit price contract wherein the purchase price is determined by
way of reference to a stated rate per unit area (e.g., P1,000.00 per sq. m.) or a lump
sum contract which states a full purchase price for an immovable the area of which may
be declared based on an estimate or where both the area and boundaries are stated
(e.g., P1 million for 1,000 sq. m., etc.). Here, the Deed of Sale executed by Banta on
March 21, 2005 and the Deed of Sale executed by Arcaina on April 13, 2005 both show
that the property was conveyed to Ingram at the predetermined price of P1,860,000.00.
There was no indication that it was bought on a per-square-meter basis. Thus, Article
Art. 1542. In the sale of real estate, made for a lump sum and
not at the rate of a certain sum for a unit of measure or number, there
greater or less area or number than that stated in the contract.
The same rule shall be applied when two or more immovables
are sold for a single price; but if, besides mentioning the boundaries,
which is indispensable in every conveyance of real estate, its area or
number should be designated in the contract, the vendor shall be bound
to deliver all that is included within said boundaries, even when it
exceeds the area or number specified in the contract; and, should he
not be able to do so, he shall suffer a reduction in the price, in
proportion to what is lacking in the area or number, unless the contract
is rescinded because the vendee does not accede to the failure to
deliver what has been stipulated.
In the case in falls under the exception of 1542.
In Asiain v. Jalandoni, we explained that "[a] vendee of a land when it is sold in
gross or with the description 'more or less' does not thereby ipso facto take all risk of
quantity in the land. The use of 'more or less' or similar words in designating quantity
covers only a reasonable excess or deficiency." Therefore, we rule that Ingram is entitled
only to 6,200 sq. m. of the property. An area of 5,800 sq. m. more than the area
intended to be sold is not a reasonable excess that can be deemed included in the sale.
Further, at the time of the sale, Ingram and petitioners did not have knowledge
of the actual area of the land within the boundaries of the property. It is undisputed that
before the survey, the parties relied on the tax declaration covering the lot, which merely
stated that it measures more or less 6,200 sq. m. Thus, when petitioners offered the
meeting of the minds is only a 6,200 sq. m. property. The deeds of sale merely put into
writing what was agreed upon by the parties. In this regard, we quote with approval the
ruling of the MCTC:
In this case, the Deed of Absolute Sale (Exhibit "M") dated
April 13, 2005 is clear and unequivocal as to the area sold being up to
only 6,200 square meters. The agreement of the parties were clear and
unambiguous, hence, the inconsistent and impossible testimonies of
N[e]nette [Archinue] and the Spouses Ingram. No amount of extrinsic
aids are required and no further extraneous sources are necessary in
order to ascertain the parties' intent, determinable as it is, from the
document itself. The court is thus convinced that the deed expresses
truly the parties' intent as against the oral testimonies of Nenette, and
 The contract of sale is the law between Ingram and petitioners; it must be
complied with in good faith. Petitioners have already performed their obligation by
delivering the 6,200 sq. m. property. Since Ingram has yet to fulfill her end of the
bargain, she must pay petitioners the remaining balance of the contract price amounting
to P145,000.00.
Supreme Court granted the petitiona and set a side and reverse the decision of
RTC and CA and Reinstated the decision of MCTC.
5. SPOUSES AMADO O. IBAEZ and ESTHER R. IBAEZ, petitioners, vs. JAMES
HARPER as Representative of the Heirs of FRANCISCO MUOZ, SR., the
REGISTER OF DEEDS OF MANILA and the SHERIFF OF MANILA, respondents.
6. SPOUSES ROMEO PAJARES and IDA T.
PAJARES, petitioners, vs. REMARKABLE LAUNDRY AND DRY CLEANING,
represented by ARCHEMEDES G. SOLIS, respondent.
G.R. No. 212690. * February 20, 2017.
Breach of contract may give rise to an action for specific performance or
rescission of contract. It may also be the cause of action in a complaint for damages filed
pursuant to Art. 1170 of the Civil Code. In the specific performance and rescission of
contract cases, the subject matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation, hence jurisdiction
belongs to the Regional Trial Court (RTC). In the case for damages, however, the court
that has jurisdiction depends upon the total amount of the damages claimed.
FACTS:
On September 3, 2012, Remarkable Laundry and Dry Cleaning (respondent) filed a
Complaint denominated as "Breach of Contract and Damages" against spouses Romeo and
Ida Pajares (petitioners) before the RTC of Cebu City. Respondent alleged that it entered
into a Remarkable Dealer Outlet Contract with petitioners whereby the latter, acting as a
dealer outlet, shall accept and receive items or materials for laundry which are then picked
up and processed by the former in its main plant or laundry outlet; that petitioners violated
Article IV (Standard Required Quota & Penalties) of said contract, which required them to
produce at least 200 kilos of laundry items each week, when, on April 30, 2012, they
ceased dealer outlet operations on account of lack of personnel; that respondent made
written demands upon petitioners for the payment of penalties imposed and provided for in
the contract, but the latter failed to pay; and, that petitioners' violation constitutes breach
of contract.
Respondent thus prayed for the total amount of 280,000 for damages but RTC
dismissed the case as lack of jurisdiction.
Under the provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 as amended by Republic Act No.
7691, the amount of demand or claim in the complaint for the Regional Trial Courts (RTCs) to
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction shall exceed P300,000.00; otherwise, the action shall
fall under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts.
Respondent filed its Motion for Reconsideration, arguing that the case is breach of
contract, or one whose subject is incapable of pecuniary estimation, jurisdiction thus falls with
the RTC. However, in an April 29, 2013 Order, the RTC held its ground.
CA rendered the assailed Decision setting aside the Order of the RTC and remanding
the case to the court a quofor further proceedings
In determining the jurisdiction of an action whose subject is incapable of pecuniary
estimation, the nature of the principal action or remedy sought must first be ascertained. If it filed w
is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money, the claim is considered capable of pecuniary correct in refusing to take cognizance of the case.
estimation and the jurisdiction of the court depends on the amount of the claim. But, where
the primary issue is something other than the right to recover a sum of money, where the
money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of the principal relief sought, such are
actions whose subjects are incapable of pecuniary estimation, hence cognizable by the RTCs.
A case for breach of contract [ sic] is a cause of action either
for specific performance or rescission of contracts. An action for
rescission of contract, as a counterpart of an action for specific
performance, is incapable of pecuniary estimation, and therefore falls
under the jurisdiction of the RTC.
ISSUE:
In a June 29, 2015 Resolution, this Court resolved to give due course to the
Petition, which claims that the CA erred in declaring that the RTC had jurisdiction over
respondent's Complaint which, although denominated as one for breach of contract, is
essentially one for simple payment of damages.
HELD
The Court grants the Petition. The RTC was correct in categorizing the civil case
as an action for damages seeking to recover an amount below its jurisdictional limit.
respondent actually intended to initiate an action for specific performance or an
action for rescission of contract. Specific performance is "[t]he remedy of requiring exact
performance of a contract in the specific form in which it was made, or according to the
precise terms agreed upon. [It is t]he actual accomplishment of a contract by a party
bound to fulfill it." Rescission of contract under Article 1191 of the Civil Code, on the
other hand, is a remedy available to the obligee when the obligor cannot comply with
what is incumbent upon him. It is predicated on a breach of faith by the other party who
violates the reciprocity between them. Rescission may also refer to a remedy granted by
law to the contracting parties and sometimes even to third persons in order to secure
reparation of damages caused them by a valid contract, by means of restoration of things
to their condition in which they were prior to the celebration of the contract.
An analysis of the factual and material allegations in the Complaint shows that
there is nothing therein which would support a conclusion that respondent's Complaint is
one for specific performance or rescission of contract.
Respondent, however, neither asked the RTC to compel petitioners to perform
such obligation as contemplated in said contract nor sought the rescission thereof. The
Complaint's body, heading, and relief are bereft of such allegation. In fact, neither phrase
appeared on or was used in the Complaint when, for purposes of clarity, respondent's
counsels, who are presumed to be learned in law, could and should have used any of
those phrases to indicate the proper designation of the Complaint.
A complaint primarily seeking to enforce the accessory obligation contained in the
penal clause is actually an action for damages capable of pecuniary estimation.But this
was not the primary intention of the repondents.
Concomitantly, what respondent primarily seeks in its Complaint is to recover
aforesaid liquidated damages (which it termed as "incidental and consequential
damages") premised on the alleged breach of contract committed by the petitioners when
they unilaterally ceased business operations.
Since the total amount of the damages claimed by the respondent in its Complaint
ith the RTC on September 3, 2012 amounted only to P280,000.00, said court was
Petittion is Granted.

7. FLORDALIZA LLANES GRANDE, petitioner, vs. PHILIPPINE NAUTICAL
TRAINING COLLEGE, respondent.
FACTS:
Respondent(PNTC) employed petitioner(Grande) as Instructor for medical
courses like Elementary First Aid and Medical Emergency and she became a Course
Director of the Safety Department and Course Director in Training Department in 2002. In
2007 Grande she resigned as she had to pursue graduate studies and carry on her plan to
immigrate to Canada. In 2009 was invited and again, employed by respondent as
Director for Research and Course Department.. In 2010 she given additional
additional post of Assistant Vice-President (VP) for Training Department. For the two
position she was holding, she received a Salary of 30,000 and 20,000 for allowances.
In 2011 several employees of respondents including the Petitioner were placed
under preventive suspension in view of the anomalies in the enlistment of students.
Petitioner was then invited in the meeting, the VP for Corporate Affairs,
Frederick Pios(Pios) and relayed the message from President Atty. Fabia the for her to
tender her resignation from the school in view of the discovery of anomalies in the
Registration Department that reportedly involved her. Pios assured petitioner of
absolution from the alleged anomalies if she would resign.
In the evening of the same date, petitioner, accompanied by counsel, filed a
police blotter for a complaint for unjust vexation against Pios. Which reads as follow:
The next day, March 2, 2011, petitioner accompanied by counsel, filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement with full backwages, money
claims, damages, and attorney's fees against respondent.
NLRC and Labor Arbiter held that Petitioner did not voluntarily resign but was
illegally dismissed by respondent thought finding the complainant's claim of forced
resignation established by substantial evidence. Concomitantly, her resignation is hereby
declared null and void, and by way of restoring the status quo, the respondent school is
ordered to reinstate her to her former or substantially equivalent position without loss of
seniority rights but without backwages. In case the complainant does not want to be
reinstated, she may, upon her option, accept, in lieu of reinstatement, a separation pay
amounting to P75,000.00 (her half month salary of P25,000.00 multiplied by three (3)
years of service), plus ten percent (10%) thereof as attorney's fees.
The CA affirmed the decison of NLRC but subsequently reversed uponn motion for
reconsideration by respondents.
Petitioner now seeks to annul and set aside the decision of Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
The Court of Appeals seriously erred in issuing CONFLICTING
DECISIONS composed by the same set of Division Members although
the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the private respondent did not
present new arguments and/or facts (rather merely reiterating the
arguments in the Petition for Certiorari) warranting a re-examination
and re-evaluation of its earlier Decision.
HELD:
Yes,
It is well settled that in labor cases, the factual findings of the NLRC are
accorded respect and even finality by this Court when they coincide with those of the LA
and are supported by substantial evidence. The confrontation on discrepancies was made
before petitioner "suddenly" tendered her resignation.
As observed by the NLRC, if petitioner was being investigated for an
administrative charge, why was she cleared from liabilities. The more logical thing to do is
to hold her clearance until all the liabilities have been settled. The logical answer is
respondent really wanted petitioner to go.
Resignation is the voluntary act of an employee who is in a situation where one
believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service,
and has no other choice but to dissociate from employment. Resignation is a formal
pronouncement or relinquishment of an office, and must be made with the intention of
relinquishing the office accompanied by the act of relinquishment. A resignation must be
unconditional and with the intent to operate as such.
The element of voluntariness in petitioner's resignation is, therefore, missing.
We concur with the findings of the NLRC that the acts of petitioner before and
after she tendered her resignation would show that undue force was exerted upon
petitioner: (1) the resignation letter of petitioner was terse and curt, giving the
impression that it was hurriedly and grudgingly written; (2) she was in the thick of
preparation for an upcoming visit and inspection from the Maritime Training Council; it
was also around that time that she had just requested for the acquisition of textbooks
and teaching aids, a fact which is incongruent with her sudden resignation from work; (3)
in the evening, she filed an incident report/police blotter before the Intramuros Police
Station; and (4) the following day she filed a complaint for illegal dismissal.
In termination cases, burden of proof rests upon the employer to show that the
dismissal is for a just and valid cause, and failure to do so would necessarily mean that
the dismissal was illegal.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is the presence of undue influence exerted on petitioner for
her to leave her employment?
HELD: Yes
The conversation showed that respondent wanted to terminate petitioner's
employment but would want it to appear that she voluntarily resigned. Undue influence is
defined under Article 1337 of the Civil Code, thus:
Art. 1337. There is undue influence when a person takes
improper advantage of his power over the will of another, depriving
the latter of a reasonable freedom of choice. The following
circumstances shall be considered: the confidential, family, spiritual,
and other relations between the parties, or the fact that the person
alleged to have been unduly influenced was suffering from mental
weakness, or was ignorant or in financial distress.
As correctly observed by the LA, petitioner's resignation immediately tendered
after the conversation is not voluntary. With an order coming from the President of PNTC,
no less, undue influence and pressure was exerted upon petitioner.
It must be noted that she was not among those preventively suspended in
February 2011, which include the Vice-President for Training, in view of the ongoing
investigation in the Registration Department. We, therefore, believe that petitioner felt
the undue pressure exerted on her to resign from employment despite her "exemplary
performance" and having served the school for years. We agree with petitioner that she
was then without "proper discernment" when she prepared the one-liner resignation
letter.
In the case at bar, petitioner's letter of resignation and the circumstances
antecedent and contemporaneous to the filing of the complaint for illegal dismissal are
substantial proof of petitioner's involuntary resignation.
We reiterate that it is axiomatic in labor law that the employer who interposes
the defense of voluntary resignation of the employee in an illegal dismissal case must
prove by clear, positive and convincing evidence that the resignation was voluntary; and
that the employer cannot rely on the weakness of the defense of the employee. The
requirement rests on the need to resolve any doubt in favor of the working man.
SC granted the petition and affirmed with modification the desicion of NLRC.